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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by D. Andre on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by D. Andre on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by D. Andre on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Moment of Silence for Accountability]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/a-moment-of-silence-for-accountability-e94b53494c06?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e94b53494c06</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[united-states]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medium]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gun-violence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Feb 2018 16:49:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-28T12:51:01.101Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CwBPjIkmC86i1UKBcPVQgg.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Paul Tong / Op Art (Paul Tong) 2009 ©</em></figcaption></figure><p>With this latest tragedy in Parkland, Florida comes the predictable chorus of voices. Politicians taking to the podium offering condolences and calls for change. Citizens taking to social media offering thoughts and prayers and opinions as they demand change. Pundits taking to the television offering narratives in an attempt to explain our pain away. Together, we pledge to do better. And then silence. A deafening and maddening silence for those left behind as we move on. As we shrug our shoulders, point our fingers, and bury our heads, the next shooter is carefully laying out their plans, buying guns, studying reactions, sitting and waiting. Silently we delude ourselves. Repeating like a mantra to ourselves: it won’t happen here <em>(this is a nice neighborhood)</em>, it won’t happen to my kids <em>(they’re in a great, safe school)</em>, it won’t happen again <em>(someone is going to fix it)</em>. But it will happen again. And it will happen near us. And our children may be next.</p><p>We failed the families from Parkland and Newtown and Las Vegas, Aurora and Sutherland Springs, Columbine, Virginia Tech, and more. Our words tell them we care, but our lack of action shows them we do not. <em>We look out the window for solutions when we should be looking in the mirror.</em> How quickly we go back to our lives of leisurely worrying. Devoting our time to wondering and debating about what age kids should have cell phones and social media accounts or whether a ten-year-old can walk to the park alone. We pass around <em>GoFundMe</em> pages and <em>Change.org</em> petitions as if they are tic-tacs and we update our social media profiles to signify approval or support of a cause. But when it comes to solving the issue of our time — silence. It’s been almost two decades since Columbine and our handling of the issue has signaled the death of accountability.</p><p><strong>It’s time to become personally accountable</strong></p><p>If you believe our own rhetoric — that politicians only care about re-election — then make gun violence <strong><em>the</em></strong> <strong><em>issue</em></strong> at the next ballot box and every one thereafter until we fix the problem.<em> </em>If you believe gun lobbyists and dollars are preventing action — then make <strong><em>inaction</em></strong> more costly. If you believe the second amendment is sacrosanct, then look again because <strong><em>every right has limitations</em></strong>. Stop falling for arguments where guns are presented as morally neutral objects akin to cars and spoons — only made dangerous by human intentions. Stop pretending it is a partisan issue. <em>And stop looking elsewhere for accountability — become accountable. </em>Educate yourself on the issues surrounding gun violence — second amendment rights, mental health issues, and take a stand.</p><p>Be accountable; hold others accountable. Translate your social media protestations into something tangible — you took the time to write it, now act upon it. Turn your private thoughts of fear and sorrow into action — your thoughts are powerful and relevant when spoken aloud. Be brave. Encourage others to be brave. The problem is not too big to solve, and it’s not someone else’s responsibility. Stop asking politicians <em>when will this end</em> and tell them <em>it ends today</em>.</p><p><strong>We are a country capable of change</strong></p><p>The problem of gun violence is large and pervasive. It will take time and effort to remedy — commodities that seem to be in short supply these days. However, if the #Metoo movement proves anything, it is that, we as a nation, are capable of having a sustained conversation and harnessing our energies to demand change. Where is this indignation for gun violence? Mass shootings have cut across every artificial cultural line America has, affecting every walk of life — red states and blue states, rich and poor, gay and straight, black, white, Hispanic, and Asian. It has turned church pews, concert grounds, and school hallways into scenes reminiscent of war zones. Creating untold numbers of invisible victims along the way: those relatives and friends who grapple with loss, but also, survivors guilt; the first responders who struggle with the grotesque images thrust upon them; the teaching staff and administrators that second guess their actions; and the community that is never quite the same again. Despite this, we remain stubbornly complacent.</p><p>We all have a responsibility to support the school administrators, teachers, sheriffs, and citizens across the country that every day are making laudable efforts to make our schools and publics spaces safer. All the video cameras, security guards, and crisis action plans in the world won’t end gun violence alone. We need to have a sustained conversation that addresses all the uncomfortable and inconvenient realities that surround the issue of gun violence. The solution — and there is a solution — must come from the people. <em>It’s time to hold ourselves accountable, for the greatest impediments to change are apathy and diffidence. </em>Politicians will continue to fail as long as we allow failure as an option.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e94b53494c06" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The False Promise of Territorial Autonomy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/the-false-promise-of-territorial-autonomy-4131bcf620b6?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4131bcf620b6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 Dec 2017 00:43:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-13T00:43:05.251Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-AThfXWt_a5VgJexRY8jPw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Demonstrations for Szelker Autonomy in Transylvania, Romania © <a href="https://dailynewshungary.com/hundreds-demonstrate-across-transylvania-szekler-autonomy/">Daily News Hungary</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>“It is not what is, but what people perceive as is that has behavioral consequences.” — Walker Conner</em></p><p>One of the enduring issues of the modern state is how it deals with its inevitable ethnic minority populations. Recent <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/10/13/557367279/in-spain-confusion-and-uncertainty-about-catalonias-future">issues</a> between the Spanish government and the semi-autonomous Catalan government highlight the volatility and precariousness of this relationship. While the Catalan issue is currently dominating the press at the moment, it is just one of many ethnonational conflicts across Europe and throughout the world. It seems no corner of the globe is immune to this issue, from Catalan, <a href="https://www.rt.com/politics/409049-crimean-lawmakers-support-cancelling-soviet/">Crimea</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sz%C3%A9kelys">Szelker</a> to <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/071120175">Kurdistan</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanao">Mindanao</a>, and <a href="https://freetibet.org/about/legal-status-tibet">Tibet</a>, minority populations are reinvigorating the question of how to accommodate the diverse populations that exist within the modern state. On common solution to appease minority population’s desire for self-rule is territorial autonomy. However, despite the promise of territorial autonomy as a viable solution to resolving ethnonational conflicts, it actually winds up acting as an obstacle.</p><p>Ethnonational conflicts are typically long-standing and potentially bloody struggles that exhaust parent state resources and fracture ethnic nationalist’s power. One popular way states try to solve these conflicts is through granting territorial autonomy to a region. Territorial autonomy — a solution where non-state nationalists receive certain rights and freedoms in lieu of abandoning their pursuit of independence — endeavors to end the zero-sum nature of armed conflict by keeping the territorial integrity of the state while simultaneously recognizing the right to ethnic claims of self-determination. Although there are benefits derived from granting autonomy as it de-militarizes the conflict and keeps the territorial integrity of the state, there are downsides that act as an obstacle to resolving ethnonational conflict.</p><p><strong><em>Though philosophically promising, there are limitations to territorial autonomy.</em></strong></p><p>Autonomy fails to address the root causes of the conflict; it potentially strengthens secessionist claims by creating spoilers and providing access to legitimate political authority; and it lacks definition and is often characterized by the desires and capabilities of the parent state, as much as it is by the demands of the ethnic nationalists. Autonomy is usually only considered an alternative when prolonged military action fails to produce a definitive result. Exhausted parties that are naturally distrustful of one another enter into autonomous agreements that do more to diffuse a situation than actually solve a problem. Certainly, the self-administration that accompanies autonomy leaves some ethnic nationalists feeling victorious and the parent state relieved of the burden of a protracted and costly conflict.</p><p>However, too often government concessions in the form of autonomy arrangements come too late in the conflict after years of repression, rhetoric, and atrocities. This makes constructive dialogue about the root causes of the conflict very unlikely, which impedes resolution of the conflict. Even when the parties do engage in dialogue there is often a lack of clear authority within the non-state entity because a unified opposition rarely exists after years of conflict. Different factions may play the spoiler in an autonomy arrangement, seeing any arrangement as undermining their power or disagreeing with the negotiated terms wholesale. This may lead these spoilers to renew secessionist claims or convince the new rulers of the autonomous state to use their new access to the political process to do so.</p><p>Lastly, many autonomy arrangements framework allow the incompatible identities that existed as the basis for the conflict to remain, alongside the ethnic politics and social relationships that led to the grievances. For example, autonomous arrangements do not necessarily involve proper resource allocations or a stake in the central government’s political process. As Henry Hale mentions, the core ethnic group may have enough control of the central government that they prevent any policies that they perceive as favoring the ethnic minority of the autonomous region. In short, the people who disliked one another to the extent that they entered into an armed conflict still live together. Since autonomy agreements often fail to include inter-ethnic mechanisms for cooperation, they fail to resolve the conflict.</p><p><strong><em>Without conflict resolution, territorial autonomy becomes an obstacle to resolving ethnonational conflicts.</em></strong></p><p>So, while conflict is not a desirable condition for a state and any means to bring it to an end has its merits, granting territorial autonomy, with all its limitations, oftentimes acts as an obstacle to definitively ending ethnonational conflicts. Considering the violence and rhetoric that likely precedes autonomy agreements, contentious dialogue after the settlement is likely and will do little to force either side to pursue long lasting solutions to the root causes of the conflict. Moreover, territorial autonomy lacks formal definition, allowing claims of false implementation by ethnic nationalists and manipulation by the parent state. This lack of conflict resolution, the potential for renewed secessionist claims, and the prospect of increased violence make territorial autonomy an obstacle to resolving ethnonational conflicts.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4131bcf620b6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Boko Haram and the Importance of Developing a Counternarrative]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/lessons-from-the-jihad-70b37c5d3439?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/70b37c5d3439</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[boko-haram]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2017 04:22:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-10T22:08:48.000Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YuOQZZPvjzFIxNsBTI71PQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Boko Haram in undated photo.</figcaption></figure><p>Boko Haram, a Salafi-Jihadist group based in the Northeast of Nigeria, has waged a seemingly insurmountable insurgency since the mid-2000s to overthrow the secular government of Nigeria and impose Sharia law throughout the country. Drawing direct ideological inspiration from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), their terrorist campaign is responsible for thousands of deaths and innumerable casualties since renewing in 2009. While terrorism and violent extremism are nothing new in Northwest Africa, the continued existence of Boko Haram offers some valuable lessons for counter-terrorism operations. Boko Haram illustrates the importance of understanding a group&#39;s philosophy and the difficulty of fighting an ideology without developing a counter-narrative.</p><p>Known locally as <em>Jama’atul Ahlul Sunna wa Liddawati wal Jihad</em>, as a Salafi-Jihadist group Boko Haram believes that “non-believers” should not rule Muslims and seeks to impose Sharia law on the entire country. Therefore, in addition to the sheer number and volatility of terrorist incidents, Boko Haram’s attacks have been brutal and often directly target civilians — Muslim and Christian alike. As a Salafi-Jihadist group Boko Haram’s ethical framework traces back to the preaching of the first four caliphates and a fundamentalist reading of the Qur’an. As fundamentalists they take the words from these seventh century caliphates and the Qur’an literally, believing that no man-made law should rise above God’s law and that Muslims have a duty to rebel against governments that attempt to implement man-made law.</p><p><em>This adherence to the fundamentals underpins Boko Haram’s activities and separates them from the larger Islamic community and differentiates them from other forms of Sunni Islam that participate in the political process by establishing Islamic republics.</em> In addition to the first four caliphates and the fundamentalist reading of the Qur’an, the recent Western-led wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have offered practical opportunities for honing these ethical models. Taken together, the ideological and practical aspects of Salafi-Jihadism have combined into a strategic outlook that Boko Haram uses to justify violence against Muslims, Christians, and any other group they deem as apostates. Furthermore, the fervor and consistency with which they pursue these goals has impacted the ethical framework of those that seek to counter their violent ideology and stymied efforts to eradicate the group.</p><p><strong>We don’t negotiate with Secularists</strong></p><p>The secular strains that are associated with the majority of religions throughout the world are noticeably absent from Islam. <em>Boko Haram take this anti-secularism one step further, contending that the secular state causes corruption and inequality, which only Sharia Law can overcome.</em> This is why these groups are not merely against the Christian facets of these secular states, but also the proponents of Sufi Islam, the most widely practiced form of Islam in West Africa. Boko Haram’s strategy is not oblique; numerous videos and statements detail their objective of an Islamic State in Nigeria governed by Sharia law. In keeping with this goal, they have never attempted to negotiate any resolution with the government in Abuja.</p><p>The history of Salafi-Jihadists is grounded in the fight against foreign, secular, and non-Muslim occupiers. This struggle was well suited to transfer to Nigeria, where the government draws its design and empowerment from secular colonial systems. Furthermore, in an effort to control populations, these successive governments exploited fissures in ethnicity and religion to divide people and keep the indigenous populations weakened. These weak and ineffectual governments provide ample room for Salafi-Jihadist ideology to flourish and radicalize locally disenfranchised populations, providing Boko Haram with a seemingly inexhaustible pool of potential recruits and supporters. It is within this complex environment that Boko Haram’s ethical framework evolves and operates.</p><p><strong>Understanding Jihadi-Salafism: the five pillars</strong></p><p>To understand exactly what Jihadi-Salafism means, it is crucial to understand the terminology. The Salafi strain of Islam has some specific ideological aspects that separate it from other traditions within Sunni Islam and explain the distinct ethical basis of Salafi-Jihadist organizations. While all Salafists seek the establishment of a theocratic state based on Islamic law, there are notable differences in their tactics. These distinctions break Salafists into three distinctive yet overlapping categories: scripturalists, whose tactical approach relies on spiritual outreach, charity, and education; political-Salafists, who promote their goals through participation in the political system; and the Jihadi-Salafists, who wage a violent fight to promote their goals.The term <em>jihad</em>, perhaps one of the more misunderstood terms of our times, literally translates to English as “struggle,” and refers to several different aspects of Muslim though that ranges from the physical all they way to the spiritual. Together these terms — Salafi and Jihad — combine to describe the specific faction within the Salafi community that has recently dominated much of the international conversation about terrorism. Although Salafi-Jihadists are united to the larger Salafi community through their common religious beliefs, they are ideologically distinct from other factions within the community by a strictly fundamentalist reading of the Qur’an. In addition to the ethical impacts, these ideological distinctions often put them at odds with the larger Islamic community who disavow the violence associated with these groups.</p><p>The lineage of Boko Haram’s jihadist ideology traces back to the post-WWII timeframe and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that preached how western imperialism had caused a decline in Islam and that the restoration of the caliphate was necessary to correct the situation. The second major ideological influence comes from Salafism, a theological movement within Sunni Islam that is primarily concerned with purifying Islam by eradicating idolatry <em>(shirk)</em> and affirming monotheism <em>(tawhid).</em></p><p>The ideological roots of Salafism reach much further back than the jihadist ideology and center on five pillars. The first pillar of <em>tawhid </em>concerns the need for<em> </em>monotheism, while the second pillar <em>hakimiyat Allah, </em>or<em> </em>God’s sovereignty, means that people are incapable of determining right and wrong through human reasoning and must rely on God to do so. <em>Bida</em>, the third pillar, concerns a rejection of innovations to Islam and propose a fundamentalist jurisprudence, arising from the notion that the Quran, as the revelation from God is complete and requires no alterations. The fourth pillar, <em>takfir</em>, allows a Muslims to declare another Muslim as outside the faith, something Jihadi Salafists do to Muslims they perceive as having committed a transgression against Islam. This point is particularly relevant when understanding the contemporary movements in the Sahel because they provide a basis for de-legitimizing secular Muslim governments. Boko Haram’s current leader, Abubakar Shekau, specifically preached <em>takfiri</em> — excommunication — in an undated 2012 YouTube <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umkj50SUzck">video</a> argued that, “any Muslim who pledged allegiance to the Nigerian flag instead of Islamic symbols or associated with Christians was an infidel.” The last pillar is the notion that <em>jihad</em> is an obligation that all Muslims have to rebel against governments that are not ruling according to God’s law.</p><p><strong>The difficulty in challenging the system</strong></p><p>These five pillars provide the key to understanding the ethical tradition of Boko Haram and like-minded Salafi-Jihadist groups. Moreover, they explain the anti-Shi’ite elements found in Jihadi-Salafism as well the reasons for the persecution of fellow Muslims that participate in a democratic system. They provide the ideological foundation for the ethical framework that Boko Haram uses to justify their brutal tactics and explains why Jihadi-Salafism differs from other forms of political Islam. Understandably, Jihadi-Salafists maintain a complex and oftentimes adversarial relationship with the larger Islamic community as well as the national governments and international organizations that operate in the region. A similarly complex relationship exists between Boko Haram and the larger Islamic community in Nigeria. Concepts like <em>bida</em>, <em>takfir</em>, and <em>jihad</em> that all allow for intra-Muslim condemnation certainly provides Islamic leaders with reason enough to denounce these groups. Likewise, the violent tactics employed by Boko Haram undoubtedly troubles the average Muslim faithful in Nigeria.</p><p>In addition to this confrontation with the Islamic community, the perceived struggle against anything Western has put the group at odds with seemingly innocuous organizations and illustrates that the kidnapping of foreign aid workers is not merely a crime of opportunity, but a belief in the innate corruptness of any form of secular rule. While Boko Haram leverages the lack of formal education and the poverty endemic to Nigeria to fuel religious clashes with the government of Nigeria, they also appear to believe in their cause as evidence by their continued campaign of terror against the government despite a recent leadership change and increasing economic opportunities.</p><p>Despite the overwhelming violence perpetrated by Boko Haram over the past six years, many Muslims remain conflicted and remain reluctant to disavow other Muslims. To fully comprehend the complex dynamics behind this reluctance, it is necessary to characterize the insurgency as an existential problem, not merely a political or social problem. Salafi Jihadists draw from the same religious sources as other Muslims and Boko Haram adeptly exploits and employs religious rhetoric and symbols to advance their cause. According to<em> </em><strong><em>Assaf Moghadam</em></strong>, a Senior Research Fellow at the <em>Combating Terrorism Center </em>at West Point, this is the “reason that ordinary Muslims — not to speak of non-Muslims — find it particularly difficult and dangerous to challenge Salafi-jihadists without running the risk of being accused of targeting Islam as a whole.” This also explains how the crimes imputed to Boko Haram do not garner the level of local condemnation one would expect; however, this silence does not equate to affirmation by the larger Islamic community.</p><p>In addition to the complex ethical dynamic of Boko Haram’s relationship with the larger Islamic community, there are also the actions of the Nigerian government and western organizations that possess an ethical dimension that Boko Haram exploits. The government of <strong><em>Nigeria’s </em></strong><a href="http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483"><strong><em>heavy-handed tactics </em></strong></a>against Boko Haram has caused numerous deaths in their own right. <strong><em>Likewise, western governments and organizations that seemingly work with the corrupt Nigerian government provide ample justification for Boko Haram to wage their struggle against these entities. </em></strong>While the validity of these claims remains disputed throughout the international community and within Nigeria, the claims conveniently fit into Boko Haram’s narrative and any challenge by the resource starved local populace remains highly unlikely.</p><p><strong>The Importance of developing a counter-narrative</strong></p><p>Boko Haram’s continued campaign against successive governments in Nigeria, their targeting of the United Nations building and Western tourists, and their spectacularly violent attacks against Nigerian citizens of all ages and creeds all present a picture of an organization with little concern for the traditional notion of an ethical framework. However, the ideological influence of Salafist thought that dates back to the seventh century caliphates and the modernized ideology of the Jihadist vision that traces back to the mid-nineteenth century have combined to provide an ethical backdrop for Boko Haram. While some critics view the organization as little more than an opportunistic group of disenfranchised citizenry, the zeal with which they pursue their cause suggests otherwise. Their ethics have been consistent throughout their existence and offer some explanation to the continued rise of violence over the past few years.</p><p>With each successive attempt by the Nigerian government to eradicate Boko Haram there comes a renewed sense of duty on behalf of their members to counter the illegitimate secular government in Abuja. Understanding this ethical framework is critical for the development of a long-term strategy to counter their terrorism. When considering the influence that the Qur’an and the five pillars have had on Boko Haram’s ideological growth, it appears that the development of a counter-narrative will be a critical component of any successful strategy. Additionally, it becomes apparent that the military-dominated solutions will never realize full success as Boko Haram and their potential recruits believe that these solutions only prove the point that these illegitimate governments need to be replaced by an Islamic caliphate run by Sharia Law.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=70b37c5d3439" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Attending to the African Growth and Opportunity Act]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/assessing-the-african-growth-and-opportunity-act-4fe18b4320a0?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4fe18b4320a0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Aug 2017 09:27:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-09T09:34:11.862Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/698/1*ML_Hcf8vm8kBni7eOZW8_w.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>As the Trump administration continues to press the renegotiation of trade agreements around the globe, there is one critical agreement that has so far received little attention — the African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA. While ignorance and disinterest towards African economic issues is hardly novel, this lack of attention is curious because of the significant investment opportunity that AGOA presents US investors and the ability it affords the US government to hedge China’s growing influence in the region. After all, buoying the economy and countering Chinese economic influence are two of the defining economic aspects of the Trump presidency thus far. With a pending trip to Togo in the coming days, AGOA may soon get its due attention. Hopefully, that attention is positive as the below assessment illustrates the importance of AGOA to the African continent.</em></p><p>Commodity dependence, limited manufacturing infrastructure, and lack of access to global markets are just a few factors that explain why a preponderance of the world’s least developed countries are located within Sub-Saharan Africa. The post-colonial era saw little long-term economic change in these nations, many of which remain economically underdeveloped decades after independence. One way the United States has been successful in remedying this economic stagnation is through AGOA, which has increased trade with a number of Sub-Saharan African countries since its implementation.<strong><em> </em></strong>The primary focus of AGOA is to<strong><em> </em></strong>integrate these countries into the global economy, encourage U.S.-African partnerships rather than dependency on aid donors, and decrease economic volatility through diversification and independence from commodity based exports. The notion that Sub-Saharan African economies that increase their exports are more attractive to foreign investors, allowing those economies to diversify — spurring economic growth — is the underpinning of the legislation. The bottom-up aspect of trade, in contrast to the typical top-down approach of aid, has not evenly benefited all Sub-Saharan African countries, nor has it been a universal solution for the economic ills of the countries it has benefited. However, data suggests that the legislation is achieving its goals: sustainable growth and diversification.</p><p><strong>Construct of AGOA</strong></p><p>In May 2000 Congress authorized AGOA with the intent of fostering export-led growth and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa and improving the economic relationship that the region has with the U.S.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> Government agencies that have roles in this effort include USAID, the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa (AUSTRA), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service (USFCS), and the Trade and Development Agency (TDA).<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> The AGOA legislation is defined as: “a non-reciprocal trade preference program that provides duty-free treatment to U.S. imports of certain products from eligible sub-Saharan African countries.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>” AGOAs framework has been adjusted on a number of occasions since 2000 to ensure that it continues to meet its objectives. To increase African exports, AGOA expanded the list of products Sub-Saharan African countries may export to the U.S. under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), expanding from 4,600 items to over 6,400 items.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> This expansion allows many Sub-Saharan African countries to sell locally produced products, that they maintain a comparative advantage in, to the U.S. duty-free and tariff free.</p><p>Since AGOA is trying to incorporate some of the world’s least developed countries into the global economy, in the belief that greater economic opportunities will translate to increased domestic stability and global integration, strict eligibility criteria were introduced with the program. To be eligible for AGOA preferences, countries must have or be making progress towards the following: “market-based economies; the rule of law and political pluralism; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; protection of intellectual property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of human rights and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labor practices.”<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> Embedded within the eligibility requirements is U.S. foreign policy goals like democratization and globalization. To ensure that these goals are met, the President reviews the list of countries receiving AGOA benefits every year; and countries not meeting the eligibility requirements are denied access to AGOA.</p><p>The products themselves are also subject to strict criteria, which have been adjusted in subsequent legislation. The most pressing issue was that of the textile and apparel market. Under the original legislation, textiles and apparels were listed as import sensitive products and not available for duty-free status. Consequently, the initial restrictions put on AGOA exports did not allow Sub-Saharan African countries to export articles that were not wholly developed and produced within their country. However, with the apparel provisions later added to AGOA legislation, Congress authorized certain countries to export third-party apparel items as long as those items met the requirements — namely that the raw materials came from the U.S. The textile and apparel preference program that was implemented enabled many Sub-Saharan African countries to capitalize on their labor force, purchasing fabrics from third-party countries and turning them into marketable products that they then exported to the U.S. This was particularly important for many of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa whose export economies are not primarily based on petroleum products.</p><p>Since many nations in Sub-Saharan Africa lack a knowledgeable business environment it was reasoned that they would be unable to take full advantage of the expanded trade opportunities that AGOA presented. As such, one of AGOAs mandates calls on the U.S. to support AGOA-eligible countries with technical assistance to develop their trade capacity.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> One approach that the U.S. implemented to help Sub-Saharan African countries build their trade capacity and take advantage of the benefits made available under AGOA is USAIDs African Global Competitiveness Initiative (AGCI). Announced in 2005, the AGCI is designed to assist Sub-Saharan African businesses in increasing their competitiveness and building their capacity so they can leverage the opportunities presented to them under AGOA.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> Under AGCI experts in trade policy provide technical assistance at USAID regional trade hubs for global competitiveness, which are located in Gaborone, Botswana; Accra, Ghana; Nairobi, Kenya; and Dakar, Senegal.</p><p><strong>Assessment</strong></p><p>To assess the overall effectiveness of AGOA one must look at the impacts that the legislation has had on the economic integration of Sub-Saharan Africa countries into the global economy; the level of development of U.S.-African partnerships, to include Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), that has been achieved; and the diversification, and subsequent stabilization, of Sub-Saharan African economies as they move away from a reliance on commodity exports. Since these objectives are predicated on increased exports to the U.S. from Sub-Saharan African nations, any study of their effectiveness must look at the net exports from Sub-Saharan African to the U.S. between 2000 and 2013. Additionally, an assessment must take into account external factors that significantly impact the success of the program. For example, the global economic downturn in 2009 can explain why a number of graphs show FDI steadily decreasing during the following years, but the slowly rebounding in 2012. Likewise, local infrastructure deficiencies within particular countries have impacted how many AGOA products the countries have been able to export.</p><p>Integration into the global economy significantly impacts a countries ability to diversify and leads to economic stability and foreign investment. Access to global markets gives countries the incentive to identify products that give it a competitive advantage in the global market. Likewise, regional integration helps less developed or geographically isolated countries overcome barriers to trade markets. In a report on Rwanda’s AGOA infrastructure<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a>, lack of a developed transportation network in the region was listed among the hurdles hindering many landlocked countries from maximizing the benefits from the AGOA. Encouraging regional cooperation and trade agreements can mitigate this, as evidenced by the East African Community’s (EAC) development of a regional AGOA work plan that is designed to help all the EAC member countries maximize the benefits of AGOA trade preferences.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> This is where the USAID regional trade hubs in Dakar, Accra, Nairobi, and Gaborone have been instrumental in developing intra-regional trade and increasing access to international markets. The U.S. experts on site assist local business owners in expanding their investment portfolios so they can understand and benefit from the opportunities that AGOA trade preferences provide to local business owners.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>Overcoming trade barriers through intra-regional cooperation increases access to the global marketplace and improves a country’s appearance to foreign investors who are more likely to invest in markets that appear stable and provide a high likelihood of investment return.</p><p>Sub-Saharan African countries, as they’ve become integrated into the global economy, have also seen an increase in FDI from the United States, Europe, and Asia. Historically, a majority of the FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa surrounded the resource and energy sectors of the economy. <a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> Data from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) suggests that this pattern is changing, noting that during the period from 2007–2012 FDI moved away from resource based projects and began to focus investments in the services and manufacturing. Between 2000 and 2012 natural resources constituted less than a third of Africa’s GDP growth, while service sector growth was becoming a significant contributor to GDP growth.<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> Some market observers have criticized the short-term authorizations of AGOA, claiming that they undermine FDI. They argue that AGOAs uncertain future makes long-term investment returns unpredictable, making foreign investors hesitant to finance in a market that is reliant on a program that may disappear. To develop and sustain economic growth, investment in the private sector is critical. This underscores the importance to extending benefits to AGOA beneficiaries past the September 2015 expiration.</p><p>While overall trade and integration have increased since AGOA, petroleum based products still account for the majority of exports and, subsequently, account for the largest portion of FDI. Not surprisingly, this is also where the loudest criticism of AGOA legislation is the persistent reliance on petroleum exports. According to the latest information from AGOA, oil exports from Nigeria, Angola, Chad and the Republic of Congo constitute the largest contribution towards AGOA-eligible trade,<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a> with apparel products amounting to about 2%.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a> According to critics, this reliance undermines one of the core objectives of AGOA — economic diversification. Countries that are too heavily reliant on a single commodity are subject to the volatility of the international markets. Additionally, reliance on petroleum products has historically not translated into benefits for people outside of the actual petroleum industry. So, while Nigeria benefits from oil exports, the economy is not diversifying and not encouraging new business opportunities. In contrast, a country like Rwanda that does not have oil deposits has diversified their economy and can now withstand the ups and downs of the international market. In response to this criticism, Rosa Whitaker the first U.S. Assistant Trade Representative for Africa has said “there’s no trade initiative that can change the paradigm that oil is the major export from Africa in 10 years.”<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> Therefore, while AGOA has fallen short of diversifying many of the economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, it has introduced ideas and encouraged diversification through its trade hubs and forums. Considering that it takes years, if not decades, to overhaul economies, the lack of diversification is not necessarily a failing of AGOA, rather it’s provides reason for its continuation. Many Sub-Saharan African business owners and investors from Europe and the U.S. are calling for AGOA to be turned into a permanent trade agreement to ensure the benefits remain.</p><p>Considering the strengths and weaknesses of AGOA legislation it becomes apparent that the program, while not addressing every issue that its architects had hoped for, overall has achieved much since its inception. AGOA products now account for 70 percent the value of U.S. imports from Sub-Saharan Africa<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a>. The latest data available from the Office of U.S. Trade Representative shows that U.S. AGOA imports for 2012 totaled $34.9 billion, a fourfold increase over 2001 and that non-oil imports — apparel and textiles, vehicles and parts, and fruits and nuts — were $4.8 billion in 2012, a threefold increase from 2001.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a> Therefore, while petroleum continues to dominate AGOA exports from Sub-Saharan Africa, data suggests that the reliance is decreasing and that other sectors are beginning to benefit. Similar data refutes the argument that AGOA preferences are only benefiting a small group of Sub-Saharan African countries. While Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa account for over 70 percent of AGOA imports, with Chad and Gabon providing another 10 percent, other countries — the Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Kenya, Mauritius, and Cameroon — are increasingly benefiting under AGOA.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a>A report commissioned by the U.S. International Trade Commission found that several Sub-Saharan African countries are developing regional integration through USAIDs trade hubs; export diversification; and developing value added products to implement into their national economic development plans.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> The report suggests that just because petroleum makes up a majority of the exports under AGOA, it does not necessarily follow that non-petroleum exporters have not benefited under AGOA. As evidence, the report goes on to cite Burundi, Ethiopia, and Zambia as examples of countries whose national export strategies are being designed to take advantage of opportunities made available through AGOA.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>A full assessment illustrates that the design and execution of AGOA is capable of reaching its objectives and the 2015 long-term renewal of the legislation solidified gains and encourage increased FDI. Therefore, while AGOA has not fully achieved the objectives of global integration and diversification, data suggests that it has helped non-traditional sectors grow and has the potential to decrease economic volatility. However, if independence from petroleum-based exports is to be truly achieved much work has to be done to ensure that the improvements in global integration and diversification are sustainable. Governments from AGOA-eligible countries must continue to work closely with businesses to identify and develop products that will give their country a comparative advantage in the global market. Additionally, these governments must create business environments that encourage export, so they can continue the diversification of their economies. Understanding that the burden to exploit AGOA preferences and develop a marketable product falls on beneficiary countries offers a counter argument to those who purport that AGOA has not properly assessed the needs of Sub-Saharan African countries; and, therefore, cannot achieve the goals that the legislation proposed. It remains to be seen whether the changes achieved so far will have a systemic change on the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Brock R. Williams, “African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization” (Congressional Research Report, Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1. <a href="https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43173.pdf">https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43173.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Vivian C. Jones, “U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act” (Congressional Research Report, Congressional Research Service, 2012), 1. <a href="http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf">http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Brock R. Williams, “African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization” (Congressional Research Report, Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1. <a href="https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43173.pdf">https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43173.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, <a href="http://trade.gov/agoa/legislation/index.asp">http://trade.gov/agoa/legislation/index.asp</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Vivian C. Jones, “U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act” (Congressional Research Report, Congressional Research Service, 2012), 19. <a href="http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf">http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Chemonics, Chemonics, International Inc., <a href="http://www.chemonics.com/OurWork/OurProjects/Pages/Competitiveness%20and%20Trade%20Expansion.aspx">http://www.chemonics.com/OurWork/OurProjects/Pages/Competitiveness%20and%20Trade%20Expansion.aspx</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> The New Times, The New Times Rwanda, <a href="http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15029&amp;a=55018">http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15029&amp;a=55018</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> U.S. Trade Hub East Africa, USAID, <a href="http://www.competeafrica.org/">http://www.competeafrica.org</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> U.S. Trade Hub Southern Africa, USAID, <a href="http://www.satradehub.org/index.php?option=com_moofaq&amp;view=category&amp;id=2&amp;Itemid=33">http://www.satradehub.org/index.php?option=com_moofaq&amp;view=category&amp;id=2&amp;Itemid=33</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> U.S. International Trade Commission, <em>AGOA: Trade and Investment Performance Overview</em> (Washington, DC: USITC, 2014), 27.</p><p><a href="http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4461.pdf">http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4461.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Ibid., 27.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA, <a href="http://agoa.info/data/trade.html">http://agoa.info/data/trade.html</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Vivian C. Jones, “U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act” (Congressional Research Report, Congressional Research Service, 2012), 24. <a href="http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf">http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> West Africa Trade Hub, USAID, <a href="http://www.watradehub.com/activities/tradewinds/aug10/agoa-phenomenal-success">http://www.watradehub.com/activities/tradewinds/aug10/agoa-phenomenal-success</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> U.S. International Trade Commission, <em>AGOA: Trade and Investment Performance Overview</em> (Washington, DC: USITC, 2014), 46.</p><p><a href="http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4461.pdf">http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4461.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, <a href="http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa">http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> U.S. International Trade Commission, <em>AGOA: Trade and Investment Performance Overview</em> (Washington, DC: USITC, 2014), 61, 54. <a href="http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4461.pdf">http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4461.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Ibid.,1.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4fe18b4320a0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Internal Migration and Conflict]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/internal-migration-and-group-conflict-422c1f214dfe?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/422c1f214dfe</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Jun 2017 13:53:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-11T04:33:47.585Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FhGl61lZI2SJtBntG1OEHg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Migrants crossing into Pakistan during Partition | <a href="http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153498">F E Chaudhry, White Star Photo Archives</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>“Discussing external migration issues is impossible without discussing internal migration issues.” — Jack Goldstone</em></p><p>While there has been much discussion surrounding international migration over the past few years, there has been less discussion on a related topic — internal migration. In particular, the relationship between internal migration and group conflict. Internal migration refers to people moving from one region to another, while remaining within their state borders. Group conflict can occur between numerous different types of groups — ethnic, religious, class, but is always underscored by an <em>us</em> against <em>them </em>mentality. Therefore, when internal migration introduces new groups into a region; it has the potential to cause conflict. Conversely, group conflict may cause internal migration as people flee a region to avoid conflict.</p><p>This correlation between internal migration and group conflict does not imply causation. It does not follow that where there is internal migration, there will be group conflict; nor does group conflict necessarily precede migration. Regardless of which comes first, the relationship between the two makes conflict resolution difficult, because it exacerbates and confuses the underlying issues of a conflict, making it exceedingly difficult to resolve.</p><p><strong>Comparing Apples &amp; Oranges: Immigrants, refugees, and internal migration</strong></p><p>Unlike immigrants or refugees, internal migrants have not crossed borders, or changed citizenry; they have a right to live in their country. This does not preclude the existence of primordial resentment, though, as ethnic enclaves are often present in multinational countries and ethno nationalist politics may be present.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> Where strong local identities prevail, internal migrants can be akin to foreigners in their own country, as is the case of the Madhesis in Nepal who, while admitting that some internal migration occurred, “take offence to being called outsiders and see themselves as people who have always lived in the region.”<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> However, since internal migration is usually the result of economic issues, war, or natural disaster, the migrants are motivated by what they feel is an existential threat. Although sometimes, internal migration can be the product of a government agenda, as was the case in Indonesia in twentieth century when populations were moved from the main islands of Java and Bali to the outer islands under the presumption of development.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> Increasing the difficulty of integration is the likelihood that many internal migrants often keep ties with their original communities, meaning that they may not fully integrate within the community, even if welcomed.</p><p>In addition to the primordial implications of internal migration, there are constructivist challenges as well. When groups feel they are not being properly cared for or represented by the state’s institutions it may result in conflict. Writing about the Karen in western Thailand, Mikael Gravers details the impact that internal migration had on the moral, social, and culture fabric of a culture. After internal migration intermingled the Thai and Karen, the Thai culture dominated. After a number of years, “schools came to the area, and a new Thai-speaking generation [of Karen] with a modernist view of the world came to see the flaws in their ancestors’ worldview and in their intimate cultural core, which many Thai consider primitive.”<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> In this case, the institutions of the state did not properly represent the Karen culture after internal migration brought them into schools with the dominant Thai culture. In addition to under representing cultures, the limited resources within a state can also lead to group conflict, the study of which was presented by Marie Besancon.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p>If internal migration causes stress on the local institutions, or challenges their methods, it may lead to conflict. Lastly, Unrestricted migration, has the potential to turn ethnic populations into minorities in their own land, this phenomenon often results in inter-communal violence. This is illustrated by the insurgency in the Tripura state of Northeast India that started as a reaction to the unrestricted migration of Hindu Bengali population from East Bengal to the state of Tripura.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p><strong>Group identities: Separate but unequal?</strong></p><p>While the reasons for internal migration vary, it seems apparent that the introduction of new people into a region, when coupled with religious and political differences or limited resources, can cause resentment and conflict. Since internal migration causes and is caused by group conflict, it has significant implication for the resolution of the conflict. Uyghurs in the Xinjiang province provide a good study for how the relationship between internal migration and group conflict impedes conflict resolution. The migration of Han Chinese into the autonomous province, which the Uyghurs see as an existential threat, has only exacerbated the conflict between Uyghurs and the government in Beijing.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> However, not everyone believes that primordial feelings represent an impediment to conflict resolution.</p><p>As Donald L. Horowitz writes, “The persistence of group identity, no matter how deeply felt, is not synonymous with antipathy, even well established antipathy, toward particular out groups.”<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> Using examples of European and Chinese immigration, Horowitz shows that conflicts fade over time through mechanisms of social and political integration, which suggests that the primordial challenge to internal migration appears to be temporal. This points to the idea that internal migration does not prevent group conflict resolution. Another result of internal migration that certainly has a negative effect on the prevention or resolution of conflict, is when the internal migration leads to segregation. In Myanmar, after violence caused internal migration, the Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya communities were essentially segregated, even including separate displacement camps.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a>This separation limits interaction, thereby decreasing the likelihood that either side will enter into agreements to end the conflict. In this case, separation prevents the fading of group resentments because the group’s position hardens through physical separation.</p><p><strong>Desired End States: Conflict prevention or conflict containment</strong></p><p>The correlation between internal migration and group conflict has a negative impact on conflict prevention and resolution. With new groups, comes new social, cultural, and political dynamics that challenge people’s idea of the state and stresses institutions and resources, which can lead to conflict. When conflict does arise, often times a group’s attitude hardens as they feel an existential threat to their culture. In other cases, groups maintain ties to other regions within the state, which causes mixed loyalties or external pressures, only serving to confuse the underlying issues that caused the conflict. Therefore, internal migration — sometimes a result of group conflict, other time the cause of group conflict — presents a significant impediment to conflict prevention or resolution. This suggests that international migration — despite its difficulties — may provide more sustainable solutions than internal migration. And if the desired end state is conflict prevention versus mere conflict containment this needs to be given serious consideration.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Jeffrey Z. Muller, “The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008.</p><p>[2] “Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region”<em> Crisis Group Asia Report </em>№136, July 9, 2007, 2.</p><p>[3] Colin MacAndrews, “Transmigration in Indonesia: Prospects and Problems”, 458–472.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Mikael Gravers, “ Waiting for a righteous ruler: The Karen Royal Imaginary in Thailand and Burma,” <em>Journal of Southeast Asia Studies. </em>Vol. 43; №02 (June 2012) 355.</p><p>[5] Marie L. Besancon, “Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides”, <em>Journal of Peace Research, </em>№42<em> (</em>2005) 393–415.</p><p>6 Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “Armed Conflicts and Movements for Autonomy in India’s Northeast”, 205.</p><p>[7] Gardner Bovingdon, <em>The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land</em> (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).</p><p>[8] David L. Horowitz, “From <em>The Primordialists</em>,” In <em>Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism</em>, ed. Daniele Conversi. (Routledge: New York) 77.</p><p>[9] “Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon”,<em> Crisis Group Asia Report </em>№238, 12 November 2012, 5.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=422c1f214dfe" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Politics of Managing Terror]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/nationalism-populism-and-the-management-of-terror-1c48253082e0?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1280/1*1eLePHR31ph8Sbj_bU9lQg.jpeg" width="1280"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">&#x201C;You see in times of crisis that extremist forces, populist forces, have a better ground to oversimplify things and to manipulate feelings&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/nationalism-populism-and-the-management-of-terror-1c48253082e0?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/nationalism-populism-and-the-management-of-terror-1c48253082e0?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1c48253082e0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fear]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2017 15:59:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-08T14:54:04.829Z</atom:updated>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Trumpkins & Snowflakes: The Art of Slang]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/from-snowflake-to-trumpkin-how-political-slang-is-killing-the-discourse-f8af76a663f5?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yl-nn2qQVLls2yQ4IDC68Q.jpeg" width="1024"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">&#x201C;Everything that irritates us about others can lead us to an understanding of ourselves.&#x201D; &#x2014; Carl Jung</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/from-snowflake-to-trumpkin-how-political-slang-is-killing-the-discourse-f8af76a663f5?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/from-snowflake-to-trumpkin-how-political-slang-is-killing-the-discourse-f8af76a663f5?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Apr 2017 14:01:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-28T12:51:58.352Z</atom:updated>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[State Capacity and the Persistence of Terrorism in Northwest Africa]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/state-capacity-and-the-persistence-of-terrorism-in-northwest-africa-ed8b0e830489?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ed8b0e830489</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Apr 2017 15:50:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-01T15:50:04.650Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Eo32Ichy8BWHxloqHyygNg.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, U.S. national security priorities were re-aligned with counterterrorism as the centerpiece. This realignment led to an unprecedented interest in Africa — specifically the Sahel region of Northwest Africa — because of the belief that terrorists would exploit the large ungoverned spaces, disenfranchised populations, and insular governments to establish training camps and recruitment centers. However, after more than a decade of steadily increasing counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Saharan region, the efficacy of the United States’ policies remains contestable. Terrorism has not abated, governments have not strengthened, and the citizenry enjoys little more human security than they did at the turn of the century. One of the primary explanations for this stasis is that state capacity throughout the Sahel remains underdeveloped, thereby preventing any sustainable change in the strategic environment of counterterrorism operations.</p><p><strong>Defining the problem</strong></p><p>The Sahel, as a geographic region, marks the transitional physical land between the Saharan desert to the north and the characteristically fertile lands to the south. Geopolitically, it represents a cultural divide between the north and the south and is home to an estimated 100 million people. Underpinning the geographic and geopolitical realities in the Sahel is a catena of developmental issues — resource scarcity, poor governance, poverty, disease, and inhospitable climates — that produce chronic insecurity. These geopolitical circumstances led to the establishment of a robust counterterrorism strategy in the Trans-Sahara region that incorporates diplomacy, development, and defense under one program known as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).<strong><em> </em></strong>As a collaborative effort between the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), TSCTP is a whole of government approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism. Despite these extraordinary efforts, the Sahel sub-region has witnessed a steady rise in the presence of Salafi-Jihadist organizations since 2003. Furthermore, the states in the region remain incapable of defending against these organizations without significant outside assistance.</p><p>Although each country presents a unique set of circumstances that offers some explanation to the persistence of terrorism, there are trends that point towards a systemic problem that transcends borders, affecting the entire region. Data shows that counterterrorism efforts have not militarized the Sahel. Similarly, data illustrates that domestic funding for social programs has not significantly decreased over the intervening years, demonstrating that the whole of government approach is more than a theoretical framework for U.S. counterterrorism policy. Additionally, despite some programmatic challenges and the global economic crisis of recent years, the U.S. counterterrorism initiatives remain appropriately funded.<strong> </strong>Despite these positive indicators, the influence of Salafi-Jihadism has risen steadily since 2001 and constitutes a significant threat to the region. While these trends illustrate the sometimes contradictory nature of political goals and security goals, they also illustrate that the improvement of state capacity continues to move at a sluggish pace across the region.</p><p><strong>Underdeveloped State Capacity</strong></p><p>Considering that U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Sahara developed from the conception that weak states provide an environment amenable to the growth of terrorism, understanding the limited capacity of the Sahel states is a key element in appreciating the strategic environment of the Trans-Sahara. Since Max Weber’s classic definition, the view of state capacity has expanded into a multidimensional concept that includes the state’s bureaucratic and administrative capacity to provide public goods; legal capacity in the form of border protection and the rule of law; infrastructural capacity to exercise control throughout the entirety of territory; and extractive capacity in the form of raising revenues.<a href="#_edn1">[i]</a> Bearing in mind that the United States attempts to work through and with these African partners to counter violent extremism and terrorism, the limited state capacity of these countries greatly affects the efficacy of counterterrorism initiatives. A review of state capacity in the region illustrates that the Sahel nations of the Trans-Sahara region remain weak and incapable of fulfilling many of the basic functions of a state.</p><p>Analysis of defense spending, social spending, unemployment rates, economic factors, and indices that measure human development and corruption establishes a comprehensive snapshot of the status of limited state capacity in the region.<a href="#_edn2">[ii]</a> There are a number of larger trends that appear throughout the data. First, a majority of TSCTP countries have seen slight increases in their social spending over the past decade.<a href="#_edn3">[iii]</a> However, these slight increases in social spending backslide when confronted with the persistently high rates of unemployment.<a href="#_edn4">[iv]</a> Second, there have been no significant changes in defense spending throughout the region, suggesting that one of the basic elements of state capacity remain underdeveloped.<a href="#_edn5">[v]</a> Third, and perhaps most problematic, is the decline that these countries registered in the areas of governance and freedom.<a href="#_edn6">[vi]</a> As the data shows, regional defense expenditures have not increased notably over the past fourteen years, nor has social spending decreased in any meaningful way. Limited economic freedom, widespread corruption, and poor governance still plague most countries — factors that contribute to an unstable society — and need to be addressed to avoid inequality and social grievances being exploited by violent extremism organizations and terrorists.<a href="#_edn7">[vii]</a> All these developmental challenges, when coupled with high levels of violence, prevent weak states from benefiting from assistance.</p><p>The limited state capacity that defines these states presents two distinct problems for counterterrorism efforts — one internal, one external. First, there is the inability of the states to combat violent extremism and terrorism. The inability of the state to exert control over its borders makes the region highly susceptible for transnational operations like smuggling, kidnapping, and human trafficking, which finance terrorist organizations. The limited presence of rule of law makes prosecution of terrorist activity improbable; severely curbing the effect that such punishments traditionally have on potential recruits and undermining the faith citizens have in jurisprudence. The limited extractive capacity of states to collect taxes puts limitations on social programs intended to improve the socio-economic situation and develop a counter-narrative to that of the violent extremists. Lastly, the political limitations associated with these weak states make the development of national agendas difficult, further limiting the ability of the federal governments to develop legitimacy in the eyes of all the citizenry. The second problem is the insular nature of many of these states. The inability or unwillingness to look past their own borders means they are often unable to absorb and benefit from all the available U.S. counterterrorism programs — to truly be partners. Additionally, it means they are unable to work effectively with neighbors and regional organizations. The nexus between state security, transnational criminal activity, and extremist financing demands regional collaboration, requiring these states to look past their own borders and develop more comprehensive national priorities. Taken together, these two limitations present a significant impediment to U.S. efforts to counter terrorism in the region.</p><p><strong>Exploiting the weakness</strong></p><p>Rather than a tactical response to powerful states, terrorism in the Sahel exploits the weak state. As a result, one cannot overstate the importance of strong states in countering terrorism. Studies confirm that a society’s access to resources vis-à-vis state institutions has a demonstrable impact on the severity of conflicts.<a href="#_edn8">[viii]</a> Terrorists and violent extremist organizations easily exploit weak or non-existing state capacity. In a 2012 <em>Foreign Policy</em> article on the ten causes for state failure, six of the ten are directly tied to weak institutions that are unable to provide public services: “lack of property rights; no law and order; a weak central government; political exploitation; forced labor; and bad public services.”<a href="#_edn9">[ix]</a> The impact these weak states have on U.S. counterterrorism efforts are manifold, as planners must work around the dearth of indigenous political, social, economic, and military infrastructure to produce infrastructure capable of sustaining operations and achieving the end-state.</p><p>The lessons from Mali, Nigeria, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso underscore the importance of a state’s capacity when addressing the Salafi-Jihadist threat. The foremost lesson is that the United States cannot overlook the capacity of the recipient state in the pursuit of counterterrorism objectives. Not only does it hamper the long-term goals of United States counterterrorism assistance, but it also plays directly into the narrative being offered by Salafi-Jihadist organizations. The situations in Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania, while unique and varied, all illustrate the link between state capacity and the effectiveness of counterterrorism initiatives. In Nigeria, the government of Goodluck Jonathan represented the neo-patrimonialism that defines post-colonial governments throughout the region. These patronage practices — coupled with challenging demographics — alienate large segments of the society, providing jihadists with a supply of recruits and challenging the developing counterterrorism capacity of the state.</p><p>Mali presents a different set of circumstances: the government in Bamako failed to capitalize on the significant funding that resulted from Mali’s status as a democratic star in the region. The developing counterterrorism capacity was not accompanied by socioeconomic or political reform, thereby limiting the states ability to counter the ideological spread of Salafi-Jihadism. These limitations, exacerbated by the stark geography that defines much of the country’s north, paved the way for the events that unfolded after the coup in 2012. Meanwhile Mauritania showed that an autocratic leader can be a significant advantage when countering terrorism because of the ability to marshal resources and direct political will toward a specific cause: in this case, developing a counterterrorism capacity. However, the case of Mauritania, where AQIM still operates from within, also illustrates the difficulty of long-term solutions and the need for regional collaboration. Throughout the cases, though, it is apparent that underdeveloped state capacity undermines counterterrorism initiatives.</p><p><strong>The bigger they are the harder they fail</strong></p><p>Despite steadily increasing funds, an increasingly expansive geographical footprint, and the creation of a combatant command, U.S. counterterrorism policies in the Sahel have not stopped the rise of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism. While suffering some setbacks, AQIM continues to operate with impunity and recent attacks in Burkina Faso and Liberia indicate a potential resurgence. Meanwhile, Boko Haram, MUJAO, Ansar al-Dine and others have come into existence and now represent significant regional threats as recent attacks by Boko Haram in Chad illustrate. Moreover, the states of the Sahel remain mired down by structural issues resulting from weak economies, poor governance, and social grievances. The situation that unfolded after the 2012 coup d’état in Mali illustrated the deep fissures that existed beneath the democratic façade of the state. Likewise, the persistent and increasingly violent upheaval in Nigeria illustrates how a large economy does not necessarily improve the underlying conditions that terrorism exploits. Considering that U.S. counterterrorism initiatives in the Trans-Sahara were designed to “enhance the indigenous capacities of governments” so they could “confront the challenge posed by terrorist organizations” these situations show that the programs have not been successful.<a href="#_edn10">[x]</a> This failure is not the result of ill-defined goals, the militarization of Africa partners, or a lack of strategic interest on behalf of the United States. The failure primarily results from the United States not having accounted for the limited capacity of the states within the Sahel.</p><p>The limited capacity of the recipient states to absorb and capitalize on the counterterrorism assistance hinders efforts and emboldens terrorist organizations. In the beginning stages of counterterrorism operations in the Trans-Sahara, the Sahel countries received counterterrorism assistance with little ability to effectively apply it and little regard to its long-term utility. Likewise, the United States lacked mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of the counterterrorism assistance. In addition, the recipient states did not necessarily subscribe to the whole of government approach that the United States promoted. However, in an effort to quickly align with the U.S.-led and western supported fight against global terrorism, a number of weak states in the Trans-Saharan region declared themselves as having a terror problem. The politically astute and shrewd African leaders quickly understood that there were political, economic, and material benefits to alignment. The pre-9/11 international environment was a unipolar world where the United States was the sole, undisputed superpower and many African politicians saw an opportunity to increase their political economy. Likewise, the United States was quick to accept and champion any professed allies in the emerging war against terrorism. In the rush to court one another, policy makers on both sides failed to account for the effects that limited state capacity would have on counterterrorism efforts.</p><p><strong>Salafi-Jihadism and the illegitimacy of the state</strong></p><p>Salafi-Jihadism has been particularly virulent in the region because its ideological foundations center on the corruption and illegitimacy of the secular state: a notion that spreads easily in areas where the state’s limited capacity makes it appear incapable or unwilling to serve the citizenry. Furthermore, these organizations operate in regions of the state largely outside the reach of the central government. Capitalizing on the limited reach of the state, these organizations exploit the resulting porous borders, presenting additional challenges for the state’s capacity. For these reasons, the Salafi-Jihadists operating in the Sahel may remain a challenge for the international community, regional organizations, and local leaders until the countries of the Sahel increase their capacity.</p><p>Considering the importance of state capacity in countering terrorism, it is likely that the states of the Sahel will struggle with Salafi-Jihadism for some time. The ability to develop a state’s capacity simply exceeds the scope and design of current U.S. initiatives in the region. Furthermore, developing state capacity relies heavily on the ability of the United States and its partners to realize the sometimes contradictory nature of security and politics. Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania provide examples of how counterterrorism goals in the Sahel do not always fall in line with political goals — a divergence that has implications for the development of a state’s capacity. In Nigeria, President Jonathan was roundly regarded as doing little to stop the rising violence of Boko Haram and the Nigerian Security Forces were routinely accused of committing human rights abuses. Both instances put the United States on cautious footing regarding the amount of counterterrorism assistance Nigeria would receive and which units would receive it. Likewise, in Mauritania, the political and humanitarian issues that plagued the Abdel-Aziz presidency called into question the wisdom of U.S. counterterrorism assistance. Conversely, the situation in Mali highlights how the achievement of political goals can gloss over security issues. Perhaps most alarming, these cases show how a government’s failure to develop the whole capacity of state can actually strengthen, and in some cases, enable terrorist ideologies to spread.</p><p><strong>In conclusion</strong></p><p>In the Sahel, Salafi-Jihadists have successfully exploited the limitations in state capacity and U.S. policies. As such, the United States’ counterterrorism initiatives need to evolve in step if they are going successfully counter these organizations. Any such evolution will require a reassessment of the approach that considers the weak state capacity prevalent throughout the region. This may require a re-balancing of funding to funnel more toward socioeconomic issues or the possibility of working through regional organizations like ECOWAS rather than directly with host governments. Additionally, it may require the United States to prioritize its security goals over its political goals, albeit temporarily. Considering the counterterrorism initiatives in the Trans-Sahara resemble initiatives elsewhere, the implications of policy changes are far reaching. However, in the challenging and dynamic environment of counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, no amount of U.S. aid — counterterrorism or otherwise — brought into the region will ever replace the need for local state capacity.</p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” In <em>Bringing the State Back In</em>, ed. by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 181; Robert I. Rotberg, <em>When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.</em>), 2; Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of State: Its Origins, Mechanism, and Results,” in <em>States in History</em>, ed. John A. Hall (New York, N.Y.: B. Blackwell, 1986), 113; Antonia Savoia and Kunal Sen, “Measurement and Evolution of State Capacity: Exploring a Lesser Known Aspect of Governance,”<em> Journal of Economic Surveys </em>29, №3 (July 2015): 441–458, doi: 10.1111/joes.120654.</p><p><a href="#_ednref2">[ii]</a> “Global Health Observatory Data Repository,” World Health Organization, August 10, 2014, <a href="http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country">http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref3">[iii]</a> The Human Capitol Report 2013,” World Economic Forum, May 12, 2013, <a href="http://reports.weforum.org/human-capital-index-2013/#section=part-2-%25e2%2580%2593-country-profiles">http://reports.weforum.org/human-capital-index-2013/#section=part-2-%25e2%2580%2593-country-profiles</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref4">[iv]</a> “Unemployment, Total,” World Bank, accessed January 22, 2016, <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS">http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref5">[v]</a> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988–2014, Accessed February 6, 2016. <a href="http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database">http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref6">[vi]</a> “Governance Indicators,” World Bank, accessed <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators">http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref7">[vii]</a> Terje Østebø, “Islamic Militancy in Africa.” <em>African Center for Strategic Studies</em>, no.23 (November 2012): 5. <a href="http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AfricaBriefFinal_23.pdf">http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AfricaBriefFinal_23.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref8">[viii]</a> Marie L. Besancon, “Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides,” <em>Journal of Peace Research </em>42, no.4<em> </em>(July 2005): 393–415. doi: 10.1177/0022343305054086.</p><p><a href="#_ednref9">[ix]</a> Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “10 Reasons Countries Fall Apart.” <em>Foreign Policy,</em> Jul/Aug 2012. 88–91. <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/18/10-reasons-countries-fall-apart/">http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/18/10-reasons-countries-fall-apart/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref10">[x]</a> “Country Reports: Africa Overview,” United States Department of State, June 11, 2014, <a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209979.htm">http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209979.htm</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ed8b0e830489" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Questioning the Narrative of Western Media Bias]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/questioning-the-narrative-of-western-media-bias-fe327049c253?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*lGy3QorZUhVaSTDyzwMefA.jpeg" width="600"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">In early January 2014, there were attacks on the newspaper offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris and the village of Baga in northeastern&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/questioning-the-narrative-of-western-media-bias-fe327049c253?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/questioning-the-narrative-of-western-media-bias-fe327049c253?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medium]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Mar 2017 10:27:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-28T12:45:59.538Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Not my President is not the Answer]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Goodsvejk/the-pitfalls-of-absolute-opposition-370884045cf3?source=rss-61c8b8b255d1------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[never-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[D. Andre]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 26 Feb 2017 13:42:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-09-26T12:18:29.928Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/759/1*mB_QUDQnxbwdrb84eX0gDw.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Not my President” is not the answer.</figcaption></figure><p><em>“Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike.” — Alexander Hamilton</em></p><p>Democracy is a constant balancing act. Representing dissimilar forces to ensure a collective right to govern creates tension. The resulting tension makes managing democracies unique among forms of government, primarily because it requires constant, dedicated attention from the citizenry. There’s never a pinnacle. There’s no culmination of the hard work. No cruising altitude where everyone relaxes and enjoys the ride. That single point where everything comes together simply does not exist, at least not on a national level. On the contrary, there are constant course corrections. A constant need for recalibration. This endless balancing act is taxing, but essential to democracy’s survival.<em> This need for balance is precisely why the notion of absolute opposition is so dangerous — its dichotomous view can only lead to imbalance.</em></p><p><strong>Ultimatums are counterproductive</strong></p><p>While the seeds for absolute opposition were laid long before the Trump administration, the idea has now become mainstream.<strong><em> </em></strong>Once considered the realm of the fringe, absolute opposition slowly crept into conventional politics. It began as partisanship, morphed into obstructionism, and now, after years of partisanship and obstructionism, we’re at a point where elements of society have taken up absolute opposition. Absolute opposition is the point where people no longer concern themselves with actively listening to propositions and begin registering opposition purely based on who is doing the proposing. The focus centers on the policymaker, not the policy. The strategy replaces conversations with ultimatums. With absolute opposition there are no qualifications and no room for context.</p><p>Under the Obama administration it was the Right-leaning Tea Party, which did little to influence the politics of people outside their core base. Despite this poor performance, the notion spread across the political spectrum and found a comfortable home in the political Left. Now the amorphous coalition of the <em>hash tag/not-my-president/resistance</em> crowd passionately refuses to acknowledge that democracy is working as intended. Ignoring cultural differences, the prevailing narratives of these opposition groups pit politics against culture, creating a scenario where only absolute adherence to the agenda is accepted. Furthermore, the principles being promoted are presented as universally valid and valued and, by extension, that other principles are invalid and not worthy of value. These absolutist narratives do not suppose that all are treated equal, but rather separates people into unequal categories of winners and losers — those on the right side and wrong side of history.</p><p><strong>Opposition requires more than just opposing</strong></p><p>Since absolute opposition eschews compromise — demanding people fully embrace one position and denounce another — it’s incompatible with democracy. Politically, this manner of negotiating undermines conversations and forces one-sided solutions — whoever have the numbers on their side wins. It turns the opposition into the outsider. This is unfortunate because opposition is critical in politics. Opposition challenges the status quo by pushing alternative thought into the public realm. The resulting debates provide opportunities for all sides to offer opinions and compromise. In addition, it provides an opportunity for moderation. Often, the dissenting voice proves to be the voice of reason — a check and balance on the power of the majority. Adopting the notion of absolute opposition effectively neuters the opposing voice. After all, if the default response is opposition there’s little need to articulate a position — it literally goes without saying. And in doing so, it cheapens the dissent.</p><p>As such, opposition brings with it a responsibility to be informed and engaged and to acknowledge opportunities to embrace alternative views. <em>After all, to move from opposition to controlling party requires the proposal of realistic solutions. And realistic solutions can only arise from compromise. </em>Opposing absolutely everything makes no room for compromise or moderation and, ultimately, represents only the most extreme views on an ideological spectrum. The resulting ideological purism appeals to few people. And by inhabiting the extremes, it relegates the dissenting voice to nothing more than ideological talking points.</p><p><strong>Opposing everything is opposing nothing</strong></p><p><em>Perversely, by opposing everything, one opposes nothing.</em><strong><em> </em></strong>The signal gets lost in the noise. And in the rush to be relevant, many find they are just the opposite. Rendering certain voices in a democratic society irrelevant leads to imbalance. The remaining voices — usually the status quo — take on outsized influence. Meanwhile, the masses tire of the constant back-and-forth and the lack of compromise. <em>The resulting fatigue is dangerous, as a fatigued democracy leads to imbalance, indecision, and, ultimately, indifference.</em> And despite what politicians and pundits would like to profess, a fatigued citizenry represents the direst threat to democracy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=370884045cf3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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