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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Poli Writing on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Poli Writing on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[中国媒体和自媒体在肺炎疫情窗口期的报道方向和实例]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@HuishiWen/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%AA%92%E4%BD%93%E5%92%8C%E8%87%AA%E5%AA%92%E4%BD%93%E5%9C%A8%E8%82%BA%E7%82%8E%E7%96%AB%E6%83%85%E7%AA%97%E5%8F%A3%E6%9C%9F%E7%9A%84%E6%8A%A5%E9%81%93%E6%96%B9%E5%90%91%E5%92%8C%E5%AE%9E%E4%BE%8B-7776a19b62c8?source=rss-7088dafc9f22------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[媒體]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[疫情]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[武漢]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[肺炎]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Poli Writing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 02 Feb 2020 21:39:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-03T11:42:07.471Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>中國媒體和自媒體在新冠肺炎窗口期的報道方向和舉例（更新中）</h3><p>1）疫情現狀與預測</p><p>官媒、市場化媒體和專業性自媒體，都在積極更新疫情數據。例如，健康類自媒體「丁香醫生」與黨媒人民日報合作發布 <a href="https://3g.dxy.cn/newh5/view/pneumonia_peopleapp?from=timeline&amp;isappinstalled=0">新型肺炎疫情實時動態</a>，財新每日更新發布疫情分析簡報、肺炎日記（疫情防治形勢），發布<a href="http://datanews.caixin.com/2020-01-20/101506236.html">疫情病例</a>和<a href="http://datanews.caixin.com/interactive/2020/fever/">定點醫院</a>的分布地圖。關於病原，專業性自媒體，如「知識分子」和「蕨經」，通過<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/35nq-TPy9xyPFT1mrQHD6Q">專家專訪</a>和<a href="https://wemp.app/posts/a03bc521-a1e7-45ac-9d7d-97a0666ef1d6">數據分析</a>，分析科普新型冠狀病毒最大可能是通過某種作為中間宿主的哺乳動物傳給人，但其傳染力小於麻疹等空氣型傳播型疾病，死亡率低於SARS。自媒體「賽先生」的分析則<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/6zv1KP6ruXZWwT29KWghCw">破除</a>了公眾對於武漢科學家從實驗室泄露病毒的猜測。</p><p>調查顯示疫情的規模並不樂觀。財新<a href="http://www.caixin.com/2020-01-18/101506105.html">引述</a>報告，估算武漢市預計有4000例病例，並通過對病毒學學家管軼的<a href="http://www.caixin.com/2020-01-23/101507670.html">專訪</a>，透露當前疫情規模大過SARS，且關鍵動物源證據缺失，封城效果不佳。自媒體「精準醫學前沿」，<a href="https://www.shangyexinzhi.com/article/details/id-474441/">引述</a>香港大學教授的研究，稱截至1月25日， 武漢已有近7.6萬人被感染了新型冠狀病毒，遠遠高於官方確診數字。</p><p>通過一線醫師的<a href="https://new.qq.com/rain/a/HEE2020012400700600">口述</a>和調查，三聯周刊也透露當前武漢當地醫院救治能力已飽和，病毒傳播可能延續到5月，節後返程高峰將承受巨大的防疫壓力。<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/5q8LuE0brX9aRxKkB46Pvw">中國新聞周刊</a>、<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Jazc0sbrp8ozVScWm3ksfQ">人物</a>和<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2020/02/%E8%B4%A2%E7%BB%8F-%E7%BB%9F%E8%AE%A1%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%97%E4%B9%8B%E5%A4%96%E7%9A%84%E4%BA%BA%EF%BC%9A%E4%BB%96%E4%BB%AC%E6%AD%BB%E4%BA%8E%E6%99%AE%E9%80%9A%E8%82%BA%E7%82%8E/">財經</a>的調查顯示，更令人揪心的是，病床難求，確診所用的核算試紙和試劑盒缺乏，很多病例並未劃入確診範圍，實際感染數字更為龐大。</p><p>2）信息披露及瞞報</p><p><a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/eI63WlcUh8kihLzMFsQ6pw">新京報</a>、<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/uXWRRDTpr4VJUaHEkW1iqQ">財新</a>評論率先批評武漢政府低估疫情、防疫和公開遲緩；<a href="http://china.caixin.com/2020-01-22/101507159.html">財新</a>1月22日的報道透露1月10日即有人傳人證據，但官方瞞報；<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/xuf8nn1OPOY51cyZMduQ-Q">三聯生活周刊</a>1月22日的報道披露，12月中下旬就有感染病例，遠早於官方在1月20日對於「人傳人」現象的確認。</p><p>官方媒體<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRmSiy1jt84">央視的《新聞面對面》</a>27日專訪武漢市長，無意中披露出武漢市需受到中央授權才能披露疫情；隨著《新英格蘭雜誌》上醫學論文的發表，以及浙大學者在微博上的憤怒「指控」，關於體制中責任誰屬的問題呼之欲出。在武漢市長、疾控專家對責任屬誰各執一詞後，<a href="http://china.caixin.com/2020-01-30/101509519.html?cxw=IOS&amp;Sfrom=Wechat&amp;originReferrer=iOSshare">財新</a>專訪法學和政策專家，稱武漢政府責任重大，今後應將屬地政府的綜合協調至於衛生主管部門的應對之上。</p><p>另一方面，「造謠」者（即披露疫情的第一批人）重新回到公眾視野。儘管最高人民法院刊文，稱認定八人「造謠」是「機械地理解適用法律」，應對這樣的「虛假信息”保持寬容態度，屬於黨媒性質的<a href="https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2020-01-28/doc-iihnzhha5115434.shtml">中國青年報</a>仍然刊發了武漢某醫院主任的口述，披露從1月6日起就開始接收疑似病例；<a href="https://www.zaobao.com.sg/wencui/politic/story20200128-1024296">北京青年報「深一度」欄目</a>更采訪首先在微信群披露疫情、後被官方認定為「造謠”的醫師。自媒體曬出楚天都市報1月19日、20日頭版（含有舉行百步亭團年飯、發放旅遊券的標題），分享湖北省政府舉辦團拜會的信息，諷刺官方應對不力；也有自媒體為被武漢官方處理的八位「造謠者”鳴不平：如思想地圖<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2020/01/%E6%80%9D%E6%83%B3%E5%9C%B0%E5%9B%BE-%E6%AD%A6%E6%B1%898%E4%BA%BA%E4%BC%A0%E8%B0%A3%E6%9C%80%E6%96%B0%E7%BB%86%E8%8A%82%E6%9B%9D%E5%85%89%EF%BC%9A%E5%81%9A%E9%94%99/">《武漢8人「傳謠」最新細節曝光：「做錯了，就要認錯，可是認錯真的好難啊！」》</a>，但很快遭到刪除。</p><p>3）官方防治措施的效果，包括封城的影響、海內外地域/種族歧視</p><p>封城生效前後，普通用戶在微博、微信、豆瓣等社交媒體上批評政府暫停市內公共交通將阻礙日常生活、工作和就醫。如，律師斯偉江的系列封城記，凡小西<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/zd7SieF5bZkM16c2Dr6f0A">《哭了！武漢封城7天，我的真實經歷》</a>，故事FM<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/0CfHc9OqmP9rNGIaznnoHQ">《五個武漢人的封城日記》</a>。</p><p>新京報「剝洋蔥」、財經、<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/xXWPeNp0z6xGviYVnhEcBQ">第一財經</a>、<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/3F61OcuHU2IUUxSSLGMgMA">搜狐極晝工作室</a>、<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/1R_6L0F5KgGrv1T6shT25Q">真實故事計劃</a>等報道武漢封城第一天的混亂。澎湃探訪武漢封城首日情況，指火車站現退票長隊，部分出租車停運，菜價上漲。財新、冰點、三聯生活週刊等，在封城翌日發佈深度採訪，講述武漢人無法離開的窘迫、失語的年三十和年初一。</p><p>封城之舉也帶來「武漢人歧視」問題，武漢人成為「流動的病毒」，城外的人在網上指責武漢人不應該「跑來跑去」。紅星新聞、調查披露湖北人在省外被歧視的窘境：賓館、酒店拒絕招待，個人信息遭泄露，封城阻礙返鄉。澎湃「思想市場」欄目發表評論《封堵武漢人：從防疫話語到地方主義》，批評與網絡上「武漢加油」的共情同時發生的，是各地對「武漢人」的排斥與區隔。</p><p>黨媒頂端的人民日報24日頭版刊發習近平在春節團拜會上的講話，並未提及疫情。事實上，從20日到25日，除了習近平的批示之外，疫情都未能上頭條。環球時報連續發表社評，稱贊「封城」是「壯士斷腕之舉」，並展示「封城”後五天內武漢人面對疫情的「樂觀與團結」，在意料之中。黨媒人民日報、環球時報，都呼籲公眾勿區別對待武漢人和湖北人，環球時報更「斥責」丹麥媒體拿疫情「渲染」種族歧視。</p><p>4）救治現狀</p><p>GQ、<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/HOsZ7hY5fNp-ts5FkNN35A">人物雜誌</a>披露醫師超負荷運轉，物資緊缺，感染風險大，封城後通勤難的困境；鳳凰網「在人間」和新京報通過病患親屬的口述，透露病人就診難、死亡人數多、求助無門，感染和被感染風險高。<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Ps5lUon8LMCxLrPGwqKjMg">北京青年報「深一度」</a>對話康復患者，分享患病反應，透露病患確診難。</p><p>自媒體也在分享病患不幸感染甚至死亡的經歷，透露普通人就診難。如，大米和小米<a href="https://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2020/01/202001300933.shtml">《家人疑似新冠肺炎被隔離，湖北17歲腦癱兒獨自在家6天後死亡》</a>（原文已被禁止分享）。</p><p>微博、微信甚至Twitter上出現大量視頻，顯示醫師因情緒崩潰而痛哭，醫院人滿為患，醫生超負荷運轉，恐慌和憤怒的情緒蔓延開來。</p><p>形成鮮明對比的是，新華社、人民日報、環球時報、長安街等官方媒體賬號一邊以圖文展示一線醫生的敬業與辛苦，同時也頻傳捷報，持續更新病患康復信息、發布最新醫藥研制成果和專家訪談，意圖平緩大眾輿論。1月31日晚，新華視點微博表示，上海藥物所、武漢病毒所聯合發現中成藥「雙黃連口服液」可抑制新型冠狀病毒，消息隨後成為網絡質疑和諷刺熱點。</p><p>5）救援情況，包括紅十字會的爭議</p><p><a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/DjqFJdJ33atrdMEsDoPhrA">南方周末</a>的調查揭示國內普遍缺乏應急物資儲備和日常管理，物資數量和處理的透明度低，供給趕不上需求；<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/uGaFeqrqmLBQe5qdRSTeSQ">GQ雜誌</a>以醫生口述透露物資仍緊缺，封城影響捐助物資運送，甚至有商家趁機哄擡物價；<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/z2lBpuEy10sMIIGxrtyW3g">南都周刊</a>報道民間熱心人士主動招募、協調物資捐助，面臨質疑，仍超負荷運轉，協助醫院。</p><p>大量的捐助去了哪裏，為什麽物資還是缺乏？據<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/24JcPg71L3ePE_mS-bIk_Q">騰訊科技</a>報道，因騙購、搶購，醫療物資購入難，大量捐助由官方機構統一調配，民間力量難以介入協調，導致分撥遲緩；而且，<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/uGaFeqrqmLBQe5qdRSTeSQ">GQ雜誌</a>通過采訪湖北孝感醫生，發現封城阻礙了物資調配。<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/VxH2jtybFOBDNfAGMOTOuw">人物雜誌</a>的調查顯示，口罩生產商盈利少、產出意願低，醫療機構物資儲備不足，調配效率低。</p><p>在微博上，眾多網友揭露紅十字會囤積物資、捐款處理不當。各大校友會、海外、快遞通道以及韓紅基金會的高效，和紅會形成鮮明對比。</p><p>自媒體文章<a href="https://think.sina.cn/doc-iimxxste7770083.d.html?cre=wappage&amp;mod=r&amp;loc=2&amp;r=9&amp;rfunc=39&amp;tj=none">《湖北紅會：能力弱雞 大權獨攬》</a>揭露湖北省紅十字會人手和倉儲缺乏，能力低下，導致捐款和物資配遲緩。在<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/0LyZtMNH87vnDwPNPymYHg">南方周末</a>、<a href="https://www.cbnweek.com/articles/normal/24357">第一財經</a>的報道中，紅十字會表示，他們只負責收物資，分配則由衛健委和防控指揮部來決定，且駁斥了網友的質疑。經由<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/f-5AC4hP2M06Va48CsLRxQ">北青報「深一度」欄目</a>，其誌願者透露，紅十字會缺乏「點對點直接快速對接的工作流程」。<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/O6HoUOV4mCKOT8d_l3eQtA">搜狐財經</a>則爆出紅會公布的工資福利過高，引人懷疑。</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7776a19b62c8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China’s Military Press: A New Force in the “Struggle” of Ideas?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/china-media-project/china-s-military-press-a-new-force-in-the-struggle-of-ideas-467b9521ac1c?source=rss-7088dafc9f22------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/467b9521ac1c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Poli Writing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2015 08:23:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-12-28T08:55:09.189Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C3ScnjjXa3UKjebad0Zd5Q.png" /><figcaption>Chinese<a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2015-12/26/c_128570002.htm"> President Xi Jinping visit the Liberation Army Daily newspaper on December 25</a> to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the paper’s founding.</figcaption></figure><p>China’s <em>Liberation Army Daily</em>, the official newspaper of <a href="http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/Leadership/">the Central Military Commission</a> (CMC), recently celebrated its 60th anniversary. In observance of a time-honoured tradition, President Xi Jinping, who is also <a href="http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/Leadership/">chairman of the CMC</a>, <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2015-12/26/c_128570002.htm">visited the paper and delivered a commemoration speech</a>. As a reflection of the leadership’s approach to media and propaganda, Xi Jinping’s speech deserves careful and considered analysis. Based on our preliminary review, however, there are two points that should make us sit up and take notice.</p><ol><li><strong>Xi Jinping contains the political banner terms of his predecessors within the new formulation “the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义理论体系)</strong>. The phrase serves as a place marker for these banner terminologies in Xi Jinping’s speech, overriding direct mention of Deng Xiaoping Theory (邓小平理论), the Three Represents (三个代表重要思想) or the Scientific View of Development (科学发展观).</li><li><strong>Xi Jinping urges the military press to “serve as a fresh new force in the struggle in the ideological sphere” (当好意识形态领域斗争的生力军)</strong>. This hardline ideological language goes beyond the emphasis Xi’s predecessors placed on Party control of the media, and echoes the way the military press were used in the call to “struggle” ahead of the Cultural Revolution fifty years ago.</li></ol><p>Inspection visits to the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em> by the chairman of the CMC in the past — and in particular speeches to commemorate the paper’s creation — have in the past three decades generally set the tone for future public opinion work, or <em>yulun gongzuo</em> (舆论工作), which refers broadly to the business of censorship and propaganda. In this sense, Xi Jinping’s visit and speech are no different, and it’s no surprise to see Xi emphasising the role of the military press as propaganda tools under the unquestionable leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.</p><p>But Xi Jinping’s speech parts ways with those of his predecessors as he comes to define the content, character and influence of the military press — and Chinese media more broadly — in a stricter manner.</p><p>The phrase “the Party commands the gun” (党指挥枪) has long been a core description of the propaganda nature of the military press in China. State media reports on Xi Jinping’s speech, both in the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em> and in the <em>People’s Daily,</em> used the phrase “Party nature of the military press” (军报姓党) in headlines, stressing the demand that the military press remain in step with the central Party leadership and obey its commands.</p><p>The following is a relevant portion of Xi Jinping’s speech:</p><blockquote>[The military press] must adhere unswervingly to the Party’s absolute leadership over the army, steadfastly maintaining unity with the Party’s Central Committee in thought, politics and action, maintaining a high level of consciousness for the preservation of the authority of the Party’s Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, firmly and unshakeably transmitting the voice of the Party’s Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.</blockquote><p>In his speech, Xi Jinping spoke of “Party control of the media” (党管媒体) and “politicians running the newspapers” (政治家办报) — both traditional buzzwords in the Party lexicon denoting the Party’s ultimate control of the media and public opinion. The Party’s control of the media, and of the military press in particular, were points that cropped up repeatedly: “[We must] uphold the principle of Party control of the media,” Xi said, “strictly implementing the demand that politicians run the newspapers, ensuring that the leadership news and propaganda work is ultimately entrusted to the hands of reliable people who remain loyal to the Party.”</p><p>In this respect, Xi Jinping’s speech did not differ greatly from those of his predecessors. Quite distinct, however, was the fact that was no mention whatsoever in Xi Jinping’s speech of Deng Xiaoping.</p><p>Instead, here is how Xi’s speech delimited the body of Party ideas that must be at the heart of propaganda work. (The emphasis is mine):</p><blockquote>[We must] effectively publicise the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and of the Third, Fourth and Fifth plenums; effectively publicise Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought; <strong>effectively publicise the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics</strong>; effectively publicise the theoretical innovations made since the 18th National Congress; effectively publicise the new achievements and new atmosphere in the work and development of the Party, government and military; effectively publicise the major decisions and deployments of the Central Military Commission, taking positive actions for the building of a common ideological foundation for unified struggle.</blockquote><p>The banner terms of Xi Jinping’s predecessors — Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents and the Scientific View of Development — are all subsumed under the bolded phrase above, the “theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”</p><p>Where did this phrase come from?</p><p>The phrase was first introduced in the political report to the 17th National Congress in 2007, and it was subsequently refined in the political report to the 18th National Congress in 2012. In the former case, this “theoretical system” included the three banner terms along with “other major strategic concepts.” In the latter case, the language about “other major strategic concepts” was dropped, yielding the following definition:</p><blockquote>The theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is a scientific theoretical system that includes Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important idea of the ‘Three Represents’ and the Scientific View of Development.</blockquote><p>In his <a href="http://www.wenku1.com/view/CA523C42E05336C8.html">speech to mark the 40th anniversary of the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em> in 1996</a>, Jiang Zemin mentioned “Deng Xiaoping” four times and explicitly restated the language of Deng Xiaoping, saying that the military press must “energetically promote the construction of Deng Xiaoping’s theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the Party’s basic line; energetically promote the military ideas of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s ideas on the building of the military in the new era; energetically promote the various policies of the Party; and energetically promote the demands and directives of the Party’s Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.”</p><p>Ten years later, in 2006, <a href="http://paper.people.com.cn/xwzx/html/2006-01/01/content_11459638.htm">Hu Jintao’s commemoration speech </a>essentially preserved the convention of listing out his theoretical precursors in hat-tip fashion, adding his own banner term to the mix:</p><blockquote>We must raise high the banners of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important idea of the “Three Represents,” effectively fulfilling the historic mission of our military in the new century and at this new stage, persisting in taking the scientific view of development as the leading principle in strengthening national defence and military construction, working to promote the rapid and effective development of national defence and military construction.</blockquote><p>Hu Jintao did not mention Marxism-Leninism or Mao Zedong Thought in his 2006 speech, another point where Xi Jinping differs. <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2015-12/26/c_128570002.htm">Xi Jinping mentions both of these first</a>, before he tosses in the catchall phrase “theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics” for the ideas of his predecessors.</p><p>In fact, this latest Xi Jinping speech seems of a piece with an article that made the rounds on the internet back in November ahead of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/world/asia/china-hu-yaobang-birthday-xi-jinping.html?_r=0">commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of reformer Hu Yaobang</a>. That article, “We Must Eradicate Political Noise as We Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of Hu Yaobang” (<a href="http://www.canyu.org/n106039c11.aspx">耀邦百年纪念要杜绝政治杂音</a>), was rumoured to have been a speech delivered by a deputy propaganda minister, and it referred to the ideas of Deng, Jiang and Hu as “a rather complex pyramid,” suggesting that in the future they could be “made more succinct.”</p><p>It’s hard to say yet what exactly this change means. We’ll leave it there for now.</p><p>Moving on to the second takeaway I noted at the outset of this post, we should note that Xi Jinping’s speech defines the character and objective of the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em> by saying that it should “<strong>serve as a fresh new force in the struggle in the ideological sphere.</strong>” Such strongly ideological language takes us back, ineluctably, to Mao Zedong’s launching of the Cultural Revolution fifty years ago. In the case of that unfortunate tragedy, the military press served as the ideological whip Mao Zedong wielded to achieve political interference.</p><p>Under the system of “two newspapers and one journal” (<a href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%A4%E6%8A%A5%E4%B8%80%E5%88%8A">两报一刊</a>) in the 1960s, during which time just three publications (the <em>People’s Daily</em>, the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em>, and <em>Red Flag</em>) dominated, the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em>was the military flag bearer in the press. The paper was <a href="https://books.google.com.hk/books?id=7bNooFMV12sC&amp;pg=PA183&amp;lpg=PA183&amp;dq=%22Lin+Biao%22+%22Liberation+Army+Daily%22&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=8oZQutoBP1&amp;sig=UUoRxyf73TCE5W3r7M8ZROE7fwU&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjdqZHJ9_3JAhUGMaYKHYc8BSMQ6AEIJzAD#v=onepage&amp;q=%22Lin%20Biao%22%20%22Liberation%20Army%20Daily%22&amp;f=false">controlled by Mao Zedong’s deputy commander in chief and “close comrade-in-arms” Lin Biao</a>(林彪), and its editorials were republished in full by other central and regional Party media as well as broadcast on the radio. This set the stage for the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em> to become the mouthpiece, or “tongue and throat” (喉舌), through which the Cultural Revolution was directed. It was the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em> that on May 4, 1966, ran the infamous editorial, “We Must Not Forget the Class Struggle” (千万不要忘记阶级斗争), which had powerful repercussions inside and outside the military, and which catalysed the Cultural Revolution.</p><p>Neither Jiang Zemin’s nor Hu Jintao’s commemoration speeches at the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em> included this worrisome phrase about the paper serving as “a fresh new force in the struggle in the ideological sphere.”</p><p>It is true that Jiang Zemin, like Xi Jinping, emphasised Mao Zedong’s notion that “the politicians must run the newspapers,” defining Party control of the media as a central priority. The important difference is that while Jiang emphasised that “the news is one form of ideology” that can serve to promote policies and tasks, and can be used to mobilise and encourage the masses, Xi Jinping has now elevated this to the plane of “ideological struggle.” The military press, he says, must “strengthen their political consciousness, regime consciousness (政权意识) and position consciousness (阵地意识), having the courage to raise the banner, stand at the vanguard and pioneer the way forward.”</p><p>Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao cautioned the military press against simple repetition of political slogans, and both leaders urged the <em>Liberation Army Daily</em> to raise its popular appeal and persuasiveness as a newspaper, in a sense modernising its role.</p><p>These sentiments, it seems, are now being swept into the dustbin. And Xi Jinping — in his language at least — is calling back the ghosts of a far more painful past.</p><p><em>Translated by David Bandurski.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=467b9521ac1c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/china-media-project/china-s-military-press-a-new-force-in-the-struggle-of-ideas-467b9521ac1c">China’s Military Press: A New Force in the “Struggle” of Ideas?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/china-media-project">China Media Project</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[We’re Not Having This Discussion]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/china-media-project/we-re-not-having-this-discussion-fe6668495add?source=rss-7088dafc9f22------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fe6668495add</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Poli Writing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Dec 2015 07:24:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-12-22T08:11:40.221Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over the weekend, a <a href="http://www.weibo.com/1709157165/D4V5UECr4?type=comment#_rnd1448502730704">post on the official Weibo account of the United Nations</a> said its <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16774&amp;LangID=E">Committee Against Torture had questioned China insistently over its record on such issues as judicial independence</a> and its use of “black jails.” <a href="http://www.weibo.com/1701401324/D5eQ4FdAS?type=comment">Responding in the comments section</a>, Xu Xin (徐昕), a professor in the law school at the Beijing Institute of Technology, gibed: “So, what punishment should the United Nations get for improperly discussing China’s legal system?” Another lawyer, Yang Junfeng (<a href="http://www.weibo.com/u/1625413330"><strong>杨俊峰</strong></a>), <a href="http://www.weibo.com/1625413330/D5f5nw23U?type=comment">added his own wisecrack</a>: “My solemn advice is that we detain and interrogate the UN secretary general for having the impudence to improperly discuss the policies of the Central Party.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*arWQTR0rDdPnKtCRR2gWvQ.png" /><figcaption>Chinese lawyer Yang Junfeng <a href="http://www.weibo.com/1625413330/D5f5nw23U?type=comment">comments on a November 24 Weibo post by the United Nations on China’s torture review</a>, with reference to the term “improper discussion.”</figcaption></figure><p>The humour in these comments is probably lost on those unfamiliar with political jargon in China, but both taunts draw attention to a term that has rightly come in recent weeks to symbolise the Communist Party’s intolerant attitude toward dissenting views under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. The term, “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/11/infraction-of-the-week-improper-discussion/"><strong>improper discussion of [the policies] of the central Party</strong></a>,” or <em>wangyi zhongyang</em> (妄议中央), kicked up a storm online after being included in the Party’s new <a href="http://chinalawtranslate.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E7%BA%AA%E5%BE%8B%E5%A4%84%E5%88%86%E6%9D%A1%E4%BE%8B/?lang=en"><strong><em>Disciplinary Regulations</em></strong></a>, released on October 21.</p><p>At the centre of the storm was the following section in Article 46 of the regulations: “Improper discussion of the fundamental policies of the Central Party authorities, causing damage to the centralism and unity of the Party, will in serious cases result in expulsion from the Party.”</p><p>In Chinese, the term “improper discussion” can be used in a colloquial sense — referring to remarks that are merely speculative. But it also has a deeper history within the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. So let’s take a closer look at this rare and extraordinary term, and try to understand its importance in the present day.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*mW3wFySf-1HD_SSk9Xralw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The cover of the recently released Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations. Image from Shanghai’s <a href="http://image.thepaper.cn/www/image/4/605/440.jpg"><em>The Paper</em></a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Looking back through the entire history of the Party’s chief newspaper, the <em>People’s Daily</em>, we find that the phrase “improper discussion” is extremely uncommon, having appeared just 24 times — on a per-article basis — in nearly six decades. Moreover, the phrase has never appeared in any document publicly released by the Chinese Communist Party. Through the entire decade of the 1980s, the term “improper discussion” appeared in the <em>People’s Daily</em> just 6 times. In the 1990s it appeared 4 times. Since 2000, the phrase has cropped up a total of 14 times, with a seven-year period up to 2011 when the phrase completely vanished.</p><p>This year, “improper discussion” has appeared in 8 articles in the <em>People’s Daily</em>, the term’s strongest annual showing in the paper’s history. Especially worth noting is the fact that throughout the entire history of the <em>People’s Daily</em> the term “improper discussion” has been explicitly defined as “an internal Party ban” (党内禁令) in just 7 articles — and 6 of these articles are from this year.</p><p>When we sift through the <em>People’s Daily</em> to ascertain the various uses of “improper discussion” over time, we find essentially 5 types, which I outline below, along with the number of articles in which they occur:</p><ol><li><strong>6 articles — </strong>The writer of the article in question uses the phrase to signal their own sense of caution over a political or other matter about which they are insufficiently clear. This basically accords with modern vernacular use of the phrase, and doesn’t merit further discussion.</li><li><strong>6 articles — </strong>The article criticises a certain person for speaking without substance and making a spurious argument.</li><li><strong>3 articles — </strong>Foreign governments are criticised for interfering with Chinese affairs through “improper discussion.”</li><li><strong>2 articles — </strong>The article argues in favour of freer discussion, and on this basis suggests “improper discussion” should be tolerated in order to avoid “incurring guilt through one’s words” (因言获罚).</li><li><strong>7 articles — </strong>The article refers to “improper discussion of the [policies of] the Centre” (妄议中央) as an internal Party ban against dissent over the high-level policies of the Chinese Communist Party, and against sharing one’s conjectures. This is the definition of the phrase we find in the Disciplinary Regulations.</li></ol><p>The pair of articles in category 4, those advocating greater tolerance toward dissenting ideas, were the outliers of the group. I started my exploration with a look at these two.</p><p>In 1988, the <em>People’s Daily</em> ran an article called, “Tolerating the Intolerable” (容天下难容之士), by a writer identified as “Shi Feng” (拾风). The piece enumerated the various emperors in Chinese history who had been incapable of tolerating “improper discussion,” and it pointed out that “’intolerance’ actually expressed a common thread in the way successive emperors treated scholars.”</p><p>The article said that early in his reign, the Hongwu Emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang (朱元璋) had actually employed scholars on the basis of proven ability, and had extended them respect. Later, however, he had turned to persecuting them. The article told the story of one poor scholar in Hangzhou who wrote out a message for an imperial celebration that read: “Under the light of heaven, a sage is born, his conduct a model for the world.” Zhu Yuanzhong, who had been born a poor peasant and spent time as a novice monk, responded fiercely to the message. He alleged that by using the character “light” (which can also mean “bald”) together with “birth” (a homophone of the word “monk”), the scholar meant to suggest he was a Buddhist monk. On top of this, the emperor chose to understand “being a model” as an oblique reference to “being a thief,” relying again on an inexact homophone. The scholar was beheaded.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/1*ETevbad0ukmtk7TMOpAaDw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The article “Tolerating the Intolerable” appears on page eight of the <em>People’s Daily</em> on April 2, 1988.</figcaption></figure><p>Whether one spoke of the “language prison” (文字狱) of ancient imperial times, or of the groundless accusations levelled against political enemies by members of the Gang of Four as they “made selective readings of speech” (言论摘编) — all of these were, for the author of the <em>People’s Daily</em> article, examples of the crazed persecution of intellectuals throughout history as a kind of “cultural autocracy” (文化专制主义). The poison still flows today, the author suggested. But if China’s intellectuals were part of the working class, equal to the leadership class, why should there be any question at all of who tolerates whom?</p><p>The “Shi Feng” who penned the 1988 article was in fact the Republican Era newspaper man and playwrite Zheng Shifeng (郑拾风). Decades earlier, he had written a series of essays in which he had revealed internal details about Chiang Kai-shek’s dealings with the United States. Finally, in an essay published in the wake of Nanjing’s “Xiaguan tragedy” of June 23, 1946, Zheng had offered up just 6 words: “Today, there is nothing to say.” This is quite possibly the briefest and most powerful essay in the history of the Chinese essay. For those 6 words, the Kuomintang government in Nanjing had put out a warrant for Zheng’s arrest.</p><p>Years later, in a “new China” under the rule of a “people’s democratic dictatorship,” Zheng would witness and experience similar persecution. For him in particular to be writing like this, advocating tolerance for “improper discussion,” tells us just how open the speech environment was in China in the 1980s.</p><p>Toward the end of the 1970s, debates over “truth standards” (真理标准大讨论) relaxed the iron grip of the “Two Whatevers” (两个凡是), the idea that all must unswervingly follow and uphold the policies of Mao Zedong. Ahead of the Third Plenum of the CCP’s 11th Central Committee in 1978, Deng Xiaoping suggested Chinese leaders should embrace criticism:</p><blockquote>The masses should be permitted to submit some opinions, and even if certain people harbour unhappiness and want to exploit democracy to make a bit of noise, there is nothing terrifying about this. To handle it properly, we need to trust that the vast majority have the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood. A revolutionary ruling party should in fact be fearful of not hearing the voices of the people, for the most terrifying thing of all is utter silence.</blockquote><p>It was during the Third Plenum that Deng raised the concept of “thought liberation,” which set the tone for the 1980s as an era of relative openness. At the time, a saying from the <em>Records of the Grand Historian</em>, dating back to the second century BC, became common coin among Party officials: “<a href="http://baike.baidu.com/view/370480.htm">One thousand obsequious yes-men are no equal to a single straight talker</a>.”</p><p>In the senior leadership of the Communist Party, the figure who best exemplified the attitude of tolerance toward “improper discussion” was Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦). At a spring tea party event held by the Central Party in March 1980, Hu Yaobang shared an ancient parable called, “Zi Chan Says Don’t Destroy the Rural School” (子产不毁乡校), a classic of the Spring and Autumn period (771–476 BC). The story is about a rural school, overseen by the story’s main character, Zi Chan, which provides peasants with a gathering place where they can debate public affairs, and where policies are often criticised. At one point, senior officials from the state of Zheng, where the school is located, suggest to Zi Chan that the place be destroyed in order to silence unwelcome criticism. Zi Chan advises against it, saying that the space is in fact a teacher for Zheng policymakers — telling them which courses of action are popular and useful, and which are despised.</p><p>Hu Yaobang’s point in telling the story was to urge his Party colleagues to “voice their own opinions on major national affairs.” Here is what he said:</p><blockquote>In ancient times, there was a man named Zi Chan from the state of Zheng, who spoke out against the destruction of the local country school. In the Tang Dynasty, [the writer] Han Yu believed this matter had been handled well, and he wrote a piece called, “In Praise of Zi Chan Saying Not to Destroy the Rural School” (子产不毁乡校颂). We can suppose that in ancient times, the rural school was a place where public discussion happened, and a place where complaints were aired out. . . . We’ve [had reforms underway] for just over three years now, and a majority of people believe that our Party under the leadership of Chairman Hua [Guofeng] is very wise, that it’s doing things properly. However, there are a number of people who disapprove. . . . We should apply the same method as Zi Chan of Zheng, adopting those things that are valuable, and spurning those things that might be harmful to our goals. . . . To simply reject things out of hand, to simply shut things out — this is not the best way.</blockquote><p>As a pro-reform propaganda chief, <a href="http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2015/1113/c85037-27810921.html"><strong>appointed to the post in December 1978</strong></a>, Hu Yaobang turned the Central Propaganda Department into a centre of “seeking truth through facts” (实事求是), of “<a href="http://data.book.hexun.com.tw/chapter-3066-1-3.shtml"><strong>thought liberation</strong></a>” (思想解放) and “thought construction” (思想建设). Within the Party’s ranks, he advocated “criticism and self-reflection,” and outside its ranks he encouraged the “opening of a hundred flowers, and <a href="http://www.21ccom.net/articles/history/xiandai/20150227121390_all.html"><strong>contending of a hundred schools of thought</strong></a>.” He opposed the idea of “unity of public opinion” (舆论一律), <a href="https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19550524.htm"><strong>a legacy of Mao Zedong’s rule</strong></a>.</p><p>The more tolerant attitude within the Party leadership under Hu Yaobang afforded liberal intellectuals outside the Party more latitude. The strategy of “reforming internally and opening externally” had been introduced at the Third Plenum in 1978. And two years later, in his famous “August 18 speech” in 1980, Deng Xiaoping had broached the more delicate topic of political reform.</p><p>By 1986, political reform drew a great deal of interest both inside and outside the Party. Leading liberal thinkers published articles in Party newspapers like the <em>People’s Daily</em> and <em>Guangming Daily</em>. They organised academic symposia, launched their own journals and newspapers, and openly advocated freedom and democracy. Ahead of the <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/07/c_131957734.htm"><strong>Thirteenth National Congress in 1987</strong></a>, Premier Zhao Ziyang founded the “Political Reform Research Group of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party” (中共中央政治改革研讨小组), which invited experts and intellectuals to offer their suggestions on what for many had become a core agenda.</p><p>As the intellectual climate warmed, a revitalised group of intellectuals pushed actively for greater reform. <a href="http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Dong_Fureng"><strong>Dong Fureng</strong></a> (董辅礽), Tong Dalin (<a href="http://baike.baidu.com/view/318403.htm"><strong>童大林</strong></a>), Yu Guangyuan (于光远) and other economists held a forum to discuss the possibility of creating a “commodity economy” in China, and the forum passed a resolution in which this hitherto avoided term actually appeared. On the political reform issue, more outspoken intellectuals like <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/world/asia/fang-lizhi-chinese-physicist-and-dissident-dies-at-76.html?_r=1"><strong>Fang Lizhi</strong></a> (方励之),<a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/feb/09/liu-binyan-19252005/"><strong>Liu Binyan</strong></a> (刘宾雁) and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/14/world/wang-ruoshui-75-liberal-who-was-shunned-in-china.html"><strong>Wang Ruoshui</strong></a> (王若水) wrote articles and gave public addresses in which they railed against corruption and advocated the path of democratisation.</p><p>Of course, the 1980s was not a decade of unbridled openness. Zheng Shifeng’s 1988 piece in the <em>People’s Daily</em>may have celebrated the value of tolerating “improper discussion.” But he had also witnessed a decade marked equally by political intolerance.</p><p>First and foremost, there was Deng Xiaoping’s concept of the “Four Basic Principles,” with its principle feature of “upholding the leadership of the Party,” a serious limitation on substantive political reform. In the arts, many works were suppressed and roundly criticised in the name of “<a href="http://www.21ccom.net/articles/lsjd/lsjj/article_20140227101332.html"><strong>expunging spiritual pollution</strong></a>” — among them <a href="https://books.google.com.hk/books?id=xOnmieI9V-gC&amp;pg=PA137&amp;lpg=PA137&amp;dq=%22Ling+Chenguang%22&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=mcxwEWDpUS&amp;sig=0Q7Rd9e-1ZboQ9CZrPr-VxIZRG4&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjxxLu4iqjJAhVFnpQKHbtNAFkQ6AEIHTAB#v=onepage&amp;q=%22Ling%20Chenguang%22&amp;f=false"><strong>the film <em>Bitter Love</em></strong></a> (苦恋), about the life of trials and troubles of painter Ling Chengguang (凌晨光).</p><p>Intolerance gained the upper hand in 1987, as Hu Yaobang was forced to step down, accused of “serious errors of political principle.” These included being too lax in opposing the trend of bourgeois liberalisation. Soon after, Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and Wang Ruoshui were expelled from the Party. Ultimately, the hopes they and many others had for political reform in China were dashed as <a href="http://time.com/3908456/tiananmen-massacre-china-chengdu-june-4-1989/"><strong>the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 were brutally crushed on June 4</strong></a>.</p><p>It would be 25 years before a second article in the <em>People’s Daily</em> advocated, as Zheng Shifeng’s article had in 1988, a tolerant attitude toward “improper discussion.” The article, “Innovating Speaking Habits and Moral Rule” (<a href="http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0319/c40531-20833833.html"><strong>文风革新与文德之治</strong></a>), again came in a supplement to the newspaper, and it admonished Party leaders by applying the concept of “moral leadership,” or wen de zhi zhi (文德之治), dating back to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emperor_Renzong_of_Song"><strong>Emperor Renzong</strong></a> of the Song Dynasty. “[We must] correct the trends of arrogance and ostentation,” the article said, “and promote a style of straight talk and practical action.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/1*ZTTQBb9B2es_g_HmcqBKFA.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Innovating Speaking Habits and Moral Rule,” written by Xiao Ying (肖鹰), appears on page 24 of the People’s Daily on March 19, 2013.</figcaption></figure><p>According to the <em>People’s Daily</em> piece, the young Emperor Renzong had encouraged a culture of straight talking in his leadership ranks, and in this way he had established the foundation of “moral rule” and had “innovated [the official] work style.” The same principle, said the author, should be applied in present-day China. Leaders should “transform their work style, change their learning attitudes and reform their way of speaking” (转作风、正学风、改文风).</p><p>As it happened, this piece ran in the <em>People’s Daily </em>just two days after the March 17 closing session of the National People’s Congress at which Xi Jinping had formally become China’s president, vowing in his speech to “serve the people, do my utmost for the nation, and consciously accept the supervision of the people.” The article seized the opportunity afforded by President Xi’s words to express the hope that the new administration would, like the enlightened emperors of old, encourage more open discussion of public affairs.</p><p>Today, more than two years later, as Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” and the “Four Comprehensives” are loudly proclaimed by the Chinese media, language like that in the <em>People’s Daily</em> two years ago about “straight talk” is drowned out by language about “improper discussion of Central Party [policies]” (妄议中央). The attitude toward “improper discussion” is markedly different from what we saw in the 1980s, or even just two years ago. “Improper discussion” now denotes “disobedience toward one’s superiors” (忤逆上级), or “unwarranted criticism” (胡加非议).</p><p>On October 23, 2014, during the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP, Xi Jinping criticised some Party officials for “doing things their own way, making a show of complying while opposing [policies] in their hearts, so that leadership was rendered ineffectual by insubordination, and by improper discussion of Central Party [policies].” This marked the first time in recent times that “improper discussion” implied a clear prohibition within the Party.</p><p>On December 17, 2014, Wang Xiankui (王宪魁), the top Party leader in Heilongjiang province, published a piece in the <em>People’s Daily</em> called, “Complying With Discipline Means Knowing How High the Sky Is and How Thick the Ground” (遵守纪律要知“天”高“地”厚). The piece argued that Party regulations and discipline are far more rigid even than national laws, and that Party members must uphold the authority of the Central Party: “It is absolutely forbidden to step out and speak improperly of the fundamental policies of the Central Party or of major strategic decisions made by the provincial Party leadership,” Wang wrote. With this piece, Wang Xianhui became the first to discuss the issue of “improper discussion of [the policies of] the central Party” in the pages of the <em>People’s Daily</em>.</p><p>One month after Wang’s piece, the <em>People’s Daily</em> ran a front-page commentary called, “Putting Discipline Rules in a More Important Position” (把守纪律讲规矩摆在更加重要的位置), framed as a discussion on the “study and implementation” of a speech Xi Jinping delivered to a session of the Discipline Inspection Commission. The piece once again stressed the importance of “strict discipline,” and said “there are still a few Party members and cadres who do not observe discipline and do not follow the rules . . . . or who speak out, carelessly engaging in improper discussion.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*tUHld_w9qhpiZG9xJhgFuQ.png" /><figcaption>The front page of Xinjiang Daily on November 2, 2015, announces the removal from the Party of former Xinjiang Daily editor-in-chief Zhao Xinwei, who is accused of “improper discussion” of the policies of the Chinese Communist Party.</figcaption></figure><p>What followed was a general outpouring of condemnation of “improper discussion” by Party officials at all levels. From January 1, 2015, to November 11, 2015, 3,677 articles appeared on mainland websites including the term “improper discussion.” Of these, 3,641 appeared after the October release of the Disciplinary Regulations.</p><p>Lest we think that all of this talk about “improper discussion” is just that, idle talk, we have already had in recent weeks our first case of a Party official being punished under the charge.</p><p>On November 2, 2015, <em>Xinjiang Daily</em>, the official Party newspaper of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, reported that Zhao Xinwei (赵新尉), the paper’s former editor-in-chief, had been expelled from the Party and dismissed from office for “improper discussion of the [policies of] the Central Party and major strategic decisions made by the Party leadership of the autonomous region.”</p><p>The Party leadership, it seems, is in no mood to stomach dissenting opinion in its ranks. The message to Party members, and to the general population, over core policies and priorities: We’re not having this discussion.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fe6668495add" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/china-media-project/we-re-not-having-this-discussion-fe6668495add">We’re Not Having This Discussion</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/china-media-project">China Media Project</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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