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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Intel-Ops on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Intel-Ops on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hunting Black Basta’s Cobalt Strike]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Intel_Ops/hunting-black-bastas-cobalt-strike-96a81a6ea781?source=rss-ec080b7b1632------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/96a81a6ea781</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cobalt-strike]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[detection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Intel-Ops]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2024 16:13:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-13T16:13:20.176Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bwhWDVDGx8ZZWT3sK7CASA.png" /></figure><p>Last week, the FBI and CISA released a #StopRansomware alert for the <strong>Black Basta</strong> ransomware group: <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/aa24-131a-joint-csa-stopransomware-black-basta_0.pdf">https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/aa24-131a-joint-csa-stopransomware-black-basta_0.pdf</a></p><p>During 2024, the group is third only to LockBit and Play in total ransomware victims. Notably, the advisory highlights the group’s utilization of Cobalt Strike (table 10 — “known Black Basta Cobalt Strike server domains”).</p><p><strong>Intel-Ops</strong> is actively tracking Cobalt Strike servers in the wild, including those deployed by <strong>Black Basta</strong>. In this post, we’ll highlight some key findings from our analysis of C2 servers included in the FBI/CISA advisory, including C2 servers not released in the advisory or servers not publicly tracked as malicious or associated with Black Basta.</p><blockquote>If you are spending this week hunting and monitoring for Black Basta Cobalt Strike servers, reach out about our <strong>C2 feed</strong> and <strong>additional indicators</strong> that Intel-Ops is tracking.</blockquote><p>Black Basta’s Cobalt Strike Graph:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DrXTiE990ZOwt0bjjLWOVg.png" /></figure><p>Using <strong>Validin’s “Bulk Analyzer” </strong>tool we can quickly resolve the domains in the advisory to active IP addresses and to understand patterns in hosting over time and produce the correlations for our Maltego graph:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d3406ti3BOEnCfpG4kUtVA.png" /></figure><h3>Findings</h3><ul><li>Black Basta infrastructure can be grouped into <strong>distinct clusters,</strong> some of which will be highlighted below.</li><li>The dominant watermarks observed within Black Basta infrastructure were <strong>1357776117 &amp; 1158277545.</strong></li><li>The majority of Cobalt Strike servers are hosted on <strong>Vult Hosting LLC (AS-CHOOPA), JW Lucasweg 35, Digital Ocean and Servinga.</strong></li></ul><h3>Cluster 1</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FBL5IRkXMkERHMTDuJLWow.png" /></figure><p><strong>The majority of Cobalt Strike servers identified as operated by Black Basta utilize DNS beacons:</strong> <a href="https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/topics/listener-infrastructue_beacon-dns.htm">https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/topics/listener-infrastructue_beacon-dns.htm</a>. Based on our analytics, the IOCs from the advisory are almost exclusively hosted on the top 3 providers: Vultr, Lucasweg and Digital Ocean.</p><p>Based on our investigations, at <strong>least 6 additional DNS Cobalt Strike beacons</strong> are hosted on these providers. Intel-Ops has identified similar C2s on other providers. Newly identified domains such as “thenewbees[.]org” also match the naming convention of other DNS beacons also listed in the advisory.</p><p>Example DNS Beacon in <strong>Intel-Ops Cluster 1</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/505/1*IwRvdm66G8uvZf4j452_8w.png" /></figure><h3>Cluster 2</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OujsyEvjU5c3JChA58faDQ.png" /></figure><p>The domain “usaglobalnews[.]org” appears to form part of a larger cluster of Cobalt Strike beacons. Within <strong>Intel-Ops Cluster 2</strong>, two domains have previously been publicly reported as involved in <strong>Black Basta incidents involving Pikabot</strong>. E.g. the domain “ruggioil[.]com” and “bluenetworking[.]net” were both attributed to an incident in December 2023 by Trend Micro:</p><p><a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/24/a/a-look-into-pikabot-spam-wave-campaign/ioc-pikabot-spam-campaign.txt">https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/24/a/a-look-into-pikabot-spam-wave-campaign/ioc-pikabot-spam-campaign.txt</a></p><p>Example Cobalt Strike servers in <strong>Intel-Ops Cluster 2:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/551/1*PY99Dc_rgQ3z7GWi9I8Dig.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/598/1*dc3XTPCsWTjcT3mBgOFIGA.png" /></figure><h3>Cluster 3</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_CK0EwWyEjRm_a5rtSk4vg.png" /></figure><p>Within Intel-Ops Cluster 3, we have observed 3 advisory domains, of which are clustered with Cobalt Strike servers that have a larger distribution of Chinese hosting providers and Chinese DNS records. Additionally, one of the advisory domains and at least 3 additional C2 servers have been publicly attributed to Black Basta activity in a report by “dfir-delight” in April 2024: <a href="https://dfir-delight.de/p/black-basta-iocs/">https://dfir-delight.de/p/black-basta-iocs/</a></p><p>Example of <strong>Intel-Ops Cluster 3</strong> Cobalt Strike C2 server:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/670/1*CubYw9P1OaWg7voOlEV9iQ.png" /></figure><h3>Cluster 4</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zwy_T3cW4HVv_052ZKUBJA.png" /></figure><p>Intel-Ops has identified a number of Cobalt Strike beacons with the watermark: <strong>1357776117</strong>. There is a relatively small cluster of IP addresses with this watermark: using <strong>Hunt.io</strong>, we can identify the <em>number of IPs with this watermark over the past 30 days</em>. Notably a number of the resolving domains match the naming convections of domains in the advisory:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/589/1*Y0GKUEXSQQH2Fi3_0Vlm3A.png" /></figure><p>Within this cluster, is another IP address publicly attributed to a recent Black Basta incident. Additionally, hosting was far more varied when analyzing Cobalt Strike beacons by watermark alone, with almost no patterns with other Black Basta clusters, such as DNS beacons for example.</p><p>Example Cobalt Strike C2 server in <strong>Intel-Ops Cluster 4</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Wevk5gNosqm0dxP7oT35ww.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>There are <strong>additional clusters/correlations</strong> to be inferred from the Black Basta advisory. This analysis covers only the known indicators in the report. For more information and to enhance your protection against groups utilising Cobalt Strike:</p><p><strong>Hunting Adversary Infrastructure Course</strong></p><p>Using the techniques taught in our course — “Hunting Adversary Infrastructure”, security analysts of all levels can learn to further enrich reports such as these to cluster and attribute activity. All of these indicators are being actively tracked by Intel-Ops and will soon be available via our C2 Threat Feed.</p><p>To learn how do track frameworks such as Cobalt Strike and groups such as Black Basta, please consider enrolling in our course here: academy.intel-ops.io — s<strong>tudents gain special Intel-Ops accounts for the Validin platform, which comes with additional query and API credits to help with learning.</strong></p><p><strong>C2 Feed</strong></p><p>For information regarding our C2 feeds, please get in touch via LinkedIn, Twitter or Email (<a href="/service/mailto:contact@intel-ops.io">contact@intel-ops.io</a>).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=96a81a6ea781" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[Phobos Ransomware: Analysing associated infrastructure used by 8Base]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Intel_Ops/phobos-ransomware-analysing-associated-infrastructure-used-by-8base-646560302a8d?source=rss-ec080b7b1632------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/646560302a8d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Intel-Ops]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Mar 2024 13:09:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-05T13:09:11.112Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On February 29th 2024, CISA released an advisory on <strong>Phobos</strong> ransomware.</p><blockquote><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-060a">https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-060a</a></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l4gGxFwmsDT03UoF-FIhKA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Intel-Ops is actively tracking infrastructure assessed to belong to the 8Base Ransomware group, an operator of Phobos ransomware. Our Threat Intel customers will be proactively blocking this threat.</strong></p><p>Phobos operates a Ransomware-as-a-Service model and groups utilising this ransomware have targeted:</p><blockquote>“county governments, emergency services, education, public healthcare, and other critical infrastructure entities to successfully ransom several million U.S. dollars.”</blockquote><p>It is assessed that Phobos is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) with a number of variants (Eking, Eight, Elbie, Devos and Faust) and a disperse set of affiliates that share very similar TTPs. Cisco Talos assess with moderate confidence that there is a central authority that holds the private key for all campaigns associated with the Phobos variants.</p><h3>8Base Ransomware Group</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/916/1*aMHZdzM2IyQKYX4nejb3ZA.png" /></figure><p>One group that utilises Phobos ransomware is the 8Base ransomware group, who have been highly active between mid-2023 and into 2024. The group are thought to be a collective of experienced ransomware operators. 8Base add their own branding customisation by appending “.8base” to their encrypted files and slightly modify the ransom note from the Phobos template. As you can observe in the graph below, operations and therefore victims significantly ramped up in June 2023 and the group is now regularly posting multiple victims in a single day since December 2023, likely motivating CISA to issue their advisory:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*lSifSsXAfeiWYICTz5beDA.png" /><figcaption>Source: ransomware.live</figcaption></figure><h3>Victimology</h3><p>Using <a href="https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/ransomware-roundup-8base">https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/ransomware-roundup-8base</a>, we can see that, like many ransomware groups, a broad range of industry verticals have been affected by 8Base. Date cut off: December 2023.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/978/1*-PhILTi38VL_lpV8fR8k0g.png" /><figcaption>Top sectors targeted by the 8base ransomware (source: FortiRecon)</figcaption></figure><p>Similarly, Western orgnisations make up the majority of victims of 8Base.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/942/1*60zBjaois0_tWCWl-ppr0A.png" /><figcaption>Top country victimized by the 8base ransomware (source: FortiRecon)</figcaption></figure><h3>Smokeloader and SystemBC</h3><p>The <strong>SmokeLoader</strong> backdoor with a range of capabilities which depend on the modules included in any given build of the malware. The malware is delivered in a variety of ways and is notorious for its use of deception and self-protection, using random API function calls and a multi-stage decryption process. The malware frequently tries to hide its C2 activity by generating requests to legitimate sites such as microsoft.com, bing.com, adobe.com, and others. Typically the actual Download returns an HTTP 404 but still contains data in the Response Body.</p><p><strong>SystemBC</strong> is primarily used as a SOCKS5 proxy allowing for interaction between victim machines and attacker infrastructure to execute commands, deploy additional payloads or exfiltrate data. SystemBC has reportedly been associated with loaders such as Smokeloader as well as Gootloader and ModernLoader. It has risen in popularity in recent years with usage linked to a variety of capable ransomware groups such as Cuba, BlackBasta, Play (Now BlackSuit), Rhysida, 8Base and more.</p><p>For an excellent in-depth report on SystemBC:</p><p><a href="https://github.com/vc0RExor/Malware-Threat-Reports/blob/main/The%20Swiss%20Knife%20-%20SystemBC%20%7C%20Coroxy/The%20Swiss%20Knife-SystemBC_EN.pdf">https://github.com/vc0RExor/Malware-Threat-Reports/blob/main/The%20Swiss%20Knife%20-%20SystemBC%20%7C%20Coroxy/The%20Swiss%20Knife-SystemBC_EN.pdf</a></p><p>As reported by VMware’s Carbon Black, 8Base use <strong>Smokeloader</strong> and<strong> SystemBC</strong> in their intrusions:</p><blockquote>“8base uses SystemBC to encrypt command and control traffic and Smokeloader, which provided initial obfuscation of the ransomware on ingress, unpacking, and loading of the Phobos ransomware.”</blockquote><p>Cisco Talos follows this description with:</p><blockquote>“8base sample had been downloaded from the domain <strong>admlogs25[.]xyz</strong> — which appears to be associated with SystemBC, a proxy and remote administration tool. SystemBC has been used by other ransomware groups as a way to encrypt and conceal the destination of the attackers’ Command and Control traffic. 8base uses SystemBC to encrypt command and control traffic and Smokeloader, which provided initial obfuscation of the ransomware on ingress, unpacking, and loading of the Phobos ransomware.”</blockquote><h3>8Base Infrastructure</h3><p>Intel-Ops has been tracking a collection of infrastructure linked to 8Base. Attribution is based on file samples with .8base extensions communicating with a number of domains in the dataset. Naming conventions for domain names follow a similar format to those reported as 8Base as well as common attributes of the C2 infrastructure.</p><p>Within this dataset, we have identified Smokeloader and SystemBC samples. We will break this infrastructure into sections looking at domains, hosting and files.</p><p>The infrastructure tracked by Intel-Ops is presented in the following Maltego graph. The size of the node correlates to the number of outgoing links to downstream nodes. E.g. 8Base root node -&gt; IP -&gt; Domain -&gt; Communicating Files:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sYlSiVmVdnKKSDdB0QGiKA.png" /></figure><p>The above graph is a great way to identify how the infrastructure has been utilised by 8Base. We can see that there a number of domains and IP addresses more heavily utilised based on number of connections between domain — IP and domain — files submitted to VirusTotal. For example, the domain servermlogs27[.]xyz has been operational since at least October 2023 and demstat577d[.]xyz has been operational since at least July 2023 and have the most submitted files. However, there still remains a large number of domains and IP addresses linked to 8Base that have been active for a similar length of time, such as fexstat227[.]xyz on IP 46.36.218[.]224 which has only now seen a sudden surge in submitted samples in late February. As we will see in the next section, this infrastructure has been deployed and pre-operational since around June and July.</p><h3>Domains</h3><p><strong>Intel-Ops has identified 45 domains linked to 8Base.</strong></p><p>Of the 45 domains identified, 43 of them belonged to the .xyz TLD, with 2 belonging to the .net and .pro TLDs. Additionally, the domains ranged from 5–13 characters in length, with the average length being 9 characters long. 42 of the 45 domains also contained strings of 2–3 random numeric values appended to the end of the domain string.</p><p>Additionally, Intel-Ops used PassiveDNS records in VirusTotal to understand when the domains resolved to an A record:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WegZP3ztoeqX3xR_Ra4UYg.png" /></figure><p>As we mentioned, there was a lot of DNS changes for a relatively short period of time, with many domains cycling through IP addresses every couple of days. Then, in November, this stopped and the DNS activity has remained very static between domain and IP. This could indicate that we have observed all active domains we’re likely to see with this current cluster of activity.</p><h4>VirusTotal Scores</h4><p>Interestingly, despite the increasing notoriety of 8Base and its use of Smokeloader and SystemBC, detection of their domains used for command and control remains very low. 18 of the domains have 0 communicating files in VirusTotal which has no real bearing on detection rate. For example, zopte234[.]xyz has the joint highest detection but no communicating files. Interestingly, the domains without any numeric values have 0 VT detections or communicating files and remain parked since June 2023. The average VT detection score is <strong>10/89</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZuoTwM-6G8bQE6LNLYEvYQ.png" /><figcaption>Domain VT Detection Scores</figcaption></figure><h3>IP Addresses</h3><p>So where do all of our 45 IP addresses resolve to? Well, 22 IP addresses that are geo-located in <strong>Germany or Estonia</strong> hosted by 3 hosting providers: <strong>Hetzner, ITP-Solutions GmbH &amp; Co. KG and P.a.g.m. Ou.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/811/1*IfzrtfRE4EWgWofT74aZ9A.png" /></figure><p>When we inspect the detection rate for IP addresses in VirusTotal, there is a notable decline in any detection at all.<strong> 63%</strong> of IP addresses used by 8Base, as far back as July 2023, still maintain a<strong> 0 detection score</strong>, with no attribution to 8Base:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/1*g-2uFe5bs8Ti4br-dqhxFw.png" /></figure><p>These scores don’t mean that they haven’t resolved to domains or communicating files submitted to VirusTotal either. If we take the bottom two IP addresses in the above graph. 45.131.66[.]34 had two files submitted in September 2023 and has subsequently had 6 files submitted in February 2024. 45.89.127[.]23 has been the A record for admlogs85[.]xyz since July 2023 however, no files have been submitted. Alternatively, the top detected IP only has two submitted files in July 2023 and February 2024. The average VT detection score for these IP addresses is <strong>1/89</strong>.</p><h3>Communicating Files</h3><p>Of the<strong> 22</strong> IP addresses tracked by Intel-Ops, only <strong>10</strong> of them have communicating files submitted to VirusTotal. In total, we have identified <strong>50 </strong>unique file samples submitted to VirusTotal linked to Smokeloader <strong>(33)</strong>, SystemBC <strong>(16)</strong> and a singular Meterpreter payload.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/908/1*EjhRFQj7gNPTRCVs6Os35Q.png" /></figure><p>Let’s break this down by name:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1001/1*8_hXL_wwX9nEeI7YZXvmRw.png" /></figure><p>We took the communicating file names directly from VirusTotal and inspected the filenaming conventions you might expect to see in a compromised environment. There appears to be 2 clusters or files when observing naming convention. The first cluseter, and the most frequently observed are the files that contain the “111” string. The second, appears to be randomly generated files using just characters. There was no distinguishing difference between filenames and associated domain/IP communication.</p><p>So when were the files submitted?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QGYrYoScb1KwpXWIwzkf6g.png" /><figcaption>File Submission Dates in VirusTotal</figcaption></figure><p>Due to the timing of the CISA report, we’d expect to see an increase in activity from Phobos ransomware groups such as 8Base but this a massive spike in submissions, with 20 files submitted to VirusTotal for analysis on a single date: 26/02/2024. Our assessment is that its likely a single organisation such as CISA conducted analysis of submitted files as opposed to many victims all submitting on the same day.</p><p>So let’s bring it all together in a single timeline graph:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IYXWtcAiJSIhTvHDc0KL0Q.png" /></figure><p>When we pull the dates together from our various datasets to give us an idea of frequency of activity we can see that whilst active through the latter half of 2023, DNS activity appeared to match pace. However, after November that was a big lull in DNS changes and file submissions to VirusTotal. After a resumption of victim posts in January 2024, we see a very sharpe increase in submitted files to VirusTotal, confirming that our tracked infrastructure is still very active.</p><h3>Summary of Findings</h3><ul><li>Intel-Ops are tracking over <strong>45 domains</strong> linked to 8Base infrastructure, matching the naming convention of the <strong>3 domains</strong> reported by CISA.</li><li>Intel-Ops are tracking over <strong>22 IPs</strong> linked to 8Base infrastructure, hosted in <strong>Germany, Netherlands and Estonia.</strong></li><li>Intel-Ops have attributed <strong>50 unique malicious samples</strong> to 8Base infrastructure, of which <strong>33 unique Smokeloader</strong> samples, <strong>16 unique SystemBC</strong> samples and <strong>1 Meterpreter </strong>payload have been identified.</li><li>The majority of these samples were submitted to VirusTotal during <strong>February 2024.</strong></li><li>Despite the prolific and high profile attacks attributed to 8Base, the majority of this infrastructure remains <strong>undetected and unattributed</strong> to 8Base.</li></ul><h3>8Base Data Leak Site</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*s6U5Ky49-1M-Bk92hUJHxw.png" /></figure><p>At the time of writing this report, the 8Base ransomware group’s data leak site ishosted on the <strong>92.118.36[.]204</strong>, ISP: Alviva Holding Limited.</p><h3>Intel-Ops</h3><p>Intel-Ops actively tracks this infrastructure including any changes to provide proactive and timely detection of threat actor changes. We will soon be providing these via an curated Threat Intelligence feed. Additionally, we provide a training academy that provides a thorough syllabus to teach analysts how to track threats such as this.</p><p>Please reach out to: <strong>contact@intel-ops.io</strong> for more information.</p><h3>References:</h3><ul><li><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/deep-dive-into-phobos-ransomware/">A deep dive into Phobos ransomware, recently deployed by 8Base group</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/understanding-the-phobos-affiliate-structure/">Understanding the Phobos affiliate structure and activity</a></li><li><a href="https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/06/8base-ransomware-a-heavy-hitting-player.html">8Base Ransomware: A Heavy Hitting Player</a></li></ul><h3>IOCs</h3><p>IP addresses:</p><p>45.131.66.120<br>185.234.72.182<br>45.89.127.232<br>91.200.102.159<br>45.89.127.242<br>185.234.72.100<br>45.131.66.222<br>45.89.127.226<br>45.138.48.20<br>45.131.66.236<br>5.182.206.85<br>91.200.100.51<br>212.87.212.72<br>45.131.66.20<br>88.198.0.181<br>193.31.28.198<br>46.36.218.224</p><p>Domains:</p><p>gentexlog238.xyz<br>zopte234.xyz<br>moknex158.xyz<br>zxvad95.xyz<br>xemtex534.xyz<br>mkhexlogs215.xyz<br>mktexlog238.xyz<br>amx55.xyz<br>zxmextog23.xyz<br>mkstat227.xyz<br>sentrex219.xyz<br>mksad917.xyz<br>mktrex219.xyz<br>mxzex322.xyz<br>mentran450.xyz<br>moplex355.xyz<br>adstat477d.xyz<br>samnex158.xyz<br>fexstat227.xyz<br>fexstat257.xyz<br>servblog757.xyz<br>servermlogs27.xyz<br>blogxstat38.xyz<br>serverxlogs21.xyz<br>dexblog45.xyz<br>kmsox815.xyz<br>adstat277xm.xyz<br>amx15.xyz<br>cexsad917.xyz<br>admxlogs25.xyz<br>demblog289.xyz<br>admlogs85.xyz<br>kmstat355mx.xyz<br>demstat377xm.xyz<br>admhexlogs215.xyz<br>servxblog79.xyz<br>amx395.xyz<br>demstat577d.xyz<br>admxlogs215.xyz<br>amx75.xyz<br>mxtmx.xyz<br>blogserv.xyz<br>mexstat.pro<br>advserv.xyz<br>privat1505.xyz<br>piserver22.net</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=646560302a8d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[TA577 phishing campaign uses NTLMv2 handshakes to steal user credentials/hashes.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Intel_Ops/ta577-phishing-campaign-uses-ntlmv2-handshakes-to-steal-user-credentials-hashes-6c736ce1c2dc?source=rss-ec080b7b1632------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6c736ce1c2dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smb]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Intel-Ops]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Feb 2024 19:44:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-29T19:44:44.696Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this blog post, Intel-Ops will present the finding of our analysis into the infrastructure behind TA577’s recent phishing campaign utilising Impacket to capture NTLMv2 hashes and steal credentials.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rji0Wv6R-79m8c-iCo5mkA.png" /></figure><h4>Summary of Activity</h4><p>TA577, are a Russia-based threat group that have been reported to deliver payloads including Qbot, IcedID, SystemBC, SmokeLoader, Ursnif, and Cobalt Strike in ongoing phishing campaigns since 2020. More recently, they have delivered Pikabot and DarkGate malware. This week, it was reported by Deutsche Telekom CERT <a href="https://twitter.com/DTCERT/status/1762808435723145366">https://twitter.com/DTCERT/status/1762808435723145366</a> that TA577 have been sending .HTML files to make outbound SMB connections to file:// URLs to retrieve a file in an attempt to capture NTLMv2 handshakes.</p><h4>Analysis</h4><p>We also began with a notification from one of our students that they had observed this activity. This provided us with some initial indicators to begin our analysis with, referred to as true-positive IPs below.</p><p>Additionally, reading the Deutche Telecom tweet mentions that the tool Impacket used in this campaign uses 8-character strings.</p><p>Our first rule:</p><blockquote>services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:/.*<em>[A-Za-z0–9]{8}.*</em>/ and services.smb.negotiation_log.server_guid:0000000000000000000000000000000041414141414141414141414141414141 and not services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:workgroup</blockquote><p>The above rule looks for the <strong>SMB target_name</strong> of 8 alphanumeric strings, as reported by Deutsche Telecom and also adds the Server GUID, finally, we remove target_name’s with “workgroup”. This returns <strong>257 results.</strong> (Remove the workgroup for all Impacket servers).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TdMnl3ideQC_Lzusj_A9Hg.png" /></figure><p>Let’s first take a look at the ASN distribution:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AT-McLFCX6FcWEzdf6CLrQ.png" /></figure><p>Over half are hosted on the <strong>GLOBALWAYS ASN</strong>. Additionally there’s some ASNs in here we regularly see used by threat actors for malicious activity, e.g. <strong>ALEXHOST, STARK-INDUSTRIES, LIMENET, AS-CHOOPA etc.</strong></p><p>Now, we can pivot on the true positive IPs which we know have .html communicating files in VirusTotal.</p><blockquote><em>103[.]124[.]104[.]22</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>104[.]129[.]20[.]167</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>204[.]44[.]125[.]68</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>66[.]63[.]188[.]19</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>89[.]117[.]2[.]33</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>155[.]94[.]208[.]137 — only IP with a dns.name: shopsportswearamerica[.]com</em></blockquote><p>If we grab the SSH banner hash from these IPs, they are all the same. So we can add this to the hunt rule:</p><p>services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:/.<strong>[A-Za-z0–9]{8}.</strong>/ and services.smb.negotiation_log.server_guid:0000000000000000000000000000000041414141414141414141414141414141 and not services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:workgroup and services.banner_hashes=&quot;sha256:2bf2033dbf501c6d1f063e64b737f30c2ab11dd1fb2e65a7dd4b2a88c71f23e5&quot;</p><p>This returns <strong>27 results</strong>, capturing the <strong>6 true positive IPs</strong> we know have been used in the campaign. So we have 21 new IPs that may be connected. When sorted by ASN we can see our 6 true positive IPs sit in only 2 ASNs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AEpvyPZu_zP91dJOp_Msqg.png" /></figure><p>The other 2 IPs in these ASNs:</p><blockquote>103[.]124[.]104[.]76</blockquote><blockquote>89[.]117[.]2[.]34 — buysportswearusa[.]com</blockquote><p>As you can see .34 IP has a similar domain to 155[.]94[.]208[.]137, a true positive hit. Let’s break these down to dns.names. (The CyberChef recipe to remove the duplicate urls with “www.” and any “ec2” Amazon urls from the Censys report):</p><blockquote>files-adcb[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>account-office[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>activity-check[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>appshare-box[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>buysportswearusa[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>connect-bsigorup[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>docusignservice[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>google-gsuitecloud[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>hash[.]10dsecurity[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>info-zapp[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>laboratoriosprovets[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>levelbrin[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>mail2[.]linkindatafile[.]info</blockquote><blockquote>mail2[.]networthfundreport[.]info</blockquote><blockquote>matrix[.]lakeys[.]net</blockquote><blockquote>primrloock[.]org</blockquote><blockquote>redenservices[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>services-helpdesk[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>sevrice-now[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>shopsportswearamerica[.]com</blockquote><blockquote>test[.]vryno[.]dev</blockquote><p>Interesting that a number of the domains have a similar construction e.g. with “-” within the strings. Bear in mind, of the true positives so far, only 1 has an IP with a corresponding <a href="http://dns.name/">dns.name</a> result.</p><p>The other two interesting findings:</p><p>From the original 257 IPs, there are <strong>11 IPs</strong> with the http response response page which says <strong>“We’ll back soon..”</strong>, on <strong>port 80.</strong> There are only these 11 IPs with that banner hash in <strong>total</strong> on the internet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/442/1*lXhoVjLYYOr7aEEKe4o7tg.png" /></figure><p>Hunt rule:</p><blockquote>services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:/.<strong>[A-Za-z0–9]{8}.</strong>/ and services.smb.negotiation_log.server_guid:0000000000000000000000000000000041414141414141414141414141414141 and not services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:workgroup and services.http.response.body_hashes=&quot;sha1:4ad651cad39078157b64b3c2784fc5c78b8bc547&quot;</blockquote><p>From the original 257 IPs, there are 35 IPs with a login panel on port 80:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/636/1*IJ27R-ym_qa4-s-p9ZkxWQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/1*On-oItG3QIzzQhP_0lwTEg.png" /></figure><p>Only <strong>1</strong> of the IPs from our subset of <strong>27</strong> have this login panel: 54[.]36[.]229[.]25. <em>None of our true positives have this login panel</em>.</p><p>Hunt rule:</p><blockquote>services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:/.<strong>[A-Za-z0–9]{8}.</strong>/ and services.smb.negotiation_log.server_guid:0000000000000000000000000000000041414141414141414141414141414141 and not services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:workgroup and services.http.response.body_hashes:sha1:acbfa5f3e98deff0c4bbe7f652cfd3af13d57fc7</blockquote><p>There are 47 IPs in total on the internet with this login panel:</p><blockquote>services.http.response.body_hashes:sha1:acbfa5f3e98deff0c4bbe7f652cfd3af13d57fc7</blockquote><p><strong>The true positives either have no http port open/scanned by Censys or return a default Apache page. </strong>We can break these results down further by looking for IPs with the SMB matches and IPs running http with a default Apache page and SMB &amp; SSH. It seems of the <strong>6 we know are true positives, 50% have default Apache page and the other 50% don’t have port 80 open/scanned</strong>, but some have other ports like Netbios. In our new results we also identify 2 more IP addresses matching on 3 ports: SSH, HTTP, SMB.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6cE_uochlsSa8sHJotXesw.png" /></figure><p>And, again, they sit on the same 2 ASNs:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/809/1*yHwoJLrbiYqIPBc07dyyzA.png" /></figure><p>Hunt rule:</p><blockquote>services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:/.<strong>[A-Za-z0–9]{8}.</strong>/ and services.smb.negotiation_log.server_guid:0000000000000000000000000000000041414141414141414141414141414141 and not services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name:workgroup and services.http.response.html_tags=&quot;&lt;title&gt;Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page: It works&lt;/title&gt;&quot;</blockquote><p>After writing this, we saw this post: <a href="https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1762939815715058073">https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1762939815715058073</a> with the following hunt rule for TA577:</p><blockquote>same_service(services.smb.negotiation_log.server_guid=”0000000000000000000000000000000041414141414141414141414141414141&quot; and services.smb.negotiation_log.authentication_types=”1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2.10&quot; and services.smb.session_setup_log.target_name=/[a-zA-Z0–9]{8}/) and (autonomous_system.asn:142036 or autonomous_system.asn:200019 or autonomous_system.asn:8100 or autonomous_system.asn:207083)</blockquote><p>This rule singles out based on ASN and authentication types which we originally used in our hunt rules at the beginning of our searches. The authentication type:<strong> 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2.10</strong> is also still found on our<strong> 27 IPs</strong> in the narrowed rule so rounding by ASNs is really interesting, including the matching domain patterns as not all IPs have a matching domain pattern. We also assessed that these IPs may not have port 80 open or contained a default Apache webpage. However, now that further samples are being submitted to VirusTotal, it appears that these 4 ASNs are standing out as those used by TA577. It looks like you can chop the datasets up many ways and we did so by SSH banner hash, auth types, login panels and ASNs.</p><p>We really enjoyed conducting this analysis and comparing findings and results with other researchers.</p><h4><strong>Results (True Positive Starting IPs — VT communicating .html files)</strong></h4><blockquote>103[.]124[.]104[.]22</blockquote><blockquote>104[.]129[.]20[.]167</blockquote><blockquote>204[.]44[.]125[.]68</blockquote><blockquote>66[.]63[.]188[.]19</blockquote><blockquote>89[.]117[.]2[.]33</blockquote><blockquote>155[.]94[.]208[.]137</blockquote><h4>Cyber Chef Recipe</h4><p><a href="https://cyberchef.io/#recipe=Find_/_Replace(%7B%27option%27:%27Regex%27,%27string%27:%27%5Eec2.*$%27%7D,%27%27,true,false,true,false)Find_/_Replace(%7B%27option%27:%27Regex%27,%27string%27:%27%5E%5C%5Cn$%27%7D,%27%27,true,false,true,false)Find_/_Replace(%7B%27option%27:%27Regex%27,%27string%27:%27%5Ewww.*$%27%7D,%27%27,true,false,true,false)Find_/_Replace(%7B%27option%27:%27Regex%27,%27string%27:%27%5E%5C%5Cn$%27%7D,%27%27,true,false,true,false)Defang_URL(true,true,true,%27Valid%20domains%20and%20full%20URLs%27)&amp;input=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">https://cyberchef.io/#recipe=Find_/_Replace({&#39;option&#39;:&#39;Regex&#39;,&#39;string&#39;:&#39;^ec2.*$&#39;},&#39;&#39;,true,false,true,false)Find_/_Replace({&#39;option&#39;:&#39;Regex&#39;,&#39;string&#39;:&#39;^\\n$&#39;},&#39;&#39;,true,false,true,false)Find_/_Replace({&#39;option&#39;:&#39;Regex&#39;,&#39;string&#39;:&#39;^www.*$&#39;},&#39;&#39;,true,false,true,false)Find_/_Replace({&#39;option&#39;:&#39;Regex&#39;,&#39;string&#39;:&#39;^\\n$&#39;},&#39;&#39;,true,false,true,false)Defang_URL(true,true,true,&#39;Valid domains and full URLs’)&amp;input=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</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6c736ce1c2dc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[WikiLeaks Version 2]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Intel_Ops/wikileaks-version-2-8d380726c5df?source=rss-ec080b7b1632------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8d380726c5df</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wikileaks]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Intel-Ops]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:22:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-25T16:00:02.272Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the days leading up to the Julian Assange’s Extradition appeal at the UK’s Royal Courts of Justice on 20–21 of February, an unknown group registered and created WikiLeaksV2. The group state that “we are the followers of Julian Assange’s case, which has lived, lives and will live despite all the difficulties faced by the international organization WikiLeaks.” In this blog, Intel-Ops will analyse our finding of the WikiLeaksV2 site and present our findings.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/313/1*eLMjnMhbUBZKYrTyFd31QA.jpeg" /><figcaption>WikiLeaksV2 Logo</figcaption></figure><h4>BACKGROUND</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*asakycSxVB-WfL6SMBmsZg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Julian Assange has been in a UK prison since 2019 and is wanted by the US for disclosing secret military files in 2010 and 2011 to the site WikiLeaks that he founded in 2006.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z-_sgW4B3rL2zIUmZr1ZQQ.png" /><figcaption>WikiLeaks website</figcaption></figure><p>During this time, Assange posted documents on corruption in Kenyra, Tibetan unrest in China and drone strikes in Yemen. Along with the military documents posted in 2010, Wikileaks also published thousands of confidential documents supplied by Chelsa Manning, a former UK intelligence analyst. In 2019, US authorities charged Assange with 18 offences including breaking into its military databases following publications on the alleged killing of civilians by US forces in Afghanistan. In 2021, the UK High Court ruled that he should be extradited, dismissing claims that his poor mental health meant he might take his own life in a US jail. In 2022, the Supreme Court upheld that decision. Forward to February 2024 and Assange is again appealling the UK Home-secretary’s decision and court ruling to fight against the extradition to the US. The 5 day case is currently ongoin and a decision has yet to be determined.</p><p>Following the creation of WikiLeaks, it was reported in 2023 by the New York Times that over 50 spin-offs including BaltiLeaks, BritiLeaks, BrusselsLeaks, Corporate Leaks, CrowdLeaks, EnviroLeaks, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediapart">FrenchLeaks</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GlobaLeaks">GlobaLeaks</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Indoleaks&amp;action=edit&amp;redlink=1">Indoleaks</a>, IrishLeaks, IsraeliLeaks, Jumbo Leaks, KHLeaks, LeakyMails, Localeaks, MapleLeaks, MurdochLeaks, Office Leaks, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porn_Wikileaks">Porn WikiLeaks</a>, PinoyLeaks, PirateLeaks, QuebecLeaks, RuLeaks, ScienceLeaks, TradeLeaks, and UniLeaks have been created, something that the spokesperson of WikiLeaks, Kristinn Hrafnsson, has welcomed.</p><h4>WIKILEAKS VERSION 2</h4><p>On, 16th February 2024, the domain “wikileaksv2.com” was created with the registrar: NiceNIC.</p><p>“NiceNIC.NET is an ICANN, Verisign, Godaddy, HKIRC, gTLDs, ccTLD, new gTLDs Accredited Domain Registrar, and Hong Kong TOP Data Center,Alibaba Cloud, Baidu Cloud, Tencent Cloud cooperated Hosting &amp; Server Provider, founded in 2006, based in Hong Kong, China.” — <a href="https://nicenic.net/">https://nicenic.net/</a></p><p>The domain points to the IP address: <strong>31.41.244[.]100 </strong>which is Hosted on the ISP Cat Technologies Co. Limited, also registered in Hong Kong. The hosting provider is however, geolocated in Russia.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0goL8E2lHmywv_FPHL3hWw.png" /><figcaption>WikiLeaksV2 Webpage</figcaption></figure><p>The WikiLeaksV2 landing page features a very similar structure to the original WikiLeaks site. It includes a Featured section and a search bar. Additionally, the webpage has the same categories of information disclosure: “Intelligence, Global Economy, International Politics, Corporations, Government, and, War and Military”. However, the new addition on WikiLeaksV2 is the “Healthcare” category. It also includes the ability to Donate and submit data.</p><p><strong>WHO ARE WE?</strong></p><p>WikiLeaksV2 define themselves as long time followers of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks. They state that they believe countries have blocked “truthful information at all levels of legislative poster” and the corporations, public authorities and commercial companies are their own discretion on the public disclosure of information. They states the regardless of the outcome of the February 20–21 court hearing, they will continue to disclose and make available the truth to everyone. They state that they currently own 20TB of information which will gradually be published. A Twitter link and email address are also provided:</p><p>https://twitter.com/wikileaksv2</p><p>wikileaksv2@tuta.io</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OFN03pFoKDEpY6JDQAZzOg.png" /></figure><p><strong>LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTACTS</strong></p><p>WikiLeaksV2 has listed multiple US organizations, such as the Police, FBI, Intellectual Property Rights, Homeland Security etc. but interestingly, added the quick dial number for the Serbian Police. An interesting and unusual inclusion. Additionally, they ask visitors to the site to raise compaints about their data accuracy through two links:</p><p><strong>EU InterSoft Consulting:</strong> “intersoft consulting services AG specializes in consulting services in the areas of data protection, IT security and IT forensics.” based out of Germany.</p><p><strong>USA SEC (USA Securities and Exchange Commission: </strong>“Our mission requires tireless commitment and unique expertise from our staff of dedicated public servants who care deeply about protecting the investing public and others who rely on our markets to secure their financial futures”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/749/1*YrGrQVHj_ntxW22ccUkB6A.png" /></figure><p><strong>CONTACTS OF LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/746/1*BkldqCqaZoii-Y6dE1HCVQ.png" /></figure><p>Amusingly, the contact information for Organizations listed in the posted data is to a “law company” called Morgan&amp;Morgan in the USA. The link takes visitors to the following webpage for the company, who claims to be “America’s Largest Injury Law Firm”:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/528/1*-Q-sFamwE7df_c17DWkMMA.png" /></figure><p><strong>DONATE</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O9w3XnUEYl1rlLPfm9uOBQ.png" /></figure><p>For those inclined to donate to WikiLeaksV2 you can do so via Cryptocurrency. The site lists Bitcoin, Etherium and Tron cryptowallets to send payments to.</p><p>BTC bc1q9dxajsllwj8lh56punny6c63v2sx57fqkeyd94</p><p>ETH 0xe9DedeB549C79C8cd2A9e4a54ffD5B7f1531440d</p><p>TRX TSfqGNc1CZmGcNxtWRQtX1YHH6fHFf8NGQ</p><p><strong>SUBMIT</strong></p><p>They offer the option to send data via the website however, which this is not yet available, they provide an anonymous email address.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/752/1*gdYk8GaeZ0qTc2-nL6N7Aw.png" /></figure><p><strong>PUBLISHED DATA</strong></p><p>So what’s published so far on the WikiLeaksV2 site. Well, two organisations under the HealthCare: “Cardio Vascular Consultants” and “EyeDocs Ottowa”. The date of disclosure on the site are listed 22nd February 2024.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JUErf_CA0XuvOquS92OMpA.png" /></figure><p>And one organisation under “Corporations”: Wacoal, published on 21st February 2024.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5cebeVA5TOHH6kgHwCiCmw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Insider disclosure or Ransomware victim data?</strong></p><p>So did Wikileaks “get their hands on” confidential information and patient data via disclosure of concerned employees or did they acquire the information via another means?</p><p><strong>All three of these organizations appear on the Data Leak Site for Qilin Ransomware.</strong></p><p>Qilin, or Agenda, ransomware were first observed in July 2022.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oRb_dGsQJshMSY-pszrDWA.png" /><figcaption>Qilin Ransomware DLS</figcaption></figure><p><strong>CARDIOVASCULAR CONSULTANTS</strong></p><p>The Data differs on the two sites however, the operators of WikiLeaksV2 may have yet finished posting the data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*k-QkR6PFE43WLTyV0NmZsA.png" /></figure><p><strong>EYEDOCS OTTAWA</strong></p><p>The data published to WikiLeaksV2 is exactly the same, the group have unzipped the contents and published the files in a new .rar format.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vyX92Xr6FRLcXADa-21PkA.png" /></figure><p><strong>WACOAL</strong></p><p>The dataset published on both sites is of the exact same size.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3WKhDR9A4iZrn3irXZOj4A.png" /></figure><p>So far, it appears that the operators of WikiLeaksV2 have merely acquired already leak data from the Qilin Ransomware group, retrieving the already publicly disclosed data and republishing it to their website. No notable publications reside on the site at this point in time.</p><p><strong>SOCIAL MEDIA</strong></p><p>As mentioned already, WikiLeaksV2 also has a Twitter account: <a href="https://twitter.com/wikileaksv2.">https://twitter.com/wikileaksv2.</a> Currently, the account has very limited numbers of followers and whilst has posted their support for Julian Assange and his ongoing case, they have not yet linked visitors to their website which is still under development.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fHowki7v5KN_cjAyiG-sig.png" /></figure><p><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></p><p>It’s clear that this website was created by a group announcing their support for what appears to be Julian Assange’s last attempt to overrule the UK’s decision to extradite the founder of WikiLeaks to the US. However, unlike WikiLeaks, this site appears to merely disclose the data of 3 victims of Qilin Ransomware, whose data was already accessible from the Data Leak Site of the ransomware group. However, the operators of WikiLeaksV2 have gone through lengths to create a Twitter profile, listed cryptowallets, and create their website. As the we move towards a decision, it will be interesting to see what further information is listed on this site.</p><h4>References</h4><ul><li><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-68302206">Julian Assange: Australian politicians call for release of WikiLeaks founder</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiLeaks">WikiLeaks - Wikipedia</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8d380726c5df" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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