<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jim Hao on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jim Hao on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@Jimrhao?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 03:51:55 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@Jimrhao/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Vertical Value Creation Vis-a-Vis VCs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/why-verticals-vex-vcs-82d506233892?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/82d506233892</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vertical-saas]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jul 2024 21:13:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-03T15:21:14.284Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*uQVDRf58tsZ1Kib8" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@firassu?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Firas Wardhana</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>There are many reasons why vertical SaaS is an attractive business model. My partner Andrew wrote in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/the-resilience-of-vertical-software-816e329cb3f8">The Resilience of Vertical Software</a> that vertical SaaS can better align with an industry’s needs, help streamline operations and drive profitability, enable skilled employees to make better decisions, and drive deeper more contextual and meaningful relationships with end customers. The specificity of the vertical solution is at the core of the value creation. However, when it comes to attracting outside funding, that specificity can also create challenges for traditional VCs.</p><p><strong>Ultimately there are key philosophical differences in building a vertical business vs. a horizontal one, as well as structural limitations of VCs that can make vertical software and traditional VC a tough fit.</strong></p><p>To explain, it helps to have a baseline understanding of what VCs are trying to accomplish. I’ve written about <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/vc-economics-and-why-fund-size-matters-to-companies-2c990d665867">VC Economics And Why Fund Size Matters To Companies</a>:</p><p><em>There’s a rule of thumb in traditional early stage VC that </em><strong><em>each investment must have the potential to return the entire fund</em></strong><em>. That’s typically what it takes to account for the high failure rates of investing in private, illiquid, unprofitable, early-stage startups […] for a $100M fund, every investment (of 15–30 total investments) should have the possibility of generating $100M of gross returns to the fund. For example, if the investor’s average ownership is 10% by the time of exit (which is generous — most would be happy with 5% after dilution), then working backwards, </em><strong><em>the underwritten exit needs to be $1B</em></strong><em>. If the investor doesn’t believe the market, product, or team can support that possibility, they can’t reasonably invest without changing their underwriting model.</em></p><p>Venture capital is at its best when taking cutting edge technologies with world-changing potential, e.g. AI today in 2024, web3 in 2021, smartphones in the enterprise circa 2010, cloud computing dating back to 2006, and applying those technologies broadly across sectors of the economy to find the “killer application(s).” The way to create VC-scale value in these types of businesses typically involves heavy amounts of funding before meaningful commercial traction, as well as the need to “cast a wide net” by selling <em>horizontally</em> to multiple industries at once. It’s not unusual to see a Seed or Series A company testing into 5–10 different end markets simultaneously (some of these may end up becoming vertical businesses). <strong>As such, it’s not a huge stretch to say that VCs back (horizontal) solutions looking for problems.</strong></p><p>On the other hand, <strong>the way to create value in a vertical is the opposite: first by understanding problems at a deep level, and then by bringing to bear the best of available technology to solve those problems. </strong>The biggest of those vertical problems prove enduring; the same problems today existed 20 years ago, and will exist in another 20 years. Take for instance the ever-present coordination problem of labor, materials, GCs, subcontractors, owners, insurance, and govt permitting in the construction industry. This is why you’ll often see actual practitioners from the industry start vertical tech companies to solve the problems they understand at a very deep and personal level.</p><p><strong>There’s a big difference in how you orient your strategy and team when building vertically vs. horizontally. That difference also has implications for the capitalization and exit strategy.</strong></p><p>Practically speaking, conversations between a vertical SaaS company and a traditional VC tend to center on TAM and TAM expansion in order to find the $1B exit opportunity (since few industries lend themselves to $1B+ tech outcomes by themselves). For example, if you have a SaaS solution for physical asset mgmt designed for the airline industry, the question from VCs is if the platform can be extended to other settings with physical assets such as manufacturing plants, warehouse/logistics operations, hospitals, and the like.</p><p>Of course TAM expansion is a key part of business strategy whether vertical or horizontal. But it pays to be cautious in expanding beyond the beachhead so that the core product in the core market doesn’t suffer from the company being spread too thin. Therefore it pays to find investors who align around creating value in verticals — ultimately centered around understanding problems at a deep level, and then piecing solutions together. <strong>This can be a tough with traditional VCs who would prefer you expand markets faster, but may be a better fit with vertical-specific VCs or growth equity firms.</strong></p><p>Granted, there have been plenty of vertical SaaS companies that have received venture funding and done well. And there are plenty of AI copilots for verticals that are getting venture funded today, e.g. for lawyers/paralegals, insurance underwriters, property managers, clinical decision support for doctors, etc. These can work if the company and investors are aligned on the method of building value around problems. See Andrew’s post on why <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/ai-is-not-the-death-of-vertical-saas-32b9f0ea0fa1">AI is Not the Death of Vertical SaaS</a>.</p><p>Furthermore, there are a handful of examples of multi-billion market cap public vertical software companies, e.g. Procore in construction, Shopify in eCommerce, Mindbody in salons and fitness, and Toast in restaurants to name a few. Some companies and investors point to these as reasons to seek VC funding for verticals. But the number of vertical companies among the top public SaaS companies pales in comparison to the number of horizontal ones that achieve much higher market capitalizations.</p><p>However you choose to build a vertical software business, it pays to have people around the table aligned around understanding specific industry problems first and foremost, and then putting together the best that technology and services have to offer to solve those problems.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=82d506233892" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/why-verticals-vex-vcs-82d506233892">Vertical Value Creation Vis-a-Vis VCs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Customer-Level P&L: When To Say No To Customers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/customer-level-p-l-when-to-say-no-to-customers-a768f35c4765?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a768f35c4765</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2023 17:35:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-17T17:35:34.639Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*RnBb6vu5C1hCkF1P" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@andytoots?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Andy T</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Startups and entrepreneurship are all about finding ways to say yes and make things happen, including and especially the types of things people say can’t or won’t work. Status quo, mediocrity, and taking no for an answer are antithetical to people drawn to startups. Indeed, startup success and rapid value creation come from dynamism, optimism, and the ability to get to yes.</p><p>In addition, an often overlooked skill of the best startups and entrepreneurs is the ability to say no. No company can be all things to all people, especially on a startup budget, and so the ability to focus (even maniacally), avoid distractions, and say no to everything but the core mission is critical to success. That means saying “no we can’t get three more engineers; we have to reprioritize our roadmap and make do;” or “no we’re not getting into the [shiny object feature] the sales team keeps pushing us on;” or “no we’re not pursuing leads in [industry or segment] because they are not in our ICP.”</p><p>Among these, it’s hardest to say no to people who pay your bills: customers and investors. But it’s exactly here where startups can go off the rails by tying themselves to bad agreements with customers (we’ll tackle investors in another post).</p><p>In pursuit of growth and rapid value creation, startups SHOULD “bend over backward” to understand a customer’s strategic priorities and tactical workflows, identify champions and stakeholders and their budgets, and work to deliver something better (10x better) than the status quo. They should NOT bend over backward to cater to every whim and vicissitude of the customer in order to make them happy. Customer happiness is obviously important, but ultimately <strong>happy, valuable customers pay you for your good or service</strong>.</p><p>So where does one draw the line when a customer — big or small — starts tipping into annoying, hard to work with, never satisfied, or generally gives the sense that there is no finality to their asks of the company’s resources?</p><p>This is where it’s helpful to analyze customer-level profitability. Pretend the business has one customer. Build a P&amp;L with just that customer’s revenue as the top line and just that customers’ share of variable and fixed costs (roughly COGS and operating expenses) underneath. If possible, start tracking the amount of time CS and product teams spend with them. Make note of how much time and energy YOU spend with that customer. Assign costs to the team’s fractional time and calculate the customer’s profitability.</p><p>This is a different from a LTV/CAC/payback analysis that determines how to deploy sales and marketing resources in order to get to yes (i.e. win business). On the other hand the customer P&amp;L analysis helps figure out when to say no (i.e. reset or end the relationship).</p><p><strong>A common result of the customer P&amp;L analysis is finding that the customers you think are your best customers may actually be your worst customers</strong>, causing you to hemorrhage time, money, and energy. At that point the only thing that can be done is resetting the relationship, ending it, or simply establishing boundaries by saying no.</p><p>Another common finding is that a smaller customer or customer segment that may not use a lot of support resources is actually the most profitable, has expansion potential, and therefore should be treated more flexibly.</p><p>A side benefit of the customer P&amp;L is finding money in the form of less than optimally-utilized team capacity. Firing a customer or charging them more to cover support costs can have the same impact on a team’s capacity as hiring more people. In fact, there’s no better exercise to determine the productive capacity of a company’s main asset — it’s people.</p><p>I’ve seen companies lulled into a sense of security with steady growth and large happy customers until a big customer churns or threatens to churn. The knee jerk reaction is to discount the contract to prevent a full churn. A few of these discounts pile up, growth slows, burn increases, and suddenly no one is sure what to do. Spending money to reignite growth doesn’t work. Not spending on growth to reduce burn doesn’t work either due to high expense load.</p><p><strong>In these situations, it’s not the end of the world to deliberately shrink the business temporarily in order to scale on more solid foundation with profitable customers.</strong></p><p><strong>You must get better before getting bigger.</strong></p><p>In summary, customers must generate profits for the company to remain customers. Customers that generate consistent losses are not and cannot be customers; they are charity cases.</p><p>Ultimately, startups are an exercise in doing more with less, in harnessing the creativity, innovation, and urgency of the opportunity to achieve more than previously thought possible. They must get the most out of their resources, and they must know when to say no.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a768f35c4765" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/customer-level-p-l-when-to-say-no-to-customers-a768f35c4765">Customer-Level P&amp;L: When To Say No To Customers</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Down Rounds & Recaps: When & Why to Push the Reset Button]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/down-rounds-recaps-when-why-to-push-the-reset-button-61a37450a963?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61a37450a963</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[down-round]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cram-down]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pay-to-play]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[recaps]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Apr 2023 17:33:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-26T19:32:53.965Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*C0u_ckD1SZm_CaDK" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@chilinik?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Nikita Kostrykin</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Putting an equity financing round together is about to get more complicated than many founders and investors have ever seen. Attracting investors is hard enough in good times. Now add the complication of down rounds, cram downs, pay-to-plays, and other forms of recaps, and you may be facing the most challenging fundraise of your life. But you’re not alone, and you shouldn’t fear what’s coming.</p><p>In this article I’ll explain what down rounds, cram downs, pay-to-plays, and other forms of recaps are, when and how they come up, and <strong>why it may actually be smart to seriously consider them instead of avoid them</strong>.</p><h3>Why we’re here</h3><p>The reason we’re having this discussion in Q2 2023 is because we are coming out of a historically heavy funding cycle into a historically light one, as this chart from a recent <a href="https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/venture-trends-q1-2023/">CB Insights</a> reports shows. The reality many founders and investors see on the ground is even more bleak.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*J4Z-v0xyDz8cBmFu.png" /></figure><p>When times are good, capital is cheap, and valuations only go up, it’s relatively easy to put together a financing round. The pie (the valuation) grows and there’s something for everyone. The only pitched battles are between investors fighting for allocation in oversubscribed rounds. But what happens when the pie stops growing or starts shrinking?</p><h3><strong>Why there are 200+ pages of legalese per deal</strong></h3><p>VC/PE deals are more complicated than most people realize. A closing binder for a priced preferred equity round is <strong>200+ pages of downside protection. No one needs 200+ pages to spell out what happens when things go well.</strong></p><p>In times like this downside protections can emerge as down rounds, cram downs, pay-to-plays, and other forms of recap. Furthermore, because unprecedented amounts of capital went into startups over the past few years at historically high valuations, there is an even greater likelihood of encountering these now that the capital markets have rapidly cooled. For a primer on the points below, see Matt Levine’s Bloomberg Opinion article <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-04/private-markets-don-t-like-to-go-down">Private Markets Don’t Like to Go Down.</a></p><h3>Down Rounds</h3><p>The most common anxiety when the capital market outlook turns negative is the down round. This happens when the current share price dips below the last round price. The tough part about times like this is a down round can actually happen while a business has grown in revenue. Many founders are discovering that they raised pre-product pre-seed rounds in 2020–2021 at higher valuations than they could raise at today with substantially more market traction.</p><p>Down rounds trigger a host of negative reactions. For one, current investors avoid them because they require investors to “mark down” their investments to the new round’s share price. Another consequence is they can scare away new investors because <strong>few like to “catch a falling knife.”</strong> Team morale can also suffer as employees question their job security and the value of their options.</p><p><strong>However, the actual mechanism of effecting a down round isn’t so bad.</strong> Most companies using standard NVCA documents have “broad-based weighted average anti-dilution.” Rather than effecting a “full ratchet” (repricing the last round to the current round), the “partial ratchet” of the BBWAAD mechanism takes into account the gap between the last round price and current round price, as well as the amount of shares issued at the current round price, to adjust the preferred price at the slight expense of the common stock. The effect, while a bit complicated to model, is not as bad as you may think.</p><p>Most companies and investors try to avoid a down round if at all possible, causing them to pause fundraising until revenue catches up, or the financing environment recovers to when the last valuation was set. <strong>Sometimes they’ll raise a “non-priced” convertible note or SAFE to avoid a down round. More on this later.</strong></p><p>By contrast, <strong>a down round may be the right thing to do, and shouldn’t be treated like it’s the death of the company. </strong>Being overvalued will eventually catch up to you in the form of a failed financing. I’ve written about this in a blog post titled <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/how-to-value-your-startup-fb3b4fb6fc28">How To Value Your Startup</a>:</p><p><em>The more you can do to make the VC’s internal discussion about the merits of the business itself, and the less “I like the company but I don’t like the terms,” the faster you will get to a yes, and the sooner you can go back to building your business, talking to customers, iterating on your product, and growing the fundamental value of your business.</em></p><p>So if there’s an opportunity to reset the valuation and increase the chance of success at the next round, now is the time to seriously consider taking the medicine early. Financing deals only get more complicated the more parties you add to the mix over time. <strong>At a certain point people throw in the towel and walk away from deals they deem too complicated.</strong></p><h3>Cram Downs</h3><p>A more complicated version of a down round involves “cramming down” the preferred shareholders. Like the down round, the cram down can actually be a good thing for the company. In fact, it is generally in the common stock’s interest, and can offset some of the anti-dilution impact from a down round.</p><p>For context, the more a company raises, the greater the liquidation preference on the company, which is the capital first in line to get paid out in a modest exit. The more money a company raises at ever higher valuations, the more likely an exit pays out “liq pref” instead of proceeds from converted stock, since the “conversion point” gets pushed ever upward. <strong>So in a perverse way, the higher the valuation, the more the preferred equity functions like debt.</strong></p><p>This is especially important when the founders and employees who hold common stock are “underwater,” meaning an exit today would pay them nothing after the liq pref is satisfied. This can demotivate the founders and team unless action is taken to cram down the preferred stock. Expect to see cram downs for companies getting serious about setting themselves up for success.</p><h3>Pay-To-Plays</h3><p>One way to cram down the preference stack is with a pay-to-play. These come into play when a company financing isn’t going well. The company and lead investor “entice” existing preferred holders to invest their pro rata of the current financing round, or else be converted to common stock.</p><p>In addition to reducing the liq pref “overhang,” savvy lead investors invoke the pay-to-play as a way to reduce the “freeloader” problem of one investor investing capital to save the company while the other investors don’t.</p><p>Generally speaking, pay-to-plays, while adding complexity to already tough deals, are to the benefit of the company by diluting the influence of passive investors and increasing the influence of the common stock and active investors. However, they are difficult to put in place as investors typically object to them unless they are out of options.</p><h3><strong>Other Forms of Recaps</strong></h3><p>Coming out of the last cycle, a lot of cap tables are very inefficiently used, which can lead to problems outlined in my post <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/founder-vesting-other-company-killing-capitalization-problems-26ece7202c9">Company Killing Capitalization Problems</a>.</p><p><strong>The principle of efficient capitalization says that you only get 100 points of cap table and they should be used to maximum effect to incentivize value creation.</strong> Good cap table management means minimizing the portion of the cap table that is “dead weight,” meaning locked up and inoperative. Practically speaking, this means granting points to effective people and clawing them back from ineffective or departed people.</p><p>A common blunt instrument to recap a company is to do a large option pool top-up to be immediately granted to the executive team and key employees. It’s not unheard of to see a 25% pool created specifically for this purpose, meaning the rest of the shareholder (investor) base takes 25% additional dilution.</p><h3>Why you can’t avoid this with “non-priced” convertible notes and SAFEs</h3><p>At this point some of you will say “Who needs 200+ pages of priced preferred equity docs when you can avoid pricing a company with a convertible note or SAFE?” Indeed, the main benefit of convertible notes and SAFEs is they are faster and cheaper to put in place because they don’t have hundreds of pages of downside protection to be negotiated. <strong>However, using a convertible note or SAFE for the express purpose of avoiding a down round is fighting fire with gasoline.</strong></p><p>The primary disadvantage in uncertain times is that <strong>a convertible note or SAFE has full ratchet anti-dilution</strong>, meaning it automatically reprices to at most the next round price - with no broad-based weighted-average mitigating mechanism. <strong>Nowhere in the docs is it written as “full ratchet anti-dilution” because it’s inherent in how it works.</strong></p><p>To illustrate, a $5M SAFE at a $50M cap (10% dilution if converting at the cap) converting in a $25M valuation priced round automatically reprices to $5M at a $25M valuation (20% dilution). On the contrary, a standard priced preferred equity round of $5M at $50M post-money (10% dilution) would likely reprice to somewhere between 10% and 15% dilution depending on the amount raised at $25M valuation. Only the latter is a down round, but it’s the one you’d probably prefer as a founder. By the way, <strong>notice how there is a valuation “cap” but not a valuation “floor” on convertible notes and SAFEs?</strong></p><h3>Push the Reset Button</h3><p>All else equal, it’s better to bite the bullet and do the down round sooner than later. It’s completely normal for a public company valuation to decrease, so founders shouldn’t think of a down round in the private markets as being abnormal.</p><p>When paired with certain necessary and advisable cram downs and other forms of recaps, the end result can actually be favorable for everyone. Ultimately it’s a chance to reset the company and cap table for the present reality, and to shed any baggage from a bygone era.</p><p>Those who get smart quickly and take decisive action will come out stronger and execute more confidently into a generational value creation opportunity ahead. On the other hand, those who kick the recap can down the road and cling to their paper valuation of the past may have a tough time finding their footing.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61a37450a963" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/down-rounds-recaps-when-why-to-push-the-reset-button-61a37450a963">Down Rounds &amp; Recaps: When &amp; Why to Push the Reset Button</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Product & Tech: The Board Meeting Back Burner]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/product-tech-the-board-meeting-back-burner-b6887eaab0a2?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b6887eaab0a2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2023 19:50:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-25T19:50:59.405Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2fYs-STK5L9kSBVh" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@henrykobutra?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Henry Kobutra</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>I’ve always found it foreboding in board meetings when sales and fundraising get the lion’s share of the discussion time while product and tech are rarely discussed. In my observation, the more time spent on sales and fundraising, and the more product and tech are relegated, the more sales and fundraising suffer and the more time HAS to be spent on sales and fundraising, thereby creating a vicious cycle of hyper vigilance on sales when the problem actually lies elsewhere…</p><p>So as sales and fundraising slow down along with broader economic growth as of the time of this writing in January 2023, I’ve been thinking about the board discussions to come and how product and tech, and the companies that excel in them, may be poised for a comeback.</p><p>Continuous product innovation is an undervalued element of high-growth, high-tech companies. A few thoughts:</p><p><strong><em>(1) Without continuous improvement in product, startups will flatten and die.</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>(2) Product and tech don’t get enough attention in VC/PE-backed companies.</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>(3) Good products are easier to sell than mediocre or bad products.</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>(4) Customers need to be wowed, not invited to a game of feature bingo.</em></strong></p><p><strong>(1) Without continuous improvement in product, startups will flatten and die.</strong></p><p>The lifeblood of a high-tech, high-growth startup is continuous innovation in product and technology. As obvious as it sounds, it’s worth remembering that a startup can’t grow without having something to sell that’s worth buying, AND buying <em>continuously.</em></p><p><strong><em>Product and technology are NOT one-time investments made in the early days, and then amortized over the life of the company.</em></strong></p><p>It’s common to see some variation of the chart below (source <a href="https://openvc.app/blog/funding-stages-pre-seed-series-a">here</a>) spelling out various stages of a company’s growth beginning with pre-seed funding for product development, then seed funding for building out the go-to-market team, then Series A or a growth round for “fuel on the fire” rapid sales execution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vM6Fg6NgacuEXKg0" /></figure><p>While charts like this are a useful high-level roadmap for the lifecycle of a high growth technology company, it’s possible to interpret them literally and act as if there is an exclusive period for product development early in the life of the company, followed by an exclusive period for scaling sales.</p><p>Instead, product development needs to be a continuous process even in large and successfully scaling companies. Nowadays the cost of product development and delivery is low and falling — and the pace of innovation and competition is fast and rising — leaving even less room for sitting still and getting complacent.</p><p>When it comes to product, there is excellence and mediocrity. And in high-growth startups, mediocrity is a direct path to death.</p><p><strong>(2) Product and tech don’t get enough attention in VC/PE-backed companies.</strong></p><p>A common danger in VC/PE-backed companies is deprecating medium-and long-term investments in product, technology, and overall company health in favor of short-term investments in sales, revenue growth, and next round fundraising. <strong><em>I’ve even heard it said that real product innovation stops at the Series B.</em></strong></p><p>The flow of most startup board meetings, especially with VC/PE backing, is to start with sales and related KPIs (if not fundraising). Then come marketing, customer success, and business development. Investors can get pretty granular in this section and go over the allotted time with tons of questions for the VP Sales and VP Marketing around pipeline progress, quota attainment, upsell potential, partner channel sales, etc.</p><p>After the sales and marketing leaders are dismissed, the product and technology leaders, who are often told to be available at a certain time and then called in much later that that, then come in and have to rush through their slides. After animated energetic discussion during the sales portion, there isn’t always a lot of energy in this portion which can be in hour 3 of 4. Whatever topics they don’t get to have to be discussed over dinner or be sent in a follow up deck after the board has dispersed.</p><p>The “discussion debt” tends to build up in product and tech and, if not caught by discerning eyes, can lead to problems down the line: low gross margins, excess engineering time spent on bug fixes or CS instead of new feature delivery, or new engineering hires quickly becoming demoralized by the tech debt or documentation debt, and not shipping code from the first weeks on the job.</p><p>In my experience, most investors are not technical (I’m not either) and therefore don’t naturally think about product and tech. But even for the technical ones, it’s often easier to perform the board oversight function by looking at quantifiable sales metrics to conclude that things are working or not than by evaluating progress in product and tech with it’s less quantifiable metrics.</p><p><strong><em>I advocate every other board meeting to flip the order of the topics so if sales goes first one time, product goes first the next.</em></strong> It’s a simple change that sends a message to the board and executive team that product is at least as important as sales and financing.</p><p><strong>(3) Good products are easier to sell than mediocre or bad products.</strong></p><p>Another obvious statement is that good products are easier to sell than bad or undifferentiated products. Not only do customers love good product; sales people do too!</p><p>As such, when sales are slow, the pressure is on to press and replace sales and marketing leaders for immediate results (if the sales people don’t churn themselves). However, it pays to look further into product and tech. At least some of the time the sales team’s complaints about the product and tech are true. No one else in the organization is going to know as fast as sales if there’s a problem with the product.</p><p>But while sales can be tuned quarter to quarter, product takes much longer to change direction and show clear results, especially if attempting to build extensible products on outdated or monolithic architecture.</p><p>One thing to keep in mind is that <strong><em>while growth is valuable to investors, product is valuable to customers</em></strong>. To illustrate, it’s generally not that effective to win discerning, profitable customers by touting the company’s growth and funding on a sales call, especially if there isn’t any “wow” factor in the product. If anything, it invites the customer to ask for deep discounts on the basis that the product is effectively “venture subsidized.”</p><p><strong>(4) Customers need to be wowed, not invited to a game of feature bingo.</strong></p><p>What is the “wow” moment in a demo? Figure out what that is and get to it ASAP. The customer probably doesn’t care to be taken through an exhaustive tour of the whole platform on a first call. Overly scripted demos that begin with a blunt BANT questionnaire tend to waste precious time to capture a prospect’s imagination of what their day-to-day workflow could look like with productivity gains from truly differentiated products.</p><p>One of my pet peeves is playing feature bingo with a prospect. For instance, having lengthy discussions on “Do you have this feature that so-and-so competitors have?” or more directly, “How is your feature better than so-and-so competitor’s?” Feature bingo conversations tend not to convert, or to convert in pricing wars in a market segment without a “wow” product. If there’s isn’t a “wow” moment, it may be the wrong prospect on the demo.</p><p>Another pet peeve is raising capital with the express purpose of playing catch up on the feature bingo card vs. better-funded or further-ahead competition, rather than for building or extending the product into new areas that few have excelled in. Companies need to continue delivering the “wows” to stay ahead.</p><p>To conclude, product and tech should be paid at least as much attention as sales and marketing, and fundraising. If the latter activities slow down in a slower market cycle, then the former may just get their chance to shine.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b6887eaab0a2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/product-tech-the-board-meeting-back-burner-b6887eaab0a2">Product &amp; Tech: The Board Meeting Back Burner</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Five Practical Tips for Startup Financial Modeling]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/five-practical-tips-for-startup-financial-modeling-3151d488eb15?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3151d488eb15</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-model]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-modeling]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Feb 2022 17:38:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-08T17:38:29.699Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yt77XLLjysiqOjFZ" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@rechaoktaviani?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Recha Oktaviani</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>I often get the question during annual planning season and fundraising discussions of how to build an effective financial model.</p><p>I actually really enjoy the exercise of financial modeling because it forces everyone to think about their goals, hopes, and dreams for the business in a more structured manner. It opens up a ton of discussion on inputs, outputs, the role of luck, and the risk-reward tradeoff we all make on a daily basis. There’s also something to interacting with your business on paper in a 2+ dimensional responsive format, rather than just linearly as if in conversation.</p><p>I personally approach financial modeling with the goal of making it a useful exercise with the key deliverable being a financial model in Google Sheets or Excel that has <strong>ongoing operational value</strong>. Not something you do once a year, drop in a pitch deck, and never look at again.</p><p>To that end, a financial model should be five things: (1) ambitious, (2) achievable, (3) personally motivating, (4) easily understood, and (5) built by YOU.</p><h3>(1) Ambitious</h3><p>That a startup financial model should be ambitious is self-explanatory. It should aim high and not be overly afraid of failure. Everyone should feel like their capabilities will be stretched to achieve it, and everyone should expect to grow from achieving it. This is why we got into startups, right?</p><h3>(2) Achievable</h3><p>An ambitious model doesn’t carry any practical weight if it’s not realistically achievable. Financial modeling shouldn’t be a throwaway hour one spends in Excel or Google Sheets doing a rudimentary exponential growth function on current revenue, and then dropping an output chart in a deck to show investors. That’s not only a waste of time, it can also strain credibility.</p><p>The reason I care about financial models is because I assume a company will roughly staff and spend to the plan they show me. If there’s no rational basis to believe the inputs in the plan (i.e. spend) correlate to the outputs in the plan (i.e. growth), or if there isn’t a plan at all, then staffing and spending into the void are a recipe for disaster. It’s worth spending real time on a financial plan even if its just projecting the next 6–12 months.</p><p>The ultimate test of whether a plan is achievable is if the leadership team and investors would sign up to it to guarantee the outcome at a 75–90% level of confidence.</p><p>Earlier in my career I worked closely with a company that repeatedly missed their plans to the point that it was demoralizing for the company no matter what it achieved, and the investors could no longer trust their ability to execute or even understand their own business. A mentor at the time asked the company for their “pinky plan” meaning the financial plan they would chop off their own pinky for if they didn’t achieve it. We finally got a dramatically shaved down plan. The company achieved it, built trust with their investors and confidence in themselves, and got to keep their pinkies.</p><h3>(3) Personally Motivating</h3><p>Another tip I picked up along the way is a financial plan can be both ambitious and achievable, but if it isn’t personally motivating for the founders, leadership team, or broader team, then it isn’t ready to be the go-forward operating plan. This can happen when a business has multiple shareholders with different interests. See my post on <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/vc-economics-and-why-fund-size-matters-to-companies-2c990d665867"><strong>VC economics and why fund size matters to companies</strong></a> for an explanation on why shareholders can become misaligned.</p><p>If you’re being pushed or pulled toward certain goal outcomes or metrics that you aren’t excited about, then it’s not a plan worth signing up for.</p><p>And speak up if this is the case because when you take on institutional investors at the Series A or later, the financial plan typically needs to be board approved and will be the stick for which you are measured against and held accountable. It’s also how you will hold your team accountable, determine bonuses, etc.</p><p>If you’re not excited by it, you’re not likely to succeed in putting it into action.</p><h3>(4) Easily Understood</h3><p>I strongly caution against building complex models with dozens of tabs, especially at the early startup stage. The more complication and tabs you add, the harder it is for anyone including yourself to understand it. When this happens your financial model loses its value as an operating model.</p><p>While there are myriad of variables that impact your business, you should really build a model around at most 1–3 key variables. Every business can be distilled down to the key 1–3 things that will largely determine the success of the business. You’ll know what they are.</p><p>Furthermore, the bigger the company gets the more people who will need to be able to wrap their head around the model quickly. <strong>Resist the urge toward “tab creep.” You will thank yourself later.</strong></p><p>It’s like Mark Twain’s famous quote “If I had more time, I would have written a shorter letter.”</p><h3>(5) Built by YOU</h3><p>With all due respect to outsourced CFOs and bookkeeping firms, you really should build and “own” the financial model internally.</p><p>It’s way more important that you build and control the main levers of your financial model than it is to have something precise- and professional-looking with 50 inscrutable tabs built by a recovering investment banking analyst whose incentive is not to simplify themselves out of a job.</p><p>Much of the output from these outsourced financial models are actually really interesting summary analytics on historical performance. Take these for what they are: analytics and intelligence, but not the internal operating model.</p><p>In addition, the financial model doesn’t have to be connected into your accounting and bookkeeping systems at all. It should be informed by it and regularly evaluated against actual results, but it does not need to be precise on every expense category. Better to build from scratch and think holistically about your fixed and variable costs than to build off something designed for a different purpose (bookkeeping).</p><p>Most importantly, you can’t let someone outside your company bottleneck your day-to-day, hour-to-hour discussions that require financial modeling. I’ve worked with companies where I’ve built the model and therefore become the “owner” of the model, which meant I was relied upon to run the math on what outputs could be expected from what inputs, or what inputs would be needed to achieve certain outputs. Sometimes I would be able to successfully hand over the model and then extract myself, but other times the transition never happened and my day job as a VC with a dozen other company responsibilities added a day or week to what needed to be a much more nimble process.</p><p>Own your model.</p><p>In summary, financial modeling doesn’t have to be a crazy stressful process that takes hours of your precious time away from customers to spend buried deep in Excel. Some of the smoothest functioning organizations I’ve worked with have had dead simple two-tab financial models.</p><p>If you follow these five tips to make your financial models (1) ambitious, (2) achievable, (3) personally motivating, (4) easily understood, and (5) built by YOU, you too can have a nimble finance and strategic planning function that serves to accelerate your business.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3151d488eb15" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/five-practical-tips-for-startup-financial-modeling-3151d488eb15">Five Practical Tips for Startup Financial Modeling</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What Is the “Right” Amount To Raise?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/what-is-the-right-amount-to-raise-4fa0162aedf4?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4fa0162aedf4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Jul 2021 20:24:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-26T20:24:27.829Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*X5qwZXcHBsQrOsRX" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@thegraphicspace?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">The Graphic Space</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Imagine you are back in high school at 17 years old. You’ve gotten into the college of your dreams and are now figuring out how to pay for it. You’re probably partially financing your education with a private loan from your local bank. You run the numbers and go in asking for $20k. Your loan officer says “$20k is alright, but you should really take $40k. That will allow you to have more fun, get better housing, afford better food, and go on fun trips with your new friends — all <em>essential</em> parts of the college experience.” …Wouldn’t that set off alarm bells in your head?</p><p>Now imagine you’re gearing up for a fundraise for your startup. Things are going well and you have a real business case to accelerate growth with outside capital. You run the numbers and come up with $1M to accomplish your goals. You meet with VCs who say “$1M is alright, but you should really raise $3M. That will allow you to grow faster, hire more people, and have more runway — all <em>essential</em> parts of building a great business.” …Are any alarm bells going off this time?</p><p>The purpose of the analogy above is to establish a limiting principle to raising capital. Just like how you wouldn’t take out as much debt as is offered to you, you shouldn’t raise as much equity as is being offered. That’s because the more money you raise, the greater the expectations and potential burden on the company, and the less flexibility you have to operate (see our post on <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/the-opportunity-cost-of-capital-68e3488bfaff"><strong>The Opportunity Cost of Capital</strong></a>). Therefore it’s worth considering raising less even when VCs around you encourage you to raise more. Keep in mind that VCs are incentivized to deploy capital (see our post on <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/vc-economics-and-why-fund-size-matters-to-companies-2c990d665867"><strong>VC Economics &amp; Why Fund Size Matters To Companies</strong></a>).</p><p>So what is the “right” amount to raise? What follows is a brief description of certain pros and cons of raising more and raising less, as well as key laws of physics concerning growth in startups:</p><ol><li><strong>There are only so many people you can effectively hire and onboard while scaling your culture of hustle, grit, and creativity that got you your success to date.</strong></li><li><strong>There is a <em>non-linear </em>relationship between the amount of money you set out to raise and the time investment on your part required to do it.</strong></li><li><strong>Every dollar of incremental capital raised beyond what is “right” for the business is at a higher cost of capital than if you were to raise it later with more traction and less fundamental business risk</strong></li></ol><h3>Raising More</h3><p>There are certainly benefits to raising more capital. You can spend more money on more things and therefore increase the throughput of product development and sales. If all goes well, this raises your enterprise value above what you could have accomplished without capital, and beyond the effect of dilution from the raise.</p><p>Sometimes raising more isn’t just recommended but is absolutely necessary in a hot market where the competition has raised huge sums of capital. In these situations, capital by itself doesn’t guarantee success, but it can at least allow you to fight fire with fire.</p><p>However the benefits of raising and spending more capital are limited by certain laws of physics. The most important law is <strong>there are only so many people you can effectively hire and onboard while scaling your culture of hustle, grit, and creativity that got you your success to date.</strong></p><p>A common harbinger of doom (or less dramatically, of mediocrity) is when a company has raised too much, runs into growth plateaus, can’t find effective places to spend their money, and the VCs start pushing them to spend money in the hopes it can reignite growth. Soon after, the founders start solving problems by throwing money at them in the form of more hires, instead of using the grit, hustle, and creativity they’d previously used to get them to that point, thereby kicking off the slow death of the startup culture, and eventually of the company’s edge in the market.</p><p>This is what it means when people say startups die of bloat more than starvation.</p><h3>Raising Less</h3><p>A key benefit of raising less is that the fundraise goes faster, sometimes much faster, and you can get back to building your business sooner. This is because <strong>there is a <em>non-linear </em>relationship between the amount of money you set out to raise and the time investment on your part required to do it.</strong></p><p>There’s a well-known dynamic in fundraising where few people jump in at the start of a fundraise without social proof, but then everyone wants in at the end when a round becomes fully subscribed, especially if a brand-name investor is leading.</p><p>To illustrate, a $500k commitment for a newly opened $1M round is 50% of the remaining amount to raise, while only 25% of the remaining amount to raise for a $2M round. However, psychologically there’s a bigger difference between being half raised and a quarter raised, and that difference could be worth weeks to months of founder time investment in the fundraise. In fact, it’s likely that a company crosses $1M raised faster in a $1M fundraise than in a $2M fundraise (assuming raising from the same type of investors), hence the non-linearity of time investment in fundraising.</p><p>If $1M is the “right” amount to raise, then incremental time spent raising the second $1M isn’t just time poorly spent, but is also capital raised at a needlessly high cost. If you are optimistic about the future of your business, then it follows that <strong>every dollar of incremental capital raised beyond what is “right” for the business is at a higher cost of capital than if you were to raise it later with more traction and less fundamental business risk</strong>. If there isn’t a clear place to invest additional capital with reasonable expectation of ROI, then you shouldn’t raise it.</p><p>However, raising too little can be futile if the amount isn’t enough to invest in anything meaningful as a business, doesn’t provide enough runway to see those investments through, or isn’t enough to justify that certain fixed amount of time and money required to do all the legal and administrative things you need to do for any size of fundraise.</p><p>Ultimately there is no broadly prescriptive “right” amount to raise. But it’s typically less than what you may initially think you need, and almost certainly less than what most VCs will tell you that you need.</p><p>By understanding the pros and cons of raising more or raising less, as well as key laws of physics surround growth and fundraising, you can make an informed decision that feels right to you.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4fa0162aedf4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/what-is-the-right-amount-to-raise-4fa0162aedf4">What Is the “Right” Amount To Raise?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[VC Economics And Why Fund Size Matters To Companies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/vc-economics-and-why-fund-size-matters-to-companies-2c990d665867?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c990d665867</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[signaling-risk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[alignment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fund-size]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Mar 2021 20:15:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-20T16:22:06.293Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IJaREWq8EAlme4Ba" /><figcaption>Different size tools for different size jobs</figcaption></figure><p>One of the biggest challenges of fundraising is finding the right fit in an investor. This can come down to alignment on a number of points: business objectives, personal values, personality fit, or simply gut feel. It’s important to get this right, as <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/founder-vesting-other-company-killing-capitalization-problems-26ece7202c9">capitalization issues can stop a growing company in its tracks</a>.</p><p>Important as it is, the investor vetting process can take a lot of founder time away from customers, product, and team-building. A couple things that can help focus the process are an <strong>understanding of VC economics</strong>, and the simple heuristic of <strong>fund size </strong>to determine alignment. Fund size is a decent proxy for fit for three main reasons: (1) matching the definition of success, (2) attention from the investor, and (3) avoidance of signaling risk.</p><p><strong>VC Economics</strong></p><p>We’ll start with a short primer on one aspect of VC economics. There’s a rule of thumb in traditional early stage VC that <strong>each investment must have the potential to return the entire fund</strong>. That’s typically what it takes to account for the high failure rates of investing in private, illiquid, unprofitable, early-stage startups. Failure rates, depending on the definition used, range from 25% to 50% for early stage VCs. The surviving portfolio companies therefore have to generate outsized returns to hit the 3x distributed cash target net of fees and expenses that VC funds aim for over their lifespan.</p><p>So for a $100M fund, every investment (of 15–30 total investments) should have the possibility of generating $100M of gross returns to the fund. For example, if the investor’s average ownership is 10% by the time of exit (which is generous — most would be happy with 5% after dilution), then working backwards, the underwritten exit needs to be $1B. If the investor doesn’t believe the market, product, or team can support that possibility, they can’t reasonably invest without changing their underwriting model.</p><p>This dynamic drives the (in our opinion) unhealthy and unstainable hunt for unicorns. Furthermore, as competition among VCs drives entry valuations and consequent exit expectations up, it creates a “lottery ticket” strategy of portfolio management. In other words, encourage everyone to shoot for the moon…or blow up on the launch pad. <strong>That risk appetite is easy for a VC with dozens of bets, but is very different for a founder who has a portfolio of one. </strong>This is the key point to understand about where investors and founders can become misaligned.</p><p>There’s a lot more to be written about how VCs operate and what that means for companies, but I’ll save those points for future posts.</p><p><strong>Matching Definition of Success</strong></p><p>In light of the primer on VC economics above, it logically follows that the smaller the VC fund, the more likely it is that a win for the company is a win for the investors, and delivering a win for everyone is a prerequisite for a company’s successful outcome.</p><p>A $50M exit can be the lucrative culmination of years of hard work and sacrifice for the founding team, as well as a big win for the early investors, but can be disastrous for investors with larger funds who were counting on a bigger outcome, especially if they invested at a $10M valuation or higher (yes, a 5x often isn’t enough). To use the framework above, if the investor owns 10% at a $50M outcome, that’s $5M of proceeds. If they’re investing out of a $100M fund, that’s only 5% of their capital returned. That’s a tough one for investors because it means $95M still needs to get made back from the rest of the portfolio (without even generating a profit on the fund), now with one fewer shot on goal.</p><p>Furthermore, each subsequent round of equity funding typically involves larger checks from larger funds, which both raises the bar for when a win is a win for all the investors (although not linearly as later stage investors don’t need to underwrite to fund returners), and gives more of the cap table to the preferred equity investors to block a sale below that bar. Eventually the bar gets so high that it’s quite literally “IPO or bust” as the mechanism for VCs to realize a profit on their investment. This is what people mean when they liken raising VC to a “hamster wheel.” It’s great when it works out, but can get messy in the 99% of cases when it doesn’t.</p><p>Our recommendation is to work with investors who would be thrilled with an outcome that matches your current expectations. As your company grows and you eye a larger prize, then bring on an investor with a larger fund size with the means and motivation to drive toward the larger goal. At least this is how things used to work before the rise of large multi-stage firms taking “FOMO flyers” or “lottery tickets” in early companies.</p><p><strong>Attention from the Investor</strong></p><p>The other reason fund size is important is what it means for companies in terms of resources and support from the investor. Larger, more established funds tend to have more resources for their portfolio companies, but those resources get used up quickly as their portfolios grow, and get concentrated in companies that are larger positions for the fund (“needle movers”).</p><p>Even if the shared goal is to drive toward a large outcome befitting the larger fund, a smaller company is naturally going to get less attention from a larger fund. Anyone who’s worked with large service providers knows this dynamic. Some excellent large funds get around this by investing in dedicated staff or technology for their portfolio companies, essentially operating more like companies than VC firms.</p><p>This natural dynamic of larger funds is usually not a problem for companies that run fairly independently, but it can come with a big potential negative in the form of signaling risk at the next fundraise.</p><p><strong>Avoidance of Signaling Risk</strong></p><p>Signaling risk is the risk that an investor known to lead inside rounds in their portfolio companies decides not to lead the next round for their company, thereby causing outsiders to wonder if something is wrong with the company. Put simply, if insiders aren’t buying, why should outsiders buy?</p><p>In the VC world where information is relatively scarce, signal of any kind is very important. VCs especially look for signal in what other VCs are doing. This can feel silly and frustrating for companies who go out to raise and get the question “who else is investing?” until someone decides to lead, after which “signal investors” clamor for allocation (if they like the signal) or pass (if they don’t).</p><p>The reason fund size relates to signaling risk is that plenty of large firms take “FOMO flyers” (“lottery tickets”) on small deals that they treat as options toward leading a larger raise that’s closer to their core strategy. They’ll even pitch it as a benefit to the company by saying “we can quickly and easily write a small check, and <strong><em>if things work out</em></strong> we can lead your next round, and that way you don’t have to pitch new investors (their competition).” If things don’t work out it’s a small loss to the large investor — a small price to pay for the option to back a big winner.</p><p>The flip side is this can be disastrous for the company when the firm doesn’t step up to lead the next round, especially when a fundraise is necessary to avoid insolvency. There’s less signaling risk when working with investors focused at the current stage of the company. And by the way, those large multistage firms will always be there later.</p><p>Ultimately, while going fast and breaking things is a great mantra for scaling, it pays to slow down and get things right when it comes to who you let onto the cap table (since you can’t fire your investor).</p><p>In conclusion, an understanding of basic tenets of VC economics suggests that companies pay special attention to fund size when choosing an investor. And while fund size is a simple heuristic to narrow the investor funnel, it is not a substitute for spending real face-to-face time with an investor to really feel out the fit.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c990d665867" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/vc-economics-and-why-fund-size-matters-to-companies-2c990d665867">VC Economics And Why Fund Size Matters To Companies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Founder Vesting & Other Company-Killing Capitalization Problems]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/founder-vesting-other-company-killing-capitalization-problems-26ece7202c9?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/26ece7202c9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dilution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[founder-vesting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2021 16:05:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-18T16:05:13.274Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ytXGndczVZINAbMl" /><figcaption>Budding success or budding problem?</figcaption></figure><p>There’s nothing more frustrating than seeing a company with so much momentum hit a wall due to (foreseeable) capitalization issues. These issues often lurk below the surface and then ambush the company at the most inopportune times — while fundraising, selling the business, making key hires, or in a routine business decision among shareholders.</p><p>What follows are a few examples of momentum-killing capitalization issues, how they manifest, and some methods to resolve them. I’ll focus on the three most common ones I see: (1) lack of founder vesting, (2) too much founder dilution, and (3) overvaluation.</p><p><strong>Lack of Founder Vesting</strong></p><p>Lack of founder vesting can kill a promising startup in its early stages when a founder in a 2+ founder business leaves early, thereby taking a huge chunk of the cap table with them without a way for the company to get it back. This leaves the remaining founder(s) in a difficult situation where they continue to work for the company to achieve the same result on a per-share basis as the founder who left. This can breed resentment that in itself can kill a company.</p><p>It also creates problems for investors if they think the remaining team doesn’t have enough skin in the game due to a large “dead weight” on the cap table from the departed founder. Investors are particularly sensitive to this risk because if founders are insufficiently incentivized and ultimately leave, then the investors are the ones left holding the bag.</p><p>If not immediately fatal, lack of founder vesting combined with a founder departure hampers the company’s ability to use it’s 100 points of cap table to the greatest effect to bring on talent, thereby necessitating additional cash comp or dilutive equity grants to make up the difference.</p><p>One way to resolve the issue is a retroactive founder vesting agreement giving credit for work done, but subjecting the remaining equity to time-based vesting — similar to the vesting schedules found in most ESOPs. But this is much harder to put in place if a founder has already left the business with all of their equity and therefore has little incentive to sell it back as they won’t be vesting it due to no longer working for the company.</p><p>The reality is co-founders often leave the businesses they found. It need not be acrimonious — life or professional events happen that cause people to reevaluate their priorities and then very naturally transition out. In recognition of this possibility, it’s worth putting founder vesting in place as an insurance policy to protect the company, and by extension, the remaining value of the departed founder stock. If everyone sticks around for the duration of the vesting period (e.g. four years), then they get the full value of their equity even if they depart later.</p><p><strong>Too Much Dilution</strong></p><p>Continuing on the theme of thinking about company capitalization as a limited resource for incentive compensation, another potentially company-killing problem is too much dilution.</p><p>Success on a traditional hyper-growth venture path involves taking on a fair amount of dilution. At 20% dilution per round, it’s possible for founders to lose majority control of their company after a Series A if they’ve done a pre-seed, seed, and seed extension leading up to it. But while founder ownership will decline over time as investors and employees join the business, the idea is the value of the remaining founder holdings should appreciate with each successful fundraise (i.e. the proverbial smaller piece of a bigger pie).</p><p>The problem appears when the dilution and loss of control is not counterbalanced by the growing value of the company, such as when the company stumbles, pivots, or runs into an exogenous event. In these instances the expected value of a founder’s holding may be so low relative to other things they could be doing (i.e. a traditional job), that it creates a principle-agent problem for investors and shareholders similar to what can happen without founder vesting.</p><p>One solution is a recap initiated by an investor evaluating the business (if they don’t simply pass due to the complexity of it). Investors will typically ask to shift company shares away from existing investors and toward the founding team in order to keep the key operators motivated. This is not an easy thing to do as existing investors are (rightfully) protective of their equity, and can lead to difficult but necessary conversations.</p><p><em>A word of advice on recaps: if it’s looking like you’re going to need a recap to get your business funded and your team motivated, it is always better to do this sooner and in one fell swoop than later in multiple attempts should one recap prove insufficient. Anytime it feels like there’s a reset in the business (e.g. a pivot) is a good time to look at the capitalization and determine if it too needs a reset.</em></p><p><strong>Overvaluation</strong></p><p>Another common capitalization problem is raising capital at a high valuation and then not being able to support it or grow into it. I’ve written before about how <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/how-to-value-your-startup-fb3b4fb6fc28">too high of a valuation can make it difficult to raise the next round</a>.</p><p>This hurts most when cash is running down to the point where the company needs to raise another round to stay solvent, but for various reasons the terms from the market are not attractive, or require much more time in the fundraising saddle, thereby taking time away from growing the business. A valuation disconnect is most commonly due to company underperformance, but can also be due to exogenous factors.</p><p>If investors continually pass on valuation, then it’s worth an internal conversation with existing investors and other shareholders to figure out if a flat or down round may be warranted to reset the valuation closer to the company’s performance and the market conditions in order to attract additional funding. Similar to the recap scenario described above, these can be incredibly painful discussions and can involve a lot of complex legal and structuring issues, but if resolved the company lives to fight another day.</p><p>In conclusion, a necessary condition for a fast-growing, resilient company with motivated founders and competitive talent is careful coordination and alignment of interests between founders, investors, and employees as part of the company’s overall capitalization.</p><p>This is the proverbial foundation for the company to rise. As cracks appear in the foundation, it’s critical that capitalization issues get diagnosed and addressed immediately, and not pushed aside until something collapses.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=26ece7202c9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/founder-vesting-other-company-killing-capitalization-problems-26ece7202c9">Founder Vesting &amp; Other Company-Killing Capitalization Problems</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What’s Really in an Acquisition Offer: A Basic Guide To M&A]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/whats-really-in-an-acquisition-offer-a-basic-guide-to-m-a-736766ba662e?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/736766ba662e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[acquisition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mergers-and-acquisitions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jan 2021 16:37:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-22T04:00:01.013Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qBr1Iqa_v5oTdZsV" /><figcaption>Just when you thought it was safe to go back to the negotiating table…</figcaption></figure><p>When is a $10M acquisition offer not really a $10M acquisition offer? All the time. Almost never does a $10M acquisition mean you are going home with your pro rata share of $10M.</p><p>In addition, an M&amp;A process is a major distraction to a business and takes precious founder time away from building compelling products, long-term customer relationships, and motivated teams. How can you be sure it’s the right thing for you?</p><p>What follows is a brief explanation as to why a $10M offer isn’t what it seems, as well as what to look out for before starting down the path with a potential acquirer. <strong>Part I</strong> deals with the key terms of an offer, <strong>Part II</strong> explains the liquidation waterfall, and <strong>Part III</strong> discusses the common pitfalls of M&amp;A processes and how to avoid them.</p><p><em>Special thanks to </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/cooper-overcash-2609b8104/"><em>Cooper Overcash</em></a><em> for reviewing and improving this post from his perspective of an M&amp;A lawyer. Cooper has an excellent blog on corporate topics </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/cooper-overcash-2609b8104/detail/recent-activity/posts/"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><h3>Part I: Key Terms</h3><p><strong>Company Consideration vs. Aggregate Employment Agreement</strong></p><p>Oftentimes the headline number on an acquisition offer doesn’t reflect the actual consideration paid to shareholders; instead it could mean the total theoretical value of the employment agreements for the retained employees. For example, $10M could mean nothing for the company itself and $2.5M in cash and stock compensation over the next 4 years of anticipated employment (more commonly referred to as an “acqui-hire”). Acquirers generally prefer this approach as pushing purchase price into compensation allows them to realize a tax deduction on the employment piece.</p><p><strong>Cash vs. Stock</strong></p><p>Whether an acquirer offers cash or stock typically depends on which is more abundant. It’s also common to have a mix of both, for example $3M cash and $7M stock. The tricky thing about stock is it’s up to you to determine the absolute and relative value of another private company’s stock. This includes factoring in things like transfer restrictions and liquidation rights which can greatly impact the value of the received stock. In general, the acquirer tends to overestimate the value of their stock while underestimating the value of yours. Cash offers are more straightforward.</p><p><strong>Upfront vs. Earn-out</strong></p><p>Another way to slice an acquisition offer is by upfront vs. deferred consideration. Acquirers prefer as much consideration to be deferred as possible. This can take the form of an earn-out stipulating a key business metric to be achieved in a set amount of time in order for the consideration to be fully released to the shareholders, thereby motivating the key team members from the acquired company to continue contributing to the go-forward entity.</p><p>There’s another major consideration here for founders, which is what happens if you’re fired from the acquiring company and lose out on both your salary and portions of your earn-out. Sellers should try to have as much “control” over the metric set for the earn-out as possible, or at least agree on the accounting or internal method to calculate the metric ahead of time.</p><h3>Part II: Liquidation Waterfall</h3><p>Another set of reasons why a $10M acquisition offer doesn’t result in your pro rata share of $10M has to do with the liquidation waterfall of your company. As a founder holding common stock, you are typically last in line to get paid.</p><p><strong>Creditors vs. Shareholders</strong></p><p>First in line in any liquidation or change in control are creditors (and within the stack of creditors there’s a pecking order too). These include venture debt investors, non-converted convertible notes, and any founders or employees who have leant money to the business.</p><p><strong>Preferred vs. Common</strong></p><p>Next in line after creditors are the holders of preferred stock that haven’t converted into common. These are your VCs who usually have some form of a liquidation preference, meaning they get the greater of some multiple of their invested capital or their pro rata portion of the proceeds to common stock, or both.</p><p><strong>Transaction fees: banker, escrow agent, etc.</strong></p><p>If you have a banker involved they are usually paid a portion of the total purchase price. There’s others in here too such as escrow agents.</p><p><strong>“Normal Working Capital”</strong></p><p>Normal working capital often throws people for a loop who aren’t used to seeing it, and who correctly recognize it as an effective reduction in the agreed-to purchase price. Acquirers want to take over the business with enough cash to pay a normal level of expenses, therefore they often set a minimum amount of cash that needs to be in the accounts at the time of the transaction. Otherwise there’s an incentive for the sellers to chase receivables and push payables, leaving the acquirer without enough cash to sustain a normal level of operation. Obviously the higher the normal working capital requirement, the less effective consideration for the company so this is often a negotiated point.</p><p><strong>Escrow and Expense Funds</strong></p><p>Every deal has some amount of “hold back” that goes into an escrow and/or expense fund managed by an independent third party to be released when a certain amount of time has passed. This in a nutshell is to ensure the obligations of the merger are met. It’s also there to fund any prevailing claims against the deal or parties to it. If there’s no issues the escrow and expense funds will be released to the acquired company. But you don’t want an overly large portion of the proceeds you were promised to be sitting out there for long.</p><h3>Part III: Common Pitfalls</h3><p>Beyond the complexities of deal terms and the liquidation waterfall, there’s a unique set of business risks inherent to M&amp;A discussions.</p><p><strong>Non-binding LOIs</strong></p><p>After initial conversations to establish a potential fit, the first official step of an M&amp;A process is a non-binding LOI — analogous to a term sheet from an investor. LOIs are typically binding on the company in the form of an exclusivity period restricting the company from entertaining other acquisition or fundraising offers until the diligence process is complete. Aside from an NDA for information gathered during the process, <strong>they are not typically binding on the acquirer.</strong></p><p>This means that, for an acquirer, there is no legal penalty for doing deep and time-consuming diligence, learning about a business (and potential competitor), and then walking away from the table for any reason. If an acquirer walks, the company can be left in a situation where the other bidders have moved on. Worse, the business can easily slow due to the distraction of diligence. This can allow acquirers to “recut” their acquisition price at the finish line since they know the dynamics will have shifted in their favor.</p><p>For larger deals there may also be breakup fees on the company, meaning if the company fails to complete the transaction they will owe money to the acquirer. Less commonly there may be reverse breakup fees that the acquirer pays to the company.</p><p>This is all to say companies should carefully diligence their potential acquirers in early conversations before the LOI stage. Likelihood of completing a deal should be weighed alongside likelihood of a high bid when choosing to move forward with one party.</p><p><strong>Information Leaks</strong></p><p>There’s also the risk of information leaking that you’re in acquisition discussions. This can bring you unwanted attention and compound your distractions. Competitors can seize on the information and use it to sell against you in competitive opportunities (“they are getting acquired and deprioritized while we are here to support you”). VCs may also react negatively if they think M&amp;A discussions are a sign that they shouldn’t be buying if the insiders are selling.</p><p>The wider the process, the more bidders and associated parties, and the longer it takes, the greater the risk of a leak.</p><p><strong>Shareholder Disputes</strong></p><p>It goes without saying that the key company stakeholders should be on the same page about an acquisition. This requires an honest internal discussion on what constitutes a “win” for everyone involved. Keep in mind that a win for a founder or early investor may be a suboptimal outcome or even a failure for a later stage investor. In some cases a later stage investor may have the ability to block a sale that doesn’t provide them a win.</p><p>Alignment is also important because merger agreements (the final execution docs after the LOI) will require a certain high threshold of shareholder consent so as to minimize the chance that minority shareholders hold up the deal or come out of the woodwork to make claims against escrow.</p><p><strong>Insolvency</strong></p><p>Another thing to discuss is backup plans in case an M&amp;A process doesn’t work as planned. If the company isn’t profitable, then it’s imperative to plan for cuts or bridge financings to avoid a doomsday situation where an acquirer walks and the company risks insolvency.</p><p>The stronger your financial position (a strong balance sheet, profitability, or both), the stronger your negotiating position, and the more likely you are to have a successful outcome.</p><h3>In conclusion…</h3><p>In M&amp;A discussions it can be difficult to discern what is genuine interest and what is a fishing expedition for your proprietary information. As with most things in business, it pays to have a healthy level of skepticism (<em>“only the paranoid survive”</em>).</p><p>To reiterate, don’t jump at big numbers, don’t go too deep before doing your own diligence, make sure your investors are aligned with you (work toward a deal where everyone wins), and — importantly — always have a backup plan.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=736766ba662e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/whats-really-in-an-acquisition-offer-a-basic-guide-to-m-a-736766ba662e">What’s Really in an Acquisition Offer: A Basic Guide To M&amp;A</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Reformation Partners 30/50 Rule of DTC Efficiency]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/reformation-partners/the-reformation-partners-30-50-rule-of-dtc-efficiency-88a3953bebdc?source=rss-a4ab9caef768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/88a3953bebdc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[customer-acquisition-cost]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ltv]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cac-payback]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Hao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2020 15:53:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-09T15:53:36.200Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fa_7GkmcS-6N24OdE8MT3A.png" /></figure><p>In years of working with DTC companies selling everything from contact lenses to bed sheets to hair loss meds, eveningwear, and prepared meals, we noticed a pattern around unit economics that correlates with efficient growth. We call it <strong>The Reformation Partners 30/50 Rule of DTC Efficiency</strong>, or in short, <strong>The 30/50 Rule</strong>.</p><p>The 30 refers to the dollars of gross profit net of CAC on first order. The 50 refers to the cumulative dollars of gross profit net of CAC within the first year. Companies that achieve $30 gross profit net of CAC on first order and follow that up with $50 cumulative gross profit net of CAC within the first year are well positioned for rapid and efficient growth.</p><p>As long as companies get close to The 30/50 Rule, keep their overhead lean (see post on <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/dont-be-afraid-of-outside-agencies-d53ad7e1f957"><strong>utilizing outside agencies</strong></a>) and their working capital cycle tight (see post on <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/the-importance-of-working-capital-in-dtc-startups-7cb1f12568fe"><strong>working capital cycle</strong></a>), they can run a fast growing, efficient DTC company with relatively little need for outside capital.</p><p>It’s important to note that not every great company gets to these thresholds, especially very early on when they don’t have much scale to maximize their margins, but they are good aspirational figures like the Rule of 40 is for mature software companies.</p><p>This is an analysis we run on every DTC company we evaluate, and we wanted to share both the methodology and a link to <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/15Ji5EsC811xWsN4-iOSUGtU3GR8cwQZCASfc332X6-A/template/preview"><strong>The Reformation Partners 30/50 Rule Google Sheet Calculator</strong></a>. Simply input over the red highlighted cells and the sheet will auto-calculate.</p><p>Aside from calculating the 30/50 Rule, the calculator can also be used in reverse to determine the CAC envelope, e.g. how high CAC can go based on payback goals (higher CAC means longer payback). This can help inform where to set a CAC limit on Facebook Ad Manager.</p><p>The calculator requires just four inputs: Initial AOV, fully-loaded GM, blended CAC, and a first year monthly cohort repeat curve. Many of our readers will know what to input, but for clarity I’ve defined the terms below.</p><p><strong>Initial Average Order Value:</strong> Take the total dollar value of all first time orders divided by the total number of first time orders. Make sure to count multiple items in the same order as one order. Don’t do overall AOV as it may skew your CAC math, and any rise or fall in AOV over time will be captured separately in the dollar repeat curve anyway.</p><p><strong>Fully-Loaded Gross Margin:</strong> Include all variable costs including labor, fulfillment to customers, and credit card processing fees. If in doubt, put it in variable costs. Don’t run this analysis with just your product margin. The idea is to set your variable net profit against your fixed overhead.</p><p><strong>Blended CAC:</strong> Take all variable marketing spend and divide by all new customers acquired, including organically or off Facebook (don’t take Facebook’s paid CAC metric on face). Some of your spend will inevitably be on reacquiring existing customers but that’s fine for this analysis. Attribution and targeting is hard.</p><p><strong>Monthly Cohort Weighted Average Dollar Repeat Curve:</strong> This one is a mouthful and takes some work. I usually go into Shopify raw data and manually engineer the data file to give me a weighted average monthly cohort repeat rate. More recently I’ve discovered tools like <a href="https://apps.shopify.com/lifetimely-lifetime-value-and-profit-analytics"><strong>Lifetimely</strong></a> and <a href="https://apps.shopify.com/glew"><strong>Glew.io</strong></a> in the Shopify App Store that automate this entirely. I’d recommend getting one of these since this is an important analysis to run all the time to determine LTV <em>(disclosure: I’m not an investor in these other than Shopify, this is not an ad, I just like their tools)</em>.</p><p>A few notes on calculating LTV and related metrics like CAC payback and LTV/CAC:</p><ul><li>For our LTV and CAC payback analysis we use a weighted average cohort repeat rate that looks like a curve instead of a rolled up monthly repeat rate like what’s shown in the standard Shopify dashboard. The curve is more accurate than the straight line extrapolation for LTV and CAC payback analyses.</li><li>The cohort view is also more useful because it shows which customers are contributing which orders at any given time. That way you can track particular acquisition or retention campaigns, or even variances in product between cohorts.</li><li>We tend not to look much at LTV/CAC ratio as a metric because it relies on too many out-year assumptions for an early stage company. More on this topic in our post on why <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/why-cac-payback-is-more-important-than-ltv-cac-ratio-fb3c8eeb4066"><strong>CAC payback is a better metric than LTV/CAC ratio</strong></a>.</li><li>Last note on methodology: don’t confuse Lifetime Revenue (LTR) with Lifetime Value (LTV = LTR * GM). LTV needs the gross margin factor to properly figure out when you are paid back on CAC and how much to spend on CAC. If you use LTR instead of LTV you run the risk of overstating the return on marketing spend.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=88a3953bebdc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners/the-reformation-partners-30-50-rule-of-dtc-efficiency-88a3953bebdc">The Reformation Partners 30/50 Rule of DTC Efficiency</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/reformation-partners">Reformation Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>