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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Matthew O&#39;Neill on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Matthew O&#39;Neill on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Matthew O&amp;#39;Neill on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Free-Will in a Deterministic Universe: A Brief Introduction to Compatibilism.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Kant_Pun/free-will-in-a-deterministic-universe-a-naive-introduction-to-compatibilism-c368eae7d42e?source=rss-7560b6caf413------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew O'Neill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2015 11:29:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-01T12:29:29.684Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When we think of our actions, we intuitively think of them as ours. But what does this mean? For many of us the naive starting point is to think that I am the sole cause of my actions if I am acting with a free-will. This, for many of us, is what it means to have free-will. But in light of philosophic scrutiny this does not seem to be an adequate view. For one, how could I have a free-will if any other factors have affected my decision? When we take on board things like environmental, biological, and social factors this seems a problematic view, for have these not all affected my actions?</p><p>Before trying to solve this, we may wish to clear up some confusion about what it is that free-will could possibly be like. The naive notion I have outlined above seems to rely on some notion of myself as something distinct and separate from the elements that make me up. Are the effects of these environmental, biological, and social factors not a part of who I am? The question begins to become “what am ‘I’?”. In light of our contemporary understandings of ourselves— in both philosophy and the sciences — I think it becomes very difficult to hold that I am separate from these influences. If these influences are inherently a part of me, then what is it that ‘I’ really am?</p><p>I think we don’t need a complete answer to this just yet (and I don’t think I could provide one). What we need is to start seeing ourselves as more in-the-world than the naive view seems to makes us. When we start to think like this it becomes that I am my desires, my emotions, my reasoning, I am all of these and many more things — the sum of them one might say. So when it comes to willing, I am also that! Just because my willing may be determined by environmental, biological, or social influences doesn’t mean that it is not <em>my willing, </em>because all of these things are a part of me also. I cannot see myself as separate from them.</p><p>Though I may not have free-will (in the naive sense) over what things have made me who I am, I do have free-will when I can act under my own will — and that is all we should require to be free. This is synonymous with saying: though we are not free to choose who we are, we are free when we can act from who we are.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c368eae7d42e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hide Behind a Sport All You Want, You’re Still a Racist!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Kant_Pun/hide-behind-a-sport-all-you-want-you-re-still-a-racist-b2225ae0068a?source=rss-7560b6caf413------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew O'Neill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2015 08:48:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-07-27T12:25:54.245Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So that whole Adam Goodes thing, right? Sports, hey?</p><p>Before someone mentions how little I <em>actually</em> know (or care) about Aussie Rules I think I should address why I chose this topic. For sometime now I’ve been trying to keep an eye out for anything in the news I could apply some of my research to (loosely in this case), but you see the unfortunate thing is that other than things happening in, or relevant to, philosophy, I’m pretty much blind. But you’d have to be completely blind to not see the fall-out from this event. It seems we have a pretty clear divide between those who believe the aggression of passionate fans directed at Adam Goodes is a form of racism, and those who think it’s merely a part of the game — other players face the same, and it’s not a race thing with them!</p><p>I may have revealed my hand on this one a little early, with the title and all, but it’s not the conclusion that is important anyway, but how we get there (for it is reason that matters)! But I might start by addressing the opposing view first. It is of course correct that other players face at least similar aggression from opposing fans, and it is not a race thing. If this is the case then isn’t it simply that this is a part of the game? Goodes is being treated in the same way any other person out on the field would be treated (if they were equally as controversial — looking at you Aker).</p><p>But what in particular has made Adam Goodes all that much more controversial of late? It seems — at least to me, a philistine when it comes to the ‘great’ game (I’d reserve that name for cricket, but oh well) — that his controversial character has risen substantially due to his recent celebratory antics. Now this may be completely fine if he was engaging in some form of over the top soccer celebration, but he has been engaging in something that represents his cultural heritage, a cultural heritage that has been devastatingly repressed in our country.</p><p>This is not a case of likeness to likeness, this kind of reductionism won’t do. In cases of severe wrong-doings we owe special moral obligations to those who have suffered the wrong-doings. Indigenous Australians have been victims of severe institutional harms throughout our history (some may even say ongoing, but that is not to be argued here), and so it seems we owe them some special obligations, at least of respect for their plight.</p><p>Now, before someone objects that ‘I’ or ‘we’ didn’t particularly cause the harms, I am more than happy to concede that point. The problem is we have accrued unfair benefits through a history of cultural oppression, and we owe at least some minimal level of support in their efforts to have these wrong-doings at least acknowledged (or maybe even compensated for, nah…), even if we are not responsible for the wrong-doings ourselves. If this means avoiding acting in certain ways that would be considered okay to any others, well this does not seem much to ask. If we avoid the current sorts of levels of aggression towards Goodes for his on-field antics, but rather seek to highlight and respect his cultural efforts, that doesn’t seem much to ask. That is, at least in comparison to the benefits we have gained from historical wrong-doings to Indigenous Australians.</p><p>For with the sleight of hand with which one brings in a jeer, one also risks dropping the justified respect. And this is where racism hides. Without realising it, we seek to reduce the justified demand that Goodes has to the acknowledgement of his cultural heritage — that which his acts present us with — by merely retorting about his character as villain on the football field. Boo all you want, just be cautious of its effects.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b2225ae0068a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Problem with the Modal-Ontological Argument]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Kant_Pun/a-problem-with-the-modal-ontological-argument-59d26a77bf69?source=rss-7560b6caf413------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew O'Neill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2015 16:34:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-08-14T06:02:14.970Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Throughout the history of philosophy a plethora of ontological arguments for the existence of God have been offered — most famously the ontological argument offered by Saint Anselm of Canterbury. To put the ontological argument in its most general form it begins by deriving its first premise from the very nature of God, namely God being that being of which no greater can be conceived. The argument then follows that we can imagine a being of which no greater being can be conceived, that we call God, however this being would lack a trait that is required of a being greater than all others conceivable— existence. For if it did not exist, it would not be a being of which no greater being could be conceived, since we can conceive of a being that is as great, yet also exists — thus being greater. Therefore this greatest being must exist, therefore God necessarily exists.</p><p>Many philosophers have tried to defend different kinds of ontological arguments over the years, and many more philosophers have attempted to refute them. However, in the last century the ontological argument has taken a modal turn. The modal argument (following Plantinga) is presented in a fashion like this:</p><ol><li>God is that being of which no greater can be conceived.</li><li>It is possible that a being of which no greater can be conceived exists.</li><li>If a being of which no greater can be conceived exists, it must exist necessarily.</li><li>A being of which no greater can be conceived exists in possible world, w*.</li><li>A being of which no greater can be conceived necessarily exists at possible world, w*.</li><li>If a being exists necessarily in some world then it necessarily exists in all worlds.</li><li>Therefore, given that a being necessarily exists in some world, w*, then it necessarily exists in the actual world, w.</li><li>Therefore God necessarily exists in all possible worlds, including our own.</li></ol><p>Though I may not have treated this argument with the rigor it deserves, this argument seems to be valid to me.</p><p>However, I wish to question how sound the argument is. The problem is given that ‘if God exists in one possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds’, all that we require for the non-existence of God is the denial of the consequent. If God doesn’t exist in all possible worlds, then God doesn’t exist in any possible world; in other words, if God doesn’t exist in one possible world, then it is necessary that God doesn’t exist in all possible worlds.</p><p>This may not seem all that problematic, one may be willing to reject the that a possible world exists without God, but that may beg the question (at least a little). The problem is that if, prior to the proof, we are willing to accept the possibility of a Godless world then the modal-ontological God seems incomprehensible. What I mean by this is that if we are conceiving of God in the way required for the modal-ontological argument, then we cannot also conceive of a possible world in which God is not, otherwise that God does not have the maximal properties required of it by definition. Therefore we are left with either that God necessarily exists, or that God — as conceived of in this way — necessarily doesn’t exist. Since it remains an open question whether in all possible worlds God exists, or in all possible worlds God doesn’t exist, the modal-ontological argument does not solve the question of God’s existence. We require another avenue of argument to get the modal proof off the ground to begin with.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=59d26a77bf69" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[You’re Probably Rich and Should Share it Around (a Little)!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Kant_Pun/you-re-probably-rich-and-should-share-it-around-a-little-aec8612ee94e?source=rss-7560b6caf413------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew O'Neill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2015 03:26:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-07-27T12:44:10.667Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I take it that if you are reading this you are more than likely part of a certain group of people — and I don’t mean the one, consisting of just you and I, as the two people who will read this. You are more than likely one of those people who is lucky enough to live at the top-end of the global wealth scale. Congratulations… of sorts… I mean the congratulations is more for your luck than any of your effort (sorry). But <em>c’est la vie </em>one might add! Some people will be lucky and be born into wealth, others into poverty, that’s life! Well yes, that seems trivially true (at least under current circumstances), but does it mean that the wealth difference should remain so great?</p><p>In 1971 Australian philosopher Peter Singer wrote a famous paper entitled “Famine, Affluence, and Poverty” in which he argued that those of us who are lucky enough to sit at this end of the wealth scale have duties to give to the poorest of the world. The power of the paper is in a rather simple story it tells that I shall put my own spin on as so:</p><blockquote>So you’ve decided to go out tonight, you’ve put on some of your favourite clothes, they cost you a bit — but not so much that you’ve spent your life savings! On your way out you walk past a small pond and notice a child drowning, you know that you can easily save the child atno risk to yourself, but you will ruin your clothes.</blockquote><p>The story asks us what we should do. Now I hope that most of us would answer yes (I’d be quite worried if someone didn’t)… but it’s still kind of unfortunate about my chinos!</p><p>That’s not really the point of this story though; there is a very important analogy to be made. The point is that it seems that if we can save a life at very little cost to ourselves then we should do it. If this seems like a thesis we are willing to accept then it has applications in other scenarios. But what if we slightly changed the story, enough so the form is the same and the maxim still applies.</p><blockquote>There is a child who currently does not have the means to get enough to eat and will soon die of starvation. It will cost you less than a cup of coffee to buy the child provide enough food so that the child may survive at least another week.</blockquote><p>If we accepted in the previous case that we should save a life when it is of little cost to ourselves then it seems that in this case we are also obliged to save the child. The problem is that when we save one, there is always another, and this adds up — eventually it won’t be of so little a cost!</p><p>That is true, but what is the cost really! The cost to us may even come to be the difference between buying a used Hyundai and a brand new BMW. But to put it in perspective what are we getting back instead? Many, many lives! The point is that the difference between the cars is a mere preference satisfaction — we are making a luxurious choice between two things — as a trade off for what could be the lives of many others.</p><p>Singer’s argument however may seem somewhat abrasive in how demanding the logic is. What it really leads us to accept is that we should give up all our preference satisfaction when we could be saving lives. Now this may seem a little much to most of us, but I don’t think it is much to say we should give more than we already do — we should think about where that money could go before we decide to spend it on mere preference satisfaction.</p><p>To tie this back to my introduction, one of the major problems is regardless of whether we have been lucky enough to be born into the lives we have, are we really entitled to as much as we have just because we have possession of the means — particularly when there are so many who have so much less? The primary question here is can we justify our entitlement to what we possess, and doing what we will with it? When there are people who require so little to save their lives, are we really morally entitled to choose not to help in favour of satisfying our preferences just because we have possession of the means to satisfy either option? It follows that if we accept the argument that Singer offers us then the answer to this last question is no, regardless of our entitlement to what we have.</p><p>But thinking about our entitlement reinforces the argument. I find it hard to think of an argument with any traction that argues that, while there are those that are merely asking for the minimum, others are entitled to so much preference satisfaction because they have the means. At least for me this undermines the fundamental principle that we are all equal in the eyes of justice and morality. Justice demands something very different from just grabbing what one has access to — in fact the enforcement of property rights often stops the poor from grabbing from the wealthy, even when they are just attempting to grab enough to survive. If we can’t justify our possession of the means to satisfy either saving a life or our own preference satisfaction as more than that fortune has favoured us, then we may have to stop considering it completely ours to begin with.</p><p>As a final note, before you object that this is all great but how do we ensure that the money is being effective (or if you are just looking for a charity to donate to), you should check out the website Singer himself has provided for just this issue: <a href="http://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/">www.thelifeyoucansave.org</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aec8612ee94e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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