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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Kifah Maseeh on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[An assessment of matching theory and its application to UK’s local Refugee Resettlement Programme]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@KifahMaseeh/assessment-of-how-matching-theory-can-improve-uk-governments-local-refugee-resettlement-programme-d5dd6cdd42c0?source=rss-c76cf01a3d2c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kifah Maseeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 10 Mar 2018 17:29:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-11T23:00:51.824Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Background and Introduction</strong></p><p>According to the UN Refugee Agency, a refugee is defined as a person “Who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence.” (<a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/what-is-a-refugee/">UNHCR, 2017</a>). There are about 14.4 million refugees worldwide, out of which less than one percent are submitted to resettlement. Refugee resettlement, on the other hand, is when a refugee living in another foreign refugee camp has been given admission and protection to live in a third country in which they are able to rebuild their lives. According to the Refugee Council of UK (a non-profit organization that deals with refugees and asylum seekers based in the UK), since 2004, UK has resettled on average of 750 refugees (<a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/what_we_do/refugee_services/resettlement_programme/refugee_resettlement_the_facts">Refugee Council, 2017</a>). This essay aims to observe and recommend how different matching theories can solve the problems the UK government faces in resettling refugees locally namely the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Programme (SVPR). It will first describe what different matching theories are, and then the problems relevant agents face and how different matching theories can improve the market’s effectiveness and efficiency, followed by possible recommendations.</p><p><strong>Theory</strong></p><p>Matching theory belongs to a subsection of economics known as market design. This aims to engineer stable allocation of resources which cannot always be resolved by a price mechanism. For example, in the context of refugee resettlement, price points might not be considered as the main variable which could generate a stable allocation. This is because refugee resettlement is a humanitarian cause rather than a profit-driven market. A stable allocation in terms of matching theory is an outcome where agents would rather end up with the current allocation rather than with another agent (<a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2012/advanced-economicsciences2012.pdf">Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2012a</a>). Whilst an optimal stable outcome is when all players better off with a stable outcome compared to other stable outcomes even if its weakly preferred (<a href="http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall09/papers/galeshapley.pdf">Gale et Shapley, 1962</a>). The matching theory has been applied in different disciplines. This includes finding stable allocations between patients with kidneys and enrolling students for colleges and high schools (<a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2012/popular-economicsciences2012.pdf">Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2012b</a>).</p><p>One of the main theoretical frameworks devised with respect to matching theory in market design is the “Deferred Acceptance Procedure” by David Gayle and Lloyd Shapely (<a href="http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall09/papers/galeshapley.pdf">Gale et Shapley, 1962</a>). This algorithm involves two sets of agents formulating their individual preference orderings. Firstly, one set of agents’ proposers to the other, whilst the other set of agents either accepts or rejects the offers based on their own individual preferences. When an agent receives two or more propositions, he/she then accepts the offer based on his/her preferences and rejects the others. The rejected proposers then proposers to the next best agent according to their preferences, in which the other set of agents repeats the procedure based on their own individual preferences. The iteration continues until all the proposers are left with a pairing, hence reaching a stable outcome (<a href="http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall09/papers/galeshapley.pdf">ibid, 1962</a>).</p><p>An alternative model is the top trading cycle developed by David Gayle and later published by Herbert Scarf and Lloyd Shapely in 1974 (<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304406874900330">Shapely et Scarf, 1974</a>). This algorithm assumes that each agent owns an indivisible good and has strict preferences overall goods traded. Firstly, each agent points in the direction of his/her most preferred good with the good pointing to its current owner simultaneously. This allows the market to create a diagram which aides in identifying cycles. Secondly, if an agent and the good are pointing at each other or if agents form a cycle which allows swapping goods between each other that results in a higher utility, then those agent(s) are removed from the market as they have reached a stable outcome for themselves. The remaining agents point out to their next best preference and observe whether a cycle is formed. The iteration continues until no cycles are formed, hence reaching a stable outcome in the market (<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304406874900330">Shapely et Scarf, 1974</a>). For example, assume there are four agents (A1, A2, A3, A4) who owns four goods (G1, G2, G3, G4).</p><p>Each of their preference orderings is as follows:</p><p>A1: (G3, G4, G1, G2)</p><p>A2: (G1, G2, G4, G3)</p><p>A3: (G1, G2, G3, G4)</p><p>A4: (G2, G3, G4, G1)</p><p>The diagrams below illustrate the top trading cycle approach:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/468/1*jYeY7rYqBRhySP2rSrH77Q.png" /><figcaption>Cycle 1</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/418/1*px46vu4_bgH00zN0r22W2g.png" /><figcaption>Cycle 2</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/445/1*PHWwsVOzqDekzWaQodAfkw.png" /><figcaption>Cycle 3</figcaption></figure><p>It is shown that in cycle 1 since A1and A3 prefers G3 and G1 respectively, they could swap the two goods in order to reach a higher utility. The algorithm then eliminates A1 and A3 as they have reached a stable outcome for themselves. In cycle 2, the second most preferred good for A2 is G2, therefore A2 will choose his/her default good (G2). Lastly, since A4 is only left with one remaining good (G4) he/she will choose G4 (<a href="https://www.springer.com/gb/book/9783662469491?gclid=Cj0KCQiAoY7VBRDtARIsAHWoO-LZZzer8n1BmWz94mW--sHfxdkkw_qiQdPeAyY_M76qg1dONe7zI4waAha0EALw_wcB">Peters, H. 2015</a>).</p><p><strong>Overview</strong></p><p>Whilst international refugee resettlement markets effectiveness and efficiency increased when matching algorithms, there is room for improvement in resettling refugee locally (<a href="http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php/jmhs/article/view/103">Jones et Teytellobym, 2017</a>). In the UK, one of the main refugee resettling initiatives is the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Programme (SVPR). It is motived to provide humanitarian protection status, access to public funds and permission to work for a maximum of five years. The programme applies to Syrian families and unccompanied minors in conflict regions from North Africa and the Middle East. (<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/631369/170711_Syrian_Resettlement_Updated_Fact_Sheet_final.pdf">Auditor General, 2016</a>).</p><p>The current process of SVPR undergoes as follows. Firstly, the central government sets a criterion. Secondly, the UNHCR submits potential cases for consideration based on the criterion. Note that the criterion prioritizes individuals who face significant challenges in being supported at the region of origin. These may include women and children, individuals that require serious medical attention and those face severe torture and violence (<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/631369/170711_Syrian_Resettlement_Updated_Fact_Sheet_final.pdf">Home Office, 2017</a>). Lastly, voluntary local authorities who choose to participate in the programme identifies, resettles and offer support for selected refugees in their respective counties (<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/631369/170711_Syrian_Resettlement_Updated_Fact_Sheet_final.pdf">ibid, 2017</a>).</p><p><strong>Analysis and Recommendations</strong></p><p>Before moving further, it is essential to create a clearinghouse to allocate refugees to respective local Authorities based on the preference orderings of relevant agents (<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13225">Roth, 2008</a>). A clearinghouse is a platform that delivers stable matches based on preference orderings of agents (<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13225">ibid, 2008</a>). The clearinghouse could be devised and implemented by the central government since the programme is initiated and managed by the central government itself.</p><p>A possible matching algorithm that can be used is the ‘Deferred Acceptance Procedure’ (<a href="http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall09/papers/galeshapley.pdf">Gale et Shapley, 1962</a>), with refugees proposing and Local Authorities’ accepting or declining. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, Local Authorities’ partially bear the burden of providing support and resettling refugees (the other being the central government) (<a href="https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/syrian-refugee-resettleme-229.pdf">Local Government Association, 2016</a>). Secondly, since Local Authorities’ volunteer to participate in SVPR, it produces an incentive to Local Authorities to participate. This is because having the liberty to accept or decline applications presents them with the power accept refugees they prefer and not vice versa. Although for ethical and logistical reasons, Local Authorities’ do not hold to liberty to rank individual refugees. Instead, they would have to state ‘priority categories’ consistent with their facilitating abilities (<a href="http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php/jmhs/article/view/103">Jones et Teytellobym, 2017</a>). This in hindsight reduces congestion which is explained in detail below (<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13225">Roth, 2008</a>).</p><p>According to Alvin Roth’s impossibility theorem published in the paper, “Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, And Open Questions” he/she notes that misstating an agent’s true preferences could lead to higher individual utilities but may make market inefficient in reaching stable outcomes (<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13225">ibid, 2008</a>). He/she also states that thick markets aide in reducing congestion, making it safer for agents to state their true preferences <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13225">(ibid, 2008</a>). Thereby, providing Local Authorities with incentives to participate in SVPR as noted above could increase market thickness, resulting in low congestion.</p><p>Furthermore, it is essential that under ‘Deferred Acceptance Procedure’ both sets of agents must state their individual preferences (<a href="http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall09/papers/galeshapley.pdf">Gale et Shapley, 1962</a>). Unfortunately, refugees are unable to do this at the moment (<a href="https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/seminar/2016/ISER_Seminar_20161205.pdf">Teytelboym et at, 2016</a>). It is also important that they signal their preferences because as understood by experiments in Sweden, the location the refugee resettle is positively correlated to his/her job prospects, income, education and health (<a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/ecjeconjl/v_3a117_3ay_3a2007_3ai_3a518_3ap_3a422-448.htm">Åslund et Rooth, 2007</a>). Therefore, they need to signal their preferences in order to reach a stable outcome.</p><p>However, it is also found that only refugees who have families residing in the UK can signal so. This is motived to allocating them with their respective families (<a href="https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/seminar/2016/ISER_Seminar_20161205.pdf">Teytelboym et at, 2016</a>). However, this would create a lower number of stable matchings (<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13225">Roth, 2008</a>) as it restricts flexibility in the market. Simply because the market is now restricted by a prerequisite. However, refugee resettled with their families residing in the UK increases the probability of the refugee settling down seamlessly (<a href="http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php/jmhs/article/view/103">Jones et Teytellobym, 2017</a>).</p><p>Moreover, creating a buffer amount for Local Authorities with semi-flexible carrying capacities could increase fluidity in the market and could consequently resettle more refugees. For example, let’s assume there are two Local Authorities’ (LA1 and LA2) LA1 and LA2 could resettle on average 10 refugees and 5 refugees respectively. Now assume LA1 faces a problem of resettling 12 refugees since families of two additional refugees reside under its jurisdiction. If a buffer amount is devised LA2 could lower the burden for LA1 by agreeing to settle a refugee from LA1 who is compatible with LA2. This results in LA1 and LA2 settling 11 and 6 refugees respectively (<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w13225">Roth, 2008</a>). It also addresses the issue of Local Authorities bearing disproportionate shares in responsibilities (<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/631369/170711_Syrian_Resettlement_Updated_Fact_Sheet_final.pdf">Home Office, 2017</a>). As seen in the example above LA2 carrying one additional refugee from LA1 shares the burden between themselves.</p><p>Lastly, another form of reaching a stable outcome is by using the ‘Top Trading Cycle approach’ explained above (<a href="http://pareto.uab.es/jmasso/pdf/ShapleyScarfJME1974.pdf">Shapely et Scarf, 1974</a>). This, however, is not as effective by itself in the refugee market as the market needs to allocate a refugee to a Local authority in order to utilize this approach. However, once all refugees are assigned to a Local Authority then the Top Trading Cycle approach could be used in determining where the market could further improve or reach an optimal stable allocation by swapping refugees with weak indifferent preferences between respective Local Authorities (given the number of stable outcomes is &gt; 1). This method could see a profound impact on improvement in efficiency for Local Authorities with similar demographics, quality of life and facilities.</p><p>In short, based on the analysis of the programme, recommendations to improve its efficiency and effectiveness is as follows:</p><p>• Create a clearinghouse to apply relevant matching algorithms.</p><p>• Allow all agents to state their preferences in order to allocate refugees to Local Authorities.</p><p>• Reduce obstacles as much as possible to improve flexibility in the market.</p><p>• Create buffer amounts for Local Authorities with semi-flexible carrying capacities.</p><p>• Use Top Trading Cycle algorithm when relevant to reach better stable outcomes.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>In conclusion, the essay focuses on how matching theory can improve market effectiveness and efficiency in the context of the UK government’s refugee resettling initiative; Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Programme (SVPR). The essay is divided into three sections. The first section describes the theoretical implications of matching theory and explains two matching algorithms. They are ‘Deferred Acceptance Procedure’ (<a href="http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall09/papers/galeshapley.pdf">Gale et Shapley, 1962</a>) and ‘Top Trading Cycles’ (<a href="http://pareto.uab.es/jmasso/pdf/ShapleyScarfJME1974.pdf">Shapely et Scarf, 1974</a>). Next, the overview section provides a general summary of the programme how the programme works. Finally, the analysis and recommendation section provides a detailed analysis of the programme and how the programme could improve when theoretical implications matching theory and matching algorithms are applied. Furthermore, it provides the Central government of the UK with advice on how to improve allocations in the perspective of matching theory.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5dd6cdd42c0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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