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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mark A.B. Donald on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Morris v. Magnanti: blogs, the sex trade and the changing face of reputation in U.K. defamation law]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MABDLaw/morris-v-magnanti-blogs-the-sex-trade-and-the-changing-face-of-reputation-in-u-k-defamation-law-68e387930908?source=rss-c6efca1150a------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark A.B. Donald]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Apr 2015 20:58:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-04-11T21:00:16.313Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Morris v. Magnanti</em>: blogs, the sex trade and the changing face of reputation in defamation law</strong></p><p>This week’s quick blog post relates to an interesting defamation coming down the pipes in the Scottish courts. The interesting part of the case centers upon the Plaintiff by Counterclaim. She’s a forensic pathologist who is suing her former boyfriend for his public allegations that she was never a sex worker (<strong>*nb</strong>: I’ve decided to use the term “sex worker” based on the understanding that it is the preferred nomenclature here in Canada).</p><p>This one will require some explaining — a brief background can be found here: <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/sex/11472374/Belle-de-Jour-author-Brooke-Magnanti-insists-she-was-a-call-girl.html">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/sex/11472374/Belle-de-Jour-author-Brooke-Magnanti-insists-she-was-a-call-girl.html</a>).</p><p><strong>The facts</strong></p><p>The claimant, Dr. Brooke Magnanti started an anonymous blog — La Belle de Jour — in 2003 to discuss the trials and tribulations of her alleged life as one of British high society’s most in-demand sex workers, a career which she maintains helped her finance her PhD in forensic pathology (hence, the “Dr.”). After maintaining her anonymity for several years, Dr. Magnanti’s identity was “outed” in the British press in 2009.</p><p>The result was apparently something of a windfall for Dr. Magnanti: she landed several book deals and her story was adapted into UK TV’s Secret Diary of a Call Girl. In fact, just a few weeks ago she gave a TED Talk on the importance of anonymity for marginalized activists and writers (check it out here: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZnXPVyWP8w&amp;list=PLsRNoUx8w3rNXcBCmETUz-uICayZayaSo">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZnXPVyWP8w&amp;list=PLsRNoUx8w3rNXcBCmETUz-uICayZayaSo</a>).</p><p>But her newfound fame wasn’t without its pitfalls: one of the recurring protagonists in her blog was a former boyfriend, a Mr. Owen Morris, whom Dr. Magnanti referred to by the pseudonym “the Boy”. Nevertheless, when her identity was revealed, eventually, so was his.</p><p>In the aftermath, Mr. Morris sued his former flame, alleging that her blog and its revelation had damaged his career as a pilot in the Royal Air Force, and his reputation generally (<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2388986/Belle-Jour-lover-I-dont-believe-prostitute-Boyfriend-seven-years-claims-author-invented-notorious-best-selling-sexploits.html">http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2388986/Belle-Jour-lover-I-dont-believe-prostitute-Boyfriend-seven-years-claims-author-invented-notorious-best-selling-sexploits.html</a>).</p><p>Most importantly: in making his claim, Mr. Morris asserted that Dr. Magnanti was never engaged as a sex worker. Dr. Magnanti responded by launching a counterclaim in defamation against Mr. Morris for alleging that she had lied about her past, thereby attacking her honesty and credibility as a writer and thinker on the issue of the sex trade.</p><p><strong>Why we should care: the changing face of reputation</strong></p><p>In practical terms, <em>Morris v. Magnanti</em> is a fairly straight-forward defamation claim/counterclaim, with two parties trying to protect the professional reputations that they’ve woven for themselves. What makes it interesting is that it might be the first time in Britain where a former sex worker has attempted to defend her reputation specifically in that context.</p><p>The case got me thinking about how fluid the concept of reputation has become in our 21st century, hyper-connected society. Professor Hillary Young of Queen’s University [Bias alert: my former law school <em>alma mater</em>] wrote an excellent paper on the subject in which she emphasized how defamation was a uniquely “sociological tort” (See: <em>But Names Won’t Necessarily Hurt Me: Considering the Effects of Disparaging Statements on Reputation</em>, Queen’s Law Journal, Fall 2011, Vol. 37 Issue 1, p. 1).</p><p>It certainly does give pause for thought: If I had been writing this blog in a previous generation, the stigma around sex work may well have hampered Dr. Magnanti’s counterclaim at the outset. Previously, the sex trade was not viewed through the objective clinical/sociological prism that it enjoys today. As a result, the very notion that being a sex worker might form the <em>foundation </em>of someone’s reputation and sense of worth in the general public was unheard of.</p><p>Legally speaking, Dr. Magnanti might have run up against the dictum in defamation law that you can’t defend a reputation that doesn’t exist (and who knows? she still might). To make the point, I’m drawn to a nice elucidation from the Superior Court of Ontario’s decision in <em>Bernstein v Poon</em> (2015 ONSC 155) — a case that I commented upon a few weeks ago. That decision discussed an argument sometimes advanced that a plaintiff has no good reputation to defend (meaning that their reputation cannot have been harmed):</p><blockquote>[172] In Leonhard v Sun Publishing Co. Ltd. (1956) 4 D.L.R. (2d) 514 (BC SC), citing Scott v Sampson as authority, it was concluded that the plaintiff had no reputation capable of being injured and, thus, was entitled to nominal damages of $1. And in the seminal case of Ruskin v Whistler, (unreported) heard at the Old Bailey in 1878, the jury, after concluding that John Ruskin’s criticism of the artist James McNeill Whistler’s painting Nocturne in Black and Gold: The Falling Rocket was defamatory (“I have seen, and heard, much of Cockney impudence before now; but never expected to hear a coxcomb ask two hundred guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public’s face.”), awarded the plaintiff damages of one farthing.</blockquote><p>In my opinion, the fact that a claimant is confident enough to defend her reputation as a former sex worker is an interesting example of how people are increasingly able to control the definition ascribed to their own “reputation”. For further evidence, see this recent article from the BBC about the growing trend of sex workers in Australia “coming out”: <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-32165949">http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-32165949</a></p><p>The takeaway is that certain societal norms and mores about how we characterize a person’s “reputation” may be changing. This in turn, may have a noticeable effect on how courts determine: (1) whether a statement was defamatory; and (2) the sort of damages that should be apportioned to a successful claimant.</p><p>Of course, the author makes no judgments as to the veracity of the claims made in Morris v. Magnanti, or the legal outcome of the action itself. Nevertheless, the Scottish court<strong>*</strong> hearing the matter may be forced to deal with modern society’s perception of sex work in 2014. If so, the result may have some very interesting implications for English jurisprudence, which in turn, might also influence Canadian courts.</p><ul><li><strong>*</strong>One important point to note is the likely reasoning behind why the suit would have been brought before the Scottish courts. Following passage of the <em>Defamation Act, 2013</em> in the United Kingdom (the “Act”), English defamation law became more defendant-friendly than its Scottish and Irish counterparts. The Republic of Ireland has its own defamation legislation, while in Scotland, the Act has very limited application. This leads to an interesting question for the future as to whether Scotland or Ireland will replace London as the center for so-called “libel tourism”or “forum shopping” by plaintiffs to defamation actions.</li><li>This article is a general survey of the law and expresses Mr. Donald’s personal views on the subject matter discussed. It is not a substitute for, nor does it constitute legal advice. Viewing this article does not create a lawyer-client relationship.</li></ul><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/markdonald1">https://www.linkedin.com/in/markdonald1</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=68e387930908" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Haters Gonna Hate?: SpectiCast vs. Drake and corporate claimants in Ontario libel law]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MABDLaw/haters-gonna-hate-specticast-vs-drake-and-corporate-claimants-in-ontario-libel-law-44b329b6fc4d?source=rss-c6efca1150a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[drake]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark A.B. Donald]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2015 12:10:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-03-24T12:36:14.645Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Haters Gonna Hate?: <em>SpectiCast vs. Drake</em> and corporate claimants in Ontario libel law</strong></p><p><strong>By Mark A.B. Donald</strong></p><p>Nobody does feuds better than hip hop artists, so when the mudslinging goes beyond who has more Humvees and veers into actual legal defamation country, you know it’s going to be good. This week’s nascent libel spat pits Toronto rapper Drake against some of his former business associates. While the action is centered in California, the facts offer a great opportunity to explore: (1) how a corporation sues for defamation in Canada; and (2) how this particular dispute might shake out under our libel laws.</p><p><strong><em>Mediacast Holdings LLC d.b.a. SpectiCast v. Aubrey Drake Graham</em>: corporations have feelings too (sort of)</strong></p><p>This week, the internet reported that rap star Drake (“Drizzy” to his friends, of whom the author sadly does not number) <a href="http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2015/03/19/drake-sued-tweet">is being sued by a promotional company for allegedly impugning their business reputation</a>. (SpectiCast’s filed claim can be found <a href="http://origin-qps.onstreammedia.com/origin/multivu_archive/ENR/Complaint-with-Exhibit.pdf">here</a>).</p><p>The facts are as follows: Back in 2009 before Drake had made it big, he performed a gig in Toronto. Footage from the performance was collected together and turned into a film entitled <em>Drake’s Homecoming</em>, which was subsequently released this past March 19th. A<a href="http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/posts/la-et-ms-drake-producers-disputing-homecoming-concert-film-20150316-story.html#page=1">ccording to the claim, Drake “agreed to the concert’s filming was paid a $15,000 cash fee and promised a 15% profit royalty for his participation in the project.” </a>Fast forward five years however, and on the eve of the film’s release, Drake tweeted to his fans as follows:</p><blockquote>The Drake Homecoming film is not something OVO [Drake’s record label] or Drake have any part in. I feel it is my responsibility to inform and protect my fans.</blockquote><p>Drake and his reps then followed-up with other tweets and statements, repeating that the film was “unauthorized” and “nothing to do with them [See: the Claim at paras. 18–19].</p><p>The Plaintiff-film distributor, SpectiCast, fired back, stating through its counsel:</p><blockquote>Drake authorized the filming, he was paid for it, he still has a financial stake in the movie, and his current statements to the contrary are completely false. SpectiCast is a respected distributor. As we state in our complaint, Drake’s actions are libelous, malicious and damaging to those who worked hard and honorably to get this movie out.</blockquote><p><strong>How a corporation sues in Ontario defamation law</strong></p><p>The interesting thing to note in this dispute is the fact that the plaintiff is a corporation and not a human being. The key question in a libel action is whether the Plaintiff’s reputation has been harmed. While corporations like SpectiCast are “people” under Canadian law, this principle gets a little more nuanced when it’s applied to the law of defamation.</p><p>Generally speaking, corporations are able to sue in defamation but only where the impugned publication damages their “business reputation”. With that in mind, statements that refer specifically to the conduct of a single corporate employee — such as the poor manners of a particular server in a restaurant, for example — may not give the corporation the right to sue. In such cases, a defamation claim would properly be brought by the individual as opposed to the company. However a business reputation is a flexible thing, and like all defamation cases, its meaning depends on context. For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal has ruled that where defamation of an individual corporate director carries the natural imputation that the corporation itself lacks competence or integrity, the corporation will have standing to sue (See: <em>Barrick Gold v. Lopehandia</em>, [2004] O.J. No. 2329, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 655 at para. 47).</p><p><strong>Damages in defamation: getting what you deserve</strong></p><p>Legally speaking, Defamation claims are one of the simpler was to fight back against “haters”. Perhaps one of the key benefits to the tort of defamation is that, generally speaking, damages are awarded “at large”. This means that the plaintiff doesn’t need to demonstrate financials losses down to the penny, but instead, can lead more general evidence for the court to apply a sort of horse-sense reasoning to. However, any potential defamation plaintiff should be aware that this approach to damages does not make defamation claims a slam dunk by any means: where a defamation claim is based on vague assertions of hurt feelings, even a successful plaintiff might find themselves with a legal bill that outstrips their damages award (for this discussion, see the author’s <a href="https://medium.com/@MABDLaw/bernstein-v-poon-and-the-pyrrhic-perils-of-exaggerated-injuries-in-ontario-defamation-actions-2ff9c83dd9ef">earlier post </a>on the recent <em>Bernstein v. Poon</em> decision from the Ontario Superior Court).</p><p><strong><em>SpectiCast v. Drizzy</em> from the Ontario legal perspective</strong></p><p>Viewed in its entirety, Drake’s March 19th tweet possibly suggests that: (1) Drake had no creative input or control over <em>Homecoming</em>; and (2) that as a result of this lack of control, Drake makes no representations as to its quality. The defence will therefore likely try to make the tweet out to be a neutral statement: Drake is simply issuing a caveat emptor to his legions of fans that good or bad, <em>Homecoming</em> was not his project.</p><p>Obviously, the Plaintiff has taken a different view of the tweet’s meaning. According to SpectiCast’s claim, by saying <em>Homecoming</em> was “not something OVO [Drake’s record label] or Drake have any part in”, Drake is apparently stating that <em>Homecoming</em> itself was “unauthorized” in its entirety. Subsequently, SpectiCast argues that by distancing himself from the project in this way, Drake is impugning not just the quality of the work, but also SpectiCast’s commercial acumen in attempting to promote an “unauthorized” film.</p><p>In an Ontario court, if SpectiCast proved that the tweet was in fact defamatory (i.e. that its reputation was damaged), the onus would then shift back to Drake’s legal team to prove one of the defences to defamation. There are a few, but the most notable in a case like this would be the defences of (1) truth and/or (2) fair comment.</p><p>Just as it sounds, the defence of truth means that Drake must prove that their comment was “substantially true”. In short, Drake would likely argue while he may have signed a contract assigning away the rights to <em>Homecoming</em>, his tweet reflects only the truthful fact that he had no input in the film’s composition.</p><p>Second, for the defence of fair comment to apply, Drake would have to prove that: (1) the tweet referenced a matter of public interest; (2) the tweet was based on fact; (3) the tweet, though it can include inferences of fact is recognizable as comment; and (4) any person could honestly express that opinion on the proved facts. Note however, that SpectiCast could defeat this defence by proving that Drake’s dominant purpose in making the comment was malice (See: Baglow v. Smith, 2015 ONSC 1155 at para. 221).</p><p>The fair comment test is a complex and nuanced analysis, with step (3) being the usual battleground to make out the defence. Still, even if Forest Hill’s favourite son were to make out the defence, the question of malice remains [full disclaimer: the author grew up in the same neighbourhood as Drake. NBD].</p><p>And speaking of malice: most interesting are the comments one party involved with <em>Homecoming</em>, who stated his belief that Drake’s tweet was really <a href="http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/posts/la-et-ms-drake-producers-disputing-homecoming-concert-film-20150316-story.html#page=1">just a financial power play</a>:</p><blockquote>Fifteen percent [of the royalties] back when he [Drake] was nobody … and [$15,000] handed to him in a paper bag, that’s a lot,” he said. “[But] I think he wants a higher percentage of the movie.</blockquote><p>In fact, SpectiCast’s claim goes so far as to suggest that Drake was inspired by a desire to torpedo <em>Homecoming</em> so his own upcoming concerts would sell without competition (See: the Claim at para. 4) If the action were to take place in Ontario, this line of inquiry could possibly be a powerful weapon in the plaintiff’s arsenal. Proving that the tweet was simply an attempt by Drake to gain financial leverage might be enough to impugn what would otherwise be a valid example of fair comment.</p><p>If the case ever makes it to trial, it will be a fascinating to see how the California court deal with the meaning and innuendo of the term “authorized” in the context of Drake’s public statements. Notably, the statements neither obscene nor virulent, and it’s perhaps precisely because the tweet appears so thought-out and measured that SpectiCast may have a case that its reputation was damaged in the eyes of a reasonable reader. At the same time, defamation law protects truthful statements and honest opinions, so it may well be that Drake will be singing triumphantly about this whole episode soon enough.</p><p><strong>Note: </strong>This article is a general survey of the law and expresses Mr. Donald’s personal views on the subject matter discussed. It is not a substitute for, nor does it constitute legal advice. Viewing this article does not create a lawyer-client relationship.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=44b329b6fc4d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Road kill or sacred cow?: defining reputation in 21st century defamation law]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MABDLaw/road-kill-or-sacred-cow-defining-reputation-in-21st-century-defamation-law-dbda884f4441?source=rss-c6efca1150a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dbda884f4441</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark A.B. Donald]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Mar 2015 22:00:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-03-07T22:11:08.582Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Road kill or sacred cow?: defining reputation in 21st century defamation law</strong></p><ul><li>This article originally appeared on April 29, 2014 in the Ontario Bar Association’s online newsletter. The link, with full citations, can be found <a href="http://www.oba.org/Sections/Entertainment,-Media-and-Communications-Law/Articles/Articles-2014/May-2014/Roadkill-or-Sacred-Cow-Defining-Reputation-in-21st">here</a>.</li></ul><p>It promises to be an exciting summer for the Liberal Party of Canada and online defamation law in general. In the space of two weeks, the Grits initiated not one, but two high-profile defamation actions that are sure to get significant media attention. Aside from their respective big-time political implications, each offers the Ontario courts an opportunity to engage with the concept of “reputation” in modern Canadian society and how this impacts the law of defamation.</p><p>The Liberal (war) party: Innes v. Trudeau &amp; Wynne v. Hudak<br>The facts of Innes vs. Trudeau and MacNaughton arise from the sexiest of all political intrigues, namely, the redistribution of electoral ridings.<br>In this case, long-time Liberal party operative Christine Innes was barred from running for her party’s nomination in an upcoming 2014 federal by-election in the Trinity-Spadina riding following accusations of “bullying” and “intimidation tactics” by members of her campaign. Notably, the Defendants in this case are her party’s own leader, Justin Trudeau and his campaign chair. Ms. Innes disputed the allegations and characterized them as a “smokescreen” for the Defendants’ true motive: to discredit the Plaintiff after she refused to abstain from running against Toronto Center’s Liberal MP (and alleged Trudeau favourite) Ms. Chrystia Freeland when the Toronto Center and Trinity-Spadina ridings are redistributed in 2015. A defamation suit was duly brought.</p><p>Meanwhile, on the provincial scene, Wynne v. Hudak, involves the well-known scandal resulting from the former Premier McGuinty’s decision to cancel the construction of two controversial gas plants, resulting in a billion dollar cancellation fee that was put on the taxpayer’s tab. The plot thickened when police began investigating whether members of the new Premier’s Wynne’s staff willfully deleted embarrassing documents related to the whole ordeal.</p><p>Enter Timothy Patrick Hudak. After the scandal came to light, Mr. Hudak took time out of his busy day to hold a press conference in which (depending on your source) he either questioned whether Premier Wynne might have had a hand in the alleged orgy of documentary destruction, or, heavily implied it. Following the press conference, Premier Wynne lawyered-up and called “defamation!” on the whole thing.</p><p>Most importantly, it need be observed that in making his comments, Mr. Hudak was not just a concerned citizen, but also the leader of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, and Ms. Wynne’s chief rival for the Premier’s sash/sceptre/crown.</p><p>Both cases are fascinating in that they allow us to rummage through the distinction between disparaging statements and legally defamatory ones. At the heart of this distinction is exactly what it means to have a “reputation” in modern Canadian society.</p><p><strong>Defamation: a primer in two paragraphs</strong><br>By way of background, the plaintiff in a defamation claim must satisfy three requirements: first, show that the defendant’s statements were published to a third person; second, demonstrate that the impugned statements refer to the plaintiff; and third, persuade the court that the publications are actually legally “defamatory”. To prove this third element, the plaintiff must show that the impugned statement would damage the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a “reasonable” person.</p><p>The mythical “reasonable person” is a hypothetical member of the publication’s audience — one who is thoughtful and informed, possessed of a degree of common sense, not naïve nor beset by an overly fragile sensibility.</p><p><strong>I <em>do</em> Give a damn about my bad reputation: debating reputation in a 24/7 media-cycle</strong><br>And yet, despite the complex and nuanced qualities that are supposedly ascribed to the reasonable person, it is arguable that Canadian courts are too willing to view this reader as one who summarily equates disparaging statements with legally defamatory ones. Political scandals like those of the Wynne and Innes variety provide a perfect opportunity to engage with this distinction, and precisely how it influences the law of defamation.<br>Professor Jerome H. Skolnick of New York University reminds us, defamation is a “distinctively sociological tort”, and in this respect it is important to acknowledge how society’s “reasonable person” would view not merely what the impugned statement means, but rather how it is interpreted in light of the context in which it is made.</p><p>Professor Hilary Young of Queen’s University makes the point that disparaging remarks about well-known media figures, including high-profile politicians are possibly less likely to be legally defamatory. This is so because once they are made, they will naturally collide with the public’s pre-existing opinions.</p><p>According to this view, when publications are imbued with an ideological or political point of view, it is more likely that the reasonable viewer likely observes the debate with their own viewpoint that would mitigate against a finding that the statement is defamatory. Justice LeBel of the Supreme Court of Canada indicated as much in the Court’s leading case on the definition of reputation in the context of defamation, WIC Radio v. Simpson, when he opined that: “members of the public must be presumed to evaluate comments in accordance with their own knowledge and opinions about the speaker and the subject of the comments.”</p><p>Furthermore, certain social science evidence indicates that a person’s reputation is not as feeble as we might sometimes assume, and is not always damaged in the blink upon the publication of a statement in the daily news. Applying this doctrine to the political context, at least one study held that the effect of political attack advertisements on viewers are influenced by that viewer’s pre-existing attitude towards the disparaged candidate and the rival who is launching the assault.</p><p>In fact, social science has demonstrated that in some instances where published misstatements are made with accompanying corrections, these corrections can in fact strengthen the belief in the original misstatement by certain ideologically-motivated subgroups. In short, the reasonable and apparently “politically-informed” member of society is possibly more interested in the political power of a defamatory statement than in its strict “truth”.</p><p>Applying this philosophy to Wynne v. Hudak, the public weight of Mr. Hudak’s statements is debatable. The reasonable supporter of the Ontario Progressive Conservative party is likely a wholehearted booster of Mr. Hudak’s accusations against the Premier, meaning that his statement probably had more of a confirmatory effect than actually engendering any lowering of the Premier’s reputation. Conversely, the reasonable Wynne-ite would probably respond to Mr. Hudak’s comments with: “Well, you would say that, wouldn’t you?”</p><p>Taking this approach to its extreme, it’s possible that the reasonable neutral observer (if there is such a thing) would perhaps see the comments for what they are — the musings of a career politician who wants to usurp the throne that his rival presently occupies. At the same time, however, to embrace this philosophy wholeheartedly would create a perverse situation where those parties with the greatest incentive to defame their rivals, are paradoxically the most heavily protected.</p><p>With this in mind, the Innes vs. Trudeau slugfest is the more interesting of the two. Instead of engaging two political foes, Innes vs. Trudeau involves two politicians who are supposed to be on the same team. It is more likely that in this context, the psychological impact of accusations of bullying, intimidation and cronyism being slung between two Liberal Party stalwarts is more likely to be taken seriously and therefore more likely to be harmful to reputation in the eyes of the reasonable audience member.</p><p><strong>Reputation: the property of the people</strong><br>The law of defamation has been criticized as being a vestige of the seventeenth century. Put more bluntly, it is a field that was developed in an era when the arbiters of what constituted the exact scope and value of an individual’s “reputation” were rich, landed, white, Christian aristocrats — not exactly a large and diverse sample size.</p><p>Today, however, the idea that reputation is a societally-mandated, monolithic concept may be changing. Modern Canada is more open and diverse, less stratified and altogether more tolerant. Changes in the nature and scope of mass communication have clearly had a fundamental impact on how we view character and standing of those around us, famous or anonymous.</p><p>Starting with WIC, Canadian courts begun a long and ongoing re-evaluation of the balance to be struck between free speech and the right to reputation in defamation law. Justice Binnie characterized the debate aptly, opining that: “An individual’s reputation is not to be treated as regrettable but unavoidable road kill on the highway of public controversy, but nor shall an overly solicitous regard for personal reputation be permitted to “chill” freewheeling debate on matters of public interest”.</p><p>These changes make it incumbent upon us to re-evaluate exactly what a “reputation” is in the 21st century. We now live in a world where concepts of moralism are no longer ubiquitously accepted — the sexual exploits of any given celebrity is now merely a precursor to vociferous debate about patriarchy versus sexual empowerment in modern society; a quick stint in rehab can actually be good for a celebrity’s career. Scholars recognized this phenomenon as far back as a generation ago, and with the advent of online and social media, it can only have become more entrenched. Professor David A. Anderson of the University of Texas writes: “Many of our ideas about reputation are products of a simpler era…. In today’s pluralistic society, much is tolerated and little is universally condemned. The mobility and anonymity of modern society make rehabilitation much easier”.<br>This was a philosophy that was explored by Justice Binnie in WIC, who held that “Public controversy can be a rough trade and the law needs to accommodate its requirements”, concluding that “[public media] combatants like lawyers or a devil’s advocate, are arguing a brief. What is important in such a debate on matters of public interest is that all sides of an issue are forcefully presented.”</p><p><strong>Cyberlibel: unpardonable or unstoppable?</strong><br>Canadian common law has been particularly indecisive on the meaning of defamation and value of reputation in the online sphere. Writing in 2004, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Barrick Gold Corp. v. Lopehandia recoiled from the internet in horror, citing the then-nascent medium as a “pervasive” forum of “tremendous power” in which reputations could be obliterated in the blink of an eye, with an inherent ability to lend credence to whatever publications it hosts.</p><p>Just one decade (and literally millions upon millions of kitten, planking and twerking videos) later, the courts are no longer so certain of the inviolable power and potential of the worldwide web to destroy us. Compare, if you will, the OCA’s chilling vision of the future from Lopehandia with the findings of the motions court in Baglow v. Smith, that blogging audiences expect and demand visceral rejoinders as part of the online political debate. According to Baglow, when the online gauntlet is laid-down, “The parry and thrust of the debaters is appreciated as much as the substance of what they say.”</p><p>Nevertheless, this freewheeling approach to modern reputation has not been unreservedly adopted. In 2012’s LaForest c. Collins, the Quebec Superior Court described the internet with hope and trepidation as “The most powerful and frequently used medium of communication on earth… [a medium that] can make anyone a celebrity in a few minutes. It can tarnish or destroy a reputation with one click.”</p><p><strong>Legislating reputation, skirting the common law</strong><br>While the common law has not yet definitively decided upon what a “reputation” is for the purposes of defamation law, certain legislative trends illustrate that law-makers around the world are starting to appreciate that one’s societal standing isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. In the United Kingdom for example, Section 1 of the recently passed Defamation Act 2013 provides that for a statement to be legally defamatory, it must be “likely” to cause “serious harm” to the plaintiff. For corporations the concept of “serious harm” is explicitly equated with “serious financial loss”.</p><p>In Ontario, government’s ongoing debate over Bill 83, the Protection of Public Participation Act purports to protect defendants in defamation claims from so-called SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) suits, in which powerful actors use their financial might to silence public interest advocates by initiating financial wars of attrition through litigation. Sections 2(3) and 2(4)4 of Bill 83 change the game by permitting judges to dismiss defamation claims in the public interest where the court is not convinced that the claim has “substantial merit”. This is a presumably high threshold that will force Ontario courts to fundamentally re-evaluate just what constitutes a tangible blow to a plaintiff’s reputation in the public interest context.</p><p><strong>Conclusions</strong><br>It’s far too early to know exactly what the Innes/Trudeau and Wynne/Hudak proceedings teach us about how defamation law is developing in Canada. However, we can draw some tentative lessons:</p><p>1. Apparently, the Grits didn’t know what “Libel” was until a few weeks ago; and now that they do, they are litigating it like champs; and</p><p>2. A good reputation is a lot like hardcore pornography. Speaking of the latter, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart presciently opined: “I shall not attempt further to define…that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it”.</p><p>The concept of “reputation” in modern defamation law is clearly changing. While an individual’s social standing may not yet be unavoidable road kill in the eyes of the reasonable observer, its value and meaning in an online and interconnected society is subject to considerable debate. The discussion will force plaintiffs, defendants and the judiciary to query whether the law of defamation needs some updating from its centuries-old roots. Aside from being good copy, the travails of Wynne, Hudak, Trudeau, Innes et al. may provide us with just the impetus we need to open the argument.</p><ul><li>This article is a general survey of the law and expresses Mr. Donald’s personal views on the subject matter discussed. It is not a substitute for, nor does it constitute legal advice. Viewing this article does not create a lawyer-client relationship.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dbda884f4441" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bernstein v. Poon and the pyrrhic perils of exaggerated injuries in Ontario defamation actions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MABDLaw/bernstein-v-poon-and-the-pyrrhic-perils-of-exaggerated-injuries-in-ontario-defamation-actions-2ff9c83dd9ef?source=rss-c6efca1150a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2ff9c83dd9ef</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark A.B. Donald]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Mar 2015 21:35:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-03-07T22:24:21.289Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Bernstein v. Poon </em>and the pyrrhic perils of exaggerated injuries in Ontario defamation actions</strong></p><ul><li>This article <a href="http://www.oba.org/Sections/Entertainment,-Media-and-Communications-Law/Articles/Articles-2015/February-2015/Bernstein-v-Poon-and-the-pyrrhic-perils-of-exagger#_ednref1">originally appeared</a> in the Ontario Bar Association’s online newsletter on February 25, 2015. Full citations can be found there.</li></ul><p>Libel law is all about reputation. So making out a successful and worthwhile defamation claim means proving that a particular publication or utterance was defamatory of the plaintiff. Practically speaking, as with any tort, the key to a worthwhile defamation claim is proving that the plaintiff’s reputation was tangibly harmed.</p><p>Considering that your average Ontario Superior Court trial costs tens of thousands of dollars, this reality should give prospective defamation plaintiffs pause for thought before they decide to head to court. In short, when a Court explicitly finds that your libel case is “more about “ego” and “turf warfare” than about reputation …..then you know you’ve got a hard road to hoe.</p><p>And yet, this is exactly what occurred in the Ontario Superior Court’s recent decision in <a href="http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2015/2015onsc155/2015onsc155.html"><em>Bernstein v. Poon</em>.</a> Consequently, the decision offers an important cautionary tale to prospective defamation litigants who are unable to make a clear distinction between reputational damage that is more akin to insult than actual injury.</p><p><strong>Battle of the Bulge: The facts of <em>Bernstein</em> in brief</strong></p><p>Two doctors with rival commercialized medical diet plans got all litigious after the defendant, Dr. Pat Poon made critical public statements about the plaintiff’s, Dr. Bernstein’s popular diet program. The comments were made by the defendant in a book and on a Cantonese-language television show that subsequently appeared online. In broad terms, the court found the defendant liable for defamatory statements and innuendos that the plaintiffs’ “Dr. Bernstein Diet” was nutritionally unsound, harmful to patients, merely transitory in its effects, based on false or incorrect science and questionable in its alleged successes.</p><p><strong>So, you’ve been defamed: now what?</strong></p><p>The truly interesting part of <em>Bernstein</em> however is not that the defendant was found to be liable, but rather, the Court’s discussion of the proper measure of damages. In his decision, Justice Mew pointed out Professor Brown’s seminal proposition regarding damages in defamation [citations omitted]:</p><blockquote><em>General damages in defamation cases flow from the defamatory publication and compensate the plaintiffs for any harm to his or her reputation or emotional well-being. This is often referred to as compensation for the “sting” of the defamation.</em></blockquote><p>His honour went on to quote from the recent Ontario Superior Court decision involving conservative media firebrand Ezra Lavant, in <em>Awan v. Lavant</em> [citations removed]:</p><blockquote><em>The factors to consider in determining the quantum of damages for defamation include the following: the plaintiff’s position and standing, the nature and seriousness of the defamatory statements, the mode and extent of publication, the absence or refusal of any retraction or apology, the whole conduct and motive of the defendant from publication through judgment, and any evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances….</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>In the Internet context </em>[recalling that a defamatory television interview had been posted on Dr. Poon’s website]<em>, these factors must be examined in the light of the ubiquity, universality and utility of that medium…</em></blockquote><p>Applying these principles to the case at bar, the Court in <em>Bernstein </em>took a rather dim view of the harm alleged by Dr. Bernstein as a result of Dr. Poon’s defamatory statements. Dr. Bernstein had testified that:</p><p>a. Dr. Poon’s statements undermined his decades of practice as a physician;</p><p>b. He had lost sleep over Dr. Poon’s statements. They had dominated his thoughts and interfered with his life;</p><p>c. He had to reassure his family, close friends, patients and staff in order to safeguard his reputation; and</p><p>d. Overall, that Dr. Poon’s statements created a public perception that the he did not practice good medicine, and therefore that the public would consequently be suspicious of his competence as a doctor.</p><p><strong>Defamation is easy; damages are hard</strong></p><p>In analyzing this evidence, the Court compared Dr. Bernstein’s alleged damages to those suffered by a defamed doctor in a similar case: <em>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. Meyers</em>. The issues in both cases were roughly analogous: in Meyers, a prominent cardiologist had been defamed on the CBC’s popular Fifth Estate television program. The Supreme Court of Canada made a damage award of $200,000, emphasizing the tangible damages that were visited upon the good doctor by Canada’s National Broadcaster:</p><p>a. Broadcasts and rebroadcasts of the programme was seen by over one million people</p><p>b. The aftermath of the broadcasts led to Dr. Meyers receiving calls from friends and colleagues inquiring of his professional reputation;</p><p>c. The CBC was found to be a news outlet with a wide viewership and a commensurate ability to significantly harm the defendant’s reputation; and</p><p>d. The defendants were found to have acted maliciously.</p><p>In contrast, on the facts of <em>Bernstein</em>, the Court found that the plaintiff’s alleged damages were of a wholly different order. Justice Mew stated that he was “unconvinced” as to the damages caused to the plaintiff’s reputation, describing them as lacking particularity and “exaggerated” at best. His Honour summed-up at paragraph 169 as to the facts that drove the damages award downwards:</p><blockquote><em>Approximately 10,000 copies of the second edition of Dr. Poon’s book entered circulation, less than the number of patients who each week pass through the plaintiffs’ clinics. Eight thousand copies of the third edition have been sold, with another 12,000 copies still in existence. There was no evidence concerning the traffic on Dr. Poon’s website or what proportion of people visiting Dr. Poon’s website would understand Cantonese and, hence, the video. Indeed, other than the evidence of Dr. Bernstein referred to above, there was no other evidence of the impact, if any, which the publication of Dr. Poon’s words has had on the plaintiff’s reputation or his business interests.</em></blockquote><p>In the result, Justice Mew ordered damages of $10,000 — essentially Small Claims Court money for what turned out to be an 8-year long Superior Court action and all its attendant expense. With this in mind, his Honour mused in closing: “It is for others to decide whether the substantial public resources that have been made available to enable this dispute to be adjudicated are proportionate to the rights and interests that were at stake.” An interesting question indeed.</p><p><strong>Takeaways from <em>Bernstein</em></strong></p><p>In the author’s opinion, what comes through Justice Mew’s decision is that Dr. Bernstein’s evidence of harm apparently lacked the definition or specificity seen in <em>Meyers</em> and therefore led to a greatly diminished damages award. Bernstein therefore teaches defamation practitioners everywhere about the importance of pre-action preparation with their prospective client. Identifying <em>prima facie</em> defamatory language and a prospective plaintiff’s bruised ego is the easy part. However, discerning tangible damages is the real driver behind any tort claim and therefore must be considered in the cold light of day.</p><p>In addition to its illumination of damages principles in defamation law, <em>Bernstein </em>offers some other interesting features that libel practitioners should know about. Firstly, in the author’s opinion, <em>Bernstein</em> surveys some of the foundational case law regarding making and defending a defamation action, and includes valuable citations, especially for historical cases where the harm caused by defamatory words to a plaintiff’s reputation was negligible. Justice Mew’s reasons therefore serve as an excellent “refresher” for counsel seeking to remind themselves of some of defamation law’s procedural peculiarities.</p><p>Second, the Court in <em>Bernstein</em> reminds us of an important point about damages in defamation actions: unlike in classic print-media cases, damages in the online libel cases are, generally speaking, not presumed once the impugned statement has been found to be legally defamatory. As a result, Bernstein reminds all plaintiffs’ counsel that when it comes to cyberlibel, they’d better be ready to document and prove downloads, hits, shares, retweets and the like in order to ground their damages claim. While the plaintiff in Bernstein jumped this hurdle, the principle remains especially relevant in cases where the media outlet accused of defamation is not generally well known, but possibly frequented by a niche community.</p><ul><li>This article is a general survey of the law and expresses Mr. Donald’s personal views on the subject matter discussed. It is not a substitute for, nor does it constitute legal advice. Viewing this article does not create a lawyer-client relationship.</li></ul><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/markdonald1">https://www.linkedin.com/in/markdonald1</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2ff9c83dd9ef" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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