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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mark Dubowitz on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mark Dubowitz on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Mark Dubowitz on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 22:19:53 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran Air participates in Syrian airlift, but Obama does nothing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz/iran-air-participates-in-syrian-airlift-but-obama-does-nothing-444d2dedb109?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/444d2dedb109</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[airlines]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2016 20:36:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-19T20:36:19.013Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/1*VEQpXuhtiw6iwepa_7vPcg.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Iran Air flying Abadan to Damascus. Less than 6 months after JCPOA implementation, Iran Air running <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/SyriaExpress?src=hash">#SyriaExpress</a>” — From Emanuele Ottolenghi’s Twitter</figcaption></figure><p>As the U.S. Treasury considers lifting barriers to Iran’s purchase of Boeing and Airbus passenger aircraft, concerned Capitol Hill lawmakers on both sides of the political aisle are working to restrict the sale. My FDD colleague <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/emanuele-ottolenghi/">Emanuele Ottolenghi</a> writes in his last contribution to <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/emanuele-ottolenghi-iran-air-participates-in-syrian-airlift-but-obama-does-nothing/"><em>The Hill</em></a> that Iran Air, which purportedly would receive a number of the new aircraft, is essentially “an accomplice to mass murder in Syria” because it ferries troops and equipment to the war-torn country.</p><p>The questions raised about the sale of Boeing of Airbus airliners to Iran are legitimate. Iran continues to fuel skepticism about its cooperation with the United States and the West, and by procuring a policy of no-response to Iranian escalations, the White House is engaging in behavior that continue regional destabilization.</p><p>“[W]hile administration officials were reassuring Congress that the money was being used to address ‘critical economic needs,’ an Iran Air Airbus A300 <a href="https://twitter.com/eottolenghi/status/773941322424221696"><strong>took off from Tehran, bound for Damascus</strong></a>,” Ottolenghi writes. But instead of heading to its stated destination, he reports that Flight IR697 headed south, to the Iranian port city of Abadan, where it landed for a quick stopover before continuing to the Syrian capital.</p><p>For its role in the crisis in Syria, “Iran Air should be sanctioned for its role in perpetuating and exacerbating the Syrian civil war,” Ottolenghi says.</p><p><a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/296303-iran-air-participates-in-syrian-airlift-but-obama-does">Find Ottolenghi’s full write up here</a>.</p><p>…</p><p><strong><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></strong><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Iran and directs its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=444d2dedb109" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fueling Terror: The Dangers of Ransom Payments to Iran]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz/fueling-terror-the-dangers-of-ransom-payments-to-iran-840087c493ab?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/840087c493ab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Sep 2016 20:33:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-08T20:33:34.925Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>My Testimony for the House Financial Services Committee</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IVsXYFdhDQjq-EFpxhqOJQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Introduction:</strong></p><p>This summer marked the one-year anniversary of the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This deal is fatally flawed in that it provides the Islamic Republic of Iran with a patient pathway to nuclear weapons capability by placing limited, temporary, and reversible constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities. These nuclear “sunset provisions,” which will begin to expire in seven years and mostly disappear over a period of ten to fifteen years, leave Iran as a threshold nuclear power with an industrial-size uranium enrichment and plutonium program, near-zero nuclear breakout capacity, an advanced centrifuge-powered clandestine sneakout capability, advanced ballistic missile and ICBM programs, access to advanced heavy weaponry, greater regional hegemony, and a more powerful economy that could be immune to Western sanctions. Even as Iran temporarily scales back some of its nuclear activities under the JCPOA, the regime’s illicit efforts to obtain proliferation-related technology continues while its other non-nuclear malign activities are expanding.</p><p>The deal — as well as the interim agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) — provided Iran with substantial economic relief that helped the regime avoid a severe economic crisis and return to a modest recovery path. The lifting of restrictions on Iran’s use of frozen overseas assets as part of the interim agreement returned about $11.9 billion to Iran. The final agreement provided Tehran with access to a further $100 billion, including over $50 billion in unencumbered, liquid cash, according to the Obama administration. These funds gave Tehran badly needed hard currency to settle its outstanding debts, begin to repair its economy, build up its diminished foreign exchange reserves, and ease a budgetary crisis, as well as providing the regime greater resources for the financing of terrorism and other illicit activities.</p><p>The nuclear deal did nothing to address the full range of Iran’s malign activities, including ballistic missile development, support for terrorism, regional destabilization, and human rights abuses. Iran also still owes American terrorism victims and their families more than $55 billion in unpaid, outstanding damages awarded by American courts. The weakening of missile language in the key UN Security Council Resolution, the lifting of a conventional arms embargo in four years, and lifting the missile embargo in seven years severely undermines international efforts to combat Iran’s illicit activities.</p><p>A key driver of these threats remains the Islamic Republic’s ability to bankroll and finance a host of terrorist groups, militias, and proxy forces throughout the Middle East, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and designated Iraqi Shiite militias, as well expanding the existing asymmetric military capabilities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite Quds Force. Iran remains the world’s largest and most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism, according to President Obama’s State Department.</p><p>Iran’s ability to access cash outside the formal banking system is crucial in supporting these activities. Tehran also uses cash for other malign activities that it aggressively supports: WMD procurement, missile and heavy weaponry procurement, as well as aid to the murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, designated Shiite militias, the Houthis in Yemen, and other malign actors.</p><p>Given existing U.S. financial sanctions, Tehran remains restricted in how it can fund these forces and activities through the formal financial system. The regime needs cash — liquid, untraceable, convertible, and easy to transfer. Cash is critical for Iran to sustain and expand these activities.</p><p>The subject of this hearing is the nature and consequences of the $400-million cash payment to Iran in connection with the settlement of an outstanding Iranian claim before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). We also know that the subsequent $1.3 billion payment to Iran was made in cash. Instead of only focusing my testimony on the question of whether the $400-million and $1.3-billion cash transfers constituted a ransom, I want to broaden the scope of the inquiry to look at a number of related questions:</p><ol><li>Was the Obama administration’s payment of $1.7 billion in three separate cash shipments a unique occurrence or part of a pattern of cash payments as part of Tribunal settlements and/or sanctions relief?</li><li>If this situation was unique, did the administration agree to a cash payment scheme because it stood to receive a very valuable Iranian concession — the release of hostages, for example?</li><li>How much has Iran received in cash or in gold and other precious metals, in particular, since January 2014, when the interim nuclear agreement came into effect?</li><li>Did these cash transfers include billions of dollars sent to Iran between 2014 and 2016 as part of the administration’s push for a nuclear deal?</li><li>Did the administration approve the transfer of billions of dollars in cash to Iran because no formal financial channels existed, or did U.S. officials concede to Iranian demands for this cash?</li><li>Which Iranian entities received the cash payments, and who were the ultimate beneficiaries of these payments — the Central Bank of Iran, the Defense Ministry, the IRGC, the Quds Force, the Ministry of Intelligence, or other state or quasi-state entities?</li><li>Did the Obama administration facilitate a massive and unprecedented cash transfer scheme to the leading state sponsor of terrorism with dangerous illicit finance consequences?</li></ol><p>According to U.S. Treasury spokeswoman Dawn Selak, it was necessary to pay the $1.7-billion settlement “in non-U.S. currency, in cash” because of “the effectiveness of U.S. and international sanctions regimes over the last several years in isolating Iran from the international financial system.” If this is true, it raises serious concerns that Iran received billions of dollars in sanctions relief from the nuclear agreement in cash. Alternatively, if Iran was able to receive sanctions relief through the formal financial system, it would seem that the administration is not being transparent about the real reasons that the $1.7 billion was paid to Iran in cash.</p><p>…</p><p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/Dubowitz_Mark_Fueling_Terror_.pdf">Read and Download the full testimony</a></p><p><strong><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></strong><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Iran and directs its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=840087c493ab" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Iran Deal’s Fatal Flaws After One Year]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz/the-iran-deals-fatal-flaws-after-one-year-39dfb42bd455?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/39dfb42bd455</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jul 2016 17:09:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-14T17:09:17.201Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Emboldened Iran and Diminished American Deterrence</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/539/1*uPwJ6vkhv0Lkli-Titr3Qg.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Executive Summary</strong></h4><p>As we mark the one-year anniversary of the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it is worth recalling why this deal is fatally flawed. The JCPOA provides Iran with a patient pathway to nuclear weapons capability by placing limited, temporary, and reversible constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities. These nuclear “sunset provisions,” which begin to expire in eight years and mostly disappear over a period of ten to fifteen years, leave Iran as a threshold nuclear power with an industrial-size, uranium enrichment and plutonium program; near-zero nuclear breakout capacity; an advanced centrifuge-powered clandestine sneakout capability; advanced ballistic missile and ICBM programs; access to advanced heavy weaponry; greater regional hegemony; and a more powerful economy that could be immune to Western sanctions. Even as Iran temporarily scaled back some of its nuclear activities under the JCPOA, the regime’s illicit effort to obtain proliferation-related technology continues while its other non-nuclear malign activities are expanding.</p><p>The deal (as well as the interim agreement in place during the negotiations) provided Iran with substantial economic relief that helped the regime avoid a severe economic crisis and return to a modest recovery path. The lifting of restrictions on Iran’s use of frozen overseas assets of about $100 billion gave Tehran badly needed hard currency to settle its outstanding debts, begin to repair its economy, build up its diminished foreign exchange reserves, and ease a budgetary crisis, which in turn freed up funds for the financing of terrorism.</p><p>The nuclear deal also did nothing to address the full range of Iran’s illicit activities, including ballistic missile development, support for terrorism, regional destabilization, and human rights abuses. Indeed, the weakening of missile language in the key UN Security Council Resolution and the lifting of a conventional arms embargo after five years, and the missile embargo after eight years, undermine international efforts to combat Iran’s illicit activities.</p><p>During last summer’s congressional review period, Obama administration officials pledged that the United States would continue to enforce non-nuclear sanctions and oppose all of Iran’s dangerous activities. However, many of us raised concerns that Iran would view any imposition of sanctions as a violation of the deal and grounds to “snap back” its nuclear program, and that those threats would in effect prevent Washington from imposing new non-nuclear sanctions. This is what we called Iran’s “nuclear snapback.”</p><p>In fear of the nuclear snapback, the Obama administration has missed numerous opportunities since the conclusion of the JPCOA to push back against Iran’s malign activities, including support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and other destabilizing activities in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and other countries across the Middle East. Iran also has tested nuclear-capable ballistic missiles seven times since July 2015 in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Yet, the administration has only issued a handful of new designations, including an ineffectual targeting of Iran’s missile procurement networks. Tehran can easily reconstitute these networks, and the designations do not impose the kind of economic costs needed to change Tehran’s strategic calculus.</p><p>In the past weeks, reports revealed Iran’s ongoing attempts to illegally procure nuclear and ballistic missile technology and raw materials. This activity violated UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (in place prior to January 2016), it violates UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and it violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the JCPOA. In its annual report released at the end of June, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency found that Iran engaged in a “quantitatively high level” of attempts to acquire nuclear and missile technology and equipment. German states also released their own intelligence reports, and multiple reports noted that Iran attempted to procure goods and technology relevant to “atomic, biological, and chemical weapons” and “nuclear and missile delivery programs.” In its coverage of these reports, The Wall Street Journal spoke with two German intelligence officers who stated that Iran’s illegal procurement efforts continued in 2016 — well after Implementation Day (January 16, 2016). If these 2016 activities included nuclear goods and technologies, Iran would be in violation of its JCPOA obligations; for missile-related technologies, Tehran would be in violation of UNSCR 2231.</p><p>The Obama administration and its European allies have not imposed meaningful sanctions or punished Iran for its illicit activities. In fact, nuclear experts at the Institute for Science and International Security found that over the past two years, “The Obama administration has inhibited federal investigations and prosecutions of alleged Iranian illegal procurement efforts.”</p><p>The Obama administration also has failed to enforce human rights sanctions against Iran. Since the JCPOA was concluded last summer, the administration has designated no individuals or entities for human rights abuses, and has issued only three designations since Hassan Rouhani took power in the summer of 2013. Meanwhile, Iran continues to hold hostage U.S., Canadian, and British dual nationals Bagher and Siamak Namazi, Homa Hoodfar, and Nazanin Ratcliffe as well as Nizar Zakka, a Lebanese citizen and U.S. permanent resident as well as many other individuals. This is unacceptable and inexcusable. They must be released unconditionally and immediately.</p><p>As international businesses re-enter the Iranian market, the regime continues to oppress its citizens and deny their basic human rights. The regime seems to hope that the promise of profits will blind the international community to Iran’s vast system of domestic repression.</p><p>Those of us who were critical of the deal also raised concerns that Iran would view the JCPOA not as the end of the negotiations, but as the beginning, and demand ever-greater sanctions relief, as we have indeed seen. We have witnessed the Iranian government’s full-court press to persuade the United States to green-light Iran’s access to U.S. dollar transactions. This significant and unilateral concession to Iran would go beyond the sanctions relief promised by the nuclear agreement, and seemed to be under active consideration by the State Department before congressional pressure stopped it (for now). Iran has pressured the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to remove it from its financial “blacklist.” While FATF recently refused to do so, it did suspend mandatory counter-measures against Iran for one year and opened up the possibility for future changes in the not-too-distant future. Iran is also seeking membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and enjoys the backing of some European countries. WTO membership for Iran could severely curtail Washington’s future ability to use financial and economic sanctions.</p><p>Statements by administration officials such as Secretary of State John Kerry that it is America’s responsibility to ensure that Iran “get[s] the benefits that they are supposed to get” are very problematic. The administration is allowing Iran to hold the U.S. responsible for delivering financial and economic outcomes, and for providing ever-greater sanctions relief in order to persuade Iran to keep to the JCPOA. This is not good policy. Instead, Congress should ensure that the onus is placed on Iran. If Tehran wants more sanctions relief and wants to encourage multinational companies to enter the Iranian market, it must change its dangerous behavior.</p><p>The JCPOA lifts sanctions on Iran’s nuclear activities, but it does not preclude the United States from using non-nuclear sanctions — despite statements from Iran that it will view any imposition of sanctions as a violation of the deal and grounds to “snapback” its nuclear program. Congress should reject that Iranian position — which amounts to a form of nuclear blackmail — and hold the administration accountable for its commitments to “oppose Iran’s destabilizing policies with every national security tool available.” Sanctions need to be imposed to target Iran’s support for terrorism, ballistic missile program, support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and designated Shiite militias in Iraq, and human rights abuses. These steps are not a violation of the JCPOA, but rather an affirmation of the stated U.S. policy. Specifically, we recommend that Congress consider taking the following steps:</p><p><strong>1.</strong> Protect the integrity of the U.S. dollar from Iranian illicit finance.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> Reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act, an important foundation of the sanctions architecture.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> Counter the narrative that Iran is a responsible financial actor.</p><p><strong>4.</strong> Strengthen sanctions against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) by designating it for terrorism and expanding non-proliferation sanctions and designations.</p><p><strong>5.</strong> Require updated reporting on IRGC penetration in sectors of the Iranian economy, along with reporting and sanctions on the sectors involved in Iran’s ballistic missile development.</p><p><strong>6.</strong> Require the U.S. Treasury to designate companies with IRGC or Ministry of Defense beneficial ownership.</p><p><strong>7.</strong> Require the U.S. Treasury to create an IRGC Watch List.</p><p><strong>8.</strong> Require reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding any transactions with IRGC Watch List companies or in sectors connected to Iran’s ballistic missile program.</p><p><strong>9.</strong> Insist on robust investigation into illicit procurement and outstanding concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.</p><p><strong>10.</strong> Expand human rights sanctions by imposing sanctions on Iranian state organs responsible for institutionalized human rights abuses and by linking sanctions concessions to improvements in human rights conditions.</p><p><strong>11.</strong> Target corruption and kleptocracy for reasons related to terrorism and human rights issues.</p><p><strong>12.</strong> Require reporting on U.S. citizens and other dual-nationals held hostage in Iran.</p><p><strong>13.</strong> Require reporting on and expand sanctions against Iran’s support for the Assad regime and IRGC activities in Syria.</p><p><strong>14.</strong> Require presidential certification that commercial planes are only being used for civil aviation end-use before authorizing the sale of any aircraft to Iran.</p><p><strong>15.</strong> Prohibit any U.S. financial institution, including the Export-Import Bank, from financing any trade with Tehran while Iran remains a state sponsor of terrorism.</p><p><strong>16.</strong> Require reporting on the use of foreign airports and seaports by sanctioned Iranian entities.</p><p>America needs a comprehensive strategy deploying all of the coercive tools of statecraft to push back against the full range of Iran’s malign activities. If Washington does not confront these activities now and at every turn, in ten to fifteen years, we may face a situation in which the president has insufficient leverage to respond to an expanding Iranian military-nuclear program, regional aggression, and global terrorism. The U.S. may have only military force left to respond to Iran’s nuclear and other dangerous activities — at which time, the Iranian regime will be stronger, and the consequences of such military action likely will be severe.</p><p>…</p><p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/Dubowitz_Fixler_Fatal_Flaws_After_One_Year.pdf">Read and download the full report.</a></p><p><strong><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></strong><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Iran and directs its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><strong><em>Annie Fixler</em></strong> <em>is a policy analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance (CSIF).</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=39dfb42bd455" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Now Is Not The Time To Lift Sanctions On Iran]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz/now-is-not-the-time-to-lift-sanctions-on-iran-c4564a34580?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c4564a34580</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[illicit-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[barack-obama]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jun 2016 18:13:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-30T18:13:56.305Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/570/1*3KXSXiHERhdFvbxEGcRGDQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>(Photo: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images)</em></figcaption></figure><p><em>By Mark Dubowitz and Annie Fixler</em></p><p>The Islamic Republic of Iran is energetically trying to legitimize its financial sector despite a decades-long rap sheet of illicit financial activities. Since the conclusion of the nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the White House has missed numerous opportunities to issue sanctions against Iran’s ongoing illicit activity. Instead, in an effort to keep Iran committed to abiding by the nuclear deal, the administration is now acting as Tehran’s <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/dem-senator-rebukes-obama-admin-america-shouldnt-be-irans-chamber-of-commerce/article/2002982">chamber of commerce</a>.</p><p>Washington’s bipartisan effort to hold the mullahs accountable for their awful non-nuclear behaviour — their support to designated terrorist groups; incitement of sectarian conflict in Syria, Iraq and Yemen; and abominable human-rights violations at home — are, in the administration’s eyes, of lesser importance than the JCPOA. This explains the perceived need to financially reward the Iranian leadership for backing the atomic deal. It also explains why the administration already has broken its promises that it would only suspend or lift so-called U.S. “nuclear sanctions” while vigorously enforcing non-nuclear sanctions against the regime’s malign behaviour.</p><p>Iran complains that it has not received the sanctions relief it was promised, but the administration did its job. It lifted the nuclear-related sanctions against Iran earlier this year, and kept some terrorism, missile and human rights sanctions in place. But now the Iranians want all sanctions lifted.</p><p>President Obama, fearful that Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and the nuclear deal he negotiated might not survive the next Iranian presidential election in 2017, has committed himself to Rouhani’s re-election. This is an unwarranted fear: Every Iranian president since the early 1980s, including the reformist Mohammad Khatami and the firebrand Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, served two terms. Nevertheless, to help Rouhani, Obama has now decided to oppose any sanctions that limit Iranian economic growth, including those permitted under the JCPOA.</p><p>The fact is that Tehran already has received an <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/dubowitz-mark-dont-buy-the-spin-iran-is-getting-economic-relief/">economic windfall</a>. The JCPOA (as well as the interim agreement in place during the negotiations) provided Iran with substantial economic relief that <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/publications/RoubiniFDDReport_Oct14.pdf">helped</a> it avoid a severe economic crisis and even enjoy a modest recovery. The <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0144.aspx">lifting of restrictions</a> on Iran’s use of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iran-claims-100-billion-now-freed-in-major-step-as-sanctions-roll-back/2016/02/01/edfc23ca-c8e5-11e5-a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html">frozen overseas</a><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-details-idUSKCN0PO14D20150714">assets</a>, totaling <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/publications/FDDRoubini_Report_Irans_mysterious_shrinking_reserves.pdf">about $100 billion</a>, now gives Iran badly needed hard currency to settle its outstanding debts, further repair its economy, build up its diminished foreign-exchange reserves and ease a budgetary crisis. Needless to say, these funds also allow the regime to increase its aggressive actions abroad.</p><p>When the administration defended the Iran deal to a skeptical Congress, it stressed that the deal would not inhibit Washington’s continuing efforts to check Iranian aggression and the mullahs’ long-standing aid to terrorist groups. It emphasized that Washington would remain vigilant in its efforts to check Tehran’s bad behaviour. President Obama himself <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/01/remarks-president-obama-p51-meeting">promised</a> that Washington would “continue to vigorously enforce sanctions pertaining to Iran’s support for terrorism, human rights abuses and ballistic missile programs.” But the president now appears cowed by Iranian <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/28/john-kerry-obama-administration-terrorism-human-rights-iran-to-united-nations-new-sanctions-could-kill-nuclear-deal/">threats</a> that it would view any imposition of sanctions as a violation of the deal and grounds to “snapback” its nuclear program.</p><p>The administration has since allowed the <a href="http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/us-allowed-weak-language-iran-missile-activity-russia-now-using">weakening</a> of <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/washington-made-it-easy-for-iran-to-fire-its-ballistic-missiles/">missile language</a> in the key UN Security Council Resolution that had, in an earlier version, explicitly banned long-range ballistic missile development — which administration officials quietly admit is a sign that Iran still harbors nuclear ambitions. Alarmingly, according to the terms of the JCPOA, Iran could legally import in eight years the missile technology that it now procures illegally.</p><p>The administration also seems uninterested in stopping Iran’s domestic repression, which has intensified with a <a href="http://shaheedoniran.org/english/human-rights-at-the-united-nations/human-rights-monitoring-mechanisms/high-commissioner-office/zeid-calls-for-an-end-to-executions-for-drug-offences-in-iran/">record number</a> of executions in 2015. When Rouhani was elected in June 2013, there was a widespread assumption that he would shepherd in an era of greater freedom. Yet, as United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran Ahmed Shaheed<a href="http://shaheedoniran.org/english/dr-shaheeds-work/press-releases/press-conference-statement-on-10-march-2016/"> reports</a>, there has been no “meaningful change on the ground.”</p><p>Sadly, since the JCPOA was reached, the administration has only issued about a dozen <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20160117.aspx">new</a> <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20160324.aspx">designations</a> to counter Iran’s continuing malign behavior including weak missile sanctions that will do nothing to change the regime’s strategic calculus. The administration has imposed <a href="http://freebeacon.com/national-security/us-iranian-human-rights/">zero</a> human rights designations since the JCPOA and <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9731.aspx">only</a> <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2411.aspx">three</a> since Rouhani came to power in 2013.</p><p>Meanwhile, Secretary of State John Kerry and other officials are touring European capitals to encourage banks to re-enter the Iranian market. The White House is <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-us-sanctions-concession-to-iran-may-be-in-works-ap/">reportedly </a>mulling a new unilateral concession that Iran did not negotiate as part of the JCPOA: Iranian use of dollarized financial transactions through <a href="https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/08v14n2/0809prei.pdf">offshore dollar-clearing</a>, <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/potential-u.s.-clarification-of-financial-sanctions-regulations">inter-bank book transfers</a> and conversions, or some other kind of mechanism that would allow Iran access to the dollar.</p><p>This concession <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/eric-b-lorber-treasury-prepares-to-take-dollarized-transactions-with-iran-offshore/">undercuts</a> the efficacy of future non-nuclear sanctions, which depend on the private sector’s perception of the severe financial risks associated with any Iranian transactions. Easing dollarized transaction restrictions will only serve to aid the current concerted Iranian push to legitimize its financial sector. And Iran will achieve this without changing its behaviour.</p><p>If the White House won’t challenge Iran, Congress should do what it can to uphold America’s commitments. Sanctions need to continue to target the regime’s support for terrorism, ballistic-missile development, aid to Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and designated Shiite militias in Iraq, and human-rights abuses. These steps are not a violation of the JCPOA, but rather an <a href="http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/09/246574.htm">affirmation</a> of stated U.S. policy to “oppose Iran’s destabilizing policies with every national security tool available.”</p><p>…</p><p>Article originally published in <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/mark-dubowitz/iran-deal_b_10721160.html">The Huffington Post</a></p><p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/dubowitz-mark/"><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></a><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Iran and directs its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>Annie Fixler is a policy analyst at FDD’s </em><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/csif"><em>Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance</em></a><em>. Find her on Twitter: @afixler</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c4564a34580" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Risky Business In Iran]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz/risky-business-in-iran-88818c00ff5?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/88818c00ff5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jun 2016 14:25:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-29T14:25:49.463Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Bankers should beware of getting too close, too quickly, to a country with a long rap sheet of financial crimes.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*3AsaiiByZ3CY9p5c15TExA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the intergovernmental organization that sets global standards to combat money laundering and finance for terrorism and proliferation, had a clear message for financial institutions last week when it <a href="http://fdd.cmail20.com/t/r-i-skkjjx-ddlutrbky-r/">declined</a> to remove the Islamic Republic of Iran from its high-risk blacklist: Iran may say it’s open for business but it’s not yet safe to do it.</p><p>FATF’s directive was a clear rejection of the Islamic Republic’s lobbying campaign to legitimize itself as a responsible financial actor: “Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.” FATF urged its members and all jurisdictions to “advise their financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relationships and transactions” with Iran.</p><p>This enhanced due diligence will prove a nightmare for businesses for important reasons.</p><p>First, many Iranian companies — including entities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) which is sanctioned by the U.S. and the EU — use nontransparent corporate structures and shadow companies to hide their true ownership interests. The IRGC controls an estimated 30% of Iran’s economy. Businesses should be concerned that they may be inadvertently dealing with entities owned or controlled by sanctioned entities or those that may become sanctioned when their ties to the IRGC become apparent.</p><h4><strong>Iran will use terrorism as it wishes</strong></h4><p>Second, Iran has continued its support for terrorist groups including Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and sanctioned militias throughout the Middle East. It provides direct support to the Syrian regime through the IRGC and Hezbollah, and arms, finances and trains foreign Shiite fighters to support Syrian President Bashar Assad’s brutal five-year war that has killed almost 500,000 people.</p><p>Third, Tehran’s efforts to pass laws that purport to address international counter-terrorism financing standards are hollow and don’t conform to FATF standards. Iran’s definition of terrorism, for example, excludes groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism,” and has other language used to justify terrorism against America and its allies. Iran’s leaders are telling the world “we will arm and bankroll whomever we want but won’t call them terrorists.”</p><p>Businesses should make no mistake about Iran’s commitment to use terrorism as it wishes. The Obama State Department <a href="http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf">recognizes</a> Iran as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. On Friday, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah publicly <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2016/06/25/In-first-Hezbollah-s-Nasrallah-confirms-all-financial-support-comes-from-Iran.html">announced</a>, “We are open about the fact that Hezbollah’s budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of Iran.”</p><h4><strong>Violation of FATF requirements</strong></h4><p>Fourth, Iran is in violation of FATF requirements to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions to target proliferation financing. Tehran’s partnership with North Korea in both missile, and potentially nuclear, development is in clear violation of UN sanctions on Pyongyang.</p><p>Finally, Iran’s nefarious activities pose additional risk. It ranked 130 out of 168 countries on <a href="https://www.transparency.org/country/#IRN">Transparency International’s</a> Corruption Perceptions Index, and 108 out of 129 on the <a href="http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/countries">International Property Rights Index</a>. Tehran ranked 150 out of 189 countries on the <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/iran/">World Bank’s</a> 2016 “Ease of Doing Business” Index on “protecting minority investors,” and 140 in “resolving insolvency.” The pervasiveness of corruption presents significant challenges for foreign companies since evidence of bribes triggers the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the UK Bribery Act, which involve severe civil and criminal penalties.</p><p>One issue though: While the FATF made the right decision to keep Iran on the blacklist, it also elected to suspend mandatory counter-measures against Tehran for one year. This could easily become a slippery slope that lets the foremost state sponsor of terrorism off the hook without changing its dangerous financial conduct. Counter-measures include, for example, requiring financial institutions to apply specific elements of enhanced due diligence to transactions and relationships with individuals and companies located in high risk jurisdictions.</p><h4><strong>A mixed message</strong></h4><p>It also sends a mixed message that risks politicizing the FATF’s work. On the one hand, U.S. officials have <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0500.aspx">pushed back</a> when Iran seeks to blame the U.S. for the slow pace of integration into the world’s financial system. On the other, the temporary suspension of mandatory counter-measures could signal a shift in FATF’s position and increase the likelihood that, under pressure from European countries eager to get back to business, Iran gets taken off the blacklist next year without a fundamental change in its financial criminal behavior.</p><p>Ranking Democratic member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Eliot Engel <a href="https://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/press-releases/engel-statement-troubling-fatf-decision-iran">underscored</a> this problem. “I am deeply concerned about what appears to be a major policy shift by the Task Force…. Congress will certainly be watching…. Financial institutions should not enable Iran’s dangerous behavior.”</p><p>Rep. Steny Hoyer, the second highest member in the House Democratic leadership, <a href="http://www.democraticwhip.gov/content/hoyer-statement-financial-action-task-forces-decision-iran">expressed</a> similar concerns: Hoyer said he is “alarmed by FATF or other bodies that give Iran’s leaders any reason to believe that their country can reintegrate into the international banking system without changing their dangerous behavior.”</p><h4><strong>Iran should remain on the blacklist</strong></h4><p>Most large banks for now may not be fooled by the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric. They will continue to implement strict counter-measures since FATF requirements are considered the floor not the ceiling for responsible risk management. Those who care about long-term protection of their assets are not rushing back into Iran because they understand the risks of getting entangled in massive money-laundering, corruption and terror finance schemes that pose unmanageable risks to their stakeholders.</p><p>But the past is an unsettling prologue. Under the Iran nuclear deal, Iran is getting conventional weapons sanctions lifted in five years and ballistic missile sanctions in eight years regardless of any changes in Tehran’s malign conduct. Nuclear restrictions will begin to sunset in eight years whether or not Iran has given up its nuclear weapons ambitions. For the reputation of FATF and the global financial community it is sworn to defend, financial restrictions cannot be disconnected from behavior. Iran should remain on the blacklist until it stops its involvement in illicit finance. Bankers should beware of getting too close, too quickly, to a country with a long rap sheet of financial crimes.</p><p>…</p><p>Article originally published in <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/06/28/risky-business-in-iran/#b3b96492a37d">Forbes Opinion</a></p><p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/dubowitz-mark/"><strong><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></strong></a><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and head of its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/toby-dershowitz1/"><strong><em>Toby Dershowitz</em></strong></a><em> is FDD’s Vice President of Government Relations and Strategy.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=88818c00ff5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran is Still a Business Risk]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz/iran-is-still-a-business-risk-b0673b27cdea?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b0673b27cdea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jun 2016 14:59:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-24T15:11:01.886Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Implications of FATF’s Decision</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*q6F8W2hWiydXjIlMSqAwNg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Following its plenary meeting this week, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is set to <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-june-2016.html">maintain</a> Iran on its black list, with a one-year suspension, though not removal, of the mandatory countermeasures applied to the Islamic Republic.</p><p>FATF is an inter-governmental organization that serves as the preeminent global policymaking body for combating illicit finance. It does that primarily by setting global standards to combat money laundering, and finance for terrorism and proliferation. Its goal is to protect the international financial system from vulnerabilities and threats that emanate from countries that do not implement its standards, and to work with countries that seek to become responsible members of the international financial system.</p><p>FATF’s move signals that, notwithstanding intense pressure from Tehran, Iran’s effort to legitimize its malign activities has not been matched by changes to its underlying conduct — the reason Iran has, along with North Korea, maintained its place on this blacklist and been subject to mandatory countermeasures.</p><p>Following FATF’s action, the base assessment of the risks of Iran’s illicit conduct remains the same. Practically speaking, there is no change since, given the continued concerns over Iran’s illicit conduct, financial institutions will continue to voluntarily implement strict countermeasures. This signals a recognition by the global community that Iran continues to represent a threat to the international financial system.</p><p>Businesses considering ties to Iran will have to conduct enhanced due diligence that will prove a nightmare for them for a number of reasons.</p><p>Many Iranian companies — including sanctioned entities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — utilize opaque corporate structures and shadow companies to hide their true ownership interests. The IRGC controls an estimated 30 percent of Iran’s economy, and those seeking to do business in the country should be concerned that they may be inadvertently dealing with entities owned or controlled by sanctioned entities or those that may become sanctioned.</p><p>Iran’s nefarious financial activities go further. It ranked 150th out of 189 countries on the <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/iran/">World Bank’s</a> 2016 “Ease of Doing Business” Index on “protecting minority investors,” and 140th in “resolving insolvency.” It ranked 130th out of 168 countries on <a href="https://www.transparency.org/country/#IRN">Transparency International’s</a> Corruption Perceptions Index, and 108th out of 129 on the <a href="http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/countries">International Property Rights Index</a>. In January, <em>Reuters</em> <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-investment-idUSKCN0UY1S8">noted</a> that “Iran’s shadow economy has been a breeding ground for corruption and nepotism,” and that “foreign companies will be wary of approaches by local ‘fixers’ who would pay bribes on their behalf.”</p><p>Iran has continued its support for terrorist groups, including Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and militias throughout the Middle East. It provides direct support for the Syrian regime, including arms, financing, training, and the facilitation of foreign Shiite fighters to support the regime’s brutal five-year crackdown.</p><p>Tehran’s efforts to pass laws that purport to address international counter-terrorism financing standards do not hold up even on paper. Its definition of terrorism excludes groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism, and racism,” and other language used to justify terrorism against American allies.</p><p>Most large banks that care about long-term protection of their assets are not rushing back into Iran because they understand it has a long way to go before it’s safe to do business there. Ultimately they are looking to avoid the massive sanctions, money-laundering, and corruption risk Iran poses to their stakeholders.</p><p>The one-year suspension will be up for consideration next June.</p><p>Even if countermeasures are removed next year, Iran likely will remain on the FATF blacklist until it stops its dangerous financial conduct. Global financial institutions understand that this illicit conduct, not empty expressions of intent, must be changed before risking business with Iran. FATF’s action this week serves as yet another reminder to “know your customer.” Buyers should beware: Iran may be open for business, but is it not yet safe for it.</p><p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/dubowitz-mark/"><strong><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></strong></a><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and head of its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/toby-dershowitz1/"><strong><em>Toby Dershowitz</em></strong></a><em> is FDD’s Vice President of Government Relations and Strategy.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b0673b27cdea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Iran-Boeing Deal: More Risk than Reward]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz/the-iran-boeing-deal-more-risk-than-reward-bbf8b19c6048?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bbf8b19c6048</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2016 16:49:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-17T16:49:28.003Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7YAur5XRuAcx-iisrtamvg.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>Boeing could find itself unwittingly supporting the Assad Regime and Hezbollah</strong></h4><p>Aircraft manufacturer Boeing has struck an historic deal with the Iranian Regime. In a multi-billion dollar transaction Boeing has agreed to sell 100 commercial airliners to Iran — more specifically Iran Air. However, as my colleague (and longtime watchdog of Iranian aviation)<a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/emanuele-ottolenghi/"> Emanuele Ottolenghi </a>warns, Iran Air may be engaging in airlifting weapons and fighters to Syria, a practice that forced the U.S. Treasury to sanction the airline in 2011.</p><p>Additionally, Ottolenghi reports that Iran Air is unlikely to retain all of the aircraft it purchases. Some of Boeing’s aircraft may end up in the hands of Mahan Air, an airline largely controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and currently under U.S. sanctions for its ongoing logistical support for Iran’s military involvement in Syria.</p><p>While the money is enticing, and being the first to break into a new market can have its advantages, Boeing might want to step back and re-evaluate the risks before it finds itself in a lawsuit, or worse.</p><p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/emanuele-ottolenghi-the-iran-boeing-deal-rewards-and-risks/">Read the full policy brief breaking down the risks of this deal from my colleague Emanuele Ottolenghi.</a></p><p><strong><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></strong><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Iran and directs its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bbf8b19c6048" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Obama Administration Needs to Stand Strong on Iran Sanctions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/implications-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/the-obama-administration-needs-to-stand-strong-on-iran-sanctions-d0df8f5c5fef?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d0df8f5c5fef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jun 2016 14:08:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-16T14:34:48.233Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/959/1*wLE_2BMg4ZGGOEep0XzBjQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Majid Saeedi/Getty Images</figcaption></figure><p><em>By: Mark Dubowitz and Annie Fixler</em></p><p>Iran’s demands are escalating. The supreme leader is sounding the alarm about American mendacity. An anxious U.S. secretary of state is practically begging companies to return to Iran. Cautious banking executives and a distrustful and angry Congress are pushing back. Welcome to the fallout from the nuclear deal, which merely signaled the beginning of negotiations with the Islamic Republic.</p><p>Last summer’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was objectively a very good deal for Tehran: It preserved essential elements of the country’s nuclear infrastructure and placed only temporary, limited restrictions on its nuclear ambitions, which start expiring in 2023. In exchange, Iran got the complete dismantlement of many of the most impactful U.S. and international economic sanctions.</p><p>In January, the accord proceeded as scheduled. Iran mothballed some of its nuclear infrastructure and got the coveted seal of approval from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Following that, Washington and the Europeans terminated or suspended a slew of punishing economic sanctions and even agreed to hand over <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0144.aspx">access</a> to a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iran-claims-100-billion-now-freed-in-major-step-as-sanctions-roll-back/2016/02/01/edfc23ca-c8e5-11e5-a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html">whopping</a> <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/publications/FDDRoubini_Report_Irans_mysterious_shrinking_reserves.pdf">$100 billion</a>in <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/14/us-iran-nuclear-usa-details-idUSKCN0PO14D20150714">blocked</a> Iranian assets.</p><p>…</p><p>Read the full article originally published in <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/16/the-obama-administration-needs-to-stand-strong-on-iran-sanctions/">Foreign Policy</a></p><p><strong><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></strong><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Iran and directs its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d0df8f5c5fef" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/implications-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/the-obama-administration-needs-to-stand-strong-on-iran-sanctions-d0df8f5c5fef">The Obama Administration Needs to Stand Strong on Iran Sanctions</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/implications-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal">Implications of the Iran Nuclear Deal</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Don’t Buy the Spin: Iran is Getting Economic Relief]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MDubowitz/dont-buy-the-spin-iran-is-getting-economic-relief-2e2e00823fd4?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2e2e00823fd4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jun 2016 14:26:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-15T14:26:30.219Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Forward — by <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/dubowitz-mark/">Mark Dubowitz</a> and <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/annie-fixler/">Annie Fixler</a></h4><p>In recent weeks, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has been on an international “road show” to encourage large European banks to return to business with Iran and to help alleviate their concerns about the legal risks associated with engaging with a country still under U.S. sanctions for money laundering, terrorism, missile proliferation, and human rights abuses. These banks also are concerned about the extensive level of non-performing assets and about financial transactions involving the still-sanctioned Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is dominant in the most lucrative sectors of Iran’s economy through its control of thousands of front companies.</p><p>Meanwhile, members of Congress from both parties are concerned that the administration is exploring workarounds to allow Iran to “dollarize” transactions without directly accessing the U.S. financial system. These workarounds include allowing foreign financial institutions to enable dollarized transactions on Iran’s behalf using offshore clearing, intra-bank book transfers and conversions, or similar dollar-based mechanisms. Providing this additional sanctions relief would contradict repeated administration statements and goes beyond any commitments made to Iran under the nuclear agreement.</p><p>Meanwhile, international banks aren’t taking the bait. Notably, HSBC Chief Legal Officer and former Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey stated that the decisions of his bank are “driven by the financial-crime risks and the underlying conduct” and there have been no assurances that Iran’s government has addressed the illicit conduct on which the sanctions were based. Indeed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s David Lipton noted on a visit to Tehran that “The best thing the government can do, and the banks can do, is to bring those standards up to international levels and try to reassure foreign partners, banks and otherwise that Iran’s banks are safe to deal with.” Former Treasury spokesperson Hagar Hajjar Chemali similarly noted, “The only move that could help bring on the business is for Tehran to change its foreign policy and improve its financial transparency measures.”</p><p>As this report demonstrates, even without access to dollarized transactions or the implementation of economic reforms, Tehran has already received a major “stimulus package” in the form of sanctions relief. Indeed, Iran has brought oil to market more quickly than expected by drawing down its inventories, accessed imports, and stabilized the economy.</p><p>This is a major shift. In 2012 and 2013, Iran’s economy was crashing. It had been hit with an asymmetric shock from sanctions, including those targeting its central bank, oil exports, and access to the SWIFT financial messaging system. The economy shrank by more than six percent in the 2012/13 fiscal year, largely due to the drop in oil exports and revenue because of tightening sanctions, and bottomed out the following year, contracting by another two percent. Accessible foreign exchange reserves were estimated to be down to only $20 billion, limiting imports.</p><p>This changed during the nuclear negotiations, as previous reports from Roubini Global Economics and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies have detailed. During the 18-month period starting in late 2013, interim sanctions relief and the lack of new shocks enabled Iran to move from a severe recession to a modest recovery. During that time, the Islamic Republic received $11.9 billion through the release of its restricted assets, while sanctions on major sectors of its economy were suspended. This facilitated strong imports, especially from China, that in turn supported domestic investment. The Obama administration also de-escalated the sanctions pressure by blocking new legislation that would have maintained or tightened sanctions on oil-related and other economic transactions. Jointly, these forces rescued the Iranian economy and its leaders, including the Revolutionary Guards, from an imminent and severe balance of payments crisis. As this report finds, in the 2014/15 fiscal year, the Iranian economy rebounded and grew at a rate of at least 3 percent.</p><p>Now, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has received access to an additional $100 billion in previously frozen foreign assets, significantly boosting its accessible foreign exchange reserves. As we described in our previous reporting on this topic, while Iran has access to $50–60 billion in liquid assets, its total funds are closer to $100 billion. Excluding previously allocated funds from this total fails to adequately estimate the effect of releasing previously frozen assets on the economy. Some of these allocated funds are collateral for joint ventures or deposits for imports. Thus, while these funds are unavailable for new investments, the payoff from the previous allocations will positively impact the Iranian economy.</p><p>Sanctions were also lifted on Iran’s crude oil exports and upstream energy investment and on key sectors of the economy and hundreds of Iranian banks, companies, individuals, and government entities. The additional access of Iranian institutions to global financial payments systems, such as SWIFT, has reduced transaction costs and the need for intermediaries.</p><p>This report demonstrates that in the fiscal year that has just ended — with declining oil prices, a tight monetary policy implemented to rein in inflation, and a tight fiscal policy imposed given revenue shortfalls — Iran’s economy grew only slightly, and may have even experienced a modest contraction. But in the coming fiscal year, Roubini Global Economics projects that Iran’s economy will grow at a rate of 3.7 percent. Assuming that Iran continues to make modest economic reforms to attract investment, this report forecasts its economic growth will stabilize around 4 to 4.5 percent annually or higher over the next five years.</p><p>The future success of Iran’s economy depends on privatization, encouraging competition, addressing corruption, recapitalizing banks, and strengthening the rule of law. If Tehran wants to encourage foreign investment and alleviate international banks’ concerns, it also needs to end its support for terrorism, missile development, and destabilizing regional activities, and to reduce the economic power of the Revolutionary Guards and the supreme leader’s business empire. All of these factors increase the risks of investing in the Islamic Republic, regardless of what deal-sweeteners the White House provides.</p><p>…</p><p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/Dont_Buy_The_Spin.pdf">Read the full and download the full report.</a></p><p><strong><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></strong><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Iran and directs its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2e2e00823fd4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[It matters if Obama uses the term ‘Islamic terrorism,’ and here’s why]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/implications-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/it-matters-if-obama-uses-the-term-islamic-terrorism-and-here-s-why-e21630d1e837?source=rss-c5267b0a3958------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e21630d1e837</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[islam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Dubowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jun 2016 19:00:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-13T19:00:09.262Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>President Obama did well to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000004467129/obamas-full-remarks-on-orlando-shooting.html">address the nation</a> yesterday following the shooting at Pulse night club in Orlando. Omar Mir Seddique Mateen murdered 49 people and injured more than 50 others. The president, unfortunately, had not come to a conclusion yet on the “precise motives of the killer,” but he did classify Omar Mateen as “a man filled with hatred.”</p><p>In fact, during President Obama’s five-and-a-half minute address, he never once mentioned ‘radical’ ‘extremist’ ‘Islamic’ or any other tangential references– despite the fact that the killer pledged his allegiance to ISIS in his <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/06/13/481852133/omar-mateen-called-911-from-bathroom-says-house-intelligence-panels-rep-schiff">9–1–1 call</a> to police. Later, the <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-state-news-agency-says-orlando-massacre-the-work-of-its-fighter.php">Islamic State’s would claim responsibility</a> for the brutal attack through the work of its ‘fighter.’</p><p>Since that address, Hillary Clinton has <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/hillary-clinton-radical-islam-224255">broken from Obama’s trend</a>, stating: “I have clearly said we face terrorist enemies who use Islam to justify slaughtering people. We have to stop them and we will. We have to defeat radical jihadist terrorism, and we will.” And Obama himself <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/06/13/president-obamas-remarks-after-meeting-with-counterterrorism-officials-on-orlando-shooting/">came close</a>, explaining the need to focus on “home-grown extremism” and “this kind of propaganda and perversions of Islam that you see generated on the internet.”</p><p>And so enters the well-trodden question of whether it’s important for the Obama administration to use the term ‘Islamic terrorism.’ CNN Politics introduced the debate to look at the question from both sides. I offered my thoughts on the topic below:</p><blockquote><em>For Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, identifying the motivations and ideology behind the terrorist threat is essential to combating it.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>“It’s always critical to understand the nature and gravity of the threat you face and correctly identify the motivating factors,” said Dubowitz. “It’s equally critical to understand the ideological motivation of the terrorisms we face so, again, we can correctly identify who’s likely to attack and … mobilize against it.”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>For example, he said, Islamic terrorism can’t be defeated without the help of Muslim communities around the world.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>He added that while “it’s dangerous and foolhardy to besmirch all Muslims,” it’s “equally foolhardy” not to understand that Islamism “is a political ideology which borrows from Islam and is motivated by Islam,” even though it only represents a tiny minority of Muslims.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>…</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Still, Dubowitz said that he thinks that “the administration has wrongly downplayed the motivating and mobilizing ideology that underpins the threat.”</em></blockquote><p><a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/13/politics/islamic-terrorism-trump-obama-clinton/">Read the full story</a> to learn more, and see if you come to the same conclusion.</p><p><strong><em>Mark Dubowitz</em></strong><em> is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Iran and directs its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance. Follow him on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdubowitz"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/mark.dubowitz.7"><em>Facebook</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-dubowitz-746301?authType=NAME_SEARCH&amp;authToken=OnW9&amp;locale=en_US&amp;srchid=1291799801462477852648&amp;srchindex=1&amp;srchtotal=1&amp;trk=vsrp_people_res_name&amp;trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1291799801462477852648%2CVSRPtargetId%3A749286%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_SEARCH"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e21630d1e837" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/implications-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/it-matters-if-obama-uses-the-term-islamic-terrorism-and-here-s-why-e21630d1e837">It matters if Obama uses the term ‘Islamic terrorism,’ and here’s why</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/implications-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal">Implications of the Iran Nuclear Deal</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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