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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by MIT Election Lab on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by MIT Election Lab on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by MIT Election Lab on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[We’re Moving!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/were-moving-93abe0aa22?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/93abe0aa22</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Nov 2021 15:06:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-16T15:06:58.726Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TgepyIhQRpwI2zcsFUQi4A.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Just down the road, with a major upgrade.</h4><p>When we started this blog back in the early days of the Election Lab, we weren’t sure where it would go, or what to expect. Planting our flag on Medium, where all the basic functionalities we wanted were already built in, made the most sense.</p><p>But luckily, we’ve grown an incredible amount since then, and like a hermit crab, it’s time to find a bigger shell.</p><h3>It’s been wonderful writing our blog here on Medium, but we’ve finally brought all of our work home to our own website:</h3><p><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/news">News</a></p><p>We’re so excited about this development — it finally means we can play around with more interactive and interesting ways to tell stories about the data we work with, and it makes it much easier for you, as a reader, to find out more about the issues that interest you! You’ll be able to browse by topic, search for a particular phrase, and even check out everything a particular author has written for us, all in one place.</p><p>Everything on Medium will stay for now, but we’ll be moving all forthcoming content to our new home. Eventually, we’ll begin to close down the old articles here, as we update content. The good news is: <a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/news">all of our existing articles are already there</a>! You won’t be losing a thing with this move.</p><h4>We hope you’ll follow us there!</h4><p><strong><em>The MIT </em></strong><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/"><strong><em>Election Data &amp; Science Lab</em></strong></a><strong><em> is dedicated to applying scientific principles to how elections are studied and administered, with the aim of improving the democratic experience for all U.S. voters. Follow our updates on </em></strong><a href="https://twitter.com/MITelectionlab"><strong><em>Twitter</em></strong></a><strong><em> and sign up for our </em></strong><a href="https://mailchi.mp/6d7d2506b1b4/sign-up-for-the-medsl-newsletter"><strong><em>quarterly newsletter</em></strong></a><strong><em>.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=93abe0aa22" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/were-moving-93abe0aa22">We’re Moving!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Retaining Election Officials to Secure Future Elections]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/retaining-election-officials-to-secure-future-elections-77e49f534373?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Nov 2021 18:02:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-09T18:02:27.943Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F1U2GMVqylNZIJI0C3gyZA.jpeg" /></figure><h4>A look at some of the steps state and local governments can take</h4><p><em>The </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/"><em>MIT Election Data and Science Lab</em></a><em> helps highlight new research and interesting ideas in election science, and is a proud co-sponsor of the Election Sciences, Reform, &amp; Administration Conference (ESRA).</em></p><p><em>Our post today was written by David Levine, based on his paper presented at the </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/events/esra-2021"><em>2021 ESRA Conference</em></a><em>; the paper that formed the basis of this blog post can be read </em><a href="https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/retaining-election-officials/"><em>here</em></a><em>. The information and opinions expressed in this column represent his own research, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the MIT Election Lab or MIT.</em></p><p>Though the 2020 presidential election has been <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election">called</a> the most U.S. secure in U.S history, many who helped successfully run that election feel anything but safe nearly ten months later. In that time, many election officials have been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/05/09/republicans-arent-just-making-it-harder-vote-theyre-going-after-election-officials-too/">threatened and harassed</a>, and such behavior shows no signs of <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2021/08/election-officials-are-being-terrorized-over-trumps-lies">abating</a>. And instead of taking steps to address this problem, many states have passed laws that could make this problem <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-06/the-new-era-of-election-subversion">worse</a>.</p><p>A survey of election officials commissioned by the Brennan Center and conducted by Benenson Strategy Group <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/election-officials-under-attack">found</a> that one in three election officials feel unsafe because of their job, and nearly one in five listed threats to lives as a job-related concern. This unrelenting targeting of election administrators has, not surprisingly, led many administrators to leave or consider leaving their position. According to a recent <a href="https://democracyfund.org/idea/amplifying-the-perspectives-of-officials-at-the-front-lines-of-elections/">Democracy Fund/Reed College Survey of Local Election Officials</a>, nearly one-third of chief local election officials will be eligible to retire before the 2024 presidential election. And after what many of these officials experienced during 2020, who could blame them for wanting to hang it up?</p><p>Unfortunately, the United States’ ability to conduct future secure elections could very well depend on how many of these unsung heroes from 2020 are retained. State and local governments should admittedly have support from the federal government and Congress to help address this national security issue, but if the fight over <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/12/08/943242106/how-private-money-from-facebooks-ceo-saved-the-2020-election">funding the 2020 election</a> is any indication, they need to begin taking steps to address this problem now. In my paper, <a href="https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/retaining-election-officials/">How to Retain Election Officials to Secure Future Elections</a>, I lay out ten suggestions for what state and local governments can do in concert with their election offices to help retain as many of their high-performing election officials as possible, each of which is briefly described below.</p><ol><li><strong>Ask election officials what can be done, ideally, to support them.</strong> You may be surprised by what you learn. Asking such questions not only shows empathy and understanding, but could lead to information that creates more effective training and development programs, which subsequently <a href="https://hbr.org/2020/01/a-better-way-to-develop-and-retain-top-talent">increases employee retention</a>.</li><li><strong>If there was turnover among your election officials, get to the bottom of why it occurred.</strong> As a <a href="https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/author/david-levine/">former election administrator</a>, I know firsthand that it’s not necessarily surprising for election officials to depart during a major election cycle, and that the reasons for departures can <a href="https://hbr.org/1999/05/firing-up-the-front-line">differ</a> pretty dramatically. But because the 2020 presidential election cycle and its aftermath have been so stressful for election officials, it’s important to examine employee turnover rate from the 2020 election cycle and see how it compares with previous election cycles. Such analysis could give governments a better sense of how employee retention could be affected by future elections that are as contentious as 2020.</li><li><strong>Consider the cost of election official employee turnover, or the “total cost” of losing an employee.</strong> If governments and their election officials can lay out the specific costs that employee turnover from accumulated strain caused by contentious elections — like the 2020 presidential election — is having on their workforces, that could make it easier to seek additional funding for retaining high performing election administrators and addressing other priorities. Since the exact costs of employee turnover <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/CostofTurnover.pdf">vary</a>, it is something all state and local governments should monitor.</li><li><strong>Compare the compensation of your election administrators to other government employees with similar responsibilities and adjust, if necessary. </strong>One of, if not the top, reasons workers quit their jobs is so they can make more money. Currently, the typical <a href="https://democracyfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2019_DemocracyFund_StewardsOfDemocracy.pdf">local election official</a> makes about $50,000 annually, which appears to be more on par with administrative support positions than positions with commensurate skills. In short, election administrators are underpaid. If key election administrators are not paid comparably to other government employees with similar responsibilities, retaining them is likely to pose a greater challenge.</li><li><strong>Establish a Government Resource Group.</strong> Many of the challenges election officials faced in the 2020 election cycle are an unfortunate outgrowth of <a href="https://time.com/5929252/edelman-trust-barometer-2021/">decreasing trust in government and increasing amounts of mis- and disinformation</a> more broadly; challenges that employees throughout government are confronting, not just in elections. Election officials often depend on large numbers of fellow government employees, particularly around election time, to serve as poll workers, process voter registration applications, and help conduct their elections. A government resource group could go a long way towards strengthening these relationships and identifying solutions for these challenges, which could help contribute to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/janicegassam/2018/09/26/how-to-retain-diverse-talent/?sh=135d0e7b2d33">higher retention rates</a>.</li><li><strong>Offer election administrators flexible working conditions when possible.</strong> The pandemic provided an opportunity for many election officials to conduct more of their work remotely, and thousands of election officials responded by taking security training that made it easier for them to work <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2020/11/election-security-2020-pandemic.html">remotely yet securely</a> during the first Covid-19 peak in the spring and summer of 2020. While many election processes — such as voting equipment preparation, mail ballot signature validation, and provisional ballot adjudication — will continue to occur at the workplace, the successes achieved from working remotely should be built upon because they can be a win-win situation for both election officials and their governments. Organizations that provide the option for remote work have <a href="https://blog.vantagecircle.com/employee-retention-strategies/">lower employee turnover</a>; state and local governments would be wise to heed this warning if they hope to retain their best election officials.</li><li><strong>Advocate for consolidating elections to no more than three per year.</strong> Consolidating elections to no more than three per year would enable election officials to keep their skills sharp while also lessening costs and reducing election officials’ stress. It could also help <a href="https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn.edu/dist/7/538/files/2019/07/Connor-Phillips-ESRA-Paper.pdf">increase turnout</a> in both local and national elections.</li><li><strong>Make sure election officials are aware of all current security protections in place.</strong> This includes any arrangements with law enforcement, office and worktime security measures, and tools available to help ensure their personal physical security. A meeting between election officials and local law enforcement can help confirm existing protections and identify any potential gaps. Such efforts, which can also be <a href="https://electionsgroup.com/assets/Running%20Elections%20Without%20Fear.pdf">aided</a> by local Cybersecurity &amp; Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) protective security advisors, can help ensure election officials know all of the resources that are currently in place to help ensure their protection, and by extension, their success.</li><li><strong>Develop a plan to provide more enhanced protection for election officials going forward. </strong>Retaining many election officials will be difficult unless more can be done to ensure they feel safe. One potential place to look for developing a more robust security plan for election officials are <a href="https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/judicial-security-safeguarding-courts-and-protecting-judges/">federal judges</a>, who have a number of protections in place for their safety and are seeking more in response to increased risks, and like election officials are often subject to threats well beyond their place of employment. In the same way that election administrators can represent or personify the election system, judges and other judicial officials can represent or personify the justice system; in both cases, the motive for an attack can arise out of anger at the respective systems or simply a desire for revenge.</li><li><strong>Form a task force made up of government employees to advocate for (or oppose) legislative measures that support your government’s work, including your election officials. </strong>Since the 2020 election, many states have adopted legislation that <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2021/06/republicans-get-a-move-on-disempowering-people-whose-job-is-to-uphold-democracy">unnecessarily penalizes</a> election administrators and workers (including, most recently, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/27/1031154177/after-a-bitter-fight-the-texas-house-passes-a-restrictive-voting-bill">Texas</a>). Election subversion laws increase the likelihood that election outcomes achieved through successfully administered elections are overturned for illegitimate reasons. Task forces made up of government employees who have firsthand experience with administering elections have gone to great lengths to outline the <a href="https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/election-subversion-growing-threat-electoral-integrity">pernicious nature</a> of such measures and their potential impact not only on administrators, but voters, elected officials, and democracy, more broadly.</li></ol><p>Election administrators’ work supports the U.S. Constitution, which forms the basis of the rule of law in this country. Administrators who are concerned for their safety or burnt out from the stress of the job are more likely to perform poorly or even leave the profession. Every citizen, regardless of political affiliation, should want to make sure these defenders of democracy are comfortable performing their legal obligations and administering safe, secure, and transparent elections. It’s perhaps the best way of ensuring that the United States continues administering its elections in a genuine and democratic manner.</p><p><strong><em>David Levine </em></strong><em>is the Elections Integrity Fellow at the Alliance for Securing Democracy, where he assesses vulnerabilities in electoral infrastructure, administration, and policies. </em><a href="https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/author/david-levine/"><em>His research interests and recent publications</em></a><em> focus on election access, trust and security, and the nexus between external threats from malign actors and the challenges many democracies face in conducting free and fair elections.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=77e49f534373" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/retaining-election-officials-to-secure-future-elections-77e49f534373">Retaining Election Officials to Secure Future Elections</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why do some States make Voting Difficult?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/why-do-some-states-make-voting-difficult-1f3a1c0423f6?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Nov 2021 17:32:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-05T17:32:52.042Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/"><em>MIT Election Data and Science Lab</em></a><em> helps highlight new research and interesting ideas in election science, and is a proud co-sponsor of the Election Sciences, Reform, &amp; Administration Conference (ESRA).</em></p><p><em>Our post today was written by Michael Pomante, based on his paper presented at the </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/events/esra-2021"><em>2021 ESRA Conference</em></a><em>. The information and opinions expressed in this column represent his own research, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the MIT Election Lab or MIT.</em></p><p>Beginning with the ratification of the Constitution, governments in the United States have implemented policies restricting who can vote. For example, in the early history of the U.S., suffrage was limited to white male landowners. The federal government slowly expanded the franchise over time, eventually extending suffrage to poor white males, Black males, women, and finally those between 18 and 21. Yet, despite these policies, state governments have worked to pass legislation limiting the participation of segments of citizens in elections.</p><p>The most notable example is the Jim Crow laws that Southern states passed following the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. Specifically, the Democratic Party worked to pass legislation that <a href="https://www.history.com/news/jim-crow-laws-black-vote">disenfranchised Blacks</a> from voting, although they were based on characteristics other than race. Examples of these restrictive policies include the poll tax and literacy test, which excluded most Blacks and many poor whites.</p><p>The passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 outlawed these policies. In addition, it required states with a history of discriminatory voting practices to receive preclearance from the federal government before making changes to their election laws. However, the preclearance requirement was <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/25/18701277/shelby-county-v-holder-anniversary-voting-rights-suppression-congress">struck down</a> in <em>Shelby Co. v. Holder</em> (2013), in a Supreme Court decision that the Act’s formula was outdated and could not be used to determine which states implement discriminatory election policies.</p><h4><strong>Research on the Difficulty of Voting</strong></h4><p>In 1957, Anthony Downs theorized in his seminal text, <em>An Economic Theory of Voting</em>, that citizens will abstain from voting when the cost (inconvenience) of voting exceeds the expected benefit. Since this time, scholars have been grappling with how to capture this “cost” accurately. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) eventually <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1953324.pdf?casa_token=Z_IbuSIXHuYAAAAA:GXUNzcNNjJ97qTPDH57P9igokAIhmyWXNBd5CaUNeTIKbZl6lCHNSCV9OhM7AAjHDqLIet0OJBCGZG95FzcBfnt-4VcJ7lGOQ8NuLFb8amCbpT6QKwGk">modeled this theory</a>, but despite scholars’ interest in the holistic theoretical “cost of voting,” research has generally been limited to studying only one or two types of law at a time. This approach has failed to give us a complete or adequate measure of this cost. In 1994, James King came closest when he created a registration index — but unfortunately, the measure only considered one of the two stages of the voting process, used arbitrary weighting, and was never updated. Therefore, to get an accurate, inclusive estimate of the “cost of voting,” my co-authors (Scot Schraufnagel and Quan Li) and I created the<strong> </strong><a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2017.0478"><strong>Cost of Voting Index (COVI)</strong></a>.</p><p>The COVI is a single value that captures how difficult it is to vote in a state, based upon the state’s adoption of any combination of 46 policies that govern elections throughout the 50 states. Values are calculated for each state for each presidential election from 1996 through 2020. State values take on both positive and negative values. All coding was done so larger values indicate a higher “cost,” and lower values indicate a reduced “cost.” In other words, states with larger positive numbers make voting more difficult. In contrast, states with smaller negative values make voting more accessible.</p><p>Now that we have a comprehensive measure of the “cost of voting,” we can examine more closely where and why some states adopt policies that make voting more costly (by adding obstacles) or less costly (by removing barriers). The figure below displays the states and their COVI values for the 2020 presidential election. States with negative values, located at the top of the figure, are the easiest to vote in, with voting becoming more costly (difficult) as one moves down the list.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/1*PKbBMWXKUxFeC9O4L8RvIQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 1: State COVI values for the 2020 Presidential Election</strong></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>A Modern-Day Jim Crow Environment?</strong></h4><p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2021/05/04/is-the-united-states-a-racist-country/">Systematic racism</a> has influenced policy throughout history and still remains in place in the modern era. Therefore, my co-authors and I suspect that the U.S. has not truly moved into the post-racial world described by Chief Justice Roberts in Shelby Co. v. Holder. Specifically, we believe racism still impacts how difficult it is to vote in a state.</p><p>The passage of Jim Crow laws provides some insight as to why parties implement restrictive voting policies. Specifically, the Democratic Party passed Jim Crow laws because the number of Blacks within the Southern states was sufficiently large to threaten the political power held by the white ruling class. This starting point leads us to analyze the data through the lens of <a href="https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/C_Dollar_Racial_2014.pdf">racial threat theory</a>. In other words, we believe that the difficulty of voting within a state is dependent upon which party controls the state legislative process, and the size of the state’s minority population. Specifically, we know that the Democratic Party implemented Jim Crow laws while in power, and that a political <a href="https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Temporary-Farewell/Party-Realignment/">realignment</a> later occurred in the South during the Civil Rights era. Because of this, we believed that the current day Republican Party (GOP) would be associated with more restrictive voting policies. We also hypothesized that a state’s minority population would also associate with a more stringent voting environment. To test these hypotheses, we use the COVI, the percentage of a state’s legislature that is GOP-controlled, and the percent of the state’s Black and Latinx populations.</p><p>We get some interesting findings when running bivariate correlations between the COVI and the percent of GOP, Blacks, and Latinx populations. First, we find that the relationship between the COVI and GOP varies significantly by election year. Specifically, we find that the GOP was associated with more accessible voting in 1996 and 2000, but transitions over several elections to associate with more restrictive voting starting in 2016. Second, the COVI and the percent of the Black population strongly correlate with the difficulty of voting in every election. In other words, when a state has a larger black populace, it also tends to have a higher COVI value. Third, we expected a similar finding regarding a state’s Latinx Populations, but did not find it. We find that a state’s Latinx population is only associated with more restrictive voting in 1996. There is no statistically significant connection in any of the other elections. A literature review suggests that it may not be the size of the Latinx population but rather the growth of the Latinx population. Once we take the growth of the Latinx population into account, we find the strong positive correlation we expected. In all instances, when the growth of the Latinx population is more significant, the difficulty of voting is greater. However, we seek to move beyond this elementary analysis.</p><p>To get a better idea of the effect of the percent of GOP state legislators and the percent of a state’s minority population, we run a random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) model. This model analyzed data from every presidential election from 1996–2020, and considered the difference in the size of Black populations between states while considering the interstate variation in the Latinx population. Figures 2 &amp; 3 below display the results of our model for each minority group. Each figure depicts the predicted cost of voting based upon the state’s GOP population and the minimum and maximum values for each minority population. The blue lines represent the maximum observed value throughout the 50 states. In contrast, the red line represented the minimum value for each population. As a reminder, larger values indicate the adoption of policies that make voting more difficult. On the other hand, smaller values indicate policies that make voting more accessible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/551/1*SFhSsRejbVoLb8q8i67W9A.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 2. Predicting the Cost of Voting with a state’s Black and GOP population: 1996–2020</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Figure 2 shows us that when the size of a state’s Black population is near zero (red line), the size of the GOP in the state legislature does not increase the cost of voting much. However, when the size of the Black population is larger (blue line), the cost of voting rises at a more significant rate when the percentage of the GOP in the state legislature grows.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/560/1*uoOj3asO2kRzZkJ2_ZdbVw.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 3. Predicting the Cost of Voting with a state’s Latinx and GOP population: 1996–2020</strong></figcaption></figure><p>We expected similar results for Latinx populations. At first glance, we see how the cost of voting decreases when a state has a relatively low Latinx population (red line) and the percentage of the GOP legislators increases. However, this trend changes considerably when the size of the Latinx population becomes more prominent (blue line). The slope of the sizeable Latinx population is surprising. However, it is important to look at the broader context of states which have sizable Latinx populations. For example, California and Texas have similarly large Latinx populations, and are regularly two of the country’s top three most populous Latinx states — but the percentage of GOP members in the legislature of Texas is two times more than in California. This difference contributes to the difference in the cost of voting between the two. Specifically, California makes voting more accessible, while Texas makes voting more inconvenient.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>To summarize, Figures 2 and 3 show that, in the past few decades, when the size or growth of a minority population interacts with the percent of a state’s legislature controlled by the GOP, the cost of voting increases. The increase in the cost of voting makes voting more difficult for citizens within the state. These findings indicate that when Black and Latinx populations grow to a size that is perceived to threaten GOP legislators’ political power, they work to make voting more challenging.</p><p>Whether or not this demobilizes these minority groups is a separate question. However, these results demonstrate that the U.S. is not yet operating in the “post-racial world” that the USSC majority indicated in Shelby Co. v. Holder. Our findings show that the atmosphere contributing to the Democratic Party implementing Jim Crow during reconstruction is still present in the United States. The only difference is the party enacting the policies. Therefore, we believe it is imperative that Congress pass a new coverage formula for Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Expressly, the U.S. Congress should limit how difficult states may make voting, because it is still evident that when the size of minority groups becomes considerable, legislators can and do work to make voting more difficult for all citizens.</p><p><a href="https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsites.google.com%2Fview%2Fmichaeljpomante%2Fhome&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cmpomant%40ju.edu%7C8b83b3bd72f64dcd8db708d98e6e0aab%7C9c5bf9df37884b6eba5e6eebbbfab579%7C0%7C0%7C637697425545810090%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=A8uaOV1%2FTbxesORXaY8SoFXB7CZ6Obs6w9AcqX9hl94%3D&amp;reserved=0"><strong><em>Michael J. Pomante II</em></strong></a><em> is an assistant professor at Jacksonville University in Jacksonville, Florida. His research on elections appears in American Politics Research and Election Law Journal, among other scholarly outlets. In addition, his research on the cost of voting has received recognition from Altmetric, a company that tracks and analyzes online activity around academic literature. Of the 3.4 million scholarly articles followed in 2020, for the attention and discussion they generated, his research on voting clocked in at №80 and is the highest-rated article by a political scientist.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1f3a1c0423f6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/why-do-some-states-make-voting-difficult-1f3a1c0423f6">Why do some States make Voting Difficult?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Do Local Election Officials Reach New Voters?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/how-do-local-election-officials-reach-new-voters-f788d97aac29?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f788d97aac29</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Nov 2021 17:53:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-04T17:56:15.153Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nm_bnFo8gS2Bnd-m6Rr24w.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>The </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/"><em>MIT Election Data and Science Lab</em></a><em> helps highlight new research and interesting ideas in election science, and is a proud co-sponsor of the Election Sciences, Reform, &amp; Administration Conference (ESRA).</em></p><p><em>Our post today was written by Mara Suttman-Lea and Thessalia Merivaki, based on their paper presented at the </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/events/esra-2021"><em>2021 ESRA Conference</em></a><em>. The information and opinions expressed in this column represent their own research, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the MIT Election Lab or MIT.</em></p><p>The 2020 United States Presidential Election featured a slew of changes to voting options in response to the COVID-19. This, combined with a rising tide of mis-/disinformation about the election highlighted the vital role voter education and outreach from trusted sources plays American elections. On the front lines of providing this information to voters are local election officials (LEOs) — the nearly <a href="https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx">8,000 officials</a> in charge of administering elections in the United States.</p><p>LEOs have a range of tools they can use to engage in voter education and outreach. They can interact with voters in-person in their office, at community events, when they visit local high schools or colleges, or when they train third-party groups to register voters. They can also post ads in local newspapers or send informational mail to voters, and on <a href="https://www.npr.org/2014/09/18/349330682/ads-get-creative-even-seductive-to-attract-voters">TV</a> and radio stations. Lastly, the accessibility and convenience of <a href="https://twitter.com/PolkElections1/status/1425426933542789138">social media</a> allows LEOs to cast a wider net to reach voters on a low cost and more regular basis.</p><p>How effective are these tools in reaching voters? Our research assesses these dynamics in the state of Florida, focusing specifically on whether they are effective at maintaining and expanding the pool of registered voters. We examine the effects voter education and outreach activities by Florida County Supervisors of Elections (SoEs) between 2014 and 2018 on new voter registrations, as well as how SoE use of social media during the 2020 Presidential election affected new registrations. We also explore the relationship between social media outreach and Floridian’s usage of <a href="https://registertovoteflorida.gov/home">Online Voter Registration,</a> a tool which allows voters to register to vote and update their information online. We expect that social media played a significant role in encouraging voters to utilize OVR, because the COVID-19 pandemic created significant challenges for <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/voter-registrations-are-way-way-down-during-the-pandemic/">voter registration outreach</a> both from LEOs, as well as third-party organizations, who are otherwise highly active in Florida.</p><h4><strong>Assessing the Impact of Face-to-Face, Traditional, and Social Media Voter Education Outreach on Voter Registration</strong></h4><p>We use an original data set that captures social media use by every local election official in the state of Florida with an active Facebook account combined with data from <a href="https://www.myfloridaelections.com/portals/fsase/documents/FSASE_Conf_2013-Voter_ED_Survey_Analysis-Final_6-7-13.pdf">Florida’s Voter Education and Outreach Survey</a>, a state-mandated survey administered to all 67 counties each federal election year. We argue that counties where SoEs engaged in more voter education and outreach efforts will have higher rates of new registrations. Research consistently shows that voters rely on local election officials for this information, and often they <a href="https://democracyfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2018_CCESReport_vFinal.pdf">are not aware</a> of the various options to register and vote in their state. SoEs are, therefore, a trusted source of information and can reduce these informational barriers.</p><p>In Florida, voter registration outreach can take many forms. The table below highlights<strong> </strong>the voter education activities used by SoEs, the most common of which were outreach to high schools, general face to face events held for the public, ads in newspapers and magazines and mailings to voters. When evaluating the impact of these activities on new voter registrations, controlling for electoral and factors and the partisanship of the LEO, we find that between 2014 and 2018, newspaper ads have a positive relationship with the rates of new registrations, as well as training of third-party organizations who conduct voter registration drives (see Figure 1, below).</p><p><strong>Table: Variation Across FL’s 67 Counties on Face-to-Face Voter Registration Outreach</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P69KpDFL4X2-TnQJt4sAAQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Figure 1. Predictive Margins for Proportion of New Voter Registrations by method of outreach, 2014–2018</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eL1shrEnq8EQoU6kiW3OBQ.png" /></figure><p>Surprisingly, the presence of an active Facebook account has a negative relationship with the rate of new registrations. While our data cannot parse out the explanation for this surprising finding, it is possible that <em>how</em> an SoE used social media matters more for explaining the relationship between social media use and voter registration. Our monthly analysis of new voter registrations and use of online voter registration in 2020 offers some insight into this question, suggesting that the frequency of posting shapes the effects of social media use on registrations. As <strong>Figure 2</strong> shows, OVR usage dramatically increased during the Presidential Primary month, and more so in the three months leading to the November election. These peaks in OVR applications seem to follow peaks in SoE Facebook post frequency, suggesting a potential relationship.</p><p><strong>Figure 2. Rates of New Registrations, OVR Usage and Facebook Posts by Month in Florida, 2020</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rlpqCtm8u7ir2cmf-t-DRQ.png" /></figure><p>While we find that the frequency of Facebook posts does not have a statistically significant relationship with new registration rates, our analysis of OVR use confirms the descriptive evidence from Figure 2. In jurisdictions where SoEs posted more regularly on their Facebook account, the rates of OVR applications increased. When we analyzed aggregate voter registration reports on how many of these applications were submitted by new voters and how many were updates to existing voters’ information, we found that the latter accounted for a higher proportion of OVR applications submitted during this period. This suggests that OVR was instrumental when SoEs were communicating with voters through social media, as they could direct prospective voters to OVR through their posts.</p><h4><strong>Social media can be a powerful, and low-cost tool for voter education</strong></h4><p>Overall, our analysis of voter education and outreach activities in Florida suggest that LEOs can have an impact on voter registrations through traditional — and potentially low-cost — activities such as newspaper ads. These findings also suggest that third-party groups like non-profit organizations may be more effective at expanding the registered electorate, which confirms existing research on the work of these groups in <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2011.00422.x">reaching under-represented voters</a>, who are less likely to be registered.</p><p>While use of social media may not drive new registrations, it can be an important resource for LEOs to encourage voters to register and update their voter information when faced with limited opportunities for in-person voter outreach during the COVID-19 pandemic. As Florida County SoEs disclosed in the Voter Education surveys, Facebook was the most common platform used to promote important deadlines, voting processes and other election related information. These responses uncover important dynamics in how SoEs manage their social media accounts. For instance, in 2018, DeSoto County reported that they have “no time to monitor social media.” Madison County reported that they have office staff manage their social media accounts, and Miami-Dade reported that they paid for advertisements in English and Spanish across various social media platforms. These responses underscore the notable variation in resources and capacity across local jurisdictions, which may also explain the breadth and robustness of voter education outreach.</p><p>These findings open new avenues for research to understand the mechanism through which voter education can expand access to voting. In 2020, mail voting was the method of choice for many voters; an important question to explore is how LEOs used social media to inform voters about requesting and casting their mail ballots. Additionally, assessments of voter education and outreach raise further questions about how LEOs combat mis/disinformation on social media platforms and elsewhere. Last, but not least, there are significant differences <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/social-media-and-king-county-with-halei-watkins/id1546061812?i=1000510890150">in how social media are used by voters of different demographics</a>. It is important to study, therefore, how LEOs use different platforms to reach new voters, particularly the youth, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/05/in-their-own-words-why-some-people-find-voting-difficult/">who view voting as important, but not necessarily exciting or convenient</a>.</p><p><a href="https://www.marasuttmannlea.com/"><strong><em>Mara Suttmann-Lea</em></strong></a><em> (@Mara_Suttmann) is an Assistant Professor at Connecticut College, Department of Government and International Relations.</em></p><p><a href="https://www.merivaki.com/"><strong><em>Thessalia (Lia) Merivaki</em></strong></a><em> (@liamerivaki) is an Assistant Professor at Mississippi State University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f788d97aac29" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/how-do-local-election-officials-reach-new-voters-f788d97aac29">How Do Local Election Officials Reach New Voters?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Research Roundup]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/research-roundup-3be06ed74ef4?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3be06ed74ef4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 Oct 2021 17:39:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-13T17:39:55.401Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Volume 1</h4><p><em>We’re launching a new feature at the MIT Election Lab blog! Each week, we’ll be featuring new research published in election science or related fields that we find interesting. For this first week, we’ve gone back in time a bit, but in future editions, you can expect to see articles that are hot off the presses.</em></p><p><em>This new feature has been brought to you with the help of Jacob Jaffe, an MIT Election Lab graduate researcher and a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at MIT.</em></p><h3>E-Voting</h3><p><strong><em>Adrien Petitpas, Julien M. Jaquet, Pascal Sciarini. </em></strong><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379420301244"><strong><em>Does E-Voting matter for turnout, and to whom? </em></strong></a><strong><em>Electoral Studies, Volume 71, 2021.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that e-voting has no measurable effects on turnout. However, existing studies did (or could) not look at e-voting effects on the individual level. We innovate by analyzing whether and to what extent the availability of e-voting fosters turnout among specific groups of citizens, and how this influences the equality of participation. To that end, we estimate Bayesian multi-level models on a unique set of official data on citizens’ participation covering 30 ballots between 2008 and 2016 in Geneva, Switzerland, which has the most far-reaching experience with e-voting worldwide. Despite the fact that e-voting was added to an easy-to-use form of postal voting, we find that offering e-voting has increased turnout among abstainers and occasional voters. By contrast, the effects of e-voting availability on the equality of participation are mixed with respect to the age cohorts and gender.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Previous research has not shown an effect on turnout.</li></ul><h4>Innovation this provides:</h4><ul><li>Using individual level data, Bayesian multi-level models estimate that e-voting in Geneva increases turnout among non-habituated voters.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Iuliia Krivonosova. </em></strong><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01442872.2021.1958179"><strong><em>The forgotten election administrator of internet voting: lessons from Estonia </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Policy Studies, 2021.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: The introduction of new voting channels, voting technologies and other voting innovations are often thought to improve voter participation in elections and democracy. However, it frequently happens at the expense of administrators, who needs to deliver even more complex elections. This article traces how the introduction of a new voting channel, Internet voting, affects frontline administrators through a qualitative in-depth case study of the 2017 local elections in Estonia. Findings show that the local election administration plays a substantial role in delivering Internet voting, despite the centralized election hierarchy. The case shows little evidence to support the expectation that Internet voting decreases the administrative burden of local election officials. The article outlines the vulnerabilities in Internet voting administration, resulting from the complexity of delivering multi-channel elections, particularly the ones integrating Internet- and paper-based voting channels. The article makes important recommendations for improving the implementation of electronic voting and improving the quality of elections.</em></blockquote><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>While our focus is on the US electoral system, we found this very interesting. Using an in-depth case study of 2017 local Estonian elections, the paper finds increased demand on local administrators despite increased centralization. This is heightened for “multi-channel” elections.</li></ul><h3>Line-Length and Electoral Timing</h3><p><strong><em>Stephen Pettigrew. </em></strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102188"><strong><em>The downstream consequences of long waits: How lines at the precinct depress future turnout </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Electoral Studies, Volume 71, 2021.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: Researchers have increasingly paid attention to the impact that the administrative component of elections has on voter behavior. Existing research has focused almost exclusively on the effect that legal changes — such as voter identification laws — have on turnout. This paper extends our understanding of the electoral process by exploring how one aspect of the precinct experience — standing in line to vote — can shape the turnout behavior of voters in subsequent elections. I demonstrate that for every additional hour a voter waits in line to vote, their probability of voting in the subsequent election drops by 1 percentage point. To arrive at these estimates, I analyze vote history files using a combination of exact matching and placebo tests to test the identification assumptions. I then leverage an unusual institutional arrangement in the City of Boston and longitudinal data from Florida to show that the result also holds at the precinct level. The findings in this paper have important policy implications for administrative changes that may impact line length, such as voter identification requirements and precinct consolidation. They also suggest that racial asymmetries in precinct wait times contribute to the gap in turnout rates between white and non-white voters.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Previous research has found that first-hand experiences deeply shape turnout, but we haven’t seen specific work on the effects of line length.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>Using aggregated and proxy precinct data, this paper shows that line length depresses future turnout and discourages in person voting.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Adam M. Dynes, Michael T. Hartney, and Sam D. Hayes. </em></strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305542100040X"><strong><em>Off-Cycle and Off Center: Election Timing and Representation in Municipal Government </em></strong></a><strong><em>. American Political Science Review, 115(3), 1097–1103.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: Who governs America’s cities: organized interests or mass publics? Though recent scholarship finds that local governments enact policies that align with citizens’ preferences, others argue that it is organized interests, not mass publics that are influential. To reconcile these perspectives, we show that election timing can help shed light on when voters or groups will be pivotal in city politics. Examining 1,600 large US cities, we find that off-cycle elections affect city policy responsiveness asymmetrically, weakening responsiveness on those issues where there is an active and organized interest whose policy objectives deviate from the preferences of the median resident. Here, we focus on public employees’ interests and find that local governments that are elected off cycle spend more on city workers than would be preferred by citizens in more conservative cities. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the study of interest groups and representation in local politics.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Off-cycle elections advantage organized groups.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>This paper shows that this affects policy-making itself, in addition to who wins.</li></ul><h3>Public Opinion</h3><p><strong><em>Burcu Kolcak and Katherine T. McCabe. </em></strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2021.1924741"><strong><em>Federalism at a partisan’s convenience: public opinion on federal intervention in 2020 election policy </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 31:sup1, 167–179.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: President Trump’s rhetoric casting doubt on the integrity of mail-in voting ignited debates about whether the federal government should be allowed to intervene in states’ policy decisions regarding how elections are conducted. This study examines public opinion on rhetorical threats by the Trump Administration to block the expansion of states’ vote-by-mail policies and potentially delay the November 2020 election. In an online survey experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to receive information regarding the traditional role of states in administering U.S. federal elections and more or less salient partisan cues. Even though the information treatment was successful in informing respondents about intergovernmental control and reducing partisan gaps in knowledge, it had only a modest impact on attitudes. Preferences about which level of government should be in charge are malleable, subject to partisan and context-specific considerations.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Voters tend to go with party advantage.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>This paper uses a survey experiment to test whether this is also true regarding Trump’s post-election rhetoric. It does.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Abigail L. Heller. </em></strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102348"><strong><em>Public support for electoral reform: The role of electoral system experience </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Electoral Studies, Volume 72, 2021.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: What affects public support for electoral reform? How does experience with different electoral systems affect people’s willingness to support electoral reform? Given the salience of changes to election rules even when they are passed via the legislature and the increasing use of referenda as alternative mechanisms for change, these questions are critical to understanding when electoral reform will occur. I argue that experience (specifically, with an electoral system similar to that under consideration) affects public opinion by reducing uncertainty about the likely effects of reform and thus affects support for reform (although the direction of the effect depends on partisan bias). Moreover, I argue that experience is most important in the absence of strong party cues. I leverage subnational electoral system variation in the United Kingdom and find that experience does affect support for reform — negative experiences decrease support for reform. The results have implications for the possibility of electoral reform in the UK and beyond.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Status-quo bias and elite messaging is what matters.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>Scotland and London have both used mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral systems. This paper predicts support for referenda on single-member districts based on positive feelings expressed on MMP in previous surveys.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Jack Edelson, Alexander Alduncin, Christopher Krewson, James A. Sieja, and Joseph E. Uscinski. </em></strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1065912917721061"><strong><em>The Effect of Conspiratorial Thinking and Motivated Reasoning on Belief in Election Fraud </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Political Research Quarterly, 70(4), 933–946.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: Belief in electoral fraud has received heightened attention due to elite rhetoric and controversial voter identification (ID) laws. Using a two-wave national survey administered before and after the 2012 election, we examine the individual-level correlates of belief in a range of election-related conspiracy theories. Our data show that partisanship affects the timing and content of belief in election-related conspiracy theories, but a general disposition toward conspiratorial thinking strongly influences those beliefs. Support for voter ID laws, in contrast, appears to be driven largely by party identification through elite-mass linkages. Our analysis suggests that belief in election fraud is a common and predictable consequence of both underlying conspiratorial thinking and motivated partisan reasoning.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Feelings of fraud post-election normally dissipate and are confined to losers.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>Using the CCES, this paper shows that fraud attitudes seem relatively stable and are related to conspiratorial thinking.</li></ul><h3>Local Officials</h3><p><strong><em>Anna Baringer, Michael C. Herron, and Daniel A. Smith. </em></strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2020.0658"><strong><em>Voting by Mail and Ballot Rejection: Lessons from Florida for Elections in the Age of the Coronavirus </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 19(3), 289–320.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic and its concomitant need for social distancing have increased the attractiveness of voting by mail. This form of voting is nonetheless not a panacea for election administration in the time of a public health crisis, as a widespread move to ballots cast by voting by mail risks exacerbating existing inequities in mail-in ballot rejection rates across voters and jurisdictions. This motivates our examination of the roughly 9.6 million and 8.2 million ballots cast in the 2016 and 2018 general elections in Florida, respectively, including over 2.6 million vote-by-mail (VBM) ballots cast in each. Using a selection model that analyzes all ballots cast and those VBM ballots not counted in Florida in these two elections, we find that younger voters, voters not registered with a major political party, and voters in need of assistance when voting are disproportionately likely to have their VBM ballots not count. We also find disproportionately high rejection rates of mail ballots cast by Hispanic voters, out-of-state voters, and military dependents in the 2018 general election. Lastly, we find significant variation in the rejection rates of VBM ballots cast across Florida’s 67 counties in the 2018 election, suggesting a non-uniformity in the way local election officials verify these ballots. As interest in expanding mail voting swells as a consequence of the novel coronavirus, protecting the rights of all voters to participate in electoral politics requires a characterization of the correlates of VBM ballot rejection with an eye toward considering how disparities in ballot rejection rates might be rectified.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Local election administrators are more likely to respond to some emails than others, depending on things like name.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>This paper finds that formality of language and email domain have a marginal impact on response rates.<br>Whether or not a response is received is largely idiosyncratic.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Thessalia Merivaki and Mara Suttmann-Lea. </em></strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2020.0638"><strong><em>Designing Voter Education Across the States: State Responses to the Help America Vote Act </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, published online 28 September, 2021.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) incentivized states to invest in voter education and outreach by making federal funds available under the condition that states include a voter education section in their state implementation plans. Since the initial HAVA plans were submitted by all states in 2003, there is notable variation in whether states revised them, and how they evolved. In this article, we offer a descriptive examination of how states designed and revised their voter education plans, and to what extent they met HAVA’s core provisions on voter education. We analyze all states’ initial HAVA submissions, and track plan revisions between 2004 and 2013. Our findings are consistent with existing scholarly evidence that loosely defined mandates lead to variation in state compliance. States did not uniformly incorporate core HAVA voter education provisions in their initial plans and revisions, and there were differences in the inclusion of education materials for language minority and disabled voters, suggesting limits on compliance with existing federal laws. Variation in the details of states’ initial plans and subsequent revisions are explained by whether a given state is covered by the Voting Rights Act as well as state electoral competition. Our findings have implications for understanding how states design voter education policies to ensure that voters have adequate information on how to navigate the election process.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Local election administrators have broad discretion in how they operate.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>This paper separates traditional media outreach, face-to-face outreach, and social media work on turnout, examining each outlet. The first two appear to affect voter registration totals.</li></ul><h3>Miscellaneous: Ballot campaigns, compulsory voting, misinformation, and VBM</h3><p><strong><em>Craig M. Burnett and Janine Parry. </em></strong><a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-019-09529-w"><strong><em>Direct Democracy, Educative Effects, and the (Mis)Measurement of Ballot Measure Awareness </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Political Behavior, Volume 42, 1015–1034.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: A century ago, Progressive reformers in the U.S. introduced the institutional innovations of direct democracy, claiming these reforms would cultivate better citizens. Two decades of high-profile research have supported and challenged the relationship between direct democracy, increased attention to politics, and a higher turnout rate. We propose, however, that a necessary condition of the “educative effects” model is voter familiarity with initiatives and referendums. While some research has examined ballot measure awareness, we suspect that that the standard measurements — e.g., “Have you heard of Proposition X?” — overestimate actual knowledge. Specifically, we measure ballot measure knowledge in a manner requiring voters to demonstrate familiarity with specific measures rather than merely asserting broad familiarity. Our approach reveals that the public’s awareness of statewide ballot measures, both in the abstract and with respect to particular measures, is far lower than past research suggests. Importantly, it also reveals that people with high levels of education, political interest, and knowledge of national politics are the most likely to misrepresent their ballot measure awareness.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Implies endorsement by unpopular figures can negatively affect ballot measures.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>Directly testing this, the paper suggests it does not. Cynicism may have more to do with political practices than institutions (cf. Hibbing and Theis-Morse, 1995).</li></ul><p><strong><em>Maurice Dunaiski. </em></strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102334"><strong><em>Is compulsory voting habit-forming? Regression discontinuity evidence from Brazil </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Electoral Studies, Volume 71, 2021.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: Voting in one election increases one’s propensity to vote in the future. It remains unclear, however, whether this pattern holds when voting is compulsory — as is the case in a quarter of all democracies. Is compulsory voting habit-forming? I address this question using a regression discontinuity design and administrative turnout data from Brazil, where voting is voluntary at age 16 and compulsory at age 18. I find no evidence that compulsory voting instils voting habits. Instead, the evidence points to a first-time compulsory voting boost, which gradually dissipates as voters grow older. I show that targeted mobilisation of first-time compulsory voters is a plausible mechanism behind the turnout boost. Alternative explanations find less support in the data. The results clarify the scope conditions of prior research on voting habits, and have important implications for the debate over the second-order effects of compulsory voting.</em></blockquote><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>While this also lies outside our focue on US election management, we found this relevant and interesting. Brazil has compulsory voting for only its youngest voters. While turnout is initially very high, this paper shows it then decreases over time.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Jon Green, David Lazer, Stefan McCabe, and Will Hobbs. </em></strong><a href="https://osf.io/qcjfa/"><strong><em>Despair or Defiance? Assessing Turnout Effects of Election Misinformation </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Available online, published September 14, 2021.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract: Following the 2020 general election, Republican elected officials, including then-President Donald Trump, promoted conspiracy theories claiming that Joe Biden’s close victory in Georgia was fraudulent. Extant literature suggests multiple hypotheses regarding the effects these conspiracy theories could have had on Republican turnout in the Senate runoff elections that took place the following January. Conspiracies regarding rigged elections could signal that voting doesn’t matter, lowering adherents’ external efficacy and decreasing their likelihood of voting relative to otherwise similar non-adherents. Conspiracy theories could also stoke political anger at out-partisans, which would predict heightened commitment to voting as a means to address the threat posed by political opponents’ supposed election theft. We test these hypotheses by combining behavioral measures of engagement with election conspiracies and administrative data on voter turnout at the individual level by linking the accounts of 40,000 Twitter users in Georgia to the voter file. We find limited turnout effects — liking or sharing retweets </em>opposed <em>to conspiracy theories was associated with higher turnout in the runoff election<br>and, among more active users, those who liked or shared tweets promoting fraud-related conspiracy theories were less likely to vote.</em></blockquote><blockquote>This is a draft working paper. This research has not yet been peer reviewed.</blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>Multiple conflicting theories.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>The research linked Twitter accounts to the Georgia voter file, with one significant finding: opposing conspiracies is linked with higher turnout.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Matt Lamb. </em></strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13012"><strong><em>The “costs” of voting: The effects of vote-by-mail on election administration finance in Colorado </em></strong></a><strong><em>. Social Science Quarterly, 2021; 1–19.</em></strong></p><blockquote><em>Abstract:</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Objective: </em></strong><em>In this article,I ask whether the adoption of vote-by-mail (VBM) has resulted in the promised cost reductions. Additionally, I examine the overall determinants of election administration expenditures after the implementation of VBM.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Methods: </em></strong><em>Using Colorado as a case study, I use county level expenditures to determine the effects of institutional change on election administration finance, as well as other institutional and socio-demographic determinants on costs.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Results: </em></strong><em>I find that adopting all-VBM elections significantly reduced expenditures. Additionally, I find that after VBM was implemented, the primary institutional determinants of expenditures are the proportion of mail-in ballots received, as well as the number of poll-workers, and early voting sites. Finally, I find that socio-demographic characteristics are predictive of expenditures for election administration. Counties with higher income spent less per voter in federal elections. Counties with higher proportions of Latinx voting-aged populations spent less per voter, even when controlling for turnout.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Conclusion: </em></strong><em>The results strongly indicate that moving to all-VBM elections can help cash-strapped counties save money. However, conversion to VBM may not guarantee that expenditures will be spent equitably.</em></blockquote><h4>Previous research this builds on:</h4><ul><li>VBM is largely cheaper to run.</li></ul><h4>Innovation:</h4><ul><li>Bringing together county level CO expenditures, this paper finds that VBM is cheaper. However, expenditures may still favor richer counties.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3be06ed74ef4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/research-roundup-3be06ed74ef4">Research Roundup</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Gerrymandering, Turnout, and Lazy Legislators]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/gerrymandering-turnout-and-lazy-legislators-3cdbf80c96e?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3cdbf80c96e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Sep 2021 17:57:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-03T17:58:39.853Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1Z8ZuvOUciIRXhkQCQzfow.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image courtesy Joey Csunyo, Unsplash.</figcaption></figure><p><em>The </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/"><em>MIT Election Data and Science Lab</em></a><em> helps highlight new research and interesting ideas in election science, and is a proud co-sponsor of the Election Sciences, Reform, &amp; Administration Conference (ESRA).</em></p><p><em>Our post today was written by Aryanna Hyde and Edwin Santana, based on their paper presented at the </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/events/esra-2021"><em>2021 ESRA Conference</em></a><em>. The information and opinions expressed in this column represent their own research, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the MIT Election Lab or MIT.</em></p><p>Gerrymandering is making headlines again, thanks to the completed census and redistricting process that is finally <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/05/1024878625/2020-census-data-redistricting-voting-districts-when-release">scheduled to happen</a> across each US state. With this in mind, we were driven to take a closer look at gerrymandering and the effects it has on voters and politicians. Specifically, we have two questions we want answered:</p><ul><li>Do districts whose lines are drawn via politician-dominated processes experience a larger decline in turnout than we would expect after redistricting occurs?</li><li>Do legislators from districts whose lines are drawn via politician-dominated processes produce fewer pieces of legislation?</li></ul><h4><strong>Background</strong></h4><p>As we dove into the research around gerrymandering, we were surprised by what we found. Despite being a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/09/house-representatives-redistricting-responsive-gerrymandering/">frequently-raised boogeyman</a>, researchers struggle to conclusively point to whether gerrymandering is the cause of things <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25548144">like polarization</a>, or if its use of protection for <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/11910880">incumbents is successful.</a> Also, we found that no prior study had viewed this issue through the lens of <strong><em>how </em></strong>the lines were drawn, not just their end shape.</p><p>Researchers and the judiciary have attempted to define gerrymandering in the past, but <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/05/27/redistricting-gerrymandering-2021-moon-duchin-interview-491199">neither have come to an agreed upon definition</a>. Rather than parse through the varied definitions that are proposed in past studies, we focus instead on how exactly states approach redistricting. The most prominent method by far is politician-dominated, and takes different forms in different states. Some states form politician commissions; in others, the state legislature draws and approves maps as a body. There are a few states that have independent redistricting processes, which are classified as such due to their independence from politicians when considering the shape of the district and who will comprise it. Finally, some states take a hybrid approach, utilizing a mixture of the two to draw their lines.</p><h4><strong>Methods/Results</strong></h4><p>To answer our respective questions, we designed two tests that both shared our classification for redistricting processes. To avoid the inevitable obstruction that comes with the lack of clear definitions mentioned above, we focus our analysis on the comparison between how broad categories of redistricting methods compare across our variables of interest.</p><p>To classify each state’s redistricting processes, we used <a href="https://redistricting.lls.edu/national-overview/?colorby=Institution&amp;level=Congress&amp;cycle=2020">All About Redistricting’s</a> database, which provides a central location for how states draw their congressional and state legislature districts, and coded each state’s district-drawing processes as either politician-dominated, independent, or hybrid. Grouping across such broad categories carries several assumptions:</p><ul><li>that politicians consider the political consequences of their maps whereas other redistricting types are at least nominally forbidden from doing so,</li><li>that the effects of any smaller variation among state redistricting types is negligible, and</li><li>that there is enough similarity between redistricting processes of different states in the same category that including them together is sensible.</li></ul><p>Our variables of interest are turnout and productivity. To measure turnout, we created the variable Voter Eligible Population (VEP) Turnout. This information is not reported in every district, so for this study some compromises were made to get as accurate a measure as possible. First, we took the reported Voter Eligible Population at the state level and divided it by the number of congressional districts, under the assumptions that congressional districts in a state are roughly the same population. This gave us an estimation of the Voter Eligible Population in the congressional district, which we then divide by the number of votes cast in the election to get a Voter Eligible Population Turnout percentage. For example, if the Voter Eligible Population of a district is 50,000, and 25,000 votes were cast in the election, then we generate a value of Voter Eligible Population Turnout of 50%. (The data used to generate these numbers was pulled from the <a href="http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data">United States Election Project</a>.)</p><p>To measure productivity, we examine the number of bills introduced and cosponsored by each representative of the <a href="https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/report-cards/2018">115th</a> and <a href="https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/report-cards/2020">116th Congresses</a> according to the GovTrack legislative report cards available for those congresses. Our analysis utilizes t-tests and multiple regression estimations to compare between the three different redistricting types mentioned above. Visualizations of those tests are shown below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/814/1*Hh0xSwfDsvqiZnPdc8n-sQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/814/1*xuRNRlHoz3Ww-f1q317n6Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Results on voter turnout were mixed. In the 2000–2002 election, results were in line with our hypothesis that politician-dominated processes had an adverse effect on turnout, but in the 2010–2012 election the results showed that politician-dominated processes had a beneficial effect. While we hoped for more conclusive results, examining voter turnout following this redistricting cycle and future cycles can help establish a pattern.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jz4buAbuIiVnD1R0QdpXbA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PCF56onUMn5o6jFfE8rdEQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Our test of productivity provided much more conclusive results. For bills cosponsored in the 115th Congress and number of bills introduced in the 115/116th Congress, we consistently found that legislators representing districts whose lines were drawn via politician-dominated processes produced fewer bills. In the 115th Congress alone, those legislators on average cosponsored 100 fewer bills than their colleagues from independently drawn districts. The variable with the largest effect was political party. With the differences in philosophical approach to governance taken by both parties, we did expect some difference between the two. However, our regression estimations indicate that the predicted difference in number of bills cosponsored between a Republican and non-Republican representative is as big as 290 bills, which seems larger than philosophical differences between parties would imply.</p><h4><strong>Moving Forward</strong></h4><p>While the results shown above are compelling, there are several steps we believe are important moving forward. First, to better examine the impact of redistricting on turnout, we would like to look at how election results following the redistricting taking place later this year compare to the results shown in the 2000–2002 and 2010–2012 cycles. It is difficult to look further in the past to test these results since the methods used to draw district lines become more homogeneous.</p><p>It would also be helpful to derive a turnout measure that accounts more precisely for population and voting population changes. Our VEP Turnout measure is useful, but we also acknowledge the error that comes along with it and hope to refine it in the future. The productivity measures used showed some interesting results, and it would be useful to use the simple tests across more congresses and productivity measures to see if those patterns continue to show up. We are also interested in further honing the estimations we use to be sure the patterns are not the result of specific variables and measures.</p><p>Overall, there do seem to be some important differences between districts that use politician dominated redistricting processes and those that do not. Going forward, more states are looking to transition towards independent redistricting processes in an attempt to remove politics from the equation, and our results provide tangible indications that who draws the district lines affects turnout and has an effect on performance of legislators once in office. We predict that as more districts rely on independent processes to draw congressional lines that the differences in turnout and legislator productivity will only become more pronounced.</p><p><strong><em>Aryanna Hyde </em></strong><em>is a PhD student in comparative politics and international relations at the Harry S. Truman School of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Missouri. She researches democratic efficacy and the study of migration and refugee movements, especially in the MENA region.</em></p><p><strong><em>Edwin Santana</em></strong><em> received an MA in Communications from Georgetown. He is interested in American politics, democratic preservation, and best practices for statistical analysis in political science.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3cdbf80c96e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/gerrymandering-turnout-and-lazy-legislators-3cdbf80c96e">Gerrymandering, Turnout, and Lazy Legislators</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rescheduling Local Elections to Make Democracy More Representative]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/rescheduling-local-elections-to-make-democracy-more-representative-a7ffe251adb1?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7ffe251adb1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Sep 2021 14:08:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-01T14:08:14.010Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wSZpvm90RduG-O6Nw4hTwg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: Dan Dennis, Unsplash</figcaption></figure><p><em>The </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/"><em>MIT Election Data and Science Lab</em></a><em> helps highlight new research and interesting ideas in election science, and is a proud co-sponsor of the Election Sciences, Reform, &amp; Administration Conference (ESRA).</em></p><p><em>Our post today was written by Zoltan Hajnal, Vladimir Kogan, and G. Agustin Markarian, based on their paper presented at the </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/events/esra-2021"><em>2021 ESRA Conference</em></a><em>. The information and opinions expressed in this column represent their own research, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the MIT Election Lab or MIT.</em></p><p>Elections are the building block of democracy. Yet, despite the centrality of the vote for the functioning of democracy, relatively few Americans turn out in the typical contest. And nowhere is that problem worse than at the local level. In contests for mayor, city council, school board, and the like, turnout can and often does fall below ten percent of the adult population. Even more alarming is that the people who do casts ballots in these local contests don’t look like those who stay home. Across the nation, local voters are much more likely than nonvoters to be white, well-off, well-educated, older, and generally advantaged.</p><p>In other words, those who by many measures are the most in need of government support may have the least say in what government does. That is particularly troubling given how much is at stake at the local level. Every year local governments spend almost two trillion dollars. Local governments also provide core functions like education, police and fire protection, and transportation that are critical for individual well-being.</p><h4><strong><em>Moving Election Dates?</em></strong></h4><p>Is there anything we can do about America’s uneven local elections? To date, existing research has uncovered few, if any, tools that would fully address these imbalances. In this project we investigate the potential of local <strong><em>election timing</em></strong> reform to make local democracy more representative. The underling question is simple. Should jurisdictions hold local elections on the same day as statewide contests, or should these offices be filled through stand-alone elections on some other day of the year?</p><p>There is a clear logic to moving to on-cycle elections that coincide with statewide or national contests. Moving to on-cycle local elections makes voting in local contests less costly. When local elections are <em>not</em> held on the first Tuesday in November with other statewide and national races, local voters need to learn the date of their local election, find their local election polling place, and make a specific trip to the polls just to vote in local contests. If, however, local elections occur on the same day as presidential or midterm contests, local voting is almost costless for a voter. Citizens who are already casting ballots for higher level offices need only check off a few more boxes further down the ballot.</p><p>Research shows that that this small change in timing makes a huge difference in turnout. Every study that has looked at election timing has found that moving to on-cycle elections doubles turnout (Marschall and Lappie 2018, Kogan et al 2018, Anzia 2013, Hajnal 2010). These results suggest that the single most important change that municipalities can undertake to increase turnout is moving local elections to November of even years.</p><p>What we don’t yet know is whether this increase in turnout translates into a more even democracy. Does higher turnout associated with on-cycle elections also mean a more representative electorate less skewed by race, class, and age? On this question, we have few systematic answers.</p><h4><strong><em>Research Design</em></strong></h4><p>In this <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3888349">study</a>, which is forthcoming in the <em>American Political Science Review</em>, we construct a panel of California city elections covering the years 2008 through 2016 to examine how the racial demographics, socioeconomic status, age, and political orientation of voters who turn out to vote in a city change as the timing of elections shifts. Specifically, we combine information on election timing with detailed micro-targeting data that includes voter demographic information. Because cities regularly change their election timing, we can examine how election composition differs <strong><em>within</em> </strong>the <strong><em>same</em> </strong>city, depending on when votes are cast.</p><h4><strong><em>Results</em></strong></h4><p>Our analysis demonstrates that that on-cycle elections make the electorate substantially more representative in terms of race, age, income, and partisanship. Some of those results are displayed in the table below, which assesses the impact of election timing in all California cities between 2008 and 2016 on voter race, age, and partisanship. The dependent variable in each case is a measure of representativeness — each group’s share of voters in an election divided by that group’s share of the city’s voting-age population. A value of one corresponds to exactly proportional representation. Larger numbers indicate that a group is over-represented, while values below one indicate that a group is under-represented.</p><p>The table indicates that when cities shift to on-cycle elections, the active electorate begins to look more like the overall adult population. Not surprisingly, as column one reveals, white voters are overrepresented in off-cycle elections (a ratio of 1.68). But shifting to on-cycle presidential dates reduces that ratio by 0.30. On-cycle elections don’t lead all the way to proportional participation by race, but they get us much closer. Latinos, also as expected, are greatly underrepresented in off-cycle elections. The Latino share of the population is roughly double the group’s share of voters in off-cycle contests. But when local elections are held concurrently with the presidential contest, Latino representation moves much closer to parity — a ratio of .86 in local contests held the same day as presidential elections.</p><p>Effects are even more pronounced in terms of voter age. Older Americans represent more than two times as many voters in off-cycle elections as they do adult city residents. But that overrepresentation is reduced by roughly half in on-cycle contests. Finally, Democrats are generally slightly underrepresented in off-cycle elections (a ratio of .91) but moving to concurrent local elections produces near-parity (a ratio of .98). Additional analysis also reveals significant and substantial effects for class (measured by income and wealth) as well as for other racial and ethnic minority groups (Asian Americans).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fdzEEvIJZn1J7EqTPlSuCA.png" /></figure><p>While these data are all from one state, nearly identical analysis in Florida also finds that moving to on-cycle elections dramatically alters the composition of the vote. In summary, the shift to on-cycle elections moves us closer to a world where voters begin to look more like the population of city residents.</p><h4><strong>Where Does Timing Matter Most?</strong></h4><p>If timing affects voter racial composition, we should see the most pronounced effects in cities where minorities make-up a larger share of the city population. In the figure below we show that this is indeed the case. The figure shows how the predicted effect of election timing varies across cities with different levels of minority population. The figure compares off-cycle to presidential elections.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_QTlAHMGKABCS2w6Tbc8hw.png" /><figcaption><strong>How the Effects of Election Timing Vary Depending on City Population</strong></figcaption></figure><p>As the figure illustrates, the shift to presidential election timing reduces the white share of voters by less than 5 percentage points in cities where whites represent more than 80 percent of the voting-age population, but the effect is more than 15 percentage points in cities where white residents account for only a quarter of the adult population. Even more dramatically, holding local elections concurrently with presidential contests increases the Latino share of voters by less than 5 percentage points in a city where Latinos account for a fifth of the adult population. But the effect increases to 25 percentage points in a city that is 55 percent Latino.</p><h4><strong><em>Significance</em></strong></h4><p>We live in a time when the nation is focusing enormous attention on electoral reform. While some efforts limit voter options in the name of preventing fraud, others seek to expand the electorate. As we write this, at least 112 bills expanding voter access are moving through 31 state legislatures and Congress is considering HR1, a major initiative to expand democratic access and equity. Almost as many fraud-related measures are actively being considered or passed. In short, there is a real appetite for electoral reform.</p><p>On-cycle elections are a reform that is not only getting increasing attention but also one that could potentially be rapidly expanded around the country. Three states — California, Arizona, and Nevada — have recently passed laws mandating on-cycle elections. At least two others — Washington state and Tennessee — are considering legislation to do the same. Moreover, with surveys showing that the public strongly favors on-cycle elections, widespread timing reform seems quite possible.</p><p>For all of these reasons, it is critical that we do more to understand the effects of local election timing. We have shown that moving to on-cycle elections — especially to elections held on the same day as presidential contests — has real potential to alter who participates in local democracy. In California, holding city elections concurrently with statewide and national contests reduces the over-representation of whites and older Americans and, to a smaller extent, the well-off. The voters who typically participate the least and, generally have less of a voice in American democracy, gain the most. These patterns make the move to on-cycle elections well worth considering.</p><h4><strong><em>Bibliography</em></strong></h4><p>Anzia, Sara. 2013. <em>Timing and Turnout: How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups</em>. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.</p><p>Hajnal, Zoltan L. 2010. <em>America’s Uneven Democracy: Turnout, Race, and Representation in City Politics</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>Holbrook, Thomas, and Aaron Weinschenk. 2014. “Campaigns, Mobilization, and Turnout in Mayoral Elections.” <em>Political Research Quarterly</em> 67: 42–55.</p><p>Kogan, Vladimir, Stéphane Lavertu, and Zachary Peskowitz. 2018. “Election Timing, Electorate Composition, and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from School Districts.” <em>American Journal of Political Science</em> 62: 637–51.</p><p><em>Zoltan Hajnal is Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Yankelovich Center for Social Science Research at the University of California, San Diego. His website is </em><a href="https://gps.ucsd.edu/faculty-directory/zoltan-hajnal.html"><em>https://gps.ucsd.edu/faculty-directory/zoltan-hajnal.html</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>Vladimir Kogan is an associate professor of political science and (by courtesy) public affairs at the Ohio State University. His website is </em><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__u.osu.edu_kogan.18_&amp;d=DwMFAg&amp;c=-35OiAkTchMrZOngvJPOeA&amp;r=FGRanhxll_2IQkt1EwWyWg&amp;m=_CyUdQu_5PDzByyIZTWUFvjB5nR9i_GrQjbfgS3zkKs&amp;s=_PxU4rgp2lcaVAdsue8OWQEMEQa66kkGz2w04uMGCfs&amp;e="><em>https://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/</em></a><em>; he is also on Twitter at @vkoganpolisci.</em></p><p><em>Agustin Markarian is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of California San, Diego. His website is </em><a href="https://www.agustinmarkarian.com/"><em>https://www.agustinmarkarian.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7ffe251adb1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/rescheduling-local-elections-to-make-democracy-more-representative-a7ffe251adb1">Rescheduling Local Elections to Make Democracy More Representative</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Watchers at the Polls]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/watchers-at-the-polls-ca2e8f05592?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ca2e8f05592</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Aug 2021 14:19:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-31T14:19:24.231Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>The Effect of Partisan Poll Watchers on Perceptions of Electoral Fairness</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*to3qzwLahJpFvgbjnCFXGA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>The </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/"><em>MIT Election Data and Science Lab</em></a><em> helps highlight new research and interesting ideas in election science, and is a proud co-sponsor of the Election Sciences, Reform, &amp; Administration Conference (ESRA).</em></p><p><em>Our post today was written by Geoffrey Sheagley and Mollie Cohen, based on their paper presented at the </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/events/esra-2021"><em>2021 ESRA Conference</em></a><em>. The information and opinions expressed in this column represent their own research, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the MIT Election Lab or MIT.</em></p><p>During the 2020 election, there was a great deal of focus on the expanded role partisan poll watchers might play on Election Day. <strong><em>Partisan poll watchers</em></strong> are recruited by the parties to observe election proceedings and to ensure that officials and voters follow the rules. Often expressly forbidden from interacting with voters, these poll watchers work with state officials, poll workers, and the parties to raise potential concerns about election day activities. It seems reasonable to expect, then, that poll watchers should therefore bolster the integrity of — and public trust in — elections.</p><p>On the other hand, poll watchers are recruited directly by political parties to work on behalf of that party’s interests. <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/10/15/election-officials-prepare-for-voter-intimidation-threat">For example</a>, President Trump’s campaign emphasized the importance of recruiting poll watchers to ensure that the election was conducted fairly, without specifying how poll watchers should expect to do so. And some largely partisan election reforms seek to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/01/us/politics/republican-pollwatchers.html">expand</a> the power of partisan watchers at the polls. Because these poll watchers are expressly<em> </em>partisan actors, it’s also possible their presence might actually <em>undermine </em>public trust in elections.</p><p>How does the public view poll watchers? Do poll watchers — partisan or otherwise — lead members of the public to be more trusting of elections? Or, does the politicized and partisan nature of poll watchers override these potential benefits and lead voters to be less trusting of elections? These are difficult questions to study with existing data. For one, states employ a wide variety of <a href="https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watcher-qualifications.aspx">rules</a> and regulations that govern the recruitment, behavior, and presence of poll watchers. Moreover, most public opinion surveys do not measure voters’ perceptions of poll watchers. Because of these difficulties, we designed an original experiment to examine these questions.</p><p>We use <a href="https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn.edu/dist/f/49/files/2019/09/handbook-draft-07-09202019-1.pdf">conjoint experiment</a>s, which present participants with paired choices, to answer these questions. Specifically, we presented respondents with hypothetical election day polling locations with six attributes that randomly took one of several values. Those attributes were:</p><ol><li>The presence and type of poll watchers</li><li>Voter identification requirements</li><li>The method for tabulating ballots</li><li>Registration requirements</li><li>Wait times</li><li>Electioneering laws</li></ol><p>In our first experiment, values for the “poll watcher” attribute included:</p><ul><li>None allowed</li><li>Non-partisan</li><li>Non-partisan with identification</li><li>Partisan</li><li>Partisan with identification</li><li>Both non-partisan and partisan</li><li>Both non-partisan and partisan with identification</li></ul><p>Figure 1, below, shows an example of one of these comparisons. Participants were asked to identify the polling location where they thought the election would be conducted more fairly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zDn96hwR9--xsocfujsAUQ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1. Example Conjoint Task</figcaption></figure><h4><em>Study 1 — Partisan and Non-Partisan Poll watchers</em></h4><p>In Spring 2021, we conducted an online survey experiment to test the impact of poll watchers on citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity. The sample included 1,000 Americans recruited by <a href="https://www.bovitzinc.com/">Bovitz Inc</a>. Figure 2, below, shows the effect of each randomized attribute value on perceptions of electoral fairness. The figure displays how much fairer participants perceived an election with that attribute value would be compared to a base category (the points with no lines through them).</p><p>The dependent variable (on the X-axis) ranges from -1 to 1. Each point with a line through it represents how much more (or less) fair participants perceived a polling location with a given attribute level to be relative to a polling location with an attribute that we set as the baseline (represented by points with no lines). The horizontal lines around each point estimate represent 95 percent confidence intervals; if these lines do not cross the vertical line at “0,” that means that attribute level is statistically significantly different from the baseline attribute level. For example, on average, respondents were .08 units (8 percentage points) more likely to view a polling location with partisan poll watchers who used identification as <strong>fairer </strong>than a location that did not allow poll watchers, and this result is statistically significant.</p><p>We find that most types of poll watchers increase perceptions of electoral fairness, compared to a polling location that does not allow poll watchers at all. The one exception is for a partisan poll watcher without identification, which does not change trust in elections compared to a hypothetical location where no poll watchers are allowed (the horizontal line crosses the vertical “0” line). These findings support the notion that poll watchers could improve public perceptions of electoral integrity, at least in some circumstances.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OcRHznzFSJwjyhnfrP2aKg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2. Effect of Randomized Polling Location Attributes on Perceptions of Electoral Fairness</figcaption></figure><p>This approach also allows us to directly compare the <strong><em>size </em></strong>of the effect poll watchers have on perceptions to other features of elections that <a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voter-identification">past research</a> has linked to trust in elections. The only feature of elections that affects perceptions of electoral fairness more than poll watchers are different types of voter identification requirements (in yellow in Figure 2 above). In other words, poll watchers can have a substantial impact on voters’ perceptions of an election’s integrity.</p><p>Given the partisan and politicized nature of many poll watchers, it is also important to test whether partisans in the mass public differ in how they view poll watchers. We do this by calculating the effect of each polling location attribute on overall levels of perceived electoral fairness separately for Democrats and Republicans. The results are presented in Figure 3 below (estimates for Republican respondents are in red; Democrats are in blue).</p><p>For poll watchers, we observe minimal differences in perceptions of fairness between Republican and Democratic participants. There are some differences — Republicans perceive lower levels of fairness than Democrats when poll watchers are affiliated with the state — but these differences are quite small. This is especially true when compared to the effects of voter identification requirements (in the second panel), which lead to strong differences between Republicans and Democrats.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OZE6HRBZly98uGh3pip5kg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3. Mean Perceptions of Electoral Fairness by Respondent Party Identification and Randomized Polling Location Attribute</figcaption></figure><h4><em>Study 2 — Asymmetric Partisan Watchers</em></h4><p>Study 1 asks about partisan poll watchers, generally. But what happens when only one party has poll watchers at a location? We examined this question in a second study, which uses the conjoint framework but changes how poll watchers are described. For this experiment, we randomly varied the following attributes for the “poll watcher” category:</p><ul><li>No poll watchers present</li><li>Only Democrats (or Republicans)</li><li>Only Democrats (or Republicans) with badges</li><li>Both Democrats and Republicans</li><li>Both Democrats and Republicans with badges</li></ul><p>As in the first study, we described each location’s voter identification laws, registration requirements, electioneering laws, ballot tabulation method, and wait times. We fielded this question in a national, demographically diverse sample of 500 Americans collected through <a href="https://www.qualtrics.com/research-services/online-sample/">Qualtrics</a> in July 2021.</p><p>The figure below shows the effect of poll watchers on trust in elections, again by presenting mean level of perceived fairness among Republicans and Democrats in the sample. First, members of both parties perceive the election to be most fair when poll watchers from both parties are present, relative to situations in which none are present or only watchers from one party are present. Second, in elections in which only members of one party are present, participants perceive the election with members of their party are fairer compared to those with only members of the opposite party. Finally, partisans perceive elections in which both parties are represented by poll watchers are fairer even compared to elections in which poll watchers are only from their party.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q0hDPtZ9dMG8_vSqbSMP0Q.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4. Mean Perceptions of Electoral Fairness by Respondent Party Identification and Randomized Poll Watcher Type (Study 2)</figcaption></figure><p>While this work is on-going, it makes three important contributions. First, ours is the first study we have seen that verifies the assumption that learning about the presence of poll watchers impacts citizen perceptions of electoral integrity. Second, the presence of partisan poll watchers does not necessarily harm views of fairness. This is especially true when members of both parties serve as watchers. Finally, our second study suggests some limit to the willingness of co-partisans to trust elections when either their own party <em>or </em>the opposition party is excluded from the process. Even with high levels of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/podcasts/transcript-ezra-klein-interviews-lilliana-mason.html">polarization</a> and often <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/01/15/voters-reflections-on-the-2020-election/">partisan</a> views of election administration, many partisans agree that having partisan watchers from both parties is more fair.</p><p><a href="https://sites.google.com/view/geoffreysheagley/home"><em>Geoffrey D. Sheagley</em></a><em> is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He conducts research in the areas of political psychology, political parties, and experimental methods.</em></p><p><a href="http://www.molliecohen.com/"><em>Mollie J. Cohen</em></a><em> is an assistant professor of comparative politics in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia. She studies public opinion and voter behavior, especially in Latin America.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ca2e8f05592" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/watchers-at-the-polls-ca2e8f05592">Watchers at the Polls</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Many Naked Ballots Were Cast in Pennsylvania’s 2020 General Election?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/how-many-naked-ballots-were-cast-in-pennsylvanias-2020-general-election-91a277a1c19d?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/91a277a1c19d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pennsylvania]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[election-2020]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Aug 2021 19:01:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-26T19:01:25.258Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ytxZVnB7EHz3MCLXgddQZQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image courtesy Tiffany Tertipes, Unsplash.</figcaption></figure><p><em>The </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/"><em>MIT Election Data and Science Lab</em></a><em> helps highlight new research and interesting ideas in election science, and is a proud co-sponsor of the Election Sciences, Reform, &amp; Administration Conference (ESRA).</em></p><p><em>Our post today was written by Daniel J. Hopkins, Marc Meredith, and Kira Wang, based on their paper presented at the </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/events/esra-2021"><em>2021 ESRA Conference</em></a><em>. The information and opinions expressed in this column represent their own research, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the MIT Election Lab or MIT.</em></p><p>Pennsylvania experienced an unprecedented surge of mail balloting in the 2020 presidential election. Because of the passage of Act 77 in 2019, the 2020 elections were the first federal elections in which all registered Pennsylvanians were eligible to apply for a mail ballot. The COVID-19 pandemic caused more Pennsylvanians to take advantage of this newfound ability to cast a mail ballot than anyone anticipated. The <a href="https://www.dos.pa.gov/VotingElections/Pages/default.aspx">Pennsylvania Secretary of State</a> reported that 2,704,147 mail ballots were cast in the 2020 presidential elections, which was about 39 percent of the total ballots cast statewide. As a point of comparison, <a href="https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/2016-election-administration-voting-survey">U.S. Election Assistance Commission</a> data show that only 266,208, or about 4 percent, of the 6,223,150 ballots cast in the 2016 presidential election were cast by mail.</p><p>Experiencing a ten-fold increase in the number of mail ballots raised the salience and impact of the rules governing what could cause a mail ballot to be disqualified. One issue that arose was how to handle the expected increase in mail ballots that were mailed back before Election Day, but not received by election administrators until afterwards because of a slowdown in mail processing or late sending. A second issue was what information must be completed on the declaration on the mail-ballot return envelope for a ballot to be eligible for counting. A third issue, which is the focus of this blog post, is whether ballots could be counted if they were not returned within a secrecy envelope.</p><p>According to data from the <a href="https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx">National Conference of State Legislatures</a>, Pennsylvania is one of sixteen states that provides mail-ballot voters with a smaller secrecy envelope that a mail ballot is placed in, which then gets placed within a larger mail-ballot return envelope. What became clear during the 2020 primary election is that Pennsylvania election administrators lacked a common understanding of whether to count mail ballots that were returned without being placed inside a secrecy envelope, which were commonly referred to as “naked ballots.”</p><p>Many expressed concern about the number of voters who might be affected when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified in September 2020 that the current state law is that naked ballots are <em>not</em> to be counted. <a href="https://www.ncnewsonline.com/news/local_news/lawyer-withdraws-secrecy-envelope-objection/article_da779e3f-d05c-5a60-91af-bcb23179c88c.html">Media reports</a> highlighted cases in Lawrence and Mercer counties in which more than 5 percent of mail ballots returned in the June 2020 primary were rejected because they were naked ballots. Similarly, about 6.4 percent of the 3,086 mail ballots cast in the 2019 general election in Philadelphia were rejected for not being enclosed within a secrecy envelope. Philadelphia City Commissioner Lisa Deeley, the chairwoman of the board that oversees the election administration of elections in Philadelphia County, wrote <a href="https://files7.philadelphiavotes.com/announcements/9-21-2020_Deeley_Letter_on_Secrecy_Envelope.pdf">a letter</a> to the Pennsylvania State Legislature noting that she believed that Philadelphia counted at least 15,000 mail ballots that were returned outside of a secrecy envelope in the 2020 primary election and that this extrapolated to about 30,000 to 40,000 Philadelphians potentially being at risk of having their votes invalidated in the 2020 general election if the law mandating the disqualification of naked ballots was not changed.</p><p>Massive voter-education efforts quickly sprung up after the September 2020 court decision to inform voters about the necessity of putting a mail ballot inside of a secrecy envelope to prevent it from being disqualified. One primary avenue of voter education was through <a href="https://billypenn.com/2020/11/11/philly-naked-ballots-pennsylvania-mail-votes-november-election/">social media</a>, with Instagram accounts such as @nakedballot using memes and infographics to emphasize the importance of putting mail-in ballots in their secrecy envelopes. Furthermore, grassroots campaigns such as RepresentUs had <a href="https://www.pennlive.com/elections/2020/10/celebrities-appear-in-the-nude-in-ads-explaining-the-naked-ballot-issue-in-pa-and-other-states.html">celebrities</a> such as Mark Ruffalo and Amy Schumer star in ads that highlighted Pennsylvania’s new voting laws. Similarly, Allegheny County election officials also created <a href="https://triblive.com/local/pennsylvania-officials-get-naked-to-address-the-importance-of-secrecy-envelopes-in-mail-in-ballots/">eye-catching ads</a> that featured them posing naked next to instructions on how to cast a “dressed” ballot. In addition, political parties quickly acted to combat the implications of the naked ballot ruling. A spokesman for the Pennsylvania Democratic Party <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/10/01/918368319/naked-ballot-rule-could-lead-to-thousands-of-pa-votes-getting-rejected">described</a> its education campaign about naked ballots as a “all-hands-on-deck effort from us and the Biden team and the DNC all kind of working hand in hand to make sure that we spread the word and educate voters.”</p><p>Despite the salience of naked ballots in the 2020 general election, no one has compiled data allowing us to understand how many naked ballots were cast statewide in the 2020 general election. Media reporting on the number of naked ballots in specific countries suggests that the share of mail ballots returned outside of their secrecy envelopes was lower than some feared, likely because of the voter education campaigns described in the previous paragraph. Philadelphia City Commissioners spokesperson Kevin Feeley <a href="https://www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphia-election-results-trump-legal-challenges-pennsylvania-mail-ballots-provisional-20201111.html">reported</a> only approximately 4,027 naked ballots cast (only 1.1 percent of mail ballots returned by city residents) in the 2020 general election instead of the 30,000 to 40,000 that Deeley projected. A <a href="https://www.ydr.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/17/naked-ballots-and-other-errors-disqualified-votes-central-pa/6279641002/">media report</a> indicated that about 1 percent of returned ballots were naked in the south-central Pennsylvania counties of Franklin, Lebanon, and York as well. The share of naked ballots may have been even lower in Allegheny County — home to Pittsburgh — with <a href="https://triblive.com/local/allegheny-county-to-count-2349-undated-ballots/">reported estimates</a> of around 2,000 naked ballots out of about 300 thousand mail ballots cast. Similarly, <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjmg6KK8qbyAhVxmuAKHbVOCEsQFnoECAMQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pacourts.us%2FStorage%2Fmedia%2Fpdfs%2F20210604%2F013509-file-10768.pdf&amp;usg=AOvVaw3sFO8FY9VJ_47Png-vaTrb">court documents</a> indicated only 708 naked ballots in Bucks County, a suburban Philadelphia area county, out of almost 140,000 mail ballots cast.</p><p>To gain a more systematic understanding of the number of naked ballots cast in the 2020 general election, we sent public information requests to all 67 Pennsylvania county board of elections. In this request, we asked each county for information on the number of mail ballots returned outside of their secrecy envelope and the number of total mail ballots rejected in the 2020 primary, 2020 general, and 2021 primary elections. We first sent an email request on June 24, 2021, following up with a postal mail request to counties that didn’t respond on July 14, 2021. We called the county election board during the week of July 26, 2021 if both of these requests went unresponded.</p><p>Not all of the counties that responded to our request were able to provide information on the number of ballots returned outside of the secrecy envelope, especially in the 2020 primary election. 32 of the 55 counties who responded were able to provide exact information on the number of naked ballots in the 2020 general election. This does not include the small number of counties reporting zero naked ballots, which we omit out of concern that they did not understand what we were asking for. Combined, about 36 percent of the mail ballots cast in the 2020 general election were cast in these counties. Similarly, 28 of the 55 counties, in which about 43 percent of the mail ballots were cast, provided information on the number of naked ballots cast in the 2021 primary election. In contrast, only 5 counties provided information on the number of naked ballots cast in the 2020 primary election.</p><p>Figure 1 displays the ratio of naked ballots cast in the 2020 general election to the number of counted mail ballots as a function of Joe Biden’s vote share in the county. Figure 1 indicates that just over 1.1 percent of the mail ballots cast in these counties were naked ballots. The trend line also does not show any clear difference in the rate of naked ballots as a function of Joe Biden’s vote share in the county.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/694/1*djvi8xXmymAV-_gDvkYA8Q.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1, showing the ratio of naked ballots to mail-in ballots voted versus Biden vote share in the 2020 general election.</figcaption></figure><p>While ballot curing policies are one factor that could have caused some of the differences observed in the rates of naked ballots over counties in Figure 1, we doubt it is the primary factor. While counties were not allowed to open ballots until Election Day, election administrators may be able to tell before Election Day when a mail ballot is not enclosed in a secrecy envelope based on its weight. Counties handled this situation in <a href="https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-flawed-mail-ballots-cure-20201029.html">different ways</a> ranging from immediately canceling the ballot, contacting the voter, mailing the ballot back to the voter, or doing nothing at all. Counties also <a href="https://www.spotlightpa.org/news/2020/11/pennsylvania-mail-ballots-republican-legal-challenge-naked-ballots-fixed-cured/">differed</a> in whether they attempted to contact voters when they discovered that they cast a naked ballot when opening their mail-ballot envelope on Election Day. Counties that gave voters more opportunities to cure their naked ballots may report a smaller rate of naked ballots if they exclude naked ballots that were ultimately cured. However, the limited evidence that exists on curing suggests that not that many ballots were cured. For example, Montgomery County, a suburban Philadelphia area county, had <a href="https://www.buckscountycouriertimes.com/story/news/2020/11/04/pennsylvania-mail-ballot-lawsuit-election-montgomery-county-barnette/6163939002/">93 voters</a> whom they contacted prior to Election Day cure their problematic mail ballots out of 208,000 mail ballots cast.</p><p>Figure 2 replicates Figure 1 for the share of mail ballots rejected in the 2021 primary election. Figure 2 shows that about 0.8 percent of mail ballots cast in the counties that provided data were naked ballots. We believe that differences in the types of registrants who vote in a presidential election and municipal election explain some of the differences in the incidence of naked ballots in the 2020 general and the 2021 primary. Because the electorate in municipal primary elections tends to be highly educated and experienced with voting, we expect municipal primary voters to be less prone to casting mail ballots that get rejected because of clerical errors than presidential election voters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/723/1*xIlDmui0IlEnTfceCDbHUw.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2, showing the ratio of naked ballots to mail-in ballots voted versus Biden vote share in the 2021 primary election.</figcaption></figure><p>It is hard to compare how often naked ballots were cast in the 2020 general and 2021 primary elections with the 2020 primary election because few counties were able to provide information on the number of ballots returned outside of a secrecy envelope in the June 2020 election. What Figure 3 does make clear is that not all counties were experiencing the same high rate of naked ballots in the 2020 primary election that media reports highlighted in Lawrence and Mercer counties. The other four counties that reported information on the number of naked ballots in the 2020 primary reported numbers that were more in line with the numbers reported in the 2020 general and 2021 primary.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/745/1*P8vI1PMTJwCOxo_UeWBhEg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3, showing the ratio of naked ballots to mail-in ballots voted versus Biden vote share in the 2020 primary election.</figcaption></figure><p>One thing we take away from this research is that Pennsylvania needs to standardize a process for tracking naked ballots. At minimum, all counties should be quickly able to report how many ballots they rejected because they were not enclosed in secrecy envelopes or for any other reason. But even better would be a requirement to distribute individual-level data on ballot rejection by reason so that observers can better understand who is casting rejected ballots and inform strategies that might be used to reduce their incidence.</p><p>Another lesson from this research is that we should not assume that the rate of mail ballot rejection in the 2020 general election in Pennsylvania is predictive of what the mail ballot rejection rate will be moving forward. We observed that many counties rejected a substantially higher share of the mail ballots returned in the 2021 primary election than in the 2020 general election, despite our expectation that the types of voters who participate in municipal primary elections would be <em>less</em> likely to make clerical errors that cause mail ballots to be rejected than presidential election voters. For example, Bedford County, a small county in south-central Pennsylvania, reported rejecting about 4.6 percent of the mail ballots it received in the 2021 primary election as compared to about 0.7 percent of the mail ballots it received in the 2020 general election.</p><p>In most cases it does not appear that naked ballots are the primary cause of most of the observed increases in rejected mail ballots, although Figure 2 reveals that this did appear to occur in Clarion County, a small county in Northeast Pennsylvania. In Bedford, for example, ballots not returned in a secrecy envelope caused 31 of the 35 mail ballot rejections in the 2020 general election, but only 19 of the 70 mail ballot rejections in the 2021 primary election. Differences in rules explains some of the increased rejection. About 2 percent of mail ballots were rejected in Bedford in the May 2021 primary because they were received after Election Day, nearly all of which would have counted in the 2020 general election. Likewise, Philadelphia County rejected <a href="https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/philadelphia-undated-mail-ballots-pennsylvania-tom-wolf-republicans-20210601.html">about 2 percent</a> of the mail ballots cast in the May 2021 primary because voters failed to date the signature on the mail ballot return envelope’s declaration, which did not disqualify a mail ballot in the 2020 general election.</p><p>Counties also experienced problems in the 2021 primary election that weren’t present in the 2020 general election, perhaps because of the reduction in voter education efforts leading up to the election. Bedford County, for example, rejected about 1 percent of the mail ballots cast in the 2021 primary election because they were put into a secrecy envelope that was not properly sealed after not rejecting any ballots for that reason in the 2020 general election. This makes us concerned about the potential for voter disenfranchisement under the rules governing mail balloting in Pennsylvania moving forward, especially when there is not the same degree of voter education and ballot curing efforts that were present in the 2020 general election.</p><p><a href="http://danhop@sas.upenn.edu/"><em>Daniel J. Hopkins</em></a><em> is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His research addresses a variety of questions related to American political behavior and policymaking.</em></p><p><a href="http://marcmere@sas.upenn.edu/"><em>Marc Meredith</em></a><em> is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His research focuses on American elections, often with an emphasis on election administration.</em></p><p><a href="http://kirawang@sas.upenn.edu/"><em>Kira Wang</em></a><em> is an undergraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania. She engaged in this research as part of her summer fellowship with the Penn Program on Opinion Research and Election Studies.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=91a277a1c19d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/how-many-naked-ballots-were-cast-in-pennsylvanias-2020-general-election-91a277a1c19d">How Many Naked Ballots Were Cast in Pennsylvania’s 2020 General Election?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Don’t Dismiss Digital Immigrants]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/dont-dismiss-digital-immigrants-17ad38877339?source=rss-3d418172c85d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/17ad38877339</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[election-2020]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MIT Election Lab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Aug 2021 18:54:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-25T18:54:23.407Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HdQT64vjDsAJQKT6YJpAjg.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>Poll Workers and New Election Technologies</strong></h4><p><em>The </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/"><em>MIT Election Data and Science Lab</em></a><em> helps highlight new research and interesting ideas in election science, and is a proud co-sponsor of the Election Sciences, Reform, &amp; Administration Conference (ESRA).</em></p><p><em>Our post today was written by Stephanie L. DeMora, Melissa R. Michelson, and Dari S. Tran, based on their paper presented at the </em><a href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/events/esra-2021"><em>2021 ESRA Conference</em></a><em>. The information and opinions expressed in this column represent their own research, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the MIT Election Lab or MIT.</em></p><p>Poll workers are critical to the election process. With little on-site supervision, they are responsible for making decisions about who can vote, the length of time that individuals wait to vote, and to some degree, whether votes are counted accurately.</p><p>The (somewhat accurate) stereotype about poll workers is that they tend to be older women (<a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/elj.2014.0277">Burden and Milyo 2015</a>). Another common stereotype about older people, sometimes dubbed <strong><em>digital immigrants</em></strong>, is that they are uncomfortable with and poor adopters of new technology (<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238496356_Explaining_Voting_System_Performance_Do_Technology_Training_and_Poll_Worker_Characteristics_Matter">Glaser et al. 2007</a>). Many other poll workers are high school students, often recruited as part of civic education efforts. The stereotype about these <strong><em>digital natives</em></strong> is that they are comfortable with and quick to adapt to new technology (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/poll-workers-and-the-vitality-of-democracy-an-early-assessment/758B3BC53D09CA461A44C398F5836250">Hall, Monson, and Patterson 2007</a>). As more of the voting process has shifted to electronic technologies, local election officials have faced questions and concerns about the degree to which their older poll workers will adapt to those new tools (<a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/10748120110424816/full/html">Prensky 2001</a>), but data we have collected from San Joaquin County, California suggests otherwise.</p><p>Voters evaluate older poll workers less favorably compared to their younger counterparts (<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2245353">Hall and Stewart 2013</a>). Older poll workers are generally less comfortable with touch-screen direct recording electronic (DRE) machines than younger poll workers (<a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2009.0046">Spencer and Markovits 2010</a>). In a study of the June 2006 election in California, Glaser and their colleagues noted that precincts with higher percentages of retirees working as poll workers recorded more voting efforts. Similarly, Hall, Monson, and Patterson found in their survey of poll workers in Ohio and Utah that respondents over the age of 55 tended to report more start-up or shut-down problems with electronic equipment than did younger poll workers.</p><p>Contrary to these stereotypes and results from previous efforts, we find that older workers were no more likely to report concerns with new digital voting equipment and that they were no more likely to experience problems with the equipment on Election Day.</p><p>We partnered with the Registrar of San Joaquin County to conduct an evaluation of the training and performance of poll workers during the March 2020 primary election. Poll workers completed paper surveys before and after their face-to-face poll worker training sessions.</p><p>Overall, 1,402 individuals completed the surveys. Over one-third (35.5%) were students, with an average age of 17.7; the average age of non-student poll workers was 54.3. Two-thirds of our survey respondents were women.</p><p>After the election, we reached out to poll workers to invite them to participate in one of two face-to-face focus groups. Participants were compensated for their time. Participants included 13 non-students and two student poll workers; 12 of the 15 focus group participants were women.</p><h3><strong>Results</strong></h3><p>Student poll workers did report more comfort with smartphones and tablets before the training, compared to non-students, but also said they felt less prepared and were slightly less optimistic that technology would make the check-in process easier.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*0Bv-tNewUt-q6ESp4EW2Iw.jpeg" /></figure><p>After the training, students felt less comfortable with the Poll Pads than non-students. Students thought it would be harder to use Poll Pads to look up voters and were more concerned about the difficulty of using Poll Pads to process VBM voters, provisional voters, and to balance the Ballot Statement. Students thought the Poll Pads were less likely to make voting more secure. Students felt less prepared to use Poll Pads on Election Day.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*TgyT2scUq7rn4ABQA5RHIQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4><em>Focus Group Data</em></h4><p>Our non-student focus group participants voiced common stereotypes about students as digital immigrants who would easily be able to adjust to using the Poll Pads and about older workers (and voters) as being less confident about their ability to do so.</p><p>Older poll workers were happy to have students take charge of the Poll Pads, given students’ assumed proficiency and their own discomfort with the new technology. One focus group participant noted, “We were a little worried about the [poll] iPads, but we had four students there.” But other poll workers shared that their initial hesitancy often turned out to be overblown and that they found the poll pads relatively easy to use.</p><p>Even experienced poll workers hold stereotypical expectations about the ability of younger and older people to use new technologies. At the same time, older poll workers had no trouble using the poll pads and often found them convenient and even enjoyable to use.</p><h4><em>Polling Location Data</em></h4><p>The San Joaquin Elections office provided us with a list of problems that occurred at each polling location. The number of problems ranged from 1 to 6; most (87.6%) polling locations recorded 1–3 problems.</p><p>We find no evidence that the average age of workers or the percentage of student workers at a polling place has any impact on the number of poll pad problems that occurred at the polling locations.</p><h3><strong>Conclusions</strong></h3><p>Defying conventional stereotypes, we find older poll workers no less able to effectively work with new polling place technologies, and higher rates of uncertainty among younger poll workers. We also find no evidence that younger workers are less (or more) likely to have an effect on the rate of polling problems on Election Day.</p><p>As noted by <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12599-013-0296-y">Wang, Myers, and Sundaram (2013)</a>, age is but one factor that may shape one’s aptitude to engage with novel technology. While poll worker recruitment efforts aimed at attracting young people may pay democratic dividends as more previously politically unengaged people recognize the value of electoral participation through pollworking, these efforts are likely not the panacea to cure all poll worker challenges with new technology.</p><p><a href="https://www.stephaniedemora.com/"><em>Stephanie L. DeMora</em></a><em> is a PhD Candidate of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside. Her research areas include mass political behavior and American politics with a focus on gender and politics. Twitter: @SLDeMora</em></p><p><em>Melissa R. Michelson, (Ph.D. Yale University) is Dean of Arts &amp; Sciences and Professor of Political Science at Menlo College. She is the award-winning author of seven books, including</em> <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B009B5SSOU/">Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate through Get-Out-the-Vote Campaigns</a> <em>(2012) and, most recently, </em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Transforming-Prejudice-Identity-Transgender-Rights/dp/0190068892/">LGBTQ</a> Life in America<em> (2021). She tweets at </em><a href="https://medium.com/@profmichelson"><em>@profmichelson</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>Dr. Dari Sylvester Tran (Ph.D. Stony Brook University) is Professor of Political Science and Program Manager of the California Healthy Futures Civic Action Fellowship Program at the University of the Pacific, Stockton, California. She is the author of </em>Unrigging American Elections: Reform Past and Prologue <em>(2019), and more than a dozen book chapters and journal articles.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=17ad38877339" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/dont-dismiss-digital-immigrants-17ad38877339">Don’t Dismiss Digital Immigrants</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-election-lab">MIT Election Lab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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