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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mark Kreitzman on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mark Kreitzman on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Mark Kreitzman on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:36:44 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Title: Why Get a Shield Number? Three Reasons That Go Beyond “Avoiding Spam”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/title-why-get-a-shield-number-three-reasons-that-go-beyond-avoiding-spam-cfd13fcf7ba5?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cfd13fcf7ba5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[voip]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[telecommunication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 14:01:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-11T14:01:15.794Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Subtitle:</strong> A private number isn’t just about hiding from robocalls. Here’s how KandiCare Shield actually gets used, and the specific gap in your voicemail you’re probably not thinking about.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yin437TmfFuDquOsdV5ENQ.png" /></figure><p>Most people’s first reaction to “get a second phone number” is spam avoidance, and that’s a real reason. But it’s the narrowest one. Talk to people who actually use Shield day to day and the reasons split into three distinct groups, each with a different need. Here’s all three, plus one thing almost nobody thinks about until it’s explained to them.</p><h3>Reason one: a public number that isn’t your real one</h3><p>This is the baseline use case. You get a dedicated number, and that’s the one you hand out: website signups, online listings, business cards, anywhere a stranger or a form might need to reach you. Your real number never enters the picture.</p><p>What happens to calls and texts is entirely up to you, and you can change it anytime from the dashboard:</p><ul><li><strong>Forward to voicemail</strong>, delivered as an MP3 to your email or sent straight to Telegram</li><li><strong>Forward to your real number</strong>, so it rings through like a normal call</li><li><strong>Switch between the two</strong>, or point it at a different number entirely, whenever you want</li></ul><p>That last part matters more than it sounds. If you change your real number, you don’t have to update every website, listing, and contact that has your Shield number, you just repoint where Shield forwards to. Same thing if you want to temporarily route calls to a different number: a temporary phone while traveling, a shared number for a specific project, whatever the situation calls for. The Shield number stays constant; what’s behind it is flexible.</p><p>And the simplest version of this: use your Shield number instead of your real one for any website signup. If it starts attracting spam or shows up somewhere you didn’t expect, you’re not stuck. You just stop forwarding it, or retire it, without touching your actual phone number at all.</p><h3>Reason two: complete separation, for people who want it</h3><p>This is a different use case entirely, and it’s the one worth explaining carefully, because it’s not for everyone. Some people don’t want a second number alongside their real one. They want their Shield number to be the only number anyone has, period, with their real line essentially invisible.</p><p>This works if you’re fine with every inbound call going to voicemail rather than ringing through live, since the point is total separation, not convenience. In exchange, you get:</p><ul><li><strong>No app installed.</strong> Nothing ties the number to a device ID, an app-store account, or an install record. There’s no “identity” for the number to be traced back to on your phone at all.</li><li><strong>You can still make outbound calls</strong>, through the browser-based dashboard, not through a native dialer tied to the number.</li><li><strong>Inbound texts route to your email or Telegram.</strong> This is inbound-only at this time. There’s no outbound texting through Shield yet, so it’s a receiving channel, not a replacement for your regular messaging.</li></ul><p>If your goal is separating your identity from your phone number, including keeping your device and your real carrier account out of whoever has that number entirely, this is the setup built for exactly that. It’s the option I’d point preppers and privacy-maximalists toward specifically: a number that exists on its own, answerable from anywhere, tied to nothing about your actual device or location.</p><h3>Reason three: call routing for small business and contractors</h3><p>The IVR feature exists for screening, two prompts a caller hears before connecting, but it doubles as simple call routing for anyone running a small operation. A contractor, a small business owner, or anyone fielding calls for different purposes can use it to direct callers appropriately before anything reaches a real person, without needing a full business phone system to do it.</p><h3>The part that applies to all three: where voicemail actually goes</h3><p>This is the piece that’s easy to miss. Voicemail is a known, documented weak point in telecom and mobile service, carrier voicemail systems have been the target of real attacks, from the UK phone-hacking scandal to more recent cases where voicemail access was used as a stepping-stone into other accounts. Most people never think about it because they never think about voicemail as an attack surface at all. It’s just where missed calls go.</p><p>Shield sidesteps that by never putting your messages into a carrier voicemail box in the first place. Voicemail and SMS route to your email or Telegram instead. Practically, that means two things: a security gap closed, and genuine flexibility, since as long as you have a data connection, you receive and can respond to your messages from anywhere in the world, not just wherever your SIM has signal. For email delivery specifically, I’d recommend Proton Mail, since it gives you end-to-end encrypted delivery for anything sensitive that comes through as a voicemail recording.</p><h3>Which reason is yours</h3><p>Most people land in reason one: a public number that keeps their real one private, flexible enough to reroute whenever circumstances change. A smaller group wants reason two: full separation, no device tied to the number, voicemail-only by design. And a specific slice of small business owners and contractors use the IVR for reason three, call routing that doesn’t require a real phone system.</p><p>They’re different needs, but they run on the same underlying thing: a number that isn’t tied to your device, your carrier, or your real identity, with messages delivered wherever you actually are.</p><p><strong>KandiCare Shield</strong> — $79.99/year, no app, instant activation. <a href="https://kandicare.com/shield/">kandicare.com/shield</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cfd13fcf7ba5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Title: I Scanned 30 Law Firms for the One Record That Stops Email Spoofing.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/title-i-scanned-30-law-firms-for-the-one-record-that-stops-email-spoofing-d9dd5ba2ef18?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d9dd5ba2ef18</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[msp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law-firm]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 11:17:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-10T11:17:41.443Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Title:</strong> I Scanned 30 Law Firms for the One Record That Stops Email Spoofing. 19 of Them Were Hacked in the Past.</h3><p><strong>Subtitle:</strong> Most fixed it after. Two didn’t, and they’re sitting below every firm in this scan that’s never been publicly breached at all.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xVbEkqjxy6hWfkoptYyiXA.png" /></figure><p>Nineteen of the thirty law firms in this scan have already had a confirmed data breach, ransomware incident, or unauthorized access disclosure. I didn’t go looking for troubled firms to make a point. I started with firms already known to have been hit, then added eleven large, well-known firms with no confirmed breach I could verify, as a comparison group. The question wasn’t whether these firms have been attacked. It was whether getting attacked changed anything about the one DNS setting that decides whether someone can send an email pretending to be them.</p><p>For most of them, it did. For a couple, it didn’t, though I’m not naming which ones here. More on why below.</p><h3>Why email spoofing matters more at a law firm than almost anywhere else</h3><p>A law firm’s email is a trust instrument. Clients wire settlement funds based on instructions that arrive by email. Opposing counsel exchange privileged documents by email. An email that looks like it came from a partner, because it actually did come from their domain and not a lookalike, is treated as fact by everyone who receives it.</p><p>That’s exactly the mechanism the FBI has been warning about. In May 2026, the Bureau flagged a group it’s tracking as Silent Ransom Group (also known as Luna Moth) for specifically targeting law firms with social engineering. Jones Day confirmed in April 2026 that this group accessed files belonging to ten clients, reportedly after targeting a partner directly by email (Bloomberg). The pattern holds across the industry: Law.com reported that at least ten Am Law 100 firms confirmed breaches in a single wave last summer alone, many starting with social engineering rather than a technical exploit.</p><p>Email spoofing is the raw material social engineering runs on. If anyone can send a message that appears to come from your domain, the rest of the attack is just convincing someone to act on it.</p><h3>What I checked</h3><p>This is narrower than the scans in my earlier pieces, deliberately. A full domain security scan (SSL, DNS hardening, headers, exposed files, certificate logs) takes real time per domain, and running the full battery across 30 firms wasn’t practical for this piece. So I scoped it down to exactly the two DNS records that determine whether email spoofing your domain actually works.</p><p><strong>SPF (Sender Policy Framework)</strong> is a DNS record listing which mail servers are allowed to send email claiming to be from your domain, and what should happen if a message doesn’t come from one of them. The record ends in a qualifier: -all (hard fail, reject anything not on the list), ~all (soft fail, flag it but let it through), or no enforcement mechanism at all.</p><p><strong>DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance)</strong> is a second record that tells receiving mail servers what to actually do when a message fails authentication, and it closes a gap SPF alone leaves open: SPF only checks the hidden technical sender, not the name a person actually sees in their inbox. DMARC’s policy sits at one of three levels: p=none (log it, do nothing), p=quarantine (send it to spam), or p=reject (block it outright). p=noneis, functionally, not protection. It’s a monitoring mode firms are supposed to use temporarily on the way to actually enforcing something.</p><p>I did not check DKIM, the third standard authentication method, for a practical reason. Unlike SPF and DMARC, DKIM records live at a provider-specific subdomain you can’t look up without already knowing which one a firm uses, and large firms often run several email systems with different ones. DMARC policy is the number that actually matters for a reader anyway: a domain at p=reject or p=quarantine is protected regardless of whether that protection is running through SPF or DKIM underneath.</p><h3>The numbers</h3><p>Across all 30 firms:</p><p>— SPF/DMARC fully enforced for 15/30 domains</p><p>— SPF/DMARC partially enforced for 13/30 domains</p><p>— SPF/DMARC not endorced at all for 2/30 domains</p><p>Every single domain had some SPF and DMARC record published. Nobody in this scan skipped email authentication entirely. The split is about whether it’s actually turned on.</p><h3>Did getting hacked change anything?</h3><p>Mostly, yes. Splitting the DMARC numbers between the 19 previously breached firms and the 11 comparison firms:</p><ul><li><strong>Breached firms:</strong> 10/19 (53%) at full p=reject, 7/19 (37%) at p=quarantine, 2/19 (11%) at p=none</li><li><strong>Comparison firms, no confirmed breach:</strong> 5/11 (45%) at p=reject, 6/11 (55%) at p=quarantine, 0/11 at p=none</li></ul><p>That first part is actually the encouraging finding. Breached firms enforce DMARC at p=reject at a slightly higher rate than the firms that have never had a public incident. Getting hit seems to prompt firms to fix this.</p><p>The second part is the one worth sitting with. Zero of the eleven large, well resourced comparison firms, firms with no confirmed breach, firms you’d expect to have the least urgency about this, are sitting at p=none. Every one of them has at least partial enforcement. The only two firms in this entire scan with no real DMARC protection at all are firms that have already been breached.</p><p>I’m not naming those two here. Both have a documented incident in their history that involved exactly the kind of access spoofed or compromised email makes easier, and publishing their names alongside a live, current, unpatched gap felt like handing out a target rather than reporting a finding.</p><h3><strong>What this scan can’t tell you</strong></h3><p>It reads only what’s publicly visible in DNS: nothing about how these firms train staff against social engineering, what their internal email security products add on top of these records, or the full facts of any incident beyond what’s been publicly disclosed. A firm at p=reject can still be breached through a channel this scan doesn’t touch; a firm at p=noneisn’t guaranteed to be breached again through email specifically. This is one control, not a verdict on a firm’s overall security program.</p><p>It’s also worth being direct about what p=none actually is: not an oversight so much as an unfinished migration. Firms move to DMARC gradually, none first to monitor without risking blocking legitimate mail, then quarantine, then rejectonce they’re confident every legitimate sender is accounted for. The question isn’t why a firm started at none. It’s how long is reasonable to stay there.</p><h3>Check your own firm, or anyone else’s</h3><p><strong>Free domain security scan: kandicare.com/tools/domain-security-scan</strong></p><p>It takes a few minutes, needs no account, and checks the same records referenced here plus the rest of the domain security picture: SSL, DNS hardening, headers, exposed files. If you work with a law firm, a title company, or any business whose email you’d trust with a wire instruction, it’s worth running on them, not just taking their word for it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d9dd5ba2ef18" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Efani SAFE + Black Seal Protection: A More Complete Approach to Mobile Security]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/efani-safe-black-seal-protection-a-more-complete-approach-to-mobile-security-94758dbf268e?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/94758dbf268e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[encryption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vpn]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 14:18:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-09T14:18:07.945Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jpYJBTBitMNHzTclIaC75Q.png" /></figure><p>Your mobile phone is connected to almost everything you do. It is used for calls, messages, banking, business, account recovery, authentication, and access to your digital life.</p><p>That makes your mobile number and internet connection two important parts of your overall security.</p><p>Efani SAFE was designed to help protect your mobile identity and add privacy to your mobile service. Now, Efani is extending that protection with <strong>Black Seal Protection (BSP)</strong>, an additional layer designed to help protect the internet connection itself.</p><p>Together, Efani SAFE and Black Seal Protection offer a more complete approach to mobile privacy and security.</p><h3>Two different parts of mobile security</h3><p>Mobile security is not just about protecting a phone from malware. It also involves protecting the mobile number, reducing the risk of unauthorized changes to mobile service, and limiting exposure to malicious online destinations.</p><p>Efani SAFE and Black Seal Protection address different parts of this picture.</p><h3>Efani SAFE: Protecting your mobile identity and privacy</h3><p>Your mobile number is often used to access important accounts. It can be tied to banking, email, cryptocurrency services, social media, and account recovery.</p><p>If someone gains unauthorized control of your number, the consequences can extend well beyond your phone service.</p><p>Efani SAFE is designed to help protect against mobile-number attacks through multiple layers of verification and SIM-swap protection.</p><p>SAFE includes:</p><ul><li><strong>11-layer identity verification:</strong> Additional safeguards around sensitive mobile account changes.</li><li><strong>SIM-swap protection:</strong> Helps prevent unauthorized transfers of your mobile number.</li><li><strong>Port-out protection:</strong> A 14-day cooling-off period for port-out requests.</li><li><strong>Secure mobile connectivity:</strong> Service operating on major US carrier networks.</li><li><strong>Privacy:</strong> Efani does not sell customer information, track customers, or maintain call logs.</li><li><strong>Insurance:</strong> SIM Swap insurance-backed protection is included with SAFE.</li></ul><p>The goal is straightforward: protect your mobile number, add privacy to your mobile service, and make unauthorized changes more difficult.</p><h3>Black Seal Protection: Adding security to your internet connection</h3><p>Protecting your mobile number is important, but it is only one part of the picture.</p><p>Every time you browse the web, open a link, or connect to an online service, your phone makes connections to internet domains. Some of those domains may be associated with phishing, malware distribution, or other malicious activity.</p><p>Black Seal Protection adds another layer of defense through encrypted DNS and malicious-domain filtering.</p><p>Its protection is designed to help:</p><ul><li><strong>Encrypt DNS requests:</strong> Help protect domain lookups from interception or manipulation.</li><li><strong>Filter malicious domains:</strong> Block access to known malicious websites and destinations including malware, phishing, spyware and adware.</li><li><strong>Reduce exposure:</strong> Help prevent connections to domains associated with online threats in the cloud before they ever touch your device.</li></ul><p>Encrypted DNS and malicious-domain filtering serve different purposes. Encryption helps protect the DNS request while it travels across the network. Filtering helps identify and block domains known to be dangerous.</p><p>Neither is a guarantee against every online threat, but together they add useful protection to everyday internet use.</p><h3>Why combine Efani SAFE and Black Seal Protection?</h3><p>The two products address different risks.</p><p>Efani SAFE focuses on protecting your mobile number, account changes, and privacy. Black Seal Protection adds security when your phone connects to the internet.</p><p>Think of it as protecting two important gateways to your digital life:</p><p><strong>Your mobile identity:</strong> Protect the number that connects you to your accounts, contacts, and services.</p><p><strong>Your internet connection:</strong> Add encrypted DNS and malicious-domain filtering to help reduce exposure to dangerous online destinations.</p><p>This layered approach recognizes that mobile security does not stop once your SIM or mobile account is protected. The websites and services your phone connects to matter too.</p><h3>Black Seal Protection is currently in beta</h3><p>Black Seal Protection is currently available in beta to existing Efani SAFE customers using iOS devices.</p><p>The beta gives eligible SAFE customers an opportunity to use the additional protection while Efani continues developing and refining the service.</p><p>To learn more about Black Seal Protection, visit:</p><p><a href="https://www.efani.com/blackseal"><strong>www.efani.com/blackseal</strong></a></p><h3>Protect your mobile identity. Add protection online.</h3><p>Your mobile number is an important part of your digital identity, and your internet connection is the gateway to the services you use every day.</p><p>Efani SAFE and Black Seal Protection bring these two areas together: mobile-number protection and privacy, combined with additional protection against malicious online destinations.</p><p><strong>Efani SAFE + Black Seal Protection: A more complete approach to mobile privacy and security.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=94758dbf268e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Title: Is Your Website Ready for AI-Powered Hacking?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/title-is-your-website-ready-for-ai-powered-hacking-2dc6038cad89?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2dc6038cad89</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[website]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-design]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 17:20:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T17:20:54.969Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Subtitle:</strong> Attackers now scan for weaknesses continuously, at machine speed. A security check you ran three months ago can’t keep up — here’s what can.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O7-UjhjcKEclOB0ALQ6y7g.png" /><figcaption>Get Secure Before You Get Hit</figcaption></figure><p>Most business owners run a security scan the way most people check their credit score: once, when something prompts them to, and then not again for a long time. That used to be good enough, because finding a weak spot on your site took a person sitting down and manually probing for one. It doesn’t anymore. AI-assisted scanning tools can now probe thousands of domains a day for the exact things that make a site exploitable — an expired certificate, a missing security header, an exposed .env file, a leaked API key sitting in plain JavaScript — far faster than any human attacker could, and continuously, not as a one-time pass.</p><p>Which means the math has changed. A scan you ran three months ago tells you nothing about today. SSL certificates expire on a schedule nobody remembers until a customer sees a browser warning. A DNS migration quietly drops a security record. A routine deploy strips a header nobody meant to touch. None of that shows up in an old scan — it only shows up in the next one, and most businesses never run a next one, while the tools scanning for exactly those gaps run constantly.</p><p>That’s the gap KandiCare Watch is built to close. Not by scanning harder — by scanning every day and only talking to you when something actually changes.</p><h3>A security scanner isn’t new. Knowing when it changes is the part that’s missing.</h3><p>Free online scanners have existed for years. Point one at your domain and it’ll tell you what’s wrong right now. That’s useful exactly once — the moment you run it. It says nothing about the certificate that expires next Tuesday, or the header that disappears with next week’s deploy — and it says nothing about what an automated scanner finds the day after you close the tab.</p><p>Watch does two things, not one:</p><p><strong>Daily Scanning.</strong> The same 20+ checks run every 24 hours against your live domain — SSL, email authentication, DNS hardening, exposed files, leaked secrets — so a scan always reflects what’s actually running in production, not your configuration from the day you signed up.</p><p><strong>Alert on Change.</strong> Nothing routine fires. You hear from Watch only when something actually flips — a certificate nearing expiry, a header that vanished, a newly exposed .env file, a security improvement that just landed.</p><p>That second part is the actual differentiator. A one-time scan tells you where you stood on the day you ran it. Daily monitoring tells you the moment that stops being true — and that gap is exactly the window an automated attacker is scanning for.</p><h3>Setup takes under a minute</h3><ol><li><strong>Enter your domain and business email.</strong> No DNS changes, no plugins, no code to install. Watch scans from the outside, the same way an actual attacker — human or automated — would see your site.</li><li><strong>Review your first scan.</strong> Your baseline score and full results land within minutes — this is what every future scan gets compared against.</li><li><strong>Confirm your alert email.</strong> Use a shared team inbox if more than one person should see a regression the moment it happens.</li><li><strong>Leave it running.</strong> Watch rescans automatically every 24 hours. There’s nothing to schedule, renew, or remember.</li></ol><h3>Your scan results don’t train anyone’s AI — on purpose</h3><p>Watch’s checks are run through an AI engine that’s completely isolated from ChatGPT, Claude, or any other outside AI platform. Your domain data is never sent to, shared with, or used to train any system beyond what’s needed to generate your own results. Watch collects nothing beyond the fact that your domain was scanned.</p><p>That’s a deliberate design choice, not a footnote. A tool that’s auditing your security posture every day is itself a thing worth being careful about — the last thing a domain security product should do is become a second place your infrastructure details quietly accumulate.</p><h3>What 20+ checks across 8 layers actually catches</h3><ul><li><strong>Email security.</strong> SPF, SPF strictness, DKIM, DMARC, MTA-STS — prevents your own domain from being hijacked to send phishing email.</li><li><strong>SSL/TLS and DNS hardening.</strong> Certificate expiry, SSL grade, DNSSEC, CAA records — catches an expiring cert or a DNS misconfiguration before a customer sees a browser warning instead of your homepage.</li><li><strong>Security headers and exposure analysis.</strong> CSP, HSTS, and a daily check for exposed admin panels, .env files, .git directories, and backup files that should never be public in the first place.</li><li><strong>Exposed secrets</strong> (Watch-exclusive). Scans your live client-side JavaScript daily for leaked API keys and credentials — exactly the kind of thing automated scanners are built to find first.</li><li><strong>Lookalike domain monitoring</strong> (Watch-exclusive). Flags newly registered typosquat domains impersonating your brand, checked against favicon, page content, and branding.</li></ul><h3>The settings worth knowing about</h3><ul><li><strong>Security score, tracked over time.</strong> A 0–100 score recalculated daily, with a monthly summary showing the trend — a score drifting down slowly over weeks is usually configuration drift, not a single incident, and the trend line is what catches it.</li><li><strong>Page speed monitoring.</strong> Daily Google PageSpeed scans, mobile and desktop, with alerts the moment your performance score drops 10+ points. Catches a bad deploy or a new render-blocking script before customers notice the site got slower.</li><li><strong>One domain included</strong>, with the option to add more — and every one of them gets the same daily treatment, not a one-time check at signup.</li></ul><h3>It’s not a firewall. It’s the thing that tells you when you need one.</h3><p>Watch doesn’t block attacks or patch vulnerabilities — that’s not its job. It’s visibility: the thing that notices before you do that your certificate is about to lapse, your DNS just changed, or a file that should’ve stayed private went public. Most security incidents aren’t sophisticated; they’re a routine change nobody flagged, sitting there for weeks before anyone finds it, in exactly the window an automated scan would have caught on day one. Watch is built to shrink that window from weeks to a day.</p><p>If you’re running a business, Watch covering the domain is only part of the picture. Your name is still on the WHOIS record. Your number still ends up on support tickets and vendor forms. KandiCare Sentinel covers the identity layer — dark web and breach monitoring, plus DNA Noise synthetic personas that pollute the same broker pipelines collecting your name as the owner. KandiCare Shield covers the number customers and vendors actually call, so your real cell number never ends up resold the moment the business becomes searchable. Watch covers the domain, Shield covers the number, Sentinel covers everything else data brokers collect about you personally — three layers, one business.</p><p><strong>KandiCare Watch</strong> — $49/year, one domain included, no contract, cancel anytime. <a href="https://kandicare.com/watch/">kandicare.com/watch</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2dc6038cad89" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Title: Stop Giving Out Your Real Phone Number]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/title-stop-giving-out-your-real-phone-number-892d64383042?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/892d64383042</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[data-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[voip]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 17:13:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T17:13:09.080Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Subtitle:</strong> Inside KandiCare Shield — a private second number that actually screens who gets through, not just who sees your caller ID</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1EkSR3pq2mqtv02nhHqp_g.png" /></figure><p>Your phone number outlives almost every account you’ll ever create. You can change an email address in five minutes. Changing a phone number means updating your bank, your doctor’s office, two-factor auth on a dozen accounts, and every contact who has you saved — so most people never do it. Which means the number you handed to a Craigslist buyer in 2019, a dating app match in 2021, or a “free quote” form on some contractor’s website is still yours, still ringing, and still sitting in a database you have no control over.</p><p>That’s the problem Shield is built to solve. Not by hiding your number — by replacing it with one you can actually afford to lose.</p><h3>A second number isn’t new. Screening is the part that’s missing.</h3><p>Burner number apps have existed for years. They solve half the problem: a stranger calling that number doesn’t see your real one. But the call still rings through. Robodialers, spam campaigns, scam operations running AI-generated voices — none of that gets filtered out, it just gets redirected to a number you still have to deal with every day.</p><p>Shield does two things, not one:</p><p><strong>Concealment.</strong> You get a real US or Canadian number — your choice of area code — that forwards to your actual phone. Callers only ever see the Shield number. It never appears on caller ID, on a listing, on a form, or in a missed-call notification.</p><p><strong>Screening.</strong> Every inbound call passes through two short IVR prompts you write yourself before it ever reaches you. Most robodialers can’t navigate a prompt — they just drop off. The ones that do get through are a human, not a script.</p><p>That second part is the actual differentiator. A hidden number stops someone from finding you. A screened number stops the ones who try from ever getting through in the first place.</p><h3>Setup takes about two minutes</h3><ol><li><strong>Pick a number.</strong> US or Canada, whatever area code you want. Shield searches for availability near it.</li><li><strong>Set your forwarding number</strong> — the real phone that should actually ring. It’s never exposed to anyone calling the Shield number.</li><li><strong>Write two IVR prompts.</strong> Short messages callers hear first. This one step is what blocks spam before it costs you anything.</li><li><strong>Link Telegram</strong> (optional, but worth doing immediately). It unlocks tap-to-answer, voicemail delivery, and SMS forwarding straight to your phone — the fastest way to actually use the thing day to day.</li></ol><p>No SIM card, no porting, no carrier lock-in. It runs alongside your existing phone and works with any carrier.</p><h3>No app to install — on purpose</h3><p>Every burner-number app you install creates its own trail: an app-store account tied to your real Apple or Google ID, a device identifier, push notification tokens, a permissions list, an install record. That ties the “private” number straight back to the physical device and address it’s running on. It doesn’t make you anonymous — it just moves the identifying information from your carrier to an app developer instead.</p><p>Shield skips that step entirely. There’s nothing to download. Your Shield number isn’t attached to a SIM, a device, or an install footprint — it isn’t attached to your device or your address at all. It’s a floating number: it forwards to whatever phone you point it at through plain call forwarding and a browser dashboard, the same way an email address isn’t tied to a specific computer. Switch phones, switch carriers, hand your old device to someone else — the Shield number doesn’t move with any of it, because it was never attached to it in the first place.</p><h3>Where it actually earns its keep</h3><p>The honest answer is: anywhere a stranger might need to reach you and you don’t yet know if they’re worth trusting with your real number.</p><ul><li><strong>Marketplace listings</strong> — Facebook Marketplace, Craigslist, OfferUp. If it turns into spam, you retire the Shield number and move on.</li><li><strong>Dating apps.</strong> Hand it out before you know someone. Upgrade them to your real number later, if there’s a reason to.</li><li><strong>Job applications and gig work</strong>, where a listing you applied to once ends up resold or scraped more widely than you’d expect.</li><li><strong>Your digital business card.</strong> Shield includes a built-in vCard with a QR code, so you can hand out a card at a networking event that routes to your Shield number — not your real one.</li></ul><h3>The settings worth knowing about</h3><p>Shield’s dashboard has more depth than most second-number apps bother with:</p><ul><li><strong>Call-answer routing</strong> you can set per situation — forward to a number, send voicemail to email, send it to Telegram, or get a tap-to-answer Telegram notification.</li><li><strong>Carrier Voicemail Bypass</strong> — forward your <em>existing</em> real number into Shield too, so the same IVR screening protects your main line, not just the Shield number.</li><li><strong>SMS forwarding</strong> to Telegram or email, same as calls.</li><li><strong>Outbound browser calling</strong> — make calls from your dashboard with no app, and the person you’re calling still sees your Shield number.</li><li><strong>Voicemail delivered as an MP3</strong>, including routing to a Proton Mail address for end-to-end encrypted delivery if that’s your setup.</li></ul><h3>It’s not trying to replace your real identity — just keep it off the parts of the internet that don’t need it</h3><p>Shield doesn’t belong anywhere that requires your actual, verified identity — banking, government forms, anything tied to your legal name for real. That’s not what it’s for. It’s for the enormous middle ground of everyday contact: strangers, listings, forms, and apps that only ever needed <em>a</em> number, not necessarily <em>yours</em>.</p><p>If you’re already using KandiCare Sentinel to manage alias emails and monitor your exposure on the dark web, Shield is the same idea applied to your phone — one more channel data brokers and spam operations don’t get to have.</p><p><strong>KandiCare Shield</strong> — $79.99/year, instant activation, cancel anytime. <a href="https://kandicare.com/shield/">kandicare.com/shield</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=892d64383042" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Data Privacy Is Dead. Here’s What Comes Next.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/data-privacy-is-dead-heres-what-comes-next-d76f1e34225a?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d76f1e34225a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-deletion]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 09:26:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T09:26:01.379Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bs8cjdg9u3mHq-4RDTmrcQ.png" /></figure><p>For twenty years, the privacy industry has sold you one promise: ask nicely, and your data will be removed. File the opt-out request. Wait 30 to 90 days. Repeat forever. That promise was never really true, and the reason it’s about to become completely false has nothing to do with data brokers at all.</p><p>It’s AI.</p><h3>The Regulation That Exists, and the One That Doesn’t</h3><p>Data brokers — Spokeo, BeenVerified, Whitepages, Intelius, and hundreds of smaller operations — are, at least on paper, regulated. The California Consumer Privacy Act and a growing list of state laws give residents a legal right to demand removal. It’s imperfect, brokers re-list you in 30 to 90 days, and compliance is inconsistent — but there is a legal lever to pull. A deletion request today is a request a human or a script can act on, backed by a law with teeth.</p><p>AI has no equivalent. There is no CCPA for a language model.</p><p>When your name, your address, your old forum posts, your public records, or a people-search listing with your phone number gets scraped into a training dataset, there is currently no reliable, enforceable mechanism to make a trained model “forget” it. You can delete the source page. You can opt out of the broker that hosted it. But if that data was already ingested into a training run months or years ago, it doesn’t matter — the information isn’t sitting in a database row waiting for a deletion request anymore. It’s distributed across billions of model weights, with no API, no opt-out form, and in most jurisdictions, no law requiring one.</p><p>Data goes into AI. It does not come out.</p><p>This is the structural reason deletion-only privacy services are now fighting yesterday’s war. They were built for a world where your data lived in broker databases you could petition. We’re moving into a world where your data lives inside models that have already learned it, with new scrapers — AI crawlers, not just broker bots — adding fresh exposure every single day search engines, AI assistants, and data aggregators index the open web.</p><p>Data privacy, in the sense of “my information is contained and I control where it goes,” is effectively dead. The honest question isn’t how to get your data removed. It’s what you do once you’ve accepted it can’t fully be.</p><h3>Data Poisoning, and KandiCare’s Version of It: DNA Noise</h3><p>There’s a concept from adversarial machine learning called <strong>data poisoning</strong>: deliberately introducing false, misleading, or corrupted data into a dataset so that anything trained or inferred from that dataset becomes less reliable. It’s usually discussed as an attack — something done <em>to</em> a system to degrade it.</p><p>KandiCare Sentinel turns that concept into a defense, under the name <strong>DNA Noise</strong>.</p><p>Here’s the mechanism, and why it matters more than deletion alone: when you delete a real data point from a broker’s database, you leave a clean, singular gap — and brokers re-crawl and refill that gap within weeks, often with the exact same accurate record. Nothing about the deletion made your <em>next</em> exposure any less accurate or any less useful to whoever finds it.</p><p>DNA Noise does something different. It doesn’t just remove your real signal — it <strong>surrounds it with false ones</strong>. Sentinel generates synthetic identity personas — each with a believable name, address, state, a decoy email address, and a decoy phone number — and gets them indexed on the same people-search directories that data brokers, search engines, and increasingly, AI crawlers, scrape to build their datasets. From the outside, a crawler can’t tell a DNA Noise persona from a real public record. It just looks like another listing with your name, or a name near yours, in the same geography.</p><p>The effect compounds with deletion rather than replacing it: every time your real data gets deleted and later re-listed, it now re-enters an ecosystem that’s already been diluted with synthetic noise. Anyone trying to verify which record is actually you — a broker, a scraper, an AI system building a profile — has to work against a lower confidence signal. You haven’t made your data impossible to find. You’ve made it statistically unreliable to act on.</p><p>That’s the strategic shift this whole approach is built on: <strong>you can’t stop the crawl. You can poison what it finds.</strong></p><h3>What’s Actually Included in Sentinel</h3><p><strong>Data broker deletion.</strong> Sentinel submits opt-out and removal requests across a large catalog of data broker sites on your behalf — the baseline layer every privacy service should have. It’s necessary. It’s just not sufficient on its own, for the reasons above.</p><p><strong>Synthetic persona generation (DNA Noise).</strong> Each subscriber gets multiple fabricated identity personas published where data brokers, search engines, and AI-training crawlers actually look. These personas exist specifically to be found, indexed, and mistaken for real records — diluting the real you across every database that scrapes the open web.</p><p><strong>Tripwire alerts.</strong> Each persona’s decoy contact information exists in exactly one place: its public listing. If anything ever contacts that email or number, there’s only one explanation — something crawled and acted on the bait. Sentinel fires a real-time alert when that happens, naming who reached out. That’s not a six-month-old breach notification. That’s live evidence of a company actively working with data that traces back to you.</p><h3>Five Alias Inboxes: Controlling Where Your Real Email Actually Goes</h3><p>Deletion and noise handle data that’s already out there. But a huge share of your exposure happens the moment you willingly hand your email address to a new website, app, or signup form — and that address becomes a permanent, searchable, sellable record the second you hit submit.</p><p>Sentinel subscribers get <strong>five private alias email addresses</strong>, each one completely independent, that forward silently to your real inbox without ever revealing what that real address is. Use one for shopping, one for subscriptions, one for app signups, one for anything you’re not sure about — and keep your actual email out of the equation entirely.</p><p>The strategic value here isn’t just hiding your real address. It’s <strong>control over routing</strong>. If one alias starts attracting spam or shows up in a breach dump, you know exactly which site leaked or sold it — and you can shut that single alias down without touching the other four or your real inbox. Your real email address never has to appear in a data broker listing, a breach database, or an AI training set scraped from a leaked signup list, because it was never the thing you gave out in the first place.</p><h3>KandiCare Shield: A Private Number, No App Required</h3><p>The same exposure problem applies to your phone number — arguably worse, since a leaked phone number is a direct line to SIM-swap attacks, spam, and harassment, not just an inbox to filter.</p><p><strong>Shield gives you a dedicated private number you hand out instead of your real one</strong> — for job applications, marketplace listings, dating apps, or any signup where giving your real digits feels risky. It’s not an app you install; it’s a communication layer you manage from a web dashboard. Calls to your Shield number pass through a built-in IVR screen — real human callers get through, robocalls and spam dialers don’t — and texts route to a Shield inbox instead of your real messages app. Because it’s virtual and platform-managed rather than tied to a physical SIM, it’s also immune to SIM-swap attacks entirely.</p><p>Shield plays the same role in this strategy that the alias emails do, just for your phone number: <strong>it’s the number that gets listed, searched, scraped, and sold — not your real one.</strong> Every form, every listing, every directory a broker or crawler indexes shows your Shield number. Your actual number never enters the pool of data anyone is poisoning, scraping, or training on in the first place, because it was never the number you gave.</p><h3>The Real Strategy</h3><p>None of these pieces work alone, and that’s the point. Deletion without noise just creates a clean target that refills itself. Noise without deletion still leaves your original, accurate data sitting in broker databases. Alias emails and a Shield number without either of those just protect your <em>next</em> exposure, not your existing one.</p><p>Together, they form a layered defense built for the world we’re actually in — one where a legal opt-out form can slow down a data broker, but can’t touch a model that already learned your name. You can’t make your data disappear. You can make it unreliable, diluted, and expensive to act on — and you can stop handing out the real thing in the first place.</p><p>That’s not data privacy in the old sense. That’s what replaces it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d76f1e34225a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[I Checked 32 Title and Escrow Companies for the One DNS Record That Stops Domain Spoofing.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/i-checked-32-title-and-escrow-companies-for-the-one-dns-record-that-stops-domain-spoofing-493cc099b100?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/493cc099b100</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fbi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[email-spoofing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[real-estate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 20:02:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-05T20:02:31.962Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*10hPwUMjuxq0YQM9L2DA-A.png" /></figure><p>Real estate wire fraud has become one of the most financially devastating scams in America. The FBI’s own congressional reporting shows victims at every level of a home purchase — buyers, agents, law firms, and title companies — getting hit, with losses that regularly reach into six and seven figures on a single closing. In December 2025, a Washington State resident nearly lost more than $700,000 this way. In a currently active federal lawsuit, a Delaware buyer says scammers diverted over $2.2 million meant for her home closing.</p><p>The mechanics are almost always the same. Days before closing, the buyer gets an email that looks exactly like it came from their title company, with new “updated” wiring instructions. They send their life savings to the fraudster’s account instead. By the time anyone notices, the money is gone.</p><p>There’s a free, well-established piece of technology that makes this specific trick much harder to pull off: DMARC, paired with SPF. Without it, anyone on the internet can send an email that claims to be from your title company’s real domain, and most inboxes will deliver it looking completely legitimate. With it enforced properly, those forged emails get blocked before they ever reach anyone’s inbox.</p><p>So I checked whether the title and escrow industry — the exact companies buyers are told to trust with closing instructions — actually has this turned on.</p><p><strong>What I checked</strong></p><p>This wasn’t a full security audit. I ran a narrow scan against 32 title and escrow companies, checking exactly three things:</p><ul><li><strong>SPF</strong> — does the domain publish a list of servers authorized to send mail as it?</li><li><strong>DMARC</strong> — does the domain tell receiving mail servers what to do with messages that fail that check (block them, quarantine them, or do nothing)?</li><li><strong>DKIM</strong> — does the domain cryptographically sign its outgoing mail?</li></ul><p>From those, each domain lands in one of four tiers:</p><ul><li><strong>Low risk</strong> — DMARC is set to p=reject. Forged email claiming to be from this domain gets blocked outright.</li><li><strong>Medium risk</strong> — DMARC is set to p=quarantine. Forged email gets routed to spam, not blocked — better than nothing, but a determined attacker’s message can still land somewhere a victim might find it.</li><li><strong>Monitoring</strong> — DMARC exists but isn’t enforcing yet (p=none), with reporting turned on. This is a legitimate staged-rollout state, not negligence — but it means nothing is actually being blocked today.</li><li><strong>Critical</strong> — no SPF, no DMARC. Anyone can send email that appears to come from this domain, with zero technical barrier.</li></ul><p>The sample mixed large national underwriters, well-known mid-size underwriters, and independent regional agencies across a dozen states, covering both coasts and the middle of the country.</p><p><strong>The results</strong></p><p>Risk tierCompaniesShareLow (p=reject)1753%Medium (p=quarantine)1238%Monitoring (p=none, reporting on)26%<strong>Critical (nothing configured)13%</strong></p><p>The headline is genuinely good news: 97% of the companies I checked have at least baseline DMARC enforcement, and a majority — 53% — are at the strongest tier, actively blocking forged mail rather than just flagging it. For an industry that handles this much money over email, that’s a better baseline than I expected.</p><p>But one company had nothing at all.</p><p><strong>One national title company: zero protection</strong></p><p>One of the companies in this sample — a settlement-services provider operating nationally — has no SPF record and no DMARC record. Not weak settings. Nothing. I confirmed this independently across two separate DNS resolvers to rule out a fluke.</p><p>In practice, this means anyone, anywhere, can send an email today that appears to come from this company’s real domain, and the receiving mail server has no technical signal telling it that email might be forged. If you’re mid-closing with a company in this position and get wiring instructions by email, there is currently no DNS-level protection stopping a scammer from making that email look like it came from them. This is a five-minute DNS fix, and it’s the single most actionable finding in this whole scan. We’ve reached out to flag it before publishing anything that could point bad actors at it.</p><p><strong>A real case, with an important nuance</strong></p><p>Nevada’s courts have already seen exactly this scenario play out. In a case that went to the Nevada Court of Appeals, a homebuyer wired her purchase funds after receiving an email impersonating her escrow officer at a licensed Las Vegas escrow company. The money went to the fraudster, not to escrow.</p><p>The court ruled that the escrow company wasn’t liable — it found no evidence the company knew about or caused the fraud, and no legal duty to protect the buyer before her escrow instructions were even signed. That’s a ruling about legal liability, not about whether the fraud was real impersonation — it was. What the court record doesn’t establish is the exact mechanism: whether the forged email spoofed the company’s actual domain, or used a lookalike domain, or something else. That distinction matters, because it determines whether DMARC would have stopped it at all.</p><p>For what it’s worth, that company’s current DMARC setting sits at Medium risk in our scan — p=quarantine, not the strongest setting. It’s not nothing, but it’s not the full stop that p=reject provides either.</p><p><strong>What this actually means if you’re closing on a home</strong></p><p>None of this — not a perfect scan, not an imperfect one — should change what you actually do before wiring money for a home purchase:</p><ol><li><strong>Never wire money based on instructions you only received by email</strong>, no matter how official it looks.</li><li><strong>Call the title company directly, using a phone number you already had</strong> — from their original engagement paperwork, not one from the email you just got — and verbally confirm the account details before sending anything.</li><li><strong>Be especially suspicious of last-minute changes</strong> to previously-confirmed wiring instructions. That’s the single most common trigger in nearly every case like this.</li></ol><p>DMARC and SPF close one real door. They don’t close all of them — account takeover, where an attacker genuinely compromises someone’s real inbox rather than forging a fake one, is a different problem these DNS records can’t touch at all. The only reliable backstop is still a phone call to a number you already trust.</p><p><em>This scan checked publicly visible DNS records only — it’s not a penetration test, and a “Low risk” result doesn’t guarantee a company’s email can’t be compromised some other way. Company names have been withheld; we’re not in the business of publishing a target list for scammers.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=493cc099b100" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Email Spoofing is the #1 Threat]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/email-spoofing-is-the-1-threat-ed45381d44d1?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ed45381d44d1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vpn]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:02:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-03T15:02:11.441Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FgpX4EsFbLd3QmhIW7CimQ.png" /></figure><p>Here’s a question most people never think to ask: When you receive an email that looks like it came from your bank, your doctor’s office, or a company you do business with, how do you actually know it came from them?</p><p>The uncomfortable answer is that you often don’t. And in many cases, neither does your email provider have enough information to reliably distinguish the legitimate message from a forged one.</p><p>This isn’t a hypothetical security concern. Over the past few weeks, I ran security scans against many different groups of organizations: cybersecurity, healthcare, crypto, family offices, and more. I’ve scanned thousands of domains over the last month.</p><p>Among other things, I checked whether these organizations had properly configured their email security to prevent someone from impersonating their domains. The results were strikingly similar, and not in a good way.</p><h3>The technology to stop email spoofing has existed for years. Most companies still haven’t finished setting it up.</h3><p>There is a technology called DMARC that works with SPF and DKIM, two other email authentication standards.</p><p>Together, these technologies help receiving email systems verify whether a message is authorized to come from the domain it claims to represent.</p><p>When DMARC is configured correctly with a strict enforcement policy, it can tell receiving systems to reject messages that fail authentication rather than simply record that something suspicious happened.</p><p>It is not a perfect defense against every phishing technique, but it is one of the most basic and effective protections a company can implement against direct domain impersonation.</p><p>It costs nothing to use. The technology has been available for more than a decade. So why aren’t more companies using it properly?</p><h3>Even cybersecurity companies are leaving the door open</h3><p>You might expect your non-technical type companies to be imperfect, but even cybersecurity companies are leaving the spoofed email door open.</p><p>Less than 40% of the companies I’ve scanned had configured DMARC strictly enough to instruct receiving email systems to reject forged messages. The rest were using weaker policies that primarily monitor and report suspicious activity without requiring those messages to be blocked.</p><p>There’s a meaningful difference between watching someone try your front door and actually locking it. The setting that stops email spoofing has two distinct modes: one that simply logs when a forged email was sent, and one that actually blocks it from reaching anyone’s inbox. Of the companies checked, about 35% had crossed that line into actual enforcement — the rest are, in effect, running a security camera pointed at an unlocked door. They can see, after the fact, that someone tried to walk in wearing their name. They just aren’t doing anything to stop it from working.</p><p>It gets worse once you look past a company’s main website. Done correctly, this protection automatically extends to every subdomain of a company’s primary domain — even ones that never send a single email — but only if nobody has quietly weakened that setting along the way, which happens more often than you’d expect, usually for an unrelated reason like hooking up a marketing tool that can’t be configured to play along.</p><p>The bigger blind spot, though, isn’t subdomains at all — it’s the <em>other domains</em> a company owns outright. A bank’s main site, www.yourbank.com, might be locked down perfectly, while yourbank-rewards.com or yourbank-alerts.com — a separate domain registered years ago for a promotion, a regional office, or just to keep someone else from grabbing it — sits with no protection configured at all, because nobody considers it “real” enough to secure.</p><p>These forgotten domains don’t just lack a lock on the door; they lack a camera, too. A scammer can send an email that looks like it’s from one of these legitimate-sounding, company-owned domains, and because no protection was ever set up, the company receives no record, no alert, and no way of ever knowing it happened — leaving them unable to warn you, because they never found out either.</p><h3>Hospitals have an even bigger problem</h3><p>I found a similar, and in some ways more concerning, pattern among 26 of America’s largest hospital systems.</p><p>These organizations hold some of the most sensitive personal information imaginable: medical records, diagnoses, prescriptions, insurance details, and mental health histories.</p><p>Yet <strong>61.5% had incomplete email-spoofing protection</strong>.</p><p>That means their configurations did not provide the full enforcement protection needed to block unauthenticated messages claiming to come from their domains.</p><p>This doesn’t mean those hospitals were breached or that patient records were exposed. It means a basic security control designed to make domain impersonation more difficult was not fully enabled.</p><p>For organizations that communicate with patients about appointments, test results, prescriptions, and billing, that is a meaningful gap.</p><h3>Why this matters to you</h3><p>Email spoofing is one of the tools used in phishing, business email compromise, payment fraud, and identity theft.</p><p>Consider a few examples:</p><ul><li><strong>Your bank:</strong> You receive an email claiming your account needs immediate verification. It looks legitimate and uses the bank’s name and branding.</li><li><strong>Your hospital:</strong> A message tells you there is a problem with your bill or that new test results are available. You click a link because you trust the organization.</li><li><strong>A company you do business with:</strong> You receive an invoice or payment request that appears to come from a real company you already know.</li><li><strong>A crypto exchange:</strong> You get an email warning of “unusual withdrawal activity” or a login from a new device, urging you to secure your account immediately through a link. Because it carries the exchange’s real name and logo, it feels urgent and credible, and unlike a bank, a crypto transaction that goes through can’t be reversed once you’ve handed over your credentials or approved the wrong request.</li><li><strong>A hardware wallet / cold storage provider:</strong> You get an urgent email claiming a “critical security update” or firmware patch is required immediately, with a link to download it or a tool that asks you to “verify” your device by entering your recovery phrase. Because a hardware wallet is supposed to be the <em>safe</em> place for your crypto, this one is especially dangerous — your recovery phrase is the one thing that should never leave the device or be typed anywhere online, and a convincing spoofed email is exactly how attackers trick people into breaking that rule the one time it matters most.</li></ul><p>The problem is that a familiar name and a convincing-looking email address are not proof of authenticity.</p><p>Even when companies have email authentication in place, attackers can still use lookalike domains, compromised accounts, or other phishing techniques. That is why protecting yourself requires more than one layer of security.</p><h3>Protecting yourself requires a different approach</h3><p>You cannot fix another company’s email security configuration. You can, however, reduce your own exposure. This is where I think people need to start looking beyond traditional antivirus software and basic mobile service.</p><p>Your phone is often the device you use to receive email alerts, approve financial transactions, access cryptocurrency accounts, reset passwords, and communicate with banks and businesses. If an attacker can compromise your mobile identity or manipulate your connection, the consequences can extend far beyond a single email.</p><p>This is one of the reasons I use and recommend the <strong>Efani SAFE mobile plan</strong>.</p><p>Unlike a conventional mobile plan, Efani SAFE is designed around protecting your mobile identity and reducing the risk of attacks against your phone number.</p><p>It includes:</p><ul><li><strong>11-layer identity verification</strong> designed to make unauthorized SIM swaps and account changes significantly harder.</li><li><strong>Insurance-backed SIM-swap protection up to $5 million</strong>, subject to the applicable coverage terms.</li><li><strong>A 14-day cooling-off period for port-outs</strong>, adding another barrier against someone attempting to transfer your number away.</li><li><strong>Secure mobile connectivity</strong> over AT&amp;T or Verizon, with encrypted Wi-Fi calling and other privacy-focused features.</li></ul><p>These protections address a different part of the problem. They do not authenticate the sender of an email or guarantee that a phishing message cannot reach you. They help protect the mobile identity and communications channel that criminals may try to exploit after getting your attention.</p><p>You can learn more at <a href="https://efani.com/">Efani.com</a>, or get a $99 discount at efani.com/promo.</p><h3>What’s coming next: Black Seal Protection</h3><p>Efani is also developing <strong>Black Seal Protection (BSP)</strong>, currently in beta for eligible SAFE customers.</p><p>BSP is intended to add another layer of protection beyond the mobile network itself. One particularly important feature is <strong>encrypted DNS</strong>.</p><p>DNS is the system that translates website names into the network addresses computers use to connect to them. It is involved in almost every website or online service you access.</p><p>Encrypted DNS protects DNS queries while they travel between your device and the DNS resolver. This helps prevent others on the network from casually observing or interfering with those requests. DNS-based protection can also help identify or restrict access to certain known malicious destinations.</p><p>In addition to secure DNS, BSP includes a VPN to hide your IP, geo-spacing to show a different location, encryption to secure any non-HTTPS traffic, and cloud based security filters by default. Cloud security includes blocking malware, spyware, phishing links, and also allows you to set customer categories or blacklist specific URLs.</p><p>That matters when you consider how many phishing attacks depend on getting someone to visit a fake login page, fraudulent payment portal, or malicious website.</p><p>BSP is still in beta, but Efani welcomes any existing customer to use the beta for free in 2026.</p><h3>What you should do right now</h3><p>Whether you use Efani or another mobile provider, there are a few things worth doing:</p><ol><li><strong>Treat unexpected email requests with suspicion.</strong> Especially messages asking you to verify an account, make a payment, or act immediately.</li><li><strong>Don’t rely on the displayed sender name.</strong> Check the actual email address, and remember that even a legitimate-looking domain can be impersonated.</li><li><strong>Go directly to the website.</strong> Don’t use the link in a suspicious email. Open the company’s website yourself or call a number you already know is legitimate.</li><li><strong>Protect your phone number.</strong> Your mobile number is often connected to password recovery and financial accounts. Make sure your mobile provider has meaningful protections against unauthorized account changes.</li><li><strong>Use multiple layers of security.</strong> Strong passwords, passkeys or multi-factor authentication, secure mobile service, and careful browsing habits all matter.</li></ol><p>If you operate a business, check your own email configuration as well. There is a good chance that your domain has DMARC partially configured but is not enforcing rejection of unauthenticated messages.</p><p><a href="https://kandicare.com/tools/domain-security-scan/">KandiCare’s free Domain Security Scan</a> checks DMARC, SPF, DKIM, DNS security, and other externally visible security settings. You can scan your own business domain, your employer, or even the website of a company you regularly do business with.</p><h3>The bottom line</h3><p>The technology to make email spoofing much harder has been available for years. Yet my scans found that even cybersecurity companies and major hospitals have not consistently implemented it.</p><p>You cannot control how well every company protects its email domain. But you can take steps to protect your own identity, your mobile number, your devices, and the connections you rely on.</p><p><strong>Security isn’t one product or one setting. It’s layers of protection working together.</strong></p><p>And the first step is understanding where the gaps are.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ed45381d44d1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[RSA Conference Sells Security. But Are They Actually Secure?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/rsa-conference-sells-security-but-are-they-actually-secure-d4abd9c29896?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d4abd9c29896</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[data-breach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 17:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-02T16:34:44.769Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-NT4l5MAV8DOPchKanQSzQ.png" /></figure><p>RSA Conference is the biggest cybersecurity trade show in the world, it’s where security companies set up booths and sell protection to everyone else. So I had a simple question: how well do these companies protect <em>themselves</em>?</p><p>I found the real, verified website for every company that had a booth at RSA Conference USA 2026, 650 companies in total. I checked each company’s listing individually rather than guessing at web addresses, and 647 of those addresses turned out to be real, working websites. Then I ran each one through a free security scanner, checking five things: whether passwords or sensitive data were exposed to the public, whether their email could be faked by scammers, whether basic security settings were turned on, whether anything sensitive was publicly reachable, and whether they made it easy for someone to report a security problem to them.</p><p><strong>Here’s what I found, in plain terms:</strong></p><ul><li><strong>No exposed passwords or sensitive data</strong> across all 647 companies — genuinely good news.</li><li><strong>4 in 10 companies’ email can be impersonated by scammers</strong>, with nothing technically stopping it. (This is called “email spoofing” — it’s how most phishing scams work. A scammer sends an email that looks like it’s from a real company, and nothing on the technical side blocks it.)</li><li>Email systems have a setting that, once fully turned on, stops fake emails from reaching inboxes. Fewer than half the companies that have this setting even partially enabled (47%) have it fully turned on. The rest just <em>watch and log</em> fake emails instead of actually blocking them.</li><li>A security feature called DNSSEC, which helps stop traffic from being secretly redirected to a fake copy of a website, is turned on for only <strong>22%</strong> of companies — the lowest adoption rate of anything we checked.</li><li><strong>1 in 3 companies have no way for someone to report a security problem to them at all</strong> — no listed contact, no public form, nothing.</li><li>Only <strong>4 companies out of 638</strong> — less than 1% — pay researchers for finding security problems (a “bug bounty” program), even though many of these same companies sell that exact service to their own customers.</li><li><strong>17 companies (2.6%)</strong> had their admin login page, the back-door control panel for the website, sitting at the default, guessable web address, left open for anyone to find.</li><li>Only about <strong>1 in 4 companies</strong> had a security setting enabled that controls which device features (like your camera or location) a website is allowed to request, one of the weaker protections we measured across the board.</li><li>Only <strong>6.5%</strong> of companies that use cookies (small files websites use to remember who you are) had all three recommended safety settings turned on for them.</li></ul><p><strong>One finding that the numbers above don’t show</strong></p><p>I’ve reached out to many companies after scanning thousands of domains over the last few weeks, but I’d estimate that only about one in ten have responded. One of them had the PHP bug which allows a hacker to take control of the server without needing a password, and the company responded by saying “we don’t use PHP”. My response was “yes you do, here is the proof, good luck.”</p><p>It also perfectly illustrates the “no way to report a problem” finding above: reporting it meant guessing at an email address, because like a third of the companies in this list, they don’t publish one. When I began this journey I would spend the time to try and find a contact, but now I just don’t have the 10 minutes to spend on one company when I can updated 10 companies automatically in that timeframe.</p><p><strong>Email security: lots of companies have started, few have finished</strong></p><p>Almost every company has taken the first step toward protecting their email, 96% have at least the basic setup in place, and 94% have the next layer on top of it. But having the setup isn’t the same as having it actually working. Only 44% have it configured strictly enough to actually block a faked email outright. The rest leave a looser setting that still lets fake emails through. It’s like having a lock on the door but leaving it unlocked — the hardware’s there, but it isn’t doing its job yet.</p><p><strong>How does this compare to other industries?</strong></p><p>Compared to the internet in general, these companies are doing well. 94% of them have basic email protection set up at all, compared to roughly 48% of a broad sample of over a million ordinary websites. Two-thirds have some way to report a security issue, compared to about 1% of typical websites. The DNSSEC number (22%) also beats what’s typical for websites generally.</p><p>But compare them to the standard <em>they themselves</em> are supposed to represent, and the picture flips. Their email-blocking rate (47%) is worse than the average Fortune 500 company (63%), and nowhere close to U.S. federal government agencies (92%), who are required by law to hit that number. It also lags behind Germany’s 40 largest public companies (92.5% adoption of a reporting channel), who aren’t even security companies, they just got there because regulation made it mandatory instead of optional.</p><p>The pattern is consistent: these companies do fine when it’s optional, and fall well behind whenever someone else is legally required to do better.</p><p><strong>So are they secure?</strong></p><p>Mostly, yes, on the hard stuff. Finding zero exposed passwords across 647 live company websites is a genuinely strong result, better than most industries manage.</p><p>But here’s the problem: phishing, fake emails pretending to be from someone you trust, is still the single most common way real security breaches start. And the exact setting that stops a scammer from faking your email is the one setting most of these companies haven’t finished turning on. 4 in 10 can be impersonated with zero resistance, and more than half the companies who’ve started setting up protection haven’t flipped the one switch that actually blocks anything.</p><p>For comparison: using the same free scanner, one cybersecurity company <em>not</em> in this dataset, Efani.com, scored a 98 out of 100 across every category, so it’s not an unreasonable bar. Among the actual RSA companies, the closest anyone came was a company called ON2IT (on2it.net) — strict email protection, every recommended security setting turned on, a public way to report issues, and zero exposed logins or data. Out of 647 companies, that’s the single best score in the entire RSA study — just short of perfect.</p><p>That’s the part that’s hard to look past. These aren’t expensive or difficult fixes. Flipping the email setting from “watch” to “block” takes minutes and costs nothing. A security company leaving that switch off for this long isn’t really about lacking the skill to fix it, it’s a sign that this is a one-day fix everyone thinks their own company has already covered. If that’s true even for the companies selling this exact product to everyone else, there’s a good chance most of their customers haven’t fixed it either.</p><p><strong>What it actually takes to fix this</strong></p><p>None of this needs a budget or new software — just someone spending an afternoon on it:</p><ul><li>Switch the email protection setting from “soft fail” to “hard fail” once you’ve confirmed your real email senders are covered. Free, takes a few minutes.</li><li>Move your email protection from “watch only” to “actually block fakes.” Also free, also a few minutes.</li><li>Turn on DNSSEC through your domain provider — usually a single switch.</li><li>Move your admin login page off its default, guessable address, or put it behind a login wall only your team can reach.</li><li>Publish a simple page listing how to report a security issue — about 15 minutes of work, and it’s the one thing an automated security scanner or bug-bounty researcher can find entirely on its own.</li></ul><p><strong>Check your own</strong></p><p>Every check in this article is free to run on your own website, right now, using the same scanner I used to build this entire dataset. <a href="https://kandicare.com/tools/domain-security-scan/">Run KandiCare’s free Domain Security Scan →</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d4abd9c29896" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[I Scanned 26 of America’s Largest Hospitals.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkKreitzman/i-scanned-26-of-americas-largest-hospitals-0b8b96860ff0?source=rss-aabee4020d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0b8b96860ff0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-breach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hospital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Kreitzman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 20:30:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-29T20:30:21.601Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>I Scanned 26 of America’s Largest Hospitals. Here’s What I Found About the Security Guarding Your Medical Records.</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7RYE_CSWFL9YwVwAk0kOBA.png" /></figure><p>Hospitals hold some of the most sensitive data that exists about you. Not just your name and address, but your diagnoses, your medications, your mental health history, and your children’s records. If that data gets exposed or your identity gets impersonated through a hospital’s name, the damage isn’t abstract.</p><p>So I checked. I ran a free, publicly-available security scan against 26 of the largest hospital and health system websites in the United States — the kind of check anyone can run on any domain in a few minutes, no hacking involved, just looking at what’s publicly visible from the outside. I did this the same way I’d check any company: email security, DNS protections, SSL setup, browser security headers, and whether sensitive internal systems were accidentally exposed to the public internet.</p><p><strong>The good news first</strong></p><p>Across all 26 hospital systems, I found <strong>zero exposed admin panels, zero exposed secrets or passwords, and zero open directory listings</strong>. Nobody left a backend login page sitting in plain sight, and nobody accidentally published a file full of credentials. On the hardest, most damaging category of mistakes, this group did well, genuinely better than I expected walking in, and better than most industries I’ve checked.</p><p><strong>The average grade was a C — and the reason why matters</strong></p><p>The average score came out to about 75 out of 100 which is a C, with a few B’s and not a single A. But why so many landed at C is more interesting than the number itself.</p><p>Email systems have a setting that, once fully switched on, blocks a scammer from sending an email that looks like it came from a trusted hospital. It’s one DNS setting, and turning it on costs nothing. <strong>61.5% of these hospital systems</strong> have that setting only partially turned on, meaning a scammer could send a fake email that looks like it’s from the hospital, with nothing technically stopping it from reaching your inbox. That single issue was serious enough that it dragged otherwise strong-scoring domains down a full letter grade. Several hospitals that did everything else right still landed at a C because of this one gap.</p><p>This matters because phishing fake emails pretending to be from someone you trust is still the number one way real security breaches start. A fake email pretending to be from your hospital, about your test results or your bill, is exactly the kind of message this setting is supposed to stop cold. Most of these hospitals haven’t finished closing that door.</p><p><strong>A password problem hiding in plain sight</strong></p><p>Email authentication also relies on something called a cryptographic signature. Basically, a digital signature that proves an email genuinely came from who it claims. Among the hospitals that use this at all, the vast majority (83%) don’t have it set up, and two of the small number that do are using a key length considered crackable by modern standards. It’s the security equivalent of a lock that still works but that a determined attacker could pick.</p><p><strong>No security contact to reach</strong></p><p>Here’s a finding that applies to every single one of the 26: <strong>not one hospital had a published way for a security researcher to report a problem.</strong> No dedicated security contact page, no public bug-bounty program, nothing. If someone outside the organization finds a real vulnerability, the way I found one at a completely different company earlier this year, there’s no clear address to send it to. That means real security reports either don’t get made, or get routed through a general contact form where they may never reach the right person in time.</p><p><strong>A few specific risks worth naming generally</strong></p><p>Among the 26, a small number had specific issues worth calling out as patterns rather than pointing fingers:</p><ul><li>A handful had web servers still accepting outdated HTTP methods that are known to enable session-hijacking attacks, settings that have had a known fix for over a decade.</li><li>One hospital had a login page, the kind an employee would use to access internal systems sitting at a guessable, standard web address, with no extra protections like a CAPTCHA or multi-factor authentication requirement visible from outside.</li><li>A few had certificates (the padlock-in-your-browser kind) expiring within three weeks of the scan. Not a security hole by itself, but the kind of thing that causes an outage or browser warning if nobody’s watching the calendar.</li><li>About 30% load outside scripts, things like maps or analytics tools, without a safety check that would stop a tampered version of that script from running on the page if the outside provider ever got compromised.</li></ul><p><strong>What “mostly secure” actually means here</strong></p><p>To be clear: nothing in this scan found a live breach, exposed patient records, or anything resembling an active hack. These are externally visible configuration gaps, not proof of a current incident. Several of these hospital systems came extremely close to a clean scan, with the <em>only</em> flagged issue being the email-spoofing setting, meaning the gap between “very good” and “excellent” across this entire group is genuinely small and inexpensive to close.</p><p>That’s actually the most useful finding here. None of this requires new budget or new staff. Enabling full email-spoofing protection, rotating a weak signing key, publishing a one-page security contact — these are afternoon fixes, not year-long projects. For an industry holding the most sensitive data most of us will ever generate, a C average with a clear, cheap path to an A is a fixable problem, not an unsolvable one — and it’s worth hospitals closing that gap before someone with worse intentions finds it first.</p><p><strong>Check your own</strong></p><p>The same free scanner I used for this entire study is available to run on any domain, including your own doctor’s office, your employer, or your own business. <a href="https://kandicare.com/tools/domain-security-scan/">Run KandiCare’s free Domain Security Scan →</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0b8b96860ff0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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