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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by MarkoInEther on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by MarkoInEther on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by MarkoInEther on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 20:49:47 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[The second LSD revolution]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/the-second-lsd-revolution-e9f069957e4c?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e9f069957e4c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[liquid-staking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[etherum-staking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 08 Sep 2023 03:32:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-08T07:55:58.786Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A case against single dominant LSD</em></p><blockquote>Alas! The shadow of the staking Lord has brought gloom over Ethereum. It brings a heavy heart to perceive such a turn of events. Yet, do not let despair cloud your heart, for even in the deepest darkness, the smallest light can shine…</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0NdvoXytXmGsosNmO4H0OQ.png" /><figcaption>LSD revolution in the making…</figcaption></figure><p><em>Special Thanks to </em><a href="https://twitter.com/Fiskantes"><strong><em>@fisky</em></strong></a><em> &amp; </em><strong><em>@Fod</em></strong><em> feedback and </em><strong><em>@Fod </em></strong><em>for extensive corrections!</em></p><h3>The revolution</h3><p>The first revolution brought us free love, exploration of alternative societies, long hair and a lot of VW minivans.</p><p>This one will bring more robust and decentralised Ethereum, thus decentralising the world’s trust ledger.</p><h3>Overview</h3><p>· <a href="#f79e">The revolution</a><br>· <a href="#e581">Overview </a><br>· <a href="#7f71">The main assumption</a><br>· <a href="#8bdf">Once a winner always a winner or?</a><br>· <a href="#fdd4">Liquidity</a><br> ∘ <a href="#1c0b">Collateral requirements </a><br> ∘ <a href="#822c">Tl;Dr</a><br>· <a href="#4b38">Network effects</a><br> ∘ <a href="#cffc">Tl;Dr</a><br>· <a href="#c557">Risks</a><br>· <a href="#7d43">Newcomers vs Incumbents</a><br>· <a href="#a8f1">Tl;Dr</a><br>· <a href="#a0e6">Interested in other staking topics?</a></p><h3>The main assumption</h3><p><em>LSDs will slowly replace ETH for all main use cases ETH is used today (except gas).</em></p><p>To argue why this shall be the case, see <a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/lsd-endgame-dfe5b80fb882"><strong>LSD endgame</strong> article</a> or <a href="https://docs.google.com/presentation/u/0/d/1TchUT1GARgyh-cqvnyAOmxdWy0m7qFURlCrKPgKuzns/edit">presentation</a>.</p><p>If true, then follows:</p><ul><li>Users with preference to hold ETH now, will express the same preference by holding LSD in the future (primarily HODL).</li><li>This process of LSDs becoming investment assets is gradual and will be playing out over time.</li><li>Current LSD users are much more active in DeFi, because LSDs are not yet investment grade assets and main users are defi degens. This means that as LSDs become safer, more regular ETH holders will use them for their main use case — ETH HODL.</li></ul><h3>Once a winner always a winner or?</h3><p>I often hear that staking is a winner-take-all business and that the dominant player just becomes more dominant. It is a narrative unsurprisingly spread by the large stake holders and taken at a face value by the rest of the ecosystem.</p><p>Quotes like this are thrown around by the opinion makers, and the rest just nod in agreement.</p><blockquote>“Liquidity begets more liquidity”</blockquote><blockquote>“power law”</blockquote><blockquote>“winner takes all effects”</blockquote><blockquote>they must surely be right, right?</blockquote><p>So let’s examine the claims themselves and how much merit they hold. The argument goes something like this:</p><p>Due to network effects, the dominant player in staking will become more and more dominant thanks to better <strong>liquidity </strong>and <strong>network effects</strong> (integrations)…</p><h3>Liquidity</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*Bq-azc5V4emcZbPoE7M6Cw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Liquidity begets liquidity</figcaption></figure><p>“Liquidity begets liquidity” right???</p><p>Let’s examine the liquidity claim and where it is coming from.</p><p>In traditional assets with a free floating price, liquidity matters a lot and more of it is always better, much better. Why?</p><p>Whenever you buy an asset on an open market, whether it is Ethereum for US dollars or gold for Japanese Yen, you will incur slippage(loss). Your loss depends mainly on the available liquidity(size of the market). This is especially true if you want to buy or sell in bulk.</p><p>Well I am sold on the liquidity idea, is LSD any different?</p><p><strong>short answer:</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>long answer:</strong></p><p>In the case of LSDs, liquidity matters, but only up to a point. Once you have “good enough” liquidity more of it does not bring much added value. Why?</p><p>Simply put, because its value is derived from the underlying asset(ETH) and is not really determined by the market. Good analogy from trad. finance is an ETF(Exchange traded fund). An ETF holds assets such as stocks or gold and its shares represent a direct claim on them. Under normal conditions it is easiest to just buy and sell ETF shares directly, however in the time of stress the ETF share price on the market can go lower than the value of assets the share represents. In such a case the investor can just redeem the ETF share for the underlying assets and sell those.</p><p>LSDs work in exactly the same way and since April 2023 are <strong>fully redeemable for underlying </strong>(ETH). That means that if their market price diverges from the price of underlying(ETH) anyone can just redeem the derivative(LSD) for the underlying and pocket the difference.</p><p><strong>liquidity fallacy</strong></p><p>The liquidity fallacy is not there just from sloppy thinking but also thanks to the past experience with LSDs. Before April 2023 LSDs were actually not redeemable, resulting in a huge rift between market and intrinsic value.</p><p><strong>practical example before vs now:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mEyem-C0l0HSMtxBM3mkXA.png" /><figcaption>source: <a href="https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/lido-staked-ether">https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/lido-staked-ether</a></figcaption></figure><p>Before withdrawals, when there was a huge selloff by 3AC stETH suddenly went from 1 stETH/ETH to 0.91 stETH/ETH losing almost 9% in a day. This is simply because there was no way to actually redeem stETH for ETH before, but now there is.</p><p>If the same situation were to repeat(which it probably will) and there was a huge selloff, this would be a wet dream of most traders / investors. It would mean that they can simply buy it off the market, redeem it for ETH and pocket 9% ETH dominated yield in one week(how long it takes to exit validators). This amounts to 469% APR and this is discounting the compounding. So if the same situation were to happen today, the LSD would be back to peg within a week.</p><p>Realistically the next drop will be much weaker. 3AC and other sellers had no other way to get ETH for their stETH other than selling it. If they had, most sellers would rather have redeemed their LSD for ETH and waited a week than incur a 9% loss. Only those who had to sell right away due to margin calls would have done so.</p><p>Conversely if the price were to diverge just 1%, all the defi sharks will smell the blood and come restore the peg, since they can just redeem the LSD and pocket the profit right away.</p><h4>Collateral requirements</h4><p>With low caps LSDs the risk of DeFi liquidations still remains, either due to a market shock, or liquidation hunting most probably both combined. The silver lining here is that investors can look onchain and see how much liquidity will be needed to push the price to the liquidation territory.</p><h4>Tl;Dr</h4><blockquote>Liquidity is normally required for efficient trading. LSDs are different because their value is not determined by the market, but derived from ETH value. Hence large liquidity is not required to enter or exit LSDs in bulk. Users can just mint or redeem it if the price on the market is not favorable.</blockquote><blockquote>The interesting thing is that even LSD without collateral use case will still target a large addressable market. More on this in the next section.</blockquote><h3>Network effects</h3><p>“There are strong network effects, higher TVL equals more integrations, equals more utility right?”</p><p>stETH now has the dominant LSDs and is the most useful, because it has the largest number of integrations. That is true both across defi(protocols) and cefi(exchanges).</p><p>Well I am sold on the network effects idea, utility and all. Is it not true?</p><p><strong>short answer:</strong></p><p>Yes it is true, but it doesn’t matter.</p><p><strong>long answer:</strong></p><p>The main argument always is that more integrations means more use cases, thus more utility. But then the million dollar question is what are the actual LSD use cases?</p><p>If you agree with my assumption that LSDs will be slowly replacing ETH in its use cases, then let’s look at ETH use cases today as a good proxy for LSD use cases of tomorrow.</p><p>Ok so what are ETH use cases that LSD can aspire to?</p><p>Well LSDs at their most bullish would have as many integrations as ETH, and you could use them both in defi and cefi in the exact same capacity. They would be equal to ETH and used for all imaginable degen use cases just like ETH is but with yield on top.</p><p>Liquidity provisioning on aave, compound, dydx, creating dai, rai, lusd and other derivatives backed by eth, collateral in all various options protocol, etc.</p><p>Basically the list of possible use cases and integrations is endless…</p><p>… Yes it is, but then again, it does not really matter…</p><p>Just because we have many different DeFi casinos, it does not mean that the majority of ETH holders really care.</p><p>At the time of writing (07/08/2023), the Ether mCap is $220 billion and Eth locked in defi is $23.2 billion. From this the amount of ETH in LSD protocols is 20.3 billion, (87% !), that leaves just 3 billion worth of ETH locked in DeFi that is not directly used for staking. (<a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1trbT8TGeImypIg-l2ymP7BUfNcrYgwKRayrGwg7zndY/edit?usp=sharing">see source + calculations</a>)</p><p>To see the big picture, defi use cases other than minting LSDs amount to <strong>less than 1.5% </strong>of the overall ETH supply.</p><p>That clearly points to<strong> the main use of ETH is HODL</strong>, and there really is no second best.</p><p>Moreover when we are talking about DeFi or CeFi integrations, both domains follow a very strong power law distribution. Basically if you are integrated in the 3 largest exchanges and 3 largest defi protocols you have 50+% of TVL, thus target market covered.</p><p>We have also seen from the recent rETH integrations which has a humble 4.3% market share (<a href="https://dune.com/eliasimos/Eth2-Liquid-Staking">source</a>) that to get accepted as collateral by the main protocols is not an insurmountable obstacle.</p><p><strong>Bottom line</strong></p><p>Most of crypto twitter is distracted by the newest shiny thing embodied by an exotic defi use case and possible integrations while missing the simple unsexy truth that most of the market cares about profit at risk and not much else. LSDs are still young and the profit of a few percent does not justify the risk taken. As Vitalik said on the recent podcast, because of risks involved he is staking only a small part of his portfolio.</p><p>If LSD are to replace ETH, then their main use case is hodl by a large margin with really no second best.</p><p>For this use case the investors do not care about integrations at all. What they do care about is the LSD risks and their diversification.</p><p>Then if an LSD wants to serve the “ETH utility” market they can target 50% of the market, by just integrating with the 3 major protocols / exchanges.</p><h4>Tl;Dr</h4><blockquote>The main ETH use case is just holding ETH. If LSDs are to aspire to this they need to do just one thing — be, and ideally be safe. The network effects are irrelevant for this use case.</blockquote><h3>Risks</h3><p>As I argued before, most ETH investors just want some juicy yield on their ETH stack, and care about two things:</p><p><strong>Yield and Risk</strong></p><p>If you are buying LSDs as ETH-with-yield-investment, the obvious play on how to diversify and lower the risk is to own a basket of different LSD coins rather than a single one.</p><p>There is a large incentive for investors to diversify once they can and will lead to a much greater heterogeneity in the staking ecosystem than we see today.</p><p>Even projects which are carbon copies of existing ones with both less liquidity and fewer integrations are well poised to capture market share. This also includes those whose LSDs are strictly worse on all imaginable metrics. <br>If they are “good enough” they can still be appealing to investors due to the simple act of risk diversification.</p><h3>Newcomers vs Incumbents</h3><p>So far I have argued why new LSD protocols don’t need to be any better than incumbents and in fact, even copycats with less liquidity will find their place in the infinite garden.</p><p>However, newcomers have two aces in their hands.</p><p>Firstly, they can leverage their tokenomics to boost the yields, gain TVL and do so quickly.</p><p>Secondly, new tech is becoming available, such as DVT (Distributed Validator Technology) and DKG (distributed key generation), both of which are powerful on their own, but when combined provide a risk mitigating superpower for anyone building their protocol.</p><p>They provide much better safety guarantees for the protocol and by extension for the investor. Of course anyone can use them, but it is definitely easier for the young guns to do so, than for the grandpa protocols.</p><h3>Tl;Dr</h3><p>If we operate with the assumption that the main use case of LSDs is getting ETH staking yield, then an LSD which is good “just” for this use case has a target market of almost $50 billion and counting.</p><p>For this use case, not much liquidity is required after withdrawals. To bootstrap sufficient TVL for it, the newcomers will leverage tried &amp; true token incentives &amp; vampire attacks.</p><p>New players also possess a competitive advantage by building without technical debt directly on the new tech stacks (DVT, DKG). <br>By doing so they acquire a different &amp; better risk profile which is crucial for investors.</p><p><strong><em>Let’s get ready for the LSD renaissance!</em></strong></p><h3>Interested in other staking topics?</h3><p><a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/lsd-endgame-dfe5b80fb882">LSD endgame</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/crypto-memery-part-i-or-schelling-games-in-asset-valuation-e3bf21e5a730">Crypto Memery part I — Schelling games in asset valuation</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/ssv-just-another-dvt-solution-73eb7541970">SSV, just another DVT solution</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e9f069957e4c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SSV, just another DVT solution]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/ssv-just-another-dvt-solution-73eb7541970?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/73eb7541970</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum-staking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ssv-network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dvt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ssv-technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Aug 2023 06:27:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-30T10:41:09.091Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3flup1-cfupqFQETpb09eg.png" /><figcaption>MoooooooooooooooooooN</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://mirror.xyz/0xaC9e344badf2E639554A9aE2abbC64Fe6523a1F6">Follow me on <strong>mirror.xyz</strong></a>, where you can <a href="https://mirror.xyz/0xaC9e344badf2E639554A9aE2abbC64Fe6523a1F6/f0GqQx1ensOXzLHsql5tHp9rflesaP1vGF5PlZ6WxBo"><strong>Mint </strong>this story as <strong>NFT</strong></a><strong> </strong>for free!</p><p><em>Special thanks to </em><strong><em>@Fod</em></strong><em> for feedback and corrections &amp; </em><a href="https://twitter.com/deaniter42"><strong><em>@Dean</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong><em>for creating the sick poster!</em></p><h3>Is ssv.network a DVT tech?</h3><p>What if I told you SSV network <strong>is</strong> <strong>NOT a DVT.</strong></p><p>Well what is it then? <br>Let’s explore 👀</p><p>As the name suggests it is a network, first and foremost. In it some run distributed Ethereum validators on their machines and others — people &amp; contracts &amp; DAOs can stake their ETH trustlessly.</p><p>DVT is an important part of the stack, but on its own it brings as many problems as it solves…</p><h3>Overview</h3><p>· <a href="#5ad3">The problems of DVT</a><br> ∘ <a href="#fd8d">Going beyond DVT</a><br>· <a href="#e145">The Vision</a><br>· <a href="#30e4">The Product</a><br> ∘ <a href="#0727">The Cluster</a><br> ∘ <a href="#0877">Static clusters</a><br> ∘ <a href="#f412">Dynamic clusters</a><br>· <a href="#5d17">Staker’s incentives</a><br> ∘ <a href="#1774">Freeriders</a><br> ∘ <a href="#7ea3">Systemic effects</a><br>· <a href="#0806">The Network</a><br> ∘ <a href="#b0cf">Fault tolerance</a><br> ∘ <a href="#0df4">Attack dynamics &amp; recovery</a><br>· <a href="#d3d7">The bottom line</a></p><h3>The problems of DVT</h3><p><em>First things first, WTF is DVT?</em></p><p>DVT or distributed validator technology as the name suggests, is a technology to distribute a single validator to be run by multiple parties (operators).</p><p>Ok now that we have multiple parties running one validator, how do they find each other and coordinate?</p><p>Also what happens if an operator is not responsive?</p><p>How will the rest of the operators even know that this is the case, since the validator is chugging along normally?</p><p>So now that operators organise into clusters, we are changing more large operators into less massive clusters. Does it really help decentralisation?</p><p>To collude one operator is definitely easier than to do so for the whole cluster, but the reward is so much sweeter…</p><p>These are the hard questions that any DVT protocol must face, let’s take a look how SSV network addresses them.</p><h4>Going beyond DVT</h4><p><em>Trustless &amp; Decentralised staking for all</em></p><p>DVT basically addresses the issues operators’ infra setup, because classic redundancy solution of mirroring to a different machine is not viable.</p><p>Using basic DVT operators gain much more robust &amp; decentralised infra, which if done correctly could be a nice value add.</p><p>But what about the stakers?</p><p>Can we somehow empower them to stake in a trustless &amp; safe way while remaining onchain?</p><p>Helping operators with the infra is great, but what gets me excited is <strong>empowering stakers</strong>. Allow them to stake<strong> </strong>in a<strong> trustless,</strong> transparent &amp;<strong> decentralised way</strong>.</p><p>Allow stakers &amp; operators come together onchain. No need for intermediaries and middlemen, full transparency and no <strong>“trust-me-bro” finance</strong>.</p><h3>The Vision</h3><p><em>The vision as I see it is to decentralise the Etherum staking markets and empower both operators and stakers to come together in a trustless decentralised way.</em></p><p>Operators can be judged for the first time purely on their merits thanks to the public nature of the network and easy performance tracking.</p><p>Stakers can choose operators based on their geography, software, performance, or fees without any need for coordination.</p><p>Since every validator is run by multiple operators, even if some of their operators fail they can simply replace them with no effect on their validator’s performance.</p><p>The goal is to have a free open market for staking services. All performance is visible, all coordination and payments are onchain.</p><p>No centralization No bottlenecks.</p><h3>The Product</h3><p>SSV.network allows the staking industry to move away from centralised monolithic architecture with very few agents fulfilling all the roles into a highly specialised decentralised system.</p><p>What flashbot has done for MEV SSV is doing for staking.</p><p>Flashbots has allowed for a clear separation of block production into searchers, builders and proposers.</p><p>SSV is doing this same thing for staking, separating it into operators, staking applications and stakers(Eth providers).</p><p>We have clearly seen this same trend in traditional web development. Web development companies used to run their own servers, use their own storage and backup solutions. <br>Nowadays developers are focused only on what they do best — developing web applications. All other tasks such as running servers and taking care of data are outsourced.</p><p>This is a trend in most complex ecosystems. As they become more mature, the actors and roles become more specialised.</p><p>In the same spirit SSV is building a network that allows for this specialisation and separation of concerns in Ethereum staking.</p><p>It allows node operators to focus just on running highly efficient staking operations, and empowers crypto developers to focus on what they do best — building sick LSDs and staking apps.</p><h4>The Cluster</h4><p><em>“There is nothing so stable as change” Bob Dylan</em></p><h4>Static clusters</h4><p>Let’s talk DVT and it’s issues. Its naïve implementation may look something like this:</p><ol><li>Single operators form operator clusters</li><li>Stakers choose clusters to stake with rather than individual operators</li></ol><p>What are the effects of this?<br>Every validator will coordinate with others and join one, or small amount of clusters.</p><p>I, as a big shot operator I want all my cluster bros to have the biggest possible punching power and bring as much stake to our common pot as possible. It makes no sense for me to team up with some small indie operators with no capital to their name.</p><p>Theoretically there could be:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/0*7AAYPGvy0HyGWkSu" /></figure><p>Where $$o$$ is number of operators and $$s_c$$ is a size of a cluster. Thus if we have 100 operators and a cluster has 4 operators this will amount to quite staggering 94,109,400 possible clusters.</p><p>In practice the incentives for operators to be a part of more than a few clusters are just not there.</p><p>Also Operators care about how much capital they have, not how many clusters they are a part of, in fact it is an added overhead for them.</p><p>Stakers care about lowering the risks thus if choosing more then one cluster, they would prefer them to be non-correlated, thus ideally not sharing any operators.</p><p>Operators will naturally promote the clusters they are a part of. This results in clusters to map to roughly the same (power law) distribution as operators follow today.</p><p>Small number of clusters will own the majority of the stake.</p><p>In summary, static cluster creation leads to an equilibrium where the large clusters control much more stake then large solo operators would, since the capital they control would be roughly the sum of the capital of all of its members.</p><p>To coerce the whole cluster is much harder than a single operator, but the honeypot awaiting is that much sweeter.</p><h4>Dynamic clusters</h4><p>In SSV stakers, not operators form clusters. They are created dynamically, on-the-fly only based on what operators a staker picks. This changes the game played on multiple fronts.</p><h3>Stakers’ incentives</h3><p>While there is no incentive for big shot operators to team up with their smaller bros, for stakers there is. Let’s examine what are stakers’ preference and what is the reality.</p><p>What are the guarantees of their performance? What is their reputation? What performance will they have in the future?</p><p><strong>The wet dream of every staker</strong>:</p><p>High-performance, high reputation, low price, low TVL operator.</p><p><strong>The realistic choice is between:</strong></p><p><strong>Professional </strong>operator — high-performance, high reputation, high price, high TVL operator<br><strong>Home </strong>operator — high-performance, low reputation, low price, low TVL operator</p><p>From the point of an staker looking from outside it’s a hard choice:<br>Do I go with a large operator which already has a large TVL honeypot, probably good security practices, the trust of a majority paired with a large price tag?</p><p>or</p><p>Do I go with a small operator with a small TVL honeypot, unknown security practices, low reputation but paired with a very competitive price tag?</p><p>In real world large TVL usually is an effect (not cause) of higher trust of stakers in a given operator, hopefully this is well placed, unfortunately in practice large TVL and security practices are as often divorced as they are not. Think 3AC and SBF.</p><p><em>You may be wondering why a low TVL operator would be preferable?</em></p><p><em>Doesn’t more TVL indicate more trust and better security practices?</em></p><p>All other variables being equal, staker is always better off going with a lower TVL operator as this offers a smaller honeypot for potential attackers. Put simply, if you are an attacker you want to go for the jackpot, as this will most likely be a one time gig for you. So if you are a staker you would rather not be on the receiving end of this.</p><p>Stakers can and will choose both well known high quality operators, but also independent ones to help with risk mitigation. Both from the perspective of stakers’ incentives and from my anecdotal evidence working with them. Most of them are interested to use high quality blue chip operators and pair them with 1–2 well-performing community operators.</p><p>This gives the staker the advantage of lower overall fee and smaller risk of coercion attack.</p><p>It also contributes to a larger heterogeneity on the systemic level.</p><h4>Freeriders</h4><p>If stakers are choosing individual operators, not the whole clusters, there is no operator “freerider” effect, where some operators just go along for the ride, because stakers were forced to choose a whole cluster. Thus the much better aligns incentives, requiring operators to focus on their performance, not to get into the “right” clusters.</p><h4>Systemic effects</h4><p>There are important differences between choosing-clusters vs choosing-operators paradigm. <br>The highest TVL operators will have about the same amount of stake in both paradigms. However in the former, these operators will be the part of the same clusters, whereas in the second the clusters are much more heterogeneous. Thus per cluster TVL in the latter case will be lower.</p><p>So if the reward of cluster coercion in the latter is lower the risk of it happening will be as well.</p><p>There will still be a power law distribution of stake allocation on the operator level, but importantly <strong>much less so on the cluster level</strong>.</p><h3>The Network</h3><p><em>Res Publica, The beauty of public networks</em></p><p>Public nature of the network solves a couple of important issues. It allows operators to build up in-system reputation and for stakers not to rely on out-system reputation (other staking services, social media presence etc.).</p><p>This is a crucial point which both helps prevent entrenchment of the big players and allows small players to be judged on their merits, not TVL.</p><h4>Fault tolerance</h4><p><em>If you can create a cluster on the fly, why could you not change it also?</em></p><p>It is a good question because it turns out you can. The public network paired up with dynamic clusters allows for their complete fluidity.</p><p><strong>Clusters can be created, updated or destroyed by a single transaction.</strong></p><p>Systemic effects of this killer feature:</p><ol><li>Much lower barriers of entry for new operators<br>If stakers can change operators if they are not performing well, they could be less picky when choosing them. In practice, choosing operators for your cluster is always a balancing act between looking at low price, low TVL, high reputation, high performance. Since changing an operator is trivial, stakers will on aggregate choose cheaper operators with lower price + reputation as they otherwise would. This in return pushes the price equilibrium for all stakers.</li><li>No operator entrenchment<br>This also allows the system to stay dynamic and not entrench the dominant operators, since barriers of entry for new operators are low, barriers to changing operators are low as well and outside reputation is not crucial as talked about above.</li><li>De-risking operator selection<br>Similarly as in point above, both the fact that the staker sees the operator’s current performance and the ability to easily change them were his performance not satisfactory, makes this decision much less risky and consequential.</li></ol><h4>Attack dynamics &amp; recovery</h4><p>In general DVT solutions, without a public network the attack is hard to detect outside the cluster. If the coerced operator is part of more than one cluster they can attack one and the others have no knowledge of this even happening.</p><p>Also, even when the attack is detected the rest of the operators need to somehow coordinate together to find another operator and replace the byzantine one. This can quickly become a headache, not only since this is not easily doable within the system, but also because the communication channels used for coordination could be DDOSed.</p><p><strong>DDOS</strong></p><p>DDOS attacks on individual operators are a nuisance, but nothing more. The dynamic operator switching saves the day again here. The attacker could either attack individual operators or the synchronisation mechanism stakers &amp; operators use. Individual operators can be targeted, but since in case of attack stakers can switch their non-responsive operators just with sending one tx, the attack hasn’t got much teeth. The attacker can of course try to prevent this coordination to take place, but good luck trying to censor Ethereum mainnet.</p><p><strong>Operator Coercion</strong></p><p>To coerce individual operators is also a non-issue, since one operator cannot do any damage on its own. This holds true for all DVT solutions. Where SSV has the upper hand is the recovery from this.</p><p>The public networking layer allows this attack to be clearly visible to all the network participants and the dynamic cluster creation allows the system to adapt without any special coordination efforts. Here stakers just need to be mindful of what is the cluster threshold, and not change more operators if they suspect they might be byzantine. <a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/dvt-landscape-part-1-a6ea7bae458b#9f7b">You can find more on this here.</a></p><p>The worst attack is the coercion of the majority of the cluster. This would be really bad if it were to happen, no sugar coating around it and could result in slashing.</p><p>The silver lining here is that the dynamic cluster creation by stakers leads to a larger heterogeneity amongst them and smaller honeypots as explained in the previous section.</p><p>Even the Largest clusters will still be smaller in SSV as in DVT Systems with similar TVL with static ones.</p><h3>The bottom line</h3><p>The bottom line is that from a Risk perspective SSV network is both orders of magnitude less risky than Non-DVT solutions and also significantly safer than simple DVT implementation.</p><p>The users of staking products will tend to choose those with the lowest risk and the highest rewards, which will be built on the tech best suited for this.</p><p>This coincidentally might just be the right niche for SSV…</p><h4>Prequal</h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/the-bull-case-for-ssv-fae07c4997b5">The Bull Case for SSV. What makes SSV unique? How does it… | by MarkoInEther | Aug, 2023 | Medium</a></p><h4>Articles on this topic</h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/dvt-landscape-part-1-a6ea7bae458b">DVT landscape part 1. DVT stands for Distributed Validator… | by MarkoInEther | Medium</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/lsd-endgame-dfe5b80fb882">LSD endgame. Let’s start with the obvious… why ain’t… | by MarkoInEther | Medium</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=73eb7541970" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Bull Case for SSV]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/the-bull-case-for-ssv-fae07c4997b5?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fae07c4997b5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ssv-network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum-staking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dvt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Aug 2023 05:49:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-04T10:16:01.788Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*iSgsdPO1wiuNLYs7" /><figcaption>SSV to the MOOOOOOON</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://mirror.xyz/0xaC9e344badf2E639554A9aE2abbC64Fe6523a1F6">Follow me on <strong>mirror.xyz</strong></a>, where you can <a href="https://mirror.xyz/0xaC9e344badf2E639554A9aE2abbC64Fe6523a1F6/GaQd737JSL-t0NH1zTlUm6CBx25t4LDdP3r5C7dOceA"><strong>Mint </strong>this story as <strong>NFT</strong></a><strong> </strong>for free!</p><p><em>Special thanks to </em><strong><em>@Fod</em></strong><em> for feedback and corrections &amp; </em><a href="https://twitter.com/deaniter42"><strong><em>@Dean</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong><em>for creating the sick poster!</em></p><h3>Overview</h3><p>· <a href="#588d">The lay of the land</a><br>· <a href="#e259">The problem</a><br>· <a href="#1d8a">The product</a><br>· <a href="#aacf">The moat</a><br>· <a href="#5ce3">The strategy</a><br>· <a href="#8914">The value capture</a><br>· <a href="#c5bb">Tl:Dr</a></p><h3>The lay of the land</h3><p><em>What is the opportunity sir?</em></p><p>Let’s start with understanding the lay of land of various staking applications and how SSV fits into the picture. Ethereum staking is becoming a huge industry, recently passing <strong>20%</strong>(<strong>46 000 </strong>million USD at time of writing) of ETH supply. Just for comparison, the amount staked is more than the market cap of any other crypto assets besides Bitcoin.</p><p>The question is, who will be able to grab some nice piece of the pie?</p><h3>The problem</h3><p><em>Where is my backup sir?</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/896/0*qhK2QoNCnLckyfZ7.jpg" /></figure><p>The Ethereum staking industry has certain idiosyncrasies compared to other traditional infrastructure setup, the main of which is the <strong>forced lack of redundancy a.k.a. no backup</strong>.</p><p>The naïve approach of running multiple instances of the same software is not possible in staking. The potential slashing risk is too great of a risk here and not worth the reward.</p><h3>The product</h3><p><em>Can the devs do something?</em></p><p>What SSV offers is magic. It offers a unique solution to the problem of easy and trustless staking and creates an open marketplace for staking services.</p><p>It is a secure and care-free staking experience for stakers and a hassle-free income stream for node operators.</p><p>As someone who wants to participate in Eth staking, the product I am looking for is the one with the lowest risk and the highest rewards. The SSV network is orders of magnitude less risky than Non-DVT solutions, has a free market structure that minimises fees for stakers to maximise their returns, and is also significantly safer &amp; easier to use than other DVT solutions.</p><p>Strong claims?</p><p>Stay tuned for the next article <strong>SSV — just another DVT solution</strong>.</p><h4><strong>Tl;Dr</strong></h4><blockquote>As an investor looking at the project, the number one question is:</blockquote><blockquote>Is the product unique? Does it have product market fit?</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Short answer: </strong><br>Yes</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Long answer: </strong><br>The reasons why are out of scope for this article, will expand on them in the upcoming one.</blockquote><h3>The moat</h3><p><em>Are the fees &amp; market share defensible?</em></p><p>The moat is probably the hardest thing of all web3, where the moats of most projects are anaemic at best and usually non-existent.</p><p>Unlike other software and DVT solutions, SSV is developing not just a tech stack for others to implement, but it is building a network. DVT is currently the catch-all phrase in the staking ecosystem, characterising a whole set of tech stacks and technologies. This is a double edge sword, since the pure technology stack has really no moat and no ability to capture value in the long term.</p><p>Some DVT projects have gone the route of licensing their product, others building a full fledged staking application.</p><p><em>SSV opts for a protocol approach encouraging other teams to build staking applications on top and keeps the open source ethos.</em></p><p>It harnesses the creative spirit and talent in the space and positions itself as the backend for other staking applications to plug into.</p><p>If it succeeds it will be thanks to the network it creates. This seems to be one of the strongest moats in software we know of. In classical web2 context it brings more of a sour taste, allowing the tech giants to run purely parasitic and extractive businesses that lots of people hate to be a part of but are unable to switch. The point being that networks can create such a strong moat that even a bad UX and extractive behaviour has a hard time neutralizing its effects.</p><p>Thankfully, this is not the case in web3 due to its open source nature, where users own their data and have the ability to port reputation.</p><h4><strong>Tl;Dr</strong></h4><blockquote>SSV has a natural <strong>moat — the network</strong> that is one of the strongest we know of and if successful will be extremely hard to dethrone.</blockquote><h3>The strategy</h3><p><em>Let a thousand flowers bloom, the protocol vs app approach</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MTxVdug6AfhIZUm1sftAhA.png" /></figure><p>A good comparison here would be between Lido and SSV whose strategies could be thought of as analogous to those of Apple (Lido) and Amazon (SSV). The former sells specific high quality product to customers and charges a healthy premium, while the latter creates a platform where other products are sold including the former, charges less of a premium, but serves many more customers in aggregate.</p><h3>The value capture</h3><p><em>The Achilles’ heel of crypto</em></p><p>Value creation is straightforward in many crypto protocols, SSV included.</p><p>What is usually the Achilles heel is the value capture part of the equation.</p><p>SSV token currently has 3 value capture mechanisms:</p><p>1. utility token (payments) — indirect value capture</p><p>2. governance token — indirect value capture</p><p>3. <strong>network fee — direct value capture</strong></p><p><strong>1. utility token</strong></p><p><em>indirect value capture</em></p><p>The use as a utility token is important and interesting. I myself go back and forth on the effectiveness of this mechanism. On one hand it clearly introduces additional complexity and headache for the users since they need to manage their SSV balance and are exposed to the token volatility, on the other it undeniably creates a demand for the token and it is one (maybe the only one) clearly established indirect mechanism that captures value. If it works for ETH, it should work for SSV too, right?</p><p><strong>2. governance token</strong></p><p><em>indirect value capture</em></p><p>It is still an open question of how much (if any) value does governance token capture (other than introducing fees) and how to evaluate it in the first place. Some projects do not have a clear path to charging fees and even those that have, like Uniswap may be very hesitant to turn them on if the main product is their strong brand and low fees.</p><p><strong>3. network fee</strong></p><p><em>direct value capture</em></p><p>It may look at first glance that mechanisms 1(utility) and 3(network fee) are co-dependent, however, on a closer inspection it becomes clear that they are not. The network fees could be in fact paid in SSV, ETH or any other token.</p><p>This mechanism creates a direct link between the usage of the network and the value captured. Once the value is captured, it is easy to translate it to the token price, either by simply burning it and lowering supply, or by paying out dividends to token holders.</p><h4><strong>Tl;Dr</strong></h4><blockquote>The most bullish signal for me is that, unlike many other crypto projects, there is a <strong>direct value capture</strong> mechanism via the network fee.</blockquote><h3>Recap</h3><p><em>Why bullish? Gimme one sentence!</em></p><h4>SSV creates foundational infrastructure for Ethereum staking (value creation), is able to create a strong moat thanks to its networking layer and strong network effects, and it has a direct value capture mechanism in the network fee which does not introduce any significant barriers for its users.</h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fae07c4997b5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Crypto Memery part 2 — rationality of degens or Schelling games in asset valuation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/crypto-memery-part-2-rationality-of-degens-or-schelling-games-in-asset-valuation-2bb51f2a3c2c?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2bb51f2a3c2c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Apr 2023 01:34:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-30T01:48:48.289Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Crypto Memery<strong> part 2 — rationality of degens or </strong>Schelling games in asset valuation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8un2NfyMsjTCB6pnNNFkow.png" /><figcaption>The (crypto) market is irrational!</figcaption></figure><p><em>Special thanks to </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/14541e547351"><em>Nate</em></a><em> @OfficialESC for feedback and suggestions!</em></p><h3>Overview</h3><p>In the <a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/crypto-memery-part-i-or-schelling-games-in-asset-valuation-e3bf21e5a730">part one</a> of this article series I proposed a Schelling game framework as a good mental tool to use for asset valuation. <br>I talked about yield bearing assets, why they are a special asset class, why they have a stable Schelling point thus classic tools of fundamental analysis might just be good enough, in times of non-zero interest policy.</p><p>In this part I will delve into why the Schelling game framework explored in <a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/crypto-memery-part-i-or-schelling-games-in-asset-valuation-e3bf21e5a730">part one</a> is especially useful for non-YBA(yield bearing assets) and crypto in particular.</p><p>How it can shed light on obvious market “irrationality” and meme stocks. In this new light meme investing viewed by traditional investors as irrational may be in fact highly rational as I will argue below.</p><h3>A Case study of irrational investing</h3><p>Let’s look at the Gamestop saga.</p><p>To quickly recap what happened with the Gamestop saga for those living under the rock:</p><p>Gamestop is a company selling computer games via physical stores. Because of covid restrictions, big hedge funds reasoned that company’s shares will go down and shorted them in large volumes, outstripping the actual supply of outstanding shares. This was picked up by the Wall Street Bets (WSB) reddit community, which started buying the stock off the market and created a short squeeze.</p><p><em>Was the WSB community irrational? If so, by what metric?</em></p><p>If you are a traditional investor, you would use DCF and say that this company has no future thus no value. But you would be missing forest for the trees here. The assumption here is that all players in the market have the same schelling point, namely DCF and if some investors deviate from this schelling point they are irrational. But the twist is:</p><p><em>What if there is an “irrational” strategy that is in fact very profitable thus highly rational?</em></p><p>Squeezing the shit out of shorters and making a ton of cash in the process does not seem very irrational. The issue is that this strategy hinges upon setting a new price equilibrium. This is a very risky business, if you do not gain enough momentum to move the price, you lose big.</p><p>For a strategy like this to work you either need very large capital (<a href="https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/george-soros-bank-of-england.asp">Soros breaking the pound</a>) or be highly coordinated(WSB Gamestop saga).</p><p>By traditional investors this phenomenon is usually dealt with the phrase “market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent”. This, however, is a pure copium.</p><p>The main point is that <strong>there is no “fair” price the market is moving towards</strong>. <br>As an investor your mandate is to make money not meditate on market rationality or the lack thereof. As one zen master said, the price isn’t right or wrong, it simply is.</p><h3>Pure memes</h3><h4>Paintings, NFTs — no utility assets</h4><p>In the previous example we are still talking about a tangible yield bearing asset with real cash flow. But let’s look at some extreme examples where memes alone determine the dominant Schelling point of an asset price and if there is any utility, it is secondary to the memes.</p><p>Why is Mona Lisa one of the most valuable works of art? Is the artistic quality a million times better than the next thing? How much would the exact copy be worth? Perhaps a bit more than a poster?</p><p>Interesting to note here that the world actually forgot about Leonardo for 300 years and his works only came into vogue in the 1800s. Still, apart from art critics, nobody cared much for this painting until it was stolen in 1911. And there could not have been a better PR move, than a rumor it was Picasso himself who stole it.</p><p>Mona Lisa is a shorthand for Leonardo and his legacy. On top of that she was stolen and has many legends surrounding it, in other words great memery!</p><p>Now imagine an alternative universe in which Leonardo’s notebooks were lost to history. Without them there would be no legend of him as renaissance master and lone genius to build on, perhaps his works wouldn’t even make it to the Louvre and nobody would care to steal it.</p><p>Now if we go a step further and replace the physical item with a digital one we get art NFTs. Same thing, different medium.</p><h3>The utility or the lack of it</h3><p>People have raised arguments that NFTs like Bored Apes actually have utility, since you can commercialize them, get access to exclusive groups etc. But this logic is circular at best(value &lt;-&gt; utility) but usually reversed(value -&gt; utility). A “tail wagging the dog” type of argument.</p><p>How much utility could you derive from Art NFTs if their price suddenly dropped to zero? Who would be eager to pay you royalties to use your Bored ape in a movie if nobody had cared about it? Aren’t there in fact thousands of different NFT projects trying to emulate success that offer the exact same attributes like BAYC and even better utility mechanisms but with no actual value?</p><p>The bottom line is that the whole idea of utility of art NFTs is built on their meme without which is useless.</p><h3>Meme assets</h3><h4>Gold, Eth — assets with little utility</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*mP569pMCOCl0TC5oqdsJ7w.png" /></figure><p>By meme assets I mean assets whose value is mainly derived from their memes but which have some utility value, making them valuable even if they lost their meme potential completely.</p><p>Examples that come to mind are Gold or Ethereum which have some utility even if they had no memes attached to them.</p><p>It is important to note that although both these assets would have some demand even if they had zero meme potential from microchip industry and block space respectively, however, it would be around 10% of the market cap they occupy today.</p><p>From an investment standpoint it is misleading to think of them as of productive assets that have some “real” use, thus their value is somehow more “fundamental” than pure memes like Crypto punks or BTC.</p><p>If they were to approach their utility value thus falling 90% in value, no bag holder would seem to be too happy. Thus from a value perspective, their utility is only valuable as a meme that can enhance their overall meme potential in peoples’ minds.</p><h3>Meme wars</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*ECCfBV4rNTOQDBGO.gif" /></figure><h4>Fighting for the same memes</h4><p>The main difference between cryptos and gold is that gold as a store-of-value meme is already well established and somewhat stable thus hard to change. Gold has been around much longer than crypto, hence the memes and the Schelling points of gold as store of value, are much more stable. Of course, there is no certainty that store-of-value meme dependent on credible neutrality and scarcity will be captured by gold a 100 years from now in the presence of assets like ETH or BTC that satisfy these properties one could argue in a better way.</p><p>We have two ways to go here, co-opting existing memes of store of value, moneyness, … and creating completely new ones like triple-point-asset. This process is chaotic and organic, but still fully dependent on human hosts to spread it and make it happen.</p><h3>Meme dynamics</h3><p>Ask yourself, what is the best store of value?</p><p>If you thought about this question, you will have an answer in your mind. Doesn’t matter what it is, the point is there is one. Hence, every crypto tribe tries to establish itself as being the best representative of a particular meme or set of memes.</p><p>All memes have an inherent zero-sumness to them since in people’s minds there is always a hierarchy of objects associated with a particular one.</p><p>We can see this in crypto twitter where different tribes are getting more antagonistic as time goes and fight for the same memes start. If two tribes are fighting for the same meme its game on.</p><h3>The one that rules them all</h3><p>Let’s explore the store-of-value meme.</p><p>Why? Because it is the juiciest, it can bring the most value to the asset of all.. in short, it’s the KING!</p><p>To claim it in the minds of as many human hosts as possible is the pipe dream of hodlers of any asset under the sun.</p><h3>A short crypto history</h3><p>BTC was proposed and originally meant as a digital cash. Its memes were much more diverse, in its early days and the “sound money” meme was only one of them. There were many early projects exploring its use as a general trust ledger (mastercoin, colored coins), digital cash use case and others beyond finance.</p><p>As Ethereum launched the builders interested to explore use cases beyond payments started leaving for greener pastures. This exodus was then pronounced with the block size wars. The tribe that wanted to continue making changes to the core protocol lost the war. This ment some people left to follow bitcoin cash, others to work on Ethereum and other projects and the Bitcoin community became more homogeneous and crystallized into “store-of-value meme” advocates.</p><p>This community, even though quite small in terms of overall holders, has been crucial for the asset’s success. These are the hardliners battling the meme war and not selling and holding the price when the bear comes. This price “stability” (compared to other crypto) then creates a virtuous cycle, since other investors view it as more stable, mature and worthy of their attention. This then in turn validates hardliners’ narrative. This clear unambiguous memeing of bitcoin as “sound money” combined with the price stability to support it has turned out to be the secret sauce thus far.</p><p>It is no coincidence that ETH at its inception wasn’t marketed or thought of by anyone as a store-of-value asset. This seat was already taken by BTC and the infant needs to grow up before battling it’s daddy for supremacy.</p><p>It’s also interesting to observe that it was actually the class of 2017/18 led by Bankless who started pushing this narrative, not the original Ethereum OGs.</p><p>To look into the future let’s explore other cryptos. <br>Solana is the “hot” upcoming L1. In its community no one is currently talking about SOL as a store-of-value yet, but how long will this last? The holders definitely have the incentive to push it as such and who can battle the incentives in the long run?</p><p><strong>To recap</strong><br>The BTC community has been mainly going for the “sound money” meme, which is taking a bite of the original gold store-of-value meme pie which has in turn been challenged by ETH holders’ “ultra sound money”. Who will be the next to join the battle?</p><h3>General crypto warring dynamic</h3><p>Let’s generalize the crypto wars. <br>It goes like this:</p><p>my coin is more — <br>“credibly neutral” “decentralized” “inclusive” “environmet friendly” … (plug your favourite meme here) <br> — than your shitcoin!</p><p>The hard part is to persuade other crypto twitter participants and the general public of your claims. Not an easy task, that’s for sure, but not an impossible one either.</p><h3>To conclude</h3><p>It is memery all the way down as there are no well-established Schelling points in crypto. Thus, the price will never approximate some “fundamental” value we believe it to reach if we just wait long enough. The thought that the market price is trending towards some predefined value is a mirage as there is no “fundamental” value to approach in the first place.</p><p>You could say that if you were to predict all future social interactions and the memes they will generate you could predict the price, but as Lincoln said:</p><p><em>“The best way to predict the future is to create it.”</em></p><p>Thus it is up to us to meme the best possible Schelling points into existence and establish the price equilibrium as high as we can. We need to create, coopt, and spread these memes as much as we can, since not only our bags but also the future credibly neutral financial system depends on it.</p><p>In <strong>part 3</strong> of this series I will talk about structural flows, why they are somewhat special in crypto and their unique role.</p><p>Or put simply, here I talked about how <em>price follows the narrative.</em> <br>In the next one I will explore the opposite, how narrative follows the price.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2bb51f2a3c2c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[LSD endgame]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/lsd-endgame-dfe5b80fb882?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dfe5b80fb882</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[liquid-staking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum-staking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 29 Jan 2023 12:21:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-29T12:21:29.472Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*72FZtr79b2QGQoFb.png" /><figcaption>Pepe the wise shaman</figcaption></figure><p>Let’s start with the obvious…</p><p><em>Why doesn’t everybody stake their ETH?</em></p><p>If you are not, you are getting diluted by your staker frens.<br>Let’s look at the main usecases of the ETH first.</p><h3>ETH main use cases</h3><ul><li>HODL</li><li>collateral</li><li>gas</li></ul><p>You can <strong><em>HODL</em></strong> LSDs and also use them as <strong><em>collateral</em></strong>. So the question is…</p><p><em>If LSDs can do almost everything ETH can why aren’t they more prevalent?</em></p><h3>Reasons for NOT doing 🌈LSD</h3><ul><li>illiquidity</li><li>risks (slashing, loss of keys, LSD specific…)</li></ul><h3>Living in Wonderland</h3><p>Imagine that we live in a too-big-to-fail tradfi wonderland world with none of the drawbacks mentioned above. This is the place where everything is liquid, uncle Sam takes on your risks and staking is as easy as buying random shitcoin, (Actual staking not taking 🌈LSD).</p><p>In this brave new world where LSDs are perfectly liquid and they carry no risks…</p><blockquote><strong><em>Every holder of ETH will stake it.</em></strong><em><br>Since every Etherean has an ETH exposure already and because 🌈LSD has no downsides (you wil NOT turn into an orange), every yield above zero is game on.<br>Some is better than none, as they say.</em></blockquote><p>But we are not living in a wonderland… yet, but how prevalent are these downsides in the long run?</p><p>Not very much, I would argue.</p><h3>Getting out of our trip to wonderland</h3><h4>No peg means no collateral</h4><p>Smaller LSDs have a very hard time getting off the ground now. The major reason is withdrawals are currently a one way street.</p><blockquote><em>Once you take LSD you are not coming back. That is, not before withdrawals.</em></blockquote><p><em>Why is this a problem?</em></p><p>’Cause without withdrawals you need huge amount of liquidity to hold the peg and even Lido’s stETH boasting ~30% market share wasn’t able to hold it when the shit hit the fan.</p><p>Without holding the peg, LSDs loose much of their appeal. Once it’s gone they become effectively illiquid since you don’t want to take a loss selling them. Also, without stable value they cannot be used in your favourite DeFi casino. No peg means no collateral, means no borrowing, means no levering up to the tits.</p><p>No casino = no fun! 🎲🚫😢</p><blockquote><em>Withdrawals solve this…</em></blockquote><p>After withdrawals, this will become a non-issue. There still maybe short term price swings, but these create huge arbitrage opportunity since anyone can buy discounted LSD and claim ETH for it.</p><h3>Liquid, no staking risks</h3><p>If there were no risks to staking only illiquidity premium, we would live in the world where 95%+ is staked and only small portion is liquid.<br>This liquid ~5% let’s say is equilibrium of cumulative demand for gas payments, which if disturbed creates small discount on LSD tokens, thus incentivizes LSD holders to unstake &amp; arbitrage the spread.</p><p>tadaaaa! equilibrium reached🎉</p><p><strong>ELI5</strong>:</p><blockquote><em>The main point is that </em><strong><em>under “no risk”</em></strong><em> assumption the staking </em><strong><em>rewards would trend towards zero</em></strong><em> as there is no opportunity cost to LSDs thus almost all ETH would be staked.</em></blockquote><p>…but we are not living in a tradfi bailout world, so let’s put risk back into the game.</p><h3>Liquid, with staking risks 🌈</h3><p>Risks</p><ul><li>general staking risks (slashing, loss of keys, …)</li><li>LSD specific (governance, smart contract, key management)</li><li>you turn into an orange (urban legend, unsupported by evidence, could be safely ignored)</li></ul><p>The point is…</p><blockquote><strong><em>Market perceived risks of LSDs will be equal to their yield.</em></strong></blockquote><p>If the return is 3% it means that the risk is 3% and risk adjusted return is zero.<br>Equilibrium will be reached when a marginal eth staked is equal to staking risks, since no new eth will get staked at this point. Otherwise the risk adjusted return would turn negative.</p><p>Thus as a wise shaman once said…</p><p><strong><em>“thy risks of LSD must equal its rewards”</em></strong></p><p>There are ways of mitigating these to a major extend with DVT powered by DKG, fascinating topic talked. <a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/what-is-dvt-and-why-do-we-need-it-1d7b58d1130c">More on DVT here</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/markoinether/status/1577674090453803008">More on DKG</a>, may write an article</p><p>Would you be interested in reading on how it will be possible to creating risk minimized LSD?<br>Any feedback?</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/markoinether">Let me know via twitter @markoinether</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dfe5b80fb882" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Crypto Memery part I
or
Schelling games in asset valuation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/crypto-memery-part-i-or-schelling-games-in-asset-valuation-e3bf21e5a730?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e3bf21e5a730</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[schelling-point]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jan 2023 04:08:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-24T06:00:24.918Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TroyWypXB01RIEdk97JK8g.png" /><figcaption>Crypto Memery</figcaption></figure><p><em>Special thanks to </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/62769abead65"><em>Robert Drage</em></a>, <a href="https://medium.com/u/ce0b6985b1e5">Dan Lee</a> and @<strong>0xFran </strong><em>for feedback.</em></p><h3>Overview</h3><p>In this article series I will argue that most investors are confused about asset valuation.</p><p>Why “value investing” or “fundamental analysis” are bad valuation models when used outside yield bearing assets, and why thinking about assets as having some “intrinsic” value is flawed.</p><p>In this first part I will lay the groundwork for the schelling games paradigm.</p><h3>Schelling point</h3><p>simple definition (from wikipedia):</p><blockquote>Schelling point is a solution that people tend to choose by default in the absence of communication.</blockquote><p>general example (from wikipedia)</p><p>question:</p><blockquote>“if you are to meet a stranger in New York City, but you cannot communicate with the person, then when and where will you choose to meet?”</blockquote><p>answer:</p><blockquote>the most common answer was “noon at Grand Central Terminal”</blockquote><h3>Schelling game</h3><p>Well, what are markets other than price discovery mechanisms that coordinate around price?</p><p>An asset price at a particular time can be thought of as a Schelling point.</p><p>Let’s transform the Schelling point question from above to better apply for asset valuation:</p><blockquote><em>“What price should an asset trade at?”</em></blockquote><p>This most basic question, although true can be better transformed to:</p><blockquote>“How will you determine the price of an asset? What models and inputs will you use?”</blockquote><p>This question below is practically the same as above and quite easy to answer given agents use roughly the same models with the same inputs.</p><p>In yield bearing assets both inputs to the model (e.g. company report) are the same for all participants (disregarding insider trading here) and everybody uses different flavors of the same discounted cash flow model.</p><p>In investing though, investors are not trying to coordinate with other investors but rather every investor is trying to front run every other investor by guestimating the future Schelling point of an asset price.</p><p>Thus a better question is:</p><blockquote>“How will other investors determine the price of an asset? What models and inputs will they use?”</blockquote><p>We will call this game of guessing the future Schelling point of an asset price a Schelling game.</p><h4>Dictionary</h4><ul><li>YBA — yield bearing assets. Stocks, bonds and other assets that give its holder potential yield.</li><li>“fair” price — price, or price range that an individual investor considers the asset will approximate in the particular time in the future, hence he is motivated to buy below the price, or sell above it. Important to note that price is “fair” only from the perspective of an individual investor and this price may not be expected from other investors.</li><li>DCF — Discounted cash flow (DCF) refers to a valuation method that estimates the value of an investment using its expected future cash flows. <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dcf.asp">source</a></li><li>Dominant strategy — a dominant strategy is a strategy that gives a player the best outcomes, regardless of the actions of the opponent.<a href="https://study.com/academy/lesson/dominant-strategy-in-game-theory-definition-examples.html"> source</a></li><li>Nash equilibrium — In a Nash equilibrium, each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no one has anything to gain by changing only one’s own strategy<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium"> source</a></li></ul><h3>Maps and Models</h3><p>Most investors are thinking about assets as if they had some “inherent” or “fundamental” value, buying the currently undervalued ones. I will argue that this paradigm is highly misleading in the context of crypto and applicable only to yield bearing assets such as stocks and bonds.</p><p>What is usually meant by “fundamental” analysis in investment context is some kind of guesstimation of future cash flows of a particular project discounting them to present value and deriving its value from there. It has dominated the investment field for the last 50+ years and for a good reason. It was roughly right. But if I am arguing it is wrong,</p><p><em>“Why has fundamental analysis been working so well?”</em></p><p>In a trad market when an investor is evaluating a stock, his main question is: “how will the company fare in the future?” what do they mean by this is “what will be the future financial results of the company” or “what will be the its future cash flows?”.</p><p>To reduce this problem of finding a future Schelling point into a subproblem of guessing inputs to a function (evaluation model) is possible only because the function is constant.</p><p>But if there isn’t a stable model and ideally other investors are using evaluation models that will not be the future Schelling point, that’s when you can make a killing.</p><p>The important question is,</p><p><em>“Why has fundamental analysis been the dominant Schelling point in trad investing for so long?”</em></p><h3>The (only) dominant one</h3><p>Short answer:</p><p>YBA(Yield Bearing Assets) is the <em>only</em> asset class with a dominant strategy.</p><p>Long answer:</p><p>YBA are a special type of asset where a dominant strategy exists. Players that have a preference to hold for a long time horizon (decades) can collect their gains just from interest payments and dividends alone, disregarding the future Schelling point.</p><p>To collect a profit on any other asset, somebody will need to value it and be willing to pay for it.</p><p>Put in investment jargon, even if the market is “irrational” in the traditional sense of the term, stopped valuing companies’ cash flow and were to follow completely different schelling points in the future such as memetic potential of companies’ CEOs a long term investor can still collect his profits just from the dividends, without the need to sell the asset.</p><p>Ok, but how many investors (in terms of capital) are ready to hold an asset on a multi-decade horizon? Is it 1% is it 5%? Whatever the number, we can safely assume it is a very small amount of the overall capital deployed.</p><p>So why would it have such a disproportionate effect and in fact determine the Schelling point for YBAs?</p><p>Because the mere existence of a singular dominant strategy in the sea of pure memes makes this Schelling point stand head and shoulders above all other meme based ones.</p><p>In other words, if we discover a new planet full of martians with a thriving economy and have no knowledge of social or economic interaction within, we could still use DCF since it would not matter that “no one else except me gets it”.</p><h3>Tying it back to crypto</h3><p>To illustrate the point, a good analogy from crypto is that the existence of BTC maxis like Michael Saylor who will buy or at least not sell no-matter-what makes all other crypto investors more comfortable holding BTC in times of strife. The mere fact that historically BTC held value better than other crypto makes it hold value better in the future.</p><p>Where the analogy breaks is that although BTC may seem like a dominant asset, it has no dominant strategy. If in 10 years people no longer believe BTC has any value, they will make it so.</p><p>Circling back to YBAs, long term value investors are the Michael Saylors of stock market. They will hold their favorite asset no matter what the market believes. However, unlike Saylor they will be able to collect their profits even if the market turns against them.</p><h3>Missing forest for the trees</h3><p>If investors play on the field of well established trad markets, they may in fact live and die looking for the fundamental value and invest successfully.</p><p>Good analogy from the world of physics comes to mind. We know that Newton’s physics is wrong on a fundamental level, since it breaks once we zoom into the particle world, but we use it for most practical use cases anyway since it is “good enough”.</p><p>As with investors in traditional markets, physicians before the 1900s thought that their model of the world does not approximate reality, but actually describes it.</p><p>Drawing on this analogy we could say that investors are trying to use “Newtonian physics” for everything, but are currently struggling because they use it in a new domain(crypto) where traditional laws of physics don’t apply.</p><p>A funny trivia from history of physics that highlights the need for simpler models and Occam’s razor approach is the period after Copernicus published his heliocentric model, but before it was widely accepted. His model became widely used by his antagonists also, because it was much simpler to calculate movement of celestial bodies using his heliocentric one, than the geocentric one which was heavily overfitted to reflect the actual planet movements.</p><p>Before Kepler, the heliocentric model wasn’t actually better at predictions but it was much simpler to use.</p><p>Hence I would argue even if both models of valuing assets; the “fundamental value” and “Schelling points” models have the same predictive power, the one making less assumption should be used, both because it makes less assumptions and because it can explain “irrational” market behavior such as Gamestop saga I will go over in the part two.</p><h3>Part II</h3><p>However, as I will argue in part two the predictive power of the Schelling game paradigm shines when it comes to crypto — an asset class without clearly established Schelling points.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e3bf21e5a730" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DVT landscape part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/dvt-landscape-part-1-a6ea7bae458b?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a6ea7bae458b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[obol-network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dvt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ssv-network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[staking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum-staking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2022 05:18:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-12T05:59:57.776Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*43jhz5HMeChL0cuL_ArvEQ.png" /><figcaption>Separating ETH stakes into juicy cuts…</figcaption></figure><p>DVT stands for Distributed Validator Technology and lets you split your Ethereum validator into several parts, distribute those to different operators who will then jointly run it. It makes your validator decentralised &amp; resilient, not going offline or getting slashed when the minority of operators misbihaves.</p><p>For a more in-depth read on DVT, check out <a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/what-is-dvt-and-why-do-we-need-it-1d7b58d1130c">What is DVT and why do we need it</a> or see its implications in <a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/the-future-of-dvt-dcc4abc9dec1">The future of DVT…🚀</a>.</p><h4>Current Landscape</h4><p>At the time of writing, there are two industry leaders developing DVT solutions, <a href="https://ssv.network/">ssv.network</a> and <a href="https://obol.tech/">obol.tech</a>. Both are currently on testnet with plans of mainnet launch in 2023. <br>In this article, I will compare and contrast these solutions highlighting their similarities &amp; differences. Recently, the founders of both teams put out very good articles explaining their respective design decisions.<br>Obol’s <a href="https://blog.obol.tech/deep-dive-into-dvt-and-charons-architecture/">Designing Non-Correlation: Deep Dive Into DVT and Charon’s Architecture</a> and SSV’s <a href="https://alonmuroch-65570.medium.com/designing-ssv-a-path-to-distributed-staking-infra-for-ethereum-9586433a536e">Designing SSV: A Path to distributed staking infra for Ethereum</a>.</p><h4>Acknowledgements</h4><p>Great thanks to the founders, <a href="https://twitter.com/AmMuroch">Alon</a> from SSV and <a href="https://twitter.com/OisinKyne">Oisin</a> from Obol for their valuable inputs &amp; feedback regarding architecture &amp; design of their solutions. <br>For general feedback my thanks go to <a href="https://twitter.com/Volkg_">Isaac</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/0xjorgeth">Jorge</a> from Nethermind, <a href="https://twitter.com/relzimroni">Ariel</a> from Blox and last but certainly not least to <a href="https://twitter.com/Robert31583545">Robert</a> for stylistic and grammar corrections.</p><p><strong>Disclosure:</strong> I am currently working as a contributor for SSV DAO. I have strived to represent both solutions to the best of my ability but am cognizant of my inherent bias.</p><h3><strong>Table of Contents</strong></h3><p>· <a href="#dc94">Architecture</a><br> ∘ <a href="#04d2">Overview</a><br> ∘ <a href="#817c">Approaches</a><br>· <a href="#7608">Networking</a><br> ∘ <a href="#f71c">Obol</a><br> ∘ <a href="#52cd">SSV</a><br> ∘ <a href="#721b">To summarise</a><br>· <a href="#fdad">Software Stack</a><br> ∘ <a href="#7a1c">Consensus</a><br> ∘ <a href="#f460">Client software</a><br> ∘ <a href="#956f">SSV</a><br> ∘ <a href="#f604">Obol</a><br>· <a href="#755f">Key management</a><br> ∘ <a href="#3efb">SSV</a><br> ∘ <a href="#8d2a">Obol</a><br>· <a href="#9f7b">Risks, Edge cases, and how to avoid them</a><br> ∘ <a href="#ba44">Loss of validation key</a><br> ∘ <a href="#fa33">Leakage of validation key</a><br>· <a href="#6c19">Tokenomics</a><br>· <a href="#05fc">To Conclude</a></p><h4>Terminology</h4><ul><li><strong>Validator </strong>— A node in the Ethereum network that is staking 32eth and participating in the network consensus, thus earning staking rewards.</li><li><strong>Staker </strong>— User renting validation services from operators. Usually, owners of the Ethereum Validators.</li><li><strong>Operator </strong>— Entity running a validation service, running Ethereum validators on the staker’s behalf.</li><li><strong>Cluster </strong>— A group of operators running single or multiple validators together.</li><li><strong>Validation key </strong>— Key for signing validator duties.</li><li><strong>Partial key </strong>— Partial validation key used by operators to sign validator duties. A threshold of these partial signatures must be aggregated to reconstruct a valid signature.</li></ul><h3>Architecture</h3><p>Both SSV and Obol are under heavy development, and the current state of both networks is not final. Thus, depending on when you are reading this, the following info may no longer be accurate. I will update the blog on a periodic basis to reflect reality.</p><h4>Overview</h4><p>In Obol, operators run validators in isolated clusters using their middleware client combined with a regular validator client. For operators to be able to coordinate around setting up a new cluster, Obol developed a dedicated website called the DV Launchpad. Unlike SSV, it does not have its own token. To facilitate payments, Obol is developing a set of smart contracts that will allow for the distribution of rewards directly from the withdrawals once enabled. Until then, Operators and Stakers must deploy custom smart contracts to handle payments or handle them in an off-chain manner.</p><p>SSV network consists of a set of on-chain smart contracts, the native SSV token, and SSV validator clients connected via a permissionless public network. Smart contracts handle the discovery, coordination, and transfers between stakers and operators. The SSV token is used for payments. Operators run SSV validator clients that connect together via a P2P pub/sub network. They dynamically form clusters based on stakers’ requirements expressed via smart contracts and perform validator duties on their behalf. The payments for their services are done in SSV tokens and are facilitated by the SSV smart contract.</p><h4>Approaches</h4><p>Seemingly the same goal lands itself in two quite different approaches in architecture and design decisions regarding both tech stacks. There is much that SSV and Obol have in common, but I will focus on the differences between them for greater clarity. It is Illuminating to look at their websites. <br>SSV’s punchline is “<em>Distributed Validator Infrastructure for Developers</em>’’ and Obol’s “<em>Distributed Validators for Ethereum</em>”. Attentive readers will notice the main difference is SSV’s focus on “<em>Infrastructure for Developers</em>”. <br>To achieve this goal of becoming a <em>decentralised infrastructure for staking applications,</em> <strong>SSV decouples staking</strong> into capital allocation (stakers provide Eth) and validation services (operators performing validation duties).</p><p><strong>Obol</strong>, on the other hand, puts heavy emphasis on non-correlation, <strong>making</strong> different <strong>clusters </strong>completely <strong>isolated </strong>from each other. This approach seems to be suited for home stakers and SaaS operators, who can now decentralise their infrastructure.</p><p>Let’s look at their engineering focus and design decisions:</p><p>SSV consists of a public operator network to which anyone can outsource their validation duties to by interacting with the SSV smart contract. Basically, you control your validators but let the network run them for you.</p><p>The upside of SSV having a public network is that stakers can provide their ETH, and operators can offer their services without any prior communication &amp; coordination. This approach offers considerable flexibility both for operators ;<br>who do not need to coordinate to form clusters <br>and for stakers;<br>who do not need to communicate with operators or pick predefined clusters. They can pick any operators with the cluster being automatically created. <br>This allows for smart contract-only staking, making it usable for DAOs, dApps, and other automated solutions.</p><p>Obol does not have a public network but rather uses isolated operator clusters because of their heavy emphasis on non-correlation. This has the benefit of avoiding any network-wide level issues and should require a smaller bandwidth since operators only communicate with nodes they run the cluster with without receiving or broadcasting third-party messages.</p><h3>Networking</h3><h4>Obol</h4><p>In Obol, the validator clusters are isolated from each other and do not pass any messages to other clusters. This means there is no danger of a network split since there is no network, only isolated clusters.</p><p>This much simpler networking topology of isolated clusters is easier to reason about and should require less bandwidth. The drawback of this approach is less redundancy and resiliency. If an operator temporarily loses direct connection to his cluster peers, he will not be able to get the undecided duties and sign them, since no other operator outside the cluster knows the current state.</p><p>This is in contrast to SSV, where an operator can be served current undecided duties by any other operator in his subnetwork (subscribed to the same topic). In Obol, operators are not expected to run a large number of clusters since users will be mainly choosing between predefined ones. However, if this turns out not to be the case and an operator needs to run a large number of different clusters, they will have to maintain a large number of open P2P connections, which may become unwieldy.</p><p>Also, the tradeoff for having all clusters isolated is that operators need to coordinate with both other operators and stakers before running one. It is also not possible for stakers to choose specific operators without their explicit agreement to create a new cluster or to change current cluster operators. However, changing operators is on the roadmap so stay tuned.</p><h4>SSV</h4><p>For all payments, key distribution, and operator management SSV uses a set of smart contracts. This leverages the immutable and uncensorable properties of Ethereum, ensuring that validator data needed by operators is impossible to censor and that there are no communication bottlenecks and single points of failure in the system. Operators need to listen to these contracts which provide them with all the necessary data (partial keys, validator activation status, cluster changes) to run validators while streaming payments for their services.</p><p>When an operator is instructed by the smart contract to run a new validator, they download all the data from the chain and coordinate with other operators via a public network that all operators are a part of. This operator network utilises pub-sub protocol on top of P2P. Peer-to-peer communication between the nodes is encrypted and signed, making it easily verifiable and attributable. Pub-sub stands for publish-subscribe networking. Operators publish new messages and subscribe only to relevant topics(subnets) they want to receive messages from. To be specific, every time a new validator is added to the network it is deterministically assigned to one of 128 consensus subnets based on its public key. Thus, an operator subscribes to a subnet only if it operates a validator that is assigned to it. In the previous version of SSV, there was a special subnet for each operator. This old approach was problematic, since for each new validator a new subnet had to be created, creating a network with many small subnets resulting in non-reliable message propagation across the network.</p><p>In the V2 design all messages are propagated by all subnet participants, making the network more robust in two crucial ways — 1 not requiring a direct P2P connection amongst cluster nodes, 2. Making DOS attacks harder, since there is no direct link between the message and its sender.</p><p>There is also one special “decided subnet” that all operators subscribe to. It contains all fully signed messages (consensus subnets contain partially signed ones) and allows for more robustness and faster syncing times.</p><p>This more mesh-like design allows for greater flexibility. Stakers can choose and change operators on-the-fly, without any coordination. Operators can join the network and start offering their services without any prior coordination with stakers or themselves. Stakers are not forced to predefined clusters but can choose any operators they wish.</p><p>Another important benefit of having a public network is the observability nature we know and love from blockchains. Dashboards, analytic tools, and valuable resources can be built using these data. This allows for easy monitoring and rating of all the operators, building various dashboards and tools. This may seem like a small thing, but can actually bring huge benefits down the line for stakers and the whole ecosystem. It can <strong>allow for high-trust anon Operators</strong>, where the trust is based on their performance alone. Something we are missing dearly in the current staking landscape, where “trust me, we have a good reputation” is the default modus operandi.</p><p>Having a public network also allows for dynamic cluster creation, removing the centralization bottleneck and allowing the network to adapt to operators being compromised, going rogue, or being coerced by powerful actors. You can easily switch operators fully automatically without any need for coordination.</p><p>The potential drawback of this solution also comes from this greater flexibility. In a public mesh-like network, it is possible to have network-wide issues, such as network splits or network wide attacks such as amplification attack affecting the whole network. <br>The bandwidth load will also be higher due to network coordination messages and the greater number of messages passed.</p><h4>To summarise</h4><p>Both SSV and Obol are bringing robustness and fault tolerance to etherum staking. Obol heavily focuses on non-correlation, and separation of concerns, both on the network and software levels. SSV focuses on creating a permissionless and distributed staking network for outsourcing staking duties and creating an open marketplace for staking services.</p><h3>Software Stack</h3><h4>Consensus</h4><p>Both SSV and Obol use the same QBFT mechanism with committees of <em>3f+1</em> total operators. This algorithm tolerates up to <strong><em>f</em></strong> of the operators being Byzantine without affecting consensus. Practically it makes for clusters of 4(1 byzantine), 7(2biz.), 10(3biz.) etc. This consensus mechanism has a restriction of requiring a leader for each voting round. Thus, if the leader is not available, there will be a small time lag in performing validator duties. This mechanism is not developed by the DVT teams, and there is already work being done on a <a href="https://alonmuroch-65570.medium.com/ssv-into-the-future-asyncrounous-bft-protocols-87e122f0f216">new leaderless mechanism</a> which is on the roadmap to be implemented into SSV once ready.</p><h4>Client software</h4><h4>SSV</h4><p>SSV uses a custom validator client built with the go-eth2 client library. This gives it better flexibility since the validator client can be adjusted based on the network needs and does not need to sync with another client software to perform validator duties. Besides performing regular validator duties, it is handling changes in validator clusters, adding and removing different operators to them. <br>To secure the validator keys, it will use a remote signer architecture allowing for complete separation between validation duties and enabling third-party signers such as <a href="https://docs.web3signer.consensys.net/en/latest/">Web3Signer</a>.</p><p>The benefit of this solution compared to middleware is that there is no additional software that needs to be run to coordinate with the validator node, hence less overhead and potentially better performance.</p><h4>Obol</h4><p>Obol runs as a middleware, meaning it is a separate software run in parallel with a standard validator client. This has the benefit of separating concerns of message aggregation and signing. <br>Thus, even if buggy, Obol middleware cannot cause slashing event since it does not hold the signing key. Slashing can still take place but is dependent on both the validator client, as well as the middleware being buggy. <br>Another benefit is less development overhead, leaving the maintenance of the signing duties and slashing database to the teams building the validator clients.<br>Their client is <a href="https://github.com/ObolNetwork/charon#supported-consensus-layer-clients">currently compatible</a> with Teku and Lighthouse validators. Also, there is currently an issue regarding signature aggregation timing that <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/beacon-APIs/pull/224">should be fixed with this PR</a>.</p><h3>Key management</h3><h4>SSV</h4><p>SSV currently handles key management by letting the staker split the validation key into parts. These are encrypted to the public keys of the chosen operators and submitted on chain by calling <em>registerValidator() </em>on <a href="https://goerli.etherscan.io/address/0xb9e155e65B5c4D66df28Da8E9a0957f06F11Bc04#writeProxyContract">SSV smart contract</a>.</p><p>This offers large robustness benefits for the network and its operators since all validator data can be fully reconstructed from the blockchain alone. Thus, in a doom’s day scenario, even if the operator loses all its data and all the validator keys, they can reconstruct everything just from the on-chain data, requiring them to only safely backup and hold their one operator key.</p><p>This makes the life of an operator much easier and the key management much safer since they don’t need to back up every new validator partial key and send its copy over the internet to a different secure location for safekeeping.</p><p>SSV is also working on implementing zero-coordination Distributed key generation (DKG). This will allow the validator key to be created &amp; managed directly by the operators and will remove the requirement for the staker to perform the key splitting and custody. This DKG will be fully automagic and will not require any manual coordination from either stakers or operators.</p><p>This unlocks new use cases, such as completely trustless liquid staking derivatives or smart-contract-only staking services essential for DAOs and other purely on-chain entities.</p><h4>Obol</h4><p>Obol runs its clusters only under the DKG paradigm. Their setup currently requires manual discovery and coordination of all parties running the cluster and a higher standard for running an operator node since neither the staker holds the key nor is it available on the blockchain.</p><p>DKG comes with the huge benefit of not requiring any party to have control of the validation keys, but also with a larger responsibility in terms of key management. In their design, neither staker holds the the keys nor are they available on-chain. Thus, putting the full responsibility of storing and backing up validator keys on operators. This should not pose any problems under normal circumstances but makes their system more trustful from the security perspective.</p><h3>Risks, Edge cases, and how to avoid them</h3><h4>Loss of validation key</h4><p>In Obol, if 2 partial keys were to be lost at the same time (n=4) due to a flooded data centre or whatever else and there is no backup, the validators affected are effectively dead, since the key is unrecoverable and there is no one else holding it.</p><p>There is currently no way to fully mitigate this risk other than choosing your operator cluster very wisely and requiring operators to hold keys in multiple locations, have strong backups and recovery processes in place. This risk would be eliminated if &amp; when a proposal to trigger voluntary exit via smart contract is implemented (<a href="https://ethresear.ch/t/0x03-withdrawal-credentials-simple-eth1-triggerable-withdrawals/10021">0x03 withdrawal credentials</a> or similar). This will allow the end user to exit his validator directly from the execution layer.</p><p>In SSV this is not an issue, since the full validator key is both held by the owner of the validator and can be retrieved by the operators from the blockchain. Thus, the loss of 2 or even all the key parts is not an issue in SSV. If you use DKG in SSV, the full key will no longer be held by the staker, but the encrypted key shares will still be retrievable from the blockchain. Thus, operators can lose all of their validator keys with no affect, they only need to take a good care of their operator key.</p><h4>Leakage of validation key</h4><p>To put things into context, currently, if a validation key gets compromised, it could result in bribery attacks or slashing, as no staking service uses DVT and holds the full validation key. With DVT the attacker always needs to get his hands on the threshold of partial keys which makes the event much less likely. To illustrate the point, if we think that there is a 1/1000 chance that a key gets compromised in the next 5 years, the chance to compromise the lowest possible threshold (3) is a million times harder than the status quo and a chance of it being compromised is 1/10⁹, a very, very small.</p><p>Granted, this presumes that key leakage events are uncorrelated, which may not be the case. A zero-day code vulnerability in any part of the software stack could affect all nodes running it. To prevent this from happening, both teams push towards client diversity by making their solutions compatible with different execution clients, beacon and validator nodes.</p><p>Both focus on separating private key management from other parts of the stack. Obol does this by not keeping the keys in their middleware and letting the validator client handle them and SSV by using a remote signer, a special software enclave that handles signing duties and already has multiple implementations.</p><p>Putting encrypted key shares on-chain brings a huge amount of robustness to the SSV system as stated in the previous section, but there is some tradeoff. Given the low probability of this happening, it seems a reasonable one.</p><p>There is an attack vector where an attacker would try to get a hold of the old operator’s private keys. This may be easier to do for inactive operators since they do not have much incentive to secure their old keys at that point. If an attacker were successful they could decrypt all the partial keys held by this operator.</p><p>Still, this would need to be done for at least three operators to have a chance of success and they would have to had run clusters together in the past, in order for that attacker to reconstruct the full key.</p><p>Even if an attacker manages to do so, this validator would still need to be active at the time of the attack, which is most probably not the case since we are talking about old inactive operator keys that are no longer being used.</p><p>However, the prudent thing for a staker can do is to pick at least two, highly reputable operators that have a good track record and can be expected to have good security practices and operate long into the future.</p><p>This edge case could be avoided altogether by being mindful of this fact and rather exiting validators in case they were forced to replace more than a threshold of operators (currently three), due to their inactivity.</p><p>A more realistic scenario stakers should be mindful of, is not to change all operators in a cluster at once, as this is effectively giving the key into the hands of both old and new clusters. To prevent this problem altogether, always change a strictly smaller number of operators than is the consensus threshold (currently three). Replacing one or two operators is safe and should be more than sufficient to switch a non-performing operator. If more than two need to be switched, it would be advisable to exit the validator and re-enter again with the new one.</p><p>It is important to keep things in perspective and not go overboard when thinking about the edge cases, since both of these solutions offer an orders-of-magnitude improvement over the status quo.</p><h3>Tokenomics</h3><p>At the time of writing, Obol has no token, hence this part will cover only SSV. Also, <strong>NOTE </strong>that SSV tokenomics is currently in active development and will most probably undergo important changes.</p><p>The SSV token serves three main functions, <strong>payments </strong>for validation services, a <strong>network fee,</strong> and <strong>governance</strong>:</p><ol><li>Facilitating payments from stakers to operators for validation services. Since withdrawals are not yet enabled, it is currently not possible to pay the operator from the staking rewards directly.</li><li>Network fee. This is a part of the validation service fee paid by the stakers. It goes directly to the DAO treasury and is used to fund the protocol development.</li><li>Governance token. It serves as a standard governance token, with similar mechanics as can be seen in many other protocols.</li></ol><p>For more information, check <a href="https://ssv.network/tokenomics/">SSV tokenomics documentation</a>.</p><h3>To Conclude</h3><p>To conclude, I would like to stress that both of these solutions are an orders-of-magnitude improvement over the status quo. I hope I have been able to illuminate the main differences in this article.</p><p><strong>In Part 2,</strong> I will focus on more practical questions such as <strong>how</strong> you can currently <strong>use</strong> each of the <strong>protocols</strong>, what is their <strong>current state of development</strong> and <strong>when mainnet</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a6ea7bae458b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The future of DVT…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/the-future-of-dvt-dcc4abc9dec1?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dcc4abc9dec1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[staking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dvt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[distributed-validators]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Aug 2022 12:01:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-28T12:01:34.220Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>🌚🥃 What is the moonshot of staking?</h3><h3>…or, on the implications of DVT</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*E0acCTekWA5L4msrZ6B21g.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Great thanks to </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/a08a0a5235a2"><em>Isaac Villalobos</em></a><em> for review and suggestions.</em></p><p><em>What are the limits of staking?</em></p><p><em>How much can we stretch them?</em></p><p><em>What are the possibilities DVT unlocks?</em></p><p><em>What does the future hold?</em></p><p><em>How far can we really push things?</em></p><p><em>Is it possible to build the future where everyone can just plug &amp; play into staking?</em></p><p><em>Will staking be as easy as running Discord app on your laptop?</em></p><h4>Into the Future</h4><p>Imagine you just turn on your laptop and your staker runs in the background just like a messaging app. No inactivity leaks, no lengthy setup, no dedicated hardware. Is this possible?? And if so, is it probable??</p><p>Few know… but there were times when you could mine on your web browser. POW was also originally meant as one-PC-one-vote system and there was a time, when people thought your smart light bulb would mine Bitcoin. This obviously did not pan out, but why?</p><p><strong>Three words:<br></strong>Economies of scale.</p><p>We learned the hard way that economies of scale matter and they matter a whole lot in POW… Mining without electricity deals on non-specialized hardware does not come close to breaking even and mining on your browser is so inefficient that even Justin Sun hasn’t tried to replicate this.</p><p>To decentralize staking we need to flatten these. Their effects need to be so small, that the marginal benefit from staking is large enough for people to care. Note, this does not mean that profits must be strictly larger than holding LSDs, since LSDs themselves could be used as a staking collateral. The motivation could also be non-financial, such as wanting to be part of the network consensus and bragging rights.</p><blockquote>…but, doesn’t Ethereum POS solve this?<br>Yes to a degree, but like many relationships, <strong>it’s complicated</strong>.</blockquote><p>Let’s take a closer look at Ethereum POS today and observe why a person cannot just one-click-stake from a browser or by running a simple program whenever they are online.</p><h4>Barriers to one-click-staking</h4><ol><li>technical expertise — Running staking software is not an easy process</li><li>inactivity leaks — staker needs to be online 24/7</li><li>capital requirements — needs 32 eth deposit</li><li>security concerns — funds being staked are basically in hot wallet, cannot be stolen but are susceptible to bribery attacks</li><li>hardware requirements — significant amount of free disk space is needed and running a staker on a low end hardware could affect performance</li></ol><blockquote>Which of these Barriers can be mitigated and which cannot?</blockquote><p>Upon closer inspection they can be divided into two categories; <strong>consensus requirements </strong>and <strong>UX issues</strong>. Solving UX issues is a matter of time, and with DVT we can really stretch the consensus requirements. So Let’s address the barriers one by one:</p><ol><li>technical expertise<br>This one is purely a UX issue which will get solved in time. To connect to the internet, send &amp; receive emails was once as hard as running a staker today. It will take time, but there is no reason to expect that this blocker will not be fully removed in couple of years.</li><li>Inactivity leaks<br>This is an interesting one. If we were actually thinking only in terms of running a an Ethereum node, there would be no way around this, as this is not a UX issue that can be just coded away but a protocol rule. DVT changes the game here though. As I have <a href="https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/what-is-dvt-and-why-do-we-need-it-1d7b58d1130c">written previously</a>, it can be thought of as a mini blockchain for validator nodes, splitting a single validator node into many DVT nodes and its execution is the result of the of the DVT nodes’ consensus. Thus it is possible to have operators come and go, as long as there is a sufficient number of them to reach the consensus. You can also imagine a hybrid solution, where there would be “core” nodes, committing to 100% uptime and others that come and go. In fact there in no hard and fast rule here. Important to note is that this is a known problem that every blockchain is solving today with its consensus engine.</li><li>Capital<br>Same case as above, a consensus requirement not a UX issue. We cannot remove this one, after all the consensus mechanism is called Proof of STAKE for a reason. Every validator in Ethereum network must be held accountable in case of misbehavior. But DVT again makes things interesting here. Let’s think of a validator node as a mini blockchain again. <br>It must source 32 ETH <em>somehow</em>. The most straightforward mechanism would be to request proportional stake in ETH from each participant. However, <strong>the design space on how exactly to do this is limitless</strong>. <br>Does it have to be eth? No, it could be any collateral for which there is a counterparty willing to lend ETH against — tokens, NFTs, stocks, real estate... Also the size of stake could vary widely and there is no reason for the staking income to be proportional to the value provided. Stake size is just one of the inputs into the payout function calculating rewards. This payout function could look anyhow you could dream of. It can take as an input social reputation and require less stake from those who have more of it, or even NO stake at all! <br>The bottom line is, this mini blockchain-like organism needs to source 32 eth and there is infinite canvas on how this can be done.</li><li>Security<br>This is a UX issue. Yes, it is hard to have a secure setup, but it has nothing to do with consensus. Well, but can we expect people who do not know how not to leak their bored ape seeds to secure a validator? We can observe normies using end-to-end encryption today, yet it was a heroic task 20 years ago. Ok, but are these two comparable or is securing staking fundamentally different?<br>Well, it is different in one crucial way. With staking there is always a honey pot waiting to be exploited. But this only increases the attacker’s incentive, it does not put any special powers into his hands. We can expect that solo staking will get much easier and secure as the time passes, but the stakes are higher here. Here again DVT comes to save the day. Depending on the consensus rule a particular network uses, currently both <a href="https://medium.com/u/7bfde6196328">ssv.network Team</a> &amp; <a href="https://medium.com/u/ea2e08c860e3">Obol Network</a> require 2/3 consensus, the attacker would have to hack and overtake 1/3 or more of DVT operators that compromise a validator node, which vastly increases the relative robustness of every single validator. Since network will be not affected by attackers overtaking individual operators until this threshold is reached, the security requirements can be somewhat relaxed. <br>Sounds like a good 🧾 recipe for secure &amp; easy 🥩stakin’!</li><li>high hardware requirements<br>Currently running a validator node does not require any high-end hardware as some bitcoin maxis would let you believe. Regular consumer laptop with bigger than usual ssd is enough. However, we are talking about the future where people can run their validator without their experience being affected. This is still not the case today for cheap consumer hardware, although currently the main reason for dedicated hardware is security concerns plus required 100% 24/7 uptime. Assuming validator requirements will increase proportionally to general hardware improvement, then even after sharding and state expiry is implemented the resource drain of running a validator will still be noticed on a low power device. <br>However, the hidden assumption here is that every DVT operator needs to run all validator duties. But is necessarily true? <br>While it is the case today, it is perfectly conceivable that validator duties can be split amongst DVT nodes, requiring some duties from one, some from another, and other nodes can just be managing their distribution.</li></ol><h4>Complex, sooooooo complex…</h4><blockquote>Hold your horses here…, this sounds overly complex and convoluted to be practical…</blockquote><p>Well yes, but so does POS to POW advocates. How do you think it would sound to computer programmer from the 80’s if you explain to him standard programming practice of today.<br>Programmer Alice:<br><em>“… and I basically code in a program run on top an Emulated system, using scripting language which is meant to be run on another virtual machine in your browser”</em><br>That sounds pretty damn complex and convoluted… and yet it is a standard practice of many web developers using Windows with WSL. But as <a href="https://medium.com/u/b51f98a74dce">Justin Drake</a> argued in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1m12zgJ42dI">this podcast</a> on POW vs POS with Lyn Alden, complexity matters at first, but given time, the complexity of yesterday is a standard practice of today. Also if you can <a href="https://vitalik.ca/general/2022/02/28/complexity.html">encapsulate complexity</a>, (great article by Vitalik), you can reason about each part of the system separately.</p><h3>OK it is possible… But is it probable?</h3><p>Well, yes and no. It is hard to predict if there is enough incentive for something like this to evolve. We have a long road ahead. And as with the all children of evolution, each new step must increase the fitness of the organism.</p><blockquote><em>It is clear to me that given the choice many Ethereans today would love to run a staker in their browser for the twitter bragging rights alone if nothing else.</em></blockquote><p>But that is today. Will it hold in 10 years?<br>Also more importantly, is there an incentive for each step in this direction to be taken? Pushing the frontier with using new, more advanced staking setups is inherently risky. Will there be the appetite to take it?</p><p>It well may be the case, that LSDs combined with DVT solutions as they are designed today is a “good enough” solution and industry will ossify at this stage. But then again, to predict the direction of blockchain industry for the next 5–10 years seems a bit blasphemous. Reminds me of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-Term_Capital_Management#Analysis">LTCM</a>, a wall street golden-boy hedge fund that failed spectacularly after 4 years of operation and retorted that they went under because of what they thought was a “sig sigma event” (chance 3 in 1000,000)…</p><p><strong>… So we are left with the only tried-and-true way how to predict the future.</strong></p><p><strong>BUIDL it!</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dcc4abc9dec1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is DVT and why do we need it?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MarkoInEther/what-is-dvt-and-why-do-we-need-it-1d7b58d1130c?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1d7b58d1130c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[obol-network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ssv-network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dvt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Aug 2022 02:17:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-26T02:17:08.786Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Distributed Validator Technology(DVT) like <a href="http://twitter.com/ssv_network">@ssv_network</a> &amp; <a href="http://twitter.com/ObolNetwork">@ObolNetwork</a> allows technically minded laymen(like me :) ) to stake SAFU full stop!</p><p>It allows everyday people without ton of resources and fancy infrastructure to participate in staking and even becoming SAAS providers! Defeating economies of ⚖️scale…</p><h4>POW story</h4><p>In POW it is stark, and there are no hobbyist left staking. if you have massive 💰 you can move your operation to a place with cheaper electricity, get discount on mining hardware, overhead is smaller etc. Put simply, the more funds you have, the better yield you can make. There is a good discussion on this in the episode of <a href="http://twitter.com/uponly">@uponly</a> with <a href="http://twitter.com/zooko">@zooko</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/UpOnlyTV/status/1552804746297237506?s=20&amp;t=B-sRbP8vfm_eho0MtV6p2A[">https://twitter.com/UpOnlyTV/status/1552804746297237506?s=20&amp;t=B-sRbP8vfm_eho0MtV6p2A[</a>]</p><p>Yea, yea, yea, we all know this about POW but <strong>doesn’t POS solve this?</strong> <br>Yes and no.</p><h4>POS story</h4><p>POS flattens the curve and levels the playing field to an extent, but even if you have ~$50,000 at hand(32eth), running a validator if you have this much money on the line is still a serious business.<br> <br>Is your setup Safe, Redundant, Online 24–7? <br>How confident are you you don’t get slashed? 99%?</p><p>If so, <strong><em>your expected loss is $500</em></strong>. Maybe better to pay a pro? If the answer is yes, you are like most of us and economies of ⚖ although smaller still apply. We can clearly see this in rise of LSDs(not trips to other galaxies, but Liquid Staking Derivates) like $stETH $rETH and SAAS(Staking as a Service) companies.</p><h4>DVT solves this…</h4><p>How? Running a solo staker, you have no safety net. If something goes wrongs, you loose your money. Running a staker on top of DVT gives you &amp; others a safety net. How? Think of DVT as of a mini blockchain. You are part of DVT network, which operates multiple stakers. e.g. in <a href="http://twitter.com/ssv_network">@ssv_network</a> there are currently four (can be more in the future) different operators running together a single staker. If something goes wrong with one of them, no problem, the other 3 still come to consensus (similar to a blockchain) and are able to run the staker without any hiccup.</p><p>One of the operators — could be you, can go offline or even double sign, but the other three still come to consensus and the staker is happily chugging along!</p><p>Basically <em>you have each other’s back in case something goes wrong</em> and the probability of something going wrong for multiple operators at the same time is much, much lower. In the future, tens of operators running can be running a single staker together. Wait what? Sounds like a blockchain… It makes DVT a metablockchain on top of which the actual blockchain is run!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/888/1*x3GLZFYqi3J0wWWWCNJLIw.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Bottom line…</h4><p>Staking as we know it today is a serious business for professionals. While SAAS providers have invested huge amount of capital into having safe &amp; robust infra, all the companies repeat the same thing in their own silo. Sounds a bit like web2… DVT does the same job but better. It is a public good for everyone, developed out in the open and with practically no cost to the staker!</p><p><em>It levels the playing field for virtually everyone who is willing to dedicate time to become a staker or staking as a service (SAAS) provider!</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d7b58d1130c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tenderize.me — Short overview]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tenderize-me/tenderize-me-short-overview-bd602c418bb5?source=rss-86b497f7c415------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bd602c418bb5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[staking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[staking-as-a-service]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[staking-rewards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stakingderivative]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[MarkoInEther]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2020 13:57:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-11T13:57:32.678Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Tenderize.me — Short overview</h3><p>Liquid staking solution, focused on yield and ease of use while keeping staking decentralized. We combine Automatic Market Maker with staking derivative token, to allow for best yield, while allowing you to start or stop staking at any time with no bonding and unbonding period!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/497/1*9buANCRIWBrV8o8nKmyqFw.png" /><figcaption>🥩Don’t just stake me, 🔨Tenderize me first!</figcaption></figure><h3>Staking</h3><p>If you are new to staking or liquid staking and you have only vague idea what am I talking about, you can check these articles explaining <a href="https://medium.com/neblio-blog/staking-explained-8c8d67f289c0">staking </a>and<a href="https://hackernoon.com/comparing-staking-rewards-is-liquid-staking-better-than-proof-of-stake-pos-ua3h3wv5"> liquid staking</a> to clarify the concepts.</p><h3>What problems are we solving?</h3><h4>Liquifying<strong> staking position</strong></h4><p>If people stake just by providing funds to a regular staker contract, their funds are illiquid. By providing people with tenderToken, we allow them to sell / buy their position freely on secondary market or use it as collateral. This is the basic feature that all other liquid staking solutions have as well.</p><h4><strong>Gas Cost savings</strong></h4><p>Some of the staking solutions are quite expensive gaswise. Therefore, it does not make sense for people to stake small amounts of funds. That is also the reason to “tenderize” their stake 😊.</p><h4><strong>Automatic reinvesting of staking rewards</strong></h4><p>All staking rewards are automatically reinvested; thus we save gas cost and time of our fellow crypto comrades.</p><h3>What makes us unique?</h3><h4>The problem with liquid staking</h4><p>Where other liquid solutions are happy to stake on their users behalf and provide them with a derivative token, we want to make things easier for the everyday user. <br>It is nice to have a token representing my staking position in a network that I can trade, but the question remains: Can I really trade this token if I need my underlying token back? Is there a liquid market for it?</p><p>short answer: For Ether probably yes, for smaller tokens, not really.</p><p>long answer: Generic answer about relationships applies here — It’s complicated.<br>It is reasonable to expect that a market will form for tokens with <em>sufficiently </em>high market cap after “<em>some” </em>time. The key words here are “ sufficiently” and “some”. It is reasonable expect that in case of Ether market for liquid staking derivatives will form fast, but what about other protocols such as <a href="https://livepeer.org/">Livepeer</a>, <a href="https://www.nucypher.com/">NuCypher</a>, <a href="https://thegraph.com/">The Graph </a>and others?</p><p>It does not really make sense for market makers to jump in early. Their main questions are: How much trading is actually taking place, meaning how much money can I make off this? The other would be how can I hedge this position? Until they can answer both positively the market makers will not jump in and provide liquidity.</p><h4>Not only liquid, but easy to exit.</h4><p>We are neither the only nor the first liquid staking platform. <br>What sets us apart form other solutions is that we focus heavily not only on liquifying the staking position, but making this derivative asset liquid at all times.</p><blockquote><strong>Put simply, people can jump in and out of the system at any time, start staking or withdraw their original tokens out at moments notice.</strong></blockquote><p>By incorporating an AMM into our solution we allow people to withdraw their staked tokens by providing tenderTokens (staking derivative token). It goes without saying that tenderTokens are standard ERC20 tokens, therefore can be traded freely, used as collateral or a DeFi building block.</p><p>We are effectively staking, liquifying the stake, and market making between original token and derivative staking token all at the same time!</p><h4>Things to observe</h4><p>1. Capital efficiency <br>The naïve approach to allow people withdraw the original token at moment notice would be to keep percentage of tokens as a reserve. e.g. 90% of all original tokes are staked 10% are kept as a reserve. This would result in the system that allows for quick withdrawals (within bounds of course), but would lower the capital efficiency, since only 90% of assets are staked. By having an AMM as a part of the solution we off-balance this loss. Trading fees and slippage, both generating revenue, thus balancing out the lost revenue from staking. But this of course could also be achieved without AMM, by simply charging fees that could be flat e.g. 0.5%, or progressive by employing a curve, increasing the fee progressively as more and more reserves are drained. That brings me to the next point.</p><p>2. Automatic price rebalancing. <br>By employing AMM, which is open for anyone to trade against we allow for arbitrage to take place, allowing anyone to provide liquidity and get paid for it. We have a mechanism of automatic replenishing the supply of underlying tokens in the AMM, but more on that in later post. This gives people the assurance that if they provide liquidity now by trading against the pool, they will be able to take it out from the pool later along with a profit! If they do not want to wait for the AMM to replenish automatically, they can unstake their tenderTokens and realize their profit that way.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/496/1*SWm1rMOT1-2ZsWYtrh4v9Q.png" /><figcaption>making stake easier to chew</figcaption></figure><h3>Summary</h3><p>With our solution we are addressing the two most important concerns stakers have. They are:</p><blockquote><strong><em>I want the staking solution to give me the </em>maximal profit<em>.<br>I want to be able to enter and exit my position</em> at moments notice<em>.</em></strong></blockquote><p>Smart incorporation of AMM allows us to address both of these most basic concerns. While Exchanges and other centralized staking solutions are addressing both of them as well, we feel that other decentralized liquid staking solutions are not addressing the second concern sufficiently or at all.</p><p><em>Our vision is to help push towards decentralize future and avoid staking centralization!</em></p><p>Thus we want to provide a counterweight to centralized staking solutions. This is possible only if the decentralized solutions bring user an experience which is on par or ideally better than centralized solutions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd602c418bb5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tenderize-me/tenderize-me-short-overview-bd602c418bb5">Tenderize.me — Short overview</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tenderize-me">Tenderize.me</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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