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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Matt Turner on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Matt Turner on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@MattTurner4L?source=rss-36c8e69dafa1------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Matt Turner on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MattTurner4L?source=rss-36c8e69dafa1------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why are Leamington and Peterborough so important to Labour?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MattTurner4L/why-are-leamington-and-peterborough-so-important-to-labour-6409c27368fb?source=rss-36c8e69dafa1------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labour-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[general-election]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Nov 2019 23:22:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-28T00:13:24.397Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*37ecat4XvBKFr2mAJ1dTeA.png" /></figure><p>There are two seats in the 2019 that I’ve been keeping an eye on intently.</p><p>Admittedly, some of that is out of personal interest, having worked in both — but the constituencies of Warwick &amp; Leamington and Peterborough are two key strategic seats that Labour must keep in order to stave off a Boris Johnson majority.</p><p>On face value, they’re two very different seats. Around 60% of Warwick and Leamington voted Remain, while around 60% of Peterborough voted to Leave.</p><p>The boundaries for these results are ever so slightly different from their parliamentary constituency boundaries, but I feel like these figures are at adequate representation of the constituency seats and their feelings towards Brexit.</p><p>Both constituencies are certainly suffering after nine years of vicious austerity, but the largely affluent, cosmopolitan, student town of Leamington can seem like a completely different world to Peterborough if you were to take a day or two to explore.</p><p>The one thing they have in common is that Labour managed to gain both in the 2017 General Election. The radical, redistributive agenda that focused on areas where both constituencies are suffering: schools, uptake in crime, struggling hospitals etc. certainly helped, but I’ve always been of the opinion that what swung it in both seats was the perfect pinch of Brexit ambiguity that convinced enough voters on both sides of the Remain/Leave spectrum to trust Labour moving forwards.</p><p>These two seats are the perfect case study of Labour bringing both Leave and Remain together in 2017. It’s the argument they’re still making today about not fighting for the 52%, or the 48%, but the 99%.</p><p>The issue facing Labour is that these uber-marginal seats that have been brought together despite hugely differing views on the European Union are now under threat.</p><p>The latest YouGov MRP has predicted that the Tories are set to regain both — but the gap facing Labour is only 3/4%. Leamington faces a stronger Liberal Democrat campaign after successful EU/local election results — potentially harming Labour. While in Peterborough, the Tories are concerned about an insurgent Brexit Party candidate in Mike Greene.</p><p>The strategic importance of retaining these seats should not be underestimated. There is much discussion around Labour’s ‘northern wall’, but it would make a significant statement were they to keep the kind of Remain and Leave marginals that W&amp;L and Peterborough clearly are.</p><p>It’s certainly doable — if not the most likely scenario despite the YouGov MRP findings. Recent polling from other companies has suggested that the Tory lead is closer to 7/8% instead of YouGov’s predicted 11, meaning that these seats are probably neck and neck right now, but tipping towards Labour again with two weeks of campaigning to go.</p><p>If you’re a fan of the drama on election night — keep an eye on these two seats when the results start rolling in.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6409c27368fb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Thoughts on the Peterborough by-election]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MattTurner4L/thoughts-on-the-peterborough-by-election-39d47be4ad9b?source=rss-36c8e69dafa1------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[labour-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[peterborough]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2019 18:39:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-21T18:39:51.430Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d7c6LjZYN_RWTb3b.jpg" /></figure><p>The Peterborough by-election is already proving to be one of the most fascinating by-election campaigns the country has ever seen. There are so many different factors and variables at play here.</p><p>We have an insurgent Brexit Party — who are currently favourites to win the seat with the odds makers. This will be a huge test to see if they can galvanise the 60% of people who voted to leave in Peterborough.</p><p>Of course they’re going to do well in the EU elections — but we all know that these are second-order elections often used to register discontent. If they can’t win over such a disillusioned, under-funded and borderline angry seat as Peterborough — what hope do they have in other Leave-voting areas across the country in a General Election?</p><p>This is without mentioning the fact that I’m unsure how many local people, with experiences of the issues and policy agendas that are important to different wards, will be taking part in their ground operation.</p><p>It’s all well and good making grand statements on democracy and Brexit, but contrary to popular belief, people in Peterborough are moving away from viewing this as the most salient issue. There are so many local issues to be addressed in the constituency.</p><p>How are they going to fare on the doorstep in the coming weeks? It truly is going to be a battle between the Brexit narrative and a broad range of policy issues coming from Labour and the Conservatives.</p><p>Onto Labour — their candidate, Lisa Forbes, ran in 2015 and bucked the national trend by shaving a fair amount of Stewart Jackson’s majority in 2015. Just going off the data, Fiona Onasanya would not have had a hope in hell of winning in 2017 were it not for the groundwork that Lisa and her campaign did in 2015.</p><p>She is a shrewd campaigner, sticking to her guns on the local issues that I can testify have been raised time and time again over my time there. The ground operation is slick and is receiving widespread national support.</p><p>Having worked for Ms. Onasanya during her trial and conviction, I can say with confidence that not as many people are linking her actions with the Labour Party as their opponents would wish. They booted her out straight away and actively campaigned for the re-call petition and her removal.</p><p>It truly is morphing into a two horse race — which is arguably the most fascinating bit. The Conservatives are currently 600 votes behind — and in conventional circumstances would be favourites to nab the seat.</p><p>Instead, they are sitting at an utterly absurd 20/1 in the bookmakers. Their candidate, Paul Bristow, probably didn’t anticipate the startling rise of the Brexit Party and thought he was a shoe-in after Ms. Onasanya’s conviction.</p><p>Not anymore. Perhaps he’s being punished by national issues, but at the same time Mr. Bristow has been keen for a Parliamentary seat for a while — and many in Peterborough are aware of his history. His ‘local credentials’ took a bit of a hit when it was revealed he went for the Bedford PPC only a short time before, and ran in Middlesbrough in a previous election.</p><p>The ‘Remainer’ bloc that was touted ended up being an absolute farce. The Lib Dems will increase their share after taking a 16% hit in 2015 and not recovering since. Whether that’s enough to strongly damage Labour’s chances, though, is a different question. From a personal view, for the sake of the city, I desperately hope not.</p><p>But there’s the risk — and it’s catch twenty-two. In Leave voting Peterborough, where many UKIP went back to Labour, trying to appease the Lib Dems by pivoting towards a second referendum will seriously damage Lab. They’re just going to have to try and cobble together a shaky coalition of voters again.</p><p>TLDR: people in Peterborough are sick and tired of being sick and tired. They have deserved better representation for years now — ditto investment and opportunity. Fertile breeding ground for the Brexit Party, but also a sense that they just want to go back to normality instead of electing another wildcard. I really, really hope Labour nick it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=39d47be4ad9b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What next for Corbyn and the country?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MattTurner4L/what-next-for-corbyn-and-the-country-37ff894c7bfa?source=rss-36c8e69dafa1------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[theresa-may]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labour-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jeremy-corbyn]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Mar 2017 14:45:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-08T14:52:00.420Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/544/1*Ep4UfyzRobU3eocp_FV6jg.jpeg" /></figure><p>We are three years away from a general election, unless Theresa May goes back on what she has said numerous times and calls a snap election. That being said, William Hague is right to say that May should call a snap election. After all, there are plenty of troubles coming Theresa May’s. With her shambolic Brexit negotiations, an NHS on its knees, the crippling insecurity that working people face with housing and zero-hours contracts, and that unemployed people face with harsh austerity measures to the benefits system — a lot could happen in three years.</p><p>That doesn’t mean that Jeremy Corbyn will win, but anybody who is writing him off already is indulging in shoddy political guesswork. Yes, a majority would be difficult, but a coalition with the Scottish National Party is something that is well within reach. Moreover, the vast majority of pundits who have smarmily written off candidates and causes that have been behind in polls in the past two years (Corbyn, Trump, Brexit) have a lot of egg on their faces already. Don’t get me wrong, there are huge improvements that need to be made and steps that need to be taken for the Labour Party to get back into power, but the media in this country are far more out of touch with the British people than Jeremy Corbyn is.</p><p>Corbyn’s political communications strategy needs to improve. He needs a bold, coherent, unified and radical programme that the country is actually aware of. He needs to advocate policies such as a universal basic income, an increased minimum wage, huge investment in infrastructure, free education and a commitment to standing up for the interests of British workers when negotiating trade deals and dealing with big business. He also needs to address the issues within his own party. He needs to take control of the Labour Party before he can take control of the country, otherwise he’s nothing but a sitting duck.</p><p>His message to and his communication with the general public will not improve if that message is being undermined every other hour on the television screens by hostile elements of the party who will never accept his leadership and as Mandelson said, will work every day to ensure that he isn’t successful. We need to see a more authoritative Jeremy Corbyn, and we need to see the implementation of mandatory reselection: where Labour Party members are able to choose or replace their own parliamentary constituency candidates. Blair and Brown spent the best part of two decades reshaping the Labour Party into their image and parachuting media friendly allies into safe seats. It is common sense to change the Parliamentary Labour Party so that it reflects the views of the membership. If Corbyn is to succeed he needs a unified, radical, populist message coming out of the Labour Party, and the harsh reality is that taking on and replacing the intellectually bankrupt right-wing of the Labour Party is a prerequisite to that success.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=37ff894c7bfa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The myth of American humanitarianism and liberal interventionism]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MattTurner4L/the-myth-of-american-humanitarianism-and-liberal-interventionism-a51846a0e8b0?source=rss-36c8e69dafa1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a51846a0e8b0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[us-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[imperialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hegemony]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jan 2017 15:05:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-23T15:05:35.952Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iWQ0auyu_CIo3CU8KcFidQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The ‘responsibility to protect’ has been intensely scrutinised and debated since the phrase was coined by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001. Since then, the term has become a significant part of the contemporary discourse surrounding humanitarian interventions. Previously, similar doctrines such as ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ had also been used to provide a framework for humanitarian intervention. This ‘protectionist’ discourse is frequently cited in justifying liberal interventions, and also to assert the protection of civilians from persecution and oppression by their own state (Chandler 2007). Many academics and political analysts argue that the US interventions in Haiti, Kosovo and others around the turn of this century show this discourse in practice. In these examples, the mantra of the ‘responsibility to protect’ and similar doctrines are believed to have guided a liberal internationalist US foreign policy that defended democracy in the name of humanitarian intervention, namely, “coercive action against a state to protect people within its borders from suffering grave harm” (Evans and Sahnoun 2002: 99) on the basis of just causes and humanitarian intentions.</p><p>Meanwhile, there are scholars in the field of US foreign policy who are more sceptical. Many view the ‘responsibility to protect’ and liberal interventionism as “a current of irrational thought that supports military occupation and murder in the name of virtue and decency” (Seymour 2012: 1). Moreover, there is dispute over who the beneficiary of the ‘responsibility to protect’ really is. After all, it has been argued that every American intervention during the period of 1989–2009 has been a self-serving attempt to preserve “U.S global hegemony” (Wood 1999: 2) and the dominance of NATO under what Wood (1991) coined as “The New Imperialism”. This new wave of thinking will be the foundation of this essay, which will take an academic trajectory honing in on anti-imperialist thought. For the purposes of this essay, interventions undergone before 2001 will be studied for the central tenets of the ‘responsibility to protect’. It will acknowledge and analyse the arguments supporting liberal interventionism and the foundation of the ‘responsibility to protect’, in order to conclude that in reality, the doctrine’s central tenets are largely vacant from hawkish, self-serving and neo-colonial US foreign policy that deceivingly drapes itself in the lexicon of compassion, humanitarianism and altruism.</p><p>The first case study to assess is the American intervention in Haiti in 1994, as the action itself was lauded as a humanitarian effort to restore a democratically elected government. Consequentially, it received widespread backing and authorisation from United Nations countries, and was praised by academics as “the beginning of a meaningful and not merely rhetorical commitment to support democracy” (Reisman 1994: 796). Meanwhile Christopher Hitchens, a darling of the liberal left and paradoxically, American intervention, claimed that this humanitarian intervention was one that should be supported due to Republicans and neo-conservatives being “hostile to doing anything about” the brutal military dictatorship ruling over Haiti (Abramsky 1997). Evidently, the consensus here is that the tenets of ‘responsibility to protect’ did indeed guide US foreign policy in this instance, and many believed that as a result of the persecution of the population under the military junta, the “responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (ICISS 2001).</p><p>Despite this rhetorical veil of humanitarianism, when the context of the role of the United States in initially destabilising Haiti is known, that veil becomes increasingly transparent. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by a military coup in 1991, and was the subject of much disdain from leading political figures in the United States due to him being “clear about the necessity of a redistribution of wealth” and a sceptic of US foreign policy (Blum 2003: 372). Another fact often omitted by advocates of American intervention is that the military coup was indirectly supported by the Bush 41 government and the Central Intelligence Agency, who “helped to create a fund a paramilitary group called The Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH)” (Farmer 2004: 29). The purpose of this death squad was to undermine popular support for the now ousted Aristide, whose “refusal to accept the (neoliberal) policies of his opponent […] was what precipitated Washington’s mobilisation of the death squads in the first place” (Seymour 2012: 352).</p><p>Moreover, before Bill Clinton fulfilled his election pledge to restore democracy (and President Aristide) to Haiti, he actually increased trade with the oppressive military junta. The subsequent intervention in Haiti in 1994 was on the “condition that he (Aristide) keep to the harsh neoliberal policies of the U.S-backed candidate” (Chomsky 2008). Meanwhile, the domestic pressures of the Haitian refugee crisis started to have a big impact in Florida and became politically unsustainable. This is a clear cut example of a fundamentally self-serving foreign policy strategy which only had a ‘responsibility to protect’ one thing; America and its domestic and foreign interests. After Bush 41 destabilised Haiti, Clinton “imposed a relentlessly neoliberal diet” on the country which was responsible for “pauperising Haitians even further” (Milne 2013: 216), all while reaping the domestic rewards for seemingly solving the problem of Haitian refugees Knowing this, it would be absurd to suggest that US foreign policy towards Haiti was guided by the ‘responsibility to protect’ in any shape or form.</p><p>The involvement of the United States in the Bosnian War paints a similar picture of the significance of the ‘responsibility to protect’ in guiding US foreign policy. The prevailing consensus among Western thinkers is that Clinton resisted intervening militarily until domestic pressures were too high (Gibbs 2009). When considering the number of civilian casualties before Clinton caved in to that domestic pressure, it is evident that this directly contradicts the assertion that US foreign policy is dictated by altruistic and humanitarian motives.</p><p>Interestingly, when one looks at the context and causes of the Bosnian War as well as the specifics of both the US intervention and their role in subsequent peace agreements, there is a disturbing insinuation that humanitarianism was never high on their list of priorities. In the 1970s and 1980s, Yugoslavia was backed into a corner by the American dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF’s aim was to restructure the global economy and by doing so, inflicted austerity and privatisation on Yugoslavia that decimated much of its economy and created a disillusioned, underemployed population susceptible to rising racial tensions (Petras and Vieux 1996). The imposition of these free market reforms inevitably “corroded the social fabric and the rights and the securities that individuals and families had come to rely on” (Woodward 1995: 15), thus playing a significant role in the horrendous upsurge in nationalism in the lead up to the conflict.</p><p>The self-serving nature of the American intervention in Bosnia is also highlighted by the fact that the US refused viable peace plans put forward by European negotiators and allowed the conflict to continue until America had a monopoly on the peace process. The US Secretary of State at the time, Warren Christopher, encapsulates the motivations of the United States perfectly when he said that “there will be no peace agreement in Bosnia unless NATO and the United States, the United States in particular, take the lead in the implementation of a peace agreement” (Christopher 1995, cited in Petras and Vieux 1996). This decision undoubtedly cost thousands of lives, which like the conflict in Haiti, begs the question of who America really feels a ‘responsibility to protect’ towards. After all, they failed to intervene until domestic pressures were too high and when they did, their main goal was to reassert NATO’s dominance in a post-Cold War era and American hegemony in Europe as opposed to offering actual humanitarian relief. This leads me to assert that the rhetoric of humanitarianism, ‘the responsibility to protect’ and similar doctrines are simply a façade for much more sinister, economic and geo-strategic motivations.</p><p>Similarly, the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo has been the subject of much debate. This intervention is often heralded as “a triumph of liberal interventionism” (The Independent 2008). Moreover, the liberal commentariat who were agitating for intervention in Kosovo lauded the effort as NATO’s finest hour, claiming that the military action was “more in the name of human rights and moral obligation than out of any traditional concept of the national interest” (Rieff 1999, cited in Ryan 2011: 675). Yet once again, the reality of the situation trumps the rhetoric. There is no denying that there was a severe humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, however what is debatable is whether this crisis and therefore the tenets of the ‘responsibility to protect’ guided US foreign policy in the Balkans. Instead, the motivations for this intervention are once again rooted in the global hegemony of not only NATO but free market capitalism. Bill Clinton himself admitted that “if we’re going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be a key […] that’s what this Kosovo thing is all about” (Schwarz and Layne 1999). It is not surprising that like Bosnia, the United States saw Kosovo as an opportunity to stamp their authority and maintain control of Europe, thus protecting their own interests and ideologies.</p><p>It has additionally been posited that the proposals at the peace talks in Rambouilet in the run up to the intervention were drawn up by NATO knowing full well that the Serbs would reject the offer. This was in order to “create a consensus in Washington and among the NATO allies that force would have to be used” (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2004: 85). Clinton and other Western allies thought it imperative that NATO remain a dominant force in Europe and that was their main motivation in “bypassing the UN and acting as judge and jury in their own case” (Milne 2013: 175). The trend in all of these interventions thus far is US foreign policy being overly concerned with maintaining American dominance rather than any ‘responsibility to protect’, especially considering that the intervention in Kosovo “exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, bequeathed a legacy of impoverished occupation and failed to resolve the underlying conflict” (Milne 2013: 175). That is not to deny that there was a moral case for intervention in Kosovo, but what is clear is that US foreign policy took advantage of that moral case for their own benefit, while leaving other countries undergoing similar atrocities in the lurch due to the lack of perceived benefits to American and her allies. Those double standards accentuate how little the ‘responsibility to protect’ guides US foreign policy, and how hegemonic interests repeatedly do.</p><p>As the Bush 43 government did not support the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a doctrine, it is not surprising that their misadventure in Iraq did not comply with its central tenets. There was no just cause, as the lack of weapons of mass destruction proves, and like all of the other interventions analysed above, the good intentions of their military action are questionable at best. The motivations and “social forces” behind military action in Iraq are more likely to have been “material demand for oil […] and the desire by elites to enforce hegemony through the war on terror” (Maguire 2010: 145). This is confirmed by none other than the former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, who wrote that “I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq War is largely about oil” (Maguire 2010: 146). This emphasises the self-serving nature of the conflict and therefore a lack of adherence to the ‘responsibility to protect’. Moreover, the Iraqi population, who under the ‘responsibility to protect’ would be the main beneficiaries of intervention, largely view the American military presence in their country as an occupation as opposed to a liberation (Gallup 2004).</p><p>The one aspect of which the Iraq War could have conformed to the ‘responsibility to protect’ is the responsibility to rebuild, which asserts that it is the responsibility of the intervening state to repair damages, rebuild infrastructure and enact necessary peacekeeping measures (Hostetter 2010). While the Bush government did give some consideration to the state building effort after the conflict, the lack of funding and a meaningful strategy meant that two thirds of Iraqis believed that the actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in rebuilding Iraqi turned out worse than expected (Gallup 2004). The effort was lambasted from all corners, with many claiming that the only post-war planning was “crowd control at exuberant parades” (Lomperis 2006: 7). This is because that “nobody in the Bush administration thought there was going to be a big bill for the Iraq aftermath” (Woodward 2008: 145), meaning that the state of Iraq was left neglected amidst the rise of sectarian insurgencies and political instability. Despite being the one area that US foreign policy could have been guided by a modicum of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine, the Bush government’s ineptitude in handling the aftermath of the Iraq War meant that their actions did far more harm than good.</p><p>In conclusion, there are evidently some attempts to invoke the ‘responsibility to protect’ and the humanitarian aspect of intervention in US political discourse, but these are merely rhetorical as opposed to being grounded in reality. When dissecting the actions of the United States over the last three decades, a clear pattern emerges. While their military interventions are eulogised as acts of compassion and humanitarianism, analysis of these escapades prove them to be nothing more than self-serving acts aimed at preserving the global hegemony of the United States whether it be politically, economically or geo-strategically. If anything, there is a glaring lack of any guidance from the ‘responsibility to protect’ in US foreign policy between 1989 and 2009. In every instance, their hegemonic motivations have trumped all others, including those where thousands of lives could have been saved in the process. This completely contradicts the key tenets of the ‘responsibility to protect’, and the liberal interventionists who falsely invoke it to justify such barbarous and self-interested acts are as Ryan (2011) described; the useful idiots of those to who seek American supremacy and imperial dominance.</p><p>Bibliography</p><p>Abramsky, S. (1997) ‘Christopher Hitchens Interview’, <em>Progressive</em> [online]. Available at: <a href="http://www.progressive.org/christopher_hitchens_1997_progressive_interview.html">http://www.progressive.org/christopher_hitchens_1997_progressive_interview.html</a> (accessed 2nd December 2016)</p><p>Blum, W. (2003) <em>Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II</em> (London: Zed)</p><p>Chandler, D. (2007) ‘The responsibility to protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’, <em>International Peacekeeping</em>, 11/1: 59–81</p><p>Chomsky, N. (2008) ‘Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of the Imperial Right’, <em>Monthly Review</em>, 60/4: 22–50</p><p>Daalder, I. and O’Hanlon, M. (2004) <em>Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo</em> (Washington: Brookings Institute Press)</p><p>Evans, G. and Sahnoun, M. (2002) ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, <em>Foreign Affairs</em>, 81/6: 99–110</p><p>Farmer, P. (2004) ‘Who Removed Aristide?’, <em>London Review of Books</em>, 26/8: 28–31</p><p>Gallup (2004) <em>Gallup Poll of Iraq: Liberated, Occupied or in Limbo?</em> [online]. Available at: <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/11527/gallup-poll-iraq-liberated-occupied-limbo.aspx">http://www.gallup.com/poll/11527/gallup-poll-iraq-liberated-occupied-limbo.aspx</a> [accessed 6th December 2016]</p><p>Gibbs, D. (2009) <em>First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia </em>(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press)</p><p>Hostetter, D. (2010) ‘Responsibility to Protect: Development of the Concept, and a Critique’, <em>The Conrad Grebel Review</em>, 28/3: 39–56</p><p>Lomperis, T. (2006) ‘Dispelling the Ghost: Iraq as the Vietnam War We Cannot Afford to Lose’, <em>The Journal of Conflict Studies, </em>26/2: 5–24</p><p>Maguire, D. (2010) ‘Marxism’ in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds.) <em>Theory and Methods in Political Science Third Edition </em>(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) pp. 136–155</p><p>Milne, S. (2013) <em>The Revenge of History: The Battle for the 21st Century</em> (London: Verso)</p><p>Petras, J. and Vieux, S. (1996) ‘Bosnia and the Revival of US Hegemony’, <em>New Left Review</em>, no.218: 3–25</p><p>Reisman, W.M. (1994) ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies’, <em>Fordham International Law Journal</em>, 18/3: 794–805</p><p>Ryan, M. (2011) ‘Bush’s “Useful Idiots”: 9/11, the liberal walks, and the co-option of the “war on terror”, <em>Journal of American Studies</em>, 45/4: 667–693</p><p>Schwarz, B. and Layne, C. (1999) ‘The Case Against Intervention in Kosovo’, <em>Nation</em> [online]. Available at: <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/case-against-intervention-kosovo/">https://www.thenation.com/article/case-against-intervention-kosovo/</a> [accessed 5th December 2016]</p><p>Seymour, R. (2012) <em>The Liberal Defence of Murder </em>(London: Verso)</p><p>The Independent (2008) <em>Editorial: Kosovo: A Triumph for Intervention</em> [online]. Available at: <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/leading-article-kosovo-a-triumph-for-intervention-783279.html">http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/leading-article-kosovo-a-triumph-for-intervention-783279.html</a> [accessed 5th December 2016]</p><p>The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). (2001) <em>The Responsibility to Protect</em> [online]. Available at: <a href="http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf">http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf</a> [Accessed 2nd December 2016]</p><p>Wood, E.M. (2002) ‘Kosovo and the New Imperialism’, <em>Monthly Review</em>, 51–2: 1–8</p><p>Woodward, B. (2008) <em>State of Denial: Bush at War Part III (New York: Simon and Schuster)</em></p><p>Woodward, S. (1995) <em>Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War</em> (Washington: Brookings Institution Press)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a51846a0e8b0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Labour Coup: An Act of Orchestrated Incompetence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@MattTurner4L/the-labour-coup-an-act-of-orchestrated-incompetence-6a6afdadf883?source=rss-36c8e69dafa1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6a6afdadf883</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[jeremy-corbyn]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labour-party]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Jul 2016 19:05:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-06T16:37:26.083Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don’t really know where to start, to be quite honest with you.</p><p>I guess we’ll start at the cataclysmic moment that gave those enacting the coup the moment they’ve been waiting for to try and dethrone Jeremy Corbyn, namely, the result of the EU referendum. After all, they’ve been waiting for a while. It was reported in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/03/revealed-plot-to-oust-jeremy-corbyn-by-using-veteran-labour-mp-m/">The Telegraph in May</a> that Margaret Hodge was going to be the one to deliver the first blow to Corbyn, and even before that, it was inferred that the plot to overthrow the democratically elected leader of the Labour Party has been in the works for months, with speculation suggesting that it was in preparation before the Oldham by-election. However, the unexpected Leave vote in the EU referendum gave them, in their opinion, the perfect chance to strike.</p><p>To me, anyway, that didn’t make sense to begin with. It was the first of many acts of incompetence shown by the plotters. Their attempts to blame Jeremy Corbyn for the EU referendum result and simultaneously use that assertion to push the claim that he is unelectable were based on the kind of intellectual gymnastics that we’ve come to expect from the Parliamentary Labour Party, but even by their standards, it was baseless.</p><p>Not only was Corbyn and his ‘reluctant remain’ position far more in tune with public opinion that the rest of the Europhiles in the Parliamentary Labour Party, <a href="https://blog.lboro.ac.uk/crcc/eu-referendum/uk-news-coverage-2016-eu-referendum-report-5-6-may-22-june-2016/">but a recent study by Loughborough University</a> suggested that Corbyn had a much larger media presence than any other prominent figure in the Labour ‘In’ campaign — the idea that he was shying away from the debate on the European Union is a complete and utter myth. Polling guru John Curtice puts forward <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/04/evidence-blame-jeremy-corbyn-brexit-remain-labour-conservative">a compelling argument defending Corbyn here.</a> Moreover, considering they had to get the young vote out to stand a chance of doing well, it is beyond belief that the supposed leader of this campaign, Alan Johnson, doesn’t even have a Twitter account. Presumed challenger to Corbyn’s leadership, Angela Eagle, has also recently changed her tune on Corbyn’s efforts on the campaign trail. Only a few weeks ago, she was incredibly complimentary about Corbyn’s efforts. It was clear from the very beginning that this was nothing to do with the EU referendum — but control of the Labour Party.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/793/0*k3JSoOYx-CA8q_34." /><figcaption>What’s changed, Angela?</figcaption></figure><p>What the plotters fail to understand is that Jeremy Corbyn is one of the people best placed to reconnect with the working class heartlands that voted leave. As I mentioned in a previous post, it was the abandonment of left-wing Euroscepticism and the working class under Neil Kinnock and Tony Blair that sowed the seeds for this very event. I still maintain that no matter who the leader of the Labour Party was at the time of the referendum, those 30% of Labour leavers were not going to be persuaded otherwise, especially not by the patronising soft left bilge that would have been peddled by Burnham, Cooper and/or Kendall. To suggest that Corbyn is the cause instead of the solution for the situation we find ourselves in is farcical. That rant, however, is for another day — <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/26/labour-mutineers-betraying-national-interest">but this article by Len McCluskey is very good.</a></p><p>Since the fateful day that Margaret Hodge (whose constituency overwhelmingly voted to leave, by the way) was wheeled out on the news channels to condemn Corbyn, the coup plotters have managed to turn themselves into a national laughing stock. The people who have been blasting Jeremy Corbyn and calling for ‘effective leadership’ have literally shown themselves up to be some of the most ineffective, inept politicians in Parliament at the moment.</p><p>Once again, I’m struggling to decide where to begin — there have been that many cockups over the last week. Most of the cockups I can laugh at, but there is one that genuinely sickens me to the core. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/29/labour-mps-vs-corbyn-war-party-members-tories-brexit">Diane Abbott’s Guardian article</a>, she claims that the first Parliamentary Labour Party meeting since the coup begun was based around ‘breaking him (Corbyn) as a man’. Firstly, for Corbyn to be used as a verbal punching bag for MPs who couldn’t even persuade their own constituencies to vote to Remain is beyond hypocritical. Secondly, the idea that this wasn’t even about a policy platform, but about Corbyn himself, really bothers me. In my opinion, any member of Parliament that was guilty of trying to ‘break him as a man’ — namely, bully an elected leader out of office, should be expelled from the party with immediate effect. Furthermore, this barrage of hatred was the only card that the coup plotters could play — and they knew it.</p><p>Their assumption that Corbyn was a weak enough character to give in to the pressure of mass shadow cabinet resignations and a barrage of abuse ignores the fact that he has been up against it his entire political career. He has stood firm against all of this, meaning that he immediately contradicted the plotters’ main complaint — his supposed weakness.</p><p><strong>Recap: the supposed ‘plan’, if you can call it that, was to put him under so much pressure that he had to resign. Instead, their actions have meant that we now have the loyal Shadow Cabinet that we should have had from the very beginning of Corbyn’s leadership and at least 60,000 engaged new members. Good coup, guys.</strong></p><p>As I said earlier, the sheer ineptidude of the coup plotters has a brilliant tinge of irony. These are the people who are calling for ‘effective leadership’. In reality, they couldn’t run a bath themselves. Not only that, but their inability to actually field a candidate to challenge Corbyn thus far shows that they have spines of jelly.</p><p>I mean, they’ve had the domain names for SavingLabour and Angela Eagle’s campaign ready since the 25th June (despite Eagle quoting Benn’s subsequent sacking as her reason for resigning) — but every day they threaten to run, try and call Corbyn’s bluff and force him to resign, fail miserably and wonder what to do next. It is seemingly obvious to everyone besides the plotters that they desperately don’t want to run, which begs the question why they’re even bothering with these games. It’s safe to say that Angela Eagle &amp; co are not members of the House of Commons’ poker society.</p><p>What happens next? Well either they challenge him, or they don’t. They have to put up or shut up. Which one would I prefer? I don’t even know anymore. I’d be more than happy for them to challenge Corbyn’s leadership, because everybody knows they’d lose. However, at a time when the Labour Party should be focusing on defending migrants who have been increasingly targeted and demonised since the Brexit vote, and appealing to the working class heartlands that we have so shamefully abandoned over the last two decades — it is clear that there are an infinite number of better things we could be doing over the summer than running a leadership contest that would both be a foregone conclusion and potentially create an irreparable split in the Labour Party.</p><p>Do I see a split as inevitable? That completely depends on whether a portion of the PLP continue being the self serving ideologues that they’ve proven to be over the last week. My thinking was always that we should be conciliatory to the right of the Labour Party, and those who don’t necessarily agree with everything that Jeremy Corbyn stands for in order to ensure party unity. Labour is a broad church, after all. However, by plotting this dangerous, self-serving, ideologically motivated coup and then having the brass neck to claim it is in the ‘national interest’ — the plotters have spat in the face of every single Jeremy Corbyn supporter who thought the same as I did.</p><p>One conclusion that I can draw from this sorry experience is that I have no qualms in saying that <strong>this coup is the main reason why I now wholeheartedly back mandatory reselection</strong> and a full Bennite democratising program within the Labour Party, regardless of whether a leadership challenge actually happens or not.</p><p>The other is that this attempt at overthrowing Jeremy Corbyn has been nothing but a shambles, and the instigators should be utterly ashamed of themselves. Not only because their actions were deeply irresponsible, divisive and undemocratic — but they didn’t even make a good job of it. Last year’s victory for Corbyn in the Labour leadership election showed that the Parliamentary Labour Party were lacking effective policies, strategies and tactics. It is clear from this sorry mess that not much has changed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6a6afdadf883" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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