<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nuala O&#39;Connor on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Nuala O&#39;Connor on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@Nuala?source=rss-694685e979a8------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:53:28 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@Nuala/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Building Trust in an Internet of Things World]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Nuala/building-trust-in-an-internet-of-things-world-fd34ce1f0259?source=rss-694685e979a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd34ce1f0259</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[consumer-protection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[encryption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-of-things]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nuala O'Connor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Jul 2017 21:07:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-06T21:07:29.429Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1017/1*vf1O7VCSHSbxxnlnGggYcQ.png" /></figure><p>It may once have seemed the stuff of science fiction that people would voluntarily wear a device that tracked their every move or talk to a computer sitting on their kitchen counter to order pizza. But here we are, working out (and sleeping) while our Fitbits report back to us, and listening to music and calling an Uber with Amazon’s Echo. On a recent visit to Best Buy, I found that the small appliance section had every manner of smart home devices (but no iron — people don’t iron anymore?).</p><p>Internet-connected devices have brought much-needed convenience into my life, as well as giving me useful data that helps inform many of my daily decisions. But like many consumers, I worry about how companies that store the data from my devices are protecting my personal data. I wonder about how much data they collect, when it is collected, and how this data is used, stored, or shared.</p><blockquote>Like many consumers, I worry about how companies that store the data from my devices are protecting my personal data.</blockquote><p>In the United States, the answers to these questions are left largely to the private-sector companies creating this new world of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Our legal framework around privacy is incredibly fragmented, and most IoT devices fall outside of sectoral laws that prescribe privacy protections, such as those for health, financial, or children’s information. While many of us have a certain level of trust in larger brand names, the fact is that not all IoT-producing companies are as advanced on the legal and privacy fronts as they should be, and many fail to fully consider the ramifications of their security programs. The range of devices they are creating is astounding and, in some cases, surprising; everything from <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/07/toaster/">connected toasters</a> to <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/">internet-enabled sex toys</a> <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/">a</a>r<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/">e</a> <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/">o</a>n<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/"> </a>t<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/">h</a>e<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/"> </a>m<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/">a</a>r<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/">k</a>e<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-next-security-risk-may-be-your-vibrator/">t</a>.</p><p>The legal uncertainty around the privacy and security of our personal data in the IoT world is even more disconcerting when one considers the implications of government access to this data. Not that long ago, the idea that granular data about our activities at home could be collected by devices was remote, and the idea that government could or would request such data sounded paranoid. Times have changed. Just this year, law enforcement requested data from both <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/nyregion/in-connecticut-murder-case-a-fitbit-is-a-silent-witness.html?mcubz=1&amp;_r=0">Fitbit </a>and <a href="https://cdt.org/blog/alexa-is-law-enforcement-listening/">Amazon </a>in separate murder cases. And while we understand the government’s intent to pursue justice in these cases, the rules around government access to this kind of data should be explicit, as they will have profound and lasting effect on all of us.</p><p>In the absence of such clarity, responsibility falls on companies to secure our personal data and shield what they choose to collect from government surveillance. A foundation of our country is the right to our personal, private spaces, and this is not a task they should take lightly. If tech companies want to advance daily use of their products, and if they — and we — want to reap the benefits of connected living, devices must be designed to merit the trust and confidence of all consumers. Here are four basic ways companies in the IoT space can build trust:</p><ol><li><strong>Build privacy into the design early.</strong> Think about the human experience and the digital dignity of consumers. Think through what data you need for your IoT product to operate, and don’t collect more data just because you can. When it comes to data, sometimes less is more. The less data you collect about your customers, the less personal information the government can attempt to collect; the less data you’re storing in an identifiable format, the lower the incentive for outside actors to breach your data. Collecting unnecessary personal data potentially increases your liability in the event of a breach. It also requires that you allocate scarce resources towards even stronger data security measures, which add to your expenses, thereby hurting both your top- and bottom-line.</li><li><strong>Make secure the default. </strong>Companies that decide that the benefits of collecting sensitive customer data are worth the risks need to implement sufficient security measures to protect this data. While there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to data protection, some common measures might include ensuring that data ‘in transit’ from the device to your servers should be encrypted (‘end-to-end’); data held at rest has strict access controls and — where appropriate — is encrypted; de-identifying data when possible; and deleting huge data stores that aren’t necessary.</li><li><strong>Provide clear, contextual notice. </strong>IoT devices come in all shapes, sizes, and forms, so it’s necessary to make sure that privacy policies and practices are communicated in an accessible, understandable format. For a toaster, this might look like the traditional manual that comes with it, as well as a web-based prompt that appears when connecting it to the internet. For something like a device that audibly speaks, it should speak the policy out loud in clear language — ideally, it should offer users the option to hear it in multiple languages.</li><li><strong>Empower and educate users. </strong>Companies can and should go beyond writing and communicating a privacy policy. They should empower consumers to take control of their online privacy and security, while providing them the tools and information to do so. Some of the major social media platforms have started to do this, such as Facebook with its privacy “checkup” and Microsoft’s Privacy Dashboard. IoT companies should emulate these examples as they explore approaches that regularly encourage their users — in the context of the user’s interaction with the device — to check their privacy preferences, while educating them about the implications of their choices.</li></ol><p>As we near the tipping point of internet-connected devices, these are the fundamental actions companies should take to build trust and empower their consumers. Concerns about unlawful government access to personal information and the ability of companies to keep our information private and secure are, perhaps, the biggest impediment to the future of IoT. Policymakers must establish clear protections that reflect the reality of the digital age across sectors, while providing flexibility for industry experimentation; as we wait for these policies, however, the private sector must lead the way.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd34ce1f0259" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Demanding Passwords at the Border Would Undermine Human Rights and Personal Security]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Nuala/demanding-passwords-at-the-border-would-undermine-human-rights-and-personal-security-6bcd7de238d6?source=rss-694685e979a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6bcd7de238d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[homeland-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nuala O'Connor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Mar 2017 15:22:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-07T15:48:54.795Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Anyone who has traveled internationally knows that uncomfortable feeling when you go through customs. As you hand over your passport, and other documentation, you are at the mercy of the border agent. Will they let you in? Did you fill everything out correctly? For many of us, that twinge of discomfort passes quickly as they hand back our passport. But for some, there are even more questions and sometimes a secondary screening. For those who experience this, their sense of vulnerability is unquestionably heightened.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lv7w2lEnPbIkOBz2AHHQ6Q.png" /></figure><p>Based on remarks by the Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly, the U.S. government is considering taking advantage of this fraught interaction to collect social media account passwords of non-citizens entering the country. In the past, there were proposals to make it optional for visitors to share their social media identifier information on certain visa applications, but this proposal is light-years beyond that. Secretary Kelly did not suggest that providing passwords would be optional, and even if they were, can you imagine saying no to a customs agent’s request? That is far easier said than done, especially if you are hoping to seek asylum or need to visit a sick relative.</p><p>Not only is the Secretary’s suggested plan an egregious affront to the dignity of our visitors, it would also be a major erosion of privacy rights that puts significant amounts of personal information at risk. It would discourage the use of communications devices and social media accounts when traveling, and, in fact, would likely discourage people from visiting the United States all together. And every American who travels should expect other countries to apply a similar policy to them. This is why the <a href="https://cdt.org/">Center for Democracy &amp; Technology</a> <a href="https://cdt.org/insight/no-to-dhs-social-media-password-requirement/">spearheaded a coalition</a> of human rights and civil liberties organizations, trade associations, and experts in security, technology, and law to oppose Secretary Kelly’s dangerous proposal.</p><p>As the <a href="https://cdt.org/insight/no-to-dhs-social-media-password-requirement/">coalition said in their letter</a> to Secretary Kelly, the first rule of personal cybersecurity is “don’t share your password.” If the Secretary gets his way, I believe it will create serious harm to all visitors’ personal security. Here’s why.</p><ol><li><strong>Passwords are the keys to your personal kingdom. </strong>Unlike publicly available social media identifiers, passwords unlock a much deeper world of information, such as chats conducted within social media apps, detailed contact information for people in your network, or financial information. The government should have cause to access this information and should only be able to do so after following legal due process. Also, despite the advice of most cybersecurity experts, many people use the same password across sites and platforms. It’s not hard to envision a social media password being the same one someone uses for their email account, online banking, or healthcare portal.</li><li><strong>Stored passwords are an incredible target. </strong>If passwords are collected at the border, you can only imagine how valuable they would be to a malicious actor. Access to any of the information I mentioned above could lead to financial fraud, blackmail, or exploitation. Even if someone were to change their password after clearing customs, would they remember to do so for all accounts with that password? Would people eventually get complacent and forget to do this? It seems likely that the answer is yes, and when coupled with the U.S. government’s less than stellar track record of securing its data, the threat is greatly magnified.</li><li><strong>Data easily flows between agencies. </strong>While the Department of Homeland Security may have a defined use for the information it collects at the border, should the NSA and the FBI and also have this information? The reality is that if one agency has your data, every agency has your data. This creates new opportunities for misuse, the messy mixing of data sets, and even more potential for breach.</li></ol><p>I understand the important need to keep our country safe, and I also recognize that having access to all the communications of everyone visiting the country could help in identifying patterns and networks. But this is a country that places great value on privacy and the ability to communicate without pervasive government surveillance. How can a nation that is so proud of our freedoms of association, of religion, and of speech put forth a proposal that so greatly devalues these freedoms for visitors? This does not reflect the best of who we are as a country or the rights to which we are entitled as citizens.</p><p>Collecting passwords of non-citizens entering the United States is clearly a search that far exceeds an appropriate level of screening at entry. It exploits people at one of their most vulnerable moments and creates a broader personal security risk. The government cannot have access to people’s passwords simply because they cross the border. Full stop.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6bcd7de238d6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The List-Building Has Begun: How the Tech Sector Should Respond]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Nuala/the-list-building-has-begun-how-the-tech-sector-should-respond-8cf5060bc15a?source=rss-694685e979a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8cf5060bc15a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[silicon-valley]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[discrimination]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nuala O'Connor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2017 19:57:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-14T19:57:28.373Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I recently walked into a policy meeting in Washington, DC, and a friendly voice called out, “Nuala, you know you and CDT are on the enemies list.” It was supposed to be a joke, and it was. But it wasn’t.</p><p>The power of the state lies in its ability to deprive individuals of rights, benefits, life, and liberty. This power is magnified when the government amasses hordes of information on its citizens, particularly on those citizens with whom they may disagree. These datasets are certainly made easier by new technologies. That is why I have always maintained that there is an important distinction between information collected by the private sector and information collected by the government.</p><blockquote>We now have an Administration that is starting its list-building in profound ways.</blockquote><p>One of the most compelling messages of the Snowden disclosures was that the bright line between those two datasets is far less clear, and far more permeable, than we had previously imagined. We now have an Administration that is starting its list-building in profound ways. There are calls to investigate alleged voter fraud, which will naturally include closely examining voter registration records across the country. We also witnessed an executive order aimed at securing our borders that adds new layers of examination for not only visitors, but also legal visa and green card holders. We’ve heard stories of forced disclosure of social media identifiers and passwords, and contacts from cell phones. This is how it begins.</p><p>This list-making will require help, though, and as Kate Crawford calls out in her <a href="http://harpers.org/archive/2017/02/trump-a-resisters-guide/11/">powerful letter to Silicon Valley</a>, the list of private-sector actors aiding and abetting government data collection is a long one. So how do we limit data collection, misuse, and potential abuse?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q5jKZBQ-EpRdu2zO6BSiog.png" /></figure><p>While individuals certainly play a role in taking control of their data, there is an essential role for industry, particularly our friends in the technology sector, to reinforce policies and enhance technologies that limit unwanted and unwarranted intrusion into our digital daily lives. Here are but a few concrete and simple — not easy, but simple — steps in that direction.</p><p><strong>Delete the data:</strong> One of the least sexy and in many ways most difficult ideas is to simply get rid of the data you don’t need any more — data deletion or minimization. This is partnered with the “only collect the minimum amount needed” concepts, collection limitation, and purpose specification. Asking corporate systems and marketing leaders to get rid of data they rightfully hold sounds about as appealing as you asking me to get rid of any of the dozens of textbooks I have from my law school days. I might need them someday? Those notes in the margins can’t be recreated? I get that it’s challenging. There is potential value in data, though I would argue there is less and less as it ages. But we must remember that large and interesting sets of personally identifiable data are not only a potential asset; they also contain inherent risk and costs. There is a risk of breach, and, increasingly, a reputational risk should the government come a-callin’ for interesting data about a particular population. Creating a data lifecycle that categorizes data and creates parameters for its end should be core operational practices for all companies that have personal data, as should minimization, de-identification, masking, and deletion-by-encryption. CDT will soon release a paper on this topic, and I’m more convinced than ever that one of the best defenses is disposing of data or making it irretrievable. I’ve long said — even back when I was in government service — that the best way to prevent the expansive or inappropriate use of data by any institution is to not have the data at all. And delete must really mean delete, if that is the intention of the individual.</p><p><strong>Make strong technical security the default:</strong> Security of internet transactions and communications is essential to preventing inappropriate collection of personal information. CDT has taken strong stances on <a href="https://cdt.org/blog/cdt-files-brief-in-support-of-apple-and-strong-encryption/">end-to-end encryption</a> and <a href="https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-the-time-has-come-to-move-to-https/">HTTPS adoption</a>. This work is founded in our belief that privacy is essential to human dignity and development. Individuals must trust that their digital lives, like their real-world lives, contain safe places for personal thoughts, communications, and collaborations. As I have <a href="https://cdt.org/insight/nuala-oconnor-remarks-on-celebrating-our-digital-rights/">said before</a>, we are fighting to protect the autonomy, the individuality, and the creativity that comes from the quiet spaces. While consumers can — and should — take some steps to adopt protections, the defaults set by companies become the norm, and the companies that hold encryption keys will also become targets. While we recognize that there are legitimate and compelling law enforcement and national security reasons to investigate criminal and terrorist acts and communications, first and foremost, we must protect the rights of an individual citizen to be left alone or we have utterly failed in our mission to uphold American values. Companies upon which individual citizens rely to engage in ordinary, daily life in the digital era — whether hardware, software, apps, or platforms — must consider these individual expectations and external threats, and design their products and services to be responsive to both.</p><p><strong>Reject overbroad government requests:</strong> I’m incredibly proud of some now-very-old stories I have about criticizing and rejecting government demands for data from the private sector. I understand the compelling nature of security threats, and the intensity with which we want to keep our friends and families safe. But demands on the private sector, when made by the government, must be made in accordance with law and legal process. It is very difficult to say no when you are told by someone in a position of power that “people are going to die” if they are not given what they want. I know — someone once said that to me. But we are a nation of laws and principles. While the onus is certainly on the government not to make egregious requests of the private sector to turn over data, it is also on companies to reject and push back against unreasonable requests and searches, and to demand transparency and accountability in these processes wherever possible.</p><p>In a digital age of fluid boundaries between the individual, company, and state, it is imperative that companies defend the rights of their individual customers and take steps — whether in technology design or in institutional policy — to limit disclosure of personal data to the government. The list-building has begun, but companies must not become willing partners.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8cf5060bc15a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Moving Forward On Our Shared Democratic Values]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Nuala/moving-forward-on-our-shared-democratic-values-7af198c6d97e?source=rss-694685e979a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7af198c6d97e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[free-speech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dignity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nuala O'Connor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Feb 2017 18:49:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-08T18:00:09.291Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RT-fDgQiG-4333_AANjdWA.png" /></figure><p>It is a time of uncertainty and anxiety around the world. The new President in the United States has moved swiftly, and has already implemented policies that upend what many of us believe are fundamental values and structures of our democracy.</p><p>The feeling of disorder is true even for those who celebrated the recent inauguration and those who marched to promote women’s rights or other important issues; I did the latter, proudly marching alongside my daughter on the National Mall. With all this uncertainty, I felt it was important to reflect on the core principles that ground our work at <a href="https://cdt.org/">the Center for Democracy &amp; Technology</a> to help inform our course of action as we face new challenges.</p><p>First, we believe technology and innovation are forces for good. For those of us in the tech world, this may seem obvious, but for many across the nation and the world, technological disruption has not always improved their lives. Whether this is a result of a lack of access to core technologies necessary to participate in a digital economy or displacement from work because of new business models, we must increase our efforts to leverage technology to eradicate inequality, not exacerbate it. This will require honest conversations about technology’s impact on society, institutions, communities, and individuals. And it will include work that we are already doing, including research and analysis on the algorithms that drive the decisions made about us each day, whether this is our creditworthiness, work performance assessment, or even the news we receive. By embedding fairness, ethics, and equality into these digital decisions, we can get far closer to a world where technology meets its democratizing potential.</p><blockquote>For many across the nation and the world, technological disruption has not always improved their lives.</blockquote><p>Second, we believe an essential part of human dignity is the right to a private life. The traditional notions of privacy have certainly been blurred by technology, as most of us walk around each day with a personal computer and beacon in our pockets. We have connected our homes, our cars, and our bodies. But embracing technology cannot mean that we have ceded our right to privacy to companies or institutions. With an Administration that appears unlikely to embrace broader privacy policies and regulations, it is imperative that not only individuals act to protect their own privacy, but also that companies — through policy choices and technology development — do more to protect the privacy of their customers.</p><p>Third, we believe freedom of expression is an underpinning of a vibrant and open democracy. A strong fourth estate and civil society are important checks on government power, as are individual voices. Citizens must have not only access to accurate information — from inside and outside the government — they must also have an unfettered right to criticize the government without fear of reprisal. The internet has certainly enabled more people to share their voice, but it has also given a platform to bullies and created silos of information. To move forward, we must work together to improve online communities so all of us have a place. We recognize the role of the internet in shaping our shared truths. And we must fight back any attempts by the government to use technology to silence individual voices.</p><blockquote>We must fight back any attempts by the government to use technology to silence individual voices.</blockquote><p>Finally, we believe ubiquitous government surveillance is harmful to individual autonomy and human advancement. Simply because the government can collect and monitor information about us does not mean it should. We have made some progress in defining clear boundaries on mass government surveillance in the U.S., but the lure of surveillance technologies too often appears to be the easy fix to life-threatening issues of national security; an easy answer to difficult questions. For creativity, individual thought, and, yes, resistance to take place, there must be truly private spaces, even in the digital world. We cannot allow governments to create a world where they are always listening and watching. Yes, there are legitimate national security concerns that warrant targeted surveillance, but these must not be abused in ways that profoundly — and permanently — erode our civil liberties.</p><p>While some might disagree with how we should go about protecting and advancing the above principles, I believe most Americans agree that these principles are essential to a free and open democracy in the United States, just as they are essential to a free and open internet around the world. CDT will stand up for these core principles each day and every day, and as we face uncertain times, we will remain grounded in these values. We look forward to engaging new partners, helping bridge divides, and advancing and protecting human rights and individual dignity, both online and off.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7af198c6d97e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Global Dignity Falls with the Stroke of a Pen]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Nuala/global-dignity-falls-with-the-stroke-of-a-pen-441b6103938c?source=rss-694685e979a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/441b6103938c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[homeland-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-liberties]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nuala O'Connor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Jan 2017 22:02:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-27T22:03:25.620Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With the stroke of a pen, the new Administration <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united">has erased</a> an important principle — and one that I am proud to have supported and implemented during my service at the Department of Homeland Security during the Bush Administration: the extension of Privacy Act coverage to non-U.S. persons for data about them held by the federal government. This means that both U.S. and non-U.S. persons could request to see the information DHS held on them, such as details from an immigration application, details of a citizen’s comings and goings from the country, and interactions with the government.</p><p>While this is a pretty wonky issue that resonates most with folks who’ve worked on policy and systems in the federal government, the message this action sends is clear: people who don’t hold a U.S. passport or current green card are not entitled to the same dignity as those of us who do.</p><blockquote>It is an age-old privacy principle… that there shall be no secret databases.</blockquote><p>To me, that’s frankly shocking. And not only because I’m incredibly proud of the work I did at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (and the U.S. Department of Commerce), and my service to this great country, but because in my life, I’ve been both a person who holds a U.S. passport, and a person who has not. And my dignity, my worth as a human being, at least to my mind, did not change. But according to this new Administration, these basic rights hinge on citizenship, and should be denied to all others.</p><p>It is an age-old privacy principle, and a principle of government accountability and restraint by its own people, that there shall be no secret databases. The creation of secret databases — the amassing of power, of knowledge of this sort — is one of the many hallmarks of a totalitarian regime, and should not be tolerated. But on a less lofty note, it’s also both operationally and individually unmanageable and inefficient.</p><p>When I was at Homeland Security, the privacy office worked with the divisional agencies, particularly their IT and systems experts, and learned that many, if not all, data systems contained the information of both “U.S. persons” and “non-U.S. persons.” Under the Privacy Act, it is true that only “U.S. persons” are entitled to the full coverage — including access to these records and redress if those records are incorrect. However, in practical reality, it is operationally inefficient to bifurcate these databases into two separate systems, or to create policies and procedures for the relatively minimal percentage of record requests (compared to the vast number of records held) to deprive non-U.S. persons of their information. Further, it is often the non-U.S. person — the applicant for asylum or legal permanent residence or citizenship — who most needs to see their records, to correct them, or to access relevant information in a legal procedure because documents may be lost, and sometimes in harrowing circumstances. It also fails the fundamental standards of fairness, openness, decency, and respect for human dignity, which are hallmarks of the America that I know, that I came to as an immigrant.</p><blockquote>Ultimately, this is about human dignity</blockquote><p>Beyond these fundamental concerns, this is also profoundly bad for American business. At a time when the international dialogue on privacy, data, and technology expansion is fraught, this is a clear shot across the bow of our trading partners and allies, stating that the United States will not adhere to even the most moderate and conventional human rights norms in the data privacy space. This puts at risk the fragile Privacy Shield agreement on cross-border data flows that is <a href="https://www.engadget.com/2017/01/26/trump-signs-executive-order-stripping-non-citizens-of-privacy-ri/">essential</a> to American businesses large and small.</p><p>Ultimately, this is about human dignity and the right to access our records that are in government databases in the United States and around the world. As the rest of the free world does, the United States government should afford all persons the basic tenets of privacy and human dignity equally, including access and redress under the Privacy Act regardless of that person’s current status as citizen or visitor. This executive order denies those basic rights.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=441b6103938c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>