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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Omri Segev Moyal on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Omri Segev Moyal on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@OmriSegevMoyal?source=rss-602ff206103a------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Omri Segev Moyal on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@OmriSegevMoyal?source=rss-602ff206103a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Online Programming Learning Sites Can Be Manipulated By Hackers To Launch Cyberattacks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/online-programming-learning-sites-can-be-manipulated-by-hackers-to-launch-cyberattacks-a684d9f4daef?source=rss-602ff206103a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a684d9f4daef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aws]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[datacamp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omri Segev Moyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Jul 2022 09:59:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-07-07T09:59:17.487Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>Hackers commonly launch their attacks using compromised machines rather than directly from owned devices, which allows them to conceal their origin. In recent incident response, Profero’s Incident Response Team investigated a possible scenario where we assumed that threat actors used Datacamp’s online IDE to launch an attack against a cloud infrastructure. However, the reason was a simple lousy attribution, a mix between Datacamp, the ISP, and the online IDE. We were intrigued by the idea of using cloud IDEs to hide the origins of an attack and initiated a research project to explore this strategy.</p><h3>Online IDEs</h3><p>With some simple Python commands, it is straightforward to access public resources and use leaked credentials to download content or perform reconnaissance. Unfortunately, many users and organizations do not properly configure their resources and cloud environments, and malicious actors know how to find these misconfigurations and scrape them with scripts.</p><p>Easy subscription and quick code execution can appeal to attackers looking to cloak their identity. In addition, blue teams would most likely overlook activity from the Amazon AWS address range, in contrast to other unfamiliar services. Online IDEs provide these advantages, and most are great for basic Python commands, which do not require third-party modules. Usually, a user must install external modules using the pip install module or use external files to import modules. These actions cannot be done with simple editors, as most online editors are fundamental and would look something like this:</p><figure><img alt="Source: https://www.programiz.com/python-programming/online-compiler/" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*04KOXn2R1khUwWAasrMzsA.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.programiz.com/python-programming/online-compiler/">https://www.programiz.com/python-programming/online-compiler/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Two high-quality examples of advanced online Python IDEs are DataCamp and Binder. They give the user more abilities than ordinary online IDEs because they allow files to be uploaded using a terminal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/699/1*59QWfv4ZzE1iX1Eb9zY8zA.png" /><figcaption>Screen captures illustrate differences between Jupyter and Datacamp editors.</figcaption></figure><p>If you are unfamiliar with DataCamp, it is an online platform for learning data science. In DataCamp, one can find online courses and an advanced Python IDE. In addition, the platform allows users to start and follow code exercises and perform advanced commands quickly.</p><p>Users can use existing datasets, recipes, and templates or create blank workspaces. A Jupyter lab IDE opens when a new workspace is made.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/467/1*PntD-BarbIJOxW1uHw0Vtg.png" /></figure><h3>Attack? Is it possible?</h3><p>One of the examples of usage on Datacamp’s website is a demonstration of how to connect to a PostgreSQL server.</p><p>So, if it is possible to connect to an SQL server in the wild, why wouldn’t it be possible to connect to any other service? What about cloud services or an AWS S3 bucket?</p><p>The terminal allowed us to install third-party modules that helped us interact with external resources.</p><p>To access AWS resources, it is necessary to install boto3:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/504/1*ykmg-kW1rOsJsktTjBu0yg.png" /></figure><p>Our next step was to connect to an S3 bucket to list and download all files from it:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/452/1*Cd4VsNpT5WC6JjeRax06Zw.png" /></figure><p>We then downloaded these files to the workspace environment on the website.</p><p>From the defender side, the CloudTrail logs of file download resemble the truncated example below:</p><pre>&quot;eventSource&quot;: &quot;s3.amazonaws.com&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;eventName&quot;: &quot;GetObject&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;awsRegion&quot;: &quot;eu-west-1&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;sourceIPAddress&quot;: &quot;34.192.118.171&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;userAgent&quot;: &quot;[Boto3/1.17.22 Python/3.8.10 &#39;</pre><pre>Linux/5.4.176-91.338.amzn2.x86_64 Botocore/1.20.53 Resource]&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;requestParameters&quot;: {</pre><pre>&quot;bucketName&quot;: &quot;test_bucket&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;Host&quot;: &quot;test_bucket.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;key&quot;: &quot;test.jpg&quot;</pre><p>For an event of file uploading:</p><pre>&quot;eventTime&quot;: &quot;2022-05-13T17:12:21Z&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;eventSource&quot;: &quot;s3.amazonaws.com&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;eventName&quot;: &quot;PutObject&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;awsRegion&quot;: &quot;eu-west-1&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;sourceIPAddress&quot;: &quot;34.192.118.171&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;userAgent&quot;: &quot;[Boto3/1.17.22 Python/3.8.10</pre><pre>Linux/5.4.176-91.338.amzn2.x86_64 Botocore/1.20.53 Resource]&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;requestParameters&quot;: {</pre><pre>&quot;bucketName&quot;: &quot;test_bucket&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;Host&quot;: &quot;test_bucket.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com&quot;,</pre><pre>&quot;key&quot;: &quot;test.jpg&quot;</pre><pre>},</pre><p>In both cases, it is clear that the user agent is:</p><p>‘<em>[Boto3/1.17.22 Python/3.8.10 Linux/5.4.176–91.338.amzn2.x86_64 Botocore/1.20.53 Resource]</em>’.</p><p>This allows for quick identification of activity from a Python Script utilizing the boto framework.</p><p>In addition, looking at the source IP address shows the traffic comes from an EC2 instance in Amazon, as a simple Google search shows.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/265/1*sFOiXd2dX5IODw_farXMpQ.png" /></figure><p>Since DataCamp uses AWS, this kind of activity can go undetected by some blue teams. And even those who further inspect the connection would hit a dead end because there is no known definitive source listing the IP range of Datacamp.</p><p>These are basic examples of attacks that could be performed, but other scenarios like utilizing Github API, Azure API, and any online resource are susceptible to this method.</p><h3>What else?</h3><p>We wanted to take a step further and see how far we could push these IDEs. So the next step was to try to import or install known network attack tools.</p><p>To simplify this step, we picked Nmap (<a href="https://nmap.org/">https://nmap.org/</a>) as our weapon of choice.</p><p>Before jumping into Nmap, we checked whether Datacamp limits any socket operations. We used a straightforward network scanning script written in Python.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/315/1*QyCXR3XjOMR17uTOWm0SGA.png" /></figure><p>The code worked without limitation.</p><h4>Nmap</h4><p>Since Datacamp does not support apt-get commands, and it’s therefore not possible to install Nmap, we tried to compile it from the source directly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/215/1*Ruhb-_ytzv-H-gnW8G1DTA.png" /></figure><p>It is simple to compile Nmap on Datacamp, but due to permission limitations, we were not able to install it. However, we were able to execute the binary from the compilation directory.</p><p>Here is a simple execution of Nmap on Datacamp:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/398/1*4AGMMFopXe0xJ7P6b5B7AQ.png" /></figure><p>This demonstrates how easy it is to bring or compile any binary on Datacamp and utilize it for malicious purposes.</p><h4>Malware hosting</h4><p>As part of our examination, we wanted to check if there is any malware or virus scanning to files uploaded to Datacamp. To evaluate this, we used the known Standard Anti-Virus test string, or EICAR (<a href="http://www.eicar.org/">www.eicar.org</a>).</p><p>As previously noted, it is possible to upload files — every file, including malware — with no malware scanning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/178/1*aim5aJkLhHY_fz5HGTgDkA.png" /></figure><p>In a harmless example, we were able to show that the EICAR test file was uploaded successfully:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/434/1*6XpPZFWHh88rlGnsvZa_rw.png" /></figure><p>We wondered if the file is already hosted on Datacamp. Wouldn’t it be nice if Datacamp could be used as a platform for malware distribution? Could there be a way to get a shareable link to download the file? Indeed there is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/197/1*qkXJgeAenjlcD24VfBy4kg.png" /></figure><p>The download link could be used by malware to download further stages onto an infected system using a simple web request. Hosting malware in third-party services is quite prevalent and occasionally happens with services such as Discord, Github, Pastebin, and others.</p><h3>Not only DataCamp</h3><p>We do not believe that Datacamp is the single IDE of its kind, and we do not mean to target or defame them. However, they are very known in the field and provide more capabilities and advanced services than their peers. Below you can find a table comparing other online IDEs we came across during our research.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/999/1*7YabY5Ocw6X5zcFOP96N5A.png" /></figure><h3>Not only Python</h3><p>Online IDEs for various languages have existed for a while, though only recently have their abilities expanded notably. In the past, only simple editors were available — now, new advanced editors appear. We’ve seen examples in Python, but other languages are available, and all of the above applies to them. Paid plans expand the variety of advanced online IDEs, but paying makes the process a bit more complicated because it requires attackers to take extra steps to cover their tracks.</p><h3>Recommendations</h3><p>Although Online IDEs can launch many attacks, it seems that threat actors who target Cloud infrastructure will find them very useful. We highly recommend reviewing our <a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/from-the-trenches-common-sense-measures-to-prevent-cloud-incidents-61441a3c9bfd">“From the Trenches: Common-Sense Measures to Prevent Cloud Incidents”</a><strong> </strong>blog post, which offers a deep dive into similar attacks and how to prevent them.</p><p>Though it’s not currently possible to map out the full extent of DataCamp’s IP range, if you find malicious attacks against your infrastructure that originates from Amazon’s AWS-owned IP Address, we highly recommend reporting it to the AWS Abuse team. A detailed description of how to submit a report can be found <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/report-aws-abuse/">here</a>.</p><p>Profero also encourages DataCamp and other providers to keep a publicly accessible list of their outgoing customer traffic gateways and provide a safe and easy way for users to submit abuse reports.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a684d9f4daef" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/online-programming-learning-sites-can-be-manipulated-by-hackers-to-launch-cyberattacks-a684d9f4daef">Online Programming Learning Sites Can Be Manipulated By Hackers To Launch Cyberattacks</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm">ProferoSec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Secrets Behind Ever101 Ransomware]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/secrets-behind-ever101-ransomware-87550d9f6955?source=rss-602ff206103a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/87550d9f6955</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omri Segev Moyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jun 2021 14:26:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-22T14:26:19.711Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A victim called the incident response teams of Global Threat Center, reporting a seemingly new stream of ransomware attack. Upon investigation, we determined the extension of the encrypted files was certainly new, but the malware displayed significant similarities with several ransomware families — a combination that made attribution an interesting and difficult riddle. The attack’s signature was a Music folder containing an arsenal of tools, which the malware dropped and executed on each of the encrypted machines. Throughout our investigation, we primarily focused on the toolset utilized by the threat actor, in order to build an in-depth profile of the incident in hopes of making an attribution. While many of the tools used by the threat actor were not custom, we were still able to assemble a temporary portfolio of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), which pointed us to potential links to a few existing ransomware groups with similar TTPs. This portfolio was particularly helpful during the negotiation process, as we were able to gain vital information, such as assessing the reliability of the threat actor in terms of providing a working decryption tool. In fact, during the negotiation, the attackers offered a video documenting the decryption process, which also revealed they used a free software from BandiCam and WinRAR, in what seems to be Arabic.</p><p>The ransomware had the extension “.ever101,” and was using the CryptoPP8 library (an inbuilt C++ library) for encryption. It utilizes Salsa20 for encrypting file data, and RSA-2048 for encrypting file keys. We confirmed many — but not all — of the tools in the arsenal. Because they were encrypted during the attack, we had little hope of discovering their origin. We were able to establish that the EVER101 ransomware is almost identical to a number of ransomware families, such as CURATOR and Paymen45, both of which are believed to be developed by the EverBe group. Our hypothesis is that this ransomware was built through a “Ransomware-as-a-Service” builder, rather than being fully developed by the threat actor or group, whose identity and location remain unknown.</p><p>During our investigation of the bitcoin movement related to the attack, we made an interesting discovery of a transfer of approximately US$600, to a platform of massage providers across major cities in the United States. This gave us a specific lead to the threat actors, and we developed potential explanations for this questionable transfer.</p><p>Full report is available here: <a href="https://shared-public-reports.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/Secrets_behind_the_mysterious_ever101_ransomware.pdf">https://shared-public-reports.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/Secrets_behind_the_mysterious_ever101_ransomware.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87550d9f6955" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/secrets-behind-ever101-ransomware-87550d9f6955">Secrets Behind Ever101 Ransomware</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm">ProferoSec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cuba Ransomware Group on a Roll]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/cuba-ransomware-group-on-a-roll-2b3d2b0e2312?source=rss-602ff206103a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b3d2b0e2312</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ransowmare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[apt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cuba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omri Segev Moyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 May 2021 14:29:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-05T14:29:21.779Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At the end of 2020, our team made up of SecurityJoes and Profero incident responders, led an investigation into a complex attack in which hundreds of machines were encrypted, knocking the victim company offline completely. The threat actors behind the attack deployed the Cuba ransomware across the corporate network, using a mixture of PowerShell scripts, SystemBC, and Cobalt Strike to propagate it. Cuba Ransomware utilizes the symmetric ChaCha20 algorithm for encrypting files, and the asymmetric RSA algorithm for encrypting key information. As a result, the files could not be decrypted without the threat actor’s private RSA key. In the days following the attack, our incident responders investigated the modus operandi of the threat actors, their malicious software, and lateral movement tools. Simultaneously, we initiated negotiations with the attackers, who over the course of the investigation, we discovered are Russian speakers, due to a simple translation mistake on their part. Unfortunately, due to several essential missing links, we were unable to approximate the attackers’ location, and as a result, their whereabouts remain unknown. Negotiations concluded with the ransom being paid, and with the successful receipt of a decryptor. After we determined the decryptor contained no malicious code within and confirmed that it did in fact decrypt the encrypted files, we deployed it across the network, allowing operations to resume. The discovered ransomware binary was generic. It utilized implemented algorithms for encryption and stored strings in plaintext — however, it was wrapped with several layers of obfuscation and packers. Based on these factors, we believe the attackers are not state-sponsored, instead of operating simply as a threat group. They are fast-acting, and seem to prefer to communicate via email — they generally launch their attacks by setting up email accounts to initiate communication a few days in advance of deploying ransomware. Additionally, based on ransom notes we’ve discovered through pivoting, it’s clear the actors often use ProtonMail as their primary email host.</p><p>The full report non-gated version is available here:</p><p><a href="https://shared-public-reports.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/Cuba+Ransomware+Group+-+on+a+roll.pdf">https://shared-public-reports.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/Cuba+Ransomware+Group+-+on+a+roll.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b3d2b0e2312" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/cuba-ransomware-group-on-a-roll-2b3d2b0e2312">Cuba Ransomware Group on a Roll</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm">ProferoSec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[APT27 Turns to Ransomware]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/apt27-turns-to-ransomware-77aaba41ef1e?source=rss-602ff206103a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/77aaba41ef1e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid-19-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omri Segev Moyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Jan 2021 13:57:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-04T13:57:45.644Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic and economic crisis, our Global Incident Response and Cyber Crisis Management teams were engaged on several fronts around the world, fighting cybercrime, and even nation-state actors.</p><p>The following <a href="https://shared-public-reports.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/APT27+turns+to+ransomware.pdf">report</a> tells the story of one of these engagements and how again, the thin line between nation-states and cybercrime was crossed.</p><p>The full report “APT27 Turns to Ransomware” can be downloaded directly (un-gated) from the following link:</p><p><a href="https://shared-public-reports.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/APT27+turns+to+ransomware.pdf">https://shared-public-reports.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/APT27+turns+to+ransomware.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=77aaba41ef1e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/apt27-turns-to-ransomware-77aaba41ef1e">APT27 Turns to Ransomware</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm">ProferoSec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“Hamagen” Application — fighiting the Corona Virus]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/hamagen-application-fighiting-the-corona-virus-4ecf55eb4f7c?source=rss-602ff206103a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4ecf55eb4f7c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omri Segev Moyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Mar 2020 18:33:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-23T12:21:31.915Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>“Hamagen” Application — Fighting the Corona Virus</h3><p>As an urgent response to the Coronavirus pandemic, the Ministry of Health has decided to develop an application which will fulfill the following requirements :</p><ol><li>Voluntary — no one will be forced to use the application</li><li>Location collection will be based on mobile device data, which has better accuracy than the current cellular tracking and as a result will prevent unnecessary mass quarantine</li><li>Immediate update for users on possible contact with a confirmed infected patient and the details of the exact contact, such as location and time</li><li>User privacy protection — data collection and matching will only happen on the user’s device, with no data reporting or submission to external sources</li></ol><p>In order to ascertain that the application is written in a secure way and protect the user’s privacy, <strong>Profero</strong> has conducted the following steps:</p><ol><li>Review of the application architecture together with the development and operational teams</li><li>Source code review ensuring that secure code development practices were used, that the data is indeed stored securely on the device and is not being sent to remote servers, and that no data leaks are found in the application</li><li>Analysis of vulnerabilities found by the Israel National Cyber Directorate, making sure none of them affect user privacy</li><li>Activation, analysis, and scanning of the application, to ensure a complete match between the source code and the compiled application</li><li>Verification that all communications channels are fully encrypted</li></ol><p>The attached diagram illustrates the application’s flow, as was tested and approved by <strong>Profero</strong>.</p><p><strong>Profero</strong> will continue to monitor and review every update of the application in order to ensure the continued privacy of users. In coordination with the Ministry of Health, <strong>Profero</strong> began revealing findings and application source code to key experts and researchers, in order to receive further reviews from fellow experts. At a later time, the project will be released as an open source project for the general public to use and review.</p><p>We would like to thank everyone who has taken part in this project in such critical times, working nights and weekends, pushing for the success of this project:</p><ul><li>Ministry of Health</li><li>Israel National Cyber Directorate</li><li><a href="https://medium.com/u/21af85a6d3b3">Tomer Zait</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/u/89adb811cdda">Guy Barnhart-Magen</a>, Karin Kosowski, <a href="https://twitter.com/IdoNaor1">Ido Naor</a>, and <a href="https://twitter.com/inbarraz">Inbar Raz</a></li></ul><p>Omri Segev Moyal, Profero</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cVwyNfYpkUpEFVJVTLw4ZQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>High-quality infographic links by -</p><p><a href="https://proferopublic.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/5f72cff6-0fb5-4517-9941-99331819b5a0/profero_infographic_01_en.jpg">https://proferopublic.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/5f72cff6-0fb5-4517-9941-99331819b5a0/profero_infographic_Hamagen-App.jpg</a></p><p><a href="https://proferopublic.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/5f72cff6-0fb5-4517-9941-99331819b5a0/profero_infographic_01_en.pdf">https://proferopublic.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/5f72cff6-0fb5-4517-9941-99331819b5a0/profero_infographic_Hamagen-App.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ecf55eb4f7c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/hamagen-application-fighiting-the-corona-virus-4ecf55eb4f7c">“Hamagen” Application — fighiting the Corona Virus</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm">ProferoSec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Simple Rules to Protect Against Spoofed & windows.net Phishing Attacks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/simple-rules-to-protect-against-spoofed-windows-net-phishing-attacks-714a2e52dd3c?source=rss-602ff206103a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/714a2e52dd3c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[office-365]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[outlook]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omri Segev Moyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Mar 2020 11:06:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-22T11:06:17.015Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Originally posted on — <a href="https://malware-research.org/">https://Malware-research.org</a> <a href="https://malware-research.org/simple-rule-to-protect-against-spoofed-windows-net-phishing-attacks/">https://malware-research.org/simple-rule-to-protect-against-spoofed-windows-net-phishing-attacks/</a></p><p>Recently Profero has seen an extended rise in usage of Microsoft Azure Blob Storage to host phishing websites targeting Office365 users. Websites hosted under Azure Blob Storage can be accessed using windows.net domains which will naturally add a convincing feature — valid Microsoft SSL certificate. This “feature” has a high probability of masquerading the undergoing phishing attempt and allow attackers to successfully lure their victims into trusting the web page.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9WV7lGNMYY0ICJdD.png" /></figure><p>In addition, attackers tend to spoof the phishing email to look like it was originated from the user’s own email address.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XdJ8waHnPLmq4Y6M.png" /></figure><p>These tactics combined together have the potential of making this attack highly successful. Although this attack method is not new and has been previously <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/outlook-and-microsoft-account-phishing-emails-utilize-azure-blob-storage/">reported</a>, it seems like Microsoft is doing very little to prevent misuse of their services.</p><h3>Omri Segev Moyal on Twitter</h3><p>Another office365 phishing on &quot;https://t.co/1guoeb51Oh&quot; domain at hxxps://office43l2v3rgq5y3xpy.z13[.]web[.]core[.]windows[.]net @Azure probably want to disable the account already. Creds sents to: hxxps://check[.]corequityholdings[.]com/validate[.]php https://t.co/IH0USNu5PR</p><p>The thing that bothers me the most is that if you are using Microsoft Office365 premium security service “Office 365 ATP Safe Links” the Azure-hosted phishing scams are marked as malicious.</p><h3>Omri Segev Moyal on Twitter</h3><p>Do Microsoft have some incentive to keep phishing sites hosted by Azure online? ATP safelinks mark link under https://t.co/1guoeb51Oh domain as malicious but did not do anything to take them down. Honestly something is very wrong here. #phishing @Azure @Microsoft</p><h3>Mitigation</h3><p>In order to not rely on Microsoft, in this case, we can create two separate rules to block this kind of phishing attack.</p><h3>Creating Office365 Rules</h3><ul><li>Browse to Office365 <a href="https://outlook.office365.com/ecp/?rfr=Admin_o365&amp;exsvurl=1&amp;mkt=en-US">Exchange Admin Center</a>.</li><li>Go to Mail Flow → Rules then click on the ‘+’ sign and create a new rule.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/944/0*6_ZjlV7zHfNEOHi5.png" /></figure><ul><li>At the New Rule section do as described in the image below:</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*baH6Pjdo87HugRDx.png" /></figure><p>Profero recommends adding exceptions for automated email services such as build utils, marketing, etc.</p><h3>Alerting users if an email contains “windows.net” domain</h3><ul><li>Repeat the previous steps to create a new rule</li><li>At the new rule section do as described in the image below:</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/890/0*W9Ub2Gs3OXbH6xjY.png" /></figure><h3>Blocking Spoofed Emails in Google Apps</h3><p>Although this article is more focused on Office365 users, I also recommend that Google Apps users do the same. Luckily, in Google Apps, it’s much simpler than in Office365. Simply go to <a href="https://admin.google.com/ac/apps/gmail/safety">Gmail Safety Settings</a> and enable the following rule:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/662/0*EfmDy34_8CVaxxF_.png" /></figure><p>These rules are not perfect but they can be helpful in protecting against this type of threat. I recommend inspecting how they might affect your organization before enabling them. In addition, I would like to thank <a href="https://twitter.com/Sirius_Malware">Sue</a> &amp; <a href="https://twitter.com/cocaman">Corsin Camichel</a> for their help in taking down some of these Azure Blobs.</p><h3>References:</h3><p><a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/phishing-attack-uses-azure-blob-storage-to-impersonate-microsoft/">https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/phishing-attack-uses-azure-blob-storage-to-impersonate-microsoft/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hurricane-michael-phishing-schemes-leverage-azure-blob-storage-rake-credentials">https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hurricane-michael-phishing-schemes-leverage-azure-blob-storage-rake-credentials</a></p><p><a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/outlook-and-microsoft-account-phishing-emails-utilize-azure-blob-storage/">https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/outlook-and-microsoft-account-phishing-emails-utilize-azure-blob-storage/</a></p><h3>IOCs</h3><p>hxxps://capitalexchangowa.z29[.]web[.]core[.]windows[.]net</p><p>hxxps://pitchbookoutlookowa[.]z29[.]web[.]core[.]windows[.]net</p><p>hxxps://office43l2v3rgq5y3xpy.z13[.]web[.]core[.]windows[.]net</p><p>hxxp://microsofpefzrydfaiv4tbz.z13[.]web[.]core[.]windows[.]net</p><p>hxxps://securitymailupdate.z15.web.core.windows.net</p><p>hxxps://fancy-prints[.]com/wp/ggfdd/index[.]php — post credential target</p><p>213.32.37.233 — fancy-prints[.]com resolve</p><p>hxxps://check[.]corequityholdings[.]com/validate[.]php</p><p>104.28.4.245 — check[.]corequityholdings[.]com resolve</p><p><a href="https://pastebin.com/KUpiiKvR">https://pastebin.com/KUpiiKvR</a> (slightly unobfuscated phishing source code)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=714a2e52dd3c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/simple-rules-to-protect-against-spoofed-windows-net-phishing-attacks-714a2e52dd3c">Simple Rules to Protect Against Spoofed &amp; windows.net Phishing Attacks</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm">ProferoSec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Block Coinminers with Little Snitch and CoinblockerList on Mac]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/block-coinminers-with-little-snitch-and-coinblockerlist-on-mac-e8ca78d73185?source=rss-602ff206103a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e8ca78d73185</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mac-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[firewall]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-miners]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Omri Segev Moyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Mar 2020 11:05:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-22T11:05:33.974Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Originally posted on — <a href="https://malware-research.org/block-js-based-coinminers-with-little-snitch-and-coinblockerlist-on-mac/">https://malware-research.org/block-js-based-coinminers-with-little-snitch-and-coinblockerlist-on-mac/</a></p><p>f you are an OSX <a href="https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch">Little Snitch</a> user you can use freely available <a href="https://zerodot1.github.io/CoinBlockerLists/">CoinBlockerLists</a> to block a large portion of JavaScript-based Coinminers like <a href="https://coinhive.com/">coinhive</a> etc.</p><p>Did your computer fans suddenly start to go all ballistic on you while browsing the internet? Did it start performing very slow? Well, you probably surfed to a website hosting a malicious JavaScript Coinminer like hxxp://intelliadmin[.]com.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2gzrV-aDjjyysQ2d.png" /></figure><p>If you don’t like evasive little java scripts running on your computer here is a short guide on how to use Little Snitch and CoinBlockerList to prevent Coinminers from consuming all of your Mac CPU power.</p><p>Thanks to the great work of <a href="https://twitter.com/@hobbygrafix">@hobbygrafix</a> sharing and updating his collection of Coinminers related domains with the community, we can easily download this list and create custom firewall rules to block any outgoing communication going to known Coinminers domains.</p><p>So first go to <a href="https://zerodot1.github.io/CoinBlockerLists/">CoinBlockerList</a> website and download the latest package as either .zip or .tar.gz, depending on your preference.</p><p>You can also find the core list on <a href="https://github.com/ZeroDot1/CoinBlockerLists/blob/master/list.txt">Github</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-P0RBXn5jRjTr2yH.png" /></figure><p>Once the package has downloaded, extract the files and open the list.txt and copy the domain list to your clipboard.</p><p>Now open Little Snitch’s configurations. This is done by clicking the Little Snitch icon in the OSX menu bar and, depending on the version in use, selecting “Little Snitch Configuration…” or “Rules…”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/274/0*jwQJDLoJZJwzTltW.png" /></figure><p>Create a new rule by, depending on the version in use, clicking on the + sign or clicking “New”:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/485/0*a4ARl3LVSM6Oo1rA.png" /></figure><p>Once the rule creation view opens, chose the following configurations for the rule:</p><ul><li>any running process</li><li>Block outgoing connection</li><li>To: Hostnames</li><li>Pick “Any” for both port and protocol.</li></ul><p>Now paste the copied domain list into the hostname text box<br>It should look like the picture below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/485/0*qM44G6v4V3Bvl9y3.png" /></figure><p>Now click on Create Rule.</p><p>Next time when your next-door website decides to run Coinminer on your browser, Little Snitch will block it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d6IJXJqbR3WHY8cb.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://twitter.com/@hobbygrafix">@hobbygrafix</a> keeps updating the list all the time, so please follow for any changes. You can edit the rule at any time and just replace the list.</p><p>Since it’s a significant security threat, sadly (or happily), <a href="https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch">Little Snitch</a> does not provide an API to automate this process.</p><p>That’s it, hope it helps and big kudos to <a href="https://twitter.com/bad_packets">@bad_packets</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/@hobbygrafix">@hobbygrafix</a> and rest of the community for your hard work.</p><p>Each blocked Coinminer is another tree saved in the Amazons or ice not melting in Antarctica.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FdFsFvj9wlCk%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DdFsFvj9wlCk&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FdFsFvj9wlCk%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4618006014248f700a2a2d44c5e6ff5e/href">https://medium.com/media/4618006014248f700a2a2d44c5e6ff5e/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e8ca78d73185" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm/block-coinminers-with-little-snitch-and-coinblockerlist-on-mac-e8ca78d73185">Block Coinminers with Little Snitch and CoinblockerList on Mac</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/proferosec-osm">ProferoSec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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