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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Osage Univ. Partners on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Osage Univ. Partners on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Osage Univ. Partners on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Brief History of University Startup Exits]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/osage-university-partners/a-brief-history-of-university-startup-exits-33850364ca0a?source=rss-2968c7c8bb31------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/33850364ca0a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-visualization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[university]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osage Univ. Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Oct 2016 13:03:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-28T21:23:10.039Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By: <a href="http://osagepartners.com/osage-university-partners/team/manny-stockman/">Manny Stockman</a></p><ul><li>Cutting-edge research?</li><li>Experienced leadership running a team of sharp 20-somethings?</li><li>Core technology and science addressing established problems in a hard sector (with millions of dollars in non-dilutive grant funds)?</li></ul><p>Most startups would be lucky to check the boxes on these questions. But in the world of university startups, doing so is the minimum exit velocity that any professor, grad student, or post doc must meet to spin out a company from their institution. Unfortunately, no checklist is sufficient to guarantee a university startup’s success; fundraising, sales, and scale-up are topics that aren’t covered when PhDs study for their qualifier exams.</p><p>But, fortunately, there have also been a large number of great university startup exits that illustrate the potential of the technologies spinning out of these labs, and the success of these exits inspire the academic entrepreneurial flywheel (<a href="https://medium.com/@OsageVC/the-academic-spinout-flywheel-fa61931985be#.jr9pn1vev">link</a>).</p><p>At OUP, we have found the university startup ecosystem to be a rich area for investing. I thought it would be worthwhile to revisit the interesting statistics around university exits, and use this post as a means to give credit to the academic origins of many well-known companies. We do a decent job of tracking this kind of data for the 80+ universities that have partnered with us, although it is far from perfect.</p><p>In our system we have recorded ~400 startup IPOs and acquisitions that are attributable to research that was performed in the depths of university laboratories. Over 300 of those liquidation events had exit valuations over $50M, a threshold above which venture investors often begin to see good outcomes. I expect there to be inaccuracies in some of the exit values, as well as some missing data points (please let me know). The data spans just over two decades of exits:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lc1fyYsxoMdbmbrtadBvow.png" /><figcaption><em>Scatter plot of startup exit valuations vs. venture capital raised. Our data is imperfect, so I expect some great startups have been left out. Not all company names could be shown on a single plot. Circles and crosses distinguish tech startups from life science startups, respectively. Public company IPO exit values are calculated in one of two ways: the majority are from OUP’s fund model, which uses a 6-month, post-IPO average market cap; and for newer exits we simply used the post-IPO market cap. (</em>Sources: OUP Data, PitchBook Data Inc., public investor documents)</figcaption></figure><p>You’ll notice this is a log-log plot. Blame Stanford spinout, Google. Their 2004 IPO for ~$23B is such an outlier that I am removing it from the dataset for the remainder of the visualizations in this blog post. Ideally, a startup is up and to the left — a region primarily occupied by software startups. On top of making really good web browsers (Google, Netscape), some of the most successful university startups have set the course for virtualization as we know it today (VMWare) and have enabled bloggers to create sharp-looking plots (Tableau).</p><h3>Sector Distribution</h3><p>The university ecosystem stretches across all sectors, and so we have two sector-focused teams at OUP: a life science team and a tech team. Here’s why:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1009/1*UJViE7ExIGdHFdy_Cp_GIA.png" /><figcaption>(Sources: OUP Data, PitchBook Data Inc., public investor documents)</figcaption></figure><p>It’s good to see that the value of two very important sectors in today’s investing landscape are mirrored in the university sector data. The uneven distribution in favor of Therapeutics and IT exits should encourage active VC firms to explore university deal flow.</p><p>Given this exit data, the real question is whether universities today are learning from exit trends and spinning out companies in the sectors that are most likely to lead to a liquidation event. Since this is a blog post on exits, not the active university funnel, I’ll just quickly interject that our database reveals that about 30% and 20% of the current university startups in our system are in the Therapeutics and IT/Software sectors, respectively.</p><p>If I were to dive deeper into the exit data, it would be interesting to see which sectors in the academic entrepreneurial space have been the <em>least</em> efficient at producing value for investors (e.g. sector exit dollars divided by sector investment dollars). My instinct is that it would be Cleantech/Energy given the fast pace of investing in that sector years ago and the lack of positive outcomes. This is not to say that universities are not leading the world in cutting-edge research in that field, but commercialization proved to be much more complicated than anyone anticipated for solar and battery technologies.</p><h3>Time to Exit</h3><p>One of the questions we often field at OUP is whether the raw technology emerging from the university ecosystem tends to create startups with longer times to exit than those borne by normal means (as an aside: what is “normal” for core technology startups?). When I look across the landscape, subjectively, I can find just as much diversity in the technology readiness of startups in many top VC firms’ portfolios as in the university ecosytem. Objectively, I consider the number of years that it has taken successful university startups to exit:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xfkeORSsWjaZtT7rJSSlIA.png" /><figcaption><em>Scatter plot, by sector, of Years to Exit vs. Exit Year for over 300 university startups that had an exit valuation greater than $50M. The diameter of the circle is proportional to the exit valuation. Years to Exit is defined as the number of years between the company’s founding and its exit. </em>(Sources: OUP Data, PitchBook Data Inc., public investor documents)</figcaption></figure><p>The flood of therapeutics IPOs in the past several years is clearly seen in the overwhelming number of yellow circles on the right side of the scatter plot. In the tech domain, Netscape, Oculus VR, and Akamai stand out as +$B exits after less than two years of operation. After filtering this data for deals that have had exits of at least $50M, only Therapeutics (n=155) and IT/Software (n=47) have enough samples to provide meaningful statistics.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f-DyBStVrc1zPni1s74Ciw.png" /><figcaption><em>Not quite a Gaussian, but helpful to see that the peak of the distribution of Years to Exit for IT/Software and Therapeutics is 6–7 years, well within the time frame of venture capital. </em>(Sources: OUP Data, PitchBook Data Inc., public investor documents)</figcaption></figure><p>Therapeutics startups exited in an average of 7.5 years, while IT/Software companies exited in an average of 6.4 years. Looking at the histogram, it seems reasonable to assume that most successful university startups within these two sectors will exit in 4–8 years. So even if a university spinout has earlier stage technology compared to the average venture-backed startup, some other forces at play are able to accelerate exits for successful companies within attractive timelines for venture. I personally believe that the magic formula is a motivated academic paired with an experienced core-technology entrepreneur. Alums of the academic flywheel understand this, and so do the university tech transfer offices that are doing more work than ever to promote those marriages.</p><h3>University Productivity</h3><p>On that last note, some fantastic reports have recently been conducted that researched which university undergraduate programs have produced the most VC-backed entrepreneurs (<a href="https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/2016-2017-pitchbook-universities">link</a>). Much career development happens after one leaves one’s undergrad institution and before one actually becomes an entrepreneur, so that report is less useful to VC firms looking to understand what happens inside a university. If you are interested in the sheer entrepreneurial productivity going on within the halls of a university, you may appreciate this listing of institutions whose startups have exited (in total) for greater than $2B:</p><p>Caltech<br>Columbia<br>Duke<br>Emory<br>Harvard<br>Hebrew University<br>Illinois Urbana-Champaign<br>Johns Hopkins<br>Michigan<br>MIT<br>Penn<br>Princeton<br>Scripps<br>Stanford<br>UC Berkeley<br>UC Los Angeles<br>UC San Francisco<br>Univ of Colorado-Boulder<br>Univ of Southern California<br>Yale</p><p>Given the uptick in and resources being devoted to university entrepreneurship on campuses across the country, I anticipate this exit dataset will only grow larger over the next several years. Our goal at OUP is to help instigate these successes by speaking with academics about their entrepreneurial ambitions, and to hopefully find a way to be a part of a few of their great exits.</p><p><em>The data presented in this blog post is derived from a variety of sources including OUP’s internal database, PitchBook Data Inc., press releases, and publicly filed investor documents.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=33850364ca0a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/osage-university-partners/a-brief-history-of-university-startup-exits-33850364ca0a">A Brief History of University Startup Exits</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/osage-university-partners">Osage University Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Crossing a Small Chasm]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/osage-university-partners/crossing-a-small-chasm-98cd19711965?source=rss-2968c7c8bb31------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/98cd19711965</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[licensing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[university]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osage Univ. Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Sep 2016 16:15:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-22T17:53:22.224Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The road to a shorter university startup licensing process</em></p><p>By: <a href="http://osagepartners.com/osage-university-partners/team/kirsten-leute/">Kirsten Leute</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/350/1*QhueWLhrym5OgNJU-TQltA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Are we making the university startup licensing process more complicated than it needs to be?</figcaption></figure><p>Last year, I surprised many (including myself) by leaving a job I loved in university technology transfer and accepting a job at a venture capital firm that invests in university spinouts. In my almost two decades of being a technology transfer person, I often negotiated with attorneys, entrepreneurs, and other business people in licensing technologies to newly created startups. Now at the juncture between venture capital and university technology transfer, I am gaining even more perspective from both sides.</p><p>I recently sat on a panel with two venture capitalists in front of an audience of university technology transfer professionals. Not surprisingly, a topic mentioned was the length of time it takes to negotiate a license agreement out of the university (insert groans and rolling eyes). I asked one of my co-panelists how long he thought the negotiation process <em>should</em> take. The answer? 5 to 6 weeks.</p><p>And honestly, I agree with him. 5 to 6 weeks is reasonable. So why does the process usually take much longer?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*oSYPoohi2A98LO_2vV06Kg.gif" /></figure><p>Looking back on my own negotiations, it was a rare event to finish a full startup license in a month and a half; I would guesstimate the typical duration was 4 to 6 months. The reasons for the delay were exactly what you would expect — numerous drafts back and forth, delays at the law firm where everyone was overworked, too many constituents needing to have a say in the deal, review of the potential conflicts at the university, the company still looking for its investors and therefore tenuous about committing to the license and payment obligations, etc. And at the end of the day, if people don’t negotiate a lot on a deal, do they end up feeling confident they got the right deal?</p><p>All that being said, I do think there are ways we could streamline the process. Some small adjustments could shave some time off this process, saving everyone time to work on the multitude of other tasks requiring their attention.</p><p>Before moving on to some suggestions, I’d like to address two criticisms of academic technology transfer:</p><p>1) “University policies and guidelines are getting in the way of startups and should be changed to make the process easier.” There are many issues with this criticism, but let’s just tackle the ultimate goals of each of the parties. For investors, the goal is to provide a great return for their limited partners. For universities, the goal is educating its students and conducting cutting-edge research. The goal of the technology transfer office may be to transfer the technology for society’s use and benefit, but that is secondary to the mission of the university. So when a technology transfer officer says they cannot change the warranties and indemnities clauses, it’s not because they are being difficult and trying to get in the way of the startup. They are adhering to the primary mission of the university. Licensing is way down on the priority list.</p><p>2) “University technology transfer offices’ number one goal is to maximize revenue.” While this might be true in a minority of cases (universities, feel free to raise your hands if it is), most TTOs are focused on transferring the technologies out of the university by means of a fair deal for the university. Always remember that a startup can come back and ask for changes to the deal if it is not working for the company, either financially or in other ways. It is extremely rare that the university can do (or does) the same.</p><p>One solution some universities are trying in order to speed up the licensing process is through university express licenses (examples <a href="http://research.unc.edu/offices/otd/inventors/starting-a-company/">here (North Carolina)</a>, <a href="https://otm.wustl.edu/for-inventors/quick-start-license/">here (WUSTL)</a>, and <a href="https://ucgo.uchicago.edu/page/about-ucgo">here (UChicago)</a>. In my opinion, it remains to be seen how effective these deals are for either party and how often these licenses are used. Since the majority of the time start up licenses require traditional negotiation, my recommendations are intended for those situations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*_lDgQEFFGKHBIpyckNjtuQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>These recommendations focus on how to make the startup licensing process easier, rather than focusing on certain license clauses.</p><h4><strong>Technology transfer offices:</strong></h4><p>1) Save both parties time by highlighting the terms that are not negotiable in the deal in the first draft. There are only a few.</p><p>2) Train your officers to negotiate the same priorities consistently. Yes, these may shift between technologies and deals, but one common complaint from VCs is that the deals are radically different depending on which licensing officer is doing the negotiating.</p><p>3) Involve more than one licensing officer on the deal. The officers will learn from one another (assisting with point #2), brainstorm ideas together, and have different experiences from which they can draw upon. If they work well together, they can keep each other on track on the deal. If one of the officers leaves the university, all of the knowledge and relationship regarding the deal does not leave with them.</p><h4>Startups/VCs:</h4><p>1) If you are using an attorney for the negotiation, ask the technology transfer office for recommendations of attorneys who have successfully and productively negotiated startup deals with their office. Nothing stalls a deal like an attorney or firm that has limited experience negotiating licensing deals with academic institutions.</p><p>2) Don’t sweat the small stuff. You are a startup. You will come back and ask for amendments to the agreement. The university will grant them if they are not egregious and you are a licensee in good standing. Their job is not to kill startups; it is to get the technology successfully transferred to an entity that will further research the technology and bring it to market.</p><p>3) Don’t try to account for every possibility. Again, you are a startup. You will pivot. See point #2.</p><h4>Both sides:</h4><p>1) Determine and communicate your priorities from the outset of the deal. Set a “top 10” list of what you are looking for from the deal and provide that list to each other at the start of the negotiation. The needs of the startup are likely to include financial terms and scope of the rights granted, which the institution will, in many instances, find reasonable. The needs of the institution will include non-negotiable terms related to risk management, use of name, and publication rights, which the startup should not even try to negotiate. In addition, set an expected turn-around time frame for each draft of the agreement (e.g., three business days).</p><p>2) Communicate, communicate, communicate. Do so in person and/or via phone rather than just electronically. As a technology transfer professional, my best experiences were with startups who didn’t just provide me an annual written update, but with whom we had a running dialogue throughout the year. Then I knew what was coming down the pike and license amendments were much easier.</p><p>3) Very few venture capitalists and technology transfer officers interact on a regular basis. Change that, and it will likely change your interactions.</p><p><em>In another blog post, I’ll take a deeper look at the particular elements and clauses of the university startup license negotiation. In the meantime, what are some small and large solutions you’ve found effective in making the process speedier and less bumpy? Please post away below.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=98cd19711965" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/osage-university-partners/crossing-a-small-chasm-98cd19711965">Crossing a Small Chasm</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/osage-university-partners">Osage University Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Academic Spinout Flywheel]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/osage-university-partners/the-academic-spinout-flywheel-fa61931985be?source=rss-2968c7c8bb31------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa61931985be</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[university]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osage Univ. Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Sep 2016 11:38:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-22T17:53:48.209Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By: <a href="http://osagepartners.com/osage-university-partners/team/john-lee/">John Lee</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/630/1*OBi_4skUJVRqaZ5wicW0Bw.gif" /><figcaption>Flywheel</figcaption></figure><p>Over the last 5 years, the pace of startup creation at universities has greatly accelerated, increasing the number of new spinouts a year by over 50%. In 2014, 914 startups spun out of university research labs across the US; by comparison, only 553 university startups were created in 2006. For a number of reasons in the last decade, universities have systematically increased fostering entrepreneurial ecosystems by focusing on technology transfer, adapting tenure requirements, and developing campus accelerators. The result of this activity has created a flywheel that consistently and uniformly spins out startups at universities across the country.</p><p>RESEARCH LABS: A STARTUP ACCELERATOR</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UBCte7EWfeI-a69zP7P59w.png" /></figure><p>As investors focused entirely on university spinouts, we’ve noticed that highly entrepreneurial professors (we call them “Leonardo’s”) typically create: 1) startups based on their research (usually in collaboration with students with whom they have mentored) 2) students that create startups of their own 3) a new generation of entrepreneurial professors that repeat 1–3.</p><p>The key insight is that a disproportionate percentage of university startups come from a small number of highly entrepreneurial faculty (Leonardo’s), as well as from the students and postdocs that worked in the labs alongside these same professors. Other factors play a significant role in the likelihood that a professor can be entrepreneurial: such as being in a robust entrepreneurial ecosystem at the university, startup focused tenure qualifications, access to experienced mentors and advisors, etc. Additionally, the above chart does not suggest that a professor or student can’t be entrepreneurial if they don’t come from a specific background; though, our own experience suggests that exposure to a Leonardo increases the likelihood of future startups.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/334/1*lq7hljxW8DjHDQasZcx2Cg.jpeg" /></figure><p>In an effort to better understand this phenomena, we examined three particularly extensive lineages: Hui Zhang (Carnegie Mellon), Geoff Hinton (University of Toronto), and Rodney Brooks (MIT). The following data are not comprehensive and are not intended to be representative of general trends in university spinouts, except to highlight these specific case studies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_mKapwiHD0DACB23oflfRw.png" /></figure><p>The reasons why Hui Zhang’s lineage is extremely productive is not clear, though there are likely many factors that may have contributed. Advancements in a specific research area and experienced mentorship likely played significant roles in producing these startups. For example, Databricks, Mesosphere, and Alluxio all stemmed from open source software that was pioneered by the AMP Lab at Berkeley in the Berkeley Data Analytics stack, which suggests that some startup creation follows research breakthroughs. Interestingly, the founders of Databricks, Mesosphere, and Alluxio all had PhD advisors that had previously started companies such as Trifacta, Nicira, and Conviva, where experienced mentorship may have been a meaningful factor.</p><p>In some cases, a very “hot” sector can have a significant impact on startup creation. Most recently, innovations by Geoff Hinton’s lab in deep learning has spurred substantial commercialization activity as illustrated below. (There are so many, it has turned into a bit of an eye chart)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rvm4ePjcUpp_3A-eKskhcg.png" /></figure><p>While not all of the above companies are based on deep learning, many of these companies incorporate significant elements of deep learning. Geoff Hinton’s research breakthroughs have not only catalyzed startups out of his own lab, but quite a few groups across the world.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*T5hysPDHLCVObZQfgUoVvA.png" /></figure><p>Academic startup flywheels are not exclusive to software either and likely exist in a number of other areas. Rodney Brooks, a robotics pioneer, has trained a number of roboticists/entrepreneurs that have gone on to start many companies. These companies have strong similarities in their expertise in fully integrated autonomous robotic systems, a key of Rodney Brooks’ research.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*xDyM1c1NXnICpBboyU5Buw.gif" /></figure><p>For decades, universities have been engines for startups, where professors have played a meaningful role in mentorship. We now posit that professors themselves, in particular a small cadre of highly entrepreneurial ones, have themselves become engines for startups.</p><p>More recently, universities across North America are increasing fostering entrepreneurship as a priority by allowing for more lenient sabbaticals and leaves of absence, startup focused tenure and promotion qualifications, on-campus startup centers, proof of concept funding, and revised intellectual property policies catered towards startups. Above, we highlighted just a small sampling of some of the lineages we have seen, though we’ve noticed these lineages developing throughout the country. Moving forward, professors will only expand their roles as catalysts/advisors/entrepreneurs and we are extremely excited to see these academic flywheels gain momentum.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa61931985be" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/osage-university-partners/the-academic-spinout-flywheel-fa61931985be">The Academic Spinout Flywheel</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/osage-university-partners">Osage University Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Entrepreneurial Campus — The Rise of the Rest]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/osage-university-partners/the-entrepreneurial-campus-the-rise-of-the-rest-787f0b1b5249?source=rss-2968c7c8bb31------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/787f0b1b5249</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[university]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Osage Univ. Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Jul 2016 14:55:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-20T15:41:04.638Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Ecosystem investment rises, but not where it is needed most</em></p><p>By: <a href="http://osagepartners.com/osage-university-partners/team/robert-adelson/">Robert Adelson</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yjnn5El01jIX5Wo1bP3Hmw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Columbia University, an academic institutional partner of OUP.</figcaption></figure><p>The entrepreneurial ecosystem on campuses across the country is being transformed at a rapid clip. The impetus for this change is both technologic and economic. We are witnessing a Fourth Industrial Revolution, which has elevated the perceived role technology will play in our lives, and universities want to share in the wealth created by faculty and student inventors and innovators. This is a cycle we have seen before, although not on this scale. On the economic front, the Great Recession of 2008–9 provided a budgetary shock to universities and colleges that may last for a generation; the political resolve to invest in higher education has given way, and universities believe they must find meaningful alternative revenue flows if they are to meet their historic missions. We have certainly benefited from this realization, as demand to join our first fund, <a href="http://osageuniversitypartners.com/">Osage University Partners</a> I, spiked during and immediately after the Great Recession.</p><p>The rapid transformation of the entrepreneurial ecosystem has manifested itself in several ways. Undergraduate incubators, campus accelerators, hack-a-thons, intra-mural shark tank competitions, on-campus funds, off-campus funds, educational programs, tenure credit for start-up activities — all these initiatives and more have bloomed on campuses, creating opportunities for new ideas to flourish but also upsetting traditional reporting patterns and metrics. The various programs, in addition to creating additional shots on goal for the university, are also magnets for alumni enthu$ia$m, tools for recruitment and, hopefully, the foundation for gifts back to the campus when current students become loyal donors.</p><p>All this is good news, although I have some reservations about the quality of training being offered to students who are committing themselves to the entrepreneurial track. We should not, however, lose sight of a fundamental truth — for most campuses, the real money is still in traditional tech transfer. And I fear that, as these other exciting programs take wing, they are being funded at the expense of the core tech transfer offices. This may be a good short term play, but it is a terrible long term bet.</p><p>Future blogs will address myths vs reality in the tech transfer world.</p><p><em>Robert is a managing partner at Osage University Partners, a venture capital firm that specializes in investing in startups commercializing university research.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=787f0b1b5249" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/osage-university-partners/the-entrepreneurial-campus-the-rise-of-the-rest-787f0b1b5249">The Entrepreneurial Campus — The Rise of the Rest</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/osage-university-partners">Osage University Partners</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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