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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Owen Chen on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Owen Chen on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@OwenChen?source=rss-adbe2c14308f------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Owen Chen on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@OwenChen?source=rss-adbe2c14308f------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Philosophy of Intentionality, The Background, and the acquisition of physical skills.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@OwenChen/philosophy-of-intentionality-the-background-and-the-acquisition-of-physical-skills-5f2230317d2d?source=rss-adbe2c14308f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[mind]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[consciousness]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Owen Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Apr 2016 22:23:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-21T22:23:20.633Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Phil 132 — “Philosophy of the Mind” taught by John Searle. 3 pg. response to prompt:</p><blockquote>“Searle states that one argument for the existence of the Background comes from that of practiced skill: though it may be the case that as in skiing, you initially use rules to guide your behavior, when you become an expert at skiing you no longer appeal to the rules, but rather your Background abilities cause you to ski well without conscious reflection. Does this argument differ at all from the computationalist claim that underlying unconscious rules guide your skilled behavior?”</blockquote><p>The process of learning any physical skill that we do, be it skiing, playing baseball, or taking an improvised jazz solo, involves an initial steps of ‘learning the rules’, to help guide our behavior to match and adapt to the context of the skill. The advancements of these skills, through repetition and practice, allow a person to internalize these foundational ‘rules’, removing the conscious thought of guiding one’s behavior in accordance to the given instructions. This has been<em> </em>demonstrated in mainstream media from recent fMRI studies on the neurobiology of jazz musicians who are taking an improvised musical solo, with results indicating that brain regions associated with conscious thought and rational decision making are deactivated during the process. Unconscious rule guided behavior is the computationalist view of explaining skilled behavior, which differs from Searle’s explanation of this phenomena with his discussion of ‘Intentionality’ and ‘The Background’. While Searle agrees with the internalization of initial rules into the unconscious, he believes that this traditional explanation is insufficient, and proposes that in his explanation of skilled physical behavior, the key distinction with ‘The Background’ is that it is a set of abilities or capacities that one evolves, to <em>enable</em> the capacity of being sensitive in <em>responding</em> to internalized rules, rather than simply following an algorithmic succession of rules themselves to guide skilled behavior.</p><p>Searle has stated that the structure of human institutions is a structure of constitutive rules and of which participants are typically not conscious of such rules. But if such people are participating in an institution and are totally ignorant of such rules, it is difficult to find a causal role between these rules and our behavior. The traditional computationalist claim of this view is that, of course we are following these rules, we are just doing so unconsciously. Such rules are propositional statements, semantically evaluable in respect to different truth and fulfillment conditions, and are internalized in our subconscious, that guide our behavior without our awareness. Cognition is then a computational manipulation of these representations. In terms of physical ability, computationalist view would consist of a complex system, composing of schemas, frames, and rules in a large semantic network with semantic relations or constraints that encompasses entire domain knowledge of each domain. In the context of the act of skiing, a beginning skier is initially given a set of verbal instructions, such as ‘lean forward’, ‘bend the ankles’, etc. The skier then obeys these explicit rules to attempt to ski for the first time. In the computationalist view, domains of knowledge would require semantic rules for understanding ‘snow’, ‘hills’, ‘people’, ‘laws of gravitational force’, and an incredibly large amount of computational processing in order to navigate the slopes with the infinite possible variations in terrain, weather, and situations they may encounter in the skiing. But as the athlete advances, they no longer need to be consciously aware of the instructions, which have been internalized and now function unconsciously as representations. Searle’s deviation from the computationalist view in this process however, is that rather than each physical skill having a large number of unconscious mental representations and constant unconscious calculations of rules for each scenario, the advancing athlete instead strengthens their ‘Background’ capabilities, a concept from Searle that he emphasizes eventually renders the causal functioning of rules unnecessary. Searle’s concept of ‘Intentionality’ and ‘Intentional States’, or the property of mental states and how they are directed at or of objects in the real world, exists in a ‘Network’ of psychological states and can only function against a ‘Background’. Searle defines ‘The Background’ as a set of ‘nonrepresentational’ mental capacities, such as abilities, dispositions, tendencies, habits, pre-intentional assumptions, that <em>enable </em>all representing of Intentional States to take place. These are “know-hows” and “knowing that”, which are not Intentional States themselves, but are the preconditions for Intentional States to function. Representational or Intentional content, such as semantic rules, require conditions of satisfactions, or ‘about-ness’ of something else, and are semantically evaluable with respect to truth or fulfillment condition. Beliefs, perception, desires, actions, and rules are all examples Intentional states that have a directed aspect, that can only function against a Background of pre-intentional assumptions.</p><p>Searle explains the necessity of a Background through demonstrating that literal meanings of sentences are radical underdeterminations of truth conditions, and that the problem of infinite regress in explaining a rule or semantic sentence with another sentence will require an infinite loop of more semantic context for understanding. In the literal meaning case, Searle demonstrates the possibility of understanding a sentence’s individual components in a literal sense and still lack understanding or correct interpretation, such as the usage of the word ‘open’ in ‘Sally opened a restaurant’ or ‘He opened the door’. The literal utterance could be understood by a person as ‘taking a surgical scalpel and making incisions into a door to open’, as well as an infinite amount of possible literal interpretations, but not its intended meaning. Searle also explains the non-algorithmic characters of rules through examining English metaphors, such as a ‘sweet person’ or ‘sour dispositions’, which are non-literal comparisons that have no algorithmic structure. Sheer application of unconscious ‘rules’ or ‘principles’ would be infeasible for effectively understanding metaphorical content, which Searle concludes that a ‘Background’ of intuitions and ‘know-hows’ are what enables the functioning of these rules to function.</p><p>In Searle’s explanation of physical acts, he expands on the notion of infinite regress and the insufficiency of semantic content in explaining another semantic content. He notes that semantic content are not self-applying, as we still need to know <em>what to do</em> and <em>how to apply</em> them. As demonstrated with the discussion of literal meanings, the ability to interpret and understand rules is still lacking with strictly unconscious rules. Suppose in an example of walking, we internalize a set of unconscious rules to ‘lift a foot’, ‘take a step forward’, ‘continue in this manner’, etc. Literal meaning of interpretations for ‘take’, ‘movement’, ‘continue in this manner’ will require an infinite regress of explanations for the correct interpretation, and Searle explains that the way out of this paradox is the ‘Background’ abilities, that allow us to ‘just do it’. These abilities or capacities of the Background are evolved <em>because</em> of the rules, and subsequently decrease the importance of internalized unconscious rules. These abilities are foundations, or ‘principles of inference’ that enable the functioning of the higher level rules and representational content. In the case of the advanced skier, they <em>evolve</em> a set of tailored capacities that allows each rapid adjustments of unconscious calculations in riding an unfamiliar terrain because they are trained in dealing with these variations automatically, rather than relying on acquired sets of explicit rules. They develop skills that are responsive to that particular setting and environment. The behavior and actions of the skier, or any other participant in an institution they are accustomed to, are therefore not due to their following of unconscious rules, but rather due to the mechanisms have evolved in the ‘Background’ to enable the capacity of being sensitive and adapt to these rules.</p><ul><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Searle#Intentionality_and_the_background">John Searle - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia</a></li><li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Intentionality-Philosophy-John-R-Searle/dp/0521273021">Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5f2230317d2d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Theory of Perception, Hallucinations, and Philosophy of consciousness]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@OwenChen/theory-of-perception-hallucinations-and-philosophy-of-consciousness-f2f4c44ad376?source=rss-adbe2c14308f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[consciousness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[perception]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Owen Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Apr 2016 18:32:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-19T18:47:09.533Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Taken from Phil 132 with John Searle. Prompt + 3 page limit response</p><blockquote>“A criticism of Searle’s theory of perception is it cannot be a realist account of perception. For example, Searle’s theory cannot discern between an hallucination and a verdicial perceptual experience so how can it legitimately claim to be a realist theory of visual perception?“</blockquote><p>The traditional “problem of perception” has revolved around the interaction between the relation of our internal perceptual experiences to the external world. John Searle’s account of visual perception lies within the context of Intentionality, and endorses a form of direct realism regarding perception, as addressed within his book “Intentionality”. This view is centered around the idea of having visual experiences as intentional states with conditions of satisfactions that are caused by objects in the material world. The distinction between perceptual content and the object of perception is the primary flaw in which Searle addresses as “the worst mistake in western philosophy” — The Bad Argument. Criticisms of Searle’s theory deny its ability of putting the external world in contact with the subjective one, as is the case of “sense datum” arguments of Representationalists citing the indistinguishable visual experience of a mere hallucination of an object versus the visual experience with the presence of the object in the material world. A second criticism of Searle’s approach introduces the notion of illusory visual experiences by way false or misleading beliefs by the mind. On this account, our perceptual apparatus may produce a visual experience on a false belief or intentional state that is not correlated with the material object in the external world. A third common criticism on Searle’s theory of perception comes from a Disjunctivist point of view, which adopts a form of naive realism approach, unlike Representationalists and Phenomenalists, yet criticizes Searle’s theory on its inability to distinguish between a hallucinatory case and a veridical perceptual experience, concluding that there is no shared, important perceptual state between both cases of perceptual experience. Searle however, maintains his stance on his realist theory of visual perception by clarifying the distinction between the content versus object of perceptual states, stating all perceptual states contain contents, but not all perceptual states have objects of the external world. With this claim, he is able to defend his realist stance of visual perception through his causal explanation of visual experience.</p><p>Once this distinction between objects and contents of visual experience is adopted, Searle asserts that no barrier exists between our acceptance of ontologically objective objects of perception are external, mind-independent entities shared in the common word, and our ontologically subjective perceptual content in which we experience how the world is presented to us. Searle’s theory begins with the concept of Intentional States, or the property of certain mental states by which they are directed at or of objects in the real world. Each intentional state, or visual experience in the case of perception, contains the necessary proposition “of such and such”, indicating a causal relation between the external object causing a subject to have a visual experience of the targeted object. These propositional phrases are the conditions of satisfactions of visual intentional states, which determine the veridicality, or the success in achieving fit of these conditions, of the visual experience. Therefore, Searle asserts that we see objects in the external world directly, but the act of seeing an object causes a subject to have a visual experience of the object, which is what we experience. The notion of perceiving then has a notion of succeeding, whereas the notion of experience is what determines the success of such conditions of satisfactions that produces the perceiving of an object. Awareness of these experiences and the causal interactions they are involved in provides the direct link to the ontologically objective objects, and when conditions of visual experiences are satisfied, it gives our subjective consciousness direct access to it in accordance to a realist view of visual perception. On this account, it is entirely possible to have a visual perception, such as a hallucination, without the conditions of satisfactions being satisfied with an object in the external world. In this case, we do not see anything, we have a visual perception of something. This failure to achieve a veridical visual experience is an instance of a visual experience, not the external world, that is at fault. Critics who attack Searle’s position as a not realist theory of visual perception predominately reject this aspect of his argument.</p><p>Various counter-arguments include the hallucination, illusion, and perceptual-error arguments in which Searle claims rests on the same elementary error as the Bad Argument. The Representatlists claim that hallucinatory visual experiences of the same type as a veridical visual experience are phenomenologically indistinguishable and thus, the object of perception is only ever presented as a representational account towards our perceptual system as “sense datum”, which evidently rejects direct realism and subsequently reduces to a form of solipsism. This counter-argument is addressed by Searle in his emphasis on the distinction between perceptual content and perceptual object, with which he is able to explain the nature of hallucinations in a way that aligns with a realist view of perception. The second argument includes the possibility of a person mistaking “an armadillo” with “a tumbleweed”, in which a falsified belief led to the perceptual experience of a false representation of the world. This in turn questions the ability prove the existence of the external world, if illusions exists may plague our visual apparatus. Searle acknowledges the fact that we can have mistaken perceptions, but this mistake is in the perceptual content rather than the existence of perceptual material objects in the external word that cause perception. By removing the concept of sense data as a representation of reality and separating the content of perception with the object of perception, we are able to link the material world with the internal world through the roles of experiences and intentionality of those experiences, which then maintains a realist account of visual perception.</p><p>The last clarification Searle addresses is that visual experience is a presentational ontology, as it is representational in every sense besides the concept of having a replica thought-object representation that models the real world objects, as the “sense datum” argument presents. It’s with these aspects of Searles theory of perception that he is able to maintain his realist view of visual perception.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f2f4c44ad376" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why A.I cannot create Human Consciousness.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@OwenChen/why-a-i-cannot-create-human-consciousness-1169b06b6a49?source=rss-adbe2c14308f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy-of-the-mind]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neuroscience]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Owen Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Mar 2016 21:21:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-08T04:09:43.521Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A recent paper I wrote for my course - Philosophy of the Mind, taught by John Searle at Berkeley. Limited to a 3-page response to the prompt -</p><blockquote>“ In the Chinese Room, the person in the room (you) behaves exactly as though he or she understands Chinese. From an observer’s point of view, he or she (you) seems to understand Chinese. From your first-person point of view, it seems that all you are doing is following rules. In light of this, argue either for or against the claim: Behavior is identical to and sufficient for understanding. Therefore, you — the person in the room — really do understand Chinese “</blockquote><h4>Chinese Room Argument — Prompt #3</h4><p>John Searle’s hypothetical thought experiment of the Chinese Room Argument refutes the notion of Strong A.I, claiming that pure syntactical symbol manipulation through a formulaic functional mechanism cannot have any interesting connection with semantics and understanding. Regardless of the outward behavior of a man replicating Chinese understanding situated in his hypothetical system of pure syntactic pattern matching and symbol manipulation that generates Chinese language, Searle asserts there is no sufficient conditions to guarantee that understanding exists in the man within the system. I will similarly argue against the claim that behavior is identical to and sufficient for understanding.</p><p>To refute the claim that “behavior is <em>sufficient </em>for understanding”, Searle emphasizes the the separation of syntax and semantics. While I, the man in the room without understanding of Chinese, may produce outputs that are indistinguishable from a well understanding native Chinese Speaker from the given inputs using the references cards and flowcharts given to me to an outside observer, I am not aware of the mental properties or beliefs that arise from the Chinese concepts to a native Chinese speaker because to me, I am simply manipulating abstract symbols and following an algorithmic rulebook determined by someone other than me. This program is insufficient to constitute mental states because of this semantics and syntax distinction, and insufficient to cause mental states because this abstract process is independent of the<em> </em>physics of its implementations. Searle states that any casual power in the machine to cause consciousness and intentionality would be a consequence of the physical nature of the machine, such as the case of the brain, but this syntactical process of symbol manipulation can be implemented independent of hardware, such as the hypothetical scenario of using pipes and water flow to signal the translation of Chinese inputs instead of the given dictionaries. Complete simulation of physical interactions and processes is not duplication and cannot guarantee the presence of mental states. A modern example is the ongoing attempt to simulate the neurobiological interactions of neural networks in the brain in computer algorithms. Successful attempts to entirely replicate synaptic firings and back-propagation algorithms of interconnected neurons in the brain have sprouted the fields of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence, of which computational models of human learning and decision making can be applied to solve large-scale data heavy analysis tasks that a humans alone do not have the capability to do. Computer programs, such as Deep Blue or IBM Watson, may even heighten and extend human’s computational abilities to an extreme, yet none of the machines we create have conscious states. While we may make metaphorical attributions of our own mental capabilities to these machines we create, such as a car door “knows how” to open via its photoelectric cells, or thermostats having certain “beliefs” of the surrounding environment, they are simply tools that are extensions of our own purposes and intentionalities, computational operations on purely formally defined elements that only have semantic meaning from human’s ascribed intentionalities.</p><p>To refute the claim “behavior is <em>identical</em> to understanding”, Leibniz identity theory states that mental state and physical state must be correlated in all instances, or two events are identical only if they have all properties in common. As the Chinese Room is a multiple realizable system that is independent of the physical hardware required to carry out the input-output translation process, behavior and understanding in the mind is not identical to my manipulation of flowcharts in a room with a Chinese dictionary. This is similar to the concept of derived intentionality, such as the English phrase “In French, ‘j’ai grand soil’ means ‘I am very thirsty’”, in which the intentionality in the French sentence is not intrinsic to that syntactical object (the physical French symbols), but rather it is derived and extended from the intrinsic intentionality of users of the French language who originally created it to convey that specific semantic meaning. To a man who understands no French, “j’ai grand soil” is simply a collection of squiggly lines, as how I perceived it before I encountered the original sentence that ascribes intentionality to the French phrase. This also refutes the beliefs that a machine’s successful passing of the Turing Test indicates human-like understanding based on the indistinguishable behavior of the machine.</p><p>Similarly, Searle argues that behavior is irrelevant in the ontology of the mind through his “Silicon Brains”, and “Conscious Robots” thought experiments. The former experiment describe scenarios in which a human slowly replaces his neurons with silicon chip replicas and his subjective conscious experiences varies while his physical behavior likewise deteriorates or stays constant. The possible combinations of conscious thought and physical behavior demonstrates the disconnect from the physical and the mental states. Searle’s “Conscious Robots” thought experiment similarly explores the possibility of constructing an unhappy, conscious robot and an unconscious robot that both produce the exact same behavior, to show the irrelevance of identical behavior with the ontology of the mind. Understanding, which exists due to the ontological nature of mental states and consciousness, then is not proven by third person observed physical behavior.</p><p>A last point Searle address in his response to the “Brain Simulation” counter-argument is the vital importance of the brain’s causal properties and ability to produce intentional states. The formal properties of any simulation is not sufficient for the causal properties, as he demonstrates in his water pipe example of simulating the formal structure of synapses and neuronal interactions of a complete Chinese brain. Such simulations are still limited to algorithmic syntactical processes with no link to semantic understanding. I, the man in the room, will still be reduced to manipulating meaningless symbols and following rules without understanding why. Regardless of how efficient I may become at this series of pattern matching and symbol shifting, I will not understand the references to the mental concepts that these symbols meant to convey.</p><h4>The man himself</h4><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fembed-ssl.ted.com%2Ftalks%2Fjohn_searle_our_shared_condition_consciousness.html&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ted.com%2Ftalks%2Fjohn_searle_our_shared_condition_consciousness%3Flanguage%3Den&amp;image=http%3A%2F%2Ftedcdnpe-a.akamaihd.net%2Fimages%2Fted%2F1d9463d0491f33d788495334dcae9e9106c83e4f_240x180.jpg%3Flang%3Den&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=ted" width="560" height="315" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/481037de8a93760e2b9f8d890f45b518/href">https://medium.com/media/481037de8a93760e2b9f8d890f45b518/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1169b06b6a49" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Neuroscience and Machine Learning perspectives of Jazz Improvisation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@OwenChen/neuroscience-and-machine-learning-perspectives-of-jazz-improvisation-75fc46ed8111?source=rss-adbe2c14308f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[neuroscience]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jazz]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Owen Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Feb 2016 23:17:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-02-03T23:17:41.074Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Neuroscience and Machine Learning perspectives of Jazz Improvisation…</h3><h3>Hello Medium.</h3><p>Jazz is a highly esoteric art-form, and I would love to introduce my perspectives and experience on this journey through the lens of my two disciplines of academic study. As my first official blog post, I will begin to publish my content in the hopes of providing bits of insights for people in these topics through what I pick up. I hope to continue reading and reflecting on my interests within the cognitive sciences, philosophy, technology, and music, and in no way consider myself an expert in any of these fields. Hoping to just spread some love of the topics, so enjoy!</p><p>From my research paper in a music cognition and neuroscience course: <em>The Neuroscience and Machine Learning perspectives of Jazz Improvisation</em></p><h3>Intro</h3><p>Music is a constantly evolving art form that has permeated through cultures and traditions from the beginnings of human civilization. The process of transcribing the masters from a prior generation and incorporating their language into the formation of a new genre is how music is passed on through the generations. These stages of careful analysis, imitations, and generation of new material is a process that is formulaic and algorithmic in nature, most particularly in forms of music with highly structured theoretic rules and compositional techniques such as classical music. Improvisational jazz music is one of the most challenging forms of spontaneous artist creativity, and additionally much more difficult for musicians coming from a classical background. Unlike the structured contexts of non-improvisational music that follow sheet music in the aims of replicating the exact notes in a score, improvisational music involves very little algorithmic and rigid processing, relying more-so on the human brain’s capacity to tap into it’s unconscious mind. <br> <br> Formal, rigorous scientific studies have shown insights into the neurological mechanisms at play in the brain during jazz improvisation via fMRI and sCIA analysis techniques. These insights, in which regions of the brain linking to working memory and decision making have been shown to be deactivated completely, conclude that professional-level jazz musicians are not fully consciously aware of the music they produce, relying more on an intuitive sub-conscious process that is difficult to explain with a purely statistical or neurological model.<br> <br> An example of a subconscious ability found in seasoned musicians is to have the intuitive ability to differentiate the playing of Charlie Parker, Coltrane, Brecker, or other jazz greats by a single note solely based on the timbre of the sound. In a similar vein, master violinists are able to instantly differentiate between a Stradivarius violin and a Guarneri with a single note whereas average listeners are unable to identify any differences. This is related to the concept of schema taxonomies, in which individual’s underlying cognitive schemas for specific genres are refined over repeated exposure and have a more specific analytical framework for identifying these sounds or context cues, whereas the average listener will have a more abstract, generalized schematic framework in attempting to analyze a specific sound. <br> <br> With the advent of computers in the age of information, statistical methods of “data mining” and computational methods of “learning from data” has sprouted the fields of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence, relying on algorithms that replicate mankind’s ability to logically compute problems. Such techniques, which include Markov models, neural networks, clustering, and dimensionality reduction techniques can all be applied in the context of learning and predicting musical data.</p><p>The schematic and formulaic nature of music, with the theoretical frameworks of harmony and theory that provide rough schematic guidelines for a musician, is suitable for supervised learning systems to predict and generate music based on quality training datasets of valid musical phrasings. With the understanding of jazz improvisation through the lens of neuroscience however, realistic computationally generated jazz improvisation is a much harder task. In this paper, I would like to explore computational methods of generating jazz improvisation through a holistic understanding of the theoretical, neurological, and computational understandings of jazz improvisation.</p><h4>Jazz Harmony Background</h4><p>I will begin this exploration of computationally generated jazz improvisation models with relevant research and understandings in jazz harmony and neuroscience, then proceeding to explore specific computational methods of generating improvisation. <br> Subsets of music are established and constantly evolving. Through a lifetime of exposure to musical idioms in patterns, scales, lyrics, timbre, and instrumentation, we establish musical schemas, or cognitive frameworks that form for the purpose of accurately predicting and categorizing future musical stimuli we encounter. These schemas are the reason we find familiar music pleasurable, as described in David Huron’s Theory of Musical Expectation. They are the same reasons strong emotions are evoked during nostalgic childhood songs, or how different cultural tastes in music appreciation are developed. Various forms of cognitive expectations, which including schematic, veridical, and dynamic expectations and are based on different forms of memory, serve as our mental inference models that learn over time based on prior experiences for the purpose of predicting musical stimuli. The successful expectation and prediction of musical stimuli we are familiar with is what gives music it’s pleasurable feeling.<br> <br> Each time we receive a new musical pattern, our brains attempt to contextualize any surrounding visual, auditory, or sensory cues to create memory links for future occurrences of the same musical pattern. This correlates to supervised learning algorithms in Machine Learning, in which a system is trained on a training data set to construct it’s predictive model, which will produce classifiers or regression functions to predict subsequent data. This generalization of prior experiences is very similar to how our brains conceptualize musical genres and rules. For largely cultural reasons, we associate musical modes with major qualities (major 3rds, natural 7ths), as happy, and modes with minor qualities (minor 3rds, flat 7th’s) as sad. Subsets of these tonalities include the pentatonic scales, largely associated with blues, rock, and other western music. Moving into dominant, diminished, and melodic minor harmony, these various intervallic relationships trigger additional feelings, images, and memories that aren’t necessarily happy or sad. Whole-tone scales, for example, conjure up the image of thought bubbles or dreaming states found in movies, the timbre of plucked violins will typically invoke feelings of sneakiness, and a spanish-phrygian dominant will bring up image associations of a gypsy-esque culture. All these context cues and established mental models are typically well understood by film composers who intend to utilize music to evoke certain feelings in a scene. <br> <br> Within jazz harmony, the dominant scale harmony and the derivatives of the melodic minor scale traditionally have a of influence in filling in tension in jazz chord progressions. A common chord progression in jazz, the ii-7 — V7 — Imaj7, is ubiquitous in jazz standards throughout the ages, as it’s a perfect representation of tension and resolution for the listener. Embellishments to the dominant V7 chord, such as a b9 or b13 interval in relation to the root note, will cause the listener extra tensions to expect the major tonic resolution chord to follow. This is similar to the ITPRA Theory of Expectation, misattribution, and prediction effect in explaining the pleasurable qualities of metric downbeats and drum fills. Both gives an auditory cue the listener to prepare and expect a particular outcome, and reduces the uncertainty of making an accurate prediction. The positive valence generated from the accurate prediction, as described by Huron’s Theory of Expectation, is what causes the ii-V-I progression and drum fills to sound pleasing. These auditory cues are stored in established schematic models so that a listener can make these inferences for the future.<br> <br> Other idiomatic jazz qualities, such as turnarounds, bebop scales, and complex chord substitutions are subsets of this jazz schema that a jazz musician’s ear and brain must develop over an extended period of time. The act of jazz improvisation is a result of these well defined and engrained schemas into a musician’s subconscious, where he then draws from during his spontaneous improvisations. For example, a seasoned jazz musician accompanist will also be able to instinctively recognize the chord tone qualities of a soloist, and accompany with adapted chord harmonies on the fly in improvisation, all of which involves no conscious thought. Unlike other genres such as classical and rock, the improvisational nature of jazz causes the brain to operate in a different fashion and replicating the act with computational models is less straightforward.</p><h4>Neuroscience of Jazz Improvisation</h4><p>Recent publication from Johns Hopkins University set out to investigate the neural correlates of musical improvisation, as many studies on music cognition outside of jazz improvisation context have been long established already. By comparing fMRI data on patients performing memorized jazz standards along with free improvisation over each standard, findings support the hypothesis that syntactical language areas of the brain such as Broca’s area of the inferior frontal gyrus are engaged, but semantic processing such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are deactivated. Regions linked with semantic processing include areas that regulate decision making, conscious reflection and analysis of impulse and thought, and working memory. These areas of the prefrontal cortex model complex thought and action in the same way statistical algorithms generate predications based on assessing input data. The inhibition and deactivation of these areas during jazz improvisation indicates a subconscious system driving the production of a musician’s improvisation, built on his store of schematic material to draw and use to generate new music. The operations of these biological systems are lesser known and are harder to replicate in mathematical models. <br> <br> Musical improvisation also activated other multi-sensory regions of the brain include somatosensory for feeling, motor system for production of movement, limbic system for emotion regulation such as the amygdala for the processing of musical associations and emotions to memories, as well as the visual and auditory systems. The trigger cues for happiness, sadness, nostalgia, and other various emotional states are processed through the limbic system, such as the dissonant tension found in jazz diminished and dominant scale harmony. The altered dominant scale, for example, is the seventh mode of the melodic minor scale in which all non-essential tones, other than the 3rd, 5th, and 7th that define a dominant chord, are altered. These alterations, such as the b9 interval, are biologically linked to sensations of tension, thanks to the limbic system processing our emotion responses and memory. In order to build up and refine a cognitive schema for jazz, a musician undergoes the process of repeated and long-term exposure to these musical phrases and relationships, strengthening the link associations between a musical stimuli, schema classification, and reaction response. <br> <br> Various forms of memory come into play in the process of jazz improvisation as well. Schematic expectations are correlated with long-term semantic memory, veridical with episodic memory, and dynamic expectations with short-term working memory. Semantic memory serves as the basis of categorizing inference and predictive rules for the jazz genre framework, and working memory and dynamic expectation is utilized heavily in the act of improvisation when notes are being created on the spot. A blunder in a musician’s improvisation will correlate to incongruences with dynamic expectations, but the blunder will most likely be an incorrect chord tone over the current musical chord, in which semantic memory and schematic expectations are in violation.</p><h4>Computational Machine Learning Models of Jazz Improvisation</h4><p>From an expectational standpoint, the probabilistic occurrences of notes have been categorized by terms such as “regression-to-the-mean”, “post-skip-reversal”, “step-inertia”, and etc. These observations and classifications are general rules-of-thumb to predict melodic contours of a piece, generalized to music as a whole. These statistical heuristics are a manifestation of collective musical phrasing tendencies, and can also dynamically adapt as new musical stimuli occur. More rigorous mathematical models in the fields of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning attempt to replicate the human neurology in algorithms to do these schema formulations, data analysis, and generative predictions even further. <br> <br> Neural Network, or multi-layered perceptron algorithms replicate the biological workings of a brain’s biological neural network. Concurrent parallel computations on input data and back-propagation algorithms are used to minimize the system’s output predictive discrepency error, and readjusts synapse weights for a refined prediction. The network of perceptrons, separated in layers connected by synapse links, is initialized with equal weighting on each link connection between perceptrons. A forward pass then pushes input training data through activation functions to produce an output prediction. Back-propogation sends feedback back to readjust synapse weight distributions until prediction errors of the network system is minimized. There have been projects on utilizing Recurrent Neural Networks in training a system to generate a Blues improvisation, in which such systems successfully learned a blues form and performed a passable blues improvisation solo. <br> <br> The generation of probabilistic music with Markov Models has also been done, such as the pyKov-Music python library that takes MIDI formatted musical phrases and outputs a generated piece. Markov Chains are essentially states, X, that have conditional probabilistic transitions to a subsequent state, Y. Solo generation with Markov Chains would entail chord progressions as states, with the current chord and the last k-beats as the current state of the Markov Chain. A program would look up viable notes from a probability transition matrix to generate the next phrase based on past states. Hidden Markov Models are a variation of regular MM’s, in that the current state is unknown but observable outputs that are dependent on states can be used to infer the underlying structure. For example, an improvised jazz solo can be the input into a Hidden Markov Model, in which the Viterbi algorithm can be used to generate the most probabilistic likely sequence of hidden states that produced that specific solo. This could be the sequence of chord qualities that defined the specific solo, and this could generate another variation of the observed jazz solo. This process is analogous to a jazz musician’s journey through transcribing well established famous jazz solos in order to ingrain these particular styles of phrasing and languages to incorporate into their own playing.<br> <br> Lastly, one other example of a potential method of computationally generating jazz improvisation is the use of clustering algorithms. K-means clustering is an example of this unsupervised machine learning algorithm, in which data point characteristics are analyzed in an n-dimensional space and euclidian distances are measured between points. These distance values are then used as a metric to calculate similarity for clustering similar data points together. In terms of musical qualities, this could mean analyzing vast amounts of various phrasings, and grouping similar phrasings together with k-means clustering. An example of clustering algorithms and jazz improvisations would be finding the unique stylistic phrasings of famous jazz musicians through their recorded solos and developing a probabilistic transition matrix for a Markov Chain to generate a new jazz solo based on these insights.</p><h4>Concluding Discussion</h4><p>While these computational methods of generating jazz improvisations successfully generate passable improvisation, there are a wide amount of extraneous factors that influence the development of a jazz musician’s improvisation and stylistic identity. The manipulation of micro timings, such as playing ahead or behind the beat, or the control of timbre on an instrument can vary each improvisation greatly. Jazz has branched into various sub-genres such as smooth jazz, nu jazz, modern jazz, etc, which all have their own unique characteristics with an underlying basis with jazz roots. These subtle nuances and deviations arise from the creative nature of the human mind, and computational models to replicate jazz improvisation will not be able to fully capture all of these features. I believe that the coming exciting age of technological intersections in machine learning, data analytics, electronic music production, and cognitive neuroscience technology has tremendous potential in creating rapid evolvement in truly avant-garde musical genres in years to come.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=75fc46ed8111" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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