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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Peter DeCaprio on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Peter DeCaprio on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Peter DeCaprio on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Workout Is a Negotiation Before It Is a Calculation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio/a-workout-is-a-negotiation-before-it-is-a-calculation-de061d9f33fc?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/de061d9f33fc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[restructuring]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[credit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[debt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 07:21:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-16T07:21:26.832Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A struggling company and its lenders settle on terms when each side learns what the other can accept, and the model only records it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fntRpHuJdjxVyFry" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@___atmos?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Caroline Badran</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>A conference table has managers on one side and lenders on the other, and a payment date is coming that the company cannot meet as written. Everyone in the room can see two ways forward. The first is to sit down now and work out new terms between the parties. The second is to let the date pass and move into a formal process with its own rules, deadlines and costs.</p><p>Most explanations of a restructuring start with the spreadsheet. A model shows cash coming in, debt going out and the gap between them, and it is easy to believe the model is the work. In a workout outside a formal process the model is the record of a negotiation, and the negotiation comes first.</p><p>A workout is an agreement between a struggling company and its lenders to change the terms of what it owes, such as stretching a maturity, pausing a payment or adjusting a covenant, without a formal bankruptcy filing. A maturity is the date a loan comes due. A covenant is a promise in a loan agreement about how the company will behave, such as keeping its debt within a stated limit.</p><h4>The first path is a conversation that starts early</h4><p>The workout path asks for effort from both sides before anyone is comfortable. Managers have to show the real state of the business while there is still time to act on it. Lenders have to decide what they can accept while the facts are still moving. Neither side can do that from a spreadsheet alone, because a spreadsheet cannot say what a lender will accept.</p><p>It also asks for time. A workout is rarely one meeting. The managers explain what happened to the plan, the lenders ask what the business needs to keep running, and each side goes away to check its own position. Then they meet again with a clearer picture of what the other side can live with.</p><p>Preparation decides how far the first meeting goes. Managers who arrive with a clear account of the cash they expect over the coming months, and of what they would need from lenders to cover it, give the room something concrete to react to. Lenders who arrive having thought about the claims in front of them and the positions of the other lenders can respond with more than a request for time. A meeting where both sides are prepared often covers in an afternoon what an unprepared one takes weeks to reach.</p><p>What each side can accept depends on where it stands. A secured lender holds a claim backed by specific assets of the company. An unsecured lender is paid from what remains after the secured claims are met. That ordering of claims shapes everything, because a lender near the front of the line has less reason to bend than one near the back, and a lender near the back may prefer an agreement to a process that could leave it with little. Knowing <a href="https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio/what-a-company-owes-decides-what-happens-when-plans-slip-3daee100d92a">what a company owes and to whom</a> is where the conversation begins, because it tells each side who holds which position before anyone proposes a term.</p><h4>The second path is a process with its own clock</h4><p>The formal route moves the decisions into a structure with deadlines. A bankruptcy filing pauses collection and sets an order in which claims are paid, and that order protects the company while a plan is worked out. Both of those are real benefits, and for some companies they are the only workable ones.</p><p>A process also changes who is in the room. A workout is built by the parties themselves, while a formal process brings in more participants with interests of their own, and each one adds time to a decision.</p><p>The formal route also has costs that a workout avoids. It brings professional fees and a loss of control over timing, since many of the key dates are set by the process rather than by the managers. Suppliers, employees and customers read a filing as a signal, and some of them change how they deal with the company in response. A business that depends on suppliers extending credit can find that its ordinary operations become harder the day the filing is made.</p><p>So the two paths ask for different things. The workout asks for early candor and repeated conversation. The formal process asks for patience with a structure that moves at its own pace. Neither is free, and the choice between them is usually decided by how much the parties can agree on before the date arrives.</p><h4>The numbers follow once each side knows the edges</h4><p>The first useful result of a workout meeting is a map of what is fixed and what can move, and it is rarely a number. A lender may be willing to stretch a maturity but unwilling to give up a covenant that protects its position. Managers may be able to commit to a smaller payment now but not to a larger one later. Each of those facts is an edge, and the room is mostly occupied with finding them.</p><p>Once the edges are known, the model has something to do. An analyst can rebuild the cash picture around the range of terms that both sides have signaled they can accept, and test whether the business survives under each one. The calculation then answers a narrow question, which terms inside the agreed edges leave the company able to pay what it has promised. That is a very different job from asking a model what the answer should be before anyone has spoken.</p><p>This is also why the order matters. A model built first and presented as the answer invites the other side to attack its assumptions, and the meeting becomes an argument about the spreadsheet. A model built after the edges are known is a shared description of a deal that both sides already half understand. A network business shows the same pattern. The <a href="https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio/telecom-networks-cost-the-most-long-before-they-earn-anything-a8499cbd5454">heavy up front spending of a network business</a> leaves its lenders holding claims on assets that cannot be carried away, and that tends to make them more willing to wait for a plan to work.</p><p>There is a human side to this as well. Lenders and managers who have met several times begin to understand how the other side decides. A lender learns whether a manager’s forecast has tended to be careful or hopeful. A manager learns whether a lender can act quickly or needs approval from a committee. That knowledge does not appear in any model, yet it often decides whether an agreement is reached before the date or after it.</p><h4>Some companies are past the point where talking helps</h4><p>The argument has limits, and they matter. A workout works when the business is worth more running than broken apart, and when its problem is the shape of its obligations rather than the lack of a way to earn a living. If a company is losing cash on its operations with no path to covering its costs, new terms on its debt only postpone the day the problem returns.</p><p>Time is the other limit. While the parties talk, the business keeps spending, and a company that waits too long has less cash, fewer options and lenders who have grown cautious. A conversation that would have produced an agreement in an earlier month can fail in a later one, because there is simply less left to negotiate with.</p><p>Waiting also changes how lenders see the managers, since a company that raises its problem late gives them less reason to believe its plan.</p><p>Lenders do not always agree with one another either. A workout needs enough of them to accept the terms, and a group with very different positions can stall even when every member wants the company to survive. In that case the formal process, with its rules for how claims are treated, may be the only way to reach a decision at all.</p><p>What this means for a reader depends on the seat. For an owner or manager, the point is that the strongest position in a hard conversation with lenders is an early one, when there is still something to propose and still time to be believed. For an analyst or a student, it is a reminder to read a restructuring as the written end of a conversation, and to ask what each side could and could not accept before asking what the numbers say.</p><p>The numbers in a workout are real and they matter, but they are the last thing agreed and the first thing written down.</p><p>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=de061d9f33fc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Telecom Networks Cost the Most Long Before They Earn Anything]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio/telecom-networks-cost-the-most-long-before-they-earn-anything-a8499cbd5454?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a8499cbd5454</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[telecom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:52:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-13T11:52:46.619Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A network spends its money before its first customer arrives, and that sequence shapes how it borrows, plans and sometimes fails.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lFo_N3P6vS5mvX89" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@kierinsightarchives?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Kier in Sight Archives</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>A new subdivision sits at the edge of town with its streets paved and its lots still empty. Along the curb a crew has opened a trench, and a spool of fiber cable waits on a trailer beside it. No household has signed up yet and no bill has been sent, but most of the money for this work has already gone out.</p><p>That picture has repeated itself in telecommunications for as long as networks have existed. A telephone company in an earlier era strung wire along poles to reach every address in a town. A cable operator later ran coaxial line down the same streets, and fiber is the newest layer. The technology in the trench changes each time, and the shape of the spending does not. A network is paid for first and earned back later, and the gap between the two decides most of what happens to the company that builds it.</p><p>Telecommunications services was the center of my research for 13 years, and the shape described here shows up in nearly every company in the field. I will go through why it holds, what it does to the way these businesses borrow and plan, and where the argument runs out.</p><h4>The money goes out before the first customer arrives</h4><p>Building a network means buying a great deal before selling anything. Crews have to dig or climb, cable and equipment have to be bought, and the route has to be designed and inspected. Every one of those steps costs money, and none of them produces a bill to a customer.</p><p>In many businesses a customer can be signed before the product exists. A network is different, because a household cannot be sold a connection that has not been built to its door. The company builds first on its own judgment of where demand will be, and every home the network passes that never signs up is spending with nothing to show for it.</p><p>Even after the last splice is made, the network is only a possibility. A customer has to be found, an installer has to visit, and service has to be switched on before a single payment arrives. In a new subdivision the households may not have moved in yet, which stretches the wait further.</p><p>The same spending also has to cover a long life. A trench, a pole line or a tower is built once and used for years, so the company is buying capacity far ahead of the customers who will fill it. That is sensible, since adding capacity later usually costs more than building it in at the start, but it means the spending leads the earning by a wide margin.</p><h4>Slow earnings shape how a network company borrows</h4><p>A business that spends first and earns slowly almost always borrows to bridge the gap. The lender is looking at a company with large assets in the ground and income that arrives in small monthly amounts over a long stretch. The loan has to be shaped to match, with repayment pushed out toward the years when the network is full.</p><p>This is where <a href="https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio/what-a-company-owes-decides-what-happens-when-plans-slip-3daee100d92a">reading what a company owes and when it is due</a> matters more than watching how fast it is growing, a point I made in an earlier piece. A network company is a clear case of it. Its debt is large, its customers arrive gradually, and a delay on either side changes whether the next payment can be made.</p><p>Lenders also care about liquidity, meaning the cash a company can reach in a given month to pay its bills. A network company in the middle of a build can be rich in assets and short of cash at the same moment, because the money has been turned into cable in the ground, which cannot be spent. Terms in a loan agreement often tie the next stage of borrowing to the progress of the build, so a route that finishes late can hold up the money needed for the one after it.</p><p>Lenders to these companies ask practical things. They want to know how many homes the network can reach, how quickly households sign up, and what it costs to keep the lines working once they are built. The answers set how much can be borrowed and how soon repayment has to begin.</p><h4>Planning has to cover years the company cannot see</h4><p>Because the spending comes first, the plan for a network has to reach far past the next quarter. A company choosing where to build next is choosing where its money will sit for years, and it makes that choice before it knows how many customers will sign up. A route that fills quickly pays the company back, and a route that fills slowly keeps the debt on its books longer.</p><p>Many companies build in stages, finishing one neighborhood before starting the next, so that income from the first stage helps carry the second. Staging reduces the amount outstanding at any one time, but it stretches out the full build and leaves some households waiting for service.</p><p>Maintenance belongs in the same plan. A network that is built and left alone does not stay sound, since cable ages, poles lean and equipment wears out. The cost of keeping it working arrives every year, and a company that counts only the cost of building will find its plan short.</p><p>Across the years the pattern has held steady even as the products changed. Voice service gave way to broadband, and broadband speeds kept climbing, with each step needing more building ahead of the customers. Companies that read the pattern early planned their borrowing around it, and those that treated it as a surprise spent their time renegotiating.</p><h4>Technology can strand a network before it pays back</h4><p>The weak point in this shape is that the payback depends on the network staying useful for as long as the loan lasts. A change in technology can break that. If a better way of carrying traffic arrives while the old network is still being paid for, customers move and the debt stays.</p><p>Copper phone lines show the pattern. They were built to last, and they did, but the cost of keeping old copper running becomes hard to justify as customers move to newer connections. A company holding that kind of network has to decide whether to keep maintaining it or to replace it, and either choice costs real money.</p><p>Many networks earn steadily for decades once they fill. The risk sits in the early years, and the reward in the later ones arrives only if the technology holds up long enough to collect it.</p><p>Telling a passing change from a lasting one is the judgment that matters here, and it grows out of <a href="https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio/covering-one-industry-for-years-builds-a-different-kind-of-judgment-9eaa679c165c">years spent covering one industry</a>. An analyst who has watched several shifts in the same field has a better sense of which ones strand networks and which ones simply add a new product to the old lines. That sense cannot be taken from a single year of results, and it still misses at times, since a new kind of competitor does not announce itself.</p><p>For anyone who works with or inside a company that builds networks, the useful habit is to read the spending and the timing together. The size of the cost says little until it is set beside the pace at which customers arrive and the number of years the network has to stay useful.</p><p>The trench at the edge of town is paid for long before the first household connects, and everything about the company that dug it follows from that order.</p><p>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a8499cbd5454" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Covering One Industry for Years Builds a Different Kind of Judgment]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio/covering-one-industry-for-years-builds-a-different-kind-of-judgment-9eaa679c165c?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9eaa679c165c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[telecom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[careers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 22:42:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-12T22:42:31.709Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An analyst who has watched one industry through several cycles learns to separate a passing swing from a change that stays.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*e_B22e8LmHqWSr3h" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@motaehdaei?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Mota Ehdaei</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>On a research analyst’s shelf, the binders for a single industry stand in a row, the oldest ones worn at the spine from years of being pulled down and put back. Each binder holds one stretch of the same story: the models, the notes from management calls, and the pages of questions that had no answer yet. Read in order, they show something that no single binder can. They show how the industry behaved when conditions changed, and how the analyst’s own reading of it held up.</p><p>This post follows how that judgment gets built, one step at a time. The claim is simple. Years spent on one industry teach an analyst to tell a passing cycle from a lasting change, and that skill is the one a newcomer lacks. For 13 years, telecommunications services was the center of my research. The mechanism below is general, and it applies to any industry an analyst follows long enough.</p><h4>A cycle and a lasting change look the same when they begin</h4><p>Start with two definitions. A cycle is a swing in demand or pricing that reverses on its own as buyers and sellers adjust. A lasting change is a shift in how an industry earns its money, and it does not reverse. The trouble is that the first weeks of each one produce the same headlines. Prices fall, a large customer leaves, a new product arrives, a competitor cuts its rates.</p><p>An analyst in the first year of coverage has seen at most one swing. Every event arrives as news, and there is nothing on the shelf to compare it with. The natural reaction is to read the newest development as the new normal, because it is the only data point the analyst has ever had. Sometimes that reading is right. Often the industry returns to where it was within a few quarters, and the early conclusion has to be quietly taken back.</p><p>The newcomer lacks a record, and carelessness has nothing to do with it. Judgment about timing needs a history to measure against, and a history takes years to accumulate, because the swings themselves take years to complete.</p><h4>The second pass through a swing is where comparison starts</h4><p>When an analyst watches a second downturn in the same industry, something changes in the work. The questions get sharper because the first pass supplied a list of things to look at. The analyst can look up what the industry looked like at the start of the last downturn, what the main customers said they were doing, what happened to the largest costs, and which companies had to borrow and on what terms.</p><p>With those answers written down, the analyst can compare. In a cycle, the underlying economics come back to roughly where they were. The cost of serving a customer, and what that customer is willing to pay, settle near their old levels once the adjustment ends. In a lasting change, those same economics settle somewhere new. The price does not return, the customer does not return, or the cost does not return, and everything built on the old arrangement has to be rebuilt.</p><p>Telecommunications offers a plain illustration of the difference. A network is long lived infrastructure that costs a great deal to build before it earns anything, so a company in that industry can look strained for a long stretch simply because of how it is financed. That strain is part of the normal shape of the business. A copper line that a carrier retires and does not replace is another matter. That customer connection is gone in its old form, and no swing in demand brings it back. An analyst who has watched both kinds of event in the same industry learns to ask which one is in front of them before reaching for a conclusion.</p><p>The second pass also reveals which numbers carry the signal. Some figures move with every swing and say little. Others stay quiet until something real shifts. Knowing the difference comes from having watched the same figures through more than one turn.</p><h4>Judgment is a record of calls that were checked</h4><p>Having seen the swings is only half of the work. The other half is keeping score. An analyst who forms a view and never returns to it learns only that the view felt right at the time. An analyst who writes the call down, along with the evidence behind it and the evidence that would show it wrong, builds something that can be tested.</p><p>The habit is easy to describe. Write the conclusion in one plain sentence. Write the two or three facts it rests on. Write what the next few quarters would have to show for the conclusion to hold. Then, when those quarters pass, open the page and mark the result. Over years, the binders become a ledger of calls, and the ledger tells the analyst which kinds of signal have been reliable in this particular industry and which have repeatedly misled.</p><p>Management calls fit into the same record. An executive who describes the same customer problem on every call for several years gives the analyst a long series of descriptions to compare. When the wording changes, that is worth noticing. When the wording holds steady while the numbers move, that is worth noticing too. A newcomer hears one call. A veteran hears the whole series, and the series is where the information sits.</p><p>This is also why showing the work matters. A conclusion that arrives without its reasoning cannot be checked by anyone, including the person who reached it. A conclusion that arrives with its reasoning can be marked right, wrong or partly right a year later, and the marking is what improves the next call.</p><h4>Deep familiarity has a cost</h4><p>The argument has a limit, and it deserves a plain statement. The record an analyst builds is a record of the competitors, customers and technologies that existed while the analyst was watching. It prepares the analyst for events that resemble the old ones. It prepares the analyst much less for an entrant that does not behave like any competitor on the shelf.</p><p>When such a company appears, the experienced reader is at risk of filing its moves under a familiar heading. A price cut from an unfamiliar source looks like the cuts seen in earlier cycles, and the analyst waits for the usual reversal. If the entrant has a different cost structure, the reversal never comes. A newcomer with no history to consult sometimes sees the break more quickly, simply because nothing on the shelf tells the newcomer it is routine.</p><p>Two more limits are worth naming. The record takes years, and nothing shortens it. And it belongs to the industry that produced it. An analyst with a deep record in one field starts nearly fresh in another, bringing only the habit of checking calls, which transfers, and not the pattern recognition, which does not.</p><p>The written record offers partial protection. If the analyst keeps the list of what would prove a view wrong, an unfamiliar entrant at least has a place to show up in the checks. Protection is the right word, because it reduces the risk and does not remove it.</p><h4>What the record means for the reader</h4><p>For an owner, a manager or an early career analyst, the practical point is about how to weigh a judgment from someone who has followed one field for a long time. The useful questions are how many full swings that person has watched in the same place, and whether the calls were written down and checked afterward. The skill grows from years that came with a written record of calls.</p><p>The same reasoning applies to anyone building their own judgment about an industry. Pick one, stay with it through more than one turn, write down each call with its reasons, and go back to it. The first pass supplies the vocabulary, the second supplies the comparison, and the checked calls supply the confidence that is worth having.</p><p>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9eaa679c165c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The First Manager Hire Changes How Information Moves in a Company]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio/the-first-manager-hire-changes-how-information-moves-in-a-company-49940d0f8fc4?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/49940d0f8fc4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[operations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[small-business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:20:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-11T07:20:05.312Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Adding the first layer of management changes who hears about problems and when, and the owner has to build new ways to see the work.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KRvMvG9k6Sq_s9b2" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@tranquilizer?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Girish Agisgekar</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>An owner sits in a parked truck late at night, thumbing out a reply to a crew lead who wants to know which supplier sent the wrong parts. The owner knows the answer, because every question in the company still ends up in that one phone.</p><p>That arrangement works for a long time, and it is easy to mistake it for a strength. When the owner hears every problem firsthand, nothing gets lost on the way up, nothing gets softened, and the owner always knows the real state of the work. Hiring the first manager ends that arrangement, and the owner’s job in the months afterward is to build new ways of seeing the work instead of hearing all of it.</p><h4>An owner who hears everything holds the company together by hand</h4><p>In a company with no layer of management, information moves in a straight line. A crew lead sees a problem, calls the owner, and the owner decides. There is no summary, no interpretation and no waiting for a meeting. The owner learns about a late delivery, a customer complaint or a tool that keeps breaking on the same day each one happens.</p><p>This is fast, and it also teaches the owner a great deal. Over time the owner builds a feel for which crews are steady, which customers are difficult and which suppliers cannot be counted on. That feel is the real asset of a small company, and almost none of it is written down anywhere.</p><p>The cost is that every decision runs through one person. The owner cannot take a full day away from the phone without work stopping. The crew learns to wait for an answer instead of deciding, because deciding was never part of their job. A company can grow a long way on this model, but each added crew adds more questions to the same phone.</p><p>The owner also becomes the only place where the pieces connect. A question from one crew about materials may explain a delay on another crew, and only the person hearing both calls can see that. Once the company outgrows what one person can hear in a day, those connections start to go unnoticed.</p><h4>The first manager becomes a filter, whether anyone intends it or not</h4><p>When a manager arrives, the crew leads start to ask that person first. This is the point of the hire, and it is also the point where the owner’s view of the business begins to change.</p><p>The manager now hears the problem before the owner does. The manager decides whether it needs the owner at all, and if it does, the manager decides how to describe it. A broken tool becomes a line in a weekly summary. A short temper on a crew becomes a comment that things are a little tense. The owner still receives information, but it now arrives later, shorter and already interpreted by someone else.</p><p>Some of that filtering is exactly what the owner wanted. Nobody benefits from an owner who is interrupted about every wrong part and every missed lunch. A good manager absorbs the small questions and lets the owner think about the larger ones. The trouble comes from the fact that the filter works silently. The owner cannot see what was dropped, and the manager cannot always know which small thing the owner would have wanted to hear about.</p><p>There is a second effect that is easy to miss. The crew leads also change how they behave. A lead who used to call the owner directly now has a layer in between, and some will stop raising problems they think the manager might take badly. Bad news travels more slowly through a company with managers than through one without, simply because it now passes through more hands before it reaches the person who can act on it.</p><h4>The owner has to replace hearing with seeing</h4><p>A company that adds its first manager has to add some way of observing the work that does not depend on being told about it. This is a design problem, and it is better solved before the first manager starts than after the first surprise.</p><p>The simplest tools are plain ones. A short written note at the end of each day from every crew, covering what was finished, what was ordered and what went wrong, gives the owner a record that no one has summarized away. A standing visit to the work, on a schedule that the crews know about, lets the owner see conditions that never make it into a report. A shared list of orders and deliveries makes it clear when something promised has not arrived, without anyone having to call to say so.</p><p>The owner also needs to decide, in advance and in plain words, which things always go straight to the top. Safety problems, a complaint from a customer who has been with the company for years, and anything that threatens the cash needed for payroll are common examples. When that list is clear, the manager does not have to guess, and the crew leads do not have to wonder whether a problem is serious enough to skip a step.</p><p>None of this replaces the manager. It gives the manager a standard to work against and gives the owner a way to check the picture without second guessing every call. A manager who knows the owner can see the work for themselves is usually more at ease passing along bad news, because the news will not be a surprise. It also helps the owner resist the habit of calling a crew lead directly, which undercuts the manager faster than almost anything else.</p><h4>The arrangement has limits that a good plan does not remove</h4><p>Several things in this argument can go wrong. Some companies stay healthy with a flat structure for a very long time, especially when the work is simple and the owner genuinely enjoys the details. For those companies a manager hired too early adds salary and a layer of communication without taking any real weight off the owner.</p><p>New ways of observing the work can also turn into paperwork. Daily notes that nobody reads teach the crews that the notes do not matter, and they soon become a line of boilerplate written to satisfy a habit. The owner has to read what comes in and act on it, or the system decays within a few months.</p><p>A manager also cannot supply what the owner knows about customers and suppliers. That knowledge came from years of direct contact, and it moves to someone else slowly, if it moves at all. The owner who steps back too fast can find that the company runs smoothly while quietly losing the relationships that made it work.</p><p>For an owner weighing the first management hire, the useful exercise is to list what the company currently learns only because the owner was interrupted, and then decide how each item will reach the owner once someone else answers the phone. For a manager taking that first role, the same list explains what the owner is worried about and why. Both sides are better off once the list exists in writing.</p><p>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=49940d0f8fc4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What a Company Owes Decides What Happens When Plans Slip]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Peterdecaprio/what-a-company-owes-decides-what-happens-when-plans-slip-3daee100d92a?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3daee100d92a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[credit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[debt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 07:34:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-09T07:34:35.220Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A growth story describes the good years, and the list of maturities and lenders shows who sits at the table in a bad one.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HiHjgSvknPAUDwTF" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@stockbirken?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Stock Birken</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>A debt schedule lies open across a desk, one page per lender, the maturity dates running down the left margin and the amounts due set beside them. A debt schedule is simply the list of everything a company has borrowed, from whom, and when each piece comes due. Nothing on the page describes the product, the customers or the plan for next year. It answers a narrower question, and in a hard year that narrower question is the one that decides what happens.</p><p>I came into finance from the side of companies in financial distress. The questions I bring to any company are still the same three: what it owes, to whom, and what happens if the plan slips. A growth story answers none of them. It describes what a company hopes to become, while the debt schedule describes what the company has already promised, and those promises arrive on their dates whether the hopes come true or not.</p><p>Knowing what a company owes, to whom and when tells you more about how it will hold up in a hard year than anything in its growth story. The rest of this piece walks through why.</p><h4>The schedule is a calendar of promises</h4><p>Read slowly, a debt schedule is a calendar. Each line is a promise with a date attached. Interest falls due every quarter. Principal falls due on a maturity. A revolving credit line, the borrowing a company draws and repays as it needs cash, has to be renewed before a certain month or it goes away. Fees and renewal dates sit on the page as quietly as the large payments, and they are the easiest lines to skip.</p><p>The company made each of those promises at a time when the future looked a particular way. The schedule keeps every one of them in force after the future changes. That is what makes it such a useful document to read. It records commitments made under old assumptions, and it says exactly when each commitment will be tested.</p><p>Most people who look at a company start with the income statement, because that is where the story lives. Revenue, margins and growth rates are the language of ambition. The debt schedule is written in a different language, the language of dates and counterparties, and it rewards a different kind of reader. It asks for patience with detail and a willingness to read the small lines as carefully as the large ones.</p><h4>Everything turns on when the dates fall and who holds the paper</h4><p>The first thing worth noticing on the page is when the large dates fall. A company whose borrowings are spread across many years can absorb a weak stretch, because only a small part of what it owes comes due in any one of them. A company with most of its debt maturing in the same season has to find new lenders, or persuade the old ones, at the very moment its results may look their worst.</p><p>Two companies with the same total debt can face very different years for that reason alone. One has time to wait out a slow market. The other has a deadline that does not move, and a slow market makes every conversation about that deadline harder.</p><p>The second thing is who sits on each line. A bank that has lent to a company for years, with people who know the plant and the managers, tends to behave differently from holders who bought the debt in the market last month and may sell it next month. A short list of lenders means a short list of conversations if relief is ever needed. A long and scattered list can mean there is no single party to call at all. The more parties there are, the more separate wishes have to be met, and the longer any change takes to agree.</p><p>The third thing is what each promise is attached to. Some debt is secured by specific assets and some is not. Some carries conditions about how the company manages its finances along the way, and some carries very few. Those details decide who has leverage when a plan goes wrong, and they rarely appear in the summary on the first page of a presentation.</p><p>None of this requires a forecast. It only requires reading what is already written down. That is part of the appeal. A growth story asks you to believe something about the future, while a debt schedule only asks you to read the present carefully.</p><h4>The shape of the calendar decides how much room a company has</h4><p>A growth story is usually offered sincerely. Management expects the new product to sell, the new region to open on time and costs to fall as volume builds. The difficulty is that a growth story describes the good years, while debt describes every year, the hard ones included.</p><p>When revenue grows as planned, the schedule fades into the background. Payments come out of rising cash flow, maturities are refinanced on comfortable terms, and lenders are glad to extend. In that world the shape of the obligations hardly seems to matter, which is exactly why it gets so little attention in a good year.</p><p>When the plan slips, the order reverses. The growth story stops paying for anything, and the schedule moves to the front of every meeting. The questions become practical and specific: which payment comes next, which lender has to approve any change, and what that lender will want in return for saying yes.</p><p>This is where reading the schedule pays off. A management team that knows its obligations can see a crowded year coming long before it arrives. It can refinance while results still look reasonable, or replace one large maturity with several smaller ones spread across later years, so that no single date carries the whole company. Those choices are structural. They change the shape of the calendar itself, which is the one thing a hard year cannot argue with.</p><p>A company that has only been reading its growth story meets the same crowded year with its calendar unchanged. The business may be just as good as it was. The calendar is the one it signed years earlier, written for a future that did not arrive.</p><p>That is the practical meaning of resilience. A company can have a fine long term future and still fail to reach it because one date arrived at the wrong time and the people around the table had too little room to work with. The schedule shows how much room exists before anyone needs it.</p><h4>A summary never shows the whole schedule</h4><p>The argument has a real limit, and it sits in the paperwork itself. Obligations change. Loan agreements are amended, deadlines are extended, terms are adjusted in side agreements, and new borrowings are layered on top of old ones. A summary schedule prepared for a presentation is a snapshot, and it rarely captures every amendment or every condition attached to a line.</p><p>So the schedule that matters is the complete one, read with the agreements behind it, and that is slow work. It can take days to piece together what a company actually owes, on what terms, and with whose permission any of it can change. Even then, a reader outside the company sees only what has been written down, and some arrangements live in conversations rather than documents.</p><p>The schedule also cannot tell you whether the business underneath is sound. A company with a perfectly spaced set of maturities can still sell a product nobody wants. Reading what a company owes is a test of how long it can survive a mistake. It says much less about whether the mistake will happen.</p><p>For an owner weighing a new loan, the same reading changes the question. The rate and the amount get most of the attention, but the date often matters more. A new maturity that lands in a year already crowded with old ones adds risk the rate does not show. One that lands in an empty year can make the whole calendar easier to carry.</p><p>What it does offer is a way to see a company the way its hard year will see it. Anyone who works with a company, as an owner, a manager, a lender or an employee, can put the same three questions to the page and get a real answer: what it owes, to whom, and what happens if the plan slips.</p><p>Those answers will never be as exciting as a growth story. They are simply more likely to describe the year that actually arrives.</p><p>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3daee100d92a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Business Dos and Don’ts]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/business-dos-and-donts-b00c1d682391?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b00c1d682391</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-credit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-debt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 2022 09:57:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-08T01:24:21.217Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Operating Discipline Is the Real Underwriting Question</h3><h4>What I look for in a middle market company long before I think about capital</h4><p>Most of the companies I meet are trying to grow faster than their cash will allow. The pitch is almost always about the opportunity in front of them. The decision almost always comes down to something quieter, which is how the business is actually run from one week to the next. Operating discipline is visible well before a model gets built, and so is the absence of it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*t6y18VT5YVCyQFQY-cPxFw.png" /></figure><p>Over time I have collected a short list of habits that tend to show up in companies that hold their value through a full cycle, and a matching list of habits that show up in the ones that do not. None of it is complicated. It is either practiced or it is not.</p><h3>Cash discipline comes before growth ambition</h3><p>Every company has a growth plan. Fewer have a cash plan that supports it. The teams that earn capital on good terms can tell me, without hunting for a file, when cash arrives, when it leaves, and what happens to both if revenue slips for a quarter or two. That is not a finance exercise. It is a management habit. When a team knows the cash cycle by heart, it makes smaller mistakes and it makes them earlier, which is usually all the protection a balance sheet needs.</p><h3>Customer concentration is a quiet risk</h3><p>Revenue that comes from very few relationships looks like strength in a good year and fragility in a hard one. I am less interested in the count of logos than in the answer to a simple question. If the largest customer reopened terms this quarter, what would the company do next week? Teams that have an answer have usually started to diversify already. Teams that have no answer are carrying a risk they have decided not to price.</p><h3>A capital structure should match the cash cycle</h3><p>Private credit and venture debt are useful instruments when they are matched to how a business converts work into cash. They become a burden when the repayment schedule assumes a pace of collection the company has never achieved. Before anything gets signed I want to understand the working capital rhythm of the business, because that rhythm, rather than the headline cost of capital, decides whether a structure feels comfortable or constraining.</p><h3>Management depth beats founder effort</h3><p>Founders carry early companies, and for a while that is the right arrangement. The transition that matters is the one where decisions stop routing through a single person. I pay attention to whether the second layer of leadership speaks in the meeting, whether they disagree in front of me, and whether they own results of their own. A company with real depth can absorb a departure, a difficult quarter, or a sudden opportunity. A company without it cannot, however capable the founder is.</p><h3>Reporting rhythm tells you more than a deck</h3><p>Materials prepared for an investor are polished by definition. What tells me more is the reporting a company already produces for itself. Does a monthly package arrive on time? Does it compare results to a plan that was set before the period began? Does the team discuss variances without defensiveness? Companies that run on their own information tend to be candid with capital partners, and candor shortens every conversation that follows, including the uncomfortable ones.</p><h3>The takeaway</h3><p>Underwriting gets described as a judgment about markets. In practice it is mostly a judgment about habits. I would rather back a company with a reasonable position in an ordinary market and genuine operating discipline than an exciting story run on improvisation. Discipline compounds quietly, and it is the one input a management team fully controls.</p><p><em>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b00c1d682391" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/business-dos-and-donts-b00c1d682391">Business Dos and Don’ts</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio">Peter DeCaprio</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Resolutions I Would Write Into an Operating Plan]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/new-year-resolutions-for-entrepreneurs-a662e96bc587?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a662e96bc587</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-credit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-debt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-market]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2022 14:39:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-08T01:25:27.891Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>An investor view of the commitments that actually change how a private company performs</h4><p>Plans written at the start of a year are usually too long. They list everything a company might do and commit to nothing in particular. The plans that work read like a short set of promises a management team can be held to, and that an investor or a lender can watch over the following quarters. If I were sitting with a middle market company before a new year began, these are the commitments I would push for.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lHcw7n-Rhw6v_tdo" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@justin_morgan?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Justin Morgan</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>None of them require a new strategy. They require a decision to do a few things consistently, which is harder and far more valuable than it sounds.</p><h3>Decide what you will stop doing</h3><p>Most operating plans are additive. New markets, new products, new hires. Very few name the activity that will be retired to make room. A plan without subtractions quietly assumes the team has spare capacity it does not have. I would ask a management team to name one product line, one customer segment, or one internal process they intend to stop supporting, and to say who is responsible for winding it down. The exercise is uncomfortable, which is exactly why it is useful.</p><h3>Put the cash forecast in front of the growth plan</h3><p>Growth consumes cash before it produces any. A plan that opens with revenue targets and treats cash as a consequence has the order reversed. I would have the team build the cash forecast first, under a conservative collection assumption, and then size the growth plan to fit inside it. If the ambition exceeds the cash available, that gap is a financing question and should be named as one in January rather than discovered in the middle of a quarter.</p><h3>Build the credit relationship before you need it</h3><p>The worst time to meet a lender is the week you need one. Private credit and venture debt providers are relationship businesses, and they underwrite the quality of the information they receive almost as closely as the asset in front of them. I would have a company begin sending a simple monthly package to prospective capital partners well ahead of any raise, so that when terms are eventually discussed the counterparty already has a record of a team that reports accurately and on time.</p><h3>Make the leadership hire you keep postponing</h3><p>Almost every company I speak with has one role that has been open in spirit for a year. A finance leader, an operations leader, a commercial leader. The seat stays empty because the founder is absorbing it, and the cost of that absorption never shows up in a report. I would make the hire a dated commitment in the plan with a named owner, because a plan that depends on one person stretching further is not really a plan.</p><h3>Revisit pricing with fresh eyes</h3><p>Pricing is the fastest route to margin and the one lever most teams leave untouched for years. Costs move, the product improves, the competitive set changes, and the price sits where somebody set it at the beginning. I would commit to a structured pricing review once during the year, with real customer input, and I would hold the team to acting on the conclusion rather than filing it politely away.</p><h3>The takeaway</h3><p>A good operating plan is short, specific, and uncomfortable in a few places. It names what stops, it respects cash, it treats capital partners as relationships rather than transactions, and it assigns people to the work. Resolutions fail when they stay aspirations. They hold when they have an owner and a date.</p><p><em>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a662e96bc587" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/new-year-resolutions-for-entrepreneurs-a662e96bc587">Resolutions I Would Write Into an Operating Plan</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio">Peter DeCaprio</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Separates a Target From a Forecast]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/amazing-tips-to-help-achieve-goals-and-reach-success-ec1d468bc699?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec1d468bc699</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2022 11:19:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-08T01:25:56.266Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Why I pay closer attention to how a team commits than to what they commit to</h4><p>Every management team I meet arrives with goals. Far fewer arrive with targets. The distinction sounds like semantics until you have sat through enough operating reviews to see which of the two actually changes behavior, and over time I have come to treat it as one of the more useful signals available to an investor in the middle market.</p><p>A goal is a statement of intent. A target is a commitment with a date on it, a name beside it, and a consequence behind it. A goal survives a weak quarter completely intact. A target does not, and that fragility is exactly what makes it worth something.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*LEnxla9CQk_TUeSw" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@yibeigeng?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Yibei Geng</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>When I spend time with a company, I am usually not trying to decide whether the plan is ambitious enough. Ambition is cheap and most plans have plenty of it. I am trying to work out whether anyone inside the building would notice if the plan were quietly missed. A few things tend to tell me.</p><h3>A target has a name beside it</h3><p>Ask who owns a number and you learn a great deal from how long the pause lasts. In companies that execute, the answer comes back immediately and it is a person rather than a department. Ownership that lands on a function tends to evaporate under pressure, because everyone involved can reasonably assume someone else is carrying it. I am not looking for a culture of blame. I am looking for evidence that accountability has an address.</p><h3>The plan survives contact with the calendar</h3><p>Plenty of operating plans are built once and then referenced at board meetings as a kind of historical artifact. The useful ones get opened weekly. I want to see a live document that the team argues with and measures against, rather than a deck that was approved and then set aside while the business runs on instinct. Cadence matters more here than the sophistication of the model behind it.</p><h3>Bad news moves as fast as good news</h3><p>This is the one I weight most heavily. In healthy organizations a miss surfaces early, from the person closest to it, while there is still time to respond. In unhealthy ones it arrives late, filtered through layers of interpretation and bundled with an explanation. The speed at which uncomfortable information travels upward says more about an operating culture than any stated value does. It is also the trait that most reliably predicts whether an investor or a lender ends up surprised.</p><h3>The number connects to something a person can move</h3><p>A target nobody can influence through their own work is not a target, it is a wish. Good operators break a company level commitment into the specific inputs that drive it, and those inputs belong to people who can act on them directly. When a team can trace a revenue commitment down to the handful of activities underneath it, I am usually looking at a group that will either hit the commitment or know early why it will not.</p><h3>Revisions are documented rather than quiet</h3><p>Plans should change. Conditions move, and a team that refuses to revise is not disciplined, it is rigid. What matters is whether revisions are explicit. A target that was formally reset with a stated reason reflects a functioning process. A target that simply drifted until it matched the result suggests the number was never a real commitment. The quiet revision is the one worth worrying about, because it teaches an organization that missing carries no cost.</p><h3>The takeaway</h3><p>None of this requires an elaborate diligence process. It requires asking who owns a number, how often the plan gets opened, how fast bad news travels, and whether past targets were reset deliberately or allowed to fade. Teams that answer those questions crisply tend to be teams that do what they said they would do. In middle market investing, where so much of the outcome rests on execution rather than on financial structure, that is most of what I am trying to learn.</p><p><em>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec1d468bc699" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/amazing-tips-to-help-achieve-goals-and-reach-success-ec1d468bc699">What Separates a Target From a Forecast</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio">Peter DeCaprio</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Building a Bench Before You Need One]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/ways-to-turn-your-employees-into-leaders-3004d053502e?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3004d053502e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2022 05:50:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-08T01:26:25.897Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Leadership depth is an operating asset and most companies start building it too late</h4><p>When I look at a company in the middle market, one of the quieter risks is how much of the operation runs through a single person. It almost never presents as a problem while that person is present and performing well. It presents the moment they are not, and by then the options are poor.</p><p>Leadership depth is an operating asset. It is harder to measure than a margin and slower to build than a sales pipeline, and for both of those reasons it tends to get postponed until the business is already feeling the absence of it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*Vjif8ptZ4EZ6p_BByxubUQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The companies that handle this well do not treat leadership development as a program with a budget line. They treat it as a set of habits visible in how work gets handed out week to week. Here is what I pay attention to.</p><h3>Depth is a capacity question before it is a talent question</h3><p>Most teams hold more capable people than they hold opportunities for those people to lead. The binding constraint is rarely raw ability. It is that every decision of consequence still routes through the same two or three names, which means nobody else ever accumulates the reps. When I ask a chief executive what would break if they stepped away for a month, a long and specific answer is a good sign. A short and confident answer usually means the question has never been tested.</p><h3>Delegation is the training rather than the reward</h3><p>There is a common pattern in which responsibility is handed over only once somebody has proven they can carry it, which leaves no obvious path to ever proving it. Development runs the other direction. You give a person a decision slightly beyond anything they have handled before, you stay close enough to catch an error that would be expensive, and you let them own the result either way. That sequence is uncomfortable for everyone involved and it is the only one I have seen produce operators.</p><h3>Watch who runs the room when the leader is absent</h3><p>Meetings are an underrated diagnostic. In a company with real depth, the agenda holds and the discussion stays sharp when the senior person is traveling. In a company without it, the same meeting becomes a status update that waits for a decision nobody present feels able to make. I am not looking for a second in command who imitates the first. I am looking for evidence that judgment is distributed rather than concentrated.</p><h3>Titles should trail responsibility rather than lead it</h3><p>Promotion is often used as a substitute for development, which rarely ends well. A title granted ahead of the work sets an expectation the person has not yet been equipped to meet, and the organization reads the gap quickly. The healthier pattern is to widen the scope first, let someone operate in it visibly, and then formalize what is already true. It is slower and it produces leaders whose authority is believed by the people around them.</p><h3>What this is worth to an investor</h3><p>A company with depth absorbs surprises. A key departure becomes a difficult quarter rather than an existential event, an acquisition can be integrated without borrowing the whole executive team, and growth does not stall every time the founder hits the limit of personal capacity. None of that appears directly in a model, but it shows up in how wide a range of outcomes you have to underwrite.</p><h3>The takeaway</h3><p>Building a bench is not an exercise in succession planning documents. It is a habit of handing real decisions to people slightly before they feel ready, tolerating the mistakes that follow, and resisting the urge to pull authority back the first time something goes sideways. Companies that do this consistently are easier to own, easier to lend to, and considerably more durable than their financial statements alone would suggest.</p><p><em>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3004d053502e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/ways-to-turn-your-employees-into-leaders-3004d053502e">Building a Bench Before You Need One</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio">Peter DeCaprio</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What I Look For in a Leader Before I Commit Capital]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/ways-to-be-a-better-leader-in-2022-caa803be28ab?source=rss-beb2449cf4ae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/caa803be28ab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[private-credit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-debt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter DeCaprio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2022 04:57:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-08T01:58:59.340Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Notes from the diligence side of the table on the operator habits that hold up</h4><p>I spend most of my time looking at private companies in the middle market, and the thing that decides whether I lean in is rarely the market opportunity. It is the person running the business. A model can be rebuilt in an afternoon. A management team cannot.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*wVgOTYcL7-wLhCtKWcn-rQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>I am a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings, a private equity firm, and over time I have come to read leadership the way a credit investor reads a covenant package. Not as a promise, but as evidence of how someone is likely to behave once conditions tighten. Here is what I weigh, and what I would work on if I were sitting on the other side of the table.</p><h3>Clarity About What the Business Actually Sells</h3><p>Strong operators describe the business in plain language. They know which customer pays, why that customer renews, and what the company has decided not to do. When a founder needs a long preamble and a stack of charts to explain the revenue line, the company usually runs the same way it is explained.</p><p>Clarity is not oversimplification. It is proof that someone has already made the hard choices about focus, and that the people below them can repeat the answer without guessing at it.</p><h3>A Plan for Cash Before a Plan for Growth</h3><p>Growth plans are easy to write and pleasant to present. Cash plans are neither. In private credit and venture debt I am underwriting the ability to meet obligations through a quiet stretch, not the ability to win in a loud one.</p><p>So I ask how payroll gets met in a slow quarter, which costs come out first, and who makes that call. A leader who has already run that exercise answers in a minute. A leader who has not tends to answer with revenue, which is another way of saying they have not thought about it.</p><h3>Willingness to Be Early With Bad News</h3><p>The managers I want to back call before the problem is solved. They would rather be seen working through something messy than be seen presenting a clean quarter that was not actually clean. That takes a kind of confidence that has nothing to do with bravado.</p><p>The habit compounds. Early information gives lenders, boards and co investors room to help. Late information turns a manageable issue into a question of trust, and trust is the expensive thing to replace.</p><h3>Hiring That Builds Depth Rather Than Cover</h3><p>Average leaders hire to patch their own gaps and stop there. The good ones hire people who could run a function without them, then hand over enough authority to make that real rather than decorative.</p><p>In diligence I pay attention to whether anyone besides the founder can speak with command about their own numbers. If only the person who started the company can explain it, the company carries a single point of failure that no capital structure can fix.</p><h3>Judgment That Holds Through a Slow Quarter</h3><p>Every business gets a stretch where nothing works. The pipeline stalls, a key hire leaves, a vendor misses. What I watch for is whether the leader keeps making decisions on the same basis they used when things were going well, or starts reacting to whatever happened that week.</p><p>Steadiness under strain is the clearest signal I have found that a team will still be worth backing in the next cycle. It is also the hardest trait to manufacture for a diligence process, because it shows up in small choices rather than in the presentation.</p><h3>The takeaway</h3><p>I cannot diligence character directly, so I read it through behavior: how plainly someone explains the business, how early they share bad news, how much authority they are willing to give away, and how steady their judgment stays when the quarter goes against them. Operators who want to be easier to back should work on those four habits long before they work on the deck.</p><p><em>Peter DeCaprio is a Member of Emerald Coast Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, and holds an MBA in Finance from Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=caa803be28ab" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio/ways-to-be-a-better-leader-in-2022-caa803be28ab">What I Look For in a Leader Before I Commit Capital</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/peter-decaprio">Peter DeCaprio</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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