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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Reconciliation agreement” in Daraa: Insecurity, continued repression and collective punishment]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/reconciliation-agreement-in-daraa-insecurity-continued-repression-and-collective-punishment-d35f6c679a1?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[daraa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[assad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[displacement]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2020 09:40:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-10T09:40:05.601Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*Y1HDNxMD0myFnP-b5bVAKg.jpeg" /><figcaption>IED attack on bus in Daraa province killed nine regime soldiers on June 20 (Photo: SOHR)</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Introduction</em></strong></p><p>“Reconciliation agreements” have been used by the Syrian regime as a tool of establishing control over areas formerly held by opposition forces following brutal sieges and devastating campaigns of force often directed against the civilian population. The former head of the Syrian People’s Assembly, Hadiya Abbas, described the reconciliation agreements being offered by Assad’s regime (and backed up by security guarantees from Russia) as a method of bringing former opposition-held areas back under its control as a “means to consolidate the military victories of the Syrian regime’s army”.[1] Such agreements represent one of the Syrian regime’s methods of “pacifying” the rebellious regions after starving them by siege and putting great pressure on their residents through heavy shelling and/or relentless military attacks accompanied by threatening messages by mediators. Locals usually sought to start a negotiating process of surrender, which would lead to a reconciliation agreement.</p><p>Following Russia’s intervention in Syria, the regime conquered various areas in Damascus and the surrounding countryside and offered reconciliation agreements with the encouragement of the Russian military. The agreements were developed as a strategy in which locals, usually former members of Armed Opposition Groups (AOG), were supposed to be ensuring security in the medium term, but in the short term Moscow aimed to restore full control by the regime’s army by integrating the rebel battalions of interest under its command.</p><p>The individuals required to undergo the surrender process would usually be instructed to sign a number of documents with personal data, contact details, career history, political orientation, criminal record and travels abroad, as well as relatives active against the regime.</p><p>In addition, they have to answer questions about the individual’s role in any anti-regime activities, including demonstrations and armed opposition, give information about AOGs groups in their areas, secret tunnels, and foreign members or governments supporting AOGs (names, affiliations, roles and locations). Lastly, the applicants have to sign statement pledging not to carry out any action against the state and its security forces and militias forces through the use of demonstrations, social media, anti-regime publications and media platforms, or AOGs.[2]</p><p>In Daraa, this was done with the largest armed groups of Daraa, Ahmad Al-Awda’s group which Russia integrated into the “Fifth Core”. In the northern Homs countryside, the Manhal al-Saluh group was integrated into the same legion. The impact of these agreements on different regions varied greatly, but none has been restored to anything resembling their pre-war status. Illustratively, most of the people from the Damascus countryside who signed a reconciliation agreement still left their homes, some of the revolutionaries and civilians from the northern Homs countryside who signed the agreement stayed, and most of those in Daraa remained. One thing in common to all these areas: they continue to be plagued by insecurity and repression.</p><p>Considering the efforts by the regime and Russia to promote reconciliation agreements as a model that could be applied more generally to the return of displaced Syrians, the Syrian Association for Citizen Dignity (SACD) will publish a series of analytical papers that examine the impact of these agreements on the regions that negotiated them. These papers will attempt to identify the key effects and developments that took place in these areas after the agreements were signed, how they impacted the people who decided to reconcile and their plausibility as a model for return. The first such briefing looks at the reconciliation agreement in Daraa, its impact and the current situation.</p><p><strong><em>Daraa: The rebellious city</em></strong></p><p>Daraa governorate is relatively rich in natural resources, with vast agricultural areas and the Yarmouk Basin rich in water, which has traditionally facilitated relatively strong economic activity. The area has also benefited from regular remittances from a large number of workers living abroad, especially in the Gulf countries (approximately 200,000 or 16 per cent of the province’s inhabitants).[3] These monthly transfers provided a strong financial injection, and local people also made an effort to diversify the economy through transportation and trade.</p><p>Before 2011, under Baath Party rule, Daraa could be categorized as a marginalized governorate. There was a noticeable military presence in the streets of its towns and cities, under the pretext of the country’s confrontation with Israel and the need to “protect the residents” of the region. Although its youth were generally better educated than those in other border governorates, and it had a strong platform for economic prosperity, it was targeted for marginalization. For instance, the government issued several laws that prevent major investments in what is known as the Security Approval Law, under the pretext of concerns about a possible attack from Israel. This marginalization caused an undercurrent of resentment and discontent with the regime among the population.</p><p>At the end of February 2011, some students wrote slogans denouncing the Assad regime on the walls of their school, inspired by the Arab Spring events in the region. One of the branches of security apparatus headed by Bashar Al-Assad cousin, Mr. Atef Najib, rushed to arrest them. The students were tortured and their nails pulled out; their families were threatened with arrest when they tried to find out about their whereabouts. The protests spread to other schools and sparked widespread peaceful protests that spilled over to other governorates. The peaceful demonstrations continued in Daraa and across Syria over the next several months. The regime responded by killing protesters. The repression and mass arrests continued, and the situation evolved into clashes that intensified with increasing numbers of soldiers from the regime army defecting to the side of revolutionaries. The regime was eventually driven out of the entire region, and the conflict turned into bombing and huge battles, ultimately ending with Russian involvement. The overwhelming force exerted on the opposition factions forced them to sign a reconciliation agreement in mid-2018, with Russia as a guarantor.</p><p>With the beginning of the popular uprising in March 2011 the regime reduced its services to the governorate as a means of collective punishment for the anti-regime sentiment. Family and clan solidarity, in addition to agriculture, were the means of survival and resistance, with people pooling resources and sharing to provide for the basic daily needs of most households. More than 100 civil organizations worked during the opposition’s control period, helping to provide public services.[4] This is how the people were surviving before the reconciliation agreement, which on paper was supposed to provide a return to normalcy.</p><p><strong><em>Reconciliation agreement in Daraa and its collapse</em></strong></p><p>The reconciliation agreement in Daraa resulted from negotiating rounds between the notables and opposition factions from Daraa, the most prominent of which is the group called “Sunni Youth” led by General Ahmed Al-Awda, and the Assad regime represented by the Military Operations Room in the south and the presence of generals from the Russian Hmeimim base. Most of the AOG members remained in the region; a few dozen rejected the agreement and fled north.</p><p>Under the agreement, Russia pledged to ensure that all necessary services are provided to the region, including the return of students and employees to universities and state institutions. However, neither services nor jobs returned, and the living situation worsened with the exit of humanitarian institutions that were operating in opposition regions; residents were dependent on the resources of those interested in supporting these areas.</p><p>After the reconciliation agreement was signed in mid-2018, thousands of residents who were displaced as a result of the bombardment returned to their homes. They had a sense of improving safety as the open military conflict ceased and because most of the people in the region remained in the area.[5] But the living situation was bad, and did not improve despite the promises to provide more services.</p><p>The situation was made worse by the presence of regime and Iranian militias, and the establishment of checkpoints that the regime put up and used to arrest the youth and shoot at those who do not stop and extort money from civilians. These checkpoints also restricted the free movement of trade between cities and towns.</p><p>In March 2019 the situation escalated, and the people demonstrated against the local authorities’ attempt to erect a statue of Hafez al-Assad while ignoring the provision of key services to them. The regime responded by driving more of the youth into forced recruitment, and civilians and ex-AOG members began attacking military checkpoints at night in simulation of the early days of the military confrontation between the regime and defected soldiers and civilians who decided to defend themselves.</p><p>By the beginning of 2020, the regime had tried to storm several cities and towns in Daraa, and the situation escalated after the rebels seized soldiers who entered the town of Nahata for inspection and ignited a wave of daily fighting that ended with a new negotiation[6] and the expulsion of a number of young people towards the north of Syria. But the arrests, assassinations and forced recruitment of youth to fight in the Idlib and Aleppo countryside frontlines increased. Since April 2020, Assad’s forces have amassed on the outskirts of various cities and towns in the south and issued daily threats to storm them.</p><p><strong><em>Living in Daraa: A collective punishment</em></strong></p><p>Once the agreement was signed, the regime cut services from the governorate instead of increasing them as promised. The Ministry of Higher Education fired more than 200 teachers at the end of 2018[7], and removed more than a third of the governorate’s attorneys from the bar association[8]. Dozens of others were fired from various institutions, which deprived a number of families of their income. In addition, the Ministry of Education rejected a third of the registered university students on the basis that they did not attend the university during the conflict[9].</p><p>The military barriers and checkpoints that were imposed near the villages contributed to obstructing commerce, which increased the price of goods, on top of the additional taxes now imposed on the area. Although Daraa boasts a large agricultural area, the people were unable to harvest approximately half of the crops due to the high prices of production inputs. Animal production decreased due to the constant bombing during the conflict, in addition to the decline in the available water in the Yarmouk Basin with the destruction of most of the infrastructure required to irrigate agricultural lands. For example, Lake Mezireb, formerly one of the largest water bodies in the region, dried up at the end of 2018[10]. In May 2020, aid in the form of agricultural seeds arrived for 1,500 families, while most families and regions were barred from accessing the seeds in the necessary quantities despite paying for them.[11]</p><p>Flour was rationed more strictly in Daraa than in any other region. The Baath Party representatives who controlled the region also used their power to distribute fuel and other resources to marginalize opponents and punish those who did not support the regime during the war.[12]</p><p>Before the war, many in Daraa relied on transport and commercial services between Syria and Jordan for their livelihoods. Yet trade with Jordan collapsed after the start of the protests in early 2011. Although the Nassib crossing reopened after the reconciliation agreement, the regime’s arrest of a number of Jordanians who entered there continue to paralyze commercial activity in the area.[13]</p><p>After the reconciliation agreement, the people of Daraa, especially those who recently returned, began to revitalize their previous work, such as agricultural work and transportation. The residents seemed to cooperate more with each other to overcome the deficiencies and bridge the gaps that arose from the decline in the role of government institutions. The region held meetings to organize business and cooperation to exchange agricultural experiences, as merchants organized long sessions to reopen some markets and carried out necessary restoration work on buildings, streets, and infrastructure. In the early months of the reconciliation, Daraa established a governance model that relies on cooperation and coordination between people with whom they share close ties and a common threat. But this model was not satisfactory to the regime and other parties that are trying to interfere in the region[14], so the regime charged and detained a number of prominent community leaders in the region on the pretext of their affiliation with the opposition. Some of the detainees were brought to the terrorism court, where more than 200 people have been referred since the signing of the agreement; some have been sentenced to death.</p><p><strong><em>Security situation: Descent into mayhem</em></strong></p><p>The Syrian regime’s practice of relentless arrests and the mass forced recruitment of men aged 25–40 significantly aggravated the situation in the region. While some were released, others were disappeared in prisons; some were reportedly assassinated. The forced recruits from Daraa were far more likely to die at the front than other recruits in regime’s army, as they were pushed to the fiercest front lines against battle-hardened opponents. There were also reports that they were executed[15].</p><p>In February 2019, during the military operation against the villages of Idlib and the western countryside of Aleppo, a number of Daraa sons were forcibly recruited, including Ahmed Al-Ibrahim from the town of Ghabagheb, Mohammed Al-Aloush from Sanamen, Hani Al-Dandan from Al-Hara, Ibrahim Al-Jibawi from Jassem, Muhammad Husam Al-Khubei from Nawa and dozens of others. These forced conscriptions prompted daily demonstrations at the time of day they normally took place.</p><p>Detentions increased with the passage of people through the military checkpoints deployed near cities and towns. For example, in early May 2020, regime forces arrested Mahmoud Majeed al-Rahil with another young man at a security checkpoint near the city of Inkhil; his body was delivered on 8 May 2020 to his relatives from the military hospital in Damascus[16]. There are many such examples. The regime forces delivered the bodies of the brothers Hosam, Haitham and Ahmed Abu Halawa from the town of Ibta in Reeq Daraa in mid-March 2019, after their arrest days after the reconciliation agreement. The bodies of Maher Suleiman Al-Dali, Ahmad Ali Al-Awad and several others were delivered in February 2020. They previously defected from the regime’s army in the town of Ghabagheb, but crossed back after the reconciliation agreement, trusting Assad’s amnesty order, which was supposed to include defectors from his army.</p><p>Another important element complicating the security situation in Daraa is the presence of the forces of Iran and Hezbollah, who have also sought to maintain a presence in the region at any cost in order to stay near the border with Israel and to take advantage of the road to Jordan to smuggle cannabis and drugs into the Arab Gulf states[17]. Iran has officially dispatched an officer to negotiate with the people[18] who visited the Hajj Al-Sagheer region in March 2020. This officer met local residents in the presence of leaders of Hezbollah and the Iraqi militia present in the area to encourage their children to join their militias in exchange for protection. At the same time, Russia wanted to recruit as many people as possible to the Fifth Corps to reinforce its vision of restoring the regime’s army and forming local protection units. Sometimes they did this by coercion and other times by offering attractive sums of money. Some agents affiliated with the regime met with local youth to convince them to join the security branches or auxiliary forces, claiming this would contribute to the stability of the region as security would be in the hands of people from Daraa, and not outsiders such as Iranian militias and Hezbollah.</p><p>Daraa has turned into an arena for settling accounts between the different actors that tried to assert their control over it. In the resulting mayhem, the region has witnessed more than 335 assassinations[19] between the signing of the reconciliation agreement and March 2020. Armed clashes have intensified in the region, while the people took to the streets to protest the living conditions, detention and forced recruitment. In early 2020 the security situation took a dangerous turn; the regime used new security and military tactics in an effort to end the protests and resistance. It appointed a new security official in the governorate, which greatly increased the frequency of threats[20]. He set out to arrest 1,000 wanted youth from Daraa[21] and started handing over the bodies of some of the detainees. On 2 February, he handed over the body of the young Radwan Sorour, and she had torture marks. On 11 February, he delivered the body of the engineer Ratib Othman al-Jabawi, a prominent resident of Jassim. He threatened annihilation by Jihad Barakat, the leader of Assad’s guerrilla force militia.</p><p>Since early April 2020, more military reinforcements began to arrive in the region. These new forces expelled civilians from their homes on the outskirts of the Daraa Al-Balad suburb on 14 May and threatened violent bombing of various areas. These measures prompted a new round of negotiations[22], which are still ongoing in several areas in Daraa and by various parties including Iran and Russia, but without a new general agreement in sight.</p><p>Partial agreements were reached in some regions, which resulted in Russia securing an increase in the power of the Eighth Brigade of the Fifth Corps and boosting the number of its members. The Syrian regime also presented a new “initiative,” announced through loudspeakers in some mosques, promising pardons to everyone sought for military recruitment, provided they give themselves up and signing documents which would determine the time and place of their recruitment. Also, the regime security forces released 50 detainees, but it subsequently transpired that most of them were accused of robbery and other felonies, not as political prisoners or those arbitrarily arrested.</p><p>On the other hand, the demonstrations continued in the cities and towns of Daraa, demanding the improvement of living conditions, the overthrow of the regime, the expulsion of Iranian militias from the city, and the release of detainees. The demonstrations continue to be held against the backdrop of an increase in kidnappings and the continued raids and arrests in most parts of Daraa. Illustratively, the former head of the local opposition council, Eng. Nabil Suleiman Al-Asmi, was arrested on June 25, 2020, after his house in Dael was raided. At the same time, the regime appointed a new governor for the Daraa governorate from a military background, Major General Marwan Ibrahim Sharbak.</p><p>The resulting cycle of violence continues with attacks such as that from the 21st of June, when an improvised explosive device targeted a bus carrying Syrian regime soldiers, killing 15 and wounding 23. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack.</p><p><strong><em>Silent displacement: the impact of the failure of Daraa reconciliation agreement</em></strong></p><p>Many displaced Syrians have followed the reconciliation model that took place in Daraa with great anticipation. Despite the prejudices of the agreement and its signing under pressure from threats, shelling and military attacks which forced it, some people held out hope for the promise of stability and the restoration of humanity that it promised to bring. But the different interests of the actors, especially Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand, and Russia on the other, in addition to the regime’s rejection of any governance model that does not accept its complete control over the region, has returned the situation to square one. Security tensions and armed clashes have returned in full force, and daily assassinations, arrests, and threats of violence against civilians have re-emerged, causing a new, gradual displacement of the population.</p><p>The displacement continues towards the north of Syria through costly smuggling operations, in which the displaced may pass through the regime’s checkpoints and be forced to pay large sums. Daraa residents are also fleeing to various regions under regime’s control, perhaps the most prominent of which is Damascus governorate, which some of them resort to in order to find work to achieve a better standard of living.</p><p>The results of a field survey conducted by the information team at SACD in mid-2019, which included the Daraa region, showed that 69 per cent of men and 59 per cent of women do not feel safe due to arrests, chaos, and forced recruitment. The study also showed that 62 per cent of respondents confirmed that they or one of their relatives had been subjected to arbitrary arrest at the hands of the regime apparatus, and 44 per cent of those who had returned to Daraa governorate were attempting to leave again.</p><p>The residents who stayed in Daraa governorate after the reconciliation agreement were also forced to pay fees for government services that do not exist: 33 per cent of the respondents from Daraa governorate claimed they were forced to pay fees for electricity, water and telephone services prior to the date of the agreement, before they returned to the region.</p><p>For example, Abu Ali’s family headed towards the Syrian north from Daraa Al-Balad in late 2019 on a two-day trip during which Abu Ali paid more than 4,000 USD[23]. Shortly after his arrival in the city of Idlib, it was bombed, which forced him to flee again to the city of Afrin, on the border with Turkey.</p><p>Some reports indicate that at least ten people were displaced from Daraa governorate every day during the first half of 2019. The SACD’s sources confirm that the displacement outside the governorate continued until at least April 2019[24]. The situation deteriorated significantly in early 2020, as residents moved to other areas over fears of large incursions by regime’s army.</p><p>Daraa is thus a region that witnessed relative calm after the reconciliation agreement, which led to the temporary return of a good portion of the local population. Yet it soon turned into another major area of displacement, with people fleeing — this time probably for good.</p><p><em>I am afraid because of the repeated harassment, discrimination, and malicious acts of the regime’s agents in the region, and I am constantly afraid of arbitrary detention or reporting. I was arrested and denied my job.</em></p><p><em>– </em>Abu Jasim, 54, from Daraa</p><p><em>There is no safety; there are arrests of financial extortion and forced recruitment, there are no job opportunities, there is no freedom of movement between towns and cities, but there is humiliation and oppression.</em></p><p>– Saeed, 37, from Daraa</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Despite the signing of the reconciliation agreement in mid-2018 with Russian sponsorship and guarantees, this agreement seemed fragile from the beginning. The regime and its allies did not fulfil their pledges from the agreement: they deliberately marginalized the city and its residents and deprived them of services as a form of collective punishment for a region that has been out of its control for many years and started a movement that extended to the rest of Syria. The security situation, arrests and liquidations at military checkpoints or prisons, in addition to the threat of intrusion and escalation, prompted thousands of citizens from Daraa governorate to leave. This in turn caused new unreported waves of displacement throughout 2019 and early 2020.</p><p>If this dire situation continues, it will result in more arrests, killings, liquidations, and revenge, which will force a large part of the governorate’s population to leave. We therefore conclude that:</p><p>· The policy of threats and bombings that forced the people and AOGs to sign the reconciliation agreement in Daraa eventually led to a relative calm that was reflected in the return of a number of people to the area. However, it was quickly followed by the imposition of collective punishment, with the regime depriving the people of basic services. This directly impacted the people of Daraa and contributed to more poverty and destitution. The regime continuously attempts to exploit the reconciliation agreement to penetrate the villages and arrest more young men to force them to the frontlines, and to liquidate its former opponents. Many of these people were put in prison and liquidated by brutal methods, all of which undermined the advantages provided by the agreement and led to the silent displacement of a large portion of the population.</p><p>· The hidden conflicts between Russia, the regime, Iran, and the militias that follow them — against the background of influence, the economy, and revenge — ignited the region and turned it into a chaotic daily arena of chaos, which led to a clear instability that quickly surfaced.</p><p>· The “reconciliation” model that was applied in the Syrian south with Russian guarantees failed to achieve the lowest level of stability or secure the minimum public services needed for living. It instead resulted in a new military escalation of the region that features almost daily liquidation and conflicts.</p><p>· This model and its effects confirm once again that the regime and its allies are unable to find a sustainable solution in Syria without a robust international presence that would guarantee people’s safety and wellbeing. On the contrary, they only succeeded in increasing the chaos and creating new waves of silent displacement from the areas of reconciliation.</p><p>· The Daraa experience illustrates the failure of the model of reconciliation agreements even as a measure of restoring some degree of stability in the areas taken by the regime, let alone as a model to be considered in any way as relevant in the context of organised, safe, voluntary and dignified return. The experience of Daraa clearly shows that this model cannot be successfully applied anywhere in Syria, especially in places with a significant number of returnees or displaced people, such as northern Syria.</p><p>[1] SANA News Agency, September 2016</p><p>[2] “The Details of ‘Reconciliation Deals’ Expose How They Are Anything But”, Haid Haid, August 2018, Chatham House <a href="https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/the-details-of-reconciliation-deals-expose-how-they-are-anything-but-a-closer-look-at-the-regimes-process-reveals-its-real-goal-retribution-and-control">https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/the-details-of-reconciliation-deals-expose-how-they-are-anything-but-a-closer-look-at-the-regimes-process-reveals-its-real-goal-retribution-and-control</a></p><p>[3] Data from the Central Statistical Office in Syria, Office of the Prime Minister, 2010</p><p>[4] For more, review the organizations’ map of Citizens for Syria: <a href="https://citizensforsyria.org/mapping-syrian-cs/simplesearch/">https://citizensforsyria.org/mapping-syrian-cs/simplesearch/</a></p><p>[5] From an interview conducted by SACD with Abu Yasser, a resident of Busra Al-Sham, May 2020</p><p>[6] From an interview conducted by SACD with Mohammad, 25 years old from the town of Nahta, May 2020</p><p>[7] Syrians for Justice, <a href="https://stj-sy.org/ar/1093/">https://stj-sy.org/ar/1093/</a></p><p>[8] President of the Bar in Daraa, One third of Daraa’s lawyers were disbarred, Enab Baladi, 22 July 2018 [in Arabic] <a href="https://enabbaladi.net/archives/242248">https://enabbaladi.net/archives/242248</a></p><p>[9] Interview conducted by SACD with Mohammad Musalma, a university student from Daraa, April 2020</p><p>[10] Who is responsible for the drought of the Muzayreeb Lake?, Syria Stories, 21 February 2018 [in Arabic] <a href="https://bit.ly/2Y6EWxi">https://bit.ly/2Y6EWxi</a></p><p>[11] One of the interviewees mentioned that the price of sowing rose several times before reaching Daraa, while the checkpoints prevented more than once the arrival of quantities of it.</p><p>[12] From interviews conducted by SACD with notables from Daraa, May 2020</p><p>[13] Jordan protests against the repeated arrest of its citizens in Syria and calls for their immediate release, CNN Arabic, 4 April 2019 [in Arabic] <a href="https://cnn.it/3e32UOt">https://cnn.it/3e32UOt</a></p><p>[14] From an interview conducted by SACD with Abu Aref, a merchant in Daraa, May 2020</p><p>[15] Reconciling with death, disappearance and fear, SACD, July 2019 <a href="https://medium.com/@SACD/reconciling-with-death-disappearance-and-fear-6e17fe2456aa">https://medium.com/@SACD/reconciling-with-death-disappearance-and-fear-6e17fe2456aa</a></p><p>[16] A body full of traces of torture … Assad’s forces hand over the body of a young man who was arrested a few days ago in Daraa countryside, Horan Free League, 7 May 2020 [in Arabic] <a href="https://bit.ly/31UC20U">https://bit.ly/31UC20U</a></p><p>[17] From interviews conducted by SACD with notables from Daraa, May 2020</p><p>[18] From interviews conducted by SACD with notables from Daraa, May 2020</p><p>[19] Assassinations in Daraa: Terrifying numbers and multiple killing mechanisms, Brocar Press, 29 March 2020 [in Arabic] <a href="https://bit.ly/2MXkx7g">https://bit.ly/2MXkx7g</a></p><p>[20] From interviews conducted by SACD with notables from Daraa</p><p>[21] From interviews conducted by SACD with notables from Daraa, May 2020</p><p>[22] From interviews conducted by SACD with Ahmad, one of Daraa notables</p><p>[23] From an interview conducted by SACD with Abu Ali</p><p>[24] Syria: Silent forced displacement of thousands of residents in Quneitra and Daraa, Syrians for Truth and Justice, 9 August 2019 [in Arabic] <a href="https://bit.ly/3f76EQt">https://bit.ly/3f76EQt</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d35f6c679a1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Denmark is setting a dangerous precedent which must be reversed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/denmark-is-setting-a-dangerous-precedent-which-must-be-reversed-eaa0b6d9a84b?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eaa0b6d9a84b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[assad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syrian-refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[damascus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denmark]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2020 14:52:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-02T09:30:03.215Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*A3E0P63P8e8x1bixN9cnjg.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Photo: GivingCompass)</figcaption></figure><p>The decision issued this week by the Denmark’s Refugee Appeals Board[1], which confirms earlier decision by the Danish Immigration Service[2] to deny asylum to three Syrian women from Damascus, claiming that “there is no reason to assume that everyone will be at real risk of being assaulted”, sets a dangerous precedent and needs to be repealed. The decision ignores the reality in Damascus and other areas under control of the Syrian regime, which is far from being anywhere close to conducive to return of refugees.</p><p>The original decision by the Danish Immigration Service, confirmed on Tuesday, claims that “the current situation in Damascus is no longer such that there is reason to believe that anyone will be at real risk of being subjected to an infringement in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR alone as a result of the mere presence in the area.”</p><p>The ECHR is the European Convention on Human Rights, and Article 3 states that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture nor to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.</p><p>Denmark is all too aware of the fate that awaits Syrians who return to the country, and yet the Danish Immigration Service based their assessment on contradictory information. The November 2018 report prepared to assist the Danish Immigration board to reach their 2019 decision regarding the status of Damascus, is light touch in its approach — using only a dozen interviews, including with experts with little local knowledge — and incorrect in several places. It drastically contradicts the stream of documented reports about arbitrary arrests, forced recruitment, harassment, extortion and various forms of harassment faced by Syrians in Damascus area and other areas controlled by the Syrian regime.</p><p><strong><em>Reality of Damascus: arbitrary arrest, forced conscription, kidnappings</em></strong></p><p>The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) documented at least 25 arbitrary arrests in Damascus and its surroundings in the month of May, while in June alone the number reached 112 detainees. These numbers are likely lower than the actual rates, due to not all cases reaching the documentation organization. More than 40 raids were conducted by the regime forces on residential homes in the neighborhoods of “Al-Hijaria” and “Abd al-Raouf” in just one city–Douma, in Damascus countryside–during which they arrested approximately 30 young men who failed to join the ranks of the regime’s army. Similar raids occurred elsewhere.</p><p>According to SNHR, the regime continues to pursue those who settled their security situation in areas that have signed so called “reconciliation agreements” with the regime, including those in Damascus suburbs[3]. SNHR and other human rights organisations have documented 684 cases of arbitrary arrest in Damascus and its surroundings since the beginning of this year[4].</p><p>Even a cursory research by the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity’s own researchers revealed three such cases in the last month or so alone.</p><p>In early May, a woman displaced from Deir Ezzor who settled in Damascus went to the Immigration Administration in Damascus to seek a permit for her brother to visit Syria. Her brother lives abroad and has not completed his military service. She was detained by the intelligence agents, and her husband was asked to leave. Seven weeks later, they called him to come pick up her body after she passed away under torture.</p><p>On 26 June, G.N., a student at the Faculty of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering — Damascus University, was seen leaving his university at 12pm but never made it home. He is still missing. Similarly, on May 30, S. H., a 13 years old, went missing in Rukn Eddine in Damascus. She has not been seen since. These kidnappings are consistent with prevalent reports of the regime’s intelligence services and various militias targeting civilians for arbitrary arrest due to their families being seen as “anti-regime” or simply for ransom to be extracted from the families. Since hearing of the Danish decision, we have documented at least one more case of such enforced disappearance, whose detailes we were asked not to share, as the family is trying to make contact with the regime’s intelligence unit to try and secure the release of their loved one by paying the ransom.</p><p>This information is fully consistent with the report SACD issued last year, which documented the experience of displaced Syrians who were forced, for various reasons, to return to Assad-held areas, including Damascus and its surroundings. The report[5] established that some 62% of returnees or their closest relatives have been subjected to arbitrary detention by the regime’s security forces. This percentage increases to 75% in the so-called “reconciliation areas”, which include parts of Damascus countryside. It thoroughly documents various other forms of harassment and targeting faced by returnees, which clearly demonstrate that the situation in Damascus falls under the definition of the Article 3 of ECHR, invoked by the Danish Immigration Service, which prohibits anyone being subjected to “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.</p><p>One of the most drastic forms of such inhuman and degrading treatment is manifested in the relentless policy off forced recruitment of Syrian youth into the regime’s forces, who are regularly sent to death on the frontlines of Idlib and north Aleppo.</p><p>On June 25, the regime’s General Conscription Department issued a list of 400 names of young men from Damascus area wanted for forced conscription. The regime check-points have already began a full scale arrests campaign to implement this order, and many of those names are already wanted by several intelligence branches[6]. Again, this is consistent with the regime’s policies documented in our report “Vengeance, Repression and Fear: Reality Behind Assad’s Promises to Displaced Syrians”, where 68 per cent of total respondents or their relatives were wanted for recruitment in compulsory military service, which was the main cause of fear and feeling of insecurity.</p><p>Very importantly, the three asylum seekers who were denied asylum by the Danish Immigration Services are identified as “coming from or living in Damascus.” All three, according to the decision, have referred to ‘fearing the general situation in Syria’.</p><p>This is hugely important, as it implies that people who have fled to Damascus from other areas of Syria and then made it to Denmark can be considered as “coming or living in Damascus”. In the case of their return to Syria, this is a very significant point which would additionally endanger their lives.</p><p>Even if such returnees were to escape arrest and persecution upon return after having clearly been identified as “anti-regime,” the regime authorities would order them to go back to their original areas where they would be vulnerable to targeting by the same forces they fled from in the first placed. The ongoing violence in Daraa province, which is causing such silent displacement towards Damascus, or the continued arrests of demonstrators in Suwayda[7] and elsewhere in Syria, clearly demonstrate the nature of such threat. In addition, to make it to their original areas these people would have to navigate an extremely dangerous universe of checkpoints and security barriers manned by the various militias and regime security units, which regularly disappear, arrest or extort people.</p><p><strong><em>Decision contradicts EU position and Danish MFA</em></strong></p><p>The decision by the Danish Immigration Service clearly contradicts the reality faced by Syrians in Assad-held areas, but also the assessments of its fellow EU members, like Germany. In a statement issued on 11 June, made after Germany extended the moratorium on repatriation of Syrian refugees, the German Foreign Ministry clearly stated that “there are still many risks for refugees in Syria, whether due to the numerous militias and their checkpoints or the weapons in the hands of these militias or those affiliated with the regime, who still use them without mercy against the Syrian people through its many intelligence services[8].”</p><p>Crucially, it goes against the assessment of the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jeppe Kofod, whose statement about the ongoing impunity for the regime’s crimes includes this explicit assessment: “The regime is known for torture and arbitrary detentions. Countless Syrians live in terrifying uncertainty. They fear the worst as their loved ones have disappeared into regime detention facilities. Numerous reports describe the worst forms of torture.[9]” The statement was illustrated with images from a report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the same organization whose reports on arbitrary arrests and kidnappings in Damascus we quoted earlier in the analysis. This is the reality that exploded in full view with another release of “Caesar’s photos” of the detainees killed in Assad’s prisons. And such detentions continue unabated, including in Damascus.</p><p>However, Kofood’s statement and the evidence of insecurity in Damascus goes directly against the words of his fellow minister in the Danish government, the Minister of Immigration and Integration, Mattias Tesfaye, who indicated that his ministry would be reviewing hundreds of asylum claims, justifying it by saying that “last year, almost 100,000 refugees returned to Syria from the surrounding areas. Of course, their countrymen who have been granted protection in Europe must also go home when conditions in Syria permit.”</p><p>Firstly, these numbers are very misleading. There are 13 million displaced Syrians, which makes the quoted number a mere 0.77% of the total number of displaced Syrians. As we have documented in our report “Between Hamer and Anvil”, they are largely people who were forced to return, primarily from Lebanon due to harsh living conditions they are facing in displacement or other personal reasons. The reality they faced upon return resulted in more than 60% of these people now looking for ways to leave Syria again, this time permanently, due to unsafe conditions they faced when they returned — arbitrary arrests, forced recruitment, harassment, inability to reclaim property, etc.</p><p>This leads us to the conclusion on the danger of the precedent set by the decision of the Danish Immigration Service not to extend protection to Syrian refugees from Damascus: Syria is not safe for return, not in Damascus or the rest of the country. Partial returns, such as that being promoted by the Danish government, are bound to mortally endanger people who are clearly entitled to protection under the relevant UN protection framework and the EU refugee law. The decision clearly runs contrary to the provisions of the ECHR Article 3, which it invokes as justification, indicating the flawed assessment process in determining the level of threat faced by returnees to Damascus. Furthermore, such a lack of clarity on criteria in determining the level of threat of being “subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” employed to make this decision, indicates that today it is Damascus and tomorrow the same lax criteria will be applied to Homs, Aleppo, Daraa or any other part of Syria. What this will lead to, without a shadow of a doubt, as our research documents, are new waves of displacement with more people trying to reach Europe and leave Syria, if they survive, permanently.</p><p>The Danish government must review this decision in the face of overwhelming evidence which clearly shows the flawed basis upon which it was made. The only way to ensure this is the case is through a comprehensive political solution, which will guarantee the rights of the displaced people with robust international guarantees. On this, let us quote the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Kofod again: “Long term stability a negotiated end to the conflict. It requires the regime to change its behavior. The abuses the Syrian people rose up against. This must stop now.” We agree. Before contemplating any return, such abuses by the regime must stop. In Damascus and everywhere in Syria. Return of Syrian refugees must be safe, voluntary and dignified. Anything else, including partial returns which expose people to the same threats they fled from, is a recipe for disaster that will primarily affect Syrians, but will reverberate far beyond Syria and the region.</p><p>[1] <a href="https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/flygtningenaevnet-slaar-fast-forholdene-i-damaskus-er-saa-gode-at-syrere">https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/flygtningenaevnet-slaar-fast-forholdene-i-damaskus-er-saa-gode-at-syrere</a></p><p>[2] <a href="https://fln.dk/">https://fln.dk</a></p><p>[3] <a href="http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/At_least_147_Cases_of_Arbitrary_Arrests_Documented_in_Syria_in_May_2020_including_10_Children_and_4_Women_en.pdf">http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/At_least_147_Cases_of_Arbitrary_Arrests_Documented_in_Syria_in_May_2020_including_10_Children_and_4_Women_en.pdf</a></p><p>[4] http://www.shaam.org/news/syria-news/ميليشيات-النظام-تنفذ-حملة-اعتقال-هي-الأضخم-جنوب-العاصمة-دمشق.html</p><p>[5] <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/vengeance-repression-and-fear-reality-behind-assads-promises-displaced-syrians">https://www.mei.edu/publications/vengeance-repression-and-fear-reality-behind-assads-promises-displaced-syrians</a></p><p>[6] <a href="https://damascusv.com/archives/25984">https://damascusv.com/archives/25984</a></p><p>[7] <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/28/syria-protesters-describe-beatings-arrests">https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/28/syria-protesters-describe-beatings-arrests</a></p><p>[8] https://www.dw.com/ar/الخارجية-الألمانية-الوضع-في-سوريا-لا-يسمح-بعودة-اللاجئين/a-53779534</p><p>[9] <a href="https://twitter.com/DanishMFA/status/1277928685128089605?s=20">https://twitter.com/DanishMFA/status/1277928685128089605?s=20</a></p><p>[1] <a href="https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/flygtningenaevnet-slaar-fast-forholdene-i-damaskus-er-saa-gode-at-syrere">https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/flygtningenaevnet-slaar-fast-forholdene-i-damaskus-er-saa-gode-at-syrere</a></p><p>[2] <a href="https://fln.dk/">https://fln.dk</a></p><p>[3] <a href="http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/At_least_147_Cases_of_Arbitrary_Arrests_Documented_in_Syria_in_May_2020_including_10_Children_and_4_Women_en.pdf">http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/At_least_147_Cases_of_Arbitrary_Arrests_Documented_in_Syria_in_May_2020_including_10_Children_and_4_Women_en.pdf</a></p><p>[4] http://www.shaam.org/news/syria-news/ميليشيات-النظام-تنفذ-حملة-اعتقال-هي-الأضخم-جنوب-العاصمة-دمشق.html</p><p>[5] <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/vengeance-repression-and-fear-reality-behind-assads-promises-displaced-syrians">https://www.mei.edu/publications/vengeance-repression-and-fear-reality-behind-assads-promises-displaced-syrians</a></p><p>[6] <a href="https://damascusv.com/archives/25984">https://damascusv.com/archives/25984</a></p><p>[7] <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/28/syria-protesters-describe-beatings-arrests">https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/28/syria-protesters-describe-beatings-arrests</a></p><p>[8] https://www.dw.com/ar/الخارجية-الألمانية-الوضع-في-سوريا-لا-يسمح-بعودة-اللاجئين/a-53779534</p><p>[9] <a href="https://twitter.com/DanishMFA/status/1277928685128089605?s=20">https://twitter.com/DanishMFA/status/1277928685128089605?s=20</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eaa0b6d9a84b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Regime’s destruction of agricultural lands as a tactic of cementing displacement]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/regimes-destruction-of-agricultural-lands-as-a-tactic-of-cementing-displacement-6b46c53f3e3d?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b46c53f3e3d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[assad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[displacement]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2020 07:58:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-12T08:14:05.814Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a disturbing trend, the Syrian regime and its allies have recently been burning agricultural lands belonging to displaced Syrians with a clear intent to cement their displacement. The systematic nature of the targeting is evident as the fires have been instigated in different areas and governorates under the control of the regime, making it impossible for the displaced to return and harvest the fields and orchards. This text provides a closer look in such incidents in Palmyra, Harasta and Al-Qusayr.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/661/1*c7LTw1M_-05JMob84Aj7lQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fires in Palmyra</figcaption></figure><p>The city of Palmyra is an oasis that adorns the Syrian desert, located northeast of Damascus. It is a UNESCO World Heritage site featuring Roman monuments that bear witness to a great city that was once one of the most important cultural centers of the ancient world. It came under international spotlight when ISIS took control of it and destroyed some of the priceless artefacts, before the regime regained the control of the area.</p><p>In May, fires burned agricultural lands in the area near the Meridian Hotel, in the vicinity of the Temple of Antiquities. The sources of the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity in the region confirmed that the fires raged in the area for hours, with the Syrian regime not making any notable effort to control the blaze. According to eyewitnesses, the deliberate failure to deal with these fires might be motivated by the desire to cover up the smuggling of antiquities the regime is carrying out in collusion with Iranian militias.</p><p>Our sources reported seeing digging equipment and trucks moving to the area immediately before the fires were started. According to these sources, the militia controlling the area has been excavating for more than two years for the antiquities in the area where the fires occurred. The area where the digging is going on has been sealed off for “security reasons” to prevent civilians from accessing it. The displacement of the local residents is at the same time a tool and a long-term consequence of this criminal effort.</p><p>Excavation and smuggling of antiquities from Palmyra is considered an important economic resource that the regime and Iranian militias use to finance the war in Syria. The practice was documented by Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper, which reported that “Iranian militias, led by the militia of Al-Najaba and Fatimiyun, began a new exploration campaign on the antiquities in the ancient city of Palmyra and its eastern desert that extended towards Deir Al-Zour, where excavation mechanisms brought in by the militias have been monitored over the past three months.” The area where these excavations started was blocked off to the people who live there, and the route of the motorway Deir Al-Zour-Damascus, which passes near Palmyra, was changed for this purpose.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wP_Bw2RjxO1wpD_XUhJU6Q.png" /><figcaption>Fires in Harasta</figcaption></figure><p>We have recently reported on the regime’s <a href="https://medium.com/@SACD/demolitions-in-harasta-confirm-regimes-intent-to-use-law-10-to-strip-displaced-syrians-of-their-2af517fba8d6">demolitions</a> of private property in the area of Harasta, in Eastern Ghouta. In the aftermath of that, the local sources reported massive fires in the same area which burned agricultural lands overlooking the Damascus-Homs International Highway during the month of May.</p><p>According to this information, members of regime’s forces present in the area intentionally set fire to the surrounding lands in the Panorama area in the city of Harasta, on both sides of the international highway from the Qaboun side, as well as the agricultural lands separating Dahiet Elasad and the Harasta and Barzeh farms.</p><p>These recent fires caused great damage to the crops and the trees planted in those lands, especially in the orchards that extend between Harasta and Arabin from the governorate side.</p><p>This is not the first time fires have been used to devastate agricultural lands in this area. The eastern Ghouta groves, overlooking the Damascus-Homs international highway, witnessed major fires during May 2019. Thousands of olive trees, some hundreds of years old, were burned in the groves of the Karm Al-Ras area, separating the cities of Duma and Harasta, and the western area of ​​the highway in Harasta. One of the engineers working in the Damascus countryside governorate suggested that the fires are aimed at emptying the agricultural areas and forcing the residents to sell or accept the regime’s expropriation, as part of a plan to include it into the “re-organization” that covers the northern entrance to the capital.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*MqCuCJuitqdkc_pIGZUvgg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Al-Qusayr</figcaption></figure><p>Lastly, at the beginning of April 2020, a big fire broke out in some of the orchards in the villages of Al-Qusayr, a town in the Homs governorate on the border with Lebanon. The area is under control of Hezbollah and the information from the ground suggests that the fires were instigated to clear the land which the militia plans to use to expand its cannabis-growing operation in the area, which is reportedly a major source of income.</p><p>The area is of importance to Hezbollah as it has a number of crossings along the border between Lebanon and Syria from the Al-Qusayr side, which are used to transport the loot from Syria which is then sold in the Central Bekaa valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah also uses the Al-Qusayr region as a training camp for the new recruits deployed in the operations in the Aleppo countryside and Daraa.</p><p>With the increasing pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon as a result of the collapse of the Lebanese economy, Al-Qusayr with its vast green areas is increasingly important to the militia as a source of income and resources. It is for this reason that the southern countryside of Homs remains empty of residents despite several attempts at return of some of those who are displaced in the areas held by the regime, such as the city of Homs or the city of Damascus.</p><p>The described practice of burning of agricultural lands in Palmyra, Harasta and Al-Qusayr clearly aim to cement the displacement of the local population by depriving them of a source of livelihood and making their return more difficult. Initial displacement affected by brutal violence and destruction is made worse, with the goal of making it permanent, by the destruction of lands and oases, which then either become settled by members of militia families who live off trafficking (Palmyra), are exploited for cultivation of narcotics (Al-Qusayr) or designated for “re-organization” (Harasta). Or, as was recently the case in the areas of the eastern and southern Idlib countryside and the western countryside of Aleppo, from which people were displaced as a result of the recent military campaign against the Syrian north, the crops sown by the displaced are first harvested by the regime forces and militias, and then set alight.</p><p>The pattern of these actions reveals a systematic targeting of the displaced Syrians, which is one of the key causes for the imposition of sanctions by the EU and the US on the regime’s officials and the individuals and entities involved in such criminal conduct. The reversal of these actions, restitution of property and lands to the rightful owners and safe and voluntary return of displaced people who lived on the harvests from the lands devastated by deliberate burning, will be among the basic pre-conditions for the lifting of the sanctions and the possibility of a political solution that guarantees the right to all Syrians.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b46c53f3e3d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SACD Analysis: Impact of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/sacd-analysis-impact-of-covid-19-on-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon-fd328b9f87f1?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd328b9f87f1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syrian-refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[displacement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2020 20:35:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-25T21:30:02.146Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*ZbXn6dF2x8MVwd5ti_OtIQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Syrian refugees outside their tents, in the Bekaa Valley town of Saadnayel, east Lebanon. (AP)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>The Covid-19 pandemic has severely affected numerous countries across the world. The loss of life, paralysis of the healthcare systems, severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods due to social distancing and other restrictive measures employed to stop the spread of the virus, have become the norm for societies on all continents. The impact of the pandemic on the economic and social spheres is yet to materialize in full force.</p><p>Amidst the crisis, there is one population that is particularly vulnerable: refugees. Exposed to the rampant spread of the virus in overcrowded camps, where social distancing measures are near impossible to implement, already living in poverty and with almost non-existent economic opportunities, and subject to discrimination and hostility, refugees are extremely exposed to the brutal impact of the pandemic.</p><p>This is why we at the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity decided to produce a series of analysis of this impact on Syrian refugees in countries which host the largest numbers of Syrians. The first such analysis will focus on Lebanon, where the situation facing Syrian refugees was dire even before the pandemic struck, due to the economic crisis rocking the country.</p><p>The Syrians who fled to Lebanon from the death and destruction in their homeland, were already facing the repercussions of the Lebanon’s economic crisis, which severely affected their ability to earn a basic income even at the subsistence level. The collapse of Lebanese pound led to a rise in the prices of basic goods and services, on top of the increases in rent that refugees are paying for accommodation and the lands leased to set up their camps.</p><p>This hardship added to a precarious situation refugees faced as the pandemic struck, which manifested in an increased threat of the spread of the virus in crowded camps or draconian and discriminatory implementation of measures by municipal authorities in charge of areas where refugees live. Very often, Syrian refugees were forbidden from leaving their places of residence even after the authorities lifted the restriction of movement on the Lebanese.</p><p>In this briefing, the researchers of the Syrian Association for Citizen Dignity conducted interviews with Syrian refugees in different regions of Lebanon to capture the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Syrian refugees there, how its consequences were reflected in their lives, and tried to present a possible scenario of what the future impact could be if the current situation continued and/or got worse. Derived from this analysis are some recommendations to the international community on alleviating what are potentially dire outcomes of this crisis.</p><p><strong>Backdrop of the crisis</strong></p><p>Since October 2019, the economic situation in Lebanon has taken several drastic turns for the worse. The cabinet initially reacted by approving a new tax package, which has sparked demonstrations and strikes in various regions of the country. It was followed by the suspension of operations in most of the Lebanese banks, which in turn fuelled strikes and new protests leading to confrontations with the security <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/lebanon-protests-explained/">forces</a>[1], in which one of the demonstrators was killed. The Prime Minister <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/lebanon-pm-saad-hariri-resigns-as-crisis-takes-violent-turn/a-51037753">resigned</a>[2] days later, but his resignation did not quell the protests throughout Lebanon.</p><p>During this period a large segment of the country’s business was disrupted, and huge amounts of capital exited Lebanon. In early March, the new government announced it was unable to pay the portion of the public debt accumulated for <a href="http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=17328">years</a>[3]. The crisis coincided with the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.</p><p>As the virus spread across the country and the societal crisis deepened, the pandemic and issues arising from its spread were weaponised by political parties in their continuous struggle for political <a href="https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-51588830">power</a>.[4] The resulting instability only made economic matters worse. The Lebanese pound collapsed, causing a sharp rise in the prices of basic goods and services. The Lebanese currency plummeted by more than 150%, which raised the consumer price index by more than 20% at the beginning of <a href="https://crilebanon.com/">April 2020</a>.[5]</p><p>In the following weeks, Lebanon, as other countries around the world, imposed a number of restrictive measures aiming to contain the virus and the resulting closures of economic activity. As the virus spread, the pressure increased both on Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees. Some 1000 cases were confirmed so far across <a href="https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/Media/view/31721/1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF-19-">Lebanon</a>.[6] There were no reported deaths among the Syrian refugees[7], although several positive cases were recorded in the Palestinian refugee camps.</p><p><strong>The repercussions on the Syrian refugees</strong></p><p>When such complex economic, political and health crises strikes, the effects will be most visible on the most vulnerable groups within <a href="https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Pages/publications/books/2018-2019/20190701-101-facts-and-figures-on-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-volume-2.aspx">society</a>.[8] Syrian refugees in Lebanon are such a group. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of Syrians in Lebanon exceeds <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria">900,000</a>[9], 80% of them are women and children, and they account for 16% of the total number of Syrian refugees in the world.</p><p>The continuing crisis in Lebanon, in all its complexity, has affected Syrian refugees in the following ways:</p><p><strong>I. Livelihoods</strong></p><p>More than two thirds of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon live below the <a href="https://bit.ly/2AEHucr">poverty line</a>[10]. With the beginning of the strike and the lockdown, their situation got much worse. Most of the refugees living in camps make a subsistence living; they pay for their basic needs like food or accommodation with what they can earn that day. Their dire situation was personified in the death of a man who burned himself alive because he was unable to pay for food and basic needs of his family, after losing his job in one of the <a href="https://bit.ly/3dj2eog">workshops</a>.[11] As the economic crisis deepened, the whole country suffered from a sharp rise in prices, especially for food commodities, which made the situation catastrophic for the most of Syrian refugees. No solution to the economic downturn is on the horizon, and the prices are likely to increase even more during the coming period.</p><p>According to a study done by a Dutch NGO <a href="https://bit.ly/3g6SVKg">Pax for Peace</a>[12], 85% of Syrian and Syrian-Pales­tinian respondents (200 out of 234 respondents) answered that they had lost their main source of income, due to the lockdown measures making it impossible to work: their income has been severely reduced or disappeared. All areas of Lebanon seemed to be equally affected by job income loss.</p><p>Ibrahim, 40, displaced from the southern countryside of Homs to the Lebanese region of Arsal, says: <em>“We are suffering a great crisis that put us under the poverty line with the scarcity of humanitarian aid. I have five children and our living conditions are very difficult. The United Nations assistance has decreased, because it is given to us in Lebanese pounds and with high prices, this is no longer enough.”</em></p><p>Jumana, from Homs, who is displaced in the Lebanese villages of the Bekaa Valley: <em>“I have to pay the rent for a house for three months in advance and I cannot afford it. The rent has increased, it is obscene now, and we do not know what the coming days will bring.”</em><strong><em>[13]</em></strong></p><p>Zaid, displaced from the countryside of Aleppo: <em>“The crisis in Lebanon started before the pandemic, and it has affected all of the people, Syrians and Lebanese. The biggest problem is that the Syrians are no longer able to pay home rents due to the cessation of work. There are many homeowners who have been patient with tenants for months, but the situation</em> has <em>prolonged on both sides, so they now have to kick the Syrians out of the houses.”</em><strong><em>[14]</em></strong></p><p><strong>II. Legal implications</strong></p><p>Most Syrians in Lebanon do not have a legal residency <a href="https://bit.ly/3cCOR2h">document</a> (74% at the end of 2018)[15] and less than 1%[16] have a work permit, as most Syrian refugees cannot obtain residency due to the high cost of the permit. With the spread of the pandemic and the increased tension in the security situation in Lebanon as a result of the recent events, the legal status has become more important than ever for the refugees. Visiting hospitals, following up with aid organizations, and the need to move around from one place to another makes the need for such documents even higher than before. However, the crisis has made the possibility of attaining the legal status in the country much more difficult. Most refugees fear to report to official institutions, including hospitals, for fear of detention or deportation. This is despite the fact that the Lebanese government issued a decision to stop the deportations of people with health conditions, but the decree was not practically implemented on the ground, as several Syrian families were expelled as a result of going to pharmacies to buy simple medicines such as <a href="https://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=6663">pain relievers</a>.[17]</p><p>According to a study by Access Center for Human Rights, at least nine camps in different towns in the Bekaa region have been raided by various security agencies on an almost daily basis without any legal justification, as their registration papers are searched with UNHCR and legal <a href="https://bit.ly/2zVd4T7">residence papers</a>[18].</p><p>Siham, a displaced person from Damascus countryside: <em>“We are being severely restricted by some of the locals who are close to our camp. They have prevented us from leaving the camp to purchase even the basic stuff. If things continue like this, we have no choice but to return to Syria despite what we know about Syria.”</em><strong><em>[19]</em></strong></p><p>Samia, from the Daraa countryside, now in Arsal: <em>“We are afraid to move or visit hospitals, we don’t know what will happen. I fear for my children and there is nothing I can do, I feel helpless.”</em></p><p><em>“Because of the heightened security, leaving the house has become an unbearable risk. The families have no choice but to have one of their family members to risk going out and secure the necessities of the house, and sometimes supplies for several families,”</em> says Leila from Hama countryside, now in Arsal.[20]</p><p><strong>Added hardship with Covid-19</strong></p><p>Syrian refugees are particularly vulnerable to the crisis caused by the collapse of the economy and the Covid-19 pandemic due to the fact that women and children make up the large majority of the refugee population. The situation makes it more difficult for them to move freely and makes them more vulnerable to harassment when they do get out.</p><p>The measures enacted to contain the spread of the virus are in many cases used to target the refugees directly, as 21 municipalities imposed discriminatory restrictions against the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/lebanon-refugees-risk-covid-19-response">Syrian refugees</a>.[21] Bans on movement and gathering were in some areas imposed on Syrians before they were extended to the Lebanese, and most municipalities designated only one person to go out to buy goods to supply the needs of all camp residents.</p><p>Non-governmental organizations working in the medical field announced that the number of beneficiaries decreased by 80% due to restrictions and barriers <a href="https://bit.ly/2zVd4T7">imposed on them</a>.[22] In practical terms, the main local powerful figures asserted full control over Syrian lives and their affairs. Clans, political party officials and other power groups took place of the official institutions tasked with combating the virus, which increased discrimination of the refugees based on sectarianism and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/lebanon-refugees-risk-covid-19-response">political positions</a>.[23]</p><p>The key priorities of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon are currently related to managing the basic living conditions, as they are struggling to secure a daily living, which has pushed the protection and prevention measures against COVID-19 to the background. The struggle to secure the basic needs has become especially difficult with the decline in support from some of the organisations that worked with the Syrian refugees, due to limited access due to the government restrictions, or to poor financing, or lack of funds related to the current economic crisis, especially that the banks imposed restrictions on withdrawing funds in addition to obliging institutions and individuals to withdraw in Lebanese pounds, which is hampering the access to funds for many aid organisations.</p><p>By the end of April, no cases of COVID-19 were recorded among the Syrian refugees in the camps, and a few cases were recorded of Syrians living in cities and outside the camps. Although UNHCR pledged to conduct free tests for Syrian refugees and expand its awareness and relief activities targeting cleaning materials and sterilization, it still lacked the capacity to cover the increasing needs in the camps and only covered a <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71#_ga=2.117667465.1417388621.1589929412-1446928877.1589929412">small portion</a>.[24]</p><p>According to the ACHR report, UNHCR faces many challenges, from a lack of financial resources that is a major challenge — UNHCR is calling on donors to increase funding to meet the growing demands of refugees beyond UNHCR’s financial capacity — to the difficulty of continuing other medical assistance programs after the reallocation of financial resources to be serve in the COVID-19 <a href="https://bit.ly/2zVd4T7">prevention plan</a>[25].</p><p>Khadr, a displaced person from Homs, is in a camp on the Syrian-Lebanese border: <em>“Yesterday, one of the benefactors donated supplies to 70 out of 300 families. What are the rest supposed to do? The number of people who do not receive help from United Nations and aid charities is increasing every day.”</em>[26]</p><p><strong>What next?</strong></p><p>Considering the current conditions in Lebanon and the reality of life of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the likely scenario in the near future involves the continuation of the economic crisis in Lebanon, coupled with the likely increase in cases of Covid-19 infection. The indebtedness of Syrian families will rise in light of the deteriorating economic situation and the weak humanitarian aid that reaches them. The weak government response to the pandemic and absence of any coherent strategy to tackle the economic crisis is likely to lead to further deterioration of the economic dynamics, which is bound to impact the security situation.</p><p>In light of this scenario, the Syrian refugees will continue to be one of the most prominent pressure points used in the political, sectarian and economic discourse as part of the problem. The president of Lebanon has compared the presence of refugees to the pandemic and this comparison is bound to deepen the already rampant dehumanisation of Syrian <a href="https://bit.ly/3e2nhf5">refugees</a>.[27] In his interview with the Russian outlet Sputnik in early May, the Lebanese President Michel Aoun stressed that “his country needs international medical and financial support because of the catastrophic effects of the Covid-19 <a href="https://bit.ly/2LHQakv">pandemic</a>”[28] on the country’s economy, made worse, according to Aoun, by the fact that Lebanon incurred nearly 30 billion US dollars in costs as a result of the “presence of 1.5 million displaced Syrians in the country.” Aoun repeated this in his meeting with the International Support Group for Lebanon and asserted that his country is facing the worst crises it has known in the last 75 years, created by the triumvirate of factors: the Syrian refugees, the economic downturn and Covid-19. In the eyes of Lebanon’s highest office, the Syrian refugees constituted the same threat a <a href="https://atalayar.com/en/content/lebanon-faces-coronavirus-midst-economic-and-social-crisis">deadly virus</a>.[29]</p><p>Although the Lebanese authorities have pledged not to deport Syrian refugees for lack of valid residency if they have to take the COVID-19 test, it is not at all clear how this may change once the pandemic is declared as over. There is a founded fear among the Syrians that they will be arrested or deported after this crisis, as authorities are aware of their information and locations.</p><p>While the government security forces are bound to be focusing on the deteriorating security situation as a result of the increasing protests, the pressure on the Syrians is bound to increase. As a result, we will likely witness more incidents and violations against the Syrians in Lebanon, beyond the current trend of expulsions, harassment and sectarianist abuse directed at them, possibly leading to direct attacks against the Syrian refugee camps and more widespread violence, which could threaten thousands of lives.</p><p>Such grim prospects in Lebanon are bound to lead to waves of forced return, with estimates of people who would chose to go back to an unsafe, dangerous Syria in the thousands. This would put their lives in direct danger of the ongoing killings, arbitrary arrest or enforced disappearance by the Syrian security forces in government-held areas.</p><p>This process has already started. At the beginning of this month, dozens of Syrian families gathered for long days at the Syrian-Lebanese border, desiring to return to Syria because of the bad conditions they are suffering in Lebanon. Some of them bribed their way into the uncertainty of Syria, but most were forced to <a href="https://bit.ly/2zQAWqS">turn back</a>.[30]</p><p>According to a last year’s report by the SACD, which interviewed more than 100 Syrians who were forced to return to Syria under similar circumstances, more than two thirds were planning to leave again and this time permanently, due to the security threats they faced from the regime and the lack of basic living conditions. Their goal was to try to reach Europe this time. If the numbers of those forced to leave Lebanon were to increase, the most probable direct consequence would be that the attempts to reach Europe are bound to increase, even if the payments to smugglers are exorbitant and the risks are high. The smuggling routes are already being re-activated. Increasingly, the Syrian refugees prefer to engage in such an adventure than to stay in Lebanon in the current circumstances.</p><p>To avoid this dangerous scenario, which is bound to impact Syrian refugees most severely, but is very probably going to reverberate beyond Lebanon, Syria and the region, the international community must take notice and act promptly. The main donors to the UNHCR and international NGOs who are providing aid to Syrians in Lebanon must be aware of the implications of such developments as they face their own economic challenges resulting from the pandemic. International aid is often the first and, politically, the easiest item to reduce when facing the pressures the Covid-19 exerted on all economies, but the consequences of cutting the aid to Syrian refugees in Lebanon would be far reaching, as described above.</p><p>The response should go in the opposite direction, with the direct aid to the refugees in fact being increased to alleviate the additional hardship they are facing as a result of restrictions and the resulting loss of employment opportunities. It is crucial that such support through the currently available channels is maintained and strengthened to help them secure accommodation, rent for the homes and lands on which the camps were built, in addition to covering their basic needs for goods and services. If this does not happen, the likely direct impact would amount to a de facto forced return into unsafe conditions of regime-held areas in Syria.</p><p>The economic aid to the Lebanese government to alleviate the raging economic crisis is of paramount importance to alleviate the economic hardship on the local population, which will in turn reduce the political manipulation of the refugee issue and dehumanisation of Syrians as one of the main problems facing the Lebanese society. Donors should also look at thee ways of working with the Lebanese government to overcome the practical difficulties of aid provision resulting from financial restrictions placed on the aid organisations receiving support from donors for re-distribution in various forms to the refugees.</p><p>In addition, the international community needs to work with the Lebanese government to improve the security situation of the refugees, to facilitate the release of Syrian detainees in Lebanese prisons who were arrested on the grounds that they violated the residency condition during Covid-19; to ease the movement restrictions on the Syrians in Lebanon, to allow them to benefit from medical services and early examinations, and to interact positively with official recommendations and prevention programs on Covid-19; and to increase health awareness and health support for Syrian refugees in their current locations, especially for the most vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and the chronically ill. The Lebanese government must act swiftly to address the discrimination against Syrian refugees and curtail such treatment through legal means, as well as come out strongly against a hostile and dehumanising discourse targeting Syrian refugees in the public space.</p><p>Lastly, the international community must act to support the Lebanese government in facing the burdens of hosting Syrian refugees, while at the same time making firm demands for discrimination against Syrian refugees to be curtailed through legal means, and for the government to decisively intervene to prevent discriminatory treatment. This includes requesting the Lebanese government to allow the registration of refugees who are not registered in Lebanon with international organizations, allowing them to obtain the necessary services and support from inte</p><p>[1] Lebanon protests explained, 17 January 2020: <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/lebanon-protests-explained/">https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/lebanon-protests-explained/</a></p><p>[2] Lebanon PM Saad Hariri resigns as crisis takes violent turn, 29 October 2019: <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/lebanon-pm-saad-hariri-resigns-as-crisis-takes-violent-turn/a-51037753">https://www.dw.com/en/lebanon-pm-saad-hariri-resigns-as-crisis-takes-violent-turn/a-51037753</a></p><p>[3] President Diab announces the suspension of the March 9 entitlement to Eurobond and the reconstruction of the debt, 07 March 2020: <a href="http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=17328">http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=17328</a></p><p>[4] Corona virus: infections in Lebanon, Italy and Israel for the first time and an increase in the number of infected people in Iran and South Korea [in Arabic], BBC Arabic, 21 February 2020: <a href="https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-51588830">https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-51588830</a></p><p>[5] Consumer Price Index Chart, Consultation and Research Institute: <a href="https://crilebanon.com/">https://crilebanon.com/</a></p><p>[6] Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Public Health: <a href="https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/Media/view/31721/1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF-19-">https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/Media/view/31721/1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF-19-</a></p><p>[7] Resources of SACD and civil society organizations in Lebanon</p><p>[8] 101 Facts &amp; Figures on the Syrian Refugee Crisis Volume II Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, pp25: <a href="https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Pages/publications/books/2018-2019/20190701-101-facts-and-figures-on-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-volume-2.aspx">https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Pages/publications/books/2018-2019/20190701-101-facts-and-figures-on-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-volume-2.aspx</a></p><p>[9] UNHCR database: <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria">https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria</a></p><p>[10] A study conducted by the UNHCR showed that 71% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live below poverty line: <a href="https://bit.ly/2AEHucr">https://bit.ly/2AEHucr</a></p><p>[11] Refugees of Lebanon at the time of Corona [in Arabic], The New Arab, 17 April 2020: <a href="https://bit.ly/3dj2eog">https://bit.ly/3dj2eog</a></p><p>[12] COVID-19 in Lebanon: Impact on Refugees and Host Communities, Pax for Peace, 22 April 2020: <a href="https://bit.ly/3g6SVKg">https://bit.ly/3g6SVKg</a></p><p>[13] From the interviews conducted by SACD with Syrian refugees in Lebanon</p><p>[14] From the interviews conducted by SACD with Syrian refugees in Lebanon</p><p>[15] 101 Facts &amp; Figures on the Syrian Refugee Crisis Volume II Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, pp.52: <a href="https://bit.ly/3cCOR2h">https://bit.ly/3cCOR2h</a></p><p>[16] ibid.</p><p>[17] Buying Panadol causes a municipal investigation and expulsion of a family: Syrian refugees are trapped between Corona and destitution [in Arabic], The Legal Agenda, 8 April 2020: <a href="https://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=6663">https://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=6663</a></p><p>[18] Lebanon: Investigating the situation of Syrian refugees under COVID-19 pandemic, Access Center for Human Rights, April 2020: <a href="https://bit.ly/2zVd4T7">https://bit.ly/2zVd4T7</a></p><p>[19] From the interviews conducted by SACD with Syrian refugees in Lebanon</p><p>[20] From the interviews conducted by SACD with Syrian refugees in Lebanon</p><p>[21] Lebanon: Refugees at Risk in COVID-19 Response, Human Rights Watch: <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/lebanon-refugees-risk-covid-19-response">https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/lebanon-refugees-risk-covid-19-response</a></p><p>[22] Lebanon: Investigating the situation of Syrian refugees under COVID-19 pandemic, Access Center for Human Rights, April 2020: <a href="https://bit.ly/2zVd4T7">https://bit.ly/2zVd4T7</a></p><p>[23] Lebanon: Refugees at Risk in COVID-19 Response, Human Rights Watch: <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/lebanon-refugees-risk-covid-19-response">https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/lebanon-refugees-risk-covid-19-response</a></p><p>[24] UNHCR Syria Refugee Regional Response: <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71#_ga=2.117667465.1417388621.1589929412-1446928877.1589929412">https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71#_ga=2.117667465.1417388621.1589929412-1446928877.1589929412</a></p><p>[25] Lebanon: Investigating the situation of Syrian refugees under COVID-19 pandemic, Access Center for Human Rights, April 2020: <a href="https://bit.ly/2zVd4T7">https://bit.ly/2zVd4T7</a></p><p>[26] From the interviews conducted by SACD with Syrian refugees in Lebanon</p><p>[27] The Lebanese President stresses that his country needs international support because of the implications of Corona [in Arabic], Al-Sharq, 4 May 2020: <a href="https://bit.ly/3e2nhf5">https://bit.ly/3e2nhf5</a></p><p>[28] Statement by the Presidency of the Lebanese Republic, 4 April 2020: <a href="https://bit.ly/2LHQakv">https://bit.ly/2LHQakv</a></p><p>[29] Lebanon faces coronavirus in the midst of economic and social crisis, 7April 2020: <a href="https://atalayar.com/en/content/lebanon-faces-coronavirus-midst-economic-and-social-crisis">https://bit.ly/2XiIyKI</a></p><p>[30] Syrians are stuck on the Lebanese-Syrian border, the Assad regime prevents their entry and Lebanon does not allow their return! [in Arabic], Orient News, 22 April 2020: <a href="https://bit.ly/2zQAWqS">https://bit.ly/2zQAWqS</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd328b9f87f1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Demolitions in Harasta confirm regime’s intent to use Law 10 to strip displaced Syrians of their…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/demolitions-in-harasta-confirm-regimes-intent-to-use-law-10-to-strip-displaced-syrians-of-their-2af517fba8d6?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2af517fba8d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sanctions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[displacement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[assad]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2020 12:38:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-13T12:38:27.914Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Demolitions in Harasta confirm regime’s intent to use Law 10 to strip displaced Syrians of their property</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sv0A_lBTlEN7XErAP3d87Q.png" /><figcaption>Demolished properties in Harasta (photo by Voice of Damascus)</figcaption></figure><p>The regime’s forces continue with demolitions of private property belonging to displaced Syrians. The units of the regime’s Fourth Division, using heavy machinery and bulldozers, several days ago demolished dozens of houses in in the city of Harasta in Eastern Ghouta.</p><p>While more than <a href="https://damascusv.com/archives/23897">50 homes</a> were being demolished, Assad’s military set up checkpoints which prevented the residents from entering their homes and lands, despite obtaining security clearances earlier.</p><p>The people in the area are convinced that this action is a continuation of property seizures under the notorious Law 10, which was used to strip the displaced Syrians of their homes previously in the adjacent neighbourhoods like Qaboun, Tishreen, and Barza.</p><p>The city of Harasta is divided into two parts, east and west, separated by the Damascus — Homs highway and the western area is considered the agricultural region of the city. It was closed off by the regime in May 2017 after the area was conquered by Assad’s forces, but the people displaced from there were allowed to visit their homes and work the land under the “reconciliation agreement” and special daily security clearances. However, the regime continued with demolitions throughout this time under the pretext of clearing uninhabitable houses and underground tunnels. Owners and residents were forbidden from returning to their properties.</p><p>Now, the closure has become permanent and demolitions have intensified. Assad’s militias stationed at the entrance of Qaboun issued orders preventing the people of the area from entering their neighborhoods permanently, according to instructions received by officers from the Fourth Division. The reason: Law 10 and the plan to appropriate the area in favour of a businessman close to the regime known as Mohamed Hamsho, who apparently plans to build in the area under the provisions of Law 10 which enabled similar confiscation of people’s property for development projects.</p><p>The Law 10, promulgated by the regime in 2018 under the guise of reconstruction and promoted as an ‘urban planning measure’ for areas destroyed in the war, essentially strips a majority of displaced people of property ownership due to administrative and legal obstacles it imposes in the process of “re-organising” the status of the properties that they own.</p><p>Even if they still possess ownership documents of their property, the law ensures that they cannot renovate or rebuild in areas designated for “re-organisation”.</p><p>The prohibitive nature of the law ensures that Syrians are prevented from the reconstruction or restoration of their homes unless granted permission by authorities. These are the same authorities who have issued a decree to “re-organise” the region which annuls the right of the rightful owners to sell, buy, mortgage, obtain construction and restoration permits.</p><p>The way the law works is that a property owner must first submit an objection, within a year, and then dare to appear before the competent authorities and obtain security approvals, or send a relative to undertake this adventure.</p><p>Approaching security services to obtain such approvals entails a genuine risk to the life of the owner considering that so many refugees and displaced people were pro-opposition. The fact is that in most of the areas from which people have been displaced, a return is not allowed and that most people have no relatives there who can act on their behalf.</p><p>Property owners whose hopes focus on “once again having a peaceful life in Syria” will likely discover that their property has been lost, or has dramatically shrunk and that they cannot reclaim it. Those trying to return will find out that the situation has changed drastically in favour of the regime and Syria’s discriminatory legal framework renders the return of a huge number of Syrians nearly impossible.</p><p>Harasta is just the latest example of the regime’s obvious intent to prevent the return of displaced Syrians and affect a permanent demographic change. Such actions are the primary reason for the sanctions from the European Union and the United States, which are now being extended to all those involved in such dealings with the regime, including Syrian but also international entities and individuals. Syrians, especially those living under the regime, must accept that the sanctions cannot be lifted nor can a sustainable political solution for Syria be reached until the discriminatory acts of the regime, such as the implementation of the Law 10, are stopped and abolished, and the rights of displaced Syrians are upheld in their totality, including the ownership of their property.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2af517fba8d6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Al Masnaa incident shows Syrian refugees in Lebanon are increasingly pressured into unsafe return]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/al-masnaa-incident-shows-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon-are-increasingly-pressured-into-unsafe-return-8fd214fa138c?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8fd214fa138c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[return]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[assad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2020 16:19:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-06T17:12:59.238Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*tNUI6HrTW3PrLxwQtk8eHA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Syrian refugees stuck in between Lebanese and Syrian borders at Al Masnaa</figcaption></figure><p>Syrian refugees in Lebanon are facing an increasingly difficult situation and there is a serious possibility that things are going to get much worse in the coming months. The deterioration of economic conditions resulting from the ongoing political crisis in Lebanon, and the additional decline of the economy caused by the spread of the Covid-19 virus, coupled with the increase of hostile and dehumanising rhetoric from the political class and media, make the Syrian refugees particularly vulnerable at this time.</p><p>In his speech on 4 May, the Lebanese President Michael Aoun named the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon as one of the “three faces of the crisis” shaking the country, comparing them to the current Covid-19 pandemic and the economic crisis crippling the country. Considering the already hostile atmosphere surrounding the refugees in Lebanon, such messages from the highest political figures are bound to inflame the anti-refugee sentiment as the Lebanese people experience more economic hardship.</p><p>In such harsh conditions, where the refugees are massively losing job opportunities in Lebanon and the aid provided by international organizations is increasingly scarce, a growing number of Syrians is forced to consider the dangerous option of the unsafe return to the areas under regime’s control in Syria. The situation they are facing is rapidly becoming equivalent to a forced return into extremely insecure environment.<br> <br>A recent incident clearly illustrates the precarious situation Syrian refugees in Lebanon are facing. On 20 April, a group of desperate Syrians flocked to the Lebanese-Syrian at the Al Masnaa crossing to try and cross into Syria. They were able to cross the Lebanese border, but were then stopped by the regime’s border guards on the pretext that the borders were closed due to the spread of the Corona virus. A tense situation quickly developed and the border guards started shooting in the air to drive the refugees back to Lebanon.</p><p>According to the information the Syrian Association for Citizen Dignity learned through private sources about the details of the incident, some of the regime border guards asked for money in order to let the refugees cross. Those who paid the bribe were then taken to a quarantine. Most of them, who had no money to pay the bribe, remained stranded in the area separating the Lebanese and Syrian borders.</p><p>The suffering of those who were able to cross into Syria did not end with the payment of the bribe, as they were denied food or water unless they paid the guards exorbitant prices. Worse, some of them were asked to pay up to $500 US per person to be released from the quarantine.</p><p>The others, some of whom were stranded in the no-mans-land for 15 days, finally started being allowed back into Lebanon. Since May 2 they have been returning to Lebanon in groups, uncertain of the fate that awaits them once they come back.</p><p>The Al Masnaa incident is but a latest illustration of the extreme vulnerability of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, which is unfolding amidst the deafening silence from the UNHCR, which is failing to substantively and systematically report on the increasingly dire situation they face. Considering the impending global economic crisis which will follow the COVID-19 pandemic, this situation is only bound to get worse. Th international community has an obligation to act and uphold the rights of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, provide adequate aid and act to stop the growing hostility that can make the situation of more than one million people untenable.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8fd214fa138c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Assad’s Model” of Fighting COVID19: Forget Syrian Lives, Use the Crisis to Annul Economic…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/assads-model-of-fighting-covid19-forget-syrian-lives-use-the-crisis-to-annul-economic-a729d003ca3?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a729d003ca3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[assad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sanctions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2020 11:18:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-06T11:49:19.285Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>“Assad’s Model” of Fighting COVID19: Forget Syrian Lives, Use the Crisis to Annul Economic Sanctions</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Hz0n_tHY2IyBiphhF05vvw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>At a time when the countries of the world are developing strategies to face the COVID-19 pandemic and focus on saving their citizens and all who live on their territories, the Syrian regime is occupied with finding ways to use this global crisis to argue for lifting the sanctions and restrictions imposed on it as a result of the atrocities it committed. Wasting precious time to prepare a response and holding off the acknowledgement of the arrival of the virus to Syria, Bashar al-Assad and his allies were busy exploring how to use the pandemic to float the regime and cement its gains.</p><p>The Syrian regime delayed its announcement of the first COVID-19 infections in areas it controls. On 22 March, Minister of Health in the Syrian government, Nizar Yazigi, admitted on television the existence of the first Corona virus case in the country, weeks after the rumours started spreading on social media. The delay in announcing the first case was maintained despite the news coming from the various partner countries of the regime of the rampant spread of the virus — especially Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. The regime imposed no restrictions on the travel with these countries as the flow of people, militias and goods continued across the porous borders. As the crisis was growing, the regime looked to invest efforts in trying to dismantle the sanctions, rather than protect the people.</p><p>A false narrative was constructed about the sanctions being the main obstacle in the country’s capacity to respond to COVID-19. The regime’s allies made a concerted push in the UN forums to have the sanctions lifted, ignoring the fact that these sanctions never applied to the humanitarian or medical aid, but were directed at the regime for crimes against its own people. At the same time, the pandemic clearly demonstrated that the regime had no capacity to act as a real state in protecting its borders or providing basic services to its citizens, but resorted to a potentially deadly “model” of dealing with the virus: covering up the real truth about the impact of the pandemic or the extent of its spreading.</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Why Are International Sanctions Imposed?</strong></p><p>International sanctions are restrictive deterrent measures (unrelated to the use of armed force) imposed by international organizations — such as the United Nations[1] and the European Union — or individual states, against states, non-state actors or individuals whose behavior or policies violate international law and human rights or constitute a threat to global or regional peace and security, with the aim of influencing the behavior or policies of these countries, entities, or individuals and persuading them to put an end to violations that threaten peace and security.</p><p>According to the EU charter, sanctions are one of the its tools to advance the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)[2] to promote world peace, protect human rights and respect the rule of law and democracy, protect international law, and prevent the spread of violence.</p><p>All EU-imposed sanctions are renewed annually after reviewing the reasons that led to their imposition. In addition, any member state of the European Union can object to the extension of the sanctions and cease their effects.</p><p>While the United States imposes sanctions for international considerations, in addition to its own considerations related to national security and foreign or economic policies, the United Nations sanctions are the most effective in influencing the targeted state, since all member states of the United Nations are obligated to apply these sanctions. This is because the sanctions imposed by the European Union, the US, or any other individual states are not binding on the rest of the United Nations member states.</p><p><strong>The scope of sanctions against the Assad regime</strong></p><p>As of the beginning of 2020, the Syrian government was not subject to any sanctions by the United Nations due to the Russian and Chinese veto. This has meant that the Syrian regime has so far been immune to any comprehensive international sanctions targeting its institutions or individuals. However, the sanctions imposed (in its various forms) to date include those imposed by the European Union, the United States of America, Canada, Australia, Turkey, and the League of Arab States, in addition to several other countries allied to the United States of America.</p><p>These countries and entities imposed sanctions on the Syrian regime for its killing of peaceful demonstrators and its subsequent attacks on civilian targets that led to the deaths of thousands of people, including attacks with chemical weapons. The penalties enforced by the sanctions differ from one state to another, and range from travel restrictions of particular officials, to the prevention of arms sales or bans of economic activities involving individuals and entities involved in construction, which strips the displaced people of their property, inter alia. The most important sets of sanctions are described below.</p><p><strong>Sanctions Imposed by the European Union</strong></p><p>The European Union imposes two types of sanctions on the Syrian regime, which are:</p><p>o Individual or specific sanctions, targeting specific individuals and entities for their association with the Syrian regime and for being responsible for human rights violations, the suppression of freedom of opinion and the suppression of demonstrators or opponents of the Syrian regime and for their support and benefit from it. The targeted groups can be summarized as follows[3]:</p><p>• The influential businessmen in the Syrian regime and those in charge of the oil, telecommunications, and technology sectors, in addition to those involved directly or indirectly in defrauding the sanctions for the benefit of the Syrian regime. This is in addition to Syrian government ministers appointed after May 2011. There are also sanctions against some senior military officers and officials in addition to sanctions targeting Bashar Al-Assad himself.</p><p>• Sanctions targeting specific economic sectors, which aim at depriving the Syrian regime of the cash revenues used to kill Syrians. The most important of these sectors[4] are the military and security sectors including the purchase of equipment intended for killing and oppression; the oil and gas sector and its resources used to finance the war against the people; the technology and communications sector and all that facilitates the monitoring of civilians and the strengthening of the security grip electronically; in addition to penalties for the transportation of antiquities and precious metals that the regime tried to sell to finance oppression.</p><p><strong>Sanctions imposed by the United States of America</strong></p><p>The US sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime are more comprehensive and expanded than the European sanctions. The US sanctions against Syria were initiated back in 2004 with the Syria Accountability Act and were followed by many economic sanctions related to the intervention of the Syrian regime in Lebanon and Iraq. The sanctions applied after March 2011 were an extension of previous sanctions due to the use of military force to suppress demonstrators and kill Syrians. Other executive decisions were issued to freeze the funds of Syrians involved in killing other Syrians, whether they were in the Syrian army or security services.</p><p>As with the European sanctions, the US sanctions were of two types: penalties for individuals and penalties for economic and government entities, which are similar in many ways.</p><p>The newly adopted Caesar Law, which has not yet been implemented, is the most important and most impactful against the Syrian regime and its allies, as it does not include only the pillars of the regime, but also any individual or entity that deals with them. Most importantly, the law imposes sanctions on[5]:</p><p>o Any foreign person participating in an activity described as financial, material and technical support for the Syrian regime;</p><p>o Military contractors, mercenary companies, or paramilitary forces operating inside Syria for or on behalf of the Syrian government, the government of the Russian Federation, or the government of Iran;</p><p>o Those who deal in the oil and gas sector, technology and communications sector with the Syrian government;</p><p>o Whoever sells or provides aircraft or aircraft parts that are used for military purposes for the benefit of the Syrian government or on its behalf to any foreign person operating in an area directly or indirectly controlled by the Syrian government or foreign forces associated with the Syrian government;</p><p>o Anyone who intends, directly or indirectly, to provide major building, construction, or engineering services to the Syrian government.</p><p>Individuals who have so far been on the sanctions list include Bashar Al-Assad, his deputies, ministers, cabinet members and governors, as well as chiefs of military units, security forces, and senior officers responsible for oppression and torture.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>The sanctions do not target ordinary Syrians</strong></p><p>In reality, the sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime by the European Union and the United States do not target any sector that affects the living conditions of the citizens such as food, medicine, and industries not used to kill Syrians. Nevertheless, the sanctions are not imposed by a large number of countries, especially those that supply much of the COVID19-related medical equipment like China, but are confined to a limited number of the countries of the world.</p><p>Despite this, the countries imposing the sanctions excluded important sectors to ensure the effects of the sanctions on the regime is not reflected upon the Syrians themselves, including the following exceptions:</p><p>o The competent authorities in the countries of the European Union may grant licenses/waivers to the sanctions, upon request, when they are certain that the requested economic funds or resources are necessary for providing humanitarian relief in Syria or providing assistance to the civilian population in Syria;</p><p>o The release of funds or economic resources to the United Nations for the purpose of delivering or facilitating the delivery of aid in Syria, according to the Syrian humanitarian response program, in addition to meeting the energy and sanitation needs of civilians in Syria;</p><p>o The sanctions also exclude medical treatment, medical and nutritional materials, and any agricultural or humanitarian supplies for the benefit of the United Nations organizations, public bodies or entities receiving funding from the European Union or one of its members to provide humanitarian relief or assistance to the civilian population;</p><p>o New bank accounts may also be licensed if they are designated for the humanitarian activities of the population in Syria;</p><p>o Any person or entity covered by the sanctions has the right to object to the sanctions to the Council of the European Union, which has the authority to consider removing the concerned person from the sanctions list.</p><p>As for US sanctions, the State Department has issued a specific guide to importing medicines and medical equipment for a number of countries, including Syria — which effectively nullifies the claims of the Syrian regime that sanctions hamper its COVID-19 response capacity and confirm that the sanctions do not target the Syrian people but the Syrian regime itself and its killing machine that has not stopped the extermination of the Syrians for nine years[6]. The US embassy in Damascus recently confirmed on its website that the sanctions do not in any way target the entry of food or medical items and stressed that there are programs funded by the United States of America working to deliver aid to various regions, including those under the regime’s control. Furthermore, US Ambassador James Jeffrey announced that “U.S. sanctions do not in any way impact the delivery of humanitarian goods, incl. medicines and medical supplies, entering Syria. Since our sanctions were implemented, we’ve provided exemptions for humanitarian aid in all areas of Syria.”[7]</p><p>In the same vein, the European countries confirmed during the UN Security Council Session on 29 April that the EU sanctions are not an impediment to the fight against COVID-19. The ambassador of Estonia at the UN, Sven Jurgenson, summed up the EU position[8] in response to the claims by Russia and some other countries that the sanctions needed to be lifted: “The EU remains determined to enforce its sanctions on Syria, whether against individuals, entities, or specific goods. Claims that these measures somehow undermine the fight against COVID-19 are baseless. EU restrictive measures do not block any items required to counter the outbreak from entering Syria. Humanitarian exemptions are also at the core of all EU sanctions.“ The UK ambassador, James Roscoe echoed[9] the EU position: “We want to confirm that goods and medical supplies used for humanitarian purposes are not subject to EU sanctions, which the UK continues to apply, and additional exemptions from sanctions are available for humanitarian activity in Syria.”</p><p>Indicatively, the World Health Organization (or any other international or humanitarian organization) did not identify any obstacles facing its work in areas under the control of the regime resulting from the sanctions against the Syrian regime. On the contrary, in the Humanitarian Update №06 from 17 April 2020, OCHA[10] mentions providing the Syrian Ministry of Health with 4000 Corona virus tests since February 12, 2020 and other medical equipment to confront the virus. This was before the Syrian government announced any infections on its soil. OCHA also talked about the establishment of new laboratories in Aleppo, Latakia, Homs, and Hasakeh, in addition to the laboratory that was established in Damascus and the start of a training program for laboratory cadres in 24 laboratories in areas under the control of the regime.</p><p>As mentioned previously in this briefing, even in the case of sanctions imposed by the European Union or the United States of America on individuals and entities, financial resources can be provided for these groups and individuals for the purpose of providing humanitarian relief in Syria or providing assistance to the civilian population in Syria.</p><p>However, a large number of organizations, led by Doctors Without Borders, still complain of their inability to reach civilians to help them provide medical services and materials to confront the pandemic, due to the regime’s refusal to give them permission. The sanctions have nothing to do with this.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>“Assad’s Model” of dealing with COVID19</strong></p><p>Amidst the global health crisis afflicting humanity and the various governments’ efforts to reduce the damage to their healthcare systems and prevent deaths of their citizens, the Syrian regime and its Russian and Iranian allies set out to use the opportunity provided by the crisis to demand the lifting of the sanctions and secure and injection of funds to float the regime. They argued that sanctions hinder the efforts of the Syrian regime in combating the COVID-19 virus and that the sanctions deprive it of financial and material resources to effectively confront the virus.</p><p>Those who follow the situation in Syria closely find that the Syrian regime has maintained the flow of people, militias and equipment with the countries and regions where the epidemic had already spread widely so travel to Iran, Iraq has not been interrupted until this moment, except for Lebanon which closed its borders with Syria. However, the regime does not control much of the border anyway, so the illegal land crossings are still used on a daily basis by militias backed by Iran[11].</p><p>The Syrian regime has targeted everyone who warned or alerted Syrians of the spread of the disease. Doctors, media and public figures[12] who spoke about the spread of the disease among Syrians in areas under the regime’s control were threatened and detained. Internet cafes were closed to prevent the spread of news about the disease and limiting the home-used internet packages[13]. also legalizing home packages.</p><p>The Ministry of Health has acknowledged only several cases of infections and death, despite reliable information about the virus spreading through the people. According to Syria Direct, 240 cases of medical quarantines were aggregated, while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported at 166 people were medically quarantined within government-held territory.[14] Ironically, the Syrian Minister of Health, Hazar Raef, during an interview mentioned that the Syrian regime has set an example in its fight against Coronavirus, and that apparently many countries are looking forward to benefit from this experience.[15]</p><p>The Syrian bakeries, a small number of ATMs, operating post offices in the governorates, and points where electricity and water bills can be paid, petrol stations, are still places where great numbers of Syrians gather without any safety precautions or any social distancing measures.</p><p>The medical institutions of the healthcare system are still almost entirely in the service of the regime’s army and forces fighting on the fronts. Priority is given to the wounded of the army, security, and allied forces over any other medical conditions, regardless of how mild or dangerous.</p><p>All this is in complete disregard for the lives of the people and in a clear preference for the political and military relations of the regime over any situation or emergency that is ravaging the country, including the COVID-19 crisis.</p><p>The regime’s lack of concern for the health of Syrians is best illustrated by the fact that it has killed nearly a thousand workers in the medical sector from 2011 to 2020[16], and its prisons today contain a number of the most prominent Syrian medical cadres.</p><p>The regime’s targeting of hospitals, clinics and ambulances in a policy of systematic destruction of health infrastructure in any areas outside its control, which is needed, today more than ever, demonstrates a clear approach to destroying the country and its capacity to protect the health of its people. On the other hand, several organizations working in the humanitarian and medical fields have tried to work in the areas under regime control to help the Syrians, but the Syrian regime refused to give them work permits, as in the case of Doctors without Borders (MSF)[17]. In addition, the Syrian Network for Human Rights confirmed that the Syrian regime prohibits international organizations and United Nations organizations from working and moving in Syrian lands without permits and work permits that need months to be approved.[18]</p><p>The Syrian regime is using the pandemic in order to lift the sanctions against it, rooting its narrative in a false claim that the continuing deterioration of the economic and medical conditions in Syria is caused by the sanctions. This false narrative claims that its institutions are unable to do anything to stop the spread of the epidemic because of the interruption in the flow of medical and humanitarian aid. These claims have been clearly refuted by the countries that imposed the sanctions[19], and the people living in areas under regime control need to be informed of the truth, as the sanctions do not include the medical and humanitarian sectors. Most importantly, the reasons for the imposition of sanctions still remain.</p><p><strong>4.</strong> <strong>The continuation of the circumstances that led to the imposition of the sanctions</strong></p><p>The sanctions are one of the few remaining pressure tools applied to the Syrian regime and its allies that limit its movement and increase its isolation from the international community. The sanctions on their own will not likely lead to a change in the totalitarian regime that exists in Syria, but in the long run they play an important role in highlighting the brutality of the Syrian regime and its allies. They are a pressure tool that cannot be underestimated in their capacity to extract fundamental concessions in the structure and actions of the regime as a political solution is sought. These sanctions were imposed for specific reasons related to the regime’s oppression of Syrians, and lifting them must be preceded by a fundamental change in the way the regime acts. Their goals must be satisfied before they are lifted. For example, the US Caesar’s Law has established special conditions for the scenario of suspending these sanctions and the most important of them include[20]:</p><p>o The air space over Syria is no longer being utilized by the Government of Syria or the Government of the Russian Federation to target civilian populations through the use of incendiary devices, including barrel bombs, chemical weapons, and conventional arms, including air-delivered missiles and explosives.</p><p>o Areas besieged by the Government of Syria, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of Iran, or a foreign person described in section 102(a)(2)(A)(ii) are no longer cut off from international aid and have regular access to humanitarian assistance, freedom of travel, and medical care.</p><p>o The Government of Syria is releasing all political prisoners forcibly held within the prison system of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the Government of Syria is allowing full access to the same facilities for investigations by appropriate international human rights organizations.</p><p>o The forces of the Government of Syria, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of Iran, and any foreign person described in section 102(a)(2)(A)(ii) are no longer engaged in deliberate targeting of medical facilities, schools, residential areas, and community gathering places, including markets, in violation of international norms.</p><p>o The Government of Syria is permitting the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of Syrians displaced by the conflict.</p><p>Recently, in January 2020, the European Union imposed sanctions on 11 Syrian figures and five companies involved in the Marota City project, which is to be established in the city of Damascus (in the area of Khalaf al-Razi and the several Mazzeh orchards) on lands owned and occupied by people opposed to Assad, who were forcibly displaced from their homes and their property seized. These sanctions cannot be lifted until such conduct is stopped and reversed.</p><p>Consequently, the disappearance of the reasons that led to the imposition of sanctions, which focus in essence on the suppression of demonstrators, the bombing of cities, the torture of prisoners and other killings and destruction, are the essence of the sanctions process and these reasons are still present, which prevents the lifting of sanctions under the current circumstances. This is what Syrians living under the Syrian regime’s rule must know, as the regime pumps out its propaganda about sanctions hampering the COVID-19 response.</p><p>It is clear that the international sanctions imposed on the regime for its brutality and repression of the Syrian people are not designed to in any way hamper the response to the COVID19 pandemic. On the contrary, the countries which have imposed the sanctions remain the largest donors of humanitarian and medical aid to the Syrian people. The regime and its allies are simply using the pandemic to try and boost the regime’s capacity for war and sustain its failing, corrupt system. This is the truth that must be communicated to the Syrians living under Assad and the international public.</p><p>There cannot be any return of the Syrian regime to the international scene without a fundamental change in its nature and actions. Sanctions cannot be lifted as long as the rights of the displaced are denied, as long as there are not minimum conditions for their safe, voluntary and dignified return. Any other scenario would acknowledge Bashar Al-Assad’s impunity for horrendous crimes of its regime and its allies, with lasting and irreversible destructive consequences for Syria and the region.</p><p>[1] Article 41 of the UN Charter: <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ar/content/repertoire/actions#rel3">https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ar/content/repertoire/actions#rel3</a></p><p>[2] EU Sanctions Policy: <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/sanctions-policy/423/sanctions-policy_en">https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/sanctions-policy/423/sanctions-policy_en</a></p><p>[3] Article 15, COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EU) No 442/2011</p><p><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32012R0036">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32012R0036</a></p><p>[4] ANNEX I, LIST OF EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE USED FOR INTERNAL REPRESSION AS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2 AND ARTICLE 3 , COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EU) No 442/2011</p><p>[5] Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019: <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/31/text#toc-id50064c7521cb41dc8c5f010ef4e95a2a">https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/31/text#toc-id50064c7521cb41dc8c5f010ef4e95a2a</a></p><p>[6] Read US Department of Treasury: [link missing]</p><p>[7] Read Statement by Ambassador Jeffrey on COVID-19 outbreak in Syria: <a href="https://sy.usembassy.gov/ambassador-jeffrey-on-covid-19-outbreak-in-syria/">https://sy.usembassy.gov/ambassador-jeffrey-on-covid-19-outbreak-in-syria/</a></p><p>[8] Read the statement by Ambassador Jurgenson here: <a href="https://un.mfa.ee/national-statement-at-the-un-security-council-on-the-political-situation-in-syria/">https://un.mfa.ee/national-statement-at-the-un-security-council-on-the-political-situation-in-syria/</a></p><p>[9] Read the statement by Ambassador Roscoe here: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-process-of-seeking-a-political-solution-in-syria-must-not-cease">https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-process-of-seeking-a-political-solution-in-syria-must-not-cease</a></p><p>[10] Read OCHA COVID-19 Update №06: <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-covid-19-update-no-06-17-april-2020">https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-covid-19-update-no-06-17-april-2020</a></p><p>[11] LBC, 5 Lebanese families arrive to Masnaa Border crossing coming from Iran: <a href="https://bit.ly/2YmLHeR">https://bit.ly/2YmLHeR</a></p><p>[12] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Mystery surrounds the killing of a doctor in Qardaha <a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=156864">http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=156864</a></p><p>[13] Asharq Al-Awsat, Syrian Regime Increases Gasoline Prices, Rations Internet Usage: <a href="https://bit.ly/2z3MOoS">https://bit.ly/2z3MOoS</a></p><p>[14] Syria Direct, Mapping the Coronavirus in Syria: <a href="https://bit.ly/2VWcsoI">https://bit.ly/2VWcsoI</a></p><p>[15] Link to the interview video: <a href="https://bit.ly/35iKdU8">https://bit.ly/35iKdU8</a></p><p>[16] Physicians for Human Rights, Medical Personnel Are Targeted in Syria: <a href="https://bit.ly/3aPSgco">https://bit.ly/3aPSgco</a></p><p>[17] Asharq Al-Awsat, MSF Spokesperson: Virus Did not Convince Syrian Regime to Allow Us to Operate: <a href="https://bit.ly/2KSQFrD">https://bit.ly/2KSQFrD</a></p><p>[18] SNHR, Sanctions Are Linked to the Syrian Regime’s Continuing Violations and Don’t Include Medical Supplies and Food, Which Shouldn’t Be Delivered Through the Regime: <a href="http://sn4hr.org/blog/2020/04/27/54922/">http://sn4hr.org/blog/2020/04/27/54922/</a></p><p>[19] Read Statement by Ambassador Jeffrey on COVID-19 outbreak in Syria: <a href="https://sy.usembassy.gov/ambassador-jeffrey-on-covid-19-outbreak-in-syria/">https://sy.usembassy.gov/ambassador-jeffrey-on-covid-19-outbreak-in-syria/</a></p><p>[20] H.R.31 — Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019: <a href="https://bit.ly/2SrQsju">https://bit.ly/2SrQsju</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a729d003ca3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[OPCW report on chemical attacks by Assad’s forces a watershed moment in international community’s…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/opcw-report-on-chemical-attacks-by-assads-forces-a-watershed-moment-in-international-community-s-41192330bbb8?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/41192330bbb8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[chemical-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[opcw]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[assad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2020 12:53:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-09T14:43:20.251Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>OPCW report on chemical attacks by Assad’s forces a watershed moment in international community’s approach to Syria</strong></h3><p><strong>Idlib, 9 April 2020 </strong>— The Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity welcomes <a href="https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2020/04/opcw-releases-first-report-investigation-and-identification-team">the report</a> from the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which for the first time in nine years of the Syrian conflict explicitly confirmed that the forces of the Assad regime used chemical weapons to attack civilians in Ltamenah, in Hama governorate.</p><p>The report cites in minute detail the incidents in which Assad’s air force dropped bombs loaded with chemical weapons on civilian targets, including a hospital, in Ltamenah in March 2017, specifying that „military operations of such a strategic nature as these three attacks only occur pursuant to orders from the highest levels of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces.“</p><p>In confirming the responsibility of Assad’s regime, including the highest levels of its military for what constitutes war crimes and crimes against humanity as part of a systematic attack on civilians, the OPCW finally confirmed what Syrian organisations, human rights groups and people have documented and revealed for years — Assad’s regime has used war crimes systematically to terrorize Syrian civilians and force them into submission and displacement.</p><p>With that in mind, the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity reiterates several key points that international negotiators and key states invested in finding a solution to the Syrian conflict must take into account:</p><p>- The OPCW report clearly confirms that chemical attacks by the Assad’s forces were used with the sole purpose of terrorising civilians and forcing them to abandon their homes, and had no military justification whatsoever. The sole aim of such terror was and still is to forcibly displace the majority of Syrian population which was seen as anti-regime and affect a demographic change in the country.</p><p>- Accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity such as attacks with chemical weapons must be considered one of the crucial pre-conditions and confidence-building measures before organized, safe, voluntary and dignified return of the displaced people to Syria can be considered.</p><p>- It is impossible to consider any of the currently ongoing elements of the political process without addressing the key issue — creating a safe environment under international sponsorship and supervision for a voluntary and dignified return of the displaced. Elections are impossible without this. Verification of the new constitution is impossible without this. Reconstruction is impossible without this. Organized return is impossible without this.</p><p>- A regime which has been proved to have used chemical weapons against its own people cannot under any circumstances be relied on to provide safe environment for the Syrian people and cannot have legitimacy to provide any guarantees to this effect. Only a robust international presence, with a clear mandate to supervise and enforce a political settlement which will guarantee the rights and safety of all Syrians, including returnees, can guarantee minimal conditions for a safe, voluntary and dignified return.</p><p>We waited for nine years for the international community to take seriously what Syrians have been documenting and reporting regarding the crimes of the regime against its own people. The OPCW report confirms that lifting the economic sanctions against the Syrian regime under the false pretext of fighting Covid-19 epidemic will likely provide the regime with a new opportunity to further build its war capacity, including additional chemical weapons to use in the future against civilians. This report is a watershed moment for the international community, which now must accept the reality in which it will have to assume the responsibility for creating and guaranteeing the safe environment in Syria, and abandon any and all policies seeking to normalize Assad’s regime.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yvw_HSu263rNv88o9ZzUvQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=41192330bbb8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Anniversary of chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun reminds why the sanctions against Assad are needed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/anniversary-of-chemical-attack-on-khan-sheikhoun-reminds-why-the-sanctions-against-assad-are-needed-1900fd75d695?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1900fd75d695</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[khan-sheikhoun]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[assad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sanctions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2020 14:02:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-06T14:02:02.982Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Aleppo countryside, April 6, 2020 — </strong>On the fourth of April 2017, the Syrian regime carried out a chemical weapons attack in the city of Khan Sheikhoun, a town in the countryside of Hama, killing nearly a hundred civilians and wounding hundreds of others, mostly children.</p><p>On this anniversary, the Syrian Association for Citizens’s Dignity (Karama) reminds Syrians and the international community of this hideous war crime against the Syrian people. Such use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime and the systematic attacks conducted from joint air bases with Russian and Iranian forces has always been a part of the wider strategy of demographic change in Syria, which has resulted in the displacement of millions of Syrians.</p><p>Since 2013, the Syrian regime has carried out more than 145 attacks using prohibited chemical weapons in residential areas, including the attack on the village of Khan Al-Asal in March 2013; the bombing of Eastern Ghouta which killed hundreds of people in August 2013; attacks on Old Homs in January 2013, Saraqib in April 2014, Kafr Zita in October 2014, Aleppo city in August 2016, in addition to the bombing of Khan Sheikhoun in April of 2017.</p><p>Apart from the killing and wounding of civilians, these attacks resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of people from different regions. Chemical attacks aimed to terrify and pressure the local population to leave their homes in Old Homs, Damascus countryside, Hama countryside and Idlib countryside, the city of Aleppo and other areas. The terror directed at civilians at these areas by the Syrian regime and its allies was always part of a clear pattern of achieving demographic change through forced displacement triggered by the use of chemical weapons, starvation and siege.</p><p>This grim anniversary is marked by the continued impunity for the atrocities like the chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun and, shockingly, by the regime’s concerted effort to use the pretext of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic to have economic sanctions against it lifted. We use this occasion to reaffirm that lifting economic sanctions on the regime will enable it to commit new crimes against the Syrians and displace more civilians, as happened in recent months in northwest of Syria.</p><p>The most effective way to help Syrians to confront the pandemic is to pressure the Syrian regime to take the correct, necessary measures to protect the Syrians, including the full transparency about the number of cases, proper description of the disease, protection of medical staff and other measure employed elsewhere. The most important first step in preventing the catastrophic impact of the pandemic would be to release tens of thousands of detainees deprived of the minimal access to health care in regime’s prisons. The economic sanctions against the regime for crimes committed against its own people, like the Khan Sheikhoun attack, do not include medical aid and should not be subject of manipulation at these difficult times for all, and especially for Syrians displaced by such atrocities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iBCWi6S3Gw7GkJ7mqeiFEg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Nearly 100 people, most of the children, died in the chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun (Photocredit: EMC)</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1900fd75d695" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Regime’s corruption and repression worsen the impact of COVID-19 on Syrians]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SACD/regimes-corruption-and-repression-worsen-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-syrians-b2da9c91879b?source=rss-218278e50d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b2da9c91879b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syrian-refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pandemic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[assad]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2020 12:23:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-02T12:23:40.349Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>By Souhaib Boushi</em></p><p>The Assad regime has recently ramped up the effort to have sanctions imposed upon the regime officials by the United States and the EU removed under the pretext of fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. The Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity and other Syrian groups have promptly <a href="https://medium.com/@SACD/syrian-regime-is-falsely-linking-the-demand-for-lifting-of-sanctions-to-the-fight-against-covid-19-f0886e8b06a">warned</a> that the sanctions do not target medical or humanitarian aid and in no way hamper the regime’s capacity to confront the pandemic effectively. The US Ambassador James Jeffery <a href="https://twitter.com/USEmbassySyria/status/1244691863627497474">confirmed</a> this in a public statement issued two days ago, reiterating that the regime is in fact using the pandemic to “further divide the Syrian people” while the US and its partners continue to deliver aid to the Syrian people.</p><p>It is not the sanctions targeting the regime for its abuses committed against Syrians that hamper the desperately needed response to the deadly COVID-19 pandemic, but in fact the regime’s corruption, decay and its unrelenting effort to repress the population under its control. There is a number of facts that illustrate this absence of basic care and empathy towards the Syrian people at a time when they desperately need it.</p><p>First, while the pandemic was spreading around the world and ravaging the neighbouring Iran, with an unknown number of Iranian militia members streaming across the border into Syria from Iran and Iraq, totally unchecked, the regime propaganda machine was claiming that there were no cases of COVID-19 in Syria. The first case that was publicly reported on the 22 March was that of a student returning to Damascus. By that time there have already been numerous cases of infections originating in Syria reported around the world.</p><p>On March 12 the Pakistani Minister of Health Zafar Mirza said 14 of the coronavirus cases were of people who <a href="https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/pakistan-links-some-its-21-coronavirus-cases-syria">arrived from Syria</a> to Karachi, the capital of Sindh province and the country’s largest city. This is 10 days before the regime acknowledged the first case. Doctors working in areas under Assad’s control have contacted the SACD even before the statement of the Pakistani official to report that they were strictly forbidden to acknowledge any COVID-19 cases or even to wear protective gear in order to maintain the regime’s line on “zero cases”. Invaluable time was wasted, which could have been used to raise the awareness among the public of the necessary measures of social distancing and general understating of the threat the pandemic poses.</p><p>Instead, the regime continued with a policy of portraying a “zero cases” reality, including surreal <a href="https://hadiabdullah.net/2020/03/21/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A9%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%89-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7/">claims</a> by its health officials that the “special knowledge” it was using to deal with the virus made it the envy of the world, with many countries seeking its expertise in combating the pandemic. The reality, however, is that the virus has been steadily spreading in a situation where the regime has not more than <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103841/1/CRP_covid_19_in_Syria_policy_memo_published.pdf">325 available ICU beds</a>. Using the available information from countries like China, Italy and Spain, this would make Syria’s threshold for manageable levels of COVID-19 infection just 0.036% of the population. Ordinary Syrians know very well who are the families for whom these beds would be reserved in the hour of need.</p><p>They are the same families who, like the son of Rami Maklouf, are flaunting their Dubai mansions, ultra-expensive cars and other riches gained from <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/525ec4e4-e4a3-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc">war profiteering</a> which placed them on the sanctions list. At the same time, the economy under Assad has totally collapsed and people are forced to literally fight in their <a href="https://www.almodon.com/arabworld/2020/3/29/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D8%AC%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85">hundreds</a> for a loaf of state-subsidised bread because they are unable to afford a 20 cents more expensive bread from private bakeries. Huge crowds are forming in lines for these handouts, or for basic supplies like gas and flour, at a time when the whole world is warning against gatherings of more than two people. The scenes of people <a href="https://www.baladi-news.com/public/ar/articles/58872">running</a> after a bread truck in Aleppo instil a dreadful feeling of an impending cataclysm.</p><p>Yet, the fate awaiting those who live under Assad’s control is still far more hopeful than for tens of thousands of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/syria-vulnerable-prisoners-should-be-released-to-prevent-spread-of-covid19/">detainees</a> held under horrific conditions in the regime’s prisons. Arrested for being “anti-Assad,” for supporting the revolution or simply for being seen as “problematic” by the regime’s notorious intelligence service, the detainees are held without any access to their families or international humanitarian agencies. The available information indicates they are held in terrible conditions of incarceration, with overcrowding, lack of facilities for basic hygiene and starved. This makes them additionally vulnerable to the COVID-19 infection, as their immune systems must be close to non-existent and they have no access to any form of healthcare. If the virus spreads in these prisons, it is likely that the vast majority of detainees would perish.</p><p>If the regime genuinely wanted to save Syrian lives from the COVID-19 threat, it would immediately release all the detainees. This would save their lives but also release the resources needed to maintain their incarceration. If the regime was serious about fighting COVID-19, it would stop its onslaught on Idlib and the war on Syrians, which has cost it <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/syria-assad-holds-rich-cousin-so-he-can-pay-putins-war-loans-pl7pplrm6">billions of dollars</a> in financing its own forces and payments to its Russian and Iranian allies. The money that has gone into <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/health-care-brink-collapse-idlib-hospitals-lack-medicine-save-lives">destroying countless hospitals</a> in Idlib, which have left millions of Syrians sheltering in displacement camps without any meaningful access to healthcare, could have gone into securing the capacity to face the pandemic.</p><p>Of course, these are only hypothetic propositions, without any real hope that the Assad will act sensibly and in the interest of Syrians at this time of unprecedented crisis facing the world. In reality, there is no state behind his Potemkin’s villages posing as institutions. There is no economy, there is no health system capable of providing anything but myths and deadly lies to the people facing a threat of a deadly virus, there is no dignity for those forced to run after bread trucks for measly handouts. There are only means of repression used to prop up a failed, corrupt, inhumane regime uninterested to care for its people and incapable of empathy for the millions in dire need of help. The COVID-19 pandemic simply laid this truth bare.</p><p><em>Souhaib Boushi is an economics researcher and an activist leading numerous civil society initiatives. He is a member of SACD’s Program Management Team.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AIh2GqGDT0dUYZUFAxKaHQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Syrians overcrowd the bread stalls in al Ba’ath neighborhood in Hama city (copyright SNHR)</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b2da9c91879b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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