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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Philip Hesketh  on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Philip Hesketh  on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Philip Hesketh  on Medium</title>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 21:07:08 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nobody Asked for Kevin the Carrot]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/nobody-asked-for-kevin-the-carrot-218f50df8cba?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 10:50:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-08T10:50:14.848Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MEUMv3OJyUk0cY1ycG3zmw.png" /></figure><p>It’s early November, and there’s the annoying increase in Christmas supermarket commercials.</p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C9mEsqI8ULc">Sainsbury’s</a> has brought back the BFG.</p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=scy0q6tfW2w">Morrison’s</a> has the Three Bears</p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqXD0E6H2OY">Aldi’s </a>Kevin the Carrot embarks on another adventure.</p><p>But do we actually give a mince pie about it? Or is this just another ad agency’s way of mindwashing us into believing Christmas starts on 3 November, complete with Ramsay’s pigs in blankets or Jamie’s perfect turkey?</p><p>It turns out the Great British public wants just one thing from its supermarkets this Christmas.</p><p><strong>Make Christmas cheaper.</strong></p><p>There’s some recent research from <a href="https://www.onepulse.com/supermarket-christmas-ads-2026/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">OnePulse that found 57%</a> of shoppers would prefer supermarkets to spend less on Christmas advertising and pass the savings on through lower prices.</p><p>I 100% agree, especially during a cost-of-living crisis, but have you ever reached the checkout, discovered your shopping was £20 cheaper than expected, and complained that Tesco hadn’t made you feel more emotional?</p><p>The same research found that 63% actually wanted Aldi’s Kevin the Carrot to return. But 61% said Christmas advertising had never changed where they did their Christmas “big shop”.</p><p>So we don’t want retailers spending money on Christmas adverts, but we do want our favourite Christmas characters back. And, to be honest with ourselves, we’re fairly certain none of it influences us anyway.</p><p>I doubt many of us sit on the sofa with a glass of red, watch Kevin the Carrot and immediately decide to switch supermarkets. And when we’re eventually elbowing our way through the Christmas crowds in mid December, trying to find the last tin of Quality Street, I’m fairly certain the BFG isn’t uppermost in our minds either, however cuddly he might be.</p><p><em>But are we asking the wrong question?</em></p><p>Kevin the Carrot isn’t going to persuade us that we suddenly need Christmas dinner. We were going to buy that anyway. Perhaps Aldi and the rest simply want to make sure we remember them when we decide where to buy it.</p><p>And there’s something rather good about this for the supermarkets. They know millions of people will be buying Christmas dinner, whether Kevin appears on television or not.</p><p>I suspect the same conversations happen in B2B businesses every day, only with less tinsel.</p><p>Marketing is making the case for another LinkedIn campaign. Somebody might see an advert today, remember the company and become a customer six months later.</p><p>Unfortunately, nobody has told the prospective customer that it’s time to buy. They might have absolutely no interest in what we’re selling. Then something changes.</p><p>A new requirement, an unexpected problem, a change in regulation or perhaps a crisis nobody saw coming.</p><p>Look at the news these past few weeks about hackers remotely interfering with supermarket refrigeration systems across Europe. Fridges and freezers had their temperatures raised, forcing retailers to remove food from sale. Now I suspect cybersecurity for refrigeration systems has suddenly become a rather more interesting subject in some boardrooms.</p><p>Not because somebody saw a clever LinkedIn advert six months ago, but because a problem that may have seemed rather theoretical became remarkably real.</p><p><strong>Which makes me wonder how often we congratulate ourselves for generating demand when we’ve actually been fortunate enough to encounter it.</strong></p><p>Which brings me back to Kevin the Carrot.</p><p>He appears every November, makes us smile and reminds us where we might buy our Christmas dinner.</p><p>But Kevin has a rather extraordinary advantage over the rest of us.</p><p>He doesn’t have to invent Christmas.</p><p>Christmas creates the demand. Kevin just has to help Aldi get its share.</p><p>In B2B, we sometimes behave as though we’ve invented Christmas.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=218f50df8cba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Bonus for Leaving That Made People Want to Stay]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/the-bonus-for-leaving-that-made-people-want-to-stay-78640678dddc?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 10:21:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-31T10:21:27.226Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mYuhvxVHwYKTn04VtuCWQg.png" /></figure><p>It’s that time of year again. Time to revisit the sales compensation plans.</p><p>We look at what’s worked, what didn’t, which hammer actually cracked the nut. Did that SPIFF encourage more sales of the product we wanted to shift? Did the accelerator persuade anyone to sell more, or did we simply pay them more for what they would have sold anyway?</p><p>A lot of effort goes into commission plan design. In effect, we’re sculpting the carrot, adjusting its shape and size in the hope of persuading salespeople to do what we want them to do. Or at least attempting to get them to do what we’ve decided we wanted them to do.</p><p>I noticed a rather unusual incentive in my news feed this week. A company offering its employees a bonus to resign.</p><p>Isn’t that just a redundancy payment dressed up as something else? Or perhaps an easy way to get around the awkward business of settlement agreements?</p><p><strong>Apparently not. This was an offer to take the money and leave.</strong></p><p>It sounds like something dreamt up at a management offsite, where the intoxication of blue-sky thinking can become as contagious as an outbreak of Covid-19.</p><p>Except the interesting part isn’t what happened to the people who accepted the money. It’s what happened to those who turned it down.</p><p>Researchers from three Canadian universities, including Waterloo, examined the effect of offering employees a financial incentive to leave. Across two experiments, they found that people who rejected the offer subsequently put in more effort.</p><p><strong>Really?</strong></p><p>We normally assume that if we want somebody to stay, we should give them a reason to stay. Better pay, a promotion, perhaps a retention bonus. Here was an incentive designed to encourage the opposite behaviour, apparently producing greater commitment among those who declined it.</p><p>The researchers suggest that actively choosing to remain can strengthen someone’s commitment to that decision. Staying because nobody has offered you an alternative is one thing. Being offered money to leave, considering it and deciding you’d rather stay is quite another.</p><p>You’ve made a decision, and that decision may change how you subsequently behave. Which brings me back to those sales compensation plans.</p><p>I’ve sat through enough commission reviews to know how much attention we pay to the mechanics. Thresholds, accelerators, multipliers, product incentives, new business premiums. We can model the cost of almost any variation, down to the last percentage point.</p><p>What we’re rather less good at establishing is whether the incentive actually changed anyone’s behaviour.</p><p>Take SPIFFs, this is often the cherry on top of the carrot. We offer an additional £1,000 for every deal involving a particular product. Three months later, sales of that product have increased and it’s declared a success.</p><p>I ask myself, how many of those deals would have happened anyway? Did salespeople genuinely create additional demand, or did they simply bring forward opportunities already in the pipeline? Perhaps the product was becoming easier to sell, or customers were beginning to ask for it.</p><p>We’ve measured what we paid and what was sold. Establishing the relationship between the two is rather more difficult.</p><p>Salespeople aren’t stupid, they know where the money is, and sometimes understand the plan better than the people who designed it. They make their own call about which opportunities are worth pursuing, which deals are likely to close and where their time is best spent.</p><p>The odd extra commission percentage might encourage somebody to pursue a different product, but equally it might reward somebody who was already planning to sell it.</p><p><strong>I believe that distinction matters when we’re deciding whether to repeat the incentive next year. I’m not a commission denier.</strong></p><p>There are good commercial reasons for rewarding sales performance, and money undoubtedly influences behaviour. But we ought to be a little more cautious about assuming that because we paid for an outcome, our incentive caused it.</p><p>The Waterloo research is interesting because it challenges the direction in which we normally think incentives work. Instead of paying somebody to demonstrate commitment, the offer gives them an opportunity to make a choice, and that choice appears to influence their subsequent effort.</p><p>It doesn’t prove that we should abandon conventional incentives, and the findings come from experiments rather than years of observing sales organisations.</p><p>I think there’s something rather odd about all this. We spend an extraordinary amount of time adjusting the size and shape of the carrot in the hope of encouraging precisely the behaviour we want.</p><p>Yet there was an incentive that appeared to work because people chose not to take it.</p><p><strong>Perhaps we’ve become so preoccupied with sculpting the carrot that we’ve forgotten to ask why people want it in the first place.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=78640678dddc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[When a Salesperson Misses Quota, How Much of That Failure Belongs to the Salesperson, and How Much…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/when-a-salesperson-misses-quota-how-much-of-that-failure-belongs-to-the-salesperson-and-how-much-d331432169b6?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 08:31:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-27T08:31:27.649Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F9T67FW4UjR99hxkxQ1s0g.png" /></figure><h3><strong>When a Salesperson Misses Quota, How Much of That Failure Belongs to the Salesperson, and How Much Belongs to the People Who Set the Number?</strong></h3><p>We see it all the time. Clubs spending £100m on a footballer who was a prolific net buster at his previous club. Put him in a different shirt, with different players and a 4–2–3–1 formation, and suddenly the goals dry up.</p><p>Many quickly jump to the conclusion that he’s not worth the money. The gaffer is under pressure, the fans groan as another chance is wasted, and Roy Keane goes off on a rant.</p><p><strong>But rather less attention is paid to whether anyone is actually passing him the ball.</strong></p><p>Take Antoine Griezmann. At Atlético Madrid he scored 19 league goals in 2017–18 and another 15 the following season. Barcelona decided he was worth £107m and signed him in 2019. His first season? Nine league goals.</p><p>Barcelona already had Lionel Messi, who rather inconveniently occupied much of the space where Griezmann liked to operate. Messi was hardly going to move aside for the new boy, so Griezmann found himself playing in positions that didn’t really suit him.</p><p>Maybe it’s a bit like joining a new sales organisation with an impressive CV, only to discover that the established star already has all the best accounts.</p><p>Griezmann eventually returned to Atlético Madrid, scoring 15 league goals and providing another 16 assists in 2022–23. He was the same player, but a few years older, back to doing what he’d always been good at. Perhaps Barcelona hadn’t bought the wrong player at all. They’d simply spent £107m on someone without really working out where he was going to play.</p><p>I think the same happens in sales. CVs are full of quota attainment percentages and claims of a consistent track record. We look for those proof points, improve on the candidate’s previous on-target earnings, onboard them, hand them a territory and expect the results to follow.</p><p>Twelve months later they’ve achieved 65% of quota. The reviews begin, the sales manager is asked to investigate what’s going on, and before long someone is recommending a performance improvement plan.</p><p><strong>But did we hire the wrong person, or give them a different pitch to play on?</strong></p><p>There’s something else about quotas that I think we underestimate. Being able to say “I’ve hit my number for the last three years” carries considerable weight. There’s status in it. Ask a salesperson considering a new job what they want to know and, after the OTE, it’s usually “What’s the quota, and how many of your reps are actually hitting it?” A perfectly reasonable question.</p><p><strong>So where does this number come from?</strong></p><p>In my experience, there’s a good chance it starts at the top, long before anyone has considered what an individual rep might actually sell. Investors have expectations, the CEO has made commitments, and the CFO has worked out what the company needs to deliver. Let’s say the business needs another 15% growth, or $10m in revenue next year.</p><p>Now, there’s nothing wrong with ambition. But needing $10m and having $10m worth of business available to win are two different things.</p><p>Then there’s the cost of employing the salespeople expected to deliver this growth. To attract the calibre of person we need, we offer a $200k on-target earnings package: $100k base salary and another $100k in commission.</p><p>At $200k OTE, we expect the rep to generate $1m in incremental revenue. A fairly conventional 5:1 quota-to-OTE ratio, with commission paid at 10% of every dollar sold up to quota. It makes perfect sense on a spreadsheet. But we’ve established what the salesperson needs to sell to justify their cost, not whether there’s actually $1m of business for them to win.</p><p>We now have three different interests at play; the business needs to deliver its revenue plan, Finance needs the sales organisation to make economic sense, and the salesperson wants to earn their commission and be able to say they’ve hit quota.</p><p>It’s not surprising I have worked my way through this for 20 years. What is odd though is that we’re trying to satisfy all three with the same number, arrived at largely by the people responsible for the first two.</p><p>And there sits our salesperson, on 65% attainment. She’s worked hard and converted deals at or above the team’s average close rate. Perhaps she didn’t prospect enough or build sufficient pipeline. Both are worth investigating. So is the number she’s about to be judged against, which she had almost no say in setting.</p><p>Take five of the new business salespeople expected to contribute to that $10m growth plan. They’re selling the same product into the same industry, but in different geographical territories. All five are on $200k OTE, with a $1m annual quota and 10% commission. That’s $5m in assigned quota. Nice and neatt, and all round numbers on the spreadsheet.</p><p>From HQ, it looks like a level playing field. Same product, same pricing, same brand, same sales support. Except one territory might have twice as many potential customers as another. Competitors may be firmly established in one, while customers elsewhere are looking for an alternative. Buying habits, budgets and the appetite for change can vary considerably.</p><p>How did we decide those territories were equal? If we’ve sold into them for years, we might have something useful to work with: deals won, average deal size, opportunities needed and what individual salespeople actually achieved. But what if we’re entering a new market or simply haven’t sold enough to establish a pattern? Two decent-sized deals last year hardly constitute a statistical foundation for next year’s sales plan.</p><p>Yet by the time the budget is approved, all that uncertainty has disappeared. Five people, five identical $1m quotas, and twelve months later we compare their attainment percentages as though they’d been given an equal opportunity to succeed.</p><p><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/1520-6793%28200009%2917%3A9%3C799%3A%3AAID-MAR4%3E3.0.CO%3B2-D">Cynthia Huffman and Lisa Cain</a> looked at this in 2000. Their research found that both sales managers and salespeople considered evaluations fairer and more useful when they adjusted for territory difficulty. Which does make you wonder why we’re so happy to line up five attainment percentages, rank everyone from best to worst and call it a performance review.</p><p>Suppose one of those salespeople sold $680k last year against their $1m quota. Not a great result on paper. But perhaps the deals they closed, their average deal value and the opportunities they lost suggest $800k is a credible target for the coming year. That’s still nearly 18% growth on what they actually delivered. Hardly an invitation to work a 3 day week.</p><p>They might now look at that number and think, yes, I can hit that. Which, given everything we know about the psychology of achieving goals, is surely worth something.</p><p>Sales management has a convenient habit of assuming that if we increase someone’s target, they’ll sell more. Need another 20% revenue? Increase quotas by 20%. Job done. In a 1993 laboratory experiment, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002224379303000103">Jhinuk Chowdhury</a> found that increasing quota difficulty raised effort only up to a point. Keep pushing and effort could fall.</p><p>I’m not suggesting we make quotas easy. There’s a difference between asking someone to stretch themselves and asking them to achieve something they no longer believe is possible. One might motivate them. The other might have them quietly updating their LinkedIn profile.</p><p>Of course, there’s a rather inconvenient problem with all this. Our salesperson is still on $200k OTE with $100k of that in commission. At a $1m quota, we pay 10% on every dollar sold. Lower the quota to $800k and, assuming we keep the same variable compensation, we’re now paying 12.5%. Same product, same salesperson, but every deal has just become more expensive.</p><p>Do the same for all five and our $5m in assigned quota becomes $4m. The business hasn’t changed its revenue expectations, and the CFO is unlikely to be delighted that we’ve made the sales team more expensive while reducing what we’re asking them to deliver.</p><p>Most businesses also assign more quota than they actually expect their salespeople to deliver. It’s called overassignment. People leave, new hires take time to become productive, some salespeople are better than others, and deals have an irritating habit of slipping into next year.</p><p>So we build in a buffer. A little insurance policy against the inevitable unpredictability of running a sales organisation.</p><p>Except we’ve effectively added a tax to everyone’s quota to compensate for the uncertainty of the organisation as a whole. The good salesperson carries some of the risk of the poor one, the established rep carries some of the risk of the new hire, and everybody gets measured against a number that includes a little bit of somebody else’s problem.</p><p>Perfectly rational from the company’s perspective. Less appealing when you’re the one explaining why you’ve only achieved 75% of your number.</p><p>Consider what happens if those five salespeople carry $5m in combined quota, but the business has budgeted for $4m from them. At the end of the year, they’ve delivered $4m. The CFO is happy enough, the business has achieved 100% of its revenue budget for that team, and the board can see the plan has worked.</p><p>Meanwhile, back in the sales department, average quota attainment is 80%. Perhaps only one of the five actually hit their number. The others are having rather less enjoyable conversations about their performance, their commission cheques and what needs to change next year.</p><p>Same business, same revenue, same result. A success in the boardroom and potentially four failures in the sales team. And we designed it that way.</p><p>Overassignment isn’t necessarily wrong. We need to allow for people leaving, deals slipping and the fact that not everyone performs equally well. Nor does missing quota automatically mean someone did a good job. But if we’ve budgeted on the assumption that the team won’t reach its combined quota, we shouldn’t act astonished when that happens, or treat every miss as proof of individual failure.</p><p>Salespeople complaining about quotas is hardly a new phenomenon. I’ve yet to meet many who thought their target was too low. But there’s a difference between a challenging quota and one people believe is fundamentally unfair. In a 2026 study involving 203 salespeople, <a href="https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/amj/vol15/iss1/7/">James DeConinck</a> found that perceptions of quota fairness were associated not just with intentions to leave, but with actual turnover.</p><p>If we can’t explain how we arrived at the number, beyond saying it’s what the business needs, why should we expect the salesperson to believe it’s achievable?</p><p>There’s something about this arrangement I’ve never been entirely comfortable with. The board sets the ambition, Finance works out the economics, and sales leadership distributes the quotas. When the numbers don’t materialise, though, it’s the salesperson who’s first in the firing line. Their commission suffers, their performance is questioned and perhaps their job is on the line.</p><p>What happens to the people who decided the territory was worth $1m in the first place? Who reviews their assumptions? In my experience, rather less attention is paid to that particular performance review.</p><p>It isn’t as simple as management getting it wrong and the salesperson getting it right. The rep knows about the customer who’s just signed a three-year contract with a competitor, or the prospect who loves the product but has no budget. HQ knows about financial commitments, the cost of running the business and the promises made to investors. Neither has the complete picture.</p><p>But only one gets to turn those assumptions into an official number. Once it appears in the compensation plan, it somehow acquires the rather grand status of an objective measure of performance.</p><p>So what should we do? We can’t abandon quotas, or expect the CFO to forget about the revenue the business needs. And I’m certainly not suggesting every salesperson should negotiate their own definition of success. The sensible starting point is to put two numbers alongside each other: what the business needs to sell, and what the available evidence says its territories might deliver. In a new market that evidence may be painfully thin. We ought to be able to admit that without pretending the gap has vanished.</p><p>I’m not proposing another complicated quota-setting methodology. There are plenty of consultants who will happily sell you one of those. Four questions before we approve the compensation plans might do for a start.</p><p>What revenue does the business actually need? What do the economics of employing our salespeople require? What evidence do we have that the markets we’re asking them to sell into can support those numbers? And, perhaps most importantly, who takes responsibility when the answers don’t agree?</p><p>I don’t want to let the seller off the hook, some people are simply better at selling than others. They work harder, create opportunities others miss and negotiate better deals. That’s part of why we employ them, and why we pay commission. If someone misses quota, we should examine their execution. We should also examine what we asked them to achieve.</p><p>At the end of the year, the spreadsheet will tell us exactly who made quota and who didn’t. What it won’t tell us is whether those quotas were sensible in the first place. A rather important omission when those same numbers determine bonuses, reputations and occasionally whether someone keeps their job.</p><p>We expect salespeople to explain why they didn’t deliver what we asked for. which is fair enough.</p><p><strong>Perhaps those of us who set the number should be asked to explain why we thought they could.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d331432169b6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Just Because You Can See It, Doesn’t Mean You Need to Do Something About It.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/just-because-you-can-see-it-doesnt-mean-you-need-to-do-something-about-it-180208becf9a?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[decision-making]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2026 09:57:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-18T09:57:29.451Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mzabEQDJjtMFnesMbbpjkw.png" /></figure><p>Another deal slips from October into November. The salesperson updates the CRM. The forecast changes. The dashboard refreshes.</p><p>Somewhere, in HQ, the CFO notices that the number has gone down.</p><p>A Slack message arrives.</p><p><em>“What’s happened to this deal? It was forecast for October. The dashboard said it was coming in. What’s the salesperson doing about it?</em>”</p><p>Followed, inevitably, by another message.</p><p><em>“And what are YOU doing about it?”</em></p><p>My sales manager already knows. They’ve spoken to the rep, understand the customer’s position, their lawyer handling the negotiation has been off unexpectably for a week and so have adjusted their forecast accordingly.</p><p>But now there’s another conversation to be had, it’s top down, another internal meeting, slide decks and whataboutery questions from the distant HQ.</p><p>All because a number changed colour.</p><p>I came across an interesting article this week in the <em>LSE Business Review</em>, written by Ch. Mahmood Anwar, titled <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2026/10/12/dont-let-your-ai-dashboard-drive-your-corporate-strategy/">Don’t let your AI dashboard drive your corporate strategy</a>.</p><p>It’s worth eight minutes of your time, particularly if you work in management, operations or any function responsible for reporting business performance.</p><p>I liked it, because the premise is simple and resonates with the work we do, and the distractions caused by having so much information available to so many people.</p><p>We’ve all become exceptionally good at making information available to people. Dashboards can now show executives almost everything happening across their organisations, increasingly in real time.</p><p>And AI is making that information even more accessible. Anwar argues that this may not be entirely a good thing. He describes something called the <em>zero-latency trap</em>.</p><p>Historically, information took time to travel through a business. Managers reviewed performance, investigated problems and decided what required escalation. Senior executives received consolidated information, usually weekly, monthly or quarterly.</p><p>That delay wasn’t necessarily inefficiency. It gave people time to understand what was happening and, importantly, do something about it themselves.</p><p><strong>Now the CEO can potentially see the same information as the person doing the job.</strong></p><p>The argument is that this creates a temptation to intervene in matters that would otherwise have been handled perfectly well further down the organisation.</p><p>A temporary decline in sales becomes a problem requiring executive attention. A change in customer behaviour prompts another review. A few disappointing weeks might even trigger a change in strategy.</p><p>The author proposes something he calls <em>curated latency</em>. Essentially, being more deliberate about which information reaches different levels of management, and when.</p><p>He also suggests establishing rules about when senior management should intervene. That strikes me as more sensible than simply restricting who gets to see the information.</p><p>In the sales organisation much of our work is concerned with improving visibility. We’ve spent years connecting systems, improving data quality, building dashboards and trying to give management a more accurate picture of the business.</p><p>I can remember when producing a sales forecast involved collecting spreadsheets from different regions, consolidating them and hoping nobody had changed anything in the meantime, this was weekly at best.</p><p>Today, we can see changes almost immediately, which leads to the question as to whether we’ve given quite as much thought to what people should actually do with all that information.</p><p>A forecast is an assessment of what we believe will happen, based on what we know at a particular <strong>point in time</strong>. As new information arrives, that assessment may change.</p><p>That’s what we want, but in my experience, it’s not uncommon for a change in forecast to generate more management activity than the underlying commercial event warrants.</p><p>However, my central point is the matter of accountability. If we employ managers to run parts of the business, presumably we expect them to make decisions.</p><p>Giving everyone above them immediate visibility of every operational movement doesn’t necessarily improve those decisions. It may simply create more opportunities for somebody else to get involved.</p><p>How often have we seen that happen? A quick question to ChatGPT or Claude and suddenly the VP of People has an informed opinion on how to negotiate enterprise software contracts.</p><p>None of this means senior management should be kept in the dark. Sometimes early intervention is absolutely necessary. And I would be reluctant to recommend deliberately withholding information simply because somebody might misuse it.</p><p>I think the more useful idea in Anwar’s article is that access to information and responsibility for acting upon it are two different things.</p><p><strong>Knowing something has happened doesn’t automatically mean it’s your job to fix it.</strong></p><p>It also raises a question about the value of all the technology we’ve invested in. We can measure the accuracy of our reporting, the completeness of our data and the speed at which information becomes available. That’s all relatively straightforward.</p><p>What I think seems considerably harder to measure is whether any of it has made us better at managing.</p><p><strong>So here’s my question.</strong></p><p><strong>Has giving management more information actually improved decision-making, or have we simply made it easier for more people to get involved in decisions that were already being made?</strong></p><p><em>The article that prompted this piece is </em><a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2026/10/12/dont-let-your-ai-dashboard-drive-your-corporate-strategy/"><em>Don’t let your AI dashboard drive your corporate strategy</em></a><em>, by Ch. Mahmood Anwar, published in LSE Business Review on 12 October 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=180208becf9a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Seventeen Hours]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/seventeen-hours-cf9b633c01b8?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cf9b633c01b8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[time-management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 09:12:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-07T09:12:14.843Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EzuvAUhieMRWK9h7W-_aWA.png" /></figure><p>There are few certainties in sales. Slipped deals, late forecast submissions, and now the regularity of emails claiming to make me and my sales teams more productive with AI. Another arrived this week, with the rather specific claim that sales admin can be reduced, carving out an additional 17 hours per month.</p><p>I don’t know how they get to these figures, but with this claim added to the others, there may soon be nothing left for the seller to do.</p><p>A CEO sent me a “personalised” email offering to make my sales team more efficient. I had to stop what I was doing to read it. I love the irony in this.</p><p>The majority of our sales calls today are virtual. Teams, Zoom, Google. We operate in two dimensions, complete with the fake backgrounds that hide the laundry. Our calls are recorded; no need for handwritten notes, every word, every pause captured. Gong captures the call verbatim turns the recording into a transcript and the transcript into a summary. It identifies action points, creates tasks, looks for evidence of MEDDICC and BANT and pushes information into the CRM.</p><p>What could be better for a seller, their manager and a Revenue Operations team. Perfect information, and extremely efficient. It’s all there but actually it isn’t. It’s misses context, interpretation, previous experience. The “I’ve seen this before” bit. The value the salesperson is supposed to add.</p><p>If I left it entirely to AI, I’d get an anodyne deal note generated in two minutes, copied and pasted into the deal notes section. The salesperson could move on.</p><p><strong>Perfectly dumb.</strong></p><p>I ask them for 10 minutes to stop, think and construct a deal note that reveals their own insight their view on what the next step should be.</p><p>When I read it, I’m trying to work out whether the seller understands what’s happening. Did we learn something? Did the customer commit to anything? Has something actually moved forward?</p><p><strong>Or was it just tea and biscuits?</strong></p><p>That’s where I want the salesperson’s judgement. Not another account of what was said. I already have that. I want to know what they think it meant, what they think is missing and what they’re going to do about it.</p><p>There it is. I’m so stupid. There’s my efficiency gain.</p><p><strong>I automate the deal note.</strong></p><p>The salesperson asks AI to write it. It already has the transcript, the summary, the action points and the MEDDICC analysis. It could probably produce something rather better written than most salespeople can.</p><p>I can then ask my AI to read the AI-generated deal note and tell me whether the deal is healthy. Perhaps another AI can decide whether it belongs in the forecast.</p><p>Gong records the meeting. AI transcribes it, summarises it, scores it, creates the actions and updates the CRM. AI writes the salesperson’s interpretation of what happened. Another AI reads that interpretation for me.</p><p>We’ve become extraordinarily efficient.</p><p>There is, of course, the question of what we’re going to do with those 17 hours.</p><p>The salesperson could automate an AI sequence to send more emails. They could use AI to message another dozen people on LinkedIn. They could have another home-brewed Nespresso.</p><p>Perhaps the discipline of ten minutes writing a deal note doesn’t sound like much. That human contribution is now a remarkably thin layer. But so is the strawberry jam in a Victoria sponge. You notice when it’s missing.</p><p>The recording, transcription, summary, qualification and task creation can all be perfectly efficient. I want them to be. But that small layer of interpretation is still the bit the salesperson adds. Their context. Their experience. Their judgement about what happened and what should happen next.</p><p>Remove that as well and the process will still look immaculate.</p><p>Which brings me back to the CEO who emailed me.</p><p>His process was certainly efficient. Perhaps AI found me, researched me, composed the email and delivered it to my inbox with very little effort required from him.</p><p>I then had to read it.</p><p>That’s the peculiar thing about efficiency. Saving you time can mean creating work for somebody else.</p><p>Perhaps his salespeople have already found their 17 hours. If so, at least some of them appear to be using the time to send AI-generated emails to people like me, suggesting that my salespeople use AI to find their own 17 hours.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cf9b633c01b8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Don’t Do A Babcock]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/dont-do-a-babcock-bc749a673f59?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bc749a673f59</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rewards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2026 11:21:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-19T11:28:42.448Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aD_hb8J5inY5i26voI_z9w.png" /></figure><p>You may never have heard of <a href="https://www.babcockinternational.com/">Babcock</a>, but they do serious things in the defence sector.</p><p>At Rosyth in Scotland it works on warships and nuclear submarine programmes. The sort of engineering where presumably nobody says, “That’ll probably do.”</p><p>It also recently had an employee suggestion scheme. You know the sort, where there’s a phyiscal post box for suggestions, with a heading above it.</p><blockquote><strong>“No idea is ever a bad idea.”</strong></blockquote><p>The aim was to encourage ideas that would make the plant better or more efficient. Come up with one and you could receive a voucher. Perhaps £25, or even £50 for a cracker.</p><p>£25 might get you four or five pints of Tennent’s down at the Compass on a Friday. Or a vindaloo and bhuna at Taste of India on Admiralty Road, depending on how ambitious you are with the poppadoms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wpYhr8FZTHKihZWN5W0e9Q.png" /></figure><p>Apparently this was enough.</p><p>This week, as many as nine managers at <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/26555511.babcock-supervisors-sacked-vouchers-scheme-abuse/">Rosyth</a> have reportedly been dismissed after allegations that some managers were rewarding each other with vouchers for good ideas, sometimes, according to one source, without anything actually having been done to earn the reward.</p><p>There is something rather ironic about this.</p><p>A company capable of working on nuclear-powered submarines discovered that its management team could become interested in £25 vouchers. But did the ideas actually need to be good?</p><p>Who decided whether they were any good? Was there a limit? Two ideas a month? Could you have a good mind-fart Tuesday and submit seven?</p><p>I don’t know how Babcock actually adjudicated them, but I’d have thought somebody had to. Perhaps a newly formed Ideas Committee.</p><p>Imagine, they empty the ideas box, slips of paper fall out into a pile on the desk. The committee reads them, then decides whether each is good enough to be worth £25 or £50. It’s then logged, and the voucher is sent to the employee. At some point, probably the cost of deciding whether Nicola deserves £25 could quite easily exceed £25.</p><p>And once Nicola discovers that ideas are worth £25, what have we incentivised Nicola to do?</p><p>Have better ideas? Or have more ideas?</p><p>Back in the 1990s, I was paid an additional £5 for every gondola end or stack of Cuprinol I secured in the DIY sheds. It was a company-wide incentive, launched by the Sales Director to increase shelf space for the peak outdoor season. It was also self-administered. There were no iPhones to photograph the evidence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6DrbAI279Y3VyGu3ZAZQGg.png" /></figure><p>I actually got the tins and built the gondola ends myself, sometimes without the permission of the store manager. A pyramid of Timbercare would appear next to the garden furniture.</p><p>And it worked. Cuprinol wanted more shelf space and I wanted the extra £5. So I got them more shelf space. Nobody needed to decide whether I’d had a good gondola-end idea. The gondola end was either there or it wasn’t.</p><p>One of my favourite authors on this subject, <a href="https://www.alfiekohn.org/article/rewards-25-years-later/">Alfie Kohn,</a> has spent decades arguing that rewards can change our relationship with the thing being rewarded. People can become rather more interested in getting the reward than whatever behaviour the reward was supposed to encourage.</p><p>My £5 did exactly that.</p><p>The difference was that Cuprinol actually wanted the thing I was being paid to obtain.</p><p>What allegedly happened at Babcock may simply have been people abusing one of those schemes. My £5 at Cuprinol was nothing of the sort. But I’m still struck by the peculiar power of such small rewards.</p><p>Babcock’s own governance processes eventually identified the problem. Which means the £25 suggestion scheme ultimately required not only whatever administration sat around it, but an investigation and disciplinary process too.</p><p><strong>As many as nine managers reportedly lost their jobs over vouchers worth roughly five pints.</strong></p><p>My Sales Director wanted more Cuprinol on display. For £5, that’s exactly what he got.</p><p>Babcock’s £25 appears to have bought rather more than it bargained for.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc749a673f59" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Would You Ask the Algorithm to Optimise?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/what-would-you-ask-the-algorithm-to-optimise-b24f0ca73316?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b24f0ca73316</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 10:25:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-12T10:25:25.043Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hw3YwZo_-INS4vvdQMIu4Q.png" /></figure><h3>We have just finished setting sales quotas for the new financial year.</h3><p>It is the annual round of Revenue Operations, Finance and Sales Leadership coming together to carve up the growth number.</p><p><em>“He smashed his quota last year, so let’s give him more this year,”</em> says Finance.</p><p>Except smashing the target meant being deeply engaged in multiple customer buying journeys that eventually paid off as deals. At the same time, that seller may not have generated much meaningful opportunity for this year. Sales can be cyclical. You could almost argue that the higher quota should go to the underachiever sitting on the more mature pipeline.</p><p>Each year, the process is much the same. Sales wants bottom up. We were maxed out with last year’s numbers, we have more competition, more economic pressure and no additional features. How can we sell more?</p><p>The business needs to grow, and grow more than it did last year, so an arbitrary 15% gets baked in. The job of the meeting is how to distribute that, and a bit more, to ensure we can show internal stakeholders that the budget is covered, even though the field evidence may not be there.</p><p><strong>The mechanics of commission are simpler.</strong></p><p>Suppose a salesperson has $100,000 of variable compensation and a $1m quota. Hit $1m and they earn $100,000. Roughly speaking, each dollar of revenue pays ten cents in commission.</p><p><strong>The difficult bit is deciding whether $1m was the right number.</strong></p><p>Set the quota too low and we believe, or at least have the perception, that we are overpaying for revenue the territory might have produced anyway. Too high and the commission rate becomes less attractive, the target less believable and eventually the salesperson less interested in chasing it. Perhaps they leave.</p><p>Quota setting is somewhat arbitrary. We cannot employ hundreds of salespeople to even out every difference between territories. The economics also need to work. It cannot cost us more in commission than we earn from the revenue.</p><p>Nor can we distribute the budget perfectly across the salesforce and hope everything goes perfectly. All organisations need a layer of fat.</p><p>Then I read about two Uber drivers sitting together in Tottenham.</p><p>They were apparently offered the same journey. One was offered £27. The other, Kola Oba, was offered £23.</p><p>Oba believes Uber’s algorithm had learnt from his previous behaviour that he was more likely to accept the lower fare. Uber disputes this and says differences can arise from factors including location, surge pricing, promotions and testing.</p><p>Think about that. The distance is the same, the car is the same, the journey time is the same, but there is a £4 difference.</p><p>So, instead of the beginning-of-the-year circus, what if an algorithm could work out exactly how much it needed to pay each person to produce the behaviour the company wanted?</p><p>In sales, we already have much of the data. We know what somebody earned, their quota and what they sold last year. Perhaps AI could tell me the lowest-cost quota and commission structure required to get the most revenue from each salesperson.</p><p><strong>I would quite like to know.</strong></p><p>But hang on. You are saying you know the minimum we need to pay someone to close their deals. Surely a dollar of revenue is a dollar of revenue. Why should we pay one salesperson materially more than another to produce exactly the same thing?</p><p>Does the quota drive the performance, with the commission merely the pay-off? Or does the prospect of earning that $100,000 drive the performance, regardless of where we set the quota?</p><p>After another year of spreadsheets, judgement and horse trading, I’m not entirely sure we know.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b24f0ca73316" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Sales Prevention Department]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/the-sales-prevention-department-63d21134ba2e?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63d21134ba2e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 29 Aug 2026 08:29:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-29T08:30:35.520Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kzzZGg1Q3CZXa3ctDOtoFQ.png" /></figure><p>The Business Justification ended with an unusual sentence.</p><p><em>“I plead you to approve this discount.”</em></p><p>The wording before it was familiar enough. The customer was described as a strategic logo in an important market, with significant land-and-expand potential. The opportunity was highly competitive and the customer would be referenceable. Winning it would help establish us in the sector. The discount was apparently the only remaining obstacle to signature.</p><p>Almost every desirable expression in the sales playbook was present, the the evidence was less conspicuous.</p><p>Every Special Bid request contained a form called the Business Justification. By the final sentence, this one had become personal.</p><p>At the time, we had almost sixty salespeople in Europe. Each had a quota, a quarterly target and an on-target earning opportunity. The incentive was reasonably clear: close the deals, hit the quarter, earn the commission. <strong>Job done.</strong></p><p>Special bid volume was going up and discount requests were increasing. Demands for additional product features were becoming more common, and customers challenged legal terms that had previously seemed generous.</p><p>Most of this should not have been necessary.</p><p>We had a list price and agreed discounts for partners, and Legal had produced standard terms and conditions that were not onerous. Product believed the software already did what customers needed it to do, and marketing regarded the leads as hot.</p><p><strong>The instruction to Sales was simple: “sell what was on the truck!”</strong></p><p>Yet almost every day, somebody returned to the garage carrying a list of modifications. A different price. An additional feature. A small change to the legal terms. Often all three. Each request was exceptional in its own right. With almost sixty salespeople, we were developing an impressive number of exceptions.</p><p>Initially, there was no formal route for handling them. Requests travelled through back channels and personal relationships. A salesperson who could not persuade the customer to accept the standard offer would begin persuading the company to change it.</p><p>We had hired sixty people to sell to customers. Without quite intending to, we had also encouraged them to sell their deals to us.</p><p>So we created a Deal Desk.</p><p>Salespeople completed the Business Justification in Salesforce.com. They explained why the customer’s value, name or strategic importance warranted the requested discount, feature or change to the contract. The form was routed to a deal manager, who assessed the request and made a recommendation.</p><p>For the first time, all the exceptions passed through a central point. The deal manager could compare the proposed discount with what similar customers had paid. An essential new feature could be compared with the other essential new features requested that month. A harmless amendment to the contract could be recognised as the same harmless amendment Legal had rejected the previous week.</p><p><strong>Sales saw one exception. The Deal Desk saw the pattern.</strong></p><p>On one request, the deal manager pushed back. We had sold comparable deals at the existing discount, so there was no evident reason to sell this one for less. Sales disagreed. This was not merely another customer. It was a must-win, blue-chip, flagship client. Winning it would establish credibility, create further opportunities and help the region hit its number.</p><p>“Must-win”, “blue-chip” and “flagship” did not explain why the customer required a larger discount. They explained how badly we wanted the customer.</p><p>The Deal Desk had asked why the customer should pay less. Sales answered by explaining why we should want the customer more. These were different questions, although the second was considerably easier to answer.</p><p>The salesperson had not ignored the Deal Desk. They had paid close attention to its forms, its approval thresholds and its escalation routes. What they had paid less attention to was the possibility that the deal manager might be right.</p><p>The deal manager recommended against the request. The salesperson was unhappy and escalated to management.</p><p>Sales management now faced the same predicament as the seller. They had their own targets and quarterly commitments. They could override the recommendation, although this also required the approval of the Vice President of Finance.</p><p>Often, the exception was approved.</p><p>Revenue had one considerable advantage over pricing discipline. It had a customer name, an opportunity value and a quarter attached to it. The future effects of another exception were more anonymous.</p><p>As the written justifications became weaker, the scrutiny increased. Greater scrutiny produced more frustration, more escalations and occasional histrionics. Eventually, the Deal Desk acquired another name: the Sales Prevention Department.</p><p>This was an impressive accusation. The deal manager was supposedly denying the company revenue which the customer had not yet agreed to provide.</p><p>The Deal Desk could only make a recommendation. Sales management could override it. Finance could approve the override. The customer could still decline to buy.</p><p>Yet the person with the remarkable power to prevent the revenue was apparently the deal manager.</p><p>The same friction still appears in plenty of businesses. I was thinking about why it persists when I came across <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1905792/full">a study by Rosa Hendijani and Piers Steel</a> into choice, reward and motivation.</p><p>The researchers gave 270 people a demanding memory test. Some were rewarded for performing well. They spent longer on the test and answered more questions correctly.</p><p>So far, so good.</p><p>But the eye tracking showed something else. Participants looked more closely at information connected to the reward. The reward was not simply increasing their effort. It was changing what stood out.</p><p>The memory test had right answers but a sales opportunity does not.</p><p>There is no answer sheet showing whether the customer would have paid the existing price, whether the missing feature was genuinely essential or whether the concession made any difference to the eventual decision.</p><p>The researchers had not studied salespeople or deal desks, perhaps because neither is especially easy to reproduce under laboratory conditions. But having worked on both sides of the fence, I can see the effect.</p><p><strong><em>A reward could make the reasons for approving an exception easier to see than the reasons for refusing one.</em></strong></p><p>No dishonesty was required. The named customer, the value of the opportunity and the remaining gap to target became exceptionally vivid. Development cost, lost margin and contractual precedent remained in the background, belonging to other teams and often to a later quarter.</p><p>Similar customers had bought at the current price. The requested feature might have little value beyond this opportunity. The legal amendment would still exist long after the salesperson had been paid.</p><p>The business needed salespeople to pursue large customers, tolerate rejection and find ways through obstacles. A perfectly dispassionate salesperson might protect the company from every bad deal and a good number of the valuable ones.</p><p>Some discounts are commercially intelligent. Contractual terms sometimes need changing. Product managers occasionally discover that the software does not, in fact, do everything a customer needs.</p><p>A Deal Desk which rejected every exception would deserve its unofficial name.</p><p>Somebody still needed the authority to override the Deal Desk’s recommendation. The difficulty was that the deals carrying the greatest reward were also those around which the safeguards became most negotiable. “We need this deal” could gradually replace “this is a good deal”, although the two sentences meant quite different things.</p><p>The CEO wanted the revenue as much as anybody. But he could not reasonably ask people carrying quotas to be the sole commercial judges of what the company should concede to help them reach those quotas.</p><p>The Deal Desk supplied another field of vision. Its managers could see across customers, territories and quarters. They were not immune from bias. A team charged with protecting margin can become excessively fond of margin.</p><p>The arrangement worked, which did little for its popularity. Margins improved, some plainly foolish deals were stopped, and requests which had once travelled through personal relationships were exposed to consistent scrutiny.</p><p>Often, the company approved the exception anyway. Sometimes that was almost certainly the correct decision. A business cannot protect its margins by refusing to sell anything.</p><p>The Sales Prevention Department rarely prevented a sale. It merely expected the Business Justification to contain a justification.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63d21134ba2e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Everything Is Green]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/everything-is-green-4da6a2b37023?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4da6a2b37023</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cold-calling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 08:12:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-22T08:12:08.444Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GjjckB4MItG--0qJbrdndQ.png" /></figure><p>Sometime in the mid-1990s, I spent a considerable amount of time walking around The City of London collecting compliment slips from office buildings.</p><p>I was selling telecommunications, phone lines. Our sales manager had decided that we needed 100 cold calls and five new-business meetings every week. This created the rather obvious problem that, before you could cold call somebody, you needed to know who they were.</p><p><strong>So we walked the streets.</strong></p><p>In those days you could wander into an office building without being photographed, scanned or asked to explain yourself to somebody in a security control room. I would walk up to reception, have a chat and cheekily ask if I could see the office manager.</p><p>Occasionally, I could. More often, the receptionist would give me their name. I would take one of the company’s compliment slips from the desk, write the name on it and leave. By Friday our desks had acquired piles of corporate stationery, each bearing the name of somebody who had successfully avoided meeting us.</p><p>There was something a bit <em>Glengarry Glen Ross</em> about the whole thing. Except instead of Alec Baldwin guarding the good leads, our evidence of endeavour came on little pieces of company stationery.</p><p>The slips mattered. They proved we had been out. They gave us names to call. Some of those calls became meetings and some of those meetings became customers. The system wasn’t entirely stupid. Far from it.</p><p>But the stack of slips also did something else. It made work visible.</p><p>Managers cannot make customers buy things. This is an unfortunate limitation of sales management which, despite considerable technological progress, nobody has yet managed to solve. When we cannot control an outcome, we develop an understandable fascination with the things we can count.</p><p>Our manager could not make somebody buy a phone line. He could make us make 50 calls.</p><p>And so we did.</p><p>I thought about those compliment slips recently after reading about an office in India where a manager had reportedly become concerned about productivity. His solution was unusual. Employees were told they could no longer leave the office during their lunch break.</p><p>One employee questioned the rule. He checked his employment contract and asked whether the manager actually had the authority to impose it. Apparently he didn’t, and the rule was withdrawn.</p><p>It is the sort of story that is easy to read, laugh at and think that would never happen here. Preventing people from leaving the building during the period in which they aren’t actually working does seem an eccentric way of increasing productivity.</p><p>Then I remembered the compliment slips. The two situations are hardly equivalent. What bothered me was the familiarity of the instinct behind them.</p><p>Thirty years passed and sales became considerably more sophisticated, or at least the machinery around it did. Cold-call sheets disappeared. Receptionists were replaced by security guards who stopped cheerful salespeople wandering upstairs looking for the office manager.</p><p>CRM was already around, of course. At first it was essentially a database. A place to keep the names, companies, phone numbers and opportunities that had previously lived in notebooks, Rolodexes and, in my case, small drifts of compliment slips.</p><p>Then something changed. CRM stopped merely recording the work and increasingly became evidence that the work had happened. Sales had acquired its own version of Strava.</p><blockquote><em>If it wasn’t in the CRM, it didn’t happen.</em></blockquote><p>And once everything was in there, we could measure everything: calls, emails, meetings, opportunities and pipeline. We built dashboards showing activity against KPIs and sat in meetings admiring reassuring green dials.I have sat in those meetings when virtually every dial was pointing in the right direction. Growth wasn’t.</p><p>This ought to have troubled us more than it did. Instead, we often concluded that we needed more activity. If 50 calls weren’t producing enough pipeline, perhaps the answer was 100. If five meetings weren’t enough, perhaps we needed ten.</p><p>Activity matters. Salespeople who never speak to customers rarely enjoy distinguished careers in sales. The trouble starts when the evidence that work is happening quietly becomes the work itself.</p><p>We wanted growth, which meant we needed more pipeline. More pipeline meant more conversations, and more conversations probably meant more calls. So we measured the calls. Nothing unreasonable had happened. Nobody had made an obviously foolish decision. Yet somewhere along that perfectly sensible chain, making the calls had become evidence that we were productive.</p><p>AI has now made this logic slightly awkward. If 100 cold calls demonstrate productivity, an AI agent capable of making 1,000 must presumably be ten times as productive. And if emails are evidence of endeavour, it can produce those in quantities that would have delighted my old sales manager. We could, if we wished, construct the greenest sales dashboard in corporate history. A magnificent display of commercial endeavour, marred only by the continued absence of any additional commerce.</p><p>Thirty years of sales technology later, there is something faintly dispiriting about discovering that we may have constructed the world’s most sophisticated compliment-slip counter.</p><p>I understand why managers do this because I have been on both sides of it. I’ve worked under activity targets, imposed them myself and subsequently built the dashboards that made them considerably easier to admire. When results are uncertain, issuing instructions has the reassuring sensation of management. Allowing people to exercise their judgement and waiting to see what happens can feel suspiciously like doing nothing.</p><p>We employ salespeople partly for their judgement. Customers are complicated, buying processes are unpredictable and circumstances differ. Yet the more nervous we become about the outcome, the less judgement we seem prepared to tolerate. We prescribe 50 calls, five meetings, twenty new contacts and an immaculate CRM, then take some comfort when the dials turn green.</p><p>By this point, the Indian lunch-break rule starts to look slightly less exotic. Preventing employees from leaving the building is plainly more intrusive than asking a salesperson to make 50 calls, but the instinct has an uncomfortable familiarity. Faced with something we cannot control, we reach for something we can.</p><p>The story became rather less amusing once I recognised the instinct behind it. Nobody starts by banning lunch. You start with something perfectly reasonable, such as 50 calls a week. The interesting question is how many perfectly reasonable steps it takes before autonomy has quietly become compliance.</p><p>AI makes the question harder to avoid because activity is becoming almost limitless. Machines can make the calls, send the emails and generate reassuring numbers at a scale that a salesperson wandering around the City of London with a pocketful of compliment slips could scarcely have imagined.</p><p>Thirty years ago, the evidence of productivity sat in piles on our desks. Today it glows green on a dashboard. We have become extraordinarily good at counting the activity. <strong>Whether we have become any better at knowing which activity matters is rather less obvious.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4da6a2b37023" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Who is allowed to be right?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SalesMatters/who-is-allowed-to-be-right-9abdca452729?source=rss-1608dbb82cf6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9abdca452729</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Philip Hesketh ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 15 Aug 2026 09:33:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-19T09:12:14.597Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q1I2wJdIhE1qZMWrBqb4Wg.png" /></figure><p>The Monday 0900 forecast call had been going for forty minutes when some bright spark who must have had an extra shot of espresso for breakfast asked a surprisingly difficult question.</p><p><em>“Who actually decides whether this is a Commit?”</em></p><p>The salesperson had already decided that it was. The sales manager was less certain. Revenue Operations had spotted that several of the things normally associated with a deal closing were conspicuously absent. The CRM, meanwhile, remained admirably neutral. It simply displayed whatever the last person had typed into it, which generally wasn’t much.</p><p>Everyone had an opinion. What wasn’t entirely clear was who had the authority to turn an opinion into fact.</p><p>This is rather odd when you think about it.</p><p>Modern organisations are obsessed with structure. We have job descriptions, reporting lines, territories, departments, approval matrices and organisational charts capable of explaining precisely who reports to whom. Move one salesperson from Germany to France and several systems may need updating.</p><p>Yet ask who is allowed to decide that £100k of revenue will arrive next month and things become surprisingly informal.</p><p>Doom scrolling on LinkedIn I spotted a piece called; “Organisational design for AI-native companies”. It caught my eye, the subject sounds futuristic, but one of the ideas was back to the 1990’s.</p><p><strong><em>Organisations can be fluid about how work gets done, provided they are rigid about who has the authority to decide, record and change things.</em></strong></p><p>Many businesses seem to have achieved precisely the opposite. We have made the organisation rigid and the decisions fluid.</p><p>Sales owns the opportunity, Finance the number and RevOps the process. The manager owns the forecast and the CRO, eventually, the quarter. Everyone owns something, which is often another way of saying nobody quite owns the moment at which hope becomes organisational truth.</p><p>The same ambiguity appears around pricing exceptions, hiring decisions, product priorities and whether a customer is genuinely at risk. Meetings fill with people precisely because authority is unclear. More attendees create more opinions, which creates another meeting to achieve “alignment”.</p><p>We normally call this collaboration. Sometimes it is. Sometimes it is simply ambiguity with a calendar invitation.</p><p>Attempts to make organisations more agile can have a peculiar result. We remove rules about how people should work without becoming any clearer about who gets to decide. The bureaucracy doesn’t disappear. It reappears as negotiation, with every important decision threatening to become a small internal crisis.</p><p>AI-native organisations are generally imagined with fewer boundaries, more autonomous teams and greater flexibility. It probably does. But freedom in execution may depend on something that sounds distinctly unfashionable: much clearer authority underneath it.</p><p>There is something peculiar about an organisation that can tell you precisely who reports to whom, what their job title is and which cost centre pays their salary, yet cannot tell you who is allowed to say whether £100k deal is actually going to arrive this month.</p><p>And if nobody quite knows who is allowed to decide that, perhaps the problem with the forecast was never really the forecast.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9abdca452729" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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