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            <title><![CDATA[Convincing China to support civilian government in Myanmar]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/convincing-china-to-support-civilian-government-in-myanmar-97c5e0866aba?source=rss-5475155d9b36------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[whatshappeninginmyanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar-coup]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[M2]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Apr 2021 15:36:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-22T12:55:34.972Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Myanmar Coup 2021</h4><h4>Myanmar-China relations [Part 2]</h4><p><em>Preface: I share these thoughts in the hopes of generating ideas and discussion to help forge an achievable path to freedom for my friends, colleagues and the people of Myanmar.</em></p><p>In <a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/why-china-cares-about-myanmar-90c94a193087">[Part 1: Why China cares about Myanmar]</a>, I shared some of the reasons why Myanmar is important to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).</p><p>As a result, the CCP wants sustained stability in Myanmar as well as openness to Chinese trade and investments.</p><p>Given this desire, might it be possible to sway the CCP into support for a true civilian government in Myanmar?</p><p>So far, the CCP has characteristically not openly taken sides in the “internal affairs” of Myanmar.</p><p>One to keep its options open, China has long maintained relationships with many of the ethnic groups on its borders and, in recent weeks, even made contact with the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a parallel civilian government of Myanmar in exile.</p><p>Nevertheless, by providing cover at the UN, for example, China’s actions indicate that it sees the Tatmadaw as their most likely counterpart in Myanmar for the coming years, if not decades.</p><p>To convince them otherwise, an alternative needs to show the CCP that:</p><ul><li>They are a more <strong>reliable counterparty</strong> than the Tatmadaw;</li><li>They can <strong>establish sustained stability</strong> but the Tatmadaw cannot;</li><li>Their administration would be <strong>better for Chinese trade and investment</strong> than the Tatmadaw’s.</li></ul><p>This will not be easy. Building up a viable alternative will take time, incredible leadership, savvy diplomacy, and luck.</p><pre><strong>TABLE OF CONTENTS<br>- Why China is pivotal</strong></pre><pre><strong>- Context: Recent Myanmar-China relations</strong></pre><pre><strong>- The Tatmadaw &quot;value proposition&quot;</strong></pre><pre><strong>- What does an Alternative look like?</strong></pre><pre><strong>- Building up an Alternative</strong></pre><pre><strong>- Annex: What about the US?</strong></pre><h4>Why China is pivotal</h4><p>What makes China pivotal is its ability to influence the internal affairs of Myanmar.</p><p>Whilst the CCP may not openly denounce the Tatmadaw or support an alternative, China can apply pressure in discreet ways. A few example levers:</p><ul><li><strong>Money:</strong> China provides Myanmar with a large portion of its foreign currency, even more so right now given the overall slump in trade, investments and aid. As the buyer for many of Myanmar’s lucrative exports such as oil and gas, and jade, China can interrupt these cash flows. This would be much more impactful than US or EU sanctions, which can be worked around.</li><li><strong>EAOs:</strong> Though the politics are complex and the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) are not subordinate, China does have relationships with many them. China is often their main trading partner, whether proper or illicit. These EAOs may not be able to defeat the Tatmadaw, but they can certainly cause difficulties.</li><li><strong>Other countries:</strong> Many countries will take cues from China’s lead, even more so with a little prodding from China. That could leave only Russia supporting the Tatmadaw and that from pretty far away.</li></ul><p>With its interest in Myanmar and the levers it can pull, China plays a far more significant role than any other actor including Thailand, the broader ASEAN, or the US.</p><p>Hence any alternative to the Tatmadaw must take into account China’s position and actively engage the CCP.</p><h4>Context: Recent Myanmar-China relations</h4><p>Since Myanmar’s independence (1948) and the formation of the People’s Republic of China (1949), China-Myanmar relations have seen ups and downs, evolving as the CCP, the Myanmar junta, their internal situations and the global context have changed.</p><p>Relationship lows such as China’s prolonged support for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and anti-Chinese riots of 1967 contrast with late 80s solidarity over 8888 and Tiananmen Square.</p><p>From the late 80s through the 2000s, the junta had few other friends and relations with China were generally positive. Arms and major investments flowed from China into Myanmar. Perhaps <a href="https://www.ibtimes.com/myanmar-fdi-china-accounts-one-third-foreign-investment-myanmar-14-billion-1446282">a third of all foreign investment during this period was from China</a>.</p><p>Cracks started to appear in the late 00s and continued to grow with Myanmar’s transition to civilian government and opening up (e.g. Myitsone suspension). China’s ongoing support for EAOs has been a point of frustration for the Tatmadaw, but perhaps offset by cover for the Rohingya campaign.</p><p>Relations over the last few years have been cordial. China may have been frustrated at the slow pace of economic progress under the NLD government, but there was stability and perceived predictability. Xi Jinping even made a personal visit in January 2020. The ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) was happy to take their time, balancing both Chinese and Western interests.</p><p>Right now, China cannot be happy with the chaos.</p><h4>The Tatmadaw “value proposition”</h4><p>Looking ahead, from the CCP perspective, the Tatmadaw seems a solid bet.</p><p>They have established relationships and experience working together. The Tatmadaw appears to be a stable institution with strong leadership and agreements made today are likely to hold in a decade’s time.</p><p>Here are two dimensions along which the CCP might assess the Tatmadaw:</p><ul><li><strong>Credentials </strong>—the overall reliability of the Tatmadaw</li><li><strong>Key issues </strong>— position on key issues: stability, broken out into public order and the domestic peace process; and trade and investment.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/1*gtHV0Chvu54Dt5ZSSuMEqg.png" /></figure><p>Let’s take a look at the first pillar, credentials:</p><pre>Note that in this initial exercise we are purposefully considering the Tatmadaw favourably — later, we’ll spin it the other way.</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*hkw0STSLkixn7GXD8gCo5g.png" /></figure><p>Next, let’s take a look at the key issues the CCP is most concerned about:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/617/1*NNqf4MrfH7atHwzwUxh0WA.png" /></figure><p>With this spin, the Tatmadaw’s credentials and track record might look pretty decent to the CCP. In fact, no-one else can really demonstrate a track record since the Tatmadaw have been in power almost the entire time since independence.</p><p>For now, don’t expect the CCP to pick sides, but allow the turmoil to play out. Yet, if they were to pick, picking anyone other than the Tatmadaw would be like picking an idea-stage startup over a flawed but enduring incumbent.</p><p>Any serious challenger needs to develop their value proposition, whilst casting doubt on the Tatmadaw’s.</p><pre>Note that other countries will also be doing similar calculations.</pre><pre>Thailand has similar considerations to China such as their significant gas interests as well as concerns over border areas.</pre><pre>Other countries (and business cronies) will also be considering credentials, though their specific concerns may be vary.</pre><h4>What does an Alternative look like?</h4><p>An Alternative that gets China’s attention needs to show that:</p><ul><li>They are a more <strong>reliable counterparty</strong> than the Tatmadaw;</li><li>They can <strong>establish sustained stability</strong> but the Tatmadaw cannot;</li><li>Their administration would be <strong>better for Chinese trade and investment</strong> than the Tatmadaw’s.</li></ul><p>With each element, there’s a two pronged effort:</p><ol><li>Discredit the Tatmadaw; plus</li><li>Promote the Alternative.</li></ol><p>Let’s retry the 2 exercises above. First, the “credentials”:</p><pre>Note this is one potential version of an Alternative. Try coming up with your own version(s) too.</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*cb36vqYKOsxfkbvyUdt_gA.png" /></figure><p>Then, for the two key issues:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/617/1*iDfLdZPwjW4IvgUS11E94g.png" /></figure><p>Overall, an Alternative needs to show that it has a thoughtful and coherent strategy, that it has the ability to plan and execute, that it has stable and well-respected leadership team, that it has deep roots and staying power, and more.</p><p>Since you cannot simply come up with credentials and a track record, it will take time, effort and luck to build up an Alternative that has a real chance.</p><h4>Building up an Alternative</h4><p>There’s a whole lot of chicken and egg: track record, credibility, international recognition, resources, influence.</p><p>Below are some ideas for building up an Alternative, all of which are already being pursued in some form or another.</p><p>An Alternative, such as the National Unity Government (NUG), will need to bring these different elements together.</p><ul><li><strong>Build a broad coalition of support:</strong> The Alternative will need to have the right to represent and speak on behalf a broad population, at least on a subset of matters. This means bringing together, for example, the Bamar public, various ethnic groups, Buddhist sangha, civil servants, medical workers, and youth, as well as working with existing (sometimes overlapping) groups such as the General Strike Committee of Nationalities (GSCN).</li><li><strong>Control public order:</strong> The Alternative will need to bring the above support to bear and demonstrate that it has (at least some) control over public order, whether through the coordination of protests and strikes, management of the economy or other actions. In doing so, they can also highlight how the Tatmadaw does not have control.</li><li><strong>Make progress on peace with ethnic groups: </strong>Perhaps the biggest challenge of all. Getting most, if not all, of the ethnic groups on board would really make the Alternative stand out against the Tatmadaw. Winning the support of the members of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), all of whom did not sign the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement and most of whom sit on China’s borders, will be especially powerful. The United Wa State Party (UWSP) in particular would be a big win given it has perhaps the largest and best-equipped forces, is an arms supplier to other groups, is a major tin supplier to China and has tended to keep to itself.</li><li><strong>Share a clear manifesto:</strong> Given the difficulty of implementing policy without being in power, developing and sharing a comprehensive set of proposed policies, particularly with regards to the economy and China, will be important in providing confidence to the CCP.</li><li><strong>Weaken the Tatmadaw:</strong> As shared in my previous articles, apply pressure to the Tatmadaw, and urge and facilitate defections. Boycott and peacefully disrupt military businesses, oil and gas, and mining sectors. The last thing the CCP wants is a paralysed state next door.</li><li><strong>Communicate, communicate, communicate:</strong> Whether it’s to inspire, motivate and align forces domestically, or to rally support from overseas, communication will be key. A good media “game” will be instrumental to win confidence, maintain morale and counter Tatmadaw propaganada.</li><li><strong>Get an international friend:</strong> Start with one. Whilst many countries may not openly support the Alternative, it’s critical that contact be made (in secret) if not already done so. Then get one to express support publicly. Perhaps someone with less at stake in Southeast Asia such as one of the Scandinavian states or even The Gambia, which brought the Rohingya genocide case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Savvy diplomacy will be required all around.</li></ul><p>If the Alternative can bring together some of the above then the CCP (and other countries) will start to have reasons to believe that supporting the Alternative might be fruitful.</p><p>Building up an Alternative that can lead domestically, garner international support and shift the CCP’s position in the face of a ruthless Tatmadaw will be tough.</p><p>On top of that, even with all of the above it won’t necessarily mean the Tatmadaw will simply step back. They’ll need an exit.</p><p>It will take hard work and a tough spirit. But there’s no lack of that.</p><p>There’ll be ups and downs, successes and setbacks.</p><p>It will take incredible leadership.</p><p>It may even require a once-in-a-generation type of leader.</p><p>And definitely some luck. But they say you create your own luck.</p><pre><strong>Annex: What about the US?</strong></pre><pre>Simplistically, the US should care about Myanmar, because China cares about Myanmar.</pre><pre>Perversely, from a strategic point of view, the US may not be fully unhappy with the current situation. With little economic interest in Myanmar, a paralysed Myanmar means China is unable to achieve its strategic and economic goals. Anti-Chinese sentiment and even open conflict on China&#39;s borders won&#39;t be seen as all bad by the US.</pre><pre>However, whilst this may be advantageous in the short-term, if the US aim is to contain China, then a civilian government in Myanmar would be greatly preferable to the Tatmadaw in the longer term.</pre><pre>China is blocked in to the East by the first island chain. A pro-US or at least a balanced government in Myanmar would constrain China to the Southwest.</pre><pre>Whilst the US doesn&#39;t have the same extent of levers to pressure that Tatmadaw as China, it also has much less at stake. In fact, given the Tatmadaw already expect condemnation from the US, US support for an Alternative civilian government wouldn&#39;t be so drastic a step.</pre><pre>There is some strategic calculus, however, as any move by the US may invoke an opposite reaction from China, thus pushing China towards the Tatmadaw further.</pre><pre>If you&#39;re an optimist, then there is that dream scenario, where the US and China (and ASEAN) work together(!) to bring about peace in Myanmar since it is both of their best interests. Diplomacy at its best.</pre><pre>Unfortunately, the US is pretty allergic to the Mekong region given its past experiences - multiple failures and losses - so don&#39;t expect too much. Moreover, regardless of the US, China&#39;s position is far more consequential.</pre><p><em>As with my previous articles, I have made many assumptions and sweeping statements as well as skipped details. I am also sure there are many complexities and nuances that I have missed. I hope readers will share their candid thoughts to generate further discussion, ideas and awareness.</em></p><pre><em>Thank you to the people who provided thoughtful input.</em></pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=97c5e0866aba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why China cares about Myanmar]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/why-china-cares-about-myanmar-90c94a193087?source=rss-5475155d9b36------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[myanmar-coup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[whatshappeninginmyanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2021-myanmar-coup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[M2]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Apr 2021 05:24:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-18T13:56:53.622Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Myanmar Coup 2021</h4><h4>Myanmar-China relations [Part 1]</h4><p><em>Preface: I share these thoughts in the hopes of generating ideas and discussion to help forge an achievable path to freedom for my friends, colleagues and the people of Myanmar.</em></p><pre><strong>TABLE OF CONTENTS<br>- Context: China&#39;s focus is China</strong></pre><pre><strong>- Why China cares about Myanmar<br></strong>-- Energy: Oil and gas<br>-- Yunnan development<br>-- Key materials</pre><p>Myanmar plays a strategic role in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) long term vision for itself and the world.</p><p>Whilst this doesn’t mean Myanmar is indispensable, it does mean that China is keen to keep Myanmar stable and to be on good terms with whoever is in power.</p><p>The CCP does not particularly care about the Tatmadaw. If the Tatmadaw can help them achieve their goals, great. If not, then they’d work with someone else.</p><p>This means that it may be possible to flip China from tacit acceptance of the military regime in Myanmar to active preference for a civilian leadership.</p><p>Imagine China condemning the actions of the Tatmadaw — perhaps not the coup but the killing of innocent civilians. Imagine China quietly applying pressure on the Tatmadaw to withdraw.</p><p>Impossible? Perhaps not as impossible as we may initially think.</p><p>Below we explore some of the reasons why China cares about Myanmar. In <a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/convincing-china-to-support-civilian-government-in-myanmar-97c5e0866aba">[Part 2: Convincing China to support civilian government]</a>, we explore how China might be convinced to play a positive role.</p><pre>I cannot pretend to understand all the nuances, so I share these thoughts to stimulate ideas and discussion.</pre><pre>Note the Tatmadaw is an insular institution and pressure from China will not necessarily cause them to withdraw. There needs to be an exit path as described in <a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-forging-a-path-to-freedom-ffcb317757d">&quot;What are the exit paths for the Tatmadaw?&quot;</a>.</pre><h4>Context: China’s focus is China</h4><p>Maintaining stability at home across a diverse population of 1.4B is no easy task. A long history of different dynasties, expanding and contracting, unifying and fragmenting, shows that “China” isn’t an easy place to manage.</p><p>Today, stability means economic growth to keep people employed and hopeful for a better future, whilst managing an increasing debt pile, an aging population and imbalances across provinces.</p><p>Feeding, housing, entertaining, and employing 1.4B people necessarily means reaching across the world for energy, raw materials, consumption goods as well as export markets.</p><p>This need to secure resources and markets inevitably leads to disputes. Especially so as at sea China is boxed in by Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Borneo, and Vietnam. On land, China has 14 neighbours to manage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*3jFs9mMa1XcAcfrztSH-3g.png" /></figure><p>Trying to maximise the territorial area for finding natural resources leads to quarrels such as the “nine-dash line”. Building new trade routes and trading partners through the sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), helps China expand its options and diversify risk, but can face suspicion especially with ill-thought-out execution.</p><p>Yet, whilst these actions may make China appear expansionist, it is at its core mostly just trying to keep itself together.</p><p>As the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer, maintaining stability at home ultimately requires stability abroad.</p><p>The US-China trade war and Covid-19 would have reiterated this.</p><p>Whilst looking to become more self-reliant through its “dual circulation” policy, China is more keen than ever on alternatives to the current US sponsored trade system.</p><p>This means that Myanmar is as important as ever.</p><h4>Why China cares about Myanmar</h4><p>There are a number of areas that particularly matter to China:</p><ul><li>Energy — oil and gas</li><li>Yunnan development</li><li>Key materials—tin and rare earths</li><li>Indian Ocean access</li><li>Border area stability</li></ul><pre><strong>Energy: </strong>China is energy hungry and wants Myanmar’s natural gas as well as to pipe oil from the Middle East and Africa through Myanmar. <em>[Expanded below]</em></pre><pre><strong>Yunnan development:</strong> Though Myanmar accounts for a tiny portion of China’s overall trade, it makes up a sizeable portion of Yunnan province’s trade.</pre><pre>China’s South Western provinces are poorer than the coastal provinces, hence any way to help the Southwest develop is welcome. <em>[Expanded below]</em></pre><pre><strong>Key materials: </strong>Myanmar is a key supplier of a few key raw materials such as tin and rare earths, and other goods such as jade.<em>[Expanded below]</em></pre><pre><strong>Indian Ocean access: </strong>Encircled on the East by US allies, Myanmar provides an outlet to the Southwest.</pre><pre>Through Myanmar, China can access the large markets of Bangladesh and India as well as beyond via the Indian Ocean.</pre><pre><strong>Border area stability:</strong> On and off conflict in Myanmar has occasionally spilled over onto Chinese territory as well as displaced tens of thousands, many of whom have sought refuge in China.</pre><pre>China is well connected with many of the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), but cares more about stability than the specific demands and rights of the participants.</pre><p>If only one image could be used to show Myanmar’s relevance to China then it is this one.</p><figure><img alt="Map showing trade route through Myanmar as opposed to via the Malacca Straits and South China Sea" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*s-XWi9eVWxBitTu-wbRGfg.png" /></figure><p>Myanmar can help China bypass the congested and less than friendly Malacca Straits and South China Sea. In addition, it gets trade directly into its relatively poorer Southwest provinces.</p><p>The Myanmar route will by no means replace the longer sea route to China’s populous and richer coastal belt, but it provides an alternative, diversifying risk.</p><h4>Energy — oil and gas</h4><p>China has an energy problem.</p><figure><img alt="Charts showing China’s energy consumption increasing faster than domestic production, meaning more imports will be required" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*vX9lZl8q5qt7JWcitex8qA.png" /></figure><p>China is making wide ranging investments into energy imports whether through pipelines from Russia and Central Asia, or through deals in various parts of Africa.</p><p>China is also investing heavily in renewable energy as well as attempting its own shale revolution, though the latter is hampered by the nature of its deposits. In the meantime, China remains a big user of domestic coal.</p><p><strong>Natural Gas: </strong>Myanmar has it. China wants it.</p><p>China is keen to increase natural gas’ share of its energy mix, particularly to reduce pollution from coal usage.</p><p>Pipeline gas also helps reduce China’s reliance on LNG. Two of the top global exporters of LNG, the US and Australia, aren’t exactly China’s best friends. Indeed, in 2019, as part of the trade war China imposed tariffs on US LNG causing imports from the US to fall to practically zero.</p><p>Myanmar provided about <a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN">164 Bcf of gas to China in 2019</a> via pipeline from the Shwe gas field off the coast of Rakhine state. This constituted about 3% of China’s total gas imports.</p><p>The existing pipeline has <a href="http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/myanmarcsr/201407/8de2c1f19f2c46e19fcb4afdbc05abf0/files/51ef2416408e480d9ab8d50d675354e2.pdf">420 Bcf/y capacity of which up to 20% is reserved for offloading in Myanmar</a>. Myanmar had about <a href="https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-natural-gas.pdf">41 Tcf of proven gas reserves as of 2019</a> and with plenty of exploration still to come there’s plenty of scope to scale up.</p><figure><img alt="Charts showing pipeline and LNG imports. Myanmar provided about 3% of gas imports in 2019." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*gwdN_QGrgVSACOBCOvqENA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Crude Oil:</strong> China is able to import oil from the Middle East and Africa via a Myanmar pipeline.</p><p>203,000 bpd of oil was imported via this pipeline in 2020. That makes up less than 2% of China’s oil imports, but the existing pipeline has 440,000 bpd capacity of which only about 10% is reserved for Myanmar.</p><p>Development of the Kyaukpyu deep water port and oil terminal facilities, which China is helping to build, will enable further imports.</p><p>The crude oil from the pipeline goes to CNPC’s Anning refinery where it can be refined and distributed for use in the Southwest provinces much more efficiently than imports entering from the South China Sea.</p><pre><strong>Electricity:</strong> Beyond imports of fossil fuels, Myanmar also has promise for electricity generation, in particular hydropower.</pre><pre>The controversial Myitsone dam, for example, was intended to export most of its electricity to China. Though construction was starting in the late 2000s, the Thein Sein administration halted the project in 2011.</pre><pre>Since then, Yunnan has built so much hydropower capacity that it is looking to export electricity to electricity-poor Myanmar instead.</pre><h4>Yunnan development</h4><p>China is by far Myanmar’s largest trading partner.</p><p>Based on official numbers from Myanmar’s <a href="https://www.csostat.gov.mm/Home/NSDP">Central Statistical Organization (CSO)</a>, China accounts for 1/3rd of trade (imports plus exports) which is twice the next largest, Thailand.</p><p>China data which may be more accurate (and capture more informal trade) suggests even higher trade numbers between Myanmar and China.</p><p>Meanwhile, Myanmar accounts for only <a href="http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm">0.3% of China’s trade and is not in the top 30 trading partners</a>, even with the EU counted together. This would suggest that China isn’t too concerned about Myanmar.</p><p>However, <a href="http://43.248.49.97/indexEn">trade between Myanmar and Yunnan was about $8.1B in 2020</a>, accounting for 21% of Yunnan’s foreign trade. Yunnan’s second largest foreign trade partner, Vietnam, accounted for $5.0B or 13% in comparison.</p><figure><img alt="Charts showing Myanmar trade partners and Yunnan trade partners. China is Myanmar’s top partner, while Myanmar is Yunnan’s." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*w-GcmIYjdmwOZaxeiV5bTQ.png" /></figure><p>In addition, as part of its plans to maintain stability, China is keen to develop the relatively poorer Southwestern provinces. Myanmar is an important component to this.</p><figure><img alt="Chart showing GDP per capita for China’s provinces. Southwest provinces have relatively lower GDP per capita." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/617/1*77Ms-FI-ec2o1-JMZScYgg.png" /></figure><h4>Key materials — tin and rare earths</h4><p><strong>Tin: </strong>Myanmar is the third largest producer of tin, accounting for about <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/mineral-commodity-summaries">12% of global production</a>.</p><p>China is the main destination and Myanmar accounted for <a href="https://www.internationaltin.org/china-begins-search-for-other-sources/">85% of China’s tin ores and concentrates imports</a>. This makes Myanmar a critical source of tin for China.</p><figure><img alt="Charts showing Myanmar as the third largest mine producer of tin and accounting for 85% of China’s tin imports." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*t46LR_ZKqwe3bL6cLqz85w.png" /></figure><p>However, <a href="https://www.internationaltin.org/tin-production-isolated-myanmar-coup/">~80% of Myanmar’s tin is from the autonomous Wa State</a> on Yunnan’s border.</p><p>China has a close relationship with the United Wa State Party (UWSP) which controls Wa State, so this trade is somewhat isolated from the current unrest in Myanmar.</p><p><strong>Rare earths: </strong>China is the world’s largest importer of rare earth ores.</p><p>This is partly because they have most of the world’s refining capacity, but also because of growing domestic demand.</p><p>Myanmar accounted for about <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/mineral-commodity-summaries">12.5% of global rare earths mine production in 2020</a>. Other large mine producers include US and Australia. Most of the mined ore goes to China for refining.</p><p>Myanmar is a key supplier for China’s rare earths imports. For example, in 2020, Myanmar accounted for <a href="http://www.baiinfo.com/en/News/22574097">71% of China’s mixed rare earth carbonate</a> ores imports.</p><figure><img alt="Charts showing Myanmar as the third largest mine producer of rare earths and accounting for 70% of China’s imports." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*u_okn1j6JzAQsgMjYOCynw.png" /></figure><p>There are 17 different rare earth elements, so it’s rather simplistic to only look at the top level, but suffice to say that China is interested in Myanmar’s rare earths.</p><p>All in all, China has significant strategic interest in Myanmar.</p><p>To this end, the CCP would like sustained stability in Myanmar as well as openness to Chinese trade and investments.</p><p>In <a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/convincing-china-to-support-civilian-government-in-myanmar-97c5e0866aba">[Part 2: Convincing China to support civilian government]</a>, we explore:</p><ul><li>Why it appears that the CCP believes the Tatmadaw are best positioned to provide stability and openness, at least relative to alternatives.</li><li>How the civil resistance and its leaders might convince the CCP otherwise.</li></ul><p><em>As with my previous articles, I have made many assumptions and sweeping statements as well as skipped details. I am also sure there are many complexities and nuances that I have missed, so I hope readers will share their thoughts so that together we can continue to synthesise a practical path.</em></p><pre><em>Thank you to the people who provided thoughtful input and feedback.</em></pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=90c94a193087" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Myanmar: Don’t count on international military intervention]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-dont-count-on-international-military-intervention-956d2a115045?source=rss-5475155d9b36------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/956d2a115045</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[2021-myanmar-coup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[whatshappeninginmyanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar-coup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[M2]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2021 08:45:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-02T05:26:33.110Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Myanmar Coup 2021</h4><h4>What that means for international action and domestic resistance</h4><p><em>Preface: I share these thoughts in the hopes of generating ideas and discussion to help forge an achievable path to freedom for my friends, colleagues and the people of Myanmar.</em></p><pre><strong>TABLE OF CONTENTS<br>- Why can’t we count on a military intervention?</strong></pre><pre><strong>- So what can be done?</strong><br>   - Internationally<br>   - Domestically</pre><p>As the military regime continues to perpetuate gross human rights abuses, the cries for international intervention ring out.</p><p>As of 15th March, at least 120 people have been murdered — half under the age of 25. In addition, over 2,000 people have been “arrested”, many disappearing without charge.</p><p>Even so, foreign military intervention remains unlikely.</p><p>This does not mean that we should not continue to demand international action, including military intervention.</p><p>Sanctions against MOGE, arms embargoes, and denying the military recognition, for example, all apply pressure to the military whilst giving energy to those resisting.</p><p>Domestically, it implies adopting a sustainable approach to civil resistance.</p><h4>Why can’t we count on a military intervention?</h4><p><strong>Firstly,</strong> only the US or China could militarily intervene unilaterally. Other countries would only act if the UN or another multinational body takes the lead.</p><p>However, there is no talk about military intervention at the UN, or in Washington, or in Beijing, or anywhere.</p><p>For instance, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar does not mention or urge military intervention.</p><p><strong>Secondly, </strong>even if countries were discussing a military intervention, China would strongly oppose it, through vetoes and diplomatic pressure, backed by economics.</p><pre><strong><em>A simplified assessment...</em></strong></pre><pre><strong>US: </strong>The US remains the only superpower with force projection capabilities anywhere in the world.</pre><pre>Since the end of the Cold War, however, their interest in policing the world has been diminishing. This trend has been accelerated by their improved energy situation thanks to the shale revolution.</pre><pre>The US is reducing the number of troops overseas. With little economic interest in Myanmar and no strong ideological motivation (e.g. communism, Islamic extremism), the US isn&#39;t about to withdraw from Afghanistan only to deploy in Myanmar.</pre><pre>The US is looking inward, dealing with Covid-19, a $1.9T stimulus and a broader economic recovery, a polarised government and electorate, racism, etc.</pre><pre>Perhaps the US is making a strategic oversight regarding Myanmar in its China strategy, but nonetheless the US isn&#39;t looking to send troops to Myanmar.</pre><pre><strong>China: </strong>Sharing a 2,100km land border with Myanmar, China could physically intervene. However, China has a strong non-intervention approach, at least on the surface.</pre><pre>China may engage through the EAOs as proxies, but will otherwise stick to diplomatic and economic pressure to protect their interests.</pre><pre>More importantly China will oppose anyone from militarily intervening. They will not allow foreign troops on their neighbour’s soil, particularly one as strategic as Myanmar.</pre><pre><em>Related reading: </em><a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/why-china-cares-about-myanmar-90c94a193087"><em>Why China cares about Myanmar</em></a><em>.</em></pre><pre><strong>UN:</strong> Military action requires a Security Council resolution. China (and Russia) would veto such a resolution.</pre><pre>Interventions have typically had strong sponsors such as the African Union and France in Central African Republic or NATO in Libya, which is lacking in the case of Myanmar.</pre><pre>The General Assembly, as far as I understand, cannot authorise the use of force without the approval of the target country (e.g. Egypt during the Suez Crisis, which was also way back in 1956).</pre><pre><strong>ASEAN:</strong> Unlike the African Union, which can create a peacekeeping force and whose members have agreed to the right to intervene in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, ASEAN is an economic union with a non-intervention policy.</pre><pre>Moreover, several members of ASEAN aren’t exactly beacons of civilian rule. Some have close ties with the Tatmadaw. For example, MyTel is a JV between Myanmar’s military-run MEC and Vietnam’s military-run Viettel.</pre><pre><strong>EU/UK/NATO:</strong> Limited economic interest, too far away for unilateral military action, and unwilling to go against China in this case.</pre><p>History has far too many examples of lack of action to prevent human rights abuses: Sudan; Syria; Yemen; Mozambique; and even Myanmar in the past.</p><p>You can’t count on military intervention.</p><h4>So what can be done?</h4><p>If we cannot count on military intervention, what can be done?</p><p><strong>Internationally</strong>, the UN Special Rapporteur in Myanmar has shared five actions:</p><pre>1)<strong> Stop the flow of funds to the junta</strong>, including through sanctions on Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE);</pre><pre>2) Impose an <strong>international arms embargo</strong>;</pre><pre>3) Ensure <strong>accountability for crimes</strong>, through national courts and the International Criminal Court (ICC);</pre><pre>4) Provide <strong>humanitarian assistance directly </strong>through local civil society and aid organisations rather than through the junta;</pre><pre>5) <strong>Deny recognition</strong> of the junta as the legitimate government of Myanmar.</pre><pre><em>Read Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, statement to UNHRC on 11th March, 2021, </em><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26884"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></pre><p>Add to this, pressure on international companies to stop working with military-related entities. Sanctions make this easier.</p><p>MOGE is a particularly important target for sanctions. All oil and gas businesses in Myanmar, including the pipelines, involve MOGE by law. MOGE is perhaps the largest source of money, particularly foreign currency, for the military.</p><p>In addition, disruptions to oil and gas flows may encourage China and Thailand to pressure the Tatmadaw.</p><p>Sanctions on MOGE would make it difficult for publicly-listed operating partners to continue operating normally and even put pressure on foreign state-owned operators such as Thailand’s PTTEP.</p><p>The US has already added Myanmar’s Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, Myanmar Economic Company (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) to their sanctions list.</p><p>The EU may add these on March 22nd.</p><p>Adding MOGE (and perhaps Myanmar Gems Enterprise, MGE) to these lists will be impactful. However, this likely requires hard evidence that show direct ties between MOGE and the Tatmadaw. If you have such evidence, share it widely.</p><p>Other international actions include getting the UN to impose an arms embargo, which is worth pushing for but likely very time-consuming and difficult.</p><p>Getting ASEAN countries to mediate, particularly military to military, may help at least minimise violence against civilians.</p><p>“Flipping” China by convincing them that their strategic goals would be significantly more achievable without the Tatmadaw in power could be quite effective but challenging to bring about.</p><p>All of these are worth pushing for, but prioritise by “effectiveness” in pushing the Tatmadaw out and “likelihood”.</p><p>It’s difficult to define “effectiveness” and “likelihood”, let alone compare different actions as they have countless nuances, such as the exact details and timeframes.</p><p>Nevertheless, here is an intentionally provocative non-scientific attempt at a simplistic prioritisation of international actions:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/639/1*YV8da6OP2aZOcVIHb8QNeQ.png" /><figcaption>Example of a simplistic prioritisation of international actions — placements not definitive</figcaption></figure><p>Feel free to come up with your own prioritisation, including by moving the pieces around, breaking them apart, redefining them, and adding your own.</p><p>Note that there is great uncertainty in the actions and outcomes. For example, military action could descend into a protracted battle at the cost of many many lives.</p><p>It’s impossible to put real life into a 2x2 matrix, but the point is to prioritise where to spend energy.</p><p><strong>Domestically</strong>, non-violent resistance as described in <a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-forging-a-path-to-freedom-part-2-2bff78e94d11">my previous article</a> is likely to be more effective than violence.</p><p>Whilst the urge to fight back is real and understandable, violence will likely be ineffective and lead to many deaths.</p><p>Violence begets violence. The military is good at violence.</p><p>The outcome of untrained civilians bringing sticks and stones to a gun fight with a battle-hardened killing machine is not pleasant.</p><p>A non-violent resistance would suggest ideas such as the following:</p><ul><li>Avoid direct confrontation and prepare for a long fight, which also means <strong>restarting the economy</strong>, already hit by Covid, as civilians will run out of food and money almost certainly before the military.</li><li>Encourage, support and protect <strong>defectors </strong>in the police and military, and their families.</li><li>Support <strong>disobedience </strong>by those working in areas with direct impact on the military such as the IRD, MOGE, the oil and gas industry as well as military-related companies, including Innwa and Myawaddy banks.</li><li>Elsewhere, pursue more <strong>subtle disobedience </strong>to disrupt military operations but not destroy the economy.</li><li>Persuade and pressure <strong>cronies</strong>, <strong>religious groups</strong>, and <strong>ethnic groups </strong>to support the resistance.</li><li>Occasional <strong>broader protests </strong>to maintain support and momentum, perhaps rotating through different parts of the economy to spread out the load.</li><li>Get <strong>China </strong>(and Thailand) to shift its position from pragmatic indifference to preference for a civilian government, by disrupting (not destroying) what it particularly cares about: oil and gas; trade flows. <em>Related reading: </em><a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/why-china-cares-about-myanmar-90c94a193087"><em>Why China cares about Myanmar</em></a><em>.</em></li></ul><p>The above are ideas and it’s important to note that there is no right answer. There are a lot of variables and unknowns.</p><p>Non-violent resistance may work and help limit civilian deaths on paper, but things will no doubt be very different on the ground and different protestors will need to make their own often stark choices.</p><p>Perhaps people smarter than I have better ideas.</p><pre><strong>It is critical that you make your own judgements. The above are ideas for discussion, not advice or instructions. Do not take actions without being thoughtful of the second and third order implications. Protect yourself and those around you. Participate only in a way that you are comfortable with.</strong></pre><p>Assuming that no military intervention is likely, does not mean it’s not worth calling for it. Nor does it mean giving up. It means resisting accordingly.</p><p>The Tatmadaw is unfortunately a well-established institution with decades of experience. Their response to the threat of sanctions and isolation is telling:</p><blockquote>“We are used to sanctions, and we survived.</blockquote><blockquote>We have to learn to walk with only few friends.”</blockquote><p><em>Vice-Senior General Soe Win as quoted by Christine Schraner Burgener, UN Special Envoy for Myanmar, 3rd March, 2021</em></p><p>There is no magical exit, but continuing to apply pressure on multiple fronts may, with time, turn enough factors against the Tatmadaw.</p><p>For instance, enough police and military may defect in order for a civilian leadership to take over or at least a different military faction to come to the negotiating table.</p><p><em>As with my previous articles, I have made many assumptions and sweeping statements as well as skipped details. I am also sure there are many complexities and nuances that I have missed, so I hope readers will share their thoughts so that together we can continue to synthesise a practical path.</em></p><pre><em>Thank you to the people who provided thoughtful input and feedback.</em></pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=956d2a115045" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Myanmar: Forging a path to freedom [Part 2]]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-forging-a-path-to-freedom-part-2-2bff78e94d11?source=rss-5475155d9b36------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2bff78e94d11</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar-coup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2021-myanmar-coup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[whatshappeninginmyanmar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[M2]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Mar 2021 06:53:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-21T14:26:05.303Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Myanmar Coup 2021</h4><h4>Non-violent resistance to pressure the Tatmadaw to an exit</h4><p><em>Preface: Over the past 4 years, I have invested time, energy and money into Myanmar with the dream of contributing to a bright future. I am by no means an expert on Myanmar or politics. It is a tremendously difficult and emotionally charged time, especially for those on the ground, so I share these thoughts in the hopes of generating ideas and discussion to help forge an achievable path to freedom for my friends, colleagues and the people of Myanmar.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/1*ybOXM88XMlw7kq1YKaYeeA.png" /></figure><pre><strong>TABLE OF CONTENTS:<br>- Non-violent resistance more effective than violence</strong></pre><pre><strong>- Pillars that sustain the Tatmadaw</strong></pre><pre><strong>- Sustaining resistance</strong></pre><pre><strong>- Ethnic Groups and Oil &amp; Gas: Triple strike?</strong></pre><pre><em>This is [Part 2]. </em><a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-forging-a-path-to-freedom-ffcb317757d"><em>Read [Part 1: Create Viable Exit] here.</em></a></pre><h4><strong>Non-violent resistance more effective than violence</strong></h4><p>Several studies point to non-violent opposition as more effective than violent opposition. I’ve listed a few at the end.</p><p>A few of the reasons include:</p><ul><li>Non-violent movements are able to attract more support, more diverse support, and more sustained support.</li><li>Any violence against non-violent protestors can drive more support to the protestor side.</li><li>The dictatorship is usually massively advantaged in a violent fight.</li></ul><p>This isn’t to say that non-violent movements will be successful. Many movements last years or even decades without resolution. You could say Myanmar itself has been in the struggle for decades.</p><p>Non-violent also doesn’t mean there is no violence. The Tatmadaw will bring horrifying violence as we have already seen.</p><h4>Pillars that sustain the Tatmadaw</h4><p>Massive and creative protests, strikes, boycotts — these non-violent efforts apply pressure to the Tatmadaw, which can open up new exits as well as push them towards it.</p><p>To guide these efforts, let’s consider key pillars that support the Tatmadaw’s regime. In rough order of relative importance to the Tatmadaw (my assumptions — please debate):</p><ul><li>Tatmadaw unity</li><li>Money</li><li>Societal cooperation</li><li>Political / Legal legitimacy</li><li>International legitimacy</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1001/1*wMLQpSCea4Cs533wDWe9FQ.png" /></figure><p>These pillars are inter-connected so one can support another — but the reverse is also true, meaning pressure on one can put pressure on another.</p><p>There are various non-violent ways to apply pressure to all of these pillars. Some possibilities include:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/903/1*K4cD7i4fOKYm45dZB0HPBw.png" /></figure><p>Thinking back to the exit paths discussion in <a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-forging-a-path-to-freedom-ffcb317757d">[Part 1]</a>, Tatmadaw unity is a particularly important pillar. If the Tatmadaw remains united behind its current leadership then an exit in the short term looks difficult.</p><p>Trying to create cracks in the military and police, for example by encouraging family members to support the resistance is one way to apply pressure.</p><p>Creating parallel governance, preventing recognition of the military regime, quietly disrupting regime administration and boycotting military-related businesses are all examples of non-violent resistance.</p><p>These pressures can put doubt into the minds of individuals within the Tatmadaw, which slowly form cracks and can eventually break open.</p><pre>There are many calls for international intervention. Whilst these calls should continue, it would be realistic not to expect any physical international intervention.</pre><pre>Never say never, but a consideration of history, the geopolitics of the region, and the current evolution of US foreign policy would conclude that it is extremely unlikely that Myanmar will see any foreign soldiers on its lands.</pre><pre>Countries and international bodies will issue statements, impose sanctions, and perhaps exclude the regime from its forums. This will help provide pressure, but the bulk of the work will remain to be done domestically.</pre><h4><strong>Sustaining resistance</strong></h4><p>We are still in the early days. There’s not been much time for cracks in the military to form let alone break open. Sufficiently squeezing the money pillar may perhaps take several years. Cronies, businesses, and neighbours are waiting to see how things evolve — perhaps ready to settle for a Thai style regime.</p><p>It’s important to find sustainable ways to apply targeted pressure. Some of the current methods are probably not very painful for the military and are too painful for the general population to sustain.</p><pre><em>Example: Banking</em><br>Closed bank branches and empty ATMs hurt SMEs and individuals. Large corporates and the military don’t really use bank branches and ATMs.</pre><pre>The on-going disruption to cash logistics will hinder cash, including donations, from getting into the hands of those that need it. Remember there is a huge difference between money and cash.</pre><pre>Instead of a blanket no-show, perhaps a rotation schedule will allow branch and cash logistics staff to provide basic banking services to the public, yet continue to participate in the resistance.</pre><pre>Delays and errors in banking transactions were not unheard of even during more normal times. For example, a zero going missing; an account number being miscopied; an instruction mistakenly ending up at the bottom of a pile. Quiet disruptions to military-related transactions are perhaps possible whilst allowing SMEs and individuals to continue banking.</pre><p>The public is more dependent on the general economy including international trade than the military.</p><p>Therefore the frequency and scope of action needs to be balanced with the ability of businesses to survive and pay employees, staff to remain employed, and the economy not to collapse.</p><p>General strikes are perhaps great symbolically, help maintain motivation, and apply pressure on businesses that are thinking of cooperating with the military. However, they are not sustainable if too frequent.</p><p>Focusing on areas such as government administration, military communications and media, and military businesses, is perhaps more sustainable and effective.</p><p>Rotating through different parts of the economy may also be helpful in allowing different people to get involved at different times yet not demanding unsustainable involvement.</p><p>There’s no doubt that the courageous protests will evolve in smart and creative ways, as they have done so far. They will also take lessons from the successes and failures of other struggles around the world.</p><p>Look to disrupt, rather than destroy. Be dynamic, rather than static. Be creative, rather than predictable. Look to be inclusive, rather than provocative.</p><pre>Note: Getting as many people as possible from different groups of society involved in their own way is critical. Remember that not everyone can or wants to participate in the same way — allow individuals to participate in the way they wish.</pre><h4>Ethnic Groups and Oil &amp; Gas: Triple strike?</h4><p>To a certain extent, it is the relative peace with ethnic groups that provided the Tatmadaw with the time and space to execute its coup.</p><p>This stability, especially in the border areas, and oil and gas flows are critical to the Tatmadaw along three key pillars:</p><pre><strong><em>Money</em> </strong>— oil and gas are perhaps the two most important sources of income for the regime. The pipelines to China and Thailand are core to this trade. Other border trade such as gems provide additional income.</pre><pre>As business with the outside world becomes increasingly difficult, China and Thailand border trade will become ever more important.</pre><pre><strong><em>Tatmadaw Unity</em> </strong>— disruptions in the border areas as well as along over 700km of Myanmar-China pipeline mean the Tatmadaw must divert attention and resources to secure these areas.</pre><pre>Stretching the Tatmadaw will increase the chances of a misstep or cracks appearing in the ranks, although perhaps also of violence.</pre><pre><strong><em>China </em></strong>— a massive simplification but there are perhaps a couple of things China really cares about: border area stability and pipeline security.</pre><pre>China has no desire to see open conflict and refugees on its borders. The pipelines are a core part of China’s strategy to bypass the less than friendly Straits of Malacca and South China Sea.</pre><pre>The Tatmadaw and China have never had much love for each other, but rather a pragmatic and opportunistic relationship. Any instability and threat to China’s broader strategic goals may turn China against the Tatmadaw.</pre><p>No doubt, China is already well connected to many of the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in the border areas, which adds layers of complexity, and avoiding open conflict will be in the interests of almost all parties.</p><p>Continuing to win over ethnic groups, their political parties and armed groups to support non-violent resistance will be important.</p><p>In addition, non-violent disruptions to the oil and gas trade, such as worker strikes, withholding of operating expertise or interruptions to operational systems may also be particularly effective.</p><h4>Concluding remarks</h4><p>Above we explore some ideas on how to apply targeted and sustained pressure to the Tatmadaw.</p><p>Pressure alone will not force the Tatmadaw or MAH out, however. It will result in a stronger and more violent push back unless there is a release valve in the form of an exit. Nonetheless, pressure may create new possibilities for an exit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/753/1*4eR8rCfWmQqJr9e3IaypuQ.png" /></figure><p>The path is likely a long one — months, years. Other than 5 years of shared power, the military have been in power for the entirety of the past 60 years. They know how to survive.</p><p>Non-violent opposition can work. The situation will evolve offering new ideas and opportunities. There is hope.</p><pre><strong>It is critical that you make your own judgements. The above are ideas for discussion, not advice or instructions. Do not take actions without being thoughtful of the second and third order implications. Protect yourself and those around you. Participate only in a way that you are comfortable with.</strong></pre><p>As with <a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-forging-a-path-to-freedom-ffcb317757d">Part 1</a>, I have made many assumptions and skipped lots of details. I am also sure there are many complexities and nuances that I have missed, so I hope readers will share their thoughts so that together we can synthesise a practical path.</p><pre><em>Thank you to the people who provided thoughtful input and feedback.</em></pre><pre>Some selected readings which may be helpful:</pre><pre><strong><em>Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict </em></strong><a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3301_pp007-044_Stephan_Chenoweth.pdf"><strong><em>[PDF]</em></strong></a><em><br>Stephan and Chenoweth<br></em>Why non-violent opposition works more often than violent opposition. A broad and diverse dataset makes it a fantastic study, but also means that many data points are perhaps not applicable (e.g. not military dictatorships; not regime change; pre-internet/smartphone/social media) so it&#39;s best to be careful how you apply any findings.<br><a href="https://www.ericachenoweth.com/research/wcrw">Appendix</a> | <a href="https://www.ericachenoweth.com/research">Dataset</a><br>A more recent follow-up: <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-future-of-nonviolent-resistance-2/">The future of nonviolent resistance</a></pre><pre><strong><em>How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy </em></strong><a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/How%20Freedom%20is%20Won.pdf"><strong><em>[PDF]</em></strong></a><strong><em><br></em></strong><em>Karatnycky and Ackerman<br></em>Why non-violent opposition is more likely to result in longer-lasting freedom. Similarly, data points are not always applicable, so take findings judiciously.</pre><pre><strong><em>From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation </em></strong><a href="https://www.aeinstein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FDTD.pdf"><strong><em>[PDF]</em></strong></a><br><em>Sharp<br></em>Perhaps the most practical guide with ideas on non-violent actions that can be taken. More a handbook than a study, so not always convincing (and at times maybe even misleading), but written with a purpose in mind. Use your own judgement.</pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2bff78e94d11" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Myanmar: Forging a path to freedom [Part 1]]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-forging-a-path-to-freedom-ffcb317757d?source=rss-5475155d9b36------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ffcb317757d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2021-myanmar-coup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar-coup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[whatshappeninginmyanmar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[M2]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Feb 2021 12:21:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-21T14:26:58.946Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Myanmar Coup 2021</h4><h4>What are the exit paths for the Tatmadaw?</h4><p><em>Preface: Over the past 4 years, I have invested time, energy and money into Myanmar with the dream of contributing to a bright future. I am by no means an expert on Myanmar or politics. It is a tremendously difficult and emotionally charged time, especially for those on the ground, so I share these thoughts in the hopes of generating ideas and discussion to help forge an achievable path to freedom for my friends, colleagues and the people of Myanmar.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/1*4TZTguYIpdcP2RSlWlBcmA.png" /></figure><pre><strong>TABLE OF CONTENTS:<br>- How do you dismantle a dictatorship?</strong></pre><pre><strong>- Why there’s no turning back for the Tatmadaw</strong></pre><pre><strong>- What are the Tatmadaw’s exit paths?</strong></pre><pre><em>This is [Part 1]. </em><a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-forging-a-path-to-freedom-part-2-2bff78e94d11"><em>Read [Part 2: Apply Pressure] here.</em></a></pre><h4>How do you dismantle a dictatorship?</h4><p>There are perhaps three ways to dismantle a dictatorship:</p><pre><strong>Path 1. </strong>Death of key figures</pre><pre><strong>Path 2. </strong>Removal by force (i.e. coup) or credible threat of force</pre><pre><strong>Path 3.</strong> Provide a path more attractive than holding onto power</pre><p>Both paths 1 and 2 create new sets of challenges and instability, which could make the situation worse.</p><p>A dictator and his associates would only willingly accept Path 3 if it assures, among other things: personal safety; protection from prosecution; retention of wealth; and a comfortable and peaceful life.</p><p>Path 3 perhaps breaks down into a few sub-paths:</p><pre><strong>3a.</strong> &quot;Retirement&quot; - give up power with guarantees of safety</pre><pre><strong>3b.</strong> &quot;Escape&quot; - flee to a friendly country that guarantees safety</pre><pre><strong>3c.</strong> &quot;Power sharing&quot; - giving up some power to the opposition</pre><p>For 3a, perhaps Than Shwe comes to mind. Given 3a requires guarantees of safety, this is only probable if the dictator hands over power to his own people.</p><p>For 3b, perhaps Ferdinand Marcos comes to mind, although with elements of Path 2. 3b requires a friendly country that is willing to assist in the escape.</p><p>3c is perhaps not a full dismantling but could be a step in the right direction. Combined with Path 2, Sudan comes to mind though there remains significant fragility.</p><p>Whilst opponents may dislike providing a dictatorship with an exit path, the reality is they are usually the one with the guns.</p><h4>Why there’s no turning back for the Tatmadaw</h4><p>The Tatmadaw led by Min Aung Hlaing (MAH) has made its move. It appears improbable that they will back down regardless of the pressures they face as:</p><ol><li>They have a deep distrust of the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The feeling I’m sure is mutual. The pre-requisite trust for Path 3 is not in place.</li><li>They’ve tried the power sharing model (Path 3c), felt they were constantly fighting to maintain power and they’ve concluded it is ineffective.</li><li>Backing down is admitting defeat. The military doesn’t accept defeat.</li><li>They are confident the military with its discipline, stockpiles and supply lines can outlast any resistance.</li><li>They believe they are doing the right thing for Myanmar and its people.</li><li>They wouldn’t be able to achieve their goals, which may include some combination of:</li></ol><pre><strong>- Power: </strong>The Tatmadaw wants to be in charge. Fully.</pre><pre><strong>- Justice: </strong>The election results were not &quot;fair&quot; due to NLD and UEC &quot;meddling&quot;. The Tatmadaw feels insulted by their treatment despite their &quot;good faith&quot; efforts, e.g. ceasefire with the Arakan Army.</pre><pre><strong>- Glory:</strong> They want the chance to &quot;save&quot; Myanmar from what they and others regard as NLD&#39;s poor performance especially on the economy.</pre><pre><strong>- Future guarantees: </strong>MAH was due for retirement this year. He wants the chance to properly set up a retirement whereby he and his associates will be safe and comfortable.</pre><pre><em>Note: I mention these as possible motivations, not facts or justifications for the coup.</em></pre><p>If the Tatmadaw are smart they will limit violence and other causes for major grievance, such as sustained telecommunications outages.</p><p>For instance, talk of the cyber security law has quietly faded. Why bother with a formal wide-ranging law that sparked uproar and that they wouldn’t be able to take full advantage of — just quietly work on specific areas and build up capabilities.</p><p>They will hope to wear down and divide protesters through terrorism and letting them run out of cash, food and other supplies, whilst picking off the leaders.</p><p>If it comes down to it, a heavy crackdown even at the risk of economic collapse and international condemnation remains a possibility.</p><h4>What are the Tatmadaw’s exit paths?</h4><p>Whilst the Tatmadaw and MAH may have heavily miscalculated the level of opposition they would face, their fundamental plan is perhaps unchanged. Something along the lines of:</p><pre><strong>1. </strong>Tame the population through a combination of attrition, co-optation and violence</pre><pre><strong>2. </strong>Hold new &quot;elections&quot;, putting the USDP in control and perhaps MAH as president</pre><pre><strong>3.</strong> Run Myanmar as a “disciplined democracy” and revive the “Thein Sein years”</pre><pre><strong>4.</strong> Prepare the ground for a safe and comfortable retirement like Than Shwe</pre><p>Assuming Path 1 (death) and Path 2 (coup) are improbable — gone are the days of CIA sponsored attempts at regime change — diplomatic efforts need to focus on creating a Path 3 that is more attractive than the default plan above.</p><blockquote>Unfortunately, my limited brain capacity cannot come up with a sufficiently attractive plan in the short term.</blockquote><blockquote>Maintaining sufficient pressure right now to ensure a “tolerable” regime with sufficient freedoms, perhaps similar to Thailand, and then working on reforming the military in the medium term is perhaps a pragmatic, though terribly unjust, route. In addition, given the military’s poor track record on human rights this comes with significant risks. Any reform would also be incredibly delicate, as the past decades have shown: e.g. 1988–1990; past 5 years and current situation.</blockquote><blockquote>Non-violent opposition may work with time, particularly if cracks develop within the military and there are changes in personnel — perhaps a faction of the old guard? However, there are risks of a continuation of military control (immediately or eventually) just in different hands (e.g. Saw Maung to Than Shwe; Egypt?).</blockquote><blockquote>Perhaps the diplomats among us will be able to come up with something that’s palatable to all sides.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/781/1*wFoN2_KohM-8kC7PP3TGWQ.png" /></figure><p>One thing to note is that MAH at 64 is relatively young. He will only be willingly to consider exit options that guarantee a safe, comfortable life for 20+ years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/330/1*sj4vtcmYFCY03qedTBL9zg.png" /></figure><h4>Concluding remarks</h4><p>Whilst the above does not lay out a clear path to freedom, I hope that it stimulates discussions and highlights the importance of creating an exit.</p><p>Pressure without an exit will result in a stronger and more violent push back. It may be infuriating, but it is important to think about what the military wants to formulate an effective strategy.</p><p>In Part 2, we explore how non-violent resistance can apply targetted and sustained pressure on the Tatmadaw, forcing them into missteps and potentially opening up new possibilities for exits.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@SavingMyanmar/myanmar-forging-a-path-to-freedom-part-2-2bff78e94d11"><em>Find [Part 2] here.</em></a></p><p>I have made many assumptions and skipped lots of details. I am also sure there are many complexities and nuances that I have missed, so I hope readers will share their thoughts so that together we can synthesise a practical path.</p><pre><em>Thank you to the people who provided thoughtful input and feedback.</em></pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ffcb317757d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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