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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Severin Alexander Bühler on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Severin Alexander Bühler on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@SeverinAlexB?source=rss-d63a74cebf8------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Severin Alexander Bühler on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SeverinAlexB?source=rss-d63a74cebf8------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to Host a Public Key Domain Website? [v0.6.0 — Ubuntu 24.04]]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/pubky/how-to-host-a-public-key-domain-website-v0-6-0-ubuntu-24-04-57e6f2cb6f77?source=rss-d63a74cebf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/57e6f2cb6f77</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pubky]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pkdns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dht]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pkd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pkarr]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Severin Alexander Bühler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2024 14:09:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-21T12:28:37.076Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>How to Host a Public Key Domain Website [v0.6.0 — Ubuntu 24.04]</h3><p><a href="https://medium.com/pubky/public-key-domains-censorship-resistance-explained-33d0333e6123"><strong>Public Key Domains</strong></a> are a powerful tool for hosting self-sovereign websites. Unlike traditional domains, their names are stored on the Mainline DHT, making them independent of DNS root servers. Anyone running a <a href="https://github.com/pubky/pkdns"><strong>pkdns</strong></a> server can resolve and host these domains independently.</p><p>In this tutorial, we’ll walk through how to create your own <strong>Public Key Domain</strong> and serve a simple self-sovereign website using <strong>NGINX</strong> on Ubuntu 24.04 LTS.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OptL2huFLD07toJmA9Ejfg.png" /></figure><h3>Install PKDNS Binaries</h3><p>Download the binaries from the <a href="https://github.com/pubky/pkdns/releases">Github release page</a> for your system.</p><pre># Download and install pkdns-cli<br>wget https://github.com/pubky/pkdns/releases/download/v0.6.0/pkdns-linux-amd64-v0.6.0.tar.gz<br>tar -xf pkdns-linux-amd64-v0.6.0.tar.gz<br>sudo mv pkdns-linux-amd64-v0.6.0/* /usr/local/bin/<br><br># Clean up folders<br>rm -rf pkdns-linux-amd64-v0.6.0<br>rm pkdns-linux-amd64-v0.6.0.tar.gz</pre><p>Check if they are installed correctly. It should output your installed version.</p><pre>pkdns-cli --version<br><br>&gt; pkarr-cli v0.6.0</pre><h3>Publish DNS Record</h3><p>Let’s create a folder where we save everything in.</p><pre>mkdir ~/.pkdns &amp;&amp; cd ~/.pkdns</pre><p>Next, we generate your seed. From this seed, the private and public key is derived. Make sure you keep it safe and private so you always have access to your new domain. Consider a backup too! It’s human readable so you can just write it down on a piece of paper.</p><pre>pkdns-cli generate &gt; seed.txt</pre><p>From this seed, we derive your public key. This is going to be your new domain name.</p><pre>pkdns-cli publickey<br><br>&gt; if9eyzjxp84ug3axxyb7fzk7ty3fuw8fqd5y4wetbe6prdfnk8fy</pre><p>Write the zone file. The zone file is a file with all your DNS records in. With this command here, we write a A record that points to your server. Make sure you replace {YOUR_IP} with your servers IP address.</p><pre>echo &quot;@ IN A {YOUR_IP}&quot; &gt; pkarr.zone</pre><p>Publish your Public Key Domain to the DHT. This takes a second.</p><pre>pkdns-cli publish<br><br>&gt; Packet if9eyzjxp84ug3axxyb7fzk7ty3fuw8fqd5y4wetbe6prdfnk8fy<br>&gt; Name                 TTL     Type   Data                     <br>&gt; @                    300     A      116.203.41.55            <br><br>&gt; Announce once.<br>&gt; 2024-12-16 14:45:01.177528662 +00:00 Successfully announced.</pre><p>Verify your zone has been published by resolving your domain name on the DHT.</p><pre>pkdns-cli resolve if9eyzjxp84ug3axxyb7fzk7ty3fuw8fqd5y4wetbe6prdfnk8fy<br><br>&gt; Resolve dns records of pk:if9eyzjxp84ug3axxyb7fzk7ty3fuw8fqd5y4wetbe6prdfnk8fy<br>&gt; Packet if9eyzjxp84ug3axxyb7fzk7ty3fuw8fqd5y4wetbe6prdfnk8fy<br>&gt; @                    A      116.203.41.55<br>&gt; <br>&gt; Last updated at: 2024-12-16 09:04:02 UTC</pre><p>If this worked your domain can also be resolved with nslookup on any pkdns server too.</p><pre>nslookup if9eyzjxp84ug3axxyb7fzk7ty3fuw8fqd5y4wetbe6prdfnk8fy 37.27.13.182<br><br>&gt; Server:  37.27.13.182<br>&gt; Address: 37.27.13.182#53<br>&gt; <br>&gt; Non-authoritative answer:<br>&gt; Name: if9eyzjxp84ug3axxyb7fzk7ty3fuw8fqd5y4wetbe6prdfnk8fy<br>&gt; Address: 116.203.41.55</pre><p>Be aware though, DNS servers cache pkarr zones for 5min or more. Any change in your zone will take time to propagate through pkdns servers. If you want to verify if your change is published without this delay use pkdns-cli resolve.</p><h4>Continuously Publish Your Zone</h4><p>Data on the DHT is short-lived and needs to be republished every once in a while. To keep your zone alive, we create a crontab job to publish your records every 60 minutes.</p><p>Keep in mind, crontab doesn’t support relative paths. We therefore use absolute paths.</p><pre>0 * * * * cd /root/.pkdns/ &amp;&amp; /usr/local/bin/pkdns-cli publish &gt;&gt; logs.txt</pre><h3>Install NGINX Webserver</h3><p>Last, we’ll install NGINX to serve the website.</p><pre>sudo apt update &amp;&amp; sudo apt install -y nginx</pre><p>If you have have the Ubuntu firewall enabled you will also need to <a href="https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/ufw-essentials-common-firewall-rules-and-commands#allow-nginx-http-https">open the http port.</a></p><p>That’s it. The website is now available on <a href="http://if9eyzjxp84ug3axxyb7fzk7ty3fuw8fqd5y4wetbe6prdfnk8fy./">http://if9eyzjxp84ug3axxyb7fzk7ty3fuw8fqd5y4wetbe6prdfnk8fy./</a>.</p><h3>Change System DNS</h3><p>Before you can access the website from your personal computer, you need to change your system DNS to pkdns. Without changing your system DNS, your browser is not able to resolve Public Key Domains.</p><ol><li>Pick a hosted PKDNS server from <a href="https://github.com/pubky/pkdns/blob/master/servers.txt">this list</a>.<br>1.1 Alternatively, <a href="https://github.com/pubky/pkdns?tab=readme-ov-file#getting-started">host a server yourself</a>.</li><li>Verify the server is running by running by executing this command below.</li></ol><pre>nslookup example.com {PKDNS_SERVER_IP}<br><br>&gt; Server:  37.27.13.182<br>&gt; Address: 37.27.13.182#53<br><br>&gt; Non-authoritative answer:<br>&gt; Name: example.com<br>&gt; Address: 93.184.215.14<br>&gt; Name: example.com<br>&gt; Address: 2606:2800:21f:cb07:6820:80da:af6b:8b2c</pre><p>The output should look like this.</p><p>3. Add the `PKDNS_SERVER_IP`. Follow the guide for your specific operating system.</p><ul><li><a href="https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/mac-help/mh14127">MacOS</a></li><li><a href="https://www.ionos.com/digitalguide/server/configuration/change-dns-server-on-ubuntu/">Ubuntu</a></li><li><a href="https://www.windowscentral.com/how-change-your-pcs-dns-settings-windows-10">Windows</a></li></ul><p>4. Test your new configuration by navigating to the demo website <a href="http://7fmjpcuuzf54hw18bsgi3zihzyh4awseeuq5tmojefaezjbd64cy./">http://7fmjpcuuzf54hw18bsgi3zihzyh4awseeuq5tmojefaezjbd64cy./</a>. It should open successfully.</p><p>5. Navigate to your newly made website. It should work now too!</p><p>Make sure you call it with the dot ./ at the end so browsers don’t accidentally fallback to Google search.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>A Public Key Domain is easy to setup without the need for a third party. You just need a server that keeps republishing your records and you are good to go. It’s the most simple tool for self-sovereignty.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57e6f2cb6f77" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/pubky/how-to-host-a-public-key-domain-website-v0-6-0-ubuntu-24-04-57e6f2cb6f77">How to Host a Public Key Domain Website? [v0.6.0 — Ubuntu 24.04]</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/pubky">Pubky</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Public Key Domains: Censorship Resistance Explained]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/pubky/public-key-domains-censorship-resistance-explained-33d0333e6123?source=rss-d63a74cebf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/33d0333e6123</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pubky]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dht]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[p2p]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Severin Alexander Bühler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 14:19:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-12T14:19:14.385Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4VxSfPiRPdRzITyWehYYnA.png" /><figcaption>The dawn of a new powerful p2p technology — Public Key Domains</figcaption></figure><p>Previously, we <a href="https://medium.com/pubky/mainline-dht-censorship-explained-b62763db39cb">explored the censorship resistance of the Mainline DHT</a>, revealing it as a robust, resilient system. Only a handful of large organizations — or botnets with substantial resources — are even capable of attempting an attack.</p><p>In this post, we’ll dive into how Pubky’s innovations build upon the default Mainline DHT design, hardening it against these remaining threats, and explain what you can expect from a Public Key Domain served through <a href="https://github.com/pubky/pkarr">PKARR</a> and <a href="https://github.com/pubky/pkdns">PKDNS</a>.</p><h3>What are Public Key Domains?</h3><p>Public Key Domains (PKDs) are a new type of domain system designed to replace traditional DNS with something more censorship-resistant and user-controlled. A PKD links a user’s public key to their digital resources — much like traditional domain names link to IP addresses — but with built-in cryptographic verification that ensures true ownership and control by the user.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JBeunZpBokLRmzrD7jpuKA@2x.png" /><figcaption><a href="http://7fmjpcuuzf54hw18bsgi3zihzyh4awseeuq5tmojefaezjbd64cy/">http://7fmjpcuuzf54hw18bsgi3zihzyh4awseeuq5tmojefaezjbd64cy/</a> as an example of a Public Key Domain served with <a href="https://github.com/pubky/pkdns">PKDNS</a>.</figcaption></figure><h3>What Vulnerabilities Remain in Mainline DHT?</h3><p>The default Mainline DHT is resistant to most forms of censorship but is not entirely invincible. It could theoretically be attacked by those with access to 10 million or more IP addresses. This level of access is prohibitively expensive, making it possible only for rogue states or well-funded criminal organizations.</p><p>Additionally, any entity attempting to attack Mainline must consider legal risks. Their IP subnet ownership is public, and any censorship attempt is easily detectable, meaning such a move would carry severe reputational and legal consequences.</p><h3>How PKDs Go Beyond Mainline</h3><p>Pubky introduced Public Key Domains (PKDs), using our own <a href="https://github.com/pubky/mainline">Rust-based Mainline library</a> that incorporates key hardening measures to make PKD the most censorship-resistant DNS system yet.</p><h3>Improvements That Set PKDs Apart</h3><h3>1. Hardened Store Algorithm</h3><p>By default, Mainline DHT clients only store data on 20 nodes, which makes targeted eclipse attacks feasible for those with enough IP resources. To counter this, Pubky dynamically adjusts the number of nodes storing domain data.</p><p>In scenarios where a domain is under attack, we store it on up to 16,384 nodes — enough to withstand an eclipse attack involving 8,000 compromised nodes. This significantly raises the cost of an attack, reaching around $64,000 per day. Keeping such attacks up for weeks or months would cost millions, a cost few can afford.</p><h3>2. Extended Caching: Keeping Your Domain Visible</h3><p>If an attacker somehow manages to censor your domain on the DHT, your domain isn’t completely lost. Public Key Domains are signed with your private key and timestamped, and DNS records don’t change frequently.</p><p>PKDNS and PKARR relay systems cache domain data for months or more, meaning even if an attacker succeeds, users can still access the cached version of your domain. This limits the attack’s effect to merely preventing updates, but they cannot make your domain disappear entirely.</p><h3>3. IP Diversity to Prevent Centralized Attacks</h3><p>Using <a href="https://github.com/pubky/mainline">our own Mainline implementation</a> allows us to optimize the network to prevent attacks. We block high-risk IP subnets, such as those held by entities like the U.S. Department of Defense, which have vast blocks of unused IP addresses that could be abused.</p><p>Additionally, to combat coordinated attacks from cloud providers, we enforce strict IP diversity rules. If a DHT bucket contains too many nodes from the same /8 subnet, we reduce their presence to ensure greater diversity. This allows cloud users to still participate in the DHT while preventing major cloud providers from launching coordinated attacks.</p><h3>4. More Nodes = Stronger Network</h3><p>The simplest way to make Mainline DHT even more censorship-resistant is to grow the network. Currently, Mainline has 10 million active nodes.</p><p>By doubling the number of nodes to 20 million, we make the DHT twice as resilient, effectively doubling the cost for attackers. With more users adopting Pubky and Public Key Domains, the number of DHT nodes grows, further enhancing the network’s strength.</p><h3>Conclusion: Censorship Resistance Made Practical</h3><p>Public Key Domains build on the solid foundation of Mainline DHT by adding smarter storage, persistent caching, and stricter node selection. These improvements make even the most well-funded censorship attacks prohibitively costly and drastically reduce their effectiveness.</p><p>Any success for Public Key Domains means an increase in Mainline DHT nodes, further bolstering security. In short, attempting to censor Public Key Domains is not only expensive but ultimately futile. Even the most resource-rich organizations will find it nearly impossible to silence a domain.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=33d0333e6123" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/pubky/public-key-domains-censorship-resistance-explained-33d0333e6123">Public Key Domains: Censorship Resistance Explained</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/pubky">Pubky</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Mainline DHT — Censorship-Resistance Explained]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/pubky/mainline-dht-censorship-explained-b62763db39cb?source=rss-d63a74cebf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b62763db39cb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pubky]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dht]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pkdns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[distributed-systems]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Severin Alexander Bühler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 13:28:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-10T17:25:35.068Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Mainline DHT — Censorship-Resistance Explained</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1Dd3xZaVkWXyLbqO" /></figure><p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mainline_DHT">Mainline Distributed Hash Table (DHT)</a> is a crucial component of decentralized networks, serving as a distributed database used to store and retrieve data across a peer-to-peer network. It is commonly used to provide torrents and now supports Pubky as well!</p><p>However, like all DHTs, it faces potential vulnerabilities such as eclipse attacks, which attempt to censor specific pieces of data.</p><p>At Synonym, we created <a href="https://github.com/pubky/pkarr">PKARR</a> (Public Key Addressable Resource Records) and <a href="https://github.com/pubky/pkdns">PKDNS</a> (Public Key Domain Name System) as mechanisms that build upon the Mainline DHT to improve security, resilience, and censorship resistance. PKARR resolves/stores Public Key Domains (PKD) like <a href="http://7fmjpcuuzf54hw18bsgi3zihzyh4awseeuq5tmojefaezjbd64cy/,">http://7fmjpcuuzf54hw18bsgi3zihzyh4awseeuq5tmojefaezjbd64cy/,</a> providing a decentralized way to map keys to data, while PKDNS offers an alternative to traditional DNS that is resistant to censorship and central control.</p><p>In this post, we provide an overview of how the default Mainline DHT handles eclipse attacks and the challenges involved in executing such an attack.</p><h3>A DHT Primer</h3><p><em>Too lazy to read the primer? Check out this DHT explainer </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QdKhNpsj8M"><em>video</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>At its core, the Mainline Distributed Hash Table (DHT) functions as a decentralized database powered by millions of nodes. It organizes these nodes and the data they store into structures called buckets, which are pivotal to its resilience and performance.</p><p>Each bucket contains up to 20 nodes and is responsible for a specific range of data within the network. When data is published, it’s replicated across 20 nodes, ensuring redundancy. When data is queried, it’s retrieved from those same 20 nodes, creating a balance between availability and efficiency.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NBcpKVMcafoYOMZmUUJ2Ug@2x.png" /><figcaption>The Mainline DHT is globally distributed, as shown by this random sample of 10,000 node locations. <a href="https://ipinfo.io/tools/summarize-ips/f7de581c-8649-4fe7-a391-aefcea7f84c1">More</a></figcaption></figure><p>Node placement within the DHT is determined by their IDs — very big numbers up to 2¹⁶⁰ in size. Nodes with similar IDs are grouped into the same bucket. Likewise, data placement is tied to its public key, another large number, which determines the closest bucket where it will be stored. This design ensures that nodes and data are consistently aligned.</p><p>Importantly, the DHT is dynamic. Buckets adjust as nodes join or leave the network, maintaining balance and ensuring no single bucket becomes overloaded. This dynamic nature is part of what makes DHTs so resilient and scalable.</p><p>Understanding this foundational architecture is essential to grasp the challenges and defenses against censorship in the Mainline DHT, which we’ll explore in detail next.</p><h3>The Challenge: Eclipse Attacks</h3><p>One of the most significant vulnerabilities in Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) is their susceptibility to eclipse attacks, a tactic designed to disrupt the integrity of the network. In an eclipse attack, a malicious actor overwhelms a specific bucket by flooding it with dishonest nodes. By pushing out legitimate nodes, the attacker gains control over the data stored in that bucket, making censorship of specific public keys possible.</p><p>This weakness stems from the open nature of DHTs: anyone can join the network and claim an ID. By strategically choosing IDs that align with a targeted bucket, an attacker can dominate that part of the network. Before 2014, this attack vector posed a serious threat, as generating large numbers of fake nodes was relatively straightforward.</p><p>The implications of such attacks were clear: without safeguards, any determined adversary with enough resources could censor data or disrupt operations within the network. Addressing this problem became a priority, leading to critical advancements that have since reshaped DHT security.</p><h3>The 2014 Breakthrough — Security with Deterministic IDs</h3><p>In 2014, a major milestone in DHT security was achieved with the introduction of the Mainline <a href="https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0042.html">DHT Security Extension (BEP_0042)</a>. This enhancement directly addressed the vulnerabilities exploited by eclipse attacks by fundamentally changing how node IDs are assigned.</p><p>Under BEP_0042, a node’s ID is no longer arbitrary. Instead, it is deterministically generated based on the node’s public IP address using a cryptographic hash. This approach ensures that a node’s ID is both unique and verifiable, making it impossible for an attacker to freely select IDs to target specific buckets. Moreover, because the ID is tied to the IP address, a node is forced to consistently use the same ID, significantly reducing the attack surface.</p><p>The result? The cost of launching an eclipse attack skyrocketed. Gaining control over a specific bucket now requires access to a vast pool of unique IP addresses — an expensive and logistically challenging proposition. This breakthrough effectively eliminated the majority of eclipse and Sybil attacks, transforming the Mainline DHT into a far more resilient system.</p><h3>Closing The Gaps: The Limits of BEP_0042</h3><p>While the 2014 BEP_0042 extension significantly improved the Mainline DHT’s defenses, it didn’t eliminate all vulnerabilities. Organizations with access to large IP address pools — such as major corporations, governments, or botnets — still pose a potential threat.</p><p>Here’s why: the Mainline DHT currently consists of approximately 10 million nodes, organized into buckets containing 20 nodes each. This means the network has around 500,000 buckets, and the probability of a single IP address falling into a specific bucket is 1 in 500,000. To influence one bucket, an attacker would need to control at least 20 dishonest nodes, requiring a pool of 10 million unique IP addresses.</p><p>However, achieving full control over a bucket is even harder in practice. Mainline clients don’t rely solely on static buckets. Queries involve random walks through the network before reaching the desired bucket, increasing the likelihood of encountering honest nodes. Additionally, nodes prefer longer-lived, established peers over newly joined ones, further delaying an attacker’s ability to dominate.</p><p>In ideal conditions for the attacker, around 60 dishonest nodes are typically required to censor data in a single bucket fully. But even then, the system’s design allows occasional honest responses, ensuring no attack is entirely foolproof.</p><p>While BEP_0042 has made eclipse attacks prohibitively expensive and complex, the reality is that they remain theoretically possible for the most well-resourced adversaries. Let’s quantify the cost of such an attack to understand its practical feasibility.</p><h3>The True Cost of IP-Based Attacks</h3><p>Controlling millions of unique IP addresses isn’t just a technical challenge — it’s a financial one. The scarcity and demand for IPv4 addresses make assembling the required resources for an eclipse attack prohibitively expensive for most adversaries.</p><p>Here’s the reality: acquiring a large IP address pool involves either purchasing or leasing subnets. A single /16 subnet, which provides 65,536 IP addresses, costs approximately $2.3 million to purchase outright. For the much larger /8 subnet, offering around 16 million addresses, the cost skyrockets to $600 million. Leasing these resources is equally daunting, with a /16 costing $29,000 per month and a /8 reaching $7.4 million per month.</p><p>Supply constraints further complicate the situation. At the time of writing, only two /16 subnets were publicly available for sale, highlighting how illiquid this market is. Assembling the required number of IPs from public marketplaces is not just expensive — it may be outright impossible.</p><p>These astronomical costs effectively exclude all but the most resource-rich adversaries, such as nation-states or major corporations, from attempting such an attack. Even for these actors, the financial burden and logistical complexity act as significant deterrents.</p><p>In short, the Mainline DHT’s reliance on IP-based node identification makes eclipse attacks infeasible for the vast majority of potential adversaries, cementing its resilience against censorship at scale.</p><h3>Examining Large IP Address Owners</h3><p>While the cost and scarcity of IP addresses deter most adversaries, some entities already possess vast pools of IP addresses, making them potential candidates for mounting large-scale attacks on the Mainline DHT. Understanding who controls these resources is critical to evaluating the remaining risk.</p><p>Here is a list of organizations with substantial IPv4 holdings:</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ca902027e3cb941f5417ff1e8a453e1f/href">https://medium.com/media/ca902027e3cb941f5417ff1e8a453e1f/href</a></iframe><p>From this list, entities like the U.S. Department of Defense and Amazon stand out. Their massive holdings and potential flexibility in allocating spare IPs mean they could, in theory, assemble the resources necessary for an eclipse attack. Similarly, large botnets in the past have managed to temporarily amass millions of IPs, demonstrating the feasibility of such mobilization.</p><p>However, practical constraints limit most of these actors. For example, companies like Google and Microsoft rely on their IP reserves to power core services, leaving little room to spare for disruptive activities. Even if they could free up IPs, the logistics of mobilizing them for a targeted attack are non-trivial.</p><h3>Visibility as a Deterrent</h3><p>One critical factor working against these organizations is transparency. IP subnet ownership is publicly recorded, making any large-scale attack traceable to its source. This alone can serve as a significant deterrent, as no legitimate organization wants to risk the reputational or legal fallout of being identified as the perpetrator of such an attack.</p><h3>Beyond IPs: The Operational Costs of an Eclipse Attack</h3><p>Even with a pool of 10+ million IP addresses at their disposal, an attacker faces additional challenges when attempting to execute an eclipse attack on the Mainline DHT. These costs, while significant, do not render such attacks impossible, particularly for resource-rich adversaries.</p><p>To target a specific public key or bucket, an attacker can precompute which IPs correspond to the desired node IDs and deploy only the required subset — approximately 60 IPs for a single bucket. This reduces the resource overhead compared to maintaining all nodes simultaneously. However, operational costs remain a factor.</p><p>Here’s a breakdown of the associated costs:</p><ul><li><strong>Server Infrastructure</strong>: A single mid-tier server capable of hosting the malicious nodes costs around <strong>$10/day</strong>.</li><li><strong>Denial-of-Service (DoS) Costs</strong>: To disrupt the honest nodes in the targeted bucket, a sustained bandwidth attack is necessary. Assuming <strong>1 Gbps per node</strong>, the DoS component of the attack would cost approximately <strong>$500/day</strong>.</li></ul><p>This brings the daily cost of targeting a single bucket to approximately <strong>$510/day</strong>.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Attacking the Mainline DHT requires extraordinary resources, particularly access to millions of IP addresses. This level of access is beyond the reach of most adversaries, making such attacks impractical for all but the most well-funded actors.</p><p>For organizations with already existing large IP pools, the daily cost of attacking a single key or bucket (~$510/day) is relatively modest. This means that, while the average user is unlikely to be targeted, high-profile individuals or entities could still face censorship risks from determined attackers, such as nation-states engaging in covert activities or well-organized criminal groups.</p><p>In summary, while the Mainline DHT offers significant resistance to censorship, it is not impervious. Its security depends on the financial and logistical barriers faced by potential attackers, which are high but not insurmountable for certain very powerful adversaries. This underscores the importance of ongoing innovation, such as PKARR and PKDNS, to strengthen decentralized systems against evolving threats.</p><p>Stay tuned for the next post on how Public Key Domains (PKDs) improve upon the default Mainline design.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b62763db39cb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/pubky/mainline-dht-censorship-explained-b62763db39cb">Mainline DHT — Censorship-Resistance Explained</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/pubky">Pubky</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[You think drinking coffee has only upsides?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@SeverinAlexB/you-think-drinking-coffee-has-only-upsides-66d04787a09c?source=rss-d63a74cebf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/66d04787a09c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[caffeine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[concentration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coffee]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[health-foods]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[health]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Severin Alexander Bühler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jul 2018 17:19:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-01T17:19:31.954Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g5MizM5yZpRw0DdIsTnXBA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Today, coffee is perceived as an energy and health booster in most of the western world. Starbucks opened up shops in every corner of the world so that coffee consumers can go everywhere without having to fear a short of their favorite drink. Coffee is even the only stimulative substance which is willingly provided to employees mostly for free.</p><p>The physical health benefits of coffee seem clear and most of the scientific world agrees about it. To mention some:</p><ul><li>Lower rates for cardiovascular disease¹</li><li>Lowers depression⁴</li><li>Lower risk for some types of cancer²</li></ul><p>Factors which contribute to the benefits³ ¹ are antioxidants, higher insulin sensitivity and more.</p><h3>But, but, but</h3><p>We would be in wonderland if coffee was all good. It is, finally, still a stimulant and like other stimulants we consume, it has upsides and downsides.</p><p>Caffeine, the main stimulative ingredient in coffee, acts like a mild painkiller. It relieves you from your physical as also from psychological pain⁶. This lasts depending on your dosage, for hours until a new shot of espresso will give you the next relief.<br>To clarify this point event more: High dosages of caffeine are used to make nervous people sleep in nursing homes for elderly. It is literally a painkiller, at least short-term.</p><p>Unfortunately, the brain gets accustomed to the effect of caffeine and if you don’t increase your intake continuously the mess starts.</p><p>After this point, coffee can cause</p><ul><li>unjustifiable anxiety/panic attack</li><li>unjustifiable daily mood swings</li><li>bad sleep like waking up in the middle of the night (no that is not normal)⁸</li><li>increased stress hormones⁹</li><li>low concentration ability (can’t slow my mind down)</li><li>and a lot more</li></ul><p>The downsides of coffee consumption usually happen when you are off for some hours. Do you have a hard time sleeping and getting up in the morning? You don’t drink coffee at the weekends and you always have a headache on Saturday morning and you don’t know why? Most people are unaware of how unstable they are psychologically with coffee and what improvement they can make without it.</p><p>The downsides only happen after a long time drinking coffee and don’t contradict studies which show short-term mental improvements.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Coffee has a lot of upsides when it comes to physical health but the psychological benefits are not as straightforward. The consumption can, for example, lead to low concentration and that is the opposite what most of us want to achieve.</p><p>I challenge everybody to stay away from caffeine for three days to really see how dependent they are. You think that is no problem? <strong>Just do it!</strong> So many people I know thought the same and came back completely devasted after two days off.</p><p>And yes, cutting out caffeine also includes tea, energy drinks, and soft drinks like coke and ice tea. So don’t cheat.</p><p>Don’t forget to like and to <a href="https://twitter.com/SeverinBuhler">follow me on Twitter.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=66d04787a09c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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