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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Shannon on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Shannon on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ShannonAmielia?source=rss-30345dc2c398------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Shannon on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is bad faith?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ShannonAmielia/what-is-bad-faith-83f0f645ac45?source=rss-30345dc2c398------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shannon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2017 22:58:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-30T22:58:24.287Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What is bad faith?</p><p>Before we can examine bad faith, it is essential to have understand the role of consciousness in Sartre’s thoughts. Sartre defines consciousness as “a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being”<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>. For Sartre, man has no predetermined nature, we arise from nothingness and our meaning is thus gained from what we do in the future; we create ourselves from nothingness, nothingness is a defining character of consciousness. Anything of this nature, i.e. mankind, is categorised as ‘for-itself’ and is contrary to the ‘in-itself’ which is anything that is determinate and not conscious; i.e. objects like tables, trees etc. Being for itself is the conscious being, it gains meaning by its freedom for the future; an artist is an artist in a different way to the way a table is a table.</p><p>In <em>Being and Nothingness, </em>Sartre explores the idea of Bad Faith. This is characterised as “a lie to oneself”<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. Initially, Sartre proposes that a man is in bad faith if he is lying to himself about the nature of his being. The lie to oneself differs from a typical lie, a typical lie relies on a duality; there is someone who deceives and someone who does the deceiving. This poses a paradoxical element to bad faith; how can I be both the deceiver and the subject of the same deception? Sartre’s answer: double negation, “the ideal description of the liar would be a cynical consciousness, affirming truth within himself, denying it in his words, and denying that negation as such”<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>. Because a lie relies on duality a lie of bad faith must create a duality within one single consciousness; part of me must know the truth, otherwise it is not a lie but ignorance, part of me must also be naïve to the truth; otherwise I could not be deceived by the lie. In this way, it is an oversimplification to see bad faith as a deception; because deception is reliant on a duality which is not apparent in a single consciousness, as is the case in a lie of bad faith. Sartre’s objection to the Freudian explanation of the Id and the Ego<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> show us that deceiver-deceived duality cannot exist in a singly unity of consciousness on the basis that the conscious is translucent; it cannot hide anything from itself “how could the censor discern the impulses needing to be repressed without being conscious of discerning them? … All conscious is knowing of knowing”<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a>. Thus, we cannot describe bad faith as self-deception, at least not if we understand this is being both a deceiver and the deceived.</p><p>Sartre’s first example of bad faith is the coquette. The situation given is that a man and a woman are on a date, the woman turns a blind eye to any sexual advances the man makes in order to postpone her having to make a decision about the future of their relationship. Thus, when the man takes her hand, she leaves it there; Sartre claims that “to leave the hand there is to consent in herself to flirt…To withdraw is to break the troubled and unstable harmony” the action therefore demands the woman makes a decision. The woman leaves her hand there, but Sartre claims, does so without realising for “she is at this moment all intellect”<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> meaning “the divorce of the body from the soul is accomplished”<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a>. This is how she achieves bad faith; she has not deceived herself in the typical deceiver-deceived duality of a lie, but has fallen into treating her facticity as a transcendence; she treats her body as though it is beyond the power of her mind in a bid to take no responsibility of it or the ramifications of its actions. Bad faith is the occurrence of the separation of facticity and transcendence, Sartre claims that bad faith “must affirm facticity as <em>being </em>transcendence and transcendence as <em>being </em>facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends the one, he can find himself abruptly faced with the other”<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a>, which is the situation the woman is in. Gary Cox summarises this point well “A person in bad faith avoids responsibility for his embodied situation by denying that it is his situation”<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a>. Cox is pointing out that the woman being in bad faith in this way is trying to separate the facticity and transcendence to become a “for-itself-in-itself”<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a>. As this kind of being, the woman would not have the obligation to make a choice; she is trying to escape her facticity. In doing so however, the woman treats her transcendent consciousness as a facticity and as Sartre explained above; this puts her in bad faith.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Being and Nothingness, P47</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Being and Nothingness, P48</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Being and Nothingness, P48</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Being and Nothingness, P51</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Being and Nothingness, P52–3</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Being and Nothingness, P56</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Being and Nothingness, P56</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Being and Nothingness, P56</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Gary Cox, <em>Sartre A guide for the perplexed, </em>P99</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Gary Cox, <em>Sartre A guide for the perplexed, </em>P98</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=83f0f645ac45" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logbook week 4]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ShannonAmielia/logbook-week-4-eb105f0b2f14?source=rss-30345dc2c398------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shannon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Oct 2017 12:28:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-30T12:45:06.219Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Heidegger. 4- A discussion of truth</p><p>proposed question: in what way do Dasein play a role in discovering the truth of the world?</p><p>In section 44 of <em>Being and Time</em> Heidegger explores the connection between Dasein and truth. The traditional concept of truth can be seen through correspondence, the correspondence theory of truth claims that there is a correspondence between my mind and the way the world is, and this is where truth lies, in Kantian terms “the agreement of knowledge with its object” (COPR B82 IN BAT P207 S44). For example, I may claim ‘it is raining’ and if this thought/statement corresponds with the way the world actually is, i.e. that it is raining, then I have said a true statement, on the other hand, if the correspondence is false i.e. it is not in fact raining, and I have claimed that it is, then what I have said is false. Heidegger wants to challenge this traditional conception of truth with insight into the relation of Dasein as an innerworldy being, and the ‘external world’. Heidegger wants to analyse this traditional conception of truth and look at the “primordial phenomenon of truth”(BAT P205 S44) which becomes visible through this process, he claims that the assumed relation between ‘intellectus’ and ‘res’ is not sufficiently proven and therefore theories which claim that truth is the agreement of the two (correspondence theories) need to be re-thought.</p><p>Heidegger challenges the traditional interpretation of truth and shows how truth is a process of discovery rather than agreement. The idea here is that a statement is true when it is discovered to be true, Heidegger gives an example of someone standing in front of a crooked picture, who claims that the picture is crooked, Heidegger notes “This statement demonstrates itself when the speaker turns around and perceives the picture hanging crookedly”(BAT P209 S44). With this the phenomenological analysis of truth can begin; Heidegger claims that this interpretation of truth differs from the traditional correspondence theories because it takes into account whether the interpretation of ‘knowledge’ (that the picture is crooked) is “phenomenally adequate” (BAT P209 S44). Heidegger claims that the process of judging, i.e. the picture to be crooked, is a process of discovery from the discovering being (the person) and another being (the object), “the being that one has in mind shows itself as it is in itself, that is, it shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it is discovered or pointed out in the statement” (BAT P209 S44). In making a statement about something in the world Dasein are discovering the world. Thus, Heidegger claims “To say that a statement is true means that it discovers the being in itself” (BAT P210 S44). It is only through the process of discovery that things can be true or false, the traditional analysis of truth claims that one thing (object) exists and what is true is a statement which agrees with the object, Heidegger claims that what is true is when a being is able to discover that an object is related to its being. This leads to the claim “Being-true as discovering is, in turn, ontologically possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world. This phenomenon, in which we recognized a basic constitution of Dasein, is the foundation of the primordial phenomenon of truth” (BAT P210 S44). This means that what is true is what is able to be discovered by Dasein, a statement isn’t true qua statement but comes to be true in the process of Dasein showing the truth/falsity. The primordial phenomenon of truth is the being of Dasein as it discloses a world; there must be a world that is able to be discovered for Dasein to discover it.</p><p>Dasein necessarily play a role in truth. Heidegger refers to Dasein as the primary truth, with the discoveries of Dasein in relation to other inner worldly beings as secondary. Dasein have the ability to discover themselves, which is the primordial phenomenon of truth, this is illustrated by the claims “The existential and ontological foundations of discovering itself first show the most primordial phenomenon of truth” (BAT P211 S44B) and “Being-true as discovering is a manner of being of Dasein” (BAT P211 S44B). The truth of things is based on the disclosure of the world which allows these things to be discovered. This is the essence of Dasein and is also the primordial phenomenon of truth, meaning that Dasein is ‘in the truth’. However, Heidegger notes that the task of disclosing the world is never completed by Dasein, as in discovering one truth another is concealed, thus ““Dasein in in the truth” also says equiprimordially that “Dasein is in untruth”” (BAT P213 S44). This is because Dasein are the kind of being that discover themselves, but in discovering themselves ‘fall prey’ to being lost in the world, i.e. Dasein discover themselves and then shift their focus onto other beings in the world, in the process of which they disclose to themselves the discovery of their being. It is in this way that the primordial phenomenon of truth is concealed to Dasein, and it is in this way that correspondence theories occupied traditional philosophy surrounding the notion of truth.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eb105f0b2f14" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logbook week 3]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ShannonAmielia/logbook-week-3-e3e934989d95?source=rss-30345dc2c398------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phenomenology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shannon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 2017 22:55:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-28T13:50:10.420Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Heidegger. 3- A discussion of being- proposed question:</p><p>‘Can we discover the world through a study of Dasein?’</p><p>Heidegger wants to carry out an investigation on being in order to understand the world in phenomenological terms. To understand this it is crucial that we understand the terms Heidegger uses, ontic and ontological. The ontic is described as being concerned about facts about entities, we can think of the ontic description of objects as anything we may say to describe an every day object; the chair has four legs, is made of wood, is painted blue, for example. The ontological is concerned with what being means; an ontological investigation endeavours to seek what it means to be a being. This leads to the ‘ontological difference’; Heidegger’s conclusion that being is not a Being, being itself is not any kind of thing, there is a crucial difference between beings as entities, and Being as a mode of existence. Heidegger wants to carry out a ‘fundamental ontology’; he wants to carry out an analysis of the way of being which makes being possible, concluding in a thematic understanding of being.</p><p>A further crucial term to learn in order to understand the investigation of being that Heidegger undertakes is Dasien. Dasein is a complex term which encapsulates the human condition of existence but is not necessarily a human feature, all humans are Dasein but it is not tautologous that all being are Dasein. Rather, Dasein can be understood as a being with the ability to be concerned with its own being, we are ‘onto-ontological’, meaning that we can be within the world at the same time as understanding the being of beings. It is through Dasein that Heidegger can explore his fundamental ontology. Dasein is a crucial component of Heidegger’s understanding of the world because “we have come to know being-in-the-world as an existential determination of Dasein”(Reader 38, BAT 64). To clarify; this means that Dasein are a necessary component of being in the world, so in order to undertake an investigation of the ‘worldliness’ of the world (gain an ontological description) we need to do this through an understanding of Dasein, “one <em>skips over</em> the phenomenon of worldliness when one fails to see the constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world”(Reader 38, BAT65).</p><p>Studying Dasein will allow Heidegger to understand the surrounding world through gaining an understanding how Dasein relate to inner worldly objects. As Dasein we make use of things in the world, this is how they gain their meaning; for example, a door knob is void of meaning until we interact with it to open a door. Things have a referential structure, they show themselves to us on account of their usefulness to us at the time, our primary mode of encounter with innerworldly beings is through realising their ‘handiness’. It is when we find something useful that we bring it “phenomenally into view”(Reader 40, BAT P68) and this is what makes it useful, this account leads Heidegger to his claim “Strictly speaking, there “is” no such thing as <em>a</em> useful thing” (Reader 40, BAT P68) however the useful thing is part of a totality, a referential structure “useful things always are <em>in terms</em> of their belonging to other useful things” (Reader 40, BAT P69), however Dasein interact with the world on the basis not of the totality of useful things but on one individual useful thing at a time, despite there being a totality which their one item is part of. This way of discovering things in the world through their handiness is also how we will discover the world, Heidegger proposes that by studying what is handy and close to us, i.e. the way we go about our everyday lives, we discover the surrounding world, due to the referential structure of which every phenomena in the world is part of. Things in the world have a relation to the nature of the world, Heidegger gives the example of a covered railroad platform which is built with the consideration of bad weather, in our everyday lives we would not consider this as a reflection of the world but just a convenient structure, it’s built with utility. However it comes with a tacit understanding of the nature of the world; i.e. changing weather conditions. Thus, “innerworldly beings that are brought along together with their constitutive references are discoverable in varying degrees of explicitness and with varying attentive penetration” (Reader 41,BAT P71), this means that we can look further into the nature of the world through examination of one thing in light of it being in a referential structure of the totality of things, “with this totality, world makes itself known”( Reader 43 BAT P74). This point is further illustrated with the example of car indicators; Heidegger explains that the indication signal of a car makes clear the whole referential structure, the sign works by being conspicuous and showing Dasein the referential whole, “they [signs] are useful things which explicitly bring a totality of useful things to circumspection so that the worldly character of what is at hand makes itself known at the same time” (Reader 45, BAT P78). Signs refer to other things in the world, “the sign itself takes its conspicuousness from the inconspicuousness of the totality of useful things at hand in everydayness”(Reader 46, BAT P80), the sign indicates and refers to something else in the world without being that thing itself. The sign is significant because it crosses the ontic and the ontological in the way Heidegger sees as important for discovering the ‘worldliness of the world’ “A sign is something ontically at hand which…functions at the same time as something which indicates the ontological structure of handiness, referential totality, and worldliness” (Reader 46,BAT P81).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e3e934989d95" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logbook week 2]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ShannonAmielia/logbook-week-2-a9fbd5cbbbf?source=rss-30345dc2c398------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a9fbd5cbbbf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shannon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 2017 22:54:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-20T22:54:35.981Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Husserl. 2- The task of phenomenology</p><p>Husserl proposes a phenomenological method which he sees as a continuing task. This method is a process of disregarding our prejudices in order to reach a point where we can actually do philosophy. Prejudices are ingrained and essential to the operation of our consciousness that they will continually reassert themselves. Thus, the phenomenologist reengages with the prejudices and the process of setting them aside.Therefore, Husserl claims, eliminating our prejudices is an ongoing task, this is a different perspective to Descartes who engages in his philosophy from the <em>tabula rasa</em> position, whereby he eliminates any ideas which have room for doubt in the bid to clear his mind and build knowledge from indisputable truths. For Husserl the prejudices are oncoming always, thus we need multiple processes of doubt. <em>But we don’t have to be a phenomenologist all of the time</em>; however whilst we are, we need to be participating in this process of eliminating prejudices.</p><p>Husserl is tasked with phenomenological reduction in order to carry out serious philosophy as a scientific endeavour. This process involves ‘Epoché’, this is the act of suspending judgement, almost ‘stepping back’ from conscious acts in order to reflect back on the content of our conscious actions. This is a reflective process which should allow us to gain a better understanding of actions. Parenthesising is a practical way in which we can exercise the Epoché. Parenthesising in phenomenology is similar to the way in which we would do it in mathematics; it is the process of bracketing something, in order to put it to one side whilst doing something else, without negating it completely. When we do this in phenomenology we are able to put our thoughts into brackets, and look at the phenomena that remains. This process is the first step in phenomenological reduction.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a9fbd5cbbbf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logbook week 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ShannonAmielia/logbook-week-1-9a4e2221dd58?source=rss-30345dc2c398------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9a4e2221dd58</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shannon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 2017 22:53:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-20T22:53:42.242Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Husserl. 1- Describe experience of an object in detail. How do I experience X, angles, sensory features, etc.</p><p>The way we perceive an object varies greatly dependant on a multitude of factors; for example, which angle I am looking at the object from, whether I am close or far away from the object, whether I am clearly perceiving; i.e. if I am tired or drunk I may perceive something with less clarity than with a refreshed or sober mind. In this weeks text, <em>Pure Phenomenology, its method, and its field of investigation</em>, Husserl writes “to every object there correspond an ideally closed system of truths that are true of it and, on the other hand, an ideal system of possible cognitive processes by virtue of which the object and the truths about it would be given to any cognitive subject”. Husserl is here stating that an object has a set of finite truths, for example a book, as a cuboid will have 8 sides, this is a fact regardless of the cognitive perception of it. However, Husserl also adds that the object has a set of possible cognitive processes which correspond to it. These are features of the object which are dependent on the perception of it; for example, the books cover is smooth, or the book is heavy, these are cognitive dependant perceptions of the object, and are not logical necessary features of the object itself.</p><p>Husserl also discusses the natural, and phenomenological attitudes that we have as perceivers. The natural attitude encapsulates our day to day experience of something; this would include our description of an object in detail. For example the book in front of me is large, the cover is hard, the pages are yellow, the text is small, it has some colour on the cover but the pages are black and white, it doesn’t have any illustrations. This is the natural explanation of something; Husserl takes interest in this experience because it is perceived as one experience; my perception of the book, although it is actually a stream of smaller experiences. During our seemingly singular experience when perceiving an object there are “multiform conscious processes which have constantly changing immanent constituents” actually happening. Our conscious experiences all the finite things; the shape, size, angle etc. of the object we are experiencing and merges the experiences into what feels like one, but is in fact a “definite series of flowing conscious processes”. In contrast to the natural attitude Is the phenomenologically reflective attitude; this explains what we are doing when we are thinking about our conscious experience of an object, rather than just perceiving it. It is in this attitude that we realise that our smooth experience in the natural attitude is in fact our conscious putting together a multitude of experiences of an object. when I am observing an object I have a natural attitude; when I am thinking about the experience of experiencing the object I have a phenomenologically reflective attitude.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9a4e2221dd58" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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