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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tatlin&#39;s Treehouse on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Capital against growth: revisiting Piketty, ten years after the crash]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Tatlin/capital-against-growth-revisiting-piketty-ten-years-after-the-crash-d330747c4b46?source=rss-e3f947694aeb------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[capitalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatlin's Treehouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Sep 2018 07:23:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-09-11T07:23:35.874Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*stDutbtH4LlD3nHr6TCt-g.jpeg" /><figcaption>“We’re ready!” From the US Office of War Information, Bureau of Special Services, 1944.</figcaption></figure><blockquote><em>Ten years on from the financial crash of 2008, Piketty’s Capital stands as the most comprehensive picture every drawn of contemporary inequality. Its fame is closely linked with the post-crash political landscape in which it was published. But if Piketty’s work is to have any lasting significance, it needs to do more than prompt us to reflect on inequality. With the start of the second post-crash decade, we need to recognise that Piketty leads us to fundamental, dire conclusions about the long-term viability of capitalist production.</em></blockquote><h3>I.</h3><p>We all remember Thomas Piketty and his much-discussed, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/least-read-book-of-the-year-2014-7?IR=T">little-read</a> monolith of economic history, <em>Capital in the 21st Century. </em>In 2014, Piketty’s work became emblematic of a political moment in which wealth and income inequality were suddenly thrust into the centre of global attention. Affluent societies became captivated by Piketty’s deep dive into the ocean of statistical data relating to taxation, income, and economic development from the pre-dawn era of capitalist production through to today. Piketty’s <em>Capital</em> dominated journalism, topped best-seller lists, and helped draw the outlines of a new age of debate about what role inequality ought to play in society, if any. Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/opinion/krugman-the-piketty-panic.html">sang Piketty’s praises</a> in his <em>New York Times</em> column week after week. <em>Capital</em> dropped at precisely the right historical moment, six years on from the 2008 financial crisis but still just at the beginning of our age of anxiety. Since the financial crash, wealth inequality has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/apr/08/global-inequality-may-be-much-worse-than-we-think">only gotten worse</a> — so much worse than the world’s richest 1% now have, famously, more wealth than the rest of the world’s population combined.</p><p>At the time, Piketty’s work<em> </em>seemed to be history in the making. What made his work so remarkable was the empirical rigour with which it demonstrated what had for many only been felt. He offerred compelling proof that modern societies really had become as staggeringly unequal as it seemed. He also showed what dire political consequences might follow from further inaction on rising inequality(political outcomes since 2014 seemed to have confirmed this). Such clarity seemed like it could be a powerful weapon in the right hands. What Piketty’s <em>Capital</em> apparently promised was a thrilling new opportunity to tackle the challenge of inequality which he had cast in such compelling terms.</p><p>But, as <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ZMd7AgAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PT48&amp;lpg=PT48&amp;dq=history+%22by+the+bad+side%22&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=N5iNkzAS-9&amp;sig=LQsGSga8Hnf-jr-xuRlgHvAE194&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiY493Nj6bdAhUEasAKHefwCY4Q6AEwB3oECAgQAQ#v=onepage&amp;q=history%20%22by%20the%20bad%20side%22&amp;f=false">Marx once reminded Proudhon</a>, “history moves by the bad side”. In the years since 2014, we have obviously not seen anything approaching a serious, critical political response to the profound crisis posed by increasing inequality. This is despite all the movements that have come and gone with the aim of amounting to such a response. We have in fact seen the opposite. Notwithstanding the <a href="https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2015/05/11/one-third-millennials-like-socialism">ground</a> that <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/02/23/british-people-view-socialism-more-favourably-capi/">socialism</a> has <a href="https://today.yougov.com/topics/philosophy/articles-reports/2018/08/07/socialism-capitalism-popular-baby-boomers">gained</a> in the often-vague estimation of public opinion polling, actual electoral outcomes have since 2016 have only served to empower political agendas that wilfully disregard the real economic, social and ecological needs of an overburdened world.</p><p>In this climate, the arguments made by Piketty in the hope of persuading policymakers have fallen flat. This has been true of subtlest claims as well as his most explicit. The party Piketty himself once advised in France — that of former President Francois Hollande — was dumped from power in disgrace in 2017. Podemos, the centre-left socialist party he <a href="https://www.thelocal.es/20150908/star-economist-piketty-to-advise-spain-anti-austerity-party">advised in Spain</a>, has fared little better. And it is obvious that right-wing nativist politics, which everywhere threaten to fill the void left by the collapse of liberal hegemony, simply pay no regard to inequality at all. The Trumpian worldview simply attempts to live with inequality by forcing the most marginalised groups in society to bear both the blame for worsening economic conditions as well as the brunt of their effects.</p><p>What is the place, then, for a Stakhanovite exercise in economic data-mining like Piketty’s? The real question is not of why Piketty’s voice failed to be heard by the powerful. Even at the time of its publication, many reviewers of <em>Capital</em> understood that the really interesting conversations sparked by it would be about what role Piketty’s work might play in socialist political praxis. And it is this area — the domain of concrete political struggle — where many of Piketty’s left critics found grounds to take issue with him. His data-heavy, human-sparse analysis of capitalism seemed to leave little room for the historical agency of people involved in movements for change. The left’s ambivalence towards Piketty formed part of the diminishment of excitement that allowed his work to be swept aside by new events.</p><p>But treating Piketty’s <em>Capital</em> as if it ought to have behaved anything like Marx’s <em>Capital</em> is a sign of how starved the mainstream political discourse is(or was) for a common-sense understanding that inequality does in fact exist. The rich simply have gained stupendously at the expense of the rest, especially since the 1970s. This makes a change from the pre-2008 political culture, which had for years been subjected to a relentless — even where unconscious and unconceived — campaign to de-legitimise any worldview which claimed that capitalism possesses dynamics which tend to increase, rather than decrease, inequality. Such an insistent disregard for lived reality is the ideological rock on which liberalism is built. Piketty did us an unquestionable service by showing in(excruciating) detail how this fairy tale view of capital accumulation is false, and worse than naïve.</p><blockquote><em>The most important takeaway from Piketty’s Capital is not simply that inequality is real or that it has become increasingly secere. If socialists learn anything from his work, it should be that inequality under capitalism is a structural inevitability. Its rising intensity is baked into the long-term development of the market economy, and this dooms capitalist relations in the long run.</em></blockquote><p>Many have contested Piketty’s proofs or found ways to diminish their significance. For instance, an unsympathetic reviewer in the <em>Financial Times</em> briefly enjoyed being at the centre of an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/upshot/everything-you-need-to-know-about-thomas-piketty-vs-the-financial-times.html">intense op-ed controversy</a> by calling into question the accuracy and deployment of Piketty’s data. This attack, however, largely fizzled out after it was subjected to its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2014/may/29/ft-journalist-errors-thomas-piketty-takedown">own withering takedown</a>. It has since become the consensus that the picture <em>Capital in the 21st Century</em> paints is a broadly accurate one. Since the FT fiasco, to make Piketty go away, the more effective tactic has been to ignore him. Piketty’s book gathers dust, his policy ideas have not been implemented, and political discourse has moved on.</p><p>For its part, the socialist movement has found little cause to mourn the passing of Piketty’s <em>Capital</em> as an object of intense discursive interest. Its technical reliance on neoclassical models of economic analysis put it too close to the camp of outright reaction for many, <a href="http://davidharvey.org/2014/05/afterthoughts-pikettys-capital/">such as David Harvey</a>. In more philosophical terms, Piketty’s argument that the tendency towards inequality sabotages liberal capitalism’s fateful promise of “meritocracy” has been seen as a hopeless validation of liberal orthodoxy. Such orthodoxy would have us believe that capitalism may not promise a perfect ratio of reward to effort today, but that its true and meritocratic form existed some time in the past. It could therefore, with a bit of fine-tuning, be made great again if voters would honour a few charming centrist technocrats with political power. Piketty can indeed be seen to draw conclusions that do nothing but support this smarmy liberal wisdom. Such ideology flies in the face of the real histories of racism, imperialism, gendered oppression, and class prejudice. These are the time-honoured methods by which societies based on competition have consistently proven their inability to offer the world anything like meritocracy.</p><p>It is on these grounds that socialists have found it possible to say that Piketty is simply wrong. On the more basic question of inequality’s existence and increasing intensity, the left has granted that Piketty is right, but wrong in being right; that is, wrong for having stated the obvious. For many, Piketty is simply seen as boring<em>.</em></p><p>This is unfortunate. Piketty’s massive study arms socialism with something much more powerful than yet more statistical proof of class domination’s tightening grip. It also gives us an ironclad empirical justification for claiming that capitalism, on the most profound level, is impermanent, contradictory, and flawed. What the left has to offer a beleaguered world on this matter goes far beyond the simple condemnation of inequality. If socialists learn can anything from his work, it should be that inequality under capitalism is a <em>structural inevitability. </em>Its rising intensity is baked into the long-term development of the market economy, and this dooms capitalist relations in the long run. And the long run is increasingly becoming our short run. The only question is of what comes after capitalism.</p><p>The grounds for making such these claims are prominent in the very first chapters of Piketty’s work. These are the chapters most reviewers bothered to read. But despite their prominence in the text, the significance of these arguments was lost. Furious debate about the mere existence or non-existence of Gilded Age-style inequality overwhelmed every other conversation which might have begun. Such a debate was made inevitable by the obstinate refusal of many commentators to recognise that capitalism could possibly create inequality, rather than serve to diminish it. But now that this absurd row has subsided, it has become possible and necessary to revisit Piketty’s work and examine the most damning conclusion one can reach by reading it: that capitalism has a tendency towards long-term decline. This has become clearer than ever in the relentless decade since 2008.</p><h3>II.</h3><p>It’s well-known that economic conditions in the societies Piketty analyses have been in decline since the 1970s. What Piketty became famous for showing is that amid such a decline, it becomes all but impossible for societies to increase real equality. This validates what we know about capitalism. Under capitalist social relations, the working population can never gain directly at the expense of the propertied classes. The poor see their standard of living substantially increase, and levels of taxation on the wealthiest rise, only when the economy is growing in absolute terms. It is only under such conditions that the rich can accept a smaller economic share — of a larger pie. This is what we call a “consensus” between capital and labour. Such a consensus was briefly seen in the post-WWII period. But as soon as conditions change and growth stalls, as happened in the 1970s, the calculations made by economic and political actors change dramatically. Capital ultimately cannot make <em>real</em> sacrifices on behalf of labour. The poor are always the first and only ones called upon to give up life and comfort when it becomes impossible for everyone in society to benefit simultaneously. Social relations under declining growth conditions become zero-sum political competitions which, so far, the rich have been winning. Given that state expenditure of the kind that maintains welfare programs is based on public debt, which is to say, on the promise of returns to debt-holders on the basis of future economic growth, these dynamics doomed the old welfare state model of social democracy. A world of weak growth, Piketty shows, has been the norm for a generation and will remain so for the foreseeable future.</p><blockquote>We see now how capitalist relations, pursued to their ultimate limit, throw up insuperable barriers which liberalism has in fact only ever been able to overcome in its dreams — that is, temporarily, in the restless sleep before each rude awakening.</blockquote><p>In proving this, Piketty’s celebrated technical characterisations take centre stage. Those who followed the Pikettymania coverage will remember his unique deployment of the terms <em>r</em> and <em>g. </em>In his formula, <em>r</em> stands for the returns on capital and <em>g</em> stands for growth. By growth, we mean the overall economic growth of countries, usually measured in GDP. By “returns on capital”, what is meant is the profitability of investments made by capitalists. Piketty’s argument about inequality ultimately rests on his observation that, historically, <em>r</em> has grown much more quickly than <em>g. </em>The rich get richer faster than nations do. As long as this is the case, inequality will increase and social order will be threatened. This is <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16545898">what we have seen</a>, especially since the 1970s. This <em>r &gt; g </em>formulation is thus where we have to begin unpacking the deep content of Piketty’s work.</p><p>Once we accept the logics of <em>r </em>and <em>g</em>, the frightening implications of inequality naturally emerge. But if one fails to linger with the actual text of <em>Capital</em> beyond this, and takes the question of its central contribution as answered, then one must draw the intuitive conclusion that what unequal societies need is simply more economic growth. <em>r</em> being greater than <em>g</em> may pose a problem that not everyone is ready to confront, but for those that are, the natural way out of Piketty’s dilemma is to increase <em>g. </em>Problem solved.</p><p>Except that “increasing economic growth” is hardly a new or revolutionary idea, and little any human being could possibly do to make policymakers obsess about this topic more intensely remains to be done. Growth is definitely one thing which the political mainstream has not left out of its consciousness and never has. If growth were as easy to generate as it were to talk about, this conversation would not be taking place. In all likelihood, no conversations would be — our planet would already be the charred, noxious husk drained of its resources it threatens to soon become. Therefore, justifying the need to expand economies is not Piketty’s contribution. Having established the implications of <em>r &gt; g</em>, Piketty goes on to demonstrate the inherent limits capitalism sets for itself concerning future economic growth. This demonstration is at the heart of the true radicalism in Piketty. Hence his statement:</p><blockquote><em>“ … growth has always been relatively slow except in exceptional periods or when catch-up is occuring. Furthermore, all signs are that growth … will be even slower in the future.” [72]</em></blockquote><p>This, more than anything else, is why <em>Capital</em> is a profoundly alarming work, which people flocked to even if the reason to do so was not always well-explained. To understand how it could be the case that economic growth is a problem in itself, we have to understand how Piketty describes the dynamics which condition the values of <em>r </em>and <em>g</em> over time.</p><p>For Piketty as for most economists, <em>r</em> is determined by the relative riskiness of an investment; the more an investor, almost always a capitalist, stands to lose, the more they expect in return if their investment pays off. Meanwhile, <em>g</em> is conditioned in a grander, somewhat vaguer way by the co-evolution of two terms: “population growth and per capita output growth”. Increase in “output” is, for most economists including Piketty, expressed in terms of growth in productivity, which is conditioned largely by technological development. The advance of productive technology is a key component of what is called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_factor_productivity">“total factor productivity”</a>. Piketty makes the observation that,</p><blockquote><em>“… growth always includes a purely demographic component and a purely economic component, and only the latter allows for an improvement in the standard of living.” [72]</em></blockquote><p>This means that technological development is the component of growth which allows for a qualitative increase in the standard of living, rather than mere population expansion.</p><p>An increase in the standard of living corresponds to an increase in life expectancy. The <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality">lower rate of child mortality</a> under modern conditions — better sanitation, advanced medical care, better nutrition due to higher incomes, etc — is synonymous with the massive population growth we have seen all over the world since the dawn of the Industrial Era. Such technological development has also created new industries for these new populations to participate in as workers. This allows wages and commodities to circulate in a way that expands the economic domain. Such expansion is essential in order for the mass of people called into being by population growth to access, through the market, the benefits of technology(more varied diets, medicine, etc), which in turn enables new rounds of growth. An increase in <em>g</em> is therefore a function of this technological-demographic feedback loop. New technologies allow populations to grow, and larger populations participating in economic life on an expanded scale create more opportunities for extended technological development. Such are the terms which condition <em>g.</em></p><p>But the two factors <em>r</em> and <em>g</em> do not exist in perfect separation. One intervenes in the other. Everyone — from Marx to the blandest of mainstream economists — knows that the technological development which partially composes <em>g</em> is conditioned by investment in research and development; investment largely done by capitalists on the basis of expected returns. <em>r</em> thus intrudes on <em>g</em> in no small way. We can explore this by further exploring <em>r.</em></p><p>From the spinning jenny to the steam engine to the microchip, commercial considerations have always been a part of technological innovation. It is on such a basis that capital justifies itself: it claims to risk its skin in the development of new technologies which, if conditions are right, create new markets, new job opportunities, and therefore new ground for the continued expansion of economies, populations and societies. Capital is in fact <em>compelled</em> to innovation, because any laxity in the battle to increase output on the part of an individual capitalist exposes him to destruction by competing capitalists who are not so idle. Hence the innate connections drawn by bourgeois economists between competition, capitalism, innovation, and growth. That these things naturally go together is simply an article of liberal faith. It is not wrong to say that such factors have co-incided historically, however much states may have been active participants in technological development. Growth is dependent to an extent on technology which is to an extent dependent on business concerns. Hence the inter-dependence of <em>r </em>and <em>g.</em></p><p>But these heartwarming partnerships run into contradictions in the long run. Both of the terms which condition <em>g</em> are subject to deterioration over time, as is <em>r</em>. It has continually become more and more difficult to maintain the harmony of their inter-relationship. <em>g </em>requires the stimulation of investment, the reliability and intensity of which is conditioned by <em>r</em>, the rate of return on investment. But what we have seen since the 1970s is an environment in which opportunities for profitable investment have become increasingly scarce. Piketty maintains that for most of capitalism’s history the actual value of <em>r</em>, the rate of return on capital, has held steady at around 5 or 6 per cent, but more needs to be said here.</p><p>The fact is that capital investment <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/declining-private-investment-infrastructure-trend-or-outlier">across sectors</a> has been on the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/global-foreign-investment-slows-as-returns-decline/a-44102316">decline</a> for a <a href="https://seekingalpha.com/article/4135699-investment-declining">very long time</a>, and ongoing investment has had to turn to increasingly risky domains to extend profit. Scholars like Nick Srnicek have written about how the decline of investment opportunities in traditional industries is what lies behind the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=2HdNDwAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PA30&amp;lpg=PA30&amp;dq=nick+srnicek+%2B+increasingly+risky+investments&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=nrGELyRkZi&amp;sig=u4HoenOJrSWj0fxjPku6G9clgqk&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwijyru2g5_dAhWrA8AKHdhZC34Q6AEwB3oECAMQAQ#v=onepage&amp;q=nick%20srnicek%20%2B%20increasingly%20risky%20investments&amp;f=false">increasing focus</a> on more volatile, experimental technology investments of the kind we see coming out of Silicon Valley.</p><p>If <em>r</em> has become more precarious for many capitalists, this has been because opportunities for anyone other than the largest, most powerful corporations to find competitive advantages in new forms of production have all but disappeared. This is the tendency that Stephen Kaufmann and Ingo Stützle identify in their <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/2255-thomas-piketty-s-capital-in-the-twenty-first-century">introductory work</a> on Piketty’s <em>Capital</em> as a “surplus of capital relative to possibilities for increasing productivity and hence returns on capital” [29]. Productivity is key here: economists routinely talk about investment as a way of increasing the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marginal_product_of_capital">“marginal productivity(or product) of capital”</a>. There is little one can do to earn profit that does not involve increasing productivity. And opportunities to do this seem to have been drying up across sectors.</p><p>Provided you accept Piketty’s definitions of capital, this is a climate where a smaller group of people stands to get richer than ever while most people, including the less powerful capitalists, get poorer. Increasingly, only the largest firms and fortunes are able to pay the entry costs involved in participating in a more and more technologically advanced business envirionment. This is why, for instance, <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/17/companies-control-food_n_5684782.html">ten companies</a> control most of the world’s food businesses. The average value of <em>r</em> may be holding steady, but only the average. Averages aside, fewer and fewer people are seeing <em>r</em> of any value other than 0. Profits, rather than uniformly rising or falling, are skyrocketing for a few and cratering for the rest. Across important sectors, for instance retail, <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/2016-11-17/staples-to-disappear-from-uk-high-street-after-buyout/">buyouts</a> and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/uk-high-street-store-closures-retail-job-losses-2018-next-toys-r-us-new-look-maplin-a8270506.html">bankruptcies</a> are rife. Corporate consolidation of this kind, which is in<a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228354-500-revealed-the-capitalist-network-that-runs-the-world/"> advanced stages</a>everywhere, comports precisely with Piketty’s arguments about the increasing aristocratisation of capital. A further consideration, however, needs to be kept in mind.</p><p><em>r</em> has therefore been subject to stress — an increasingly difficult job of maintaining the “stable” 5 or 6 per cent Piketty celebrates. This has had dire implications for <em>g. </em>If it is true that opportunities to increase the marginal productivity of capital are becoming more scarce, it follows logically that in addition to old industries reaching the limits to which they can be made optimally efficient, new industries are not being called into being which can be made subject to profitable improvement either. Such a phenomena can be observed as economic fact.</p><h3>III.</h3><p>Over time, advanced economies have evolved in such a way as to reveal the limitations of technological innovation as a way to create new domains for capital accumulation and employment. New industries with labour requirements large enough to take in the ever-expanding supply of surplus workers have simply not materialised, despite the reckless promises made by and about the high-tech industry. Societies have simply not emerged from deindustrialisation in tact. Rather than usher in an entrepreneurial renaissance, deindustrialisation has led to the flourishing of low-paid, often precarious service-industry work. This economic sector is estimated to account for <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2ce78f36-ed2e-11e5-888e-2eadd5fbc4a4">80% of the UK economy.</a> We will see what the implications of this are for equality and social stability. The trap-doors through which policy thinkers attempt to escape the crisis of capitalism — education, re-industrialisation, etc — each come with their own limitations.</p><p>It is often said that for the bootstrapping dreams of the knowledge economy to come true, for plucky startup cultures to flourish and the promise of social mobility to be fulfilled, “education” and “skills” are what is needed. In this narrative, the millions economically displaced by deindustrialisation simply have not been “reskilled” properly. But education-as-politics is a long-standing liberal panacea with historical results we can evaluate critically. Pushing <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/universityeducation/11811928/University-was-never-meant-to-be-for-everybody.-Young-people-have-been-sold-a-lie.html">entire generations of young people</a> into higher education has not ushered in utopia. While there are millions who no doubt count themselves grateful for having been given the opportunity to expand their minds, it simply cannot be denied that the real economic effect of treating higher education as the solution to all problems has been to create millions of heavily indebted people with university degrees whose actual market value is marginal, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/01/13/is-a-college-degree-the-new-high-school-diploma-heres-why-your-degrees-worth-is-stagnant/?utm_term=.de3e85c64290">similar to what a US high school degree was</a> in the past. The figure of the PhD working at a coffee shop while their degree gathers dust is so well-known as to be comical. This has nothing to do with whether going to school is good or bad. Instead, it has to do with the actual needs of modern economies. We simply do not actually need as many computer engineers or data analysts as we have people with mouths to feed. The service industry has become the home of what would otherwise be an entirely surplus population, of the kind we see in mega-slums around the world.</p><p>But the service industry cannot support modern industrial society without the injection of huge amounts of consumer debt into the economy. Consumer <a href="https://books.google.at/books?id=LtvsCSeyF7QC&amp;pg=PA110&amp;lpg=PA110&amp;dq=expansion+of+%22consumer+debt%22+in+postwar+period+UK+-US&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=zA_EVrboWn&amp;sig=wziH2kLAkybObyHN0pzlrsE766g&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiFnpv_qqbdAhVMiCwKHZejCA0Q6AEwAHoECAEQAQ#v=onepage&amp;q=expansion%20of%20%22consumer%20debt%22%20in%20postwar%20period%20UK%20-US&amp;f=false">debt levels have indeed been soaring</a> since the end of WWII. This is necessary, because the service industry work is and will remain characterised by low wage levels which inhibit the growth of consumer economies based on service industry employment. This is because such work comes with inherently low <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK4079/">skill requirements</a>. The barrier to entry in the service job market will therefore always remain low. The potential supply of service-industry labour will always more or less match the size of the working-age population as a whole. No one is too educated to not have the option of resigning themselves to looking for service-industry work. This guarantees intense competition over jobs — many employers routinely receive hundreds of applications for a single position — which translates into severe difficulty in forming networks of trade union solidarity, which are the main mechanism by which wages are propped up: the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_wage_premium">“union wage premium”</a> cannot help but go down under such conditions. Only trade union activity could guarantee high service-industry wages, and it is just such activism which has become difficult in the present economy, bar a few non-service industry bright spots. And as automation in the service industry proceeds — and it is already wiping out the British high street — competition will become even more intense. (I have written <a href="https://www.nelondonfabians.org/nolan-macgregor/2018/8/10/worker-against-worker">more extensively</a> on this subject elsewhere.)</p><blockquote>In the second chapter of Capital, Piketty characterises the arc of global economic growth over time as “a bell curve with a very high peak” [99]. The very high average rate of growth in advanced western economies during the middle of the 20th century was an historical anomaly.</blockquote><p>This poses a dilemma for capitalist reproduction. If 2008 taught us anything, it taught us that debt defies control. Long-term stability becomes an oxymoron when economic processes come to rely on debt. This is how the partisans for financial de-regulation frame their arguments: we <em>need</em> to de-regulate in order to facilitate more transactions, which everyone knows is the only way to keep the economy growing overall. And they are not wrong, where a consumer economy is concerned. This is especially true of debt in the housing market, where the 2008 crisis began. A massive expansion of housing debt was part and parcel of the post-war economic expansion.</p><p>But in order for capitalism to survive, it will need more than new forms of debt and new suckers to take them on. It needs <em>real</em> growth. But growth, historically, has been dependent on the creation of new markets via the development of new technologies. The invention of the automobile, for instance, brought into being a whole army of auto industry workers as well as countless ancillary forms of labour; highway motel operators, independent car mechanics, and so on. This was not debt-driven expansion, even if it co-incided with and fed into an era of expansion that did involve debt.</p><p>But in the 21st century, rather than a flowering of new industries, we have seen the expansion of an old one — services — and the intensification of automated technique across sectors. Increasingly, investors have had to focus their attempts to increase the marginal productivity of capital on making existing industries more efficient, rather than the creation of new ones. This qualitative deepening of technological modernity increasingly takes the place of technology’s quantitative <em>broadening</em>. Manufacturing is not a solution to the problems posed by automation: automation is precisely what took manufacturing off the table as a basis on which to build a society.</p><p>It is not just that new industries are not coming into being on the necessary scale: existing industries are simultaneously becoming more and more hostile to human labour as time goes on. Automation is proceeding in the service industry and <a href="https://www.consultancy.uk/news/13628/uk-manufacturing-employment-nosedives-with-automation-looming">continues to be extended</a> in manufacturing. The tech sector, despite claiming to be a “pioneer” of new industries whenever convenient, much more often prefers to cast itself as a “disruptor” of old industries. And this title is earned. Far more of what Silicon Valley does is disruptive to existing industries than in any way constitutive of entirely new ones. Jeff Bezos, richest man on earth, obviously did not increase the number of shopfronts in the world: Amazon simply concentrated access to a world of consumer goods into one central interface. It has therefore become <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2014/10/04/technology-isnt-working">abundantly clear</a> that the tech industry cannot save capitalism.</p><p>All this means one thing: technological growth and development does create new opportunities for expanding the labour market, but only up to a historical point. At a certain stage of development, what automation makes possible for businesses becomes greater than what human beings make possible. We reached this point some time in the latter half of the 20th century. Automation has without a doubt <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/augie_picado_the_real_reason_manufacturing_jobs_are_disappearing">pushed millions of people out of work</a> since the postwar era, and rather than turning them into highly-paid engineers, it forced them and their children into service-industry drudgery. The majority of today’s workers simply cannot earn enough to participate in the consumer economy on the scale necessary to guarantee economic growth without recourse to crippling student, household and consumer debt.</p><p>Piketty would have us linger on the problem of growth, and does tie it directly to the problem of technology having ceased to open up expansive new markets. He stops short of predicting what technological innovations have yet to take place, or of what hypothetical new opportunities might be created for economic expansion. This is good form on his part, but deferring to uncertainty is the standard escape hatch through which liberal technocrats attempt to evade difficult conversations about growth. Rather than ask serious questions, we are meant, <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/david_autor_why_are_there_still_so_many_jobs">almost literally</a>, to have faith in “human ingenuity”. The afflicted are constantly confronted with the dubious comfort of being promised that people put out of work by robots can get new jobs programming robots, as if the world needed precisely as many computer programmers as it needed computers. One wonders just how inefficient liberal technocrats think capitalism really is.</p><p>Despite playing cute on technology and growth, Piketty does make reference to the work of Northwestern University economist Robert Gordon, whose theory of growth rests on a conceptualisation in which waves of technological innovation correspond to waves of economic expansion. Gordon believes that, with the passing of an epoch where innovation created vast new industries and markets, growth in the advanced countries is <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/robert_gordon_the_death_of_innovation_the_end_of_growth">destined to slow down</a>. Piketty cheekily leaves it up to the reader to decide if he explicitly agrees with Gordon or not, but he does not contradict him, and on the subject of future growth prospects, Piketty references no other economist. Considering his references to Gordon follow clear statements that economic growth has likely plateaued, this name-check should tell us something.</p><p>If it seems like things can’t get more bleak, don’t worry: they can. The other term which conditions <em>g</em>, population growth, has also been subject to change. Population growth, which historically is correlated with economic growth, has stalled in the advanced economies for reasons that also have to do with the unfiolding of technological-economic possibilities. It is well-known that as societies pass from an agricultural model to an advanced industrial model, they undergo something called the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition">“demographic transition”</a>. This essentially means that as standards of living reach a certain point, birth rates go down. People have less desire to have children if infant mortality rates are low. This is what we have seen in all the high-GDP countries since the end of the Second World War. This means that the same number of people are being burdened with an ever-greater responsibility to maintain and expand consumption levels. Of course, Piketty stresses that population has not actually begun to contract in any country. We still have populations large enough for competition over scarce work to be a problem. The so-called problem of “overpopulation” need not concern us here — suffice to say that all societies eventually undergo their demographic transition, which poses long-term problems for capitaism. India and China are both in the process of undergoing their own transitions.</p><p>The pressure which the development of capitalism puts on <em>r </em>and <em>g</em> thus tends to explode their stable, mutually-beneficial relationship. Opportunities to increase <em>r</em> become scarcer and more risky as technology becomes more specialised and efficient. This same development of technology, which directly corresponds to the perfection of labour-saving technique, also destabilises labour markets and pushes a larger and larger surplus population into the ranks of precarious service-industry labour, where automation is continuing to evolve. The depressive effect all this has on wages then punishes growth, because growth in a consumer economy depends on consumer spending levels. We have been caught in this loop for generations now, moving forward largely under the power of consumer debt, a badly-trained beast which constantly threatens to turn around and bite us.</p><p>This is why Piketty can dedicate so much time to the subject of low growth rates and their political, social and economic implications. In the second chapter of <em>Capital</em>, Piketty characterises the arc of global economic growth over time as “a bell curve with a very high peak” [99]. The very high average rate of growth in advanced Western economies during the middle of the 20th century was an historical anomaly. Piketty claims it will level off at around one per cent in the near future, a return to something closer to its historic average, which was all but negligible until the Industrial Revolution.</p><p>The trend-bucking which dynamic Asian economies like India and China have been doing over the course of the last couple decades corresponds to what Piketty calls “catchup”. According to him, this is another form of anamolously quick growth, in which countries which lag behind developmentally begin to rapidly “converge” on the more advanced economies through a process which Piketty says is driven, first and foremost, by the diffusion of knowledge. It makes sense to claim that the diffusion of skills, education and technical know-how is the primary mechanism by which one economy catches up with another. Without these, all the fixed capital such as machinery and factories a country accumulates will be nothing but inert matter. And knowledge is more <a href="https://www.csoonline.com/article/3254810/data-protection/cyber-espionage-china-wants-japanese-firms-intellectual-property.html">easily stolen</a> than machinery. But even knowledge has its limits as a commodity, just like all other commodities. “Human capital” cannot <a href="https://acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-8-number-1/human-capital-and-poverty">save capitalism</a>, despite what some people would have you believe. When economies catch up, they have caught up: as Piketty says, the world cannot play catch-up with itself. While he stresses that this process of global convergence on low growth levels is not complete, he does claim that the developing economies which are the focus of such attention and envy today will, tomorrow, suffer the same problems as all countries. He wrote this in 2014, already being able to read the signs coming out of Asia about slowed growth in the post-2008 period. Since the publication of <em>Capital</em>, the news has only gotten worse. China, often seen as the saviour of capitalism, <a href="http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/chinas-economy-stagnating">has become</a> one of its <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h7V3Twb-Qk">many victims</a>.</p><p>This is the dynamic from which Piketty’s point about the increasing significance of inherited wealth as opposed to “earned” wealth proceeds. As economies contract, inheritence becomes a more effective way to accumulate wealth than innovation. We have seen that this phenomenon proceeds not on the basis of increased inequality, but on the basis of diminished opportunities to innovate effectively. Technology has, in many ways, done its job too well. The circuitous evolution of capitalism has re-created conditions similar to those which prevailed during the Gilded Age of the late 19th century. What many of Piketty’s readers — or those who claim to have read him — would have us believe is that this is somehow a betrayal of capitalism’s promise. Socialism must argue that it is in fact a fulfillment, and Piketty proves it, regardless of what he may have intended.</p><h3>IV.</h3><p>A puzzlingly backwards approach is often taken to Piketty’s <em>r &gt; g</em> formula. The inequality which is a <em>result</em> of <em>r </em>being greater than <em>g</em> is often taken as a kind of <em>cause</em> for weak growth. In describing the social and political fallout of increased inequality as described by <em>r &gt; g</em>, Finnish economist Heikki Patomaki writes:</p><blockquote><em>There are two main reasons why these developments[increased inequality, concentration of political power] would increase the likelihood of major economic and political shocks. First, they strengthen the relative power of those actors who are predisposed to disregarding those rational economic policies needed to ensure full employment and steady economic developments. (</em><a href="http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue69/Patomaki69.pdf"><em>53</em></a><em>, PDF)</em></blockquote><p>While it is certainly possible to see how inequality has a compounding effect on the contraction of <em>g</em>, leaving unexplained the fundamental dynamics that drive this process and failing to tell its history in detail leaves us vulnerable to a tautological form of thinking which essentially makes the claim that <em>r</em> is greater than <em>g</em> because <em>g</em> is less than <em>r. </em>This is supposed to be something politically profound. We are meant to believe that purely “rational” policies exist which could guarantee an increase in <em>g</em>, if only the pig-headed elites who are empowered by the rise in <em>r</em> relative to <em>g</em> were not increasingly in a position to block them.</p><p>This is a neat story, but a circular one. We have attempted to show how difficult the conundrum of growth, productivity and labour in the 21st century actually is to solve. Socialism will need to have a much broader imagination than is currently shown in those corners of left policy thinking that make <a href="https://www.nelondonfabians.org/nolan-macgregor/2018/7/25/build-it-in-britain">industrial protectionism</a> out to be some kind of salvation.</p><p>This lack of imagination is also on display wherever critics on the left have lost sight of what makes Piketty’s <em>Capital</em> truly significant. David Graeber, for instance, takes the argument that Piketty’s work ignores the role of political struggle played in shaping neoliberal capitalism to its logical conclusion by advancing the argument that a powerful anti-capitalist social movement <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/30/savage-capitalism-back-radical-challenge">is necessary</a> to tame “savage capitalism”. In doing so, Graeber claims that Piketty’s work misses the essential driving force behind increased inequality: the lack of a global “alternative” to capitalism. This absence of resistance allows bourgeois rule to rampage across the world unchecked. This is an intuitive argument, and its flaws are easily able to hide behind its strengths. What Graeber fails to show — and what Piketty more than anyone allows us to see — is <em>how</em> this world-historic defeat of those forces pushing beyond capitalism in the 20th and early 21st centuries was actually accomplished. I have attempted to show here and <a href="https://www.nelondonfabians.org/nolan-macgregor/2018/8/10/worker-against-worker">elsewhere</a> how an increase in labour market competition, made possible by new forms of automation, contributed to the dissolution of old bonds of labour union solidarity in key industries, and that this set the stage for the political defeats sufferred by 20th-century British socialism. Piketty’s work provides a framework for understanding the consequences of these historic shifts, and draws our attention to the relevant economic information in a way that Graeber’s simplistic rah-rah activist narratives do not.</p><p>Graeber, in his analysis of <a href="http://www.strikemag.org/bullshit-jobs/">“bullshit jobs”</a>, has done more than anyone to conflate industrial productivity of the kind that human labour steadily began to abandon in the postwar period with the “real” economy, as opposed to the false, bullshit economy of finance. Of our post-Fordist world, Graeber writes:</p><blockquote><em>“If someone had designed a work regime perfectly suited to maintaining the power of finance capital, it’s hard to see how they could have done a better job. Real, productive workers are relentlessly squeezed and exploited.”</em></blockquote><p>As if “real, productive” capitalism — industrial capitalism — were not guilty of its own monstrous absurdities. Burning the planet alive just so that rich countries can<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jan/10/half-world-food-waste"> throw away half the food</a> they import, or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/shortcuts/2018/jan/02/wardrobes-full-unworn-clothes-worth-10-billion-pounds">abandon to their closets half the clothes</a> they purchase, amounts to bullshit no less odorous than what goes on in the City banks. The false profundity of the left’s common sense on “neoliberalism” is worth its own, long treatment.</p><p>Suffice to say that the growth regimes people like Graeber would seek to return to are gone forever, and Piketty proves this. This is despite his failure to live up to the radicalism of his book’s communist namesake. As Stephen Kaufmann and Ingo Stützle point out, on this subject Piketty’s <em>Capital</em> actually bears direct comparison with an argument advanced in Marx’s <em>Capital</em> — one which Piketty explicitly denies. They write:</p><blockquote><em>“Against this background, Piketty is confronted with a similar ‘logical contradiction’ supposedly also identified by Marx with his theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall … “ [29]</em></blockquote><p>This “tendency of the rate of profit to fall” has been debated and analysed endlessly. Very roughly speaking, it corresponds to the problem highlighted already by Kauffman and Stützle; the decreasing availability of opportunities to invest capital productively. But Piketty explicitly rejects this idea, maintaining that <em>r </em>— the rate of return on capital investments — has held steady more or less for all of capital’s history.</p><p>Make no mistake, Piketty did not set out to tell the story of capitalism’s irreversible decline. To this day, he takes every opportunity — <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11320477/French-rock-star-economist-Thomas-Piketty-refuses-highest-honour.html">even his most high-profile ones</a> — to remind the French public that “reviving growth” should be the guiding star of their politics. Such claims rest on the assumption is that such a revival is possible, even if much of Piketty’s <em>Capital</em> works to show how unlikely this is even in the distant future.</p><p>Marxist economist Michael Roberts, who blogs at <em>The Next Recession</em>, has done some intriguing if not entirely blameless work in attempting to <a href="https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2014/04/23/a-world-rate-of-profit-revisited-with-maito-and-piketty/">rehabilitate the orthodox Marxian view</a> on the TRPF, against Piketty. He points out some interesting research done by scholars at China’s Tsinghua University(Li, Xiao, Zhu, 2009) and others that give some credence to the notion. But this need not concern us here.</p><p>One can make the argument that it is not necessarily changes to the average rate of return on capital which fundamentally determine the speed and severity with which inequality and instability grow. We have drawn attention to the tendency for such returns, whatever their average level, to accrue to a smaller and smaller strata of highly diversified, technologically advanced mega-corporations. Additionally, the practical social effects of inequality which Piketty would have us focus proceed more directly from an increase in the relative surplus population, the “reserve army of labour”. Marx describes the growth of this surplus population in its own terms, distinct from his treatment of the falling-profit tendency. The forces which act to broaden the surplus population are subsumed under a rubric which Marx refers to as the “general law of capitalist accumulation”. From <em>Capital,</em> Vol. 1, Ch. 25, Section 4:</p><blockquote><em>“In the </em>automatic<em> factories, as in all the great workshops, where machinery enters as a factor, or where only the modern division of labour is carried out, large numbers of boys are employed up to the age of maturity. When this term is once reached, only a very small number continue to find employment in the same branches of industry, whilst the majority are regularly discharged. This majority forms an element of the </em>floating surplus population<em>, growing with the extension of those branches of industry … The same causes which develop the expansive power of capital, develop also the labour power at its disposal. The relative mass of the </em>industrial reserve army increases therefore with the potential energy of wealth<em>. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to its torment of labour. The more extensive, finally, the lazarus layers of the working class, and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. </em>This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation.<em>” [My emphasis]</em></blockquote><p>This general law of accumulation, and the effects it has on the growth of the surplus population, has less in common with the TRPF than with the dynamics we have been describing, in which disruptive innovations de-stabilise traditional forms of work and introduce intense competition into a labour market characterised increasingly by service-industry labour. The <a href="https://endnotes.org.uk/"><em>Endnotes</em> collective</a> has written powerfully on the extent to which the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is really a centrally necessary concept in Marx’s work. In brief, we can say with them that that the TRPF may act as more of a supplemental concept to Marx’s broader contention about the long-term prospects of capitalist reproduction, rather than a central one. From Endnotes, Vol. 2:</p><blockquote><em>“… if the theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall helps to highlight the extent to which labour is a problem for capital, Marx’s theory of the ‘general law of accumulation’ and of the constant generation of surplus populations, is both more revealing and more historically palpable in this respect.” [15]</em></blockquote><p>The debate about whether Piketty proves or disproves Marx’s predictions about the historic trajectory of capitalist production essentially hinges on whether one considers Marx’s central contention about its slide towards breakdown to be the “general law” or the TRPF. Perhaps what Piketty shows is that both have a role to play, even if these are not connections or implications he explicitly pays attention to. We do know from publicly-available data that <em>r</em>, despite the degree to which it is holding steady on average, has come under strain as new opportunities to invest capital effectively have dried up. And we know with equal certainty that <em>g</em>, economic growth, is also under strain from the pressures of a surplus population increasingly marginalised from the consumer economy.</p><p>In conclusion, we should spend some time with Piketty’s often-overlooked “solution” to the crisis posed by <em>r &gt; g. </em>He dedicates a great deal of space to this subject in the final third of the book. In brief, he proposes that the policymakers of the world come together to enact a “global tax on wealth”, in order to diminish inequality by paying for a new round of social welfare programs. This would amount to an almost magical act of multi-lateral governmental solidarity that seems, in the age of Trump, as if it could only occur on another planet.</p><p>The idea is simple. Piketty leaves the details indeterminate; they are not really relevant for his purposes. A global wealth tax would simply be a tax on the very rich, meant to pay for social programs, assessed by all nations acting in concert with each other. For Piketty, this is the only way to guarantee some approximation of equality and meritocracy. He would have us try to recreate the conditions of the mid-century welfare state, this time on a globally-coordinated level. Piketty calls this “a social state for the twenty-first century”. Why would such a scheme — and presumably such a state — have to be global?</p><p>One of the central arguments made by the hatchet-wielders of the neoliberal turn was that in order to attract business and investment to a particular nation or locality, capital needed to enjoy maximum freedom. As many regulations as possible must go, and public bodies entrusted with essential functions must be turned into profit-making private businesses. If such conditions are not created, then capital can be expected to take itself elsewhere, to somewhere with a “more favourable business climate”. It is on this basis that the world’s “innovation hubs” and “Special Economic Zones” were created. This is why any such wealth tax as Piketty proposes would have to be global. Capital can have nowhere to hide — only then can tax revenue grow to the size necessary to fix an utterly broken welfare state, or bring one into existence where none exists.</p><p>When it comes to the threat of business exodus, Piketty recognises what many on the left do not: that the logic of neoliberalism makes a perverse kind of sense. In a world where capital is global but workers are largely not, a world wherein people need to eke out a living based on what employment opportunities present themselves, capital really does have the power to set the terms of the social contract with reference to its extraterritoriality. Globalisation is real. Today more than ever, there can be no socialism in one country. No real way out of this dilemma currently exists. And Piketty’s global tax represents an abstract, lifeless attempt to cut the Gordian knot of globalised capital in the realm of theory.</p><p>In the global wealth tax scheme, we see technocratic 20th-century welfare state liberalism reach its logical conclusion. Now we have entered the inner chamber of the liberal heart. Here, even Piketty himself must dispense with all pretence: half-proudly he declares this ecstatic vision of a global revenue service “utopian”. With this one word, Piketty demolishes the intellectual high ground on liberalism which has always tried to perch itself by claiming a specious monopoly on “realism”, as opposed to the “utopianism” of socialism. This is what all the centuries of liberal thought from John Locke to John Meynard Keynes to John Rawls to today have apparently been building up to. Piketty has drawn back the curtain for the final time. We do not have space here to outline how unlikely it is in the current political climate that the nations of the world will be able to organise anything on a global, coordinated scale, other than perhaps a war. And Piketty knows this.</p><p>We see now how capitalist relations, pursued to their ultimate limit, throw up insuperable barriers which liberalism has in fact only <em>ever</em> been able to overcome in its dreams — that is, temporarily, in the restless sleep before each rude awakening. Piketty the cartographer has done more than anyone since Marx to map out the profoundly deluded realm in which liberalism lives. That he did so more or less without meaning to makes his achievement all the more impressive. Capital cannot grow out of its contradictions. From the moment it was born, it was marked, like all things historical, for eventual old age and death. This has profound implications for the socialist project, which today more than ever needs to distinguish itself from the half-measures dreamt up by liberals of all stripes — whether conservative or “progressive” — who hope to defer the hard choices involved in charting humanity’s future in an age of economic and ecological crisis.</p><p>What we have in Piketty’s <em>Capital </em>is a profoundly confused book, but confused in a way that should be familiar to all socialists. The liberal premises from which it begins are built on a bedrock of confusion. This, however, should in no way diminish the contribution it can make to a scientific socialist study of contemporary political economy. Ten years on from the financial crisis which crowned capitalism’s final run of unqualified growth(itself a part of a much longer postwar decline), we owe it to ourselves to take seriously all the empirical data that comes our way regarding socialism’s true historic tasks in the 21st century. It is beyond the scope of this essay to chart a precise route towards the fulfillment of those tasks, but we can say one thing with certainty: commodity production itself is the problem. This means that the competitive system of buying and selling that guides all forms of capitalism whether state-driven, co-operative or <em>laissez</em>-<em>faire, </em>must be treated as the starting point for our critique. In a world which has long since reduced “scarcity” to a cruel, ideologically-sustained absurdity, we can accept no more delays. Ten years since 2008 is already far too long.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d330747c4b46" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Identity and Reification: Thoughts on Marx at the Big 200]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Tatlin/identity-and-reification-thoughts-on-marx-at-the-big-200-a98258c0005e?source=rss-e3f947694aeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a98258c0005e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[transgender]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sexism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatlin's Treehouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 May 2018 16:41:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-10T17:09:58.313Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*MJzNvNfxSowbXvSyba_YVQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>hbd</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Let’s stop talking about shared experiences — which we often only pretend to share — and start talking about shared interests.</strong></h3><p>This month, Karl Marx turned 200. It’s been said that we shouldn’t pay too much attention to anniversaries, given that they have a tendency to embed moments that should be appreciated for their historic singularity in a pattern of repetition and sameness that necessarily drains them of meaning. Still, we have to take what opportunities we can get in our harried lives to be reminded of the things that matter. For that reason, we should not begrudge anyone their right to mark the Bearded One’s hitting the big two-zero-zero.</p><p>But how should we celebrate? What birthday present would one buy the man?</p><p>If Marx were alive today, he’d have something to say about the “crisis” the left finds itself in, which, broadly speaking, has to do with our confusion — or certain persons’ confusions — over the meaning and role of “identity politics”. We can say that Marx would weigh in on this topic without giving ourselves too much credit because he was a dedicated organiser and passionate believer in mass movements who would have felt the duty to join any conceptual battle seen to be so important by so many people. What he’d say exactly, is, of course, pretty much the matter under dispute in this ongoing trauma of ours.</p><p>So that my terms will be clear, let’s repeat what will no doubt be familiar to many. In general, the “problem” of identity politics, for Marxists, is whether they are a “distraction” or an asset to/component of the “class struggle”. Any illustration of extremes should come with the caveat that extremists, for the most part, do not exist in pure form, and the idea of what we take an extremist to be is usually someone else’s ideological construction. There are very few people on the left who genuinely believe that class does not exist and that feminism only ever has anything to do with feminine identity, though no doubt one can find examples of people who do believe this. Likewise, most “class reductionists” will grant, at least for a moment, the existence of gendered and racialised forms of oppression. The problem is that people can admit a concept exists and even appear to accept that it might be important(at least to someone) while going on to demonstrate — in words or deeds, intentionally or otherwise — how little they really think of it.</p><p>The fact that most people fall somewhere on the continuum between class reductionism and identitarian reductionism does not mean that the continuum does not exist and does not have to be navigated carefully. With that in mind, let’s think about how this continuum has been dealt with by people interested in something more than just pitching their battle camp somewhere along it.</p><p>For many Marxists, including myself, the body of intellectual work heaped up by Marxist and some other feminisms over the years has been enough to settle the problem on a basic level: the term “intersectionality”, now widely used, puts us in a position(and nothing more) to cut the Gordian knot. Anyone not tending towards an extremism can tell you that all those forms of oppression described by scholars who work on culture and identity are real: racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, and so on. Sometimes moving past a dispute is about resolving contradictions in such a way that a real consensus forms — but sometimes this isn’t possible without making a few categorical statements that need to be agreed on before moving forward. Because of this, the fact confronts us that not everyone broadly identified with the “left” can move forward from the aforementioned positions. As said, there are few genuine extremists. But in the above list, there may be some categories of oppression that a given person will accept and some that they won’t. This isn’t extremism per se, but it’s bad. An extremist would reject all the categories, but for me, even rejecting one is enough to drive consensus into the ditch. The evidence that these categories are valuable and that those positioned within them disadvantegously suffer significantly and in singular ways under patriarchal capitalism is just too strong. Furthermore, most of us are resigned to the fact that our organisations must be prepared to carry on without universal appeal to every human being on earth; we have to consider what has the broadest appeal. Given things today, we have more to lose by rejecting any one of these categories than by playing games with them.</p><p>But accepting the categories of oppression outlined by identity politics and cultural studies is not the same thing as forging them into a coherent materialist analysis of the world. Marxist thinkers like Jodi Dean <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2970-not-us-me">have argued</a>, for instance, that while such categories may exist and describe real problems, taking collective action to solve those problems is impossible as long as people identify, in general, more with those categories or a combination of them, as opposed to identifying with some “universal” historical subjectivity like that of “proletarian”. The categories of identity describe, but they do not prescribe; that is, they do not point towards a unified understanding of broad political tasks. They can, at best, offer fragmentary glimpses of our social formation and its repressive nature, which may inspire someone to learn more about the deeper causes of their particular experience of repression. But theorised this way, the assumption is still that an understanding of oppression in particular, from the vantage point of a particular identity, will or should lead to an understanding of oppression in general and from a general point of view — for instance, that of a proletarian. The trajectory is upward, away from the starting point.</p><p>This position goes somewhat beyond the vulgarity of calling all identitarian categories falsifications, but it still puts Marxists like Jodi Dean in tension with non-Marxists like Sara Ahmed, who have <a href="https://feministkilljoys.com/2015/12/15/melancholic-universalism/">challenged the whole notion of universality</a> and framed the idea of a universal category of identity as being inherently repressive. This is why intersectionality as a concept, for all its usefulness, has begun to suffer a bit from overexposure. We’ve all heard the term, and we can all agree that Marxists do not have to be straightforwardly class-reductionist. But we see how simply accepting that identities exist does not necessarily mean we’ll be able to do anything useful with them; all we seem to be able to do is put ourselves right back where we started. This leaves everyone frustrated — Marxists feel like they’ve done everything they can to meet the identitarians halfway, and “identitarians”, to the extent that they actually exist, feel like Marxists are just trying to liquidate everyone into generality again, no doubt under one social group’s hegemony.</p><p>Hence the dilemma; the Gordian knot still holds. We are faced as Marxists with the legacy of a universal and universalising category — that of the proletariat as subject of history — which seems to be at odds with peoples’ passionately held convictions about their identities, which they simply will not see put on a subordinate level, even if the level is “only” methodologically and not morally lower. To resolve this problem, we have sought a way to say that all categories of identity are equally implicated in the socialist struggle. And yet, as Marxists, we cannot make the case that a historical materialist philosophy which proceeds from the standpoint of the proletariat(in Lukács’ terms) really treats the experience of work(being a worker) as the same as the experience of being black, transgendered or both. Blackness, for instance, cannot be reduced to a particularly miserable experience of work. When we speak of workers and women, we are talking about differences of kind, not of degree; this is not to oppose intersectionality but to recognise that things which may have some relation to each other do not necessarily need to be of the exact same type.</p><p>Stick with me now: it’s only by understanding what we’re talking about when we talk about a universal historical subject like the proletariat that we can make sense of the problem. We need to grasp that proletarian-ness is not of a kind with blackness or femininity; it is not just another category in the catalogue of identities, nor is it “like” those categories but somehow a more important version, nor is it simply all those categories “added up” to unity in a crude aping of maths the way some vulgarities would have it. We are dealing with different things. It is still possible to follow the trajectory outlined before — of, for instance, being a woman, understanding woman’s oppression, and then educating oneself about oppression in other senses so as to be able to see beyond ones’ own experiences. Such a process is essential to any feminism that is not a white supremacist feminism, for instance. But this process does not proceed linearly to class consciousness. One can go a long way down this road, adding more and more categories to ones’ grab bag of oppressions — one can even develop a critique of classism and a concern for workers’ rights — without ever grasping the unity of capitalist political economy.</p><p>The essential thing when hacking ones’ way through this jungle is understanding categories not as timeless or abstract but as living, moving things. It is impossible to develop a Marxist understanding of class — as opposed to a purely sociological or anthropological understanding — without understanding that classes do not only exist: they also have roles, tasks, and destinies. In a word, they have interests. The proletariat, because of its constantly being subjected to greater precarity in the capitalist pursuit of greater profits and productivity, has an inherent class interest in abolishing classes. The proletarians of any country, as a whole, simply by definition have more to gain from the abolition of class than the continuation of class society. The only exceptions are those rare individuals raised to the position of what Althusser called “museum pieces” — those raised above their class so as to sustain the illusion that anyone can become a millionaire with hard work and tenacity(<a href="https://libcom.org/files/louis-althusser-on-the-reproduction-of-capitalism.compressed.pdf">PDF: page 37</a>). Such blessed individuals do exist — but classes and the broad masses of individuals of which they are made up do not lose the unitary character of their interests by virtue of such exogenous exceptions. When we speak of the proletariat, we can speak scientifically of a particular thing they all have in common and an interest — even a viewpoint, if this interest is consciously recognised — that they all share.</p><p>This is precisely what we cannot speak of when we speak of categories of identity. It is precisely along these lines that supposedly well-meaning leftists and liberals from dominant social groups disappoint their erstwhile allies in subaltern groups. The film <em>Get Out</em>, for instance, was largely a story of how many white people, despite professed good intentions and liberal attitudes, still treat black individuals as if they were things and not people(one might say they reify them). Time and time again we see how the best anti-racist politics in the world liquidates itself when it treats disadvantaged people as nothing more than a homogenous mass of disadvantage. This is the source of the discomfort that some people who could fairly be called “of colour” feel when the phrase “people of colour” is deployed too enthusiastically by white “allies” who seem to be performing allyship more than anything else. In the wrong mouths, the phrase can sound homogenising. When white people use excessive deference to the “voices of POC” as a way of avoiding real discussion, the impression is given that all POC speak with one voice and therefore no debate is possible. Nothing is more frustrating than being told by people who claim to respect you that you represent your demographic in a way that other individuals do not represent theirs.</p><p>So when we treat categories of identity as being universal, we do those who identify with these categories a disservice. And when we try to put such categories on or near the same level as a category like proletarian, we are, intentionally or not, making the claim that all categories possess access — indirectly or otherwise — to the universality of proletarian-ness. It is not our task to show how being black and oppressed is really just a fragment of being proletarian and oppressed: down that way lies madness. Black people the world over do not possess a unified destiny or a unified set of concrete historical and political interests, nor do women, gay men, trans women, or the bearers of any other such categories.</p><p>This is not to say that identitarian categories are timeless and fixed, without being subject to historical change the way the proletariat has been in its process of being created and eventually abolished. We are all familiar with the arguments for categories like gender and sexuality as being socially constructed and not fixed; therefore we have to see these categories as being “in motion” as well. And since the category of wage worker is also a historic category — one with a beginning and an end — we likewise call it a social construct. The phrase “social construction” has been so widely abused that confusion here is almost inevitable, but we can overcome this confusion. We must overcome it because it lies at the root of the broader confusion about the supposedly shared characteristics of the proletarian and identitarian categories. What we are trying to avoid here is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reification_(Marxism)">reification</a> — the tendency to see categories as eternal and ahistorical, even or especially implicitly.</p><p>The role of proletarian is, of course, only intelligible in relation to a specific set of social relations — capitalist relations — which convert every abstract, potential category they touch into an actual, living category. As Marx said, again and again, <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch33.htm">land, machinery and other resources are not capital unless they bear a real relationship to exploitation and commodity production</a>. So it is with the commodity of labour. But while constructed, the proletarian is not socially constructed in the same way as, for instance, the woman, even if historical materialism has plenty to say about the social construction of women. De Beauvoir, in her magnum opus The Second Sex, made clear her departure from Engels along precisely these grounds: while she remained within the historical materialist and Marxist framework, she broke with Engels’ Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State by underlining how workers necessarily had an interest in abolishing work, while <a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/de-beauvoir/2nd-sex/ch03.htm">women did not necessarily have an interest in abolishing femininity</a>. This logic can apply in every identitarian case: blackness may be constructed, but black people do not necessarily have to seek the destruction of everything — music, food, whatever else it may be — that has historically helped them construct that identity. These fragments are materials that can be worked up for different people in different ways. Part of a progressive struggle for freedom in the sphere of identity is knowing what we want to throw away and what we don’t, but a struggle for freedom in the realm of class is, by its nature, a struggle to abolish everything we know of class relations. (This is why the society of the future, for instance, will have as much to do with the “socialist realist” art of glorifying proletarians as today’s society does with poetic epics of the rural, pre-modern countryside.)</p><p>To be a proletarian is to be a worker, and to stand in a particular relationship to the economic system. In this sense, no one is <em>just</em> a proletarian — everyone has an identity that places them in relation to the culture as well, and this cultural relationship also bears on the economic system in various ways. But we cannot say that it is possible to construct meaningful emancipatory politics by trying to convince people that they should see blackness as the key to militancy, or as a linear step along a fixed path towards proletarian self-consciousness.</p><p>To be clear: what we need is to stop asking people to think of political struggle in terms of a rank ordering of identities or of some kind of identitarian calculus in which all social particularities add up arithmetically to proletarian generality. When we reflect on anti-racist struggle, we reflect on one element of the progressive struggle which must necessarily be allied to the class struggle. But class struggle operates on its own strict logic, and by comparing the relative value of different struggles we undermine all of them.</p><p>The goal in all this theoretical contortionism is to provide an answer to the question: who, exactly, is responsible for social change? How will social movements for change be constituted? If there is to be a mass party or movement, it will have to be able to define itself — it will have to be able to say what characteristics a member will have, other than the vaguest possible intuition that society needs to change and a momentary impulsive desire to jump on bandwagons.</p><p>Occupy Wall Street demonstrated this more completely than I ever could: post-mortem criticism tends to have highlighted its failure to “define its aims” — what this sort of criticsm fails to recognise is the logical impossibility of such a movement forming concrete aims. This has nothing to do with the particular kinds of people who supposedly participated in it — lurid visions of drug addict idealists and other social rejects — and everything to do with the fact that those who made it up possessed no common characteristics whatsoever.</p><p>For a brief moment, Occupy laid claim to the whole of society. One of the few things from that movement which has lasted — the phrase “we are the 99%” — attests to this. During its high point, it could reasonably claim to represent a coalition whose social base was that broad. It did not, obviously, command the attention of every member of every social group it claimed to represent, but it did have, within it, substantial representation of all those social groups: black, white, able-bodied and otherwise, gay, veterans, middle class, homeless, etc. From within, this near-universality was seen as strength: the humanistic desire to be a movement for “everyone” and to speak to a romantic ideal of the “nation” and “the people” dominated. This, incidentally, was precisely where things went wrong. Before the camps were cleared and activists swept up by the apparatus of state repression, things had already frayed beyond the point of no return. Proto-Black Lives Matter activists — those who one could find years later on the front lines of BLM — were already raising concerns in Occupy assemblies about the limits of this universalism. I will never forget how uncomfortable discussion could become when some black activist asked a question that drew attention to the lack of common ground between their community and those of middle-class white people more concerned with the Federal Reserve Bank than police brutality, and how the dominance of such privileged groups could be seen reflected in the decisions of such assemblies.</p><p>It is in the search for an answer to this question — the question of what, exactly, different repressed groups have in common — that we become Marxists. But in saying they bear certain kinds of experiences of oppression and exploitation in common, to a greater or lesser extent, we are not moving all that much closer to a sense of their common interest. Identity politics, to the extent that it exists, subsists on notions of experience. What made Rachel Dolezal a liar about her race was more than the literal fact of her skin colour — critical race theorists have long made it clear that racial distinctions on the basis of precise gradiations in melanin are the very definition of a social construct. It was her co-option of the black <em>experience</em> and her refusal to accept that she had not truly undergone it that marked her out for infamy. Identity is, in this respect, experience-identity. This is precisely what proletarian subjectivity is not. While aspects of proletarian-ness involve the “experience” of exploitation, and it is, in the strictest sense, a form of identity, it is, most of all, a category of <em>interest</em>. The most important thing about being a proletarian — the key to class consciousness, in other words — is the class interest of the proletariat, the position of this group in relation to the <em>historic task</em> of abolishing itself and creating a classless society. The degree to which social identities “intersect” with the proletarian subject halts at precisely this point. This does not mean there is no relation; it simply means the relation does not conquer all limits to the point of unintelligibility, but takes place within definite terms.</p><p>All too often, Marxists frame proletarian subjectivity as being analogous to the subjectivity of race or gender, but on a higher level. Even at our most intersectional, we ask people to substitute proletarian “identity” for other forms of identity or to put the proletarian category at the top of their categorical hierarchy. This is exactly what we do when we say that a mass socialist movement will never develop until people start “identifying” as proletarians rather than as black, white or brown.</p><p>It is time to stop pretending that proletarian subjectivity is something you identify with. Even if Marxists of this stripe mean something different than what I have described, the way the word “identity” has evolved means that we necessarily invoke a certain kind of categorisation when we use it. Raising class consciousness is, of course, to an extent a process of getting people who think of themselves as “temporarily embarrassed millionaires” as to think of themselves as workers in an exploitative class system. But this is using identity more as a metaphor than anything else, and we should beware of metaphors: we are in fact asking people to do something far more complicated than the ticking of an extra box on the proverbial census form. Proletarian subjectivity illustrates much about our relationship to the world, but, unlike identity, it is a wholly negative, oppressive category, one which we seek to destroy, even as we use the category to make sense of our position and take stock of our collective strength. With De Beauvoir, we should understand that “identity” as we have defined it — racially, sexually, etc — is not something the workers’ movement straightforwardly seeks to <em>abolish</em>, even if it is subject to distortion under patriarchal capitalism, and even if the socialist society of the future might seek to create spaces in which it can be fundamentally reshaped for human benefit.</p><p>We need to realise that if we are, in fact, going to create a mass movement with a clear categorical definition of who comprises it and what characteristics they have in common, we need to stop talking about shared experiences and start talking about shared interests. White people and black people, as racial categories, can only ever have things in common on a very broad level — this is because the very people who <em>comprise</em> these categories do not, themselves, have anything substantial in the way of common, universal interests or standpoints based on those interests. Human life can only reveal itself in its totality, and human destiny can only reveal itself as singular if we recognise the one basis on which any human being regardless of race, colour, sexual orientation, gender or the lack thereof can find truly common ground: the basis of proletarian subjectivity. It is this subjectivity and no other that has a task, a teleology: that of abolishing class and bringing an end to the thousand-year-war of all against all.</p><p>With that, let’s finish the leftovers of Marx’s two-hundredth birthday cake which we cut a few days ago. Here’s to another century, Old Prometheus.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a98258c0005e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Soft Power and Saudi: A Hollywood Story]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Tatlin/soft-power-and-saudi-a-hollywood-story-8c61410a0f7a?source=rss-e3f947694aeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c61410a0f7a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[saudi-arabia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-east]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatlin's Treehouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2018 07:34:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-30T07:34:50.155Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*WI6Cm0-yKQioxTQklSIIaQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Soft power isn’t just a science — it can also be an art, sometimes literally. For Western institutions, particularly American, the 20th century was one of dominance as much for cultural products as political: everything from <a href="http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20161004-was-modern-art-a-weapon-of-the-cia">Jackson Pollock</a> to Michael Jackson can attest to this.</p><p>So it should come as no surprise that the Crown Prince and <em>de facto</em> ruler of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad bin Salman, should see Hollywood as a prize to be won. In March, it was reported that he had <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/saudi-arabia-buys-400-million-stake-in-ari-emanuel-s-hollywood-agency-1.5931295">bought a $400 million stake in Ari Emanuel’s talent agency.</a> This puts him in the enviable position of being able to influence the creation of cultural products that put him and his values in a favourable light. This showbiz splash-out rhymes perfectly with the ongoing PR campaign to bolster the Kingdom’s image. This routine runs the gamut from <a href="https://www.recode.net/2018/3/31/17182240/saudi-prince-four-seasons-silicon-valley-hotel-vip-state-department">courting Silicon Valley execs</a>, <a href="http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/u-s-saudi-lobby-washington-in-overdrive-for-crown-prince-salman-mbs-visit-yemen-qatar-trump/">upping the output of Saudi-linked think tanks</a>, and more. This roadshow <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3149b714-2073-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11">recently rolled into the UK</a> ahead of a major arms deal.</p><p>It’s easy to see this kind of flashy spending as being mostly harmless. For many, immunity to such political pathogens comes with repeated exposure. One could see all this noise as merely a continuation of the old prestige-buying tradition in Gulf billionaire circles, a tradition whose fame was recently re-affirmed with the $450.3m (£320.5m) acquisition of Da Vinci’s <em>Salvator Mundi </em>by the Louvre Abu Dhabi — itself a a massive PR undertaking.</p><p>If the Kingdom’s more transparent attempts to build soft power are nothing more than new versions of old schemes to caress the royal ego, then worry not. If soft power is about making a worldview more attractive, then such gestures are totally mismatched to the project. They have done little to undermine faith in democracy and attract millions to an authoritarian view of the world. For instance, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves">scandals surrounding Doha’s hosting of the 2022 World Cup</a> have done that emirate’s image as a developmental model far more harm than good.</p><p>Yet what we are seeing lately is not just more of the same. Rather than viewing the Crown Prince’s charm offensive as a pricey, doomed attempt to shift the Western perspective in a direction it simply won’t be shifted — towards a tolerance for flashy kleptocracy — we should see it as him seizing an opportunity which has already presented itself to the world’s authoritarians. Prince Muhammad has, more than most, grasped just how far the gap between the official mythology of liberal democratic power and the popular imagination has widened lately. <a href="https://www.theinvestigativefund.org/investigation/2014/09/18/saudi-lobbying-complex/">Decades of Saudi influence-buying in Washington</a> have positioned the Crown Prince perfectly for the Trump era.</p><p>That Brexit, Donald Trump, the electoral overperformance of the AfD in Germany, and other expressions of populist rage illustrate this reality is now familiar. Weariness with business-as-usual politics is not identical with weariness of democracy in general, but it does create a political moment that autoctrats can seize, especially when they go unchallenged. Views that would have been dismissed out of hand in the Obama era have a shot at normalcy during that of Trump.</p><p>If Russia’s influence campaigns and China’s neo-colonialism in Africa are the soft power iceberg, their fellow authoritarian Prince Muhammad buying a Hollywood agency may only be the tip. But should understand just how much work is cut out for the defenders of a pluralistic view of society. They cannot coast on past achievements, and we are beyond the stage where it is appropriate to point out the potential for authoritarian narratives to gain widespread appeal. We must realise that this potential is being actualised, and in unexpected ways.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c61410a0f7a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Towards a Fabian Marx: A Response to Frederick Harry Pitts and John Cruddas MP]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Tatlin/https-medium-com-nolan-macgregor-towards-a-fabian-marx-91375579cdb2?source=rss-e3f947694aeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/91375579cdb2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marxism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatlin's Treehouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2018 08:16:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-27T09:12:50.358Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Towards a Fabian Marx: A Response to Frederick Harry Pitts and John Cruddas MP</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gI6rEg3mrQriiZ6kOJiAug.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>“The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society … Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones … All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.”</em></p><p>Karl Marx, 1848</p><p>—</p><p>Mark this date well: April 26th, 2018. Yesterday, the Fabians officially made Karl Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism a subject of open debate within the Labour movement.</p><p>John Cruddas MP and Frederick Harry Pitts, the joint authors of <a href="https://fabians.org.uk/marxism-revisited/">“Marxism revisited”</a>, do take pains to make clear from the outset that they are not dropping the Marx-bomb out of the clear blue sky. They rightly pay homage to the ways in which Marx has informed Labour thinking not only historically — even through the Blair years — but in the most “energetic” parts of the contemporary left, namely in the “post-work” current swirling around such authors as Paul Mason and Nick Srnicek. To Cruddas and Pitts, Marx needs not so much to be rediscovered as reaffirmed.</p><p>This author can only welcome the recognition that Marx not only has a place in the Labour movement, but is actually occupying that place and should be recognised as doing so. Pretending otherwise is just that — pretending. Right-wing Labour MPs like Chris Leslie are not describing reality in pushing against Marx — they are attempting to substitute their reality for the real one. Socialism is impossible without Marx. It requires <em>more</em> than Marx, of course, but he is and always will be a bright star in our sky. Anyone with a genuine apprehension of the dire straits society finds itself in in the 21st century will applaud these authors with me.</p><p>And it is equally important that Marx have not just an important place in the Labour movement generally, but within the Fabians in particular. Any all-Party honour assigned to him will have to be ceremonial; Labour is self-avowedly a big tent, and Marx can only be a universal figure of admiration when he is drained of his deep content. It is right that we share common starting points, and he should be one, but these can only be starting points. The various wings of the Party cannot, by dint of their basic values, all view the man in the same way. Marx reveals himself only by interpretation. The development of a specifically <em>Fabian</em> interpretation(or re-interpretation, contra Crosland) of Marx is essential.</p><p>But my readers will already be able to hear thunderclouds approaching. If there is nothing to do with this piece but support it, why write an essay when a Tweet would suffice?</p><p>Part of what makes yeserday’s date so special is that it marked the first known instance in history of the theory of commodity fetishism being used to rationalise and justify the reproduction of the commodity form of alienated labour. One can imagine that the socialist technicians of International Marx-Engels Institute in Amsterdam are even now plunging the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe">abyssal depths of the <em>Gesamtausgabe</em></a> in search of precedent.</p><p>Sarcasm, in this case, resolves(dialectically, of course) to its opposite. I really am looking at something that makes me stop and think in ways that are new to me. This is something to be thankful for. But let’s let Pitts and Cruddas speak:</p><p>“Marx speaks from the past to warn today’s radicals that the escape from or glorification of work or labour cannot be the overriding focus of radical politics. We must instead consider how the work we do is conditioned in certain ways by the relations that structure it and the forms which its results assume. In other words, a politics of production must be accompanied by a politics of consumption and beyond.”</p><p>What strange new wreckage have you piled up for us today, <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2791-the-storm-blowing-from-paradise-walter-benjamin-and-klee-s-angelus-novus">oh Angel of Benjamin?</a></p><p><strong>I.</strong></p><p>After a spirited exploration of the various currents of Marxism which stress the fetishistic character of our relationship with commodities — essentially, our alienated condition as labourers — our authors arrive at their main point, which amounts to a takedown of the various post-work strands of thought at work in the Labour movement. This attitude is most tellingly revealed here:</p><p>“The effect of automation on unemployment, for example, is contested to say the least. It may be that current public and political hysteria about this is nothing more than a moral panic in which the postcapitalist left themselves have been swept up.”</p><p>What we are dealing with, then, is apparently an attempt to chart a different course for the Labour movement than the one supposedly being set out by people who view technology as having a mechanistic relationship with freedom. But in this treatmeant, this amounts to a defense of work as inevitable, which amounts to a defense of wage-labour and therefore the commodity form. It’s something else entirely to stress the dignity of creative activity — neither our authors nor those they criticise are talking about how we need to move beyond purposeful activity <em>in general</em>. Our authors are talking specifically about work as we know it — work <em>under capitalism</em>, and its ongoing reality in our lives. They somehow manage to do this while drawing attention to the way in which Marx explicitly treats those very problems — wage-labour and commodity production — as impermanent and unnatural. They even go so far as to say that the “pessimistic” attitude with which Marx treats the possibility of change “within” capitalism is a valuable one, while simultaneously using his arguments to show how we should continue to think within capital, that is, within wage-labour and commodity production. Hopefully my readers can already understand by bewilderment.</p><p>From the outset, I should stress — and will continue to stress — that our authors are on the right side of history in describing Marxism as a non-deterministic system. There are, and have been, many vulgar Marxist or Marx-inspired thinkers who take technology, or more abstractly, the “development” of productive forces, as some kind of guiding star which lights the way towards a magical moment of liberation. But this is only the beginning for our authors.</p><p>To look at everything Marx wrote about the relationship between fixed and variable capital, about dead labour and living labour, and use all that to buttress the conclusion that “automation” — which in Marx’s writing presents itself as nothing more than what it really is, namely industrial labour-saving technique of <em>any and all kinds </em>— is a “moral panic” is, at least to a wonk, shocking in the extreme. One would have to have come to Marx yesterday in order to miss the significance of the pushing-out of the living workforce from the process of production and consumption as an essential core of his work.</p><p>We see in <em>Capital</em> a clear red line connecting productive technology and the experience of labour under capitalism when Marx discusses his <em>General Law of Capitalist Accumulation</em>, known and understood by all Marxists as absolutely fundamental. From this general law arises the idea of the <em>industrial reserve army</em>, i.e., the mass of unemployed or underemployed workers relative to those employed, whose presence in the labour market ensures what we now call “flexibility”, i.e., a relative ease of hiring and firing that bosses — and all economics, not only Marxian — know keeps labour docile and wages low. From <em>Capital,</em> Vol. 1, Ch. 25, Section 4:</p><p>“In the <em>automatic</em> factories, as in all the great workshops, where machinery enters as a factor, or where only the modern division of labour is carried out, large numbers of boys are employed up to the age of maturity. When this term is once reached, only a very small number continue to find employment in the same branches of industry, whilst the majority are regularly discharged. This majority forms an element of the <em>floating surplus population</em>, growing with the extension of those branches of industry … The same causes which develop the expansive power of capital, develop also the labour power at its disposal. The relative mass of the <em>industrial reserve army increases therefore with the potential energy of wealth</em>. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to its torment of labour. The more extensive, finally, the lazarus layers of the working class, and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. <em>This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation.</em>” [My emphasis]</p><p>The end of child labour as described here has not altered the basic dynamics in play. Note that Marx does not even do our authors the service of describing technologically advanced production in 19th-century language that could be construed as meaning something other than “automation” by 21st-century readers. The term “automatic factories” plainly and literally describes automation. Or, contrarily, “automation” describes — with the techno-millenarian flair that our authors rightly look on skeptically — any improvements to industrial process that raise the productivity of workers such that workers are not needed as regularly or in as large quantities. Innovation in industrial technique <em>is</em> labour-saving technique, and any engineer will tell you so. That this has <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/augie_picado_the_real_reason_manufacturing_jobs_are_disappearing">happened at scale across the world</a>, especially since the 1970s, is an historical fact.</p><p>One does not have to jump through mental hoops to imagine what this means for workers in practical terms: unemployment, whether “cyclical” or “structural” — i.e., whether one is living through an acute depression or a long downturn like that experienced by Western economies since the 70s — means more acute competition between workers over work, which means longer hours, lower pay, fewer benefits, and harder work. These tendencies all manifest themselves today in the lives of millions who struggle to find and hold work while pay and benefits diminish and new technological and managerial techniques are constantly introduced to increase the relative productivity of each worker, from wristbands that track warehouse workers’ performance to mandatory smiling and jocularity for baristas and wait staff. This is the general law of capitalist accumulation as described, not in the fringes of Marx’s theory where our authors locate the alleged mistakes of others, but in the key passages of <em>Capital</em>.</p><p>What conditions the severity of this general law as it works its way in the world is the <em>rate of exploitation</em> — the rate at which surplus-value is extracted from labour. The higher the rate of exploitation, the more the general law is in effect, and for the capitalist, this rate should always be getting higher:</p><p>“The technical and social conditions of the process and consequently the mode of production itself must be revolutionised before the productivity of labour can be increased. Then, with the increase in the productivity of labour, the value of labour-power will fall, and the portion of the working day necessary for the reproduction of that value will be shortened.”</p><p><em>Capital,</em> Vol. 1, Ch. 12, Section 1</p><p>And what does it mean to increase productivity, to “revolutionise” the process of production? Revolution here means precisely what it means in the phrase “Industrial Revolution” — increased sophistication of industrial technique.</p><p>It is in this process that the meaning of Marx’s famous characterisation of capital as “dead labour” reveals itself:</p><p>“Capital is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks. The time during which the labourer works, is the time during which the capitalist consumes the labour-power he has purchased of him.”</p><p><em>Capital, </em>Vol. I, Ch. 10, Section 1</p><p>Capital is not simply the direct power of the bosses over the workers, nor the thing that the bosses seek to acquire(this would be surplus-value). Capital comes in two forms: fixed capital, that is, the means of production, which include labour-saving and productivity-boosting technologies, and variable capital, i.e., workers. Capital also has a <em>composition</em>: the ratio of fixed to variable capital in a given enterprise or economy can and does change. Marx describes this ratio, which he calls the “organic composition of capital”, thusly:</p><p>“The composition of capital is to be understood in a two-fold sense. On the side of value, it is determined by the proportion in which it is divided into constant capital or value of the means of production, and variable capital or value of labour power, the sum total of wages. On the side of material, as it functions in the process of production, all capital is divided into means of production and living labour power. This latter composition is determined by the relation between the mass of the means of production employed, on the one hand, and the mass of labour necessary for their employment on the other. I call the former the value- composition, the latter the technical composition of capital. Between the two there is a strict correlation. To express this, I call the value composition of capital, in so far as it is determined by its technical composition and mirrors the changes of the latter, the organic composition of capital. Wherever I refer to the composition of capital, without further qualification, its organic composition is always understood.”</p><p><em>Capital, </em>Vol. 1, Ch. 25, Section 1</p><p>The “technical composition” of capital is its “fixed” aspect, and the “value composition” is its “variable”. Together they form the organic composition. Marx shows how the technical composition tends to rise in relation to the other, which accounts for the increasing rate of exploitation and the whole working of the general law of accumulation:</p><p>“This is the place to return to one of the grand exploits of economic apologetics. It will be remembered that if through the introduction of new, or the extension of old, machinery, a portion of variable capital is transformed into constant, the economic apologist interprets this operation which “fixes” capital and by that very act sets labourers “free,” in exactly the opposite way, pretending that it sets free capital for the labourers.” <em>Ibid.</em></p><p>Elsewhere Marx makes the distinction between these two forces, and the extent to which productive forces have been developed — that is, characterised by greater efficiency, which in real history is a synonym for more automation — <em>the</em> measure of how fully capitalism has developed itself:</p><p>“The most extreme form of this rupture, and the one in which the productive forces of social labour are also most powerfully developed, is capital.”</p><p><em>Capital, </em>Vol. III, Pt. 3, pp. 422–433</p><p>All this, as stated, amounts, in mainstream economic terms, to a more “flexible” labour market — one characterised by precariousness and competition between workers; a vast reserve army of labour. In a word, structural unemployment and underemployment, which is a fact we have been dealing with for decades. This is the significance of Marx’s admittedly much-debated “tendency of the rate of profit to fall”, which, while contested by many intelligent people — Thomas Piketty most recently and thoroughly — is certainly not something one “reads off” from the margins of Marx’s work.</p><p>The central role of the development of productive technology must be kept in mind as crucial here, lest we assume that what is at work is a primarily <em>sociological</em> development in which the relations between labour and capital changes without change to the basis of production. In <em>Capital</em>, Marx criticises this perspective openly:</p><p>“… the confusion and identification of the process of social production with the simple labour-process … to the extent that the labour-process is simply a process between man and nature, its simple elements remain common to all social forms of development. But <em>each specific historical form of this process further develops its material foundations and its social forms.</em> Whenever a certain stage of its maturity has been reached, the specific historical form is discarded and gives way to a higher one <em>A conflict then ensues</em> between the material development of production and its social form.” [My emphasis]</p><p><em>Capital</em>, Vol. III, pp. 861</p><p>There are serious implications for the Fabian project. Anthony Crosland made labour market inflexibility a central pillar of his argument in <em>The Future of Socialism, </em>which spelled out the Labour vision of the post-war world. It was infamously based, as we all know, on an assumption of continued economic growth, which would guarantee abundant jobs and labour market inflexibility. This lack of competition between workers would guarantee — as it did, for a time — industrial and political solidarity that translated into stable Labour party leadership. Such leadership would give the Party the power to extend and preserve gains made possible by this overall economic growth and stability. We all know what happened next: growth collapsed, the welfare state was put on the defensive, and neoliberalism mobilised as a political project to take advantage of this moment. Reaganism and Thatcherism didn’t cause the 70s downturn: they may not have helped, but the Labour movement should not put the cart before the horse when it comes to economic history.</p><p>Basic processes at work in the capitalist economy work simultaneously for and against growth. On the one hand, capital pursues new markets and occasionally opens up new industries with new inventions. On the other hand, technological development <em>in general</em> has tended to diminish workers’ purchasing power, which leads to crises of overproduction and periodic instances of what mainstream economics calls “market corrections”. The promise of socialism has always been about taking advantage of those moments made possible by capitalist development to point beyond capitalism, and throughout Marx we see that technology is inseparable from these possibilities, both within capitalism and beyond it.</p><p>It may be asked why, if Marx made so much of the tendencies here described, there has not been the kind of “jobs apocalypse” visible in the work of writers like Mason and Srnicek. The problem lies in thinking in apocalyptic terms, either positively(it <em>will </em>happen) or negatively(it <em>won’t</em> happen and people who say it will are hysterical). Capitalism is an ongoing apocalypse — this is what we learn from Marx. One of the main reasons why it is necessary to even be having a conversation about “revisiting” Marx is because people — Anthony Crosland in Britain, Eduard Bernstein in Germany who inspired him — made a concerted effort to eject him from the socialist camp on the basis of his allegedly “apocalyptic” predictions about a final breakdown of capitalism which, of course, has not come to pass. We cannot rehabilitate Marx by committing the same errors that put him in a state requiring rehabilitation in the first place.</p><p>In his masterful treatment of the general law, <em>The Law of Accumulation and the Breakdown of the Capitalist System</em>, Henryk Grossman sums up the issue with reference to Marx:</p><p>“Marx was perfectly conscious of the abstract, provisional nature of his law of accumulation and breakdown. Having presented ‘the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation’, he says that: ‘Like all other laws it is modified in its working by many circumstances, the analysis of which does not concern us here’ (p. 603). Elsewhere, in describing the process of accumulation, he writes: ‘This process would soon bring about the collapse of the capitalist production were it not for counteracting tendencies’ (p. 246).”</p><p>These counter-acting tendencies include things like the conquest of new markets, destruction of capital in wars, periodic crises which diminish capital output for a time and clear space to build it back up again, and so on. None of these have been enough to resolve the basic contradictions of capitalism — indeed, if depressions and recessions are ways to “correct” the market as mainstream economics claims, then we should look upon the health of the system as being little different from its sickness. War is certainly no way to run a sane society. And in the end it all amounts to a catastrophic burning-up of planetary resources.</p><p>All of this should be sufficient to show that in Marx we are dealing with theory which throws serious doubt on the long-term stability of capitalism, which is defined by the alienated condition of labour as our authors rightly point out.</p><p><strong>II.</strong></p><p>Let’s not mince words. What we see in this piece is a mishmash of Marxian concepts transparently employed in the interest of scoring points against thinkers whose ideas can be made vulnerable. Skepticism in the face of utopian claims is a Fabian tradition, and rightly so. The authors are doing true Fabian work in deflating some of the uncritical assumptions made by celebrity futurists. They are also right to criticise any sort of economic determinism. So right, in fact, that they take their being right about what should be a relatively basic point as an excuse to elevate themselves above all others and make bold proclamations about what Marxism is for.</p><p>The authors’ logic has gone on a harrowing journey from the idea of commodity fetishism to the idea that post-work is “hysteria” and that what we really need, presumably, is to keep the wheel of commodity production turning, but somehow in a more critical, Marxist way. We are meant to find in their work a bridge across this unbridgeable chasm — rather than dream of an end to alienated labour, “We must instead consider how the work we do is conditioned in certain ways by the relations that structure it and the forms which its results assume.” From critically analysing the ways in which work is conditioned, we are then supposed to realise:</p><p>“The understanding of technology as a liberating force cannot be simply read-off from fragments of Marx’s wider project. This ignores — at a huge cost — what machinery means for workers engaged in production in capitalist societies where our human creative essence is subordinated to other ends.”</p><p>It’s hard to imagine what this means in practice. The authors are not straightforwardly glorifying alienated labour, and yet somehow it seems as if we are meant to take the fact of alienation as described by Marx as some sort of perverse explanation for why it is a misinterpretation of Marx to imagine technology as pointing in any way beyond capitalism, as if the first principle of Marx’s historical framework of transition to socialism was not the full development of the productive forces under capitalism, i.e. proletarianisation and technological development. One does not have to go through the pages of <em>Capital</em> with a magnifying glass to find this notion on full display; it is given its first and most definitive life in <em>The Manifesto of the Communist Party:</em></p><p>“Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. <em>For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production</em>, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeois and of its rule … The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them.”</p><p><em>Manifesto of the Communist Party</em>, Ch. 1</p><p>And again, in <em>Capital</em>:</p><p>“The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has flourished alongside with and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and the socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.”</p><p><em>Capital</em>, Vol. 1, Ch. 32</p><p>It seems as if the authors are trying to say that technology should not be hailed as straightforwardly liberating <em>in itself.</em> In this much they are correct, and this is one reason why they are not wrong to criticise techno-socialists like Mason and Srnicek, who may perhaps have more work to do in separating their ideas from Silicon Valley boosterism. And yet by not simply being liberating in itself, technology does not disappear from the Marxian <em>ouvre </em>or lose its essential character. We certainly cannot use Marx to support the claim that “automation” is a “moral panic”.</p><p>Describing technological growth and its attendant effects on the economy — and therefore political-economic <em>possibilities</em> — is not necessarily teleological. It is simply logical. An account of economics would be impossible without an understanding of economic change, and an understanding of this change would be absurd without an understanding of the Industrial Revolutions which Marx wrote in explicit response to. In is a total vulgarisation of Marx separate “the” Industrial Revolution from the ongoing, inherent process of revolutionisation he describes in the passages of <em>Capital </em>quoted above.</p><p>Avoiding determinism simply means making room for political consciousness, education, and development. Marx made this clear in a now overly-familiar line which, for Marxists of the critical stripe, settled the issue for all time:</p><p>“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”</p><p><em>18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,</em> Ch. I</p><p>Our authors are aware of this and make a criticism of economic determinism the foundation of their argument, and we cannot blame the dialectical, mutually-conditioning feedback of subjectivity and objectivity for the shaky edifice which Pitts and Cruddas attempt to build on top of it. Political judgment is a real and often a neglected part of Marxist thinking and our authors are right insofar as they say so.</p><p>But none of this can justify the erasure of <em>basic economic realities</em> immanent in every moment of the process of capitalist development from the earliest days of the Industrial Revolution, realities over which Marx pored his whole life. The substitution of dead labour for living labour is one of the most basic of those realities. That the authors have managed to come away from <em>Capital </em>without grasping this utterly beggars the imagination.</p><p><strong>III.</strong></p><p>All this would be worth only mild discourse, rather than vigorous debate, if the conclusions arrived at by this road of confusion were not so clearly partisan and couched in such dismissive terms. Equating the post-work left with hysteria and panic is taking criticism quite a bit too far.</p><p>Our authors, it seems, look back on the struggle — <a href="http://openlibrary.org/books/OL25072899M/The_eight_hours_day">of which Sidney Webb was a key part</a> — for an eight-hour day and assume that the number eight had some magical property associated with it, as if what workers really wanted was alienation and exploitation but only for that many hours, as if the demand of the Eight Hours Movement was anything other than a mediated — according to what was realistic at the time — expression of the real demand for less work and more life. The fact is that the Labour movement, historically, was — according to everyone, not just the kinds of easily-sneered-at intellectuals that our authors sneer at — about shortening the working day.</p><p>When people reflect on their lives, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2012/feb/01/top-five-regrets-of-the-dying">almost always what they regret is having worked too much.</a> There is pathos in this that should deeply move all socialists. This, ultimately, is why shortening the working day is a progressive demand. This demand has been abandoned in the course of the Long Downturn in which work, any work has been the desperate <em>idée fixe </em>of all parties, but in all that time, no one has yet managed to put heads together and find a way to make an economy where good, high-paying, stable, dignified work is available for all, because tendencies within capitalism — as Marx tells us — make this impossible in the long run. When it comes to stable, dignified work that can support economies without massively increased access to consumer debt, hyper-exploitation of remaining workforces and skyrocketing inequality, <em>work has already ended.</em></p><p>This latest attempt to tilt at the windmills of history employs an interesting strategy — use of the very theory which illustrates the fundamental <em>problem</em> posed by labour under capitalism — in an attempt to resolve these problems by whisking them away, but it falls short. Food for thought. Perhaps there is a reason why commodity fetishism and Marxian value theory have not been used to rehabilitate the commodity form and the law of value before.</p><p>This isn’t about being “utopian” — vague as that is as both a philosophy and as a description of someone else’s philosophy — and it certainly isn’t about assuming that technological development will make positive, fundamental social change happen “by itself”. But if we freeze this moment in time and think of work as a natural category, we are not only failing <em>utterly</em> to understand Marx, we are failing to understand the reason why Marx has mattered to so many millions; a reason which he, as always, sums up best.</p><p>“ … the less you eat, drink and read books; the less you go to the theatre, the dance hall, the public-house; the less you think, love, theorise, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save — the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor dust will devour — your capital. The less you are, the more you have; the less you express your own life, the greater is your alienated life — the greater is the store of your estranged being … “</p><p><em>Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844</em></p><p>What makes all this so strange is that our authors cannot have simply <em>forgotten</em> the alienating nature of the commodity form, like others before them. It is easy to take from Marx, or from the socialist canon generally, a vulgar interpretation of history in which (alienated)labour is an eternal font of meaning which will lose its alienated character as soon as the state takes it under its own direction: such is Stalinism, Trotskyism and the other classic 20th-century socialisms. But to read those parts of Marx <em>specifically dedicated</em> to calling labour as a category into question — those parts which show that capital itself conducts this interrogation — and come away from that with a theoretical cudgel to wield against the post-work milieu is bizarre to say the least.</p><p>We can criticise Mason and Srnicek, or at least those who repeat their claims uncritically, for couching their analysis in insufficiently sober terms. And we can certainly call universal basic income as a panacea into question — in fact, Marx provides us with the sharpest tools here, by showing how commodity production(which UBI is explicitly meant to support, not replace) fundamentally undermines itself no matter what pains we go to to prolong its life. But it is simply dishonest to say that Marx, much less Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, has anything to offer someone committed from the outset to proving that anxiety about work and economic stability is hysterical. Work has been precarious since Marx. Indeed the whole edifice of Marxist economic analysis rests on the fact, demonstrated throughout every expansion and contraction of industry, that the proletarian condition is <em>defined</em> by precariousness. The kind of labour we seek to get back to — stable, highly-paid, unionised labour under Fordism is the exception which warps our perception of what a proletarian is, not the rule. To Marx, to be proletarian was to be at the mercy of caprice, constantly one step away from the gutter, going in and out of the factories at the whim of economic forces over which you had no control. Marx located the source of this instability — with all the terror and heartbreak that goes with it for individuals and families — in the dynamics of commodity production itself. It is absurd in the highest degree to think that we can use Marx to show how such precariousness is only a phantom of overheated intellectual minds.</p><p>The Fabian Society in the 21st century often undertakes these kinds of doomed crusades. Just when it recommends that Labour <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/labour-must-sound-patriotic-win-next-election-fabians-say-2017-7">“sound patriotic”</a> to win elections, historical circumstances — Brexit — highlight for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/27/labour-voters-could-abandon-party-over-brexit-stance-poll-finds">majority of Labour voters the importance of internationalism</a> and the need not to turn inward. And now, just as economic and technological change(ongoing for centuries) reaches a point at which white-collar workers begin to learn what blue-collars learned long ago about the significance of change, Fabians start calling worry over automation “hysteria” and a “moral panic”. One imagines this is an attempt to stake out a position as the “hard, realistic” left against the utopian left of post-work Corbynism.</p><p>A better understanding of Marx is absolutely a way of gaining a competitive advantage over the Momentum left. But this is an inverse understanding, not a better one. And rather than rush to the opposite end of theoretical contradictions in order to distinguish ourselves most sharply from our rivals, we should be thinking about why, exactly, we find ourselves in such a weak position relative to the Corbyn left in the first place. Rather than saying they are all hysterical, we should try to understand what kinds of crises and possibilities their fractured understanding is working to understand, and why, in the absence of any compelling alternatives, people are drawn to those views rather than our own, which, in this case, amounts to pretending the problems posed by post-work thinkers don’t exist. Marx shows us how to resolve these contradictions, not exacerbate them.</p><p>We need to understand how pretending that the economy we have, or that we once had, can exist forever is as utopian as imagining it will change overnight or with minimal political input. Marx makes this clear. We can criticise basic income, but we shouldn’t blindly follow the income regime as it has existed thus far. In the short term we need to be thinking about how to ensure the mental and physical health of society by allowing people to work less while earning the same, which means exercising control over wage practices and working conditions. In the long term we need to be thinking about progressively moving away from commodity production in various aspects of life entirely.</p><p>We can’t count on a massively revitalised manufacturing base to provide the kind of broad-based stable employment necessary to replicate the Croslandian, Fordist post-war society. In “Raising the Bar”, the most recent Fabian Ideas tract, just such a notion was proposed by writers such as Craig Berry and Chi Onwurah, but it immediately undermined itself by stressing that investment geared towards such a new productive economy would have to be in “innovative” manucaturing. As if the bottom line in innovation were not absolutely set by the extent to which innovation “saves” labour — in Marx’s terms, the extent to which dead labour supplants living. This is what innovation means because in the long run it saves costs and boosts profitability. How British industry can simultaneously be competitive enough to actually survive and support economies while simultaneously being the most top-heavy in the world by employing millions is beyond me. And this Fabian Ideas tract made it clear that such a level of manufacturing employment buttressed <em>all </em>its other recommendations. These are the kinds of confusions endemic not only to the Fabians but to the Labour movement and society at large. Marx can help us overcome them, but only if he is taken for what he is.</p><p>Vulgarising Marx in order to fight other vulgar Marxists is a devilishly paradoxical trick of perverse dialectics which one can almost admire for its intricacy, but it is not the way forward. To play with Marxism is to play with it, in Marx’s analogy, as a sorcerer’s apprentice plays with his spellbook: the forces one unleashes rapidly take on a life of their own.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=91375579cdb2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Socialism and Syria: Why the Left Can’t Promise Anything Yet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Tatlin/socialism-and-syria-why-the-left-cant-promise-anything-yet-dcd89a48784f?source=rss-e3f947694aeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dcd89a48784f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatlin's Treehouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Apr 2018 14:48:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-14T16:07:20.686Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Socialism and Syria: Why the Left Can’t Promise Anything Yet</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wDxQp8-xQjXNa6eQ1UN3lA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Labour movement, historically, has always stood for peace — not just any kind of peace, but peace specifically between working people within and between all countries. War is not an accident, or a crime committed by “bloodthirsty” tyrants against less obviously bloodthirsty ones. War in the age of nation-states(going back four hundred years or more now) is always and everywhere rivalry between imperial powers or those who would usurp their crowns. Such rivalry is for the wealth and prestige of the mighty ones alone: workers can only ever hope, at most, to be particularly notable sacrifices.</p><p>Wherever the workers do not rule, there is, or will be someday soon, an imperial power. As the workers today rule nowhere in the world, <em>all warfare is nothing more than rivalry. </em>We must condemn it absolutely. So, to be clear: by all means, protest. But let’s not let the logic of national conflict infect our protest, even under the guise of an “anti-imperialism” which really just means taking sides in a war that isn’t ours.</p><p>To see this as being as easily said as done is essentially to see it as being nothing more than something one “says” at all. But blanket condemnation of all aggressors looks easy, perhaps “too easy”, only when one fails to apprehend what it really means.</p><blockquote><strong>Socialism, from its dawning days, has made a mission out of <em>exposing</em> the false, ideological, messianic, utopian foolishness of every power-seeker out to sell easy solutions to an exploited world terrified of the true implications of its exploitation.</strong></blockquote><p>Truly condemning imperialism means making a hard choice: it means choosing to look at images of suffering, death and pain(perhaps thousands of them in a year, and more all the time), choosing to listen to the impassioned pleas of those who demand action, and choosing to <em>deny</em> them, and the world, any easy answers. Easy answers include, for instance, the blood-spattered lie that Syria’s salvation is to be found in the increased martial rigor of either the NATO powers, or their Russian and Chinese opponents, <em>or </em>the popular might of militias whether terrorist or freedom fighter.</p><p>The fact is that socialism, from its dawning days, has made a mission out of <em>exposing</em> the false, ideological, messianic, utopian foolishness of every power-seeker out to sell easy solutions to an exploited world terrified of the true implications of its exploitation. Nationalism and imperialism are classic methods employed by ruling powers to divide people, both within and between nations, against each other for the greater glory of wealth accumulation. Socialism’s highest creed is that humanity is one, not many, and that it is divided against itself only to sustain an iron illusion, that the power of property is absolute.</p><p>While nationalism may be an instrument of decolonisation, which was and is an essential step on the path towards the global human community of socialism, when nationalism becomes a tool of nation-states — which it always has — it becomes a tool of ruling powers.</p><p>Borders are a black mark on human history, and while they may not be gone tomorrow, when the hour arrives the workers will come for the maps of partition with rubbers to erase them all.</p><p>That the victims of imperialism in Syria cannot be saved by increased application of high explosives should be obvious. Those in governments clamouring for war are only demonstrating the principle proved by <em>twenty years experience </em>in the Middle East, counting only the post-9/11 period <em>alone: </em>the principle that <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/bombs-away/433845/">bombing campaigns are never “precision”</a>, that <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-red-line-syria-iran-2016-8">“red lines” are always crossed</a>, and that <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/blowback-from-further-us_b_5668692.html">“destabilising” regimes leads only to new instability</a> and then new regimes, not genuine social change.</p><p>The reason is simple: political power may grow out of the barrel of a gun, but healthy political life — the life of real, prosperous, human and humane communities — never does. The ruling class can only show itself up repeatedly because the <em>one thing</em> it would have to give to the world in order to lift it up from the depths of depravity it has sunk to — freedom — it will not and fundamentally <em>cannot</em> give. Only when the world, which is to say, the peoples of the world, can command its own destiny without regard to the flows of accumulation which follow privileged lines from Global South to Global North and from poor to rich, will prosperity even approach a general distribution from London to New York to Syria and beyond.</p><blockquote><strong>Until such time as wealth and human life are free, or at least moving noticeably towards freedom, any attempt on the part of nations large and small to bomb their way towards peace will expose itself as the cruel absurdity that it is.</strong></blockquote><p>And it is only this prosperity — a new, shared prosperity, in which no nations are left to the mercies of the world market — that will save Syria. Ask any militiaman, extremist or otherwise, who has remained behind in the blasted land that a near-decade of war has created there: they fight because they have nothing else. Many IS recruits joined out of fervour — mostly ones from abroad — but <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-defector-explains-why-people-continue-joining-group-2015-11">the majority joined for a stable fighter’s income. </a>The insane disparities of wealth, the lack of access to basic resources and utilities, the hypercorrupt governance practices, and the constant pressure on traditional economies like that of agriculture under the new drought regimes brought on by climate change, are all enough to resolve the so-called “mystery” of why the Middle East cannot find its way to peace. There is no peace, and cannot be, as long as the poor go hungry while the rich keep their hoard under lock and key in Zurich. Such pain and chaos will always be exploited by would-be political and religious warlords. Until such time as wealth and human life are free, or at least moving noticeably towards freedom, <em>any attempt on the part of nations large and small to bomb their way towards peace will expose itself as the cruel absurdity that it is.</em></p><blockquote><strong>Even that tense balance of forces between people and state that passes for “peace” in the so-called developed world has become more and more punctuated by violence and despair in recent years, as part of the long process of capitalist decline usually referred to under the heading of austerity.</strong></blockquote><p>The history of the world shows that it is not in the drama and posturing of armed powers, whether of the NATO or the Russo-Chinese camp, nor of their non-state auxiliaries, but in the real development of stable, equitable, long-lasting political and economic communities that anything resembling peace can reign between people. And anyone who thinks that the Putins, Assads and Gaddafis of the world represent anything other than capitalism is fooling themselves at the expense of others’ lives.</p><p>If capitalism in the 21st century seems to have uniquely failed to provide the stable, equal development of life required to bring peace not just to rich countries but also to poor, that’s because it fundamentally can’t. Even that tense balance of forces between people and state that passes for “peace” in the so-called developed world has become more and more punctuated by violence and despair in recent years, as part of the long process of capitalist decline usually referred to under the heading of austerity.</p><p>Socialism demands that we walk a dark, lonely, circuitous, forking path hemmed in on all sides by wolves and woods, with only the historical and practical experiences we share with each other to light us on the way. Finding specific answers to general questions about how best to move away from capitalism and towards the kind of socialism that can resolve these apparently-eternal conflicts will not be easy, and it is the business of the Labour movement to seek those answers. One thing can be called certain, however: we cannot rely on the Western armies, nor on those powers outside the NATO sphere of influence who dare to usurp the name of anti-imperialism, to use their instruments of death on behalf of freedom.</p><p>As in 1914, so today. We can, as always, only rely on ourselves.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dcd89a48784f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Joe Biden and Reality]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Tatlin/joe-biden-and-reality-f780fa521ea5?source=rss-e3f947694aeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f780fa521ea5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-states]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[millennials]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatlin's Treehouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2018 14:24:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-23T14:30:42.022Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What Joe Biden’s comments say about the man behind the memes</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LTr438QuT-TILyXQyu4ULQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>In a <a href="http://www.latimes.com/politics/95641832-132.html">conversation with Pat Morrison</a> as part of the <em>Los Angeles Times’</em> “Ideas Exchange” series of talks, former Vice President and darling of the Democratic Party establishment Joe Biden had some harsh words for “millennials”. The key points of the exchange — namely his having “no empathy” for millennials who think they have it tough — immediately made the rounds of the web and everyone’s favourite meme subject of late 2016-early 2017 came in for vicious criticism.</p><p>The story is now over a week old, and has thus passed its use-by date for most of the commenting class. It seems as if there’s not much more to be said about the man other than that he is out of touch and slightly heartless, which comes as a surprise to some but by no means all. As usual, though, I like to wait until the dust has settled on a story before I write about it.</p><p>What does it mean for a man like Joe Biden to ask to be given “a break” when confronted with the suggestion that millennials “have it tough”? Is this just the crustyness of crusty old men that we have all been familiar with since the day after Adam left Paradise — the bog-standard, abstract fear that we all(supposedly) eventually develop of those who remind us of our mortality? Or does Diamond Joe’s pointless, vindictive dismissiveness represent something more interesting, politically?</p><p>We can start by thinking about what, exactly, Biden is dismissing. What do we mean when we say that to be a millennial is to be put under pressures worthy of being brought up in the presence of political leaders?</p><h3>This signifies much more than callousness. It signifies a total separation from reality — all reality, not just that of the “milennial experience”.</h3><p>In the millennial’s organ of record(for now), <em>VICE, </em>Eve Peyser <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbpxx8/biden-trashes-millennials-in-his-quest-to-become-even-less-likable">took Biden to task for his lack of empathy</a> in terms that most people will be acquainted with: the first item of criticism in her line-by-line attack on Biden’s statement was an exhibition of economic facts that every millennial with an Internet connection — among others — is familiar with, namely that home ownership is beyond the range of most millennials and that <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/01/13/millennials-falling-behind-boomer-parents/96530338/">their median income is 20% lower</a>, adjusted for inflation, than the income of Baby Boomers like Biden at a comparable age. Information to shock no one.</p><p>And yet there is a host of senior Democratic leaders, officials, and a whole class of older, more rightward-leaning Democratic voters in society at large who consider it perfectly acceptable to breeze past these facts of life as if they were incidental to politics. This signifies much more than callousness. It signifies a total separation from reality — <em>all</em> reality, not just that of the “milennial experience”. Talking to more young voters won’t solve this problem, because to fail to understand millennial economic issues is to fail to understand political economy as a whole. This is a reality which touches all our lives, not just the lives of those under 30.</p><p>While the generational portioning out of wealth certainly favours those who accumulated wealth and property in better economic times — i.e., the older — our economy does still operate, in general, on a single track. There is not, as yet, one economy for the old and one for the young. The fact that millennials came later into the world and thus found much wealth and power already spoken for is what accounts for their relative position, not their inhabiting some separate universe of political economy in which all their supposed deficiencies in education, training and stick-to-it-iveness come into play to wreck their lives.</p><h3>If you can’t understand why millennials would say they have it tough, you can’t understand anything that has happened in the world since at least the 1970s.</h3><p>What makes their share of the pie so small is the lack of the same economic opportunities as their parents and especially their grandparents. That there are fewer economic opportunities is a function of the economy itself. Understanding why opportunities for social mobility are slim means understanding that the economy — the real, living economy of wages, work, and productivity, not just that of stock market activity and GDP — has not grown in the ways or at the speed it would need to grow in order to account for demographic change over time.</p><p>The process of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stagflation">contraction that began in the 1970s</a>, which ended the postwar boom, has never left us. Every measure taken since then to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_renewal">prop up failing urban centres</a>, boost employment through the <a href="https://www.intheblack.com/articles/2017/05/05/race-to-cut-company-taxes">slashing of corporate tax rates</a> and regulations, stimulate growth in glamorous tech industry work through “reskilling” — everything, essentially, proposed by politicians of both the Left and the Right since deindustrialisation and financialisation began — has failed to provide a stable economic foundation for a whole generation of Americans, and this process has been replicated in the developed world at large. Talking about economic stagnation, consolidation of major industries, the increase in wealth inequality, the flatlining of wage growth relative to increases in productivity — all these things are synonymous with talking about the lack of economic opportunities available to millennials. If you can’t understand why millennials would say they have it tough, you can’t understand anything that has happened in the world since at least the 1970s. Such social realities have to be at the forefront of every conversation like the one had by Biden and Pat Morrison.</p><p>So often, when we talk about what it means to be young in the 21st century, we talk in the language of affect: how the “feeling” of life has changed in relation to the rise of the Internet and smartphones, or about the feeling of helplessness seemingly imposed on millennials by acts of a capricious economic god beyond human understanding. Millennials themselves, if they lack a firm understanding of political economy, cannot but fail to express themselves more clearly than the language of abstraction allows. When the crisis of youth is put in such terms, it is inevitably misunderstood: someone like Joe Biden cannot understand what it “feels” like to be a millennial, and we do not really need to expect him to. Without grounding the discussion in historical reality, a millennial cannot help but seem like a whiner to those who cannot directly empathise. Millennials can only make their situation understood by others by putting it in a language common to everyone: the language of political and economic reality. This is why it is so important to put the millennial dilemma in terms of the broader dilemma of society in late capitalism. When we speak of these things, we can speak — at least up to a point — of facts that are beyond question.</p><p>On the other hand, I am hardly the first person to say this. As mentioned, Eve Peyser at <em>VICE</em> brought economic facts to the table at lightning speed. That people like the former Vice President should fail to grasp what is being talked about intuitively, or even when the stakes of the issue are put right in front of them, does not speak well for their ability to manage a large federal apparatus with huge fiscal and fiduciary responsibilities in a complex economy. How can anyone trust a Democratic Party <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/364702-expand-all-print-all-in-new-window-biden-on-running-in-2020-i-may">seriously thinking about allowing this man to run in 2020</a> when he clearly lives on another planet and refuses to come down to Earth? How can anyone think that he represents a serious alternative to Trumpian plutocracy when every economic fact that ties into the late advances made by that plutocracy in politics lies beyond his grasp? It should come as no surprise that a grandee of one of the two parties of corporate rule cannot bear to hear — indeed, cannot even imagine to himself — that his power and wealth was bought at the cost of human lives and livelihoods.</p><p>If Joe Biden ever had a chance to learn and grow, he missed it. He can go now to where he belongs: the ash-heap of history. But there are many others of his time and place who have had that chance and have taken it, or are not beyond hope of taking it in the future, if it is properly presented to them by passionate people who <em>are</em> capable of empathy and come armed with the knowledge and power to make the truth clear.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f780fa521ea5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Carillion: Perverse Incentives in Action]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Tatlin/carillion-perverse-incentives-in-action-28af5e6243c7?source=rss-e3f947694aeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/28af5e6243c7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatlin's Treehouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jan 2018 21:24:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-17T22:24:04.368Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carillion: Perverse Incentives in Action</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*abpCCwfyJxcBbAwgqyrT6A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Splashed across the British headlines for the last few days has been news of <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/carillion-collapse-ould-leave-taxpayer-600m-bill/">the collapse of Carillion plc</a>, formerly the UK’s second-largest construction firm. As a dominant player in one of the key industries that every economy places its broader hopes in — construction — the company by its nature was invested with a huge amount of public trust. As <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/revealed-carillions-billion-pound-government-clients">a firm embedded heavily with the UK government</a>, which lavished Carillion with sumptuous contracts for such major works as the construction of the Royal Liverpool Hospital(still unfinished), that public trust was magnified enormously. On the 15th of January, that trust was broken: Carillion announced it was going into liquidation and the familiar process of begging for a government bailout began. It’s worth saying up front that this bailout was denied. But it’s hard to characterise the billions awarded to Carillion by the UK government over the years, despite the firm’s basic economic superfluity, as anything other than a drawn-out handout.</p><p>In terms of the 24-hour news cycle, Carillion’s demise is old hat. Of course, despite the story’s relative age, much remains to be seen. Interested observers will be able to dip into this particular well for years to come as new facts about the series of events that led up to the collapse come to light. At this stage, it is not possible — for myself at least — to assign blame for the firm’s failure to any particular person. It is clear that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/16/six-warning-signs-that-the-carillion-collapse-was-coming">Carillion’s collapse was determined long ago</a>: dodgy loans taken out, payments to subcontractors deferred, a continual problem with being short-sold — the list of woes is long. But the picking apart of these tidbits cannot slow the story’s rapid fading into the past. Taken at face value, the issue is already tiresome: we know that Carillion was doomed, we know the UK government continued awarding contracts despite this, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/15/jobs-carillion-liquidation-construction-hs2">we know that millions of workers and small businesses who subcontracted with Carillion are on the hook for unpaid wages and bills</a>, respectively. Grim but familiar, like so much in politics. In light of all that certain knowledge, are there any interesting questions about this sad debacle left to ask?</p><p>We can, as always, ask what the collapse of this venerable institution means for the broader world of political economy in the 21st century. Does the death of Carillion mark any particular moment in the story of late capitalism, or is it a random(if unsurprising) event, perhaps representing the corrupt theme of politico-corporate entanglement in a general way, but without any particular lesson to teach?</p><p>There is a reason why so many public-interest alarm bells have been rung to mark the passing of this grand old man. The fact that so many thousands of livelihoods will be directly and indirectly diminished by this event is not without broader political significance, and that significance goes far beyond the vague human-interest quality that any story of families’ incomes diminished, meals skipped and mortgages defaulted on naturally possesses. This is not merely a story of the poor man done wrong by irresponsible suits. The scale of the damage done by Carillion’s fall illustrates a crucial feature of contemporary political economy: the utter dependence of large sectors of the economy on the stimulation of governments. The fact that Theresa May refused to support Carillion when its time was finally up only stands as a testament to how politically toxic such a move would have been, not to any basic underlying divide between the political and corporate worlds.</p><p>When we talk about the ways in which major corporations and national governments are implicated in each other, the conversation tends to revolve around corruption, namely the deference with which neoliberal regimes treat their corporate patrons. Carillion has already been used as another example of the venal, cringing character of the UK government in the face of big business. Always, in the Left imagination, neoliberal government is the whipped junior partner, business the whip-wielder. When situations become critical and the dominant partners — corporations — find one of their number in need of a bailout, most famously in the 2008 financial crisis, this is seen as a sign of the subordination of dependent governments to the corporations they depend on, rather than of their mutual interdependence.</p><p>The fact is that even now, decades after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Fordism">Fordist state</a> — which saved bucaneering 19th century capitalism from itself during the great crisis of the 1930s — passed into what has been clumsily called the “post-Fordist” state, the Left still struggles to see political economy for what it is. That is, as an admixture of politics and economy, rather than as a primal battle between the “economy”, which is synonymous with the corporate world and capitalist logics of economic activity, and the “political”, which is synonymous in Left minds both with the servile governments of neoliberalism and with the negating power of a proposed socialist system of governance.</p><p>Carillion illustrates a simple principle: in an age of diminishing <a href="https://hbr.org/2017/10/why-wages-arent-growing-in-america">purchasing power</a>, increased <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24641559">precariousness</a> in what employment remains, and overall economic and political instability, the gulf between the rhetoric of free markets and the reality of what governments actually do will continue to widen. The fact is that none of the major political parties practices anything like free market liberalism(in the classical sense), regardless of what they preach. Every Western government since the Second World War has made it its first duty to support economic activity — specifically the activity of businesses — in whatever way it can.</p><p>“Neoliberalism” is not a project of the state retreating from public life, as it is so often characterised. It is a project of the state entering public life more vigorously than ever, but without even the pretense of doing so in the interest of society as a whole. It is a campaign of centralisation — euphemistically called “consolidation” — as committed as any dreamed up by the great proponents of nationalisation, but in the interest of the existing property-owning class and no others. It is a matter of public record that, since the neoliberal scheme got underway, the number of competing businesses in most sectors of the economy has precipitously shrunk — this process is seen most starkly <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-in-america-2012-6">in the media</a> and in finance but is visible everywhere.</p><p>It is not merely the job of neoliberal governments to get out of the way of this process — it is their job to support it by awarding generous benefits for the winners of these games. This becomes a more and more important duty of the state as <a href="https://futurism.com/mckinsey-finds-automation-eradicate-third-americas-workforce-2030/">automation</a> and the diminishment of ordinary peoples’ income shrinks the purchasing power of the economy still further: corporations become more and more highly dependent on favourable contracts, which means that only the most well-connected corporations survive and thrive, a process guaranteed to whittle the pool of economic actors down still further until only a tiny ruling clique remains.</p><p>What we should take away from Carillion’s collapse is this: here was a corporation heavily reliant on government contracts — subsidies, essentially — for its survival. Here was a business on which a huge section of the British population relied on to live. The UK government was able to justify its ongoing relationship with Carillion on the basis that stimulating this “job-creating” entity would fulfill the one so-called public trust that modern political culture can talk about with a straight face: the maintenance of employment, no matter how low-paying or uncertain. This is what one might call a perverse incentive: free market ideologues demand that bad businesses fail but do everything they can to prop up any business that covers a serious section of the employed population or a key strategic industry. This does not mean that we need to return to an idyll of pre-modern, romantic capitalism where “genuine” competition is given free reign. It means we have passed through that historic stage and are now near the end of passing through this one, the stage characterised by, among many other things, centralisation of state and corporate power.</p><p>The perverse interests go deeper than kickbacks, however: human beings, as a whole, have an interest in spending less of their time chained to the machine of alienated labour, and in having less of an apocalyptic impact on their natural environment. Under any economic schema that is foreseeable, technologically, within the near future, this will require some contraction in the scale of industrial activity. Given that there are, for instance, far more homes available than there are homeless people, and given the number of office buildings and luxury apartment blocks that stand empty, the actual economic usefulness of a construction company of the type Carillion personified is dubious, though obviously we would all like to see Royal Liverpool Hospital finished some time soon. But the construction industry as a whole — like almost every industry in the world of late capitalism — serves more to prop up the endless cycle of production and consumption that modern elites draw their wealth from. The rest of us are left holding the bag, performing pointless work in pointless jobs, not because anyone really needs us to — hence the constant threat of unemployment and the cutting of hours — but because it is a rule of the world, a so-called “fact of life”, that we need to make money and be employed to live. To crown this historic insult, we are expected to do this under the constant threat of having our jobs taken over by machines — a process ongoing since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution — and are scolded for not preparing our skillsets more assiduously in preparation for this recurring inevitability. What people will do when this treadmill finally stops turning is information the oracles of neoliberal civilisation have yet to bestow on the world.</p><p>Carillion was nothing more than a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ixion">Wheel of Ixion</a> which was kept turning by the circular logic of a corporate-political old boys’ network and the broader economic justification of “keeping Britain working”. As more and more of the economy becomes superfluous, this kind of business will become more and more common. All this means is that the UK government, like all governments, will find its wallet put under continual strain as such businesses follow their own internal logics to their ultimate conclusion and wind up hanging in the breeze just like their forerunners. This is the 21st century. The trick is to do something about it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=28af5e6243c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Fight That Wasn’t: Net Neutrality and Learned Helplessness]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Tatlin/the-fight-that-wasnt-net-neutrality-and-learned-helplessness-267ac7169ca?source=rss-e3f947694aeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/267ac7169ca</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[net-neutrality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[activism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-states]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatlin's Treehouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Dec 2017 18:26:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-20T18:40:36.283Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ln7lWW3pUR88wkLQc9QTtg.png" /><figcaption>The banner of the tread-on.</figcaption></figure><p>The Fight That Wasn’t: Net Neutrality and Learned Helplessness</p><p>It’s been a few days now since the coroner of history made his time-of-death announcement for net neutrality in the US: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/technology/net-neutrality-repeal-vote.html">December 14th, 2017</a>. The run-up to this event and the time since has provided ample opportunity for the concerned American public, and especially its online commentary class, to alternate between wild extremes of mania and fear.</p><p>The dialogue around FCC Chairman Ajit Pai’s scheme to gut Obama-era net neutrality provisions can be charted in terms of highs and lows of feeling. The highs came first.</p><p>When it became widely known, several months ago, that the telecom industry had fully armed itself for a rather one-sided battle with net neutrality principles, the mood — on reddit, in Facebook threads, and so on — was anxiously optimistic. The whole Internet was suddenly militant with fury over the threat to its ancient liberties and rallied in its millions around hastily-assembled banner campaigns like <a href="https://www.battleforthenet.com/">battleforthenet.com</a>. The heights of passion to which comment threads were raised will stand as a testament before posterity.</p><p>But it won’t be the testament our mighty keyboard warriors hoped for. The campaign to bombard the FCC’s public comments interface in the hopes of beating our collective head through that institutional wall amounted to something much worse than “slacktivism”. It was a masterclass in the kind of non-politics which has come more and more to stand in for politics in the age of Trump, since arguably getting its 21st-century ball rolling with the Occupy protests of 2011–2012.</p><p>With the extremely inevitable decision by the FCC to overhaul net neutrality rules, this non-politics revealed itself, yet again, for what it always is: a one-way ticket to disappointment town. And so we reach the aforementioned low.</p><p>Commentators like Joshua Kopolsky in <em>The Outline</em> have gone so far as to describe the failure of our latest so-called “effort” to hold back against another Trumpoid assault on human dignity as an <a href="https://theoutline.com/post/2558/death-of-the-internet-net-neutrality-donald-trump-alt-right-gamergate-facebook-twitter">occasion to doubt whether “systems that will save us … exist at all”</a>. Truly, these are the end times.</p><p>It cannot be said strongly enough: such pessimism is a self-fullfilling prophecy that will realise itself <em>over and over again</em> if people refuse to learn from their mistakes. And the worst part of all this, the memory that will haunt humanity as it goes reeling into oblivion unless something is done soon, is that this is so, so preventable.</p><p>The fact of the matter is this: campaigns like the one outlined by battleforthenet.com did not “fail”. This was not a case of a valiant effort doomed to defeat by the sheer superiority of forces opposed to it. The campaign to save net neutrality simply did not exist. It was, from its beginning, only the <em>idea</em> of a campaign: all form, no substance.</p><p>This isn’t about blaming those people who forgot or couldn’t be bothered to sign the petition or call their Congressperson for the failure of this effort. This was not a question of the total massed-up pile of human emotions not being of the appropriate size. Every American from the age of two could have signed the same petition and had it tattooed on Trump’s face and it would have amounted to the same thing. What went wrong in this campaign, if it deserves the name(it doesn’t) was a fundamental disconnect between the reality of politics as <em>power</em> and the fantasyland of politics as affectation.</p><p>In an age where <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/11/politics/popular-vote-turnout-2016/index.html">a world-historic Presidential election can only muster voter turnout at twenty-year lows</a>, and in which <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/05/09/people-hate-congress-but-most-incumbents-get-re-elected-what-gives/">anywhere from<em> 85 to 90%</em> of Congresspeople are re-elected every time</a>, it has become customary for people to treat their elected representative as a fact of life, unchanging as the moon, meaning political participation can do little but boil down to one thing: signing petitions, writing emails and placing phone calls in the expectation that citizens can <em>annoy </em>their way to good government. How can we then fail to establish a political class which <em>knows</em> we do not possess genuine political power and can see that we do not possess any clear idea of how to get it? The result of this reality are plain.</p><p>Obviously, plenty of blame has to be laid at the feet of America’s insanity of a <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/fixcapitalism/5-serious-problems-with-t_b_9698584.html">voting system</a>, its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrymandering_in_the_United_States">byzantine gerrymandering</a> and its unconscionable acts of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter_suppression_in_the_United_States">voter suppression</a>. Obviously, in saying people place too much hope in the politics of mere hope, I am not saying people can feel their way towards a political system that promotes better engagement any more than they can feel their way towards concrete political results within the system as it currently stands.</p><p>But just imagine what it means to treat politics as reducible to “applying pressure” in the abstract: in response to a political crisis, our first thought is to reach for the phone and ask — whether politely or not is immaterial — for a resolution in our favour without indicating in the least way what we will do if our favour is not granted. There is a reason why politicians don’t budge in the face of petitions and commenting campaigns: they know that all they have to do is ignore us and our broken understanding of politics will lead us, time and time again, to conclude that we did all we could, that we were doomed to failure, and that all hope is lost.</p><p>This kind of systemic <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learned_helplessness">learned helplessness</a> is a product of our broken political system, but it also reinforces it. Casting about for evidence over whether to blame people or the system instead of recognising the situation for the feedback loop that it is is also a big part of this problem.</p><p>So what’s the alternative? It’s not a mystery, though it is by no means simple: recognise politics for the contest of power that it is. Build a political party committed to net neutrality.</p><p>We need to accept the fact that as mere “citizens”, we have no power. Understand that entering into a negotiation — as any attempt to persuade a politician or any human being is — is a farce unless you enter into it with some bargaining power, some influence — and in any such farce you <em>will</em> be laughed at. When we call the FCC, we may do so in a large group, but unless that group has power — actual political power — it isn’t seen by politicians as a large political force. It’s seen as many manifestations of the same pathetic, loud-mouthed loser who doesn’t understand his irrelevance.</p><p>Did your Congressperson vote to repeal net neutrality rules? Forget about shaming him. Unseat him and replace him with someone who genuinely cares about this issue and other issues, and make sure that person understands they can be unseated just as easily. That’s what it means to wield political power: wielding the sword of Damocles when it comes to who actually is legally authorised to take political decisions. As long as that remains a dream, everything else will too.</p><p>This is not a partisan screed, so I won’t subject anyone(for now) to my opinions about exactly how this ought to be done and in the context of what party or parties. Some people may believe that action within one of the currently existing viable US parties is worth pursuing. Many others — <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/most-americans-desperate-third-major-political-party-trump-era-672540">more than ever before</a> — believe that an entirely new party will have to be brought into being. It’s pointless at this stage to fight about which strategy will work best in the long run: in the short run, neither strategy is being seriously pursued by many, so there is very little real information to come armed to any such arguments with. By all means, form a strong opinion, but then go out and put it to the test by fighting for it and seeing the results.</p><p>It is only by building a movement for mass power that corresponds to the needs of people in the 21st century that we will break out of this endless cycle of false activism and very real disappointment. Rebuilding our trust in ourselves as bearers of genuine political agency will take time, but with every minor victory, such trust will grow as our power is demonstrated. Starting from nothing — which is undoubtedly where we stand — there may only be a few who believe in this power, but the future belongs to them. Such work is long overdue and there is nowhere to go but up.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=267ac7169ca" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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