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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sandra Ordonez on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sandra Ordonez on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@TeresaMunoz?source=rss-6fd61dd377c8------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Sandra Ordonez on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TeresaMunoz?source=rss-6fd61dd377c8------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Censorship and Disinformation to Blame for the Spread of COVID-19]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TeresaMunoz/censorship-and-disinformation-to-blame-for-the-spread-of-covid-19-e3453c05642c?source=rss-6fd61dd377c8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sandra Ordonez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Mar 2020 23:26:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-30T17:32:25.892Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following article summarizes information shared during the Internet </em><a href="https://internetfreedomfestival.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page"><em>Freedom Festival’s weekly community gathering</em></a><em> that took place on March 19. It is not intended to be a holistic analysis of the COVID-19 situation, but rather highlighting knowledge from ongoing or recent research, and helping individuals understand the role censorship and disinformation has played in COVID-19. Please note that better English translations are being worked on for many of the articles and reports referenced below.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I5OtdD71aqm9s-xIHYvyWw.jpeg" /></figure><p>As the world struggles to fight the ravages of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), we are now only beginning to have a fuller picture of how the Chinese government’s use of censorship and misinformation has hindered people’s ability to report, track and treat the disease. China has one of the most effective and surveillance systems in the world.</p><p><strong>Early Censorship Lead to Avoidable Deaths</strong></p><p>China Digital Times (CDT) published a <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2020/03/%E6%88%88%E6%88%88%E7%82%B9%E5%95%8A-%E6%8E%A5%E5%8A%9B%E3%80%8A%E5%8F%91%E5%93%A8%E5%AD%90%E7%9A%84%E4%BA%BA%E3%80%8B%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87%E7%89%88/?fbclid=IwAR3Jvbj_7ix1vQrFDcr65nCzVpRzxqbjmG3_GOilNNY6OtrGu8FZv-UVV-U">startling piece</a> detailing the initial days of COVID-19 transmission in Wuhan, including a personal account by the medical doctor and whistleblower who first identified the virus. The investigative piece (better english translation forthcoming) recounts how censorship catalyzed the spread of COVID-19 and eventually led to Wuhan’s closure.</p><p>If you don’t know of CTD, you should. They have been at the forefront at fighting the Chinese government’s censorship and misinformation campaigns for years, and publish news which are blocked, deleted or suppressed by the state’s advanced censorship system. However, they are not the only ones publishing accounts of this story. Stay tuned for more information as this gets picked up by the English media.</p><p>In summary, Wuhan medical staff that identified the virus and tried to warn the public, were disciplined by authorities. Moreover, the doctor that first identified the virus, Dr. Li Wenliang, was also approached <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2020/03/%E6%88%88%E6%88%88%E7%82%B9%E5%95%8A-%E6%8E%A5%E5%8A%9B%E3%80%8A%E5%8F%91%E5%93%A8%E5%AD%90%E7%9A%84%E4%BA%BA%E3%80%8B%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87%E7%89%88/?fbclid=IwAR3Jvbj_7ix1vQrFDcr65nCzVpRzxqbjmG3_GOilNNY6OtrGu8FZv-UVV-U">by the hospital disciplinary committee</a>. You can read their <a href="https://matters.news/@LittleKui/%E5%8F%91%E5%93%A8%E5%AD%90%E7%9A%84%E4%BA%BA-bafyreihrxt65lculizxd6ng2c5y4kdl2rh5q4ahyeso57ybreb3gmard5i?fbclid=IwAR3CSyf3I2OecdyO2biDWYSvyJneoiz4domMrbscVBmOBgYYNJlj8goREZY">personal account here</a>, though the article is currently only available in Chinese with an English version forthcoming. <em>(As information is heavily censored in China, Matter.News is one of the few places where Chinese citizens can preserve these types of content.)</em></p><p>Why would government officials want to censor this information? The answer is neither simple nor logical. Censorship in itself is illogical; it is a tool used to serve the needs of the few, disguising itself as a tool for the well-being of the group. In this particular case, the Chinese government has been determined to present an image that everything is stable and under control. They were afraid that people, both inside and outside the country, would question their capacity and authority. The Chinese government wanted to maintain an appearance of competence and control, and COVID-19 challenged their image of effective technocrat and legitimacy.</p><p>Censorship around COVID-19 was so heavily enforced that when Dr. Li Wenliang died, for a period of time, the first line of China’s national anthem,“Arise, ye who refuse to be slaves” was banned on WeChat, a government controlled and popular social media site. A March 14 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/world/asia/china-ren-zhiqiang.html?smid=fb-share&amp;fbclid=IwAR0StlZb-8i6ayU2I8513lD4PU_vqwtr3LGDRzvJ_OaGUocDsPny-VrGRmU">New York Times article</a> reports that Beijing increased its crackdown on those dissenting over the handling of the pandemic, and a Chinese Tycoon who criticized the government’s response to the Coronavirus had vanished.</p><p><strong>Early Censorship Tracking in China</strong></p><p>Citizen Lab, a research center based at the University of Toronto, <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2020/03/censored-contagion-how-information-on-the-coronavirus-is-managed-on-chinese-social-media/">just published a report</a> confirming that Chinese social platforms started COVID-19 censorship at an early stage of the outbreak, specifically one day after Dr. Li Wenliang tried to warn the public on December 31, 2019. In the report, they document how two platforms YY (a popular live streaming service) and WeChat (the most popular social platform in China) block keywords related to COVID-19.</p><p>In the report, Citizen Lab states that the censorship rules in place are broad and effectively block messages that include names for the virus and sources for information about it. For example you cannot send a message on WeChat that contains the keywords “美国疾控中心” (US Center for Disease Control) and “冠状病毒” (coronavirus).</p><p>This censorship, they argue, has the potential to restrict vital communication related to the disease information and prevention. The government’s reliance on information control and instances of downplaying the seriousness of the disease caused avoidable deaths and potentially delayed precious time for other countries to prepare for its eventual worldwide spread.</p><p><strong>A Timeline of Misinformation in Taiwan</strong></p><p>Censorship has not been the Chinese government’s only tool of information control — they have used misinformation both against Taiwanese citizens and to establish the narrative that they have been more effective than western powers at controlling the spread and impact of COVID-19. Through misinformation, the Chinese government has tried to shift citizen’s concerns and shape public opinion by stating that COVID-19 is less serious than the “USA Flu,” a term they actively use. Through misinformation campaigns, they promoted the idea that Western democratic countries are doing nothing to protect their people and are learning from and using China’s model against COVID-19.</p><p>The people of Taiwan consider its country independent, yet is afforded no recognition by the government of China. Claimed as the province of China, Taiwan is often the target of monitoring, misinformation, and disinformation campaigns by Beijing.</p><p>In the beginning of 202, when COVID-19 began appearing on Taiwense social media networks, researchers began analyzing the various misinformation strategies used by the Chinese government to spread erroneous information. In a preliminary study by <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Z0Vu2XpE9YER_bGpivS_3AZRzCr4nTGUFuzBfw25LLI/edit#heading=h.bn6vu8dp7kz7">Doublethink Lab</a> that commenced during the ramp up to the January Taiwanese presidential election until now, researchers documented and discovered:</p><ul><li>During the Taiwnese election on January 11, 2020, there had been no confirmed cases in Taiwan, COVID-19 was not yet a media “hot topic’’, and there was very little information about what was occurring in Wuhan. Yet, social media messages began to circulate suggesting that voting booths were infected. In reaction, the Taiwanese Department of Health had to clarify that there had been no confirmed cases in Taiwan to-date.</li><li>On January 16, 2020 messages on social media and websites began appearing stating the “USA Flu” is affecting millions of people and that thousands of people were dying. The “USA Flu” became so popular that on January 22 it became a top search topic on Weibo.</li><li>On January 21, Taiwan had its first confirmed case and public concern about the virus soared. During this time, social media posts began to appear emphasizing that the COVID-19 epidemic was less severe than the flu. These posts downplayed the seriousness of the coronavirus and discounted the concerns. They also noted that mainland China only had six deaths related to COVID-19. Taiwanese researchers determined that this narrative was distributed by online marketing companies who enlisted the help of live streamers and influencers.</li><li>Two days later,on January 23, Wuhan closed the city and confirmed cases began to appear outside of China. While COVID-19 had just begun to appear on the global radar, in Taiwan people had already begun to panic.</li><li>Messages on social media began to appear discussing remedies and the source of the disease. Many messages emphasized that COVID-19 came from animal infections and/or people eating infected animals. The other was that COVID-19 was an artificially manufactured virus, or an outbreak transmitted as a biochemical weapon attack.</li><li>On January 30th, the World Health Organization held an emergency meeting, announcing that COVID-19 would be listed as “Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)”, and that immediate action was required. Flights to and from China began to be restricted and Chinese people living overseas were being recalled back to China. In Taiwan, panic buying began. On Facebook and Line groups, fake messages began to be disseminated emphasizing that the raw materials used to produce masks, toilet paper and diapers were the same and almost out of stock. In response, on February 7th, the Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs clarified that the raw materials used for the production of masks were different from those of toilet papers and diapers, and were not in shortage.</li></ul><p>Researchers in Taiwan will continue to track the misinformation campaigns in their country. A better translation of the report will be forthcoming.</p><p><strong>What’s Next</strong></p><p>While the model of the Chinese government’s detection and containment of the coronavirus may not be replicated elsewhere, the systems of misinformation and disinformation are already deeply rooted in many other countries. As world governments grapple with how to adequately respond and care for their own citizens during the COVID-10 pandemic, we are already seeing signs of <a href="https://www.apc.org/en/news/7amleh-netanyahu-imposes-dangerous-big-brother-surveillance-under-pretext-security-response">overreaching surveillance</a> in the name of disease monitoring, lack of transparency, censorship, and a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/16/how-coronavirus-could-trigger-backslide-freedom-around-world/">further backsliding</a> of rights around the world.</p><p>The IFF Team will continue to collect stories, experiences, research, and updates from our community as they grapple with COVID-19. Stay safe and healthy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e3453c05642c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Censorship & Surveillance in Vietnam is Rising. 
Here is How You Can Help.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TeresaMunoz/censorship-surveillance-in-vietnam-is-rising-here-is-how-you-can-help-ba70210f8d48?source=rss-6fd61dd377c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ba70210f8d48</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sandra Ordonez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 15:00:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-13T15:04:03.065Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/628/1*_L9cc9jLbRdl19nFPrcOvw.jpeg" /></figure><h3><strong>Censorship &amp; Surveillance in Vietnam is Rising — Here is How You Can Help.</strong></h3><p>Two thirds of Vietnam’s population are on the Internet, 95% of these users are on Facebook, according to the most recent <a href="https://viettan.org/en/vcd2019-report/"><strong>Vietnam Cyber Dialogue Report</strong></a><strong> </strong>published by pro-democracy organization <a href="https://viettan.org/">Viet Tan</a>. In addition, the average users spends nearly 7 hours online, about 2.5 hours on social media, and like many other developing nations, Facebook is most users’ first interaction with the outside world.</p><p>What this equates to is 65 million people whose free speech and right to organize is at-risk, as Hanoi increases its use of vague laws, physical and online surveillance, and punitive measures to limit citizens’ freedom of expression by controlling both what information they see online and what they can post.</p><blockquote><strong>Quick Facts: <br>- </strong>Reporter Without Borders ranks Vietnam as 176 out of 180 on its Word Press Freedom Index<br>- Freedom House Freedom placed Vietnam as 76 out of 100 countries in their Freedom on the Net report.</blockquote><h3><strong>Surveillance is Better When Done Locally</strong></h3><p>In January of 2019, Vietnam passed a new cybersecurity law requiring foreign companies like Facebook, Twitter and Google to setup local data servers and offices in-country. The law gives the government the legal authority over these companies, who can now demand specific actions from them such as taking down or censoring posts or handing over user data such as private messages. The very own publishers of the VCD report linked above, reported that Facebook currently censors some of their articles based on the government’s request.</p><p>Even more alarming, under this law online content considered “anti-government” or “anti-state” is prohibited, and the police’s ability to arrest people for online activities has been expanded significantly. While guidelines for the implementation of this law have not been published, numerous people have already been jailed for posting on social media, and the frequency of arrest is expected to increase.</p><h3><strong>Internet Platforms: A Double Edge Sword</strong></h3><p>Meanwhile, Internet platforms are so desperate to enter emerging markets in the Global South, that they have been complying with the Vietnamese government’s requests and laws, providing little, if any, resistance and, in some cases, strengthen the state’s censorship efforts. This is troublesome given citizen’s dependency on these platform for alternative news. All media is controlled by the state in Vietnam.</p><p>In addition, social media platforms have historically been important for bloggers and citizen journalists whose websites were being blocked or DDOSed by the government. This may change, as more platforms like Facebook continue to block pages and posts to comply with the government’s requests and new draconian laws. Facebook Live is used to mobilize or broadcast events such as arrests or trials. However, accounts are often suspended in the middle of broadcasting, especially at the height of coverage.</p><h3><strong>A Multitude of Tools to Crack Down on Activists &amp; Bloggers</strong></h3><p>The new cybersecurity law is only one of many tools that have been used by the government to crack-down on activists and bloggers in recent years. They include trolls, sophisticated phishing attacks, intimidation, hacking, device seizures, and many more.</p><p>A current worrying trend is the use of phishing campaigns that start on Facebook. For example, accounts were suspended because users (often human rights activists) were made admins of groups or pages that violate Facebook’s terms of service. Hackers then report to Facebook these violations, leading to <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/vietnam-facebook-phishing-attack-take-opposition-voices-offline/">account suspension</a>.</p><p><strong><em>While tactics may differ, the VCD report identified specific steps the Vietnamese government takes to prosecute activists:</em></strong></p><p><strong>1)</strong> Threaten and demand activists to stop using social media to post anti-government content,</p><p><strong>2)</strong> Prepare documents to fine activists from 200,000 to 1,000,000 VND ($9 to $44 USD), and</p><p><strong>3)</strong> Temporarily detain the activists from 3 to 9 days.</p><p>Based on their findings, the police may then prosecute activists. During the “investigation period,” which lasts 2 to 4 months, activists have no access to lawyers or family, and are often beaten and tortured. The investigation period can also be renewed up to three times, so individuals can be held in detention for 16 months before going to trial.</p><p>After the investigation, the defendant is often put on trial — to-date, no activist has been acquitted. After sentencing, activists are often moved to prisons in rural regions, far enough away that their families cannot travel to visit them. Conditions in prisons are dire. In certain situations, activists go on days-long hunger strikes to get access to food and medicine.</p><h3><strong>What You Can Do to Help</strong></h3><p>There is much you can do to help. Below are a few starting points.</p><ul><li>Share Viet Tan’s most recent letter to Facebook asking that they do not give in to government censorship in Vietnam. <a href="https://twitter.com/viettan/status/1124223085807321088">https://twitter.com/viettan/status/1124223085807321088</a></li><li>Encourage Internet platforms to not comply with draconian laws that support censorship and human rights abuses in any country.</li><li>Help brainstorm solutions to bypass censorship tactics, and ensure that censored Facebook posts are seen by people within Vietnam. Have an idea? Ping me and I can connect you to the right people.</li><li>Donate to Viet Tan’s help desk initiative, dedicated to helping activists and citizens in-country. <a href="https://viettan.org/en/">https://viettan.org/en/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ba70210f8d48" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[You Spoke, We Listened! Feedback Post-IFF 2019]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iff-community-stories/you-spoke-we-listened-feedback-post-iff-2019-27a625b8e6be?source=rss-6fd61dd377c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/27a625b8e6be</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[coc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-freedom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[community-feedback]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[event-design]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sandra Ordonez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2019 19:01:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-08T19:01:10.050Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JeakPm2VIpwhBZH_TJrVrw.png" /></figure><p><em>Help us improve the IFF! </em><a href="http://iffteam.typeform.com/to/GwhFyJ"><em>Take our 5 minute survey</em></a><em> and let us know what you think about IFF 2019.</em></p><p>The foundational stone of the IFF has always been our community, ensuring that they take center stage to everything that we do. Your feedback is critical to ensuring that the IFF remains a useful tool that allows us to look towards the future together, and to build a healthy movement that promotes collaboration and solidarity.</p><p><strong>What did Participants Feel About IFF 2019?</strong></p><p>During our first Glitter Meetup post-IFF, we continued this research by asking community members to share their thoughts on the IFF 2019 instance and this is what they had to say:</p><ul><li>Overwhelmingly, folks enjoyed what they described as a “chill and relaxed” environment. Adding to this, one newcomer stated that IFF was better than they had imagined, while others stated that the Code of Conduct felt less intimidating than last year, and that there was a good mix between newcomers and returning participants.</li><li>Folks appreciated the theme of gratitude, as the past year has been very difficult for many.</li><li>Participants that had attended previous editions stated that they enjoyed the increase in countries represented from their region, and felt that it was one of the most diverse gatherings to-date. However, some folks hope that future instances will include more academics.</li><li>The expo tables were also positively received, with those running the tables stating that they had visitors all the time, and participants stating that they enjoyed the one-to-one. However, folks felt they needed to be better organized, along with the mentor and digisec tables.</li><li>There was a lot of appreciation for themed music nights, even though some suggested having some of those offsite next year. Meetups were overwhelmingly positively received, and folks appreciated they were scheduled earlier in the week.</li><li>Some felt that the program moved away from focusing on tools, but that it was a welcomed change. While most session were amazing, participants reported that some sessions leads didn’t pay attention to the session role cards, meaning some sessions got derailed. In addition, some speakers didn’t show up.</li><li>The biggest annoyances was the lack of strong internet and good coffee. In addition, folks requested that future instances have a better schedule page, suggesting the possible creation of an app. One suggestion included having a “subscribe” button on session pages, so folks can get notified before session start.</li><li>The use of the library this year was the biggest surprise. People said that during registration it was more accommodating for people with disabilities. Others stated that having the tool showcase there was preferable because it was warm and quiet.</li><li>Overwhelmingly, people appreciated the introduction of psychologists but asked for more diversity of both languages and backgrounds on the Wellness Team in future instances.</li></ul><p><strong>We Want Your Feedback!<br></strong>If you want to share your feedback, we want to hear from you! Take our <a href="http://iffteam.typeform.com/to/GwhFyJ"><strong>5 minute survey</strong></a><strong> </strong>and let us know what you think! Remember, we can’t improve the IFF without your help!</p><p><strong>Join Us Virtually Every Week! <br></strong>We also encourage you to participate in the weekly IFF Glitter Meetup (GM), where the Internet Freedom Festival comes to you every week, taking place every Thursday a 9am est. GM is a great place to connect and share with others throughout the year, and contact the IFF team with any question or concern you may have. In addition, if you would like to be a featured guest, reach out to <a href="/service/mailto:sandy@internetfreedomfestival.org">sandy@internetfreedomfestival.org</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=27a625b8e6be" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iff-community-stories/you-spoke-we-listened-feedback-post-iff-2019-27a625b8e6be">You Spoke, We Listened! Feedback Post-IFF 2019</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iff-community-stories">IFF Community Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Brand New Intersectional DNS Working Group]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TeresaMunoz/the-brand-new-intersectional-dns-working-group-7bef1b49da3f?source=rss-6fd61dd377c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7bef1b49da3f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dnssec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-freedom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sandra Ordonez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2019 11:38:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-16T12:26:42.385Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A few months ago, <a href="https://medium.com/@TeresaMunoz/why-dnssec-matters-to-activists-8365930d28d5">we discussed the importance of DNS</a> and why it should matter to activists after a major phishing campaign was uncovered in Venezuela, which targeted tens of thousands of citizens who now are in danger of facing punitive measures or retaliation by the government.</p><p>Essentially, the internet’s structural issues are putting our social activism networks at risk, as well as other citizens. In 2019 for example,<a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/iranian-hackers-suspected-in-worldwide-dns-hijacking-campaign/"> we witnessed an unprecedented number of successful DNS attacks against ISPs, internet infrastructure providers, governments and sensitive commercial entities </a>across North America, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, which in many cases, resulted in successfully harvesting the targets’ credentials.</p><p>What we see is that the onus of responsibility to protect activists is placed on activists themselves (and their allies). Instead, we should be engaging with those who have the power to push change to the Internet’s infrastructure, which would allow for an environment that is more equitable and safe for everybody.</p><h3>People Want to Help — So We Are Creating an Intersectional DNS Working Group</h3><p>After the publication of the article, we received inquiries from individuals working in both civil society and for-profit organizations that want to help tackle the DNS challenge, but also get more involved in imaging what a better Internet could look like.</p><p>Also, while a handful of privacy technologists are having these conversations with each other, it is important to provide support in both amplifying their recommendations and better understanding what activists are experiencing.</p><p>As a result, we are creating an Intersectional DNS working group made up of activists, technologists, journalists, and other human rights defenders interested in learning more about DNS and helping push forth the change we need and want to see. We believe that by having different types of voices represented, we can both help educate each other, and successfully come up with creative short-term and long-term solutions that may help mitigate risks.</p><h3><strong>Why Intersectional?</strong></h3><p>Throughout the years, we have seen the power of intersectional groups in the Internet Freedom community, with the IFF being a prime example of that. To achieve a goal, we require that diverse voices are represented, with different skill sets and experiences. This mix of people with different backgrounds and knowledge, helps produce more effective and powerful approaches and insights.</p><h3>Scope of Work</h3><p>While the working group will evolve to meet the needs and interests of those involved, it will focus primarily on the following tasks:</p><ul><li><strong>Salon-Inspired Educational Activities:</strong> Members will pool their knowledge to collectively educate each other on different aspects of DNS.</li><li><strong>Documenting Cases: </strong>Members will help document cases that can be used to inform researchers working on these issues</li><li><strong>Bridge Building Between Service/Infrastructure Providers and IF Community</strong>: Considering the scope of the problem, the group will aim to create more bridges between the IF community and internet infrastructure/service providers. These bridges are essential to help with knowledge share, and cultivate allies in sectors outside of the IF community.</li><li><strong>Crafting Recommendations for Internet Infrastructure Providers: </strong>Produce recommendations that can be shared with internet infrastructure providers, and help shape the future of the Internet to be more secure and equitable.</li></ul><h3>Who Can Join</h3><p>Anyone can join who fits the following requirements:</p><ul><li>Has at least 4–5 hours per month that can be dedicated to the group. Ideally, it should be people whose work requires either working on internet infrastructure, or learning about how it works to help better protect their community.</li><li>Has a passion and desire for better understanding internet infrastructure, with a special focus on DNS, and helping come up with creative possibilities to tackle the problem.</li><li>Is either an activist, technologist, journalist, or human rights defender. In fact, we would like a diversity of profiles represented!</li></ul><p>If this sounds like something you want to get involved with, please reach out to <a href="/service/mailto:Sandy@internetfreedomfestival.org">Sandy@internetfreedomfestival.org</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7bef1b49da3f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mentoring @ the IFF — Why we need you]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TeresaMunoz/mentoring-the-iff-why-we-need-you-7b3a747c472f?source=rss-6fd61dd377c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7b3a747c472f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mentor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mentoring]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-freedom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sandra Ordonez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 14:20:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-19T14:20:36.135Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Mentoring @ the IFF — Why we need you</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_RaMlDuFPFp9XS0DVDovbA.png" /></figure><p>The Internet Freedom Festival will be celebrating its 5th Anniversary this April. For some of us, it feels like only yesterday that a small group was huddled in a corner trying to figure out how to bring more underrepresented voices to important conversations in the Internet Freedom space. Since then, the community has grown exponentially, with the 2019 IFF having around 50 percent of participants identifying as first time participants.</p><p>This shouldn’t be surprising, considering reports from the field — surveillance and censorship challenges have increased throughout the world, becoming more sophisticated and affecting more groups than ever before. Core Internet Freedom members from every region have reported feeling unsure of how they can meet the needs of the communities they serve, let alone expand to assist emerging at-risk ones.</p><p><strong>IFF Represents a Unique Opportunity to Increase Capacity Across the Globe</strong></p><p>More than ever, the need to increase capacity in the Internet Freedom space is intrinsic to our struggle, and one that is continuously addressed at the IFF. This is because many communities new to Internet Freedom use the festival as an intensive, immersion course. In 5 days, they are able to cover more issues and meet more key nodes than they could in a few months virtually. Part of this is because of the amount of trust required to cultivate relationships and the diverse knowledge required to keep communities safe are only possible at a place like the IFF..</p><p>This translate to a unique opportunity to tackle capacity issues collectively at the IFF. It also means that we need to increase the number of people that can hep onboard new folks, guiding them, and providing them with the information and support they need.</p><p><strong>Pay It Forward — Yes, We Mean You!</strong></p><p>If you have been part of the Internet Freedom Community for more than two years, we are here to inform you that you are officially part of the “old school” crew. As part of an emerging field, you already hold an incredible amount of knowledge that can help open doors for new communities. While some of us have doubts about our expertise, remember that even a simple welcome can do wonders to support the new communities knocking at our door. This is why the IFF has decided to create two spaces meant to help better coordinate this assistance, and by default improve the networking taking place.</p><p><strong>Mentor Table &amp; Digital Security Help Desk</strong></p><p>For IFF 2019, we will hosting a Mentor Table and a Digital Security Help Desk, which will be staffed with volunteers from all corners of the community.</p><p>The Mentor Table will feature individuals who have been part of the Internet Freedom community for two or more years. They will try to answer all sorts of questions, including information on the Internet Freedom community itself, such as important organizations or service providers; provide feedback on projects or community needs presented to them; help identify experts or where to find specific information; or simply welcome new participants, helping them navigate the IFF.</p><p>The Digital Security Help Desk will be staffed with digital security experts who can answer participant’s questions about digital security or organizational security, or provide feedback on specific needs or problems.</p><p>Of course, not every volunteer will have the answer to all the questions, but it’s a start to helping create a stronger, more connected community across the globe.</p><p><strong>Seeking Mentors — Yes, YOU!</strong></p><p>We currently have several two-hour shifts available for folks interested in taking part these new initiatives.</p><p>For the Mentor Table, we are looking for all types of professionals including researchers, technologists, activists, journalists, program administrators, communications professionals, and others.</p><p>For the Digital Security Help Desk, we are looking for digital security experts that specializes in different areas and regions.</p><p>If you are interested in volunteering for either, email <a href="/service/mailto:team@internetfreedomfestival.org">team@internetfreedomfestival.org</a> and let us know which one you are interested in.</p><p>We thank you in advance for helping bridge communities and increase the solidarity and resilience of our space.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7b3a747c472f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why DNSSEC Matters to Activists:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TeresaMunoz/why-dnssec-matters-to-activists-8365930d28d5?source=rss-6fd61dd377c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8365930d28d5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacktivism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[futurism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[activism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sandra Ordonez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:34:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-01T15:07:26.358Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Why DNSSEC Should Matter to Activists</h3><h3>… And why the internet’s structural issues is putting your activist network at risk</h3><p>.<br>More and more, activists are victims of online attacks where DNS spoofing is used, which has real life implications. This is because the internet has serious structural issues that results in the most vulnerable being at risk, while providing those with the most power and privilege with some strong surveillance (and nefarious) opportunities. <em>(DNS spoofing is a type of cyber-attack that results in users being tricked and deceived into visiting a malicious site, that is usually a clone of the site they were attempting to visit)</em>.</p><p>In addition, the majority of the pressure to protect activists is placed on the activists themselves (and their allies), instead of those that have the power to push change so that the Internet’s infrastructure allows for an an environment that is more equitable and safe for everybody.</p><blockquote>You don’t have to understand the intricate details of how digital attacks occur or how the internet works, but as an activist you should know what the Internet-of-the-future should look like so you can advocate for it.</blockquote><p><strong>Case Study: Venezuela</strong></p><p>If you have friends in the digital rights space, they may have told you about <a href="https://vesinfiltro.com/noticias/Phishing_by_Venezuelan_government_targets_activists/">the recent phishing campaign in Venezuela targeting tens of thousands of citizen</a>s interested in distributing humanitarian aid. These individuals are now in danger of facing punitive measures or retaliation by the government because they were tricked by malicious actors, via DNS spoofing, to submit their personal information to them, and in the process mark themselves as political dissidents.</p><p>Essentially, citizens thought they were signing up to volunteer on a specific website owned by the opposition. By taking advantage of the internet’s infrastructure vulnerabilities, the malicious actors were able to redirect people without their knowledge or consent, using DNS spoofing, to a clone of the site owned by them. At no point did users get any indication, like an error message, that this was happening to them. Thus, users thinking they were on the authentic site, they submitted all the personal information that was asked of them.</p><p><strong>How Did They Trick Users? How does DNS spoofing work?</strong></p><p>Each website essentially has two addresses. One that humans understand that serves very much like a first and last name of an individual. For example, http://www.aljazeera.com; A second that serves very much like the physical address you put on a package to send, lets say to your sister, via the post office — this is called an IP address and it looks like a series of numbers, such as: 198.78.201.252</p><p>Lets use this analogy below, to help better illustrate.</p><p>When you type the name of a website address into your browser, for example Maria Fernandez (<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/">www.aljazeera.com</a>), your browser connects to the phone book operator (DNS server) asking for Maria’s physical address.</p><p>The phone book operator (DNS Server) responds with Maria’s home address of 43 Fern St, Bronx, NY (<a href="http://4.27.19.126.)/">http://4.27.19.126.</a>). Your browser then visits 43 Fern St, Bronx, NY <a href="http://4.27.19.126.)/">http://4.27.19.126.</a>), and you are able to see the site. .</p><p>DNS spoofing is essentially hackers intercepting this conversation, pretending to be the phone book operator or DNS server. However, there are many different ways this can be done.</p><p><strong>But Isn’t the Internet Supposed to be Secure?</strong></p><p>No one said the Internet is secure. In fact, many of the security and privacy standards we have today are thanks to demands and pressure from citizens. For example, there was a time where it wasn’t standard practice to encrypt credit card information on online stores. This is why its so important for activists to become familiar with the changes we want to see, and push for them collectively. We are living in a historical time, and the battles we win (or lose) have the potential to affect activists for many generations after us.</p><p>Even ICANN considered internet’s address book keeper, <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/23/icann-ongoing-attacks-dns/?fbclid=IwAR1iW__6IZfEwyiZng3W_ZLM_fuqFwhr1xsXIwmQJoKb5EFxI7H3SKtls9k">recently warned about “ongoing and significant risk to DNS, following months of increased attacks.</a> It should be noted that many of these attacks are reportedly coming from nation state hackers.</p><p><strong>What can we do about DNS Spoofing?</strong></p><p>As you can imagine, this is a fairly simple explanation, meant to serve as a type of primer. However, this doesn’t mean you can’t start advocating for the following solutions:</p><p><strong>Short-Term:</strong> <br>Call on domain owners, or website owners, to deploy DNSSEC, which makes it harder for malicious actors to interfere or spoof DNS. Currently, only 3% of the Fortune 1,000 are using DNSSEC according to statistics released <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/18/cloudflare-dnssec-one-click-securing-internet/">by Cloudflare</a> in September. Note: If you are a small website, companies like Cloudflare and Google have pushed for greater adoption by rolling out a one-click enabling of DNSSEC for domain name owners.</p><p><strong>Long-Term:<br></strong>Help push the messaging. As activists, we are constantly talking to the public on a variety of issues. Make sure to include the message that law makers, companies and others should make securing the infrastructure of the internet a main priority because it affects us all, especially at-risk activists. Remember, pushing for a more private and secure internet does not mean you have to be the expert. Don’t let anyone gaslight you about not having high technical knowledge. However, if you want to learn more, find a technologist in your network that can prime you, or follow organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation.</p><p><strong>Whats Next? <br></strong>Until they fix the Internet’s infrastructure, the only thing you can do is learn how to keep you and your network safe. Here are some suggestions:</p><p>a) Avoid submitting any real personal information online. Really question why and how necessary it is. Do you really need to take that online personality test? Do you really need to register to join a demonstration?</p><p>b) Password managers can be a type of canary in the coal mine, when attempting to login to a site that is a malicious clone. Use them.</p><p>c) Read, Read, Read: Tons of digital security manuals exist in all languages, written exclusively for activists.</p><p>d) When visiting a website, make sure its 100% the correct URL. www.facebook.com looks very similar to www.faceboook.com (there is an extra o in the second).</p><p>e) If your browser gives you an error message or alert that suggests the site is not secure, immediately disconnect from it.</p><p>f) Its much better to use websites that use HTTPS versus just HTTP in the URL.</p><p>g) Consider using a trusted VPN or Tor when surfing the net.</p><p>Questions? Feel free to contact Sandra at @collaboracion on Twitter.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8365930d28d5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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