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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by K S Nair on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by K S Nair on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by K S Nair on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Indian Aviators in WW2: My book, The Forgotten Few]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TheBrownBeagle/indian-aviators-in-ww2-my-book-the-forgotten-few-be9a2ddc29b2?source=rss-ad75c469394a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[indian-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wwii]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aviation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[K S Nair]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 May 2019 05:20:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-01T05:20:16.585Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g-AHrbXNuKf8Kcl6XteQkA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Indian Aviators in WW2 mostly flew Hurricanes (L), and tangled with Japanese Ki-43 “Oscars” (R)</figcaption></figure><p><em>THE FORGOTTEN FEW: THE INDIAN AIR FORCE IN WW2</em></p><p>Family, buddies, fellow enthusiasts, and anyone else interested:</p><p>You all know (and pull my leg) about my lifelong interests in the Indian Air Force, and the Second World War. You’ve seen me devour books, and heard (or read) me going on and on about both topics. But among all those great books, I never found one combining the two — the air war and India.</p><p>There are many fine books out there about the Indian Army in World War 2. There are books about the air war in the China-Burma-India theatre of World War 2, mostly from a British viewpoint. But there do not seem to be books specifically about India’s own participation in the air war during World War 2, about the young Indian Air Force, and the small band of almost-forgotten Indian aviators of the time, in the larger context of that globe-straddling war.</p><p>So about a year ago, presumptuous as always, I thought I’d try to write one myself.</p><p>Now, after a year of dusting off IAF WW2 anecdotes and poring over war diaries and logbooks, I am both proud and slightly nervous to say (drum roll!!) that HarperCollins India have agreed to publish my book.</p><p><em>The Forgotten Few: The Indian Air Force in World War II</em> should, if all goes well, be in print around June this year. I know some of you will be interested; I hope it measures up!!</p><p>I will keep posting more about the book over the next few weeks. I hope a cover design will be out soon — and trust me, I am as keen to see it out as you are</p><p>#WW2_IAF_FF</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=be9a2ddc29b2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Indian Aviators in WW2: JC Verma]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TheBrownBeagle/indian-aviators-in-ww2-jc-varma-83b241a368aa?source=rss-ad75c469394a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[world-war-2]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world-war-ii]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-air-force]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[K S Nair]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Feb 2018 18:25:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-15T14:38:45.883Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Verma’s Victory</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/421/1*9THT0BwEPxyf9FY8mT9VsQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Flying Officer J C Verma, IAF</figcaption></figure><p>As set out in an <a href="https://scroll.in/magazine/867596/who-was-the-first-indian-pilot-to-shoot-down-an-enemy-plane-we-may-have-got-it-wrong-all-along">earlier article</a>, on 8th February 1944 four Hawker Hurricane fighters of the Indian Air Force (IAF) clashed with Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa fighters of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) over Burma. That dogfight resulted in two IAF losses, though it <em>may</em> also conceal one victory, possibly their first over the Burma Front. The next couple of weeks were to be equally eventful.</p><p>Launched three days earlier, the Japanese <em>HA-GO</em> or “Operation Z” offensive was making some gains, and the Allies were under pressure. The Imperial Japanese Army’s attacking force, designated Sakurai Force for its commander, had surrounded 7th Indian Division around their administrative base at Sinzweya in the Arakan (now Rakhine State in modern Myanmar). For the three weeks’ duration of this battle, the Division was sustained entirely by supplies air-dropped by RAF and USAAF Dakotas.</p><p>In that situation, the Army needed frequent tactical reconnaissance (Tac/R) and close air support. No 6 Squadron of the IAF was the only Tac/R specialised unit, out of about a dozen Allied squadrons in the area. It responded well to the pressure. In the first fortnight of February the squadron flew 193 sorties, many pilots flying multiple sorties in a day. Tactical reconnaissance, to determine Japanese movements and locate their gun positions, was their main task.</p><p>But No 6 Squadron had also taken heavy losses. Against a sanctioned establishment of 17 pilots, its strength fluctuated between a maximum of 13 pilots and a minimum as low as eight, during the battle. As on 15th February, it had lost six aircraft destroyed, and five pilots killed or missing (one had survived and was a PoW in Japanese hands, but this was not known at the time), in the previous six weeks. A detachment of 28 Squadron RAF was hurriedly moved nearby in support. Unfortunately, at the same time, the situation on the Imphal front, 300 miles north, was also deteriorating, in the face of another Japanese offensive, Operation <em>U-GO</em>. <em>U-GO</em> attracted attention, partly because the Japanese had dubbed it “the March on Delhi”. As the situation at Imphal worsened, the reinforcing detachment had to return in a hurry.</p><p>From contemporary accounts, No 6 Squadron was not unhappy to resume sole Tac/R responsibility. They were known to take particular pride in meeting their targets, even while under strength. And happier results were soon evident.</p><p>On 15 February another of their Tac/Rs was intercepted by Japanese fighters, leading to another extraordinarily long-running combat. The formation, a tactical pair on this occasion, was again led by Flying Officer JC Verma, who had also been the leader during the 8th February dogfight. He was on his third sortie of the day, with Pilot Officer Indar Battacharji as Weaver, on an offensive reconnaissance again over Taung Bazaar. Sighting a force of over 200 Japanese trying to build a bridge, they pulled up to attack. As Fg Off Verma was about to roll in, he saw a Japanese fighter diving towards his Weaver.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/452/1*8I1LvrVIxPldNS1ms2eIug.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pilot Officer Indar Battacharji, No 6 Squadron IAF</figcaption></figure><p>There are several versions of his operations report, in various coffee table books and anniversary souvenirs. One of them reads:</p><p>“I broke off the attack, at the same time warning my No 2. I gave the attacking Oscar a burst but on looking around found two other Oscars diving on me.</p><p>“I skidded, slipped and went as low as I possibly could and steered north, but they followed me on and on without giving me a chance to cross the hills on the left to get home. I had now been chased for five minutes. During the chase, I was pulling up, skidding, and doing steep turns to avoid the Oscars but they kept pursuing me relentlessly. Finally I flew straight and throttled back completely. Both Oscars, coming on at great speed, overshot me and one came right within my gunsight at about 20 yards. I gave a long burst and noticed direct hits on the wings and fuselage. The Oscars rolled away. But I had no time to see any more of him since the other Oscar was turning in for me. The chase carried on for another ten minutes.”</p><p>Plt Off Battacharji, in HW428, was shot down, but Fg Off Verma eventually made it home. He knew he had at least damaged one of the enemy fighters, during his fifteen-minute running battle at low-level among the trees; he had seen pieces flying off his adversary’s aircraft as he fired. The Operations Record Book (ORB) says, “Attacked by O’s / Damaged one”. Incidentally, the ORB page also shows that as soon as Verma returned, his CO, Squadron Leader Mehar Singh, and one of the Flight Commanders, Flight Lieutenant MS Pujji, the two seniormost and most experienced pilots in the unit, took off to search for Plt Off Battacharji.</p><p>A day later Army observers confirmed that Verma’s victim had been seen to crash. In 2002 this author corresponded with Japanese aviation historian Hiroshi Umemoto, whose monumental Japanese-language book, <em>Burma Air War</em>, suggests that Verma’s victim may have been Corporal Tsuneo Nabeta of the 204th<em>Sentai</em>. It is hard to be certain, because the records of most IJAAF units in the theatre were destroyed later in the War.</p><p>From the squadron ORB, Fg Off Verma’s aircraft on this sortie was serial number BG852. This very aircraft had flown the squadron’s first sortie of its tour. That sortie had spotted a Japanese troop concentration. BG852 was clearly a lucky aircraft!</p><p>Flying Officer Hoshang K “Pat” Patel, who like Flying Officer Ramunny was happily still with us till relatively recently, helped to debrief Fg Off Verma that day. He recalls that an Indian Army patrol found Plt Off Battacharji in the wreckage of his crashed Hurricane, so badly injured and burnt that they did not think he would live. Maggots had infected his wounds, and the Armymen who found him thought that an ominous sign. In fact, we now know that maggots can in some circumstances be beneficial. They eat dead flesh, but do not eat living — effectively, carrying out the medical process now known as <em>debridement</em>. So they sometimes actually <em>save</em> a wound from festering.</p><p>Luckily for Battacharji, the Army patrol was not observing triage, the cold-blooded but practical approach by military medics to prioritise medical treatment in pressure situations to those most likely to benefit. Despite their grim prognosis, they put unstinted effort into trying to evacuate him. With only the tools they were carrying, they hacked a <em>kutcha</em> airstrip out of the jungle. A small air ambulance aircraft, probably either a de Havilland DH82 Tiger Moth or a Stinson L-5 Sentinel, slipped into that improvised strip to evacuate Battacharji, manhandling his still-unconscious form into a space modified to carry a single stretcher behind the pilot. He was still hovering on the edge of a coma, when his ambulance aircraft landed at a larger airfield, probably Ramu.</p><p>From there a Dakota, possibly of 31 Squadron RAF (which was doing supply drops to the surrounded Allied troops, and occasional casualty evacuations on the return legs) carried Battacharji further to the rear. The Dakota was itself bounced by IJAAF Oscars as it headed back, and Plt Off Battacharji came to briefly just as the aircraft was jinking to evade its attackers — it must have seemed like a continuing nightmare to him! Mercifully, he lapsed back into unconsciousness almost immediately. The Dakota did escape, and Plt Off Battacharji went into intensive care at the Military Hospital at Jorhat. He did not recover for months, but did survive, although he did not fly again.</p><p>On the ground, 26th Indian Division came up in support of the surrounded Allied troops, and 5th Indian Division outflanked Sakurai Force with a landing from the sea. By the end of February <em>Ha-Go</em> had clearly failed. This was the first failure of a Japanese overland offensive in the theatre, and a significant turning-point, though it was masked at the time by the larger battles unfolding around Imphal and Kohima.</p><p>And as a tiny footnote to this battle — now known as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Admin_Box">Battle of the Admin Box</a> — Fg Off Verma was decorated with the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC), partly for this victory. More than twenty IAF aircrew received DFCs during the Second World War, but Verma’s was the first since the First World War for a confirmed victory in air combat.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/418/1*einD7dxn3hDPzFeHD3AqFw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Distinguished Flying Cross</figcaption></figure><p>So ended the eventful February of 1944, for this young squadron of the IAF. There was much more to come, for them and their colleagues in the rest of the war. To be continued!!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=83b241a368aa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Indian Aviators in WW2: DR Reddy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TheBrownBeagle/indian-aviators-in-ww2-dr-reddy-34535bd3eb62?source=rss-ad75c469394a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[indian-air-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world-war-2]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world-war-ii]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[K S Nair]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Feb 2018 05:30:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-25T05:39:49.309Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is an extended, un-edited version of an article that originally appeared in </em><a href="https://scroll.in/magazine/867596/who-was-the-first-indian-pilot-to-shoot-down-an-enemy-plane-we-may-have-got-it-wrong-all-along"><em>Scroll</em></a><em>:</em></p><p>AN UNSUNG HERO: FLYING OFFICER DODLA RANGA REDDY</p><p>By K S Nair</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/207/1*dNM5oTfLSLHywmpg7Ff2Wg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Flying Officer D R Reddy. Pic: Bharat-Rakshak</figcaption></figure><p>Many Indian military history anniversaries are marked in February, such as the capture of Sinhagad Fort. This is the story of a tiny Indian military aviation event, almost forgotten now, but possibly concealing a significant marker. Seventy-four years ago, on 8 February 1944, four young Indian pilots were involved in a dogfight with Japanese fighters over Burma. Overall, it did not end well for the Indians, as two of the four were shot down and killed. But it <em>may</em> have been the first occasion during World War 2, when an Indian pilot shot down an enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat.</p><p>The four Indian pilots were:</p><p>Flying Officer Jagdish Chandra Varma, 25 years old at the time;</p><p>Flying Officer Murkot Ramunny, 28 at the time;</p><p>Flying Officer Dodla Ranga Reddy, 23 at the time (his 23rd birthday was less than a week earlier); and</p><p>Flying Officer Joseph Charles de Lima, 27 at the time.</p><p>They belonged to No 6 Squadron of the Indian Air Force, which was flying Hawker Hurricane fighters. They had deployed to Cox’s Bazaar (now in Bangladesh but at the time marking the frontier between colonial-era India and Burma) a few weeks earlier, in December 1943. On 4 February, just four days earlier, the squadron had moved to a forward airstrip called Ratnap.</p><p>The squadron was flying intensively, as the Japanese had launched a major attack a few days earlier, and they were the only reconnaissance-specialist squadron on the Arakan front (now Rakhine State in modern Myanmar), the site of some of the fiercest fighting between Japan and the Allies.</p><p>The squadron had already lost two pilots in previous weeks; and this day, 8 February 1944, saw some of the most intense air combat over the Arakan. RAF and USAAF transport aircraft were trying for the first time to drop supplies by parachute to a large body of Allied troops who had been surrounded and isolated by Japanese attacks. Japanese fighters had broken up the transport formations and shot down some of the escorting Allied fighters.</p><p>This morning, the four Indian pilots were tasked to attack Japanese positions at Taung Bazar, a small town on the Japanese route to the frontier of India. The squadron’s Operations Record Book (ORB) for this date says, baldly:</p><p>“Taung Bazar area — Dropping and contact/R — … East of Taung Bazar. Duty not carried out. Jumped by 0s.”</p><p>And against the names of Reddy and de Lima:</p><p>“Failed to return. Missing presumed shot down by 0s.”</p><p>“Duty not carried out” is a standard, sometimes ominous phrase in military reporting, often abbreviated to DNCO. “Failed to return” is an even more ominous phrase.</p><p>Ramunny, who survived this combat and many others, lived to the ripe old age of 95, and became a prolific writer (mostly in Malayalam). He described the combat in his book published in 1996, <em>The Sky Was the Limit</em>:</p><p>“After reaching the target, Varma gave the order, ‘Line astern’ [ordering the formation to change, from the Finger Four battle formation in which they had approached the target, to a line following the leader, in preparation for diving on the target]. I was Number Two, Reddy Three and de Lima Four. After the first attack we were climbing back in a steep left hand turn when Varma shouted, ‘Rats, go home!!’ The Zeros were on our tail. I was still following the leader when <em>a Zero which was on my tail was shot down by Reddy</em>. [Emphasis added.] In the process Reddy was also shot down by another Zero.”</p><p>A piece of military trivia is that both the squadron ORB entry, as well as the excerpt from Ramunny’s book quoted above, identify the Japanese fighters as “0s” or “Zeros” — that is, the famous Mitsubishi A6M Navy Type 0 Japanese fighter, referred to as the “Zero” [in its time as iconic a fighter to the Japanese as the Spitfire was to the British]. In actual fact, they were almost certainly the similar-looking Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa fighters, which were known by the Allied reporting name “Oscars”. Zeros were Navy fighters and hardly used in Burma, which was an Army theatre; Oscars were widely used there. This was a common mis-identification during the war.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*fD3bP5TuE8Gf9tbJ7GOB4A.jpeg" /><figcaption>A Japanese Nakajima Hayabusa “Oscar”, almost certainly the Japanese aircraft type involved. Pic: CBI-History</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*7S8goCv8Ka-LPIPVc9uemg.jpeg" /><figcaption>A Japanese Mitsubishi “Zero”, the type which the Oscar was often mistaken for. Pic: Fine Art America</figcaption></figure><p>In 2006, the author had the privilege of calling on Wing Commander (as he later became) Ramunny, by then long-retired. Over the course of two days spent with him, the author listened to him describe vividly, and in much more detail than in his book, a swirling dogfight, straight out of every World War 2 fighter pilot’s memoirs. “Reddy was shouting all the time, ‘Jap on your tail, Jap on your tail’”, he recalled. A classic tail-chase developed, with Ramunny being chased by a Japanese fighter, itself being pursued by Reddy, and another Japanese fighter behind Reddy. Turning and jinking hard, to avoid being shot down, Ramunny glimpsed Reddy shooting down the Japanese fighter on his (Ramunny’s) tail. But to fire effectively, Reddy had to hold his own aircraft steady for a few moments — and that was probably all the opportunity the second Japanese fighter needed. The Japanese pilot’s guns also found their target, and Flying Officer Dodla Ranga Reddy’s aircraft started to stream smoke, and lose airspeed and height. With little margin for recovery at the treetop levels at which they were flying, he crashed into the impenetrable jungle below.</p><p>Fg Off de Lima actually survived the whirling dogfight, but was shot down later, possibly by ground fire, when he climbed out of ground cover to cross the Arakan hills on his way back to his base at Ratnap. This was a frequent sting in the tail of return trips from the Arakan, which claimed many other pilots as well, during the campaign. Fg Offs Varma and Ramunny, the two survivors of the formation, had to fly “miles and miles” up the valley before they felt it safe to climb and cross the hills.</p><p>Ramunny continued, in his book:</p><p>“Back in the Mess in the evening it was difficult to go back to the room. Reddy had been my room-mate for long. We were together at the Madras Flying Club also . [Ramunny and Reddy had both learned to fly, one batch apart, at the Madras Flying Club, one of several Flying Clubs which in the early years of World War 2 had supported the war effort by providing initial training of Indian pilots.] It was difficult to console the Burmese cook. He said he would trek through the jungles in the hills and valleys and find his body if we could tell him where the likely spot was. There was a half-finished letter to his mother on the table in the crew room … ”</p><p>Reddy’s victory over one of the Japanese fighters is not currently recognised in Allied official records. Conditions in Burma were such as to make it very difficult to confirm air-to-air kills, particularly by the IAF: the ground observer network was sparse; because of film shortages IAF aircraft often flew without film in their gun cameras (which might otherwise have provided evidence); and in this case, the victor was himself killed. But for what it is worth, Wg Cdr Ramunny was clear, definite and positive in his recollection. Fg Off Reddy shot down a Japanese fighter, and saved a squadron-mate’s life at the cost of his own. It remains one of thousands of unrecognised wartime acts of heroism and selflessness.</p><p>Neither Reddy’s nor de Lima’s bodies was ever found, but both are commemorated in quiet, well-kept war memorials maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC). De Lima’s name is displayed at the Taukkyan War Cemetery in modern Myanmar, Reddy’s at the Singapore Memorial. (There is no memorial bearing their names in India.)</p><p>CWGC records say that de Lima hailed from Bandra in today’s Mumbai, and was a graduate of Bombay University. There is some evidence that a relative of his flew for Air India in post-Independence India. Reddy hailed from Buchireddypalem in Nellore District of coastal Andhra Pradesh. Around 2004, a British researcher tracked down copies of a poignant letter written by Reddy to his mother while still under training, as well as of his flying licence. The letter is hugely positive in tone; nothing remotely like the laments in many letters from Indian servicemen to their families which have been published in recent years. Reddy’s letter tells of money sent home, reassures his family, and exults in the challenges he is confronting and overcoming.</p><p>Exactly one week after the dogfight described above, Fg Off Verma was involved in another dogfight in the same area, and this time he emerged victorious. Fg Off Verma is officially recognised as the first Indian Air Force pilot to score an air-to-air victory during World War 2, and was decorated with the Distinguished Flying Cross. He went on to distinction in the IAF, commanding his old Squadron just before Independence, becoming Station Commander of Air Force Station Kalaikunda in the early 1960s, and rising to the rank of Air Commodore at a time when only a handful of Indians held that rank. He passed away in 1975, with a record of accomplishments that are in no way to be belittled.</p><p>Fg Off Ramunny became a Wing Commander by the age of around 30, and was the first Chief Instructor at the Joint Services Wing, the predecessor of the modern National Defence Academy. Soon after Independence he was one of a handful of service officers hand-picked for key roles in the infant Indian civil service, where he served with distinction at levels up to Cabinet. He passed away in 2009.</p><p>The Indian Army’s contributions to the Allied victory in World War 2 are no longer doubted (except possibly by a tiny minority in the European and North American right wing). The Indian Air Force’s and Indian Navy’s contributions were numerically far smaller, but they still represent the sacrifice of some of our finest young people.</p><p>To the end of his life, Wg Cdr Ramunny continued to quietly insist, with full respect to his squadron-mate “Bandy” Varma, that Flying Officer Dodla Ranga Reddy had shot down a Japanese Oscar a week before Flying Officer Varma.</p><p>It does not really matter any more, some would say. Aircraft shoot-downs, while iconic and celebrated, are not actually the best measure of air power. All participants in this combat are no more, and World War 2 is in danger of being forgotten in India, the country that provided the largest number of volunteers for the war. National alignments have changed, with India and Japan now both democracies and part of the Quadrilateral Alliance.</p><p>But this story remains one of four young Indian men who threw themselves into one of the riskiest forms of warfare of the time. Its seventy-fourth anniversary is a good time to remember it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=34535bd3eb62" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[16 December 1971 in Dacca]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TheBrownBeagle/16-december-1971-in-dacca-af35f959de22?source=rss-ad75c469394a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af35f959de22</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[film]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[K S Nair]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Sep 2017 02:47:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-16T04:46:12.556Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/724/1*34X84hyANh7ZyJvmup4kcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Signing the Surrender. Seated: Lt Gen JS Aurora, Indian Army and Lt Gen AAK Niazi, Pakistan Army. Standing, L to R: V Adm N Krishnan, Air Marshal HC Dewan, Lt Gen Sagat Singh, Maj Gen JFR Jacob</figcaption></figure><p><strong>16 December 1971 in Dacca</strong></p><p>On Independence Day this year, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bGdIAf2J_k">this Manu Chobe short film titled <em>Mukti</em></a>, with the attraction of Milind Soman in a starring role, became quite a hit in India. Easily accessible, at least to those who could get YouTube, and technically accomplished, it told a dramatised version of the negotiations between then-Major General JFR Jacob of the Indian Army and Lieutenant General AAK Niazi of the Pakistan Army, which led to the Pakistani surrender that afternoon.</p><p>It definitely did its bit, in raising awareness of an inadequately-remembered moment in Indian history. But on a couple of military-interest mail and social media groups that I lurk on, it sparked considerable, and sometimes heated, debate on historic accuracy, and on whether the historic accuracy mattered.</p><p>As it happens, on 16 December last year, I had posted a version of the story of that day, based partly on Gen Jacob’s own book, and partly on some Pakistani recollections. This post isn’t intended to be an analysis of the historic accuracy of the film, but simply to offer a hopefully more fact-based version of the story. In my view the story is quite dramatic, even as it stands.</p><p>So, without criticising a creative professional’s attempt to add to the pitifully tiny corpus of Indian-created stories of Indian military exploits, here is another version — of</p><p><strong>What happened in Dacca on 16 December 1971 — as drawn from a post written on 16 December 2016:</strong></p><p>45 years ago on this day, 16 December 1971, India was seeking to bring to a close its swift, effective military campaign in the former East Pakistan, while leaving no opportunity for the military victory, and the sacrifice of some 2,500 lives, to be negotiated away in a diplomatic or political “settlement”.</p><p>On the Eastern Front, Indian troops were now on the very point of entry into Dacca, from several different directions. They had captured several towns on the way, mostly communications centres; but had also bypassed others, leaving garrisons of Pakistani troops isolated and with paralysed communications. This was thanks partly to some intelligent staff work at Eastern Command, which had calculated (sometimes against the advice of more cautious generals) that there was no point in attempting to occupy every town on the way; there were enough Bangladeshi freedom fighters to keep Pakistani troops penned up in their cantonments. And it was also partly thanks to the daring, imaginative way in which some Indian line commanders, in particular Lt Gen Sagat Singh, GOC of IV Corps, had exploited unexpected successes, and kept up the momentum of advance.</p><p>There remained perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 Pakistani troops in Dacca, plus a few thousand more who had abandoned other positions and streamed into the city. This, in the built-up environment of a sizeable city, would have been enough to mount a fairly extended resistance, should they have chosen to fight, street by street and house-to-house. Urban warfare is one of the most unpleasant forms of combat, and inevitably results in civilian casualties (as has been seen in recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria). It is no disgrace to the Indian Army that they wanted to avoid it if possible.</p><p>The Pakistan Air Force had virtually ceased to operate, certainly by day, since around 6 December. The Pakistan Navy’s strength in the Eastern theatre, consisting of a number of gunboats and one US-provided submarine, had been sunk at sea or crippled in port. There was no possibility of any military turnaround — except for the risk that Pakistani leadership would continue to fight in the hope of a bailout by China or the United States. The larger risk was the mounting pressure on India at the United Nations (UN), to suspend military operations.</p><p>Starting two nights previously the Indian Army had been broadcasting radio messages on Pakistani channels, talking up the strength of the Indian Army approaching Dacca, and warning that Bangladeshi freedom fighters would slaughter all West Pakistani military personnel and those perceived as having collaborated with the puppet government, unless they surrendered and placed themselves under the protection of the Indian Army. On the 15th the radio broadcast was supplemented with the announcement that the Indian Army would observe a ceasefire, represented as strictly temporary, until 9:00 am on the 16th, to give the Pakistanis time to surrender.</p><p>Early on the morning of 16 Dec, the Indian Army Chief, General Manekshaw, received a response to his signals from Lieutenant General AAK Niazi, Commander of Pakistan’s Eastern Command (and hence the seniormost Pakistani in Bangladesh), in Dacca. Niazi requested a six-hour extension of the Indian ceasefire, to 3 pm that afternoon, suggested a “preliminary staff meeting” in Dacca, and agreed to go ahead with “cease-fire formalities”.</p><p>By his wording, Niazi was clearly still attempting to salvage an agreement that could be represented as a “cease-fire” rather than surrender. General Manekshaw responded, agreeing to the extension of the ceasefire but reiterating that the Pakistanis would have to surrender. Either he, or Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, GOC-in-C of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command, ordered Major General JFR Jacob, the Chief of Staff (CoS) of Eastern Command, to fly to Dacca and secure the Pakistani Army’s surrender.</p><p>Maj Gen “Jackie” Jacob was born in Calcutta, into the small community of Indian Jews. His family had been settled in India for over 200 years, and he often described himself as “Indian through and through”. He had joined the Indian Army in 1942. During World War 2 he served in North Africa, Burma and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), and attended training in the UK and the US. He remained in the Indian Army after Independence, and was a Brigadier in the Rajasthan sector during the 1965 war. He had built a reputation as a strong staff officer, and written one of the Indian Army’s training manuals. He was appointed CoS of Eastern Command in 1969.</p><p>In early 1971, when Pakistan launched its “crackdown” in East Pakistan and refugees, eventually numbering 10 million, began to stream into India, Maj Gen Jacob started work on contingency plans to engage Pakistan in the Eastern theatre, with all the difficulties of its swampy, river-riddled terrain. The strategy of selective bypass was his idea. Once the fighting started, as Indian forward troops (in particular those of IV Corps) advanced even faster than planned, Gen Manekshaw and Lieutenant General JS Aurora, the Commander-in-Chief of Eastern Command, initially sceptical, came to support and reinforce Jacob’s ideas.</p><p>On the morning of 16 Dec, Maj Gen Jacob flew to Dacca in a single helicopter, accompanied only by a single staff officer, carrying a draft of the Instrument of Surrender. He was met by representatives of the UN, with offers to arrange the withdrawal of the Pakistani military and Pakistani civilians. Gen Jacob declined their offer.</p><p>The Indian Army was on the outskirts of the city, but not yet in the city in any strength. There was sporadic fighting in the city between the Mukti Bahini and the Pakistan Army. The Pakistan Army staff car which met Jacob at the airport was stopped by angry Mukti Bahini fighters, on the way to Niazi’s headquarters. The Mukti Bahinis calmed down only on recognising Jacob’s<strong> </strong>olive green Indian Army uniform. They demanded custody of the Pakistani officer in the car, who had come to the airport to receive Gen Jacob; and it took all Gen Jacob’s persuasive powers to get the Pakistani safely past them.</p><p>A few members of the international press also caught up with Gen Jacob. Clearly focussed on his task, Gen Jacob brushed them off. The <em>Time</em> magazine correspondent reported dramatically that Jacob had threatened to shoot them. Gen Jacob scoffs at the accusation, saying he didn’t carry a firearm on this trip (which speaks volumes to his confidence — even if partly-assumed).</p><p>By the time he reached Lt Gen Niazi’s office, Major General Gandharv Nagra, commanding the Indian force approaching Dacca from the north, had already secured entry, by trading on old connections — he and Niazi had served together at the pre-Independence Indian Military Academy, and Nagra had served later as the Military Advisor at our High Commission to Pakistan. Early that morning, Nagra had simply sent a note to Niazi, addressing him by his first name “Abdullah”, and offering sympathy like an old friend. Niazi had sent an escort, with orders that Nagra be escorted into Dacca and to his office. A Pakistani officer present at the time wrote of Nagra that “the Indian general entered Dacca with a handful of soldiers and a lot of pride … It fell quietly like a heart patient”.</p><p>(In his own memoir, Gen Jacob makes it clear he was not best pleased with Gen Nagra’s initiative; perhaps because he had exceeded his brief. But much of the Bangladesh victory was in fact due to imaginative officers on the ground, up to and including Lt Gen Sagat Singh, exceeding their brief. Whatever the reason, the sheer confidence and positive body language with which Gen Nagra had swaggered into Dacca clearly added to the cumulative disintegration of Gen Niazi’s own confidence.)</p><p>Lt Gen Niazi was still hoping to negotiate a ceasefire and not surrender. There are multiple versions of how the discussions between Jacob and Niazi played out, from several Pakistanis and from Jacob’s own book. They identify sometimes different turning-points in the discussion, but all of them make it clear that Niazi was by this time mentally a completely defeated and traumatised man.<br> <br> Later, Lt Gen Niazi complained that Jacob blackmailed him into surrender by threatening to turn the Mukti Bahini loose on Pakistanis in Dacca. Jacob always denied having made any such threat. But whether by threats, by persuasion, or by the sheer power of Maj Gen Jacob’s personality, after three hours of intense negotiation, Lt Gen Niazi eventually agreed to sign the Instrument of Surrender, to do so in public (he tried to negotiate for a signature in his office), and to provide a Pakistan Army guard of honour for the Indian contingent at the surrender ceremony.</p><p>At around 3 pm, Lt Gen Niazi and Maj Gen Jacob drove to the airport, in Gen Niazi’s staff car. Mukti Bahini fighters, who were about in far greater numbers than Indian troops at the time, swarmed the car, and again it took all the force of Jacob’s personality as well as that of his staff officer, a powerfully-built and Stentorian-voiced Sikh, to reach the airport safely. They picked up an escort along the way, of a jeep with all of two Indian paratroopers. The two paratroopers had come into Dacca on a preliminary scouting drive, when they and their jeep were commandeered by Gen Jacob. They stuck by his side for the rest of the day, probably nonplussed at their sudden responsibility, but in the manner of most paratroopers, admirably game for the unexpected.</p><p>At the airport, a Mukti Bahini commander, a former Pakistani Army officer of Bengali origin, appeared with a truckload of fighters, threatening Niazi. Jacob stared him down, with the judicious back-up of the two paratroopers, and ordered him off the airfield.</p><p>Around 4:30 pm, Maj Gen Jacob’s direct superior and Niazi’s Indian counterpart, Lt Gen JS Aurora, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command, arrived with a fleet of nine IAF helicopters. He was accompanied by Eastern theatre Commanders-in-Chief of the Indian Navy and Air Force, Vice Admiral N Krishnan and Air Marshal HC Dewan. Also included in the entourage was Lt Gen Sagat Singh, who more than any other commander had effected successes on the ground, and some of his division commanders, as well as some senior officers of the Bangladeshi government in exile in Calcutta.</p><p>The surrender ceremony was held at the Race Course, where thousands of Bangladeshis had already gathered. After inspecting the guard of honour, Aurora and Niazi sat at a small table and signed the Instrument of Surrender. The famous photographs of the occasion show Lt Gens Aurora and Niazi seated, and V Adm Krishnan, Air Marshal Dewan, Lt Gen Sagat Singh, and Maj Gen Jacob standing behind them.</p><p>After signing Niazi removed his epaulettes, took out his personal revolver and handed it to Aurora, with tears rolling down his cheeks. The crowd at the Race Course began shouting anti-Pakistan slogans and threats to lynch Niazi. The Indian officers present formed a cordon around Niazi and whisked him off in an Indian jeep.</p><p>So ended the 1971 war in the Eastern theatre. Mrs Gandhi announced the victory in the East in Parliament, with the ringing words, “Dacca is now the free capital of a free country”. Parliament erupted in cheers, and even Opposition leaders over the next few days praised her as the embodiment of Durga and Shakti.</p><p>Having secured its major strategic objective, and thereby put an end to major humanitarian crimes — and just by the way, re-shaped the geography of the sub-continent — India announced a ceasefire in the Western sector as well, from 17 December. Over the next few weeks, the new country began the process of setting up national institutions, with support from India.</p><p>16 December is celebrated by the Indian armed forces as Vijay Divas, but its significance is not widely remembered outside the armed forces. We lost about 2,500 men killed, and about 4,000 injured; Bangladesh, of course, lost literally lakhs of people (some say up to three million), mostly civilians, over the period from March 1971 onwards. India’s comprehensive victory remains one of the most significant since World War 2, one of the few ethically “just wars” of the 20th century, and was widely studied for applicable lessons.</p><p>In a tiny Delhi-based souvenir of that war, the inverted rifle and bayonet at the Amar Jawan memorial under India Gate belong to an unknown Indian soldier who gave his life in the Jessore sector.</p><p>War is never a good thing; but if there has to be a war that plays a large role in the awareness of Indians, it should have been the 1971 war. We still seem to be a little embarrassed rather than otherwise about our involvements in any war (which in some ways is definitely a Good Thing); but 1971 was unequivocally one of India’s finest achievements after Independence, and (this is important) not just — perhaps, not even primarily — for military reasons.</p><p>The military reasons are just the start. We won an overwhelming military victory; but that was only the enabler. We put a stop to humanitarian crimes on a truly massive scale (which should guide us, as we consider the plight of the Rohingya in Burma); we changed the world map by helping to create the new nation of Bangladesh; and we withdrew all our military forces from the new country in a period measurable in <em>weeks</em> (unlike the aftermaths of many Western countries’ recent military successes).</p><p>So remember this victory and the Indians who died for it, and honour those who wear the Sangram Medal. They were part of something admirable that India did, 46 years ago.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af35f959de22" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[RIBBON RANT]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TheBrownBeagle/ribbon-rant-6e42e740c0ae?source=rss-ad75c469394a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6e42e740c0ae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medals]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[K S Nair]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Sep 2017 11:18:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-26T18:27:38.757Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An Obsessive on Media Portrayals of the Military, and Medal Ribbons</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*aiicF2T0BaOITLkMG_mKBg.jpeg" /><figcaption>This is how they should be worn</figcaption></figure><p>OK. So all my life, having seen far too many images and clips showing British and American military images to illustrate general military writing and media, I’ve ranted. I’ve ranted about how we in India need to do more, to tell our own Indian military stories. (It’s actually not <a href="http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/dunkirk-sparks-debate-india-failure-show-soldiers-country-1024935">Christopher Nolan’s job</a>, to tell our stories — it’s ours.) And as part of that process, show Indian people, in Indian uniforms, operating Indian hardware, against more recognisably Indian backgrounds.</p><p>And to some extent, the Indian creative and media worlds have been getting better at this. There have been many more Indian attempts to tell military stories, in the last few years than earlier; and many of these recent attempts are genuine and sympathetic (as opposed to some earlier stories, which simply used military operations as a <em>deus ex machina</em> in the background). I have in mind the TV series <em>Bandi Yudh Ke</em> (Nov 16), the films <em>Madras Cafe</em> (Aug 2013), <em>Kanche</em> (Nov 2015), <em>The Ghazi Attack</em> (Feb 2017), and <em>Kaatru Veliyidaai</em> or <em>Cheliyaa</em> (Apr 2017). They all try, and that’s a start.</p><p>There are also more and more Indian attempts to use Indian military images in Indian advertising — mostly sincere, in attempting to pay respect.</p><p>There still remain too many howlers, such as stock photos of American APCs illustrating an article on Kashmir, clips of American helicopters in a movie set during the IPKF’s operation in Sri Lanka, and the like. But that’s not the subject of this rant.</p><p>What’s really got my goat, of late — and this, I realise, is a mostly personal grouse, not necessarily one most of the world identifies with — is the complete indifference to medal ribbons, that even the best-intentioned of recent Indian media throw up.</p><p>To those who pay attention, when you meet military personnel in uniform, one look tells you a great deal about that person’s military career, affiliations and qualifications. And medal ribbons are — or should be — taken particularly seriously in that respect.</p><p>The Indian military doesn’t quite hand out medals as liberally as the Americans do. The American approach was once described, by a World War II Royal Navy officer, as, “medals for travelling from point A to point B”. (Not to be too snarky about one of the most powerful militaries in the world, but the American military does hand out medal ribbons for, eg, Basic Training Honours Graduation, Overseas Training, Enlisted Person of the Year, and similar achievements.) India certainly isn’t that liberal, but we do hand out enough campaign and service medals that you can tell, for instance, that this wearer has served in high-altitude areas; that wearer was in service at the time of the 1971 war; and the other wearer was not only in service during the 1971 war but served specifically on the Bangladesh front. And sometimes, reading a serviceman’s (or servicewoman’s) medals gives you, at a glance, a quick sense of their entire career.</p><p>More to the point, these 32 mm by 9 mm rectangles of coloured silk are — or should be — one of the most important symbols of a grateful nation’s recognition of what every serviceperson has done, of what sets a service career apart from a civilian one. They need to be treated with the appropriate level of respect. And the visual media in India, particularly film, have a particular responsibility, by virtue of their enormous reach.</p><p>Which is why the following three howlers — among others — bug me so much.</p><p>In the well-intentioned, and in many other ways not entirely unconvincing film, <em>The Ghazi Attack</em>, released early this year, starting with the first shot of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXISMIm9Iqg">Om Puri as an Indian Navy admiral</a>, it is obvious that the ribbon sets worn by most of the actors are upside down (Aargh!!). Om Puri, for instance, is wearing the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Awards_and_Decorations_of_the_Indian_Armed_Forces#/media/File:IND_9YearsServiceMedalRibbon.svg">green-and-black 9 Years’ Long Service ribbon</a> at the top left, the senior position, when it should be at the bottom right. His ribbon set also looks as though a few random additional ribbons have been added, to generate a third and fourth row. Among other howlers in this process, it looks to me as though the costume department have added a second, duplicate occurrence of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Awards_and_Decorations_of_the_Indian_Armed_Forces#/media/File:IND_High_Altitude_Medal_Ribbon.svg">blue-and-white High Altitude Service Medal</a> (the last ribbon in his top row, and the second in his third row), the stylized peaks of which have been converted to troughs by virtue of being worn upside down.</p><p>To me, it is fairly obvious that one contributor to this howler is that the ribbon sets worn by most of the actors have probably been sourced from real-life Army and Air Force recipients, whose ribbon sets are laid out with the narrowest row at the top, and widest row at the bottom. Some inadequately-observant member of the costume department has probably noticed that the Navy wear their ribbon sets the opposite way, with the widest row at the top and the narrowest at the bottom. So, simple solution, as far as they are concerned — turn the whole set upside down.</p><p>Don’t get me wrong, there is much that I really liked, about <em>The Ghazi Attack</em>. It is unequivocally good, in my view, to see a wartime story by a young film-maker who has clearly come to this genre relatively recently (on the basis of a visit to the submarine museum at Vizag, an on-line interview says). The film comes across as genuinely interested in, and sympathetic to, the men of the submarine arm, and deserves kudos on many grounds. But this detail is Just. Plain. Wrong.</p><p>In another example, in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2k_zc60DIg">this recent Hero Motor Corporation TV commercial</a>, under the tag line, “#HeroSalutes the heroes behind the heroes”, at the first moment that a uniform appears, at about the 23 second point, the ribbon set is once again upside down. Once again, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Awards_and_Decorations_of_the_Indian_Armed_Forces#/media/File:IND_9YearsServiceMedalRibbon.svg">9 Years’ Long Service ribbon</a> is at the top left, where it should be at the bottom right. Bonus points to those of you who noticed that this howler is the opposite of those in <em>The Ghazi Attack</em> — this Army officer is wearing his ribbons the way only Naval personnel do, with the wider row above, rather than below.</p><p>And in a final (for now) example, in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bGdIAf2J_k">this recent Independence Day short film</a> (which I actually welcome, for other reasons — because I believe the 1971 victory is inadequately locked into Indian memories), dramatising the conversation between the Indian Army’s Major General JFR Jacob, and the Pakistan Army’s Lieutenant General AAK Niazi, which led ultimately to the Pakistani surrender in 1971, the ribbons worn by Milind Soman, playing Gen Jacob, are simply an unholy mess of unrecognisable ribbons mixed with a few era-inappropriate military ribbons. About the ribbons worn by the actor playing Gen Niazi, the less said the better.</p><p>I just know the costume department, the director, and even some military veterans, possibly some who have worked in advisory capacities on some of these films, will all render a collective shrug. No one will notice; Nobody cares; Nobody else is like you. Here’s my push back. I certainly care. And I know a great many other people will. And still more should.</p><p>Even among military veterans, some of those who affect not to care, I promise you, do care, deeply — they are just so used to a sometimes indifferent public, they have cultivated this don’t-care attitude, as a means of social self-defence.</p><p>Well, from this tiny soap box of mine, with its couple of hundred followers, let me shout, loud and clear: This Is Important, and we all ought to care.</p><p>And you out there in the media — you film makers, photographers and everyone else — you are helping to tell a story, using the medium most accessed by Indians. You have a responsibility to lead public perception and understanding. And sometimes that means getting these tiny, 32 mm-wide details right. Please try.</p><p>I don’t always — I am conscious of the irony, that this was originally an INA greeting, not an Indian Army envoi — but today, I will sign off with this phrase. Jai Hind.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6e42e740c0ae" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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