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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tim Shorrock on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tim Shorrock on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@TimothyS?source=rss-7bfd5e9b7741------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Tim Shorrock on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TimothyS?source=rss-7bfd5e9b7741------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Kim Jong Il’s Magic Kingdom]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TimothyS/kim-jong-ils-magic-kingdom-d324a5972aec?source=rss-7bfd5e9b7741------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[japan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-korea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[north-korea]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Shorrock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Jan 2018 16:38:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-07T17:06:50.036Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>My 2012 review of B.R. Myers’ flawed book on North Korea, “The Cleanest Race.”</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/546/1*GXD_1nNbgVuybQj-I3QLDw.png" /></figure><p>On Saturday night, January 6, 2018, I came across a <a href="https://twitter.com/AskAKorean/status/949857183491153920">tweet</a> posted by one of my favorite commentators on Korea, a lawyer who goes by the handle of “T.K. of AAK!” and invites questions on North and South Korea under a stream he calls <a href="https://twitter.com/AskAKorean">“Ask a Korean.”</a> Like me, T.K. is often rankled by the writings of B.R. Myers, an American expat in Pusan, South Korea, whose views on the Koreas are frequently sought out by American journalists.</p><blockquote>Because I’m so sick of B.R. Myers’ psychobabble about how S Koreans are about to give away their country to Kim Jong-un, here are a couple of S Korean polls to consider.</blockquote><p>The first poll he posted showed that 76.7% of South Koreans welcomed North Korea’s participation in the upcoming Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. “Oh noes! The soft-brained S Koreans are letting the Norks in the Olympicz!” T.K. commented, sarcastically summarizing Myers’ take on the situation.</p><h3>T.K. of AAK! on Twitter</h3><p>First from Jan. 4 by RealMeter. https://t.co/9LPxAD9oCh 76.7% of the respondents welcomed NK participation in Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. &quot;Oh noes! The soft-brained S Koreans are letting the Norks in the Olympicz!&quot; But then again...</p><p>The tweet resonated with me, in part because I spent part of my youth in South Korea and have visited there many times on reporting and research trips. My last visit was last spring, when I spent two months in Gwangju, the site of the 1980 citizens uprising that is considered in the South, from President Moon Jae-in on down, as the spark of South Korea’s democratic movement (for more, see <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/south-koreas-new-president-says-his-election-completes-the-candlelight-revolution/">my interview with Moon</a> from last May). Moreover, being quite familiar with what I consider Myers’ warped view of both Koreas, I endorsed T.K.’s tweet with my own:</p><h3>Tim Shorrock on Twitter</h3><p>B.R. Myers is the most arrogant, wrong-headed and useless American &quot;expert&quot; on Korea writing today. https://t.co/K1Gq81mmme</p><p>My opinion was reinforced when I looked up some of Myers’ recent work, including <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2018/01/the_problem_with_south_korea_yes_south_korea.html">this interview with a writer from <em>Slate</em></a><em> </em>who, like many US journalists, have no real idea of the complexity of Korean politics — North and South. In it, Myers confirms many of the assumptions many Americans, especially cold war liberals, hold about South Korea, in particular the view that South Koreans are as starry-eyed about North Korea as many US communists were about Stalin’s Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s. He also used the interview to red-bait journalists he disagrees with, such as Choe Sang-Hun, the excellent Seoul bureau chief of <em>The New York Times. </em>Choe, he tells the eager <em>Slate </em>writer, Isaac Chotiner,</p><blockquote>Serves a kind of agenda-setting function, perhaps because he is the only fully bilingual correspondent. His agenda is that of the nationalist left-wing press where he got his own start, so any developments that would arouse American concern about that camp get filtered out. As a result the U.S. public has been misled into thinking of South Korea as a kind of Asian West Germany, a state where left and right share a commitment to the same liberal-democratic principles we hold dear.</blockquote><p>To be factual here, Choe got his start not at the “nationalist left-wing press,” but at the rather conservative <em>Korea Herald </em>and then the Associated Press, where he was part of team that <a href="https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Choe%20Sang-hun">won the 2000 Pulitzer Prize</a> for a stunning investigation into the <a href="https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=No_Gun_Ri_Massacre&amp;item_type=topic">No Gun Ri massacre</a> during the Korean War, when US forces killed scores of Korean civilians taking refuge under a bridge. The distortion is typical of Myers; Choe is well-respected in both Korea and the United States for his fair and accurate coverage of the peninsula and especially the complex politics of the South.</p><p>In any case, my critical tweet got the attention of several prominent Korea-watchers, including the renowned Aidan Foster-Carter, a British specialist on the Koreas I’ve been following almost as long as I’ve been covering Korea as a journalist (a period that dates back to the late 1970s).</p><h3>Aidan Foster-Carter on Twitter</h3><p>Now boys. Peace &amp;amp;. love in 2018, ok? Name-calling is just childish - tho&#39; #BRMyers himself likes a scrap. Let&#39;s hear nuanced arguments, pro &amp;amp; con. Eg aren&#39;t we all in his debt for revealing #DPRK&#39;s racism in #TheCleanestRace? Also, read him on Eng. Lit., &amp;amp; on food: bracing stuff!</p><p>Now I’ll admit that Twitter is not the best place for analysis, and I apologize for any “childish” language (it was late, and I was pissed off). But I stand by my critique of Myers. And since my British colleague brought up Myers’ book, “The Cleanest Race,” it’s only appropriate that I post here my 2013 review of it. In retrospect, I think I was quite fair in my analysis, giving Myers credit where it was due (his analysis of North Korean propaganda, based on research in its original Korean, is quite good) but slamming his basic theme: that post-Korean War DPRK is a replica of the Japanese Imperial State of World War II (I believe <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n10/bruce-cumings/a-murderous-history-of-korea">this recent article on Kim Jong Un and Japan’s Minister Shinzo Abe in <em>The London Review of Books</em></a><em> </em>by the eminent historian Bruce Cumings, whose work Myers distorts in his book, underscores the absurdity of this proposition).</p><p>I also post this knowing quite well the contradictions and confusion of the South Korean left, which I’ve experienced over the years (e.g., I’ve never understood its love-affair with Michel Chossudovsky, the Canadian economist and conspiracy theorist who has his own distorted analysis of South Korea and frequently posts on his website articles I have written without permission or even the courtesy of a request). But I think Myers was way off in his most popular book. So here’s my review — five years after it was posted at <a href="http://www.bookforum.com/inprint/018_05">BOOKFORUM</a> (it’s only available behind the paywall, thus my posting below).</p><p><strong>“The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves — and Why It Matters,” By B.R. Myers, New York: Melville House</strong></p><p><strong>By Tim Shorrock</strong></p><p>In November 2010, I spent a week in Cuba in my first visit ever to a<br>socialist country. One afternoon, a colleague from the University of<br>Havana took me to see Revolution Square, the enormous plaza where<br>Cuba’s accomplishments are often celebrated. The square is flanked on<br>one side by a giant tower honoring Cuba’s national hero Jose Marti,<br>and on the other by large iron sculptures of Che Guevara and Camilo<br>Cienfuegos, once Fidel Castro’s top aides. As I took in the view, my<br>friend explained to me that, in Cuba, only deceased heroes warrant<br>such recognition.</p><p>“Unlike North Korea,” she told me, “Cuba doesn’t honor living leaders<br>with statues.”<br> <br>That was the only time I heard anyone in Havana criticize<br>a communist ally. The message was clear: Socialism is not a religion,<br>and the near-worship of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and his son<br>Kim Jong Il is fundamentally out of synch with Marxism. Doctrinaire adherents of socialism leave no place for idolatry –let alone hereditary successions from father to son to grandson. To many communists the world over, North Korea, and its relentless propaganda about its “great” and “dear” leaders, is an enormous historical and political aberration.</p><p>This is the line of argument that the American writer B.R. Myers — an Asian-based contributing editor for the Atlantic pursues in “The Cleanest Race,” a provocative but analytically flawed study of North Korean ideology first published in 2010, but reissued with an afterward about Kim Jong Un, the third generational successor to the Kim dynasty who is posed to take power in the wake of Kim Il Sung’s death last December.</p><p>Myers lives and teaches in Pusan, South Korea, and has traveled to North Korea — known officially as the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, or DPRK — several times. He does a masterful job of analyzing North Korean state propaganda, which he has read in its original Korean in a government library in Seoul. Through the films, romance novels and wildly excessive editorials he finds there, Myers weaves a convincing portrait of a racially based personality cult around the two Kims and the 27-year old Kim Jong<br>Un.</p><p>Myers, who is identified as a “North Korea analyst,” pitches his book<br>as an argument against conventional theories holding that the Kim regime is a<br>strange and deadly mix of Confucianism, Stalinism and extreme<br>nationalism. But this contrarian reasoning leads him on to a shocking — and dubious — conclusion: The ideology of the DPRK, he claims, is directly linked to the fascist ideology trumpeted by wartime Japan, which colonized Korea<br>from 1910 to 1945. Myers contends that, stripped of its Marxist jargon, the guiding ideology in North Korea is really a bastardized version of Japan’s Shinto-tinged theories of racial purity and an Asian master race. This was the world view that Japan’s political and military elite imposed on East Asia from Japan’s first forays into China in 1937 to its unconditional surrender to the United States and its allies in September 1945.</p><p>Myers’ theory is indeed a dramatic departure from the consensus interpretation of the DPRK’s ideological makeup –but it’s based on evidence so thin and convoluted that one wonders if his editors at Melville House had<br>any knowledge whatsoever of Korea, or indeed, of East Asia in general. While<br>Myers’ study of North Korean propaganda is both fascinating and<br>horrifying, the conclusions he draws about its roots hold up about as<br>well as Glenn Beck’s outlandish theory that U.S. “progressives” are<br>followers of Adolph Hitler. Indeed, Myers offers so little data on the<br>comparison between the DPRK and wartime Japan that his argument boils<br>down to a single photograph on page 32: Emperor Hirohito rode a white<br>horse; Kim Il Sung was sometimes photographed on a white steed; ergo,<br>North Korea is a carbon copy of Imperial Japan. This is a wholly misleading, and in many ways, a dangerous view of the status quo in Pyongyang.</p><p>Myers’ thesis is laid out in a preface written shortly after his last<br>trip to Pyongyang last October. The DPRK is different from previous<br>communist states such as East Germany, he writes, “because it showcases a<br>very different ideology, a far-right one that the country’s mainstream does not perceive as having failed — yet.” He warns that “the worst thing would be for the outside world to continue misperceiving North Korea as a failed communist state that will become less confrontational as its economy liberalizes.”<br> <br>In other words, any talk of ending the nuclear standoff and reducing military tensions on the Korean Peninsula through direct US-DPRK negotiations (something I support and often speak about) are silly and unfounded fantasies. This remains Myers’ view as the world watches the careful choreography now under way in Pyongyang as Kim Jong Un consolidates his family’s power in the wake of his father’s funeral.</p><p>If Myers had solely focused on his close reading of North Korean propaganda,<br>The Cleanest Race could have she considerable light on the self-image of a largely unknown and inaccessible communist power. But the version of Korean history he promotes is so flawed — and so clearly choreographed to fit his outlandish conclusions — that a careful reader simply cannot take his<br>theories seriously. Take, for example, Myers’ quick history of the<br>Soviet occupation of North Korea form 1945 to 1948. On one hand, he<br>claims (rightly) that Soviet military officers quickly promoted Kim Il<br>Sung as a leader, largely based on his prior participation <br>in the guerrilla war against the Japanese empire in Manchuria.<br> <br>But Kim, Myers claims, was “the closest thing to a resistance fighter the<br>Koreans had; moreover, North Korea had a “lack of left-wingers”<br>because the north under the Japanese “had been a bastion of<br>conservatives and Christians.” Into this gap, he speculates, North<br>Korea filled its political and cultural void with Koreans who had<br>“collaborated with the Japanese to some degree.” The north, he states,<br>was in fact “more and not less hospitable” to collaborators than the<br>south, while “no writer was excluded from the (communist) party or its<br>cultural organizations due to pro-Japanese sympathies.” Therefore, he<br>concludes, it was easy for Kim Il Sung and his propagandists to fool<br>people into unknowingly following a Japanese imperial ideology slyly<br>disguised as communism.</p><p>under the Soviets following Japan’s surrender in 1945. The first was<br>Kim and others who had fought with Soviet units against the Japanese<br>in Manchuria. The second was cadre from the Korea Communist Party,<br>which had been founded in 1925 and carried out underground activities<br>inside Korea during World War II. The third, the so-called Yenan<br>Faction, was comprised of Korean revolutionaries who had fought with<br>Mao’s guerrilla army in China. Kim Il Sung consolidated his power<br>during and after the Korean War — in part by executing Pak Hon-yong,<br>perhaps Korea’s most famous communist prior to liberation, who had<br>allegedly — and mistakenly — promised Kim that the masses of South Korea<br>would rise up against their American occupiers when the Northern army<br>invaded in June 1950. In recounting this period, however, Myers<br>doesn’t provide a single example of a North Korean Japanese<br>sympathizer who had significant influence on the DPRK’s leadership or<br>its propaganda machine. His theories on Japanese “fascist” influence<br>appear to have materialized from thin air.</p><p>Myers is also unaccountably silent on the enormous role played by<br>pro-Japanese elements and collaborators in postwar South Korea. You<br>would never guess from his book that the US military deliberately kept<br>pro-Japanese rightists in power in South Korea during the early years<br>of the US occupation — precisely because American military leaders so feared communist and leftist influence. (Indeed, the US Army initially even allowed the hated Japanese police to remain in control of certain South Korean cities.) Nor would you learn anywhere in Myers’s chronicle that, under the autocratic “independence” leader Syngman Rhee, South Korea and the United States fought an extremely brutal counter-insurgency campaign against leftist-led nationalist forces from 1946 to 1948.</p><p>Many of the officers leading this effort had served in the Japanese military during the occupation. And as many South Koreans are aware, dozens of Korean officers trained by the Japanese military played key roles in the South Korea Army during and after the Korean War. Among them were Park Chung Hee, who later became president of South Korea following a 1961 military coup. And it was Park, whose authoritarian rule stretched to 1979, who (under strong US pressure) signed a normalization treaty with Japan in 1965 that allowed Japanese corporations and banks to invest in South Korea again for the first time since World War II. In other words, if any part of Korea had a Japanese phase and allied itself with collaborators, it was the South, and emphatically not the North.</p><p>Because Myers’ polemic also seeks to double as a history of North Korea, he must take into account the work of America’s preeminent scholar on Korea, Bruce Cumings of the University of Chicago. But rather than engaging seriously with Cumings’ careful, lifelong research into the origins of the Korean War, Myers seeks to dispatch it with a series of gratuitous slaps at Cumings and his work. So, for instance, when Myers notes Cumings’ pioneering work documenting the role of anti-Japanese fighters<br>in the postwar regime in the North, Myers waves this critical finding away as a “left-wing myth” that Cumings “had done much to nurture.”. It soon becomes plain, however, that such insults are necessary to the logic of the book, because Myers knows that a careful reading of Cumings’ extensive work will completely unravel the myths he has woven in “The Cleanest Race.”</p><p>Myers’ history of recent North Korea actions, and its confrontation<br>with the United States, is no less slanted. Throughout the book, he<br>ridicules the 1994 Agreed Framework under which Pyongyang promised to<br>end its nuclear program in return for US economic and political<br>guarantees as a “Yankee surrender.” The pact might have been flawed, and its<br>terms were ignored by both the DPRK and the United States, but it was hardly a “surrender” for the United States — a country maintaining nearly 30,000 troops in South Korea and surrounds the DPRK with thousands of lethal weapons and surveillance systems that could destroy the North in a flash. His<br>account of the North-South confrontation of a year ago, when the North<br>cruelly shelled a coastal town near a disputed maritime border, is<br>likewise one-sided and unreliable.</p><p>Much in the manner of the American foreign-policy press that he professes to detest, Myers fails to mention that a previous South Korean<br>president, the human rights lawyer Roh Moo Hyun, had agreed at a<br>summit with Kim Jong Il to diffuse tensions near that border. Nor, in addition, does Myers bother to note that the South’s current president, the conservative Lee Myung Bak, had unilaterally abrogated that agreement and gone back to holding huge military exercises there. Even the Pentagon realized Lee’s<br>actions were provocative; its warnings against escalation on the disputed border effectively ending the crisis last December.</p><p>In another key section, Myers dismisses the North Korean philosophy of<br>juche — or self-reliance — as a “pseudo-doctrine.” Juche, he grandly<br>proclaims without a shred of evidence, is “an implacably xenophobic<br>race-based world view derived largely from fascist Japanese myths”<br>(For good measure, he also delivers another passing dig at Cumings, accusing him of “apologetic desperation” for saying that the idea of juche may be “inaccessible” to non-Koreans.) A more objective writer would at least discuss juche in the context of the DPRK’s economic achievements after its<br>near-total destruction by US bombers during the Korean War. By the<br>1970s, North Korea had highly developed steel, metals, chemical and<br>machinery industries that gave the DPRK a certain degree of<br>independence from both China and the Soviet Union. If anything, Kim’s<br>go-it-alone economy was classic Stalinism: It basically followed the<br>Soviet dictator’s determination — against opposition from the global<br>revolutionaries led by Trotsky — to “build socialism in one country.”<br>These were no small achievements, and they explain in part why this small,<br>impoverished country has been able to build sophisticated nuclear<br>weapons and guided missiles.</p><p>Still, the most distasteful element of Myers’ study is his evident antipathy toward Koreans who don’t see the world as he does. Throughout the book he<br>takes nasty digs at South Koreans and the anti-Americanism that he sees lurking just beneath the surface of the Soouth’s political culture. At one point, for example, he denounces people who live near the southwestern city of Kwangju, which was the site of a 1980 revolt against military rule put down with the assistance of the United States. This area, he claims, is “a hot-bed<br>of left-wing sentiment and anti-Americanism (where) one encounters<br>widespread sympathy even for the North Korean dictator himself.”<br> <br>This is a comic-book portrayal that could have been lifted from any US<br>intelligence report written after the Korean War. Myers reveals more<br>of his antipathy toward the south when he lashes out at news<br>announcers who called Kim Jong Il the “National Defense Council<br>Chairman.” This title, he says darkly, “implicity acknowledged the<br>legitimacy of both the North Korean state and its nuclear program.”<br>There’s nothing remotely that sinister in repeating an official job title — and attacking a foreign press corps for recognizing political reality (however distasteful it may be to the interests of that press corps’ home country) is plain<br>silly.</p><p>At the end of his book Myers insists that he has established “the continuity between the imperial Japanese worldview instilled into colonial-era Koreans and the official North Korean worldview that immediately succeeded it.” In short order, though, he undoes his own argument, pointing out, correctly, that official North Korean propaganda has “never proposed the invasion of so much of an inch of non-Korean territory” and arguing that the North Korean worldview “naturally precludes dreams of a colonizing or imperialist nature.”<br>This makes his connection between fascist Japan and present-day North<br>Korea even more tenuous and implausible, and Myers seems to know it. So he quickly moves into his conclusion, which is that the true threat to the DPRK<br>is “not America” but the prosperity of the slippery South, “whose citizens are content to prolong the division of the peninsula indefinitely.” North Korea will not survive, he argues, once its masses realize that “it was their own blood brothers and not the Yankees who had been blocking reunification all along” — a claim that few in Korea would agree with. And, he continues, with the Kim family still in charge, North Korea will attempt to counter any unrest among any of its people people who come to this realization “by ratcheting up tensions with America or South Korea.” Negotiations with such a regime, he says, are useless, particularly after what he calls the “failure” of the previous Sunshine Policy of openness towards the North. “To expect Washington to succeed with Pyongyang where the South Korean left failed is to take American exceptionalism to a new extreme,” he says.<br> <br>On the contrary: US policy makers seeking to engage with Pyongang are pursuing a realist path of containment, which has won incremental successes there, and much bigger ones over the course of the Cold War. To ground policy on a fantasy version of North Korean ideology, ad Myers advocates here, is to tilt — quite dangerously — at pasteboard Dear Leaders who thinkers like Myers are curiously reluctant to let die.</p><p><em>Tim Shorrock is a Washington-based journalist who was raised in Japan and South Korea by missionary parents. His writings on Korea have appeared in many publications in the United States and Asia, and he blogs regularly at his website, </em><a href="http://www.timshorrock.com/"><em>www.timshorrock.com</em></a><em>. For his latest work on North and South Korea, visit </em><a href="https://www.thenation.com/authors/tim-shorrock/"><em>his page at The Nation</em></a><em> and South Korea’s </em><a href="https://newstapa.org/author/shorrock"><em>Newstapa/The Korea Center for Investigative Journalism.</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d324a5972aec" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Korean President Moon visits Trump as US think tanks and right-wingers squirm]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TimothyS/korean-president-moon-visits-trump-as-us-think-tanks-and-right-wingers-squirm-3d07a9dc712a?source=rss-7bfd5e9b7741------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3d07a9dc712a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[moon-jae-in]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-korea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[north-korea]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Shorrock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Jun 2017 16:00:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-28T16:00:50.228Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zlFY1Yl5JUT8XMCK_SFZ-g.png" /><figcaption>Anti-THAAD protesters form a human chains &amp; surround the US Embassy in Seoul this week: “Take Back THAAD; Bring Back Peace.” Credit: <a href="http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/society/2017/06/24/0701000000AKR20170624055051004.HTML?template=2087">Yonhap</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is the English version of my story on the upcoming Moon-Trump summit published today in Seoul by </em><a href="http://newstapa.org/40444/"><em>Newstapa</em></a><em>, the Korea Center for Investigative Journalism.</em></p><p><strong>President Moon Jae-in arrives in Washington today for two days of talks with US President Donald J. Trump. While political observers will be watching closely for any signs of disagreement over Moon’s desire to improve intra-Korean relations through dialogue and engagement, the most significant discussions are likely to take place out of the public eye.</strong></p><p>One of those events will be on the Friday night after the summit, when President Moon delivers an important policy speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), one of Washington’s most powerful think tanks. Funded heavily by <a href="https://www.csis.org/support-csis/our-donors/government-donors">the US and Japanese governments</a> as well as <a href="https://www.csis.org/support-csis/our-donors/corporation-and-trade-association-donors">major defense contractors</a> such as Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the THAAD anti-missile system, the organization has played a key role in shaping US policy towards Korea for decades.</p><p>Last fall, <a href="https://www.csis.org/people/john-j-hamre">John Hamre</a>, the CEO of CSIS and a former deputy secretary of defense, made public comments expressing deep concern over the rising strength of South Korea’s left-leaning political parties. “We have to do something so we don’t become an issue in [Korea’s] next election,” <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tim-shorrock/the-us-militarys-role-in-asia-in-the-age-of-trump_b_13603724.html">he told a forum</a> at the right-wing Heritage Foundation in October. “There’s a strong strain in the left parties that America is the problem.”</p><p>Eight months later, CSIS and the US foreign policy establishment have been forced to accept a new, independent South Korean leader with an agenda markedly different than his conservative predecessors. The new reality was clear on Monday, when <a href="https://www.csis.org/people/victor-cha">Victor Cha</a>, a CSIS senior adviser and the former director of Korean affairs for the George W. Bush administration, addressed a Seoul conference on the US-Korean alliance co-sponsored by CSIS and Joongang Ilbo (with Samsung, it is a major donor to the think tank).</p><p>Cha, who is about to be named <a href="http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/06/26/2017062600899.html">the next US ambassador</a> to South Korea, began his speech by praising the “extraordinary demonstration of democracy at work” during what he called the “crisis” over the impeachment of Park Geun-hye. But he quickly shifted into lecture mode, warning the Moon government not to take “unilateral action” on North Korea and to avoid “unconditional” economic assistance that could violate the current sanction regime endorsed by the UN.</p><p>In a subtle dig at Moon’s strong emphasis on North Korea, Cha insisted that the new government should prioritize the US-ROK alliance as “critical to dealing with the North Korean threat.” He argued that differences between Seoul and Washington could only be managed with “true, seamless, almost daily policy coordination” between the two sides. His speech sounded much like a practice run for his term as US ambassador, although some Koreans might wonder if “governor-general” might be a better term.</p><p>Cha’s comments underscored that Moon will likely face open criticism and skepticism in Washington, where the political establishment is united behind tough, militaristic policies towards North Korea. Over the last two years, discussions about regime change and pre-emptive strikes have become almost routine in both Democratic and Republican circles, and eagerly reported on by journalists of both liberal and conservative bent.</p><p>The latest trigger for US hostility is the strange case of Otto Warmbier, the Virginia college student who was arrested in 2015 by North Korean authorities and suddenly returned to the United States in June in a coma. His doctors quickly dismissed North Korean claims that his brain damage was induced when he contracted botulism and then took a sleeping pill. But <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/06/15/otto-warmbier-has-extensive-loss-of-brain-tissue-no-obvious-signs-of-trauma-doctors-say/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_warmbier-435pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&amp;utm_term=.aab530e3ed9c">according to the Washington Post</a>, doctors did not find any evidence that he was beaten or tortured, as alleged by his family.</p><p>Warmbier’s death several days after his return triggered angry denunciations of Pyongyang from Trump, his cabinet and many lawmakers. “The young Ohioan’s death may force President Donald Trump to take a tougher line with North Korea, a shift that could increase tensions with Beijing,” <a href="https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2017/06/19/politics/warmbier-china-us/index.html">declared CNN</a>, which typically views Korea only in terms of US relations with China. Several House and Senate lawmakers said they would push for a new law banning Americans from traveling to the North except in official capacities (strangely, Warmbier’s family asked doctors not to perform an autopsy, so the cause of his death may never be known).</p><p>Meanwhile, US right-wingers disturbed by President Moon’s embrace of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policies, have started a relentless campaign to paint the new president as a dangerous leftist. Their latest target was Moon Chung-In, the president’s special advisor on foreign policy. Earlier this month, he told a Washington forum that US-South Korean military exercises, including the use of “strategic assets” such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, could be scaled back if North Korea suspended it nuclear and missile tests.</p><p>This apparently irritated President Moon, whose office issued a terse statement asking the adviser to “exercise restraint.” In response, Bruce Klinger, a former CIA officer who directs Korea policy at Heritage, <a href="https://twitter.com/BruceKlingner/status/876364543693209600">tweeted</a> that “Moon Jung-in’s visit only exacerbated US concerns about Moon Jae-in’s policies on North Korea, US alliance, and THAAD.” A few days later, Joshua Stanton, a fanatical champion of regime charge in North Korea, wrote a blistering attack on the South Korean president.</p><p>“Moon has spent his entire political career in the brain trust of South Korea’s hard left, among those who’ve shown more solidarity with North Korea than with America,” he wrote in his notoriously slanted blog, <a href="http://freekorea.us/2017/06/22/moon-chung-ins-visit-was-a-fiasco-moon-jae-ins-summit-with-trump-summit-might-be-the-next-one/#sthash.Cx2VnKbs.4EBXVqdP.dpbs">FreeKorea</a>. These attacks prompted several Korean media outlets, such as the Chosun Ilbo, to declare that Moon Chung-In’s “dovish” comments had “raised hackles” in Washington.</p><p>But that was an exaggeration. In fact, key players in the US national security state have decided that Moon’s election, and his positions on North Korea, pose no threat to the US-Korean military alliance.</p><p>In an unusual public speech on Monday, Scott Bray, the National Intelligence Manager for East Asia at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, told a conference at Heritage that US spying agencies are spending enormous resources on North Korea. “There are few issues that garner the same level of attention at the highest levels of government” than North Korea, he said. But, asked if Moon’s election and anti-THAAD protests in Korea posed a problem for the United States as it confronts the North, he said no.</p><p>“I know that President Trump is looking forward to Moon’s visit, and know they will have a lot to talk about on North Korea and broader issues,” Bray replied. “I also know that, even with the changed domestic environment in South Korea, our alliance remains remarkably strong.” He added: “Even if at times our approach is somewhat different — if we prefer stronger measures and South Korea prefers engagement — ultimately we’re both dedicated to the same outcome.”</p><p>That may or may not true, but should set the right-wingers straight. This week’s visit could prove to be very interesting indeed.</p><p>— Boyong Lim of <em>Newstapa </em>contributed to this article from Seoul.</p><p><em>Tim Shorrock is a Washington journalist who has been writing about Korea since the 1970s. He partly grew up in Seoul and visits Korea often. In May, he was one of two foreign reporters to </em><a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/south-koreas-new-president-says-his-election-completes-the-candlelight-revolution/"><em>interview</em></a><em> Moon Jae-in during his presidential election campaign. To see his latest writing on Korea, privatized intelligence and US foreign policy, visit </em><a href="https://www.thenation.com/authors/tim-shorrock/"><em>his page at The Nation</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3d07a9dc712a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[People power, not the U.S. military, created South Korea’s vibrant democracy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@TimothyS/people-power-not-the-u-s-military-created-south-koreas-vibrant-democracy-246232020ac9?source=rss-7bfd5e9b7741------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/246232020ac9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[north-korea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-korea]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Shorrock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2016 01:03:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-16T01:03:15.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-bLCds3YwHULzlyiy03j1g.png" /><figcaption>Millions of Korean citizens took to the streets in November and December demanding the impeachment of their corrupt president, Park Guen Hye.</figcaption></figure><p>As millions of South Koreans filled their streets in the weeks leading up to last week’s impeachment of their beleagured president, Park Guen-hye, I was reminded of a political refrain we often hear from U.S. political leaders about Korea.</p><p>It goes like this: by intervening in 1950 to prevent a communist takeover and then stationing thousand of U.S. soldiers at the border with North Korea, the United States provided the security that allowed South Korea to become the vibrant democracy it is today. The pride was typified by George W. Bush in a 2005 visit to U.S. troops.</p><p>“Five decades of sacrifice by the men and women of our Armed Forces secured peace and democracy on this peninsula,” Bush declared. Hillary Clinton echoed that sentiment in a 2013 speech to bankers later obtained by Wikileaks. South Korea, she said, became a “functional democracy” because “we had troops there, we had aid there, we had a presence of American business there. We were there for the long run.”</p><p>There’s a bit of hubris in these sentiments. While there is no doubt that American policy has had a positive influence on South Korea, it was the Koreans themselves who created their own democracy. Moreover, at several critical junctures in South Korea’s turbulent history, U.S. actions and miscalculations led to serious setbacks to their progress. Sometimes America was on their side; other times, not.</p><p>In 1960, for example, when South Korea’s first president, Syngman Rhee was <a href="http://timshorrock.com/?p=2540">toppled</a> after weeks of violent street demonstrations, the Eisenhower administration took a hands-off approach.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yfCsMAg6LAOlLYwblpxIwA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Demonstrators surge down a Seoul boulevard demanding the overthrow of the hated Syngman Rhee in 1960.</figcaption></figure><p>Rhee — an autocrat whose frequent calls to “march north” irritated U.S. officials trying to enforce the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War — was seen as a liability. When the U.S. ambassador drove through Seoul after Rhee’s exit, his limousine was surrounded by jubilant students grateful for America’s support.</p><p>But a year later, Park Chung Hee, an Army general, seized power in a coup. To the shock of many Koreans, President Kennedy’s State Department decided to back the new junta. Park quickly turned out to be a dictator, ruling through a police state that imprisoned and tortured political opponents and stifled workers trying to organize unions.</p><p>But Park — the father of the president who was just impeached — was strategically useful to the United States, which supplied him with millions of dollars in military aid. He returned the favor by sending Korean troops to South Vietnam. Yet, even as U.S. officials praised South Korea as an “economic miracle” and a vital ally, Korean anger smoldered. In October 1979, students and workers in Pusan and Masan rose up to protest his authoritarian rule. In the midst of the uprising, Park was assassinated by the head of his own CIA.</p><p>This set the stage for one of the greatest blunders ever made by the United States in Korea.</p><p>By 1980, the Carter administration was anxious to avoid “another Iran,” where an Islamic revolution had just toppled the U.S.-backed Shah. That May, in the city of Gwangju, hundreds of people protesting the military takeover by another general, Chun Doo Hwan, were slaughtered by Korean paratroopers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pWs8Y0j4VXr5G7lluS0ewA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Citizens demanding an end to military rule face off with martial law troops in Kwangju, May 18, 1980. Minutes later, the troops charged with bullets and bayonets, killing dozens. Thus began the Kwangju Uprising of 1980. Photo courtesy of the 5.18 Foundation, Kwangju, South Korea.</figcaption></figure><p>Outraged, hundreds of people organized a citizens army and <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/kwangju-uprising-and-american-hypocrisy-one-reporters-quest-truth-and-justice-korea/">liberated</a> their city from the martial law forces. Many of them believed that President Carter, who had made human rights the centerpiece of his foreign policy, would side with the forces of democracy.</p><p>But on May 22, 1980, <a href="http://timshorrock.com/?p=435">convinced</a> that Gwangju was a communist-led rebellion that might tempt North Korea to intervene, the White House decided otherwise.</p><p>It authorized South Korean forces — who were under a joint U.S.-Korean command set up to protect the country from North Korea — to put down the uprising, which they did on May 27. (I obtained the minutes to that fateful meeting as part of a large <a href="http://timshorrock.com/?page_id=21">cache</a> of declassifed documents on Korea released under the Freedom of Information Act.)</p><p>Carter’s inept handling of that crisis paved the way for another seven years of military dictatorship. In contrast to 1960, dissidents began to openly criticize the United States, and for a period of time a wave of anti-Americanism gripped South Korea’s youth. Then, in June 1987, the death by torture of a student once again galvanized the population to take to the streets. This time Washington did the right thing.</p><p>With Chun threatening martial law again, President Reagan — who had welcomed the dictator to the White House in 1981 — bluntly <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1987-06-23/news/mn-10163_1_korean-military">informed</a> him that the United States would not tolerate another military takeover. In 1988, democracy was finally restored. To many Koreans, the massive demonstrations and candlelight vigils that led up to Park’s impeachment mark the latest step in South Korea’s long march to democracy.</p><p>Park’s impeachment and potential <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/world/asia/south-korea-president-park-geun-hye-impeached.html?_r=0">resignation</a>, however, is causing some nervousness at the Pentagon. It has counted on Park’s administration to support its tough policies against North Korea, including annual military exercises and a recent decision to deploy THAAD anti-missile batteries in South Korea.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zKsaZhEhUl96_KrYXc3VJA.png" /></figure><p>But the United States has apparently learned the lessons of the past.</p><p>In the wake of last week’s events, U.S. ambassador Mark Lippert <a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/12/09/74/0401000000AEN20161209009853315F.html">promised</a> that the U.S.-South Korean alliance “would continue to be strong.” But he added an important qualification. “Obviously, this decision [to impeach Park] is a domestic issue and it is ultimately up to the Korean people and their democratic institutions.”</p><p>He’s right — and that’s exactly how it should have been been all along.</p><p><em>Tim Shorrock is a Washington-based writer who was raised in South Korea and Japan during the Cold War. His latest work, published by </em><a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176221/tomgram%3A_tim_shorrock,_american_military_power_in_asia_and_the_trump_factor/"><em>TomDispatch</em></a><em>, is titled </em><a href="http://www.commondreams.org/views/2016/12/13/cops-pacific-us-militarys-role-asia-age-trump"><em>“Cops of the Pacific? The U.S. Military’s Role in Asia in the Age of Trump.”</em></a><em> His handle on Twitter is @TimothyS.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=246232020ac9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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