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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ostap Ukrainets on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ostap Ukrainets on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@Ukrostap?source=rss-3b5cf1b45e47------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Ostap Ukrainets on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Ukrostap?source=rss-3b5cf1b45e47------2</link>
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        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:48:39 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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            <title><![CDATA[The End of Gutenberg Era]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Ukrostap/the-end-of-gutenberg-era-a552ea65891f?source=rss-3b5cf1b45e47------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a552ea65891f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[paradigm-shift]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ostap Ukrainets]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 18:12:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-03T18:12:43.028Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We witnessed the end of the Gutenberg era. Over the past decade, the structure of media has changed more dramatically than at any time since the invention of printing. No one has yet properly described this new structure (and no one will anytime soon), only a minority of experts account for this fact when assessing the current state of affairs, and that is beginning to worry me.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Al_twK_go2XiysYeUGd0sQ.png" /><figcaption>As I do not get paid for these texts, I myself use AI to prey on your cognitive bugs</figcaption></figure><p>When Marshall McLuhan wrote <em>The Gutenberg Galaxy</em>, he did two important things: first, he said, “The medium is the message” (a phrase everyone seems to know from somewhere, while hardly anyone can correctly attribute it). Second, he demonstrated how exactly our relationship with information changes when our relationship with the medium changes: from replication (copying by hand), the world moved to multiplication (reproducing from a single original).</p><p>The world kept moving on, modernity gradually flowed into postmodernity, metanarratives were collapsing somewhere in the background, while our relationship with information media remained unchanged. New media were added: a single film reel multiplied onto many screens, a single song multiplied onto many discs, and structurally all of this was no different from a single text that had for centuries been multiplied into many copies. Even the arrival of the internet and digital piracy did not fundamentally alter this relationship between the user and the medium of information distribution.</p><p>But today that relationship has changed. The issue is not “AI,” not “streaming,” nor any one separate thing. The issue is a change in the mode of operation. For at least the past decade, we have relied less and less on multiplying messages and far more on imitating them. Reading headlines replaces reading articles; the wording of the headline imitates the substance of the article. A new trend or flash mob appears online — it spreads through imitation of the original template (ice-bucket challenges, planking, lip-syncing to popular songs — whatever it may be).</p><p>Here, of course, post-structuralists bear some responsibility. Without their notion that every message is a self-generated myth, a subjective representation of an object rather than a reflection of the object itself, we would never have reached this state of “laying bare the device.” Here, laying bare the device means that the primary mass reaction to a real-world event in digital space is to imitate that event through memes. We in Ukraine know this approach well as we have used it to great effect lately.</p><p>There is a saying that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. I am inclined to think imitation is the sincerest form of admiration in general. We want to imitate — to transform, in some way and on our own terms — the other’s message that moved us. We seek to reach the state of mind that moved us. That is all normal. The problem, as I see it, is that soon this may become almost the only mainstream way available to us to respond to information.</p><p>Before Johannes Gutenberg, to obtain and preserve needed information, one had to commission a book or another work of art to be produced. After Gutenberg, the notion of print runs conceptually meant that any book became equally available to any buyer. The limitation was the logistics of the medium, not the reproduction of the information itself within the medium. The digitization of books removed most logistical barriers as well.</p><p>Yet in both the pre-Gutenberg and post-Gutenberg eras, the individual’s relationship with what we may call “published information” did not substantially change. Both were based on the principle of voluntary engagement with information. The subject had to make a conscious cognitive effort, to choose to engage with a given body of information.</p><p>And it is not hard to notice that this principle no longer underlies our daily interactions. Algorithms and endless optimization of feeds do not allow the subject to consciously choose the information they wish to engage with. In recent decades, humanity has steadily transformed from “the observing subject” into “the subject being shown things.” In the past, this shift was situational and almost always linked to attempts at institutional censorship. Today it is called “feed algorithms.”</p><p>TikTok and similar short-video platforms are, of course, harmful. But they are the harm perfectly integrated into this new paradigm of relations with data. Since the user’s conscious will in searching for information is absent or minimized, the only thing that matters is whether each individual message captures attention sufficiently and does not provoke rejection. That is all. This system is designed not to match your interests, but to prioritize content that most efficiently parasitizes your attention.</p><p>Fifteen seconds of popping bubble wrap will predictably attract far more attention than, say, the first fifteen seconds of 2001: A Space Odyssey. But this attention-grabbing factor tells us nothing about the value of the information or the quality of the message — it only tells us how effectively a particular kind of content exploits your cognitive weaknesses and makes you “zone out.”</p><p>That is why I find it very strange — almost unsettling — to hear serious people seriously claim that the short-video format and, more broadly, life through algorithmic networks is the future, and therefore these parasitic formats should be used for noble purposes to convey the information we deem important. I would agree that there may be promising avenues here, if only these conversations included some caution about the format itself — and about how deeply working within it differs from any previous strategy of narrative design. I would like to explain exactly how, but the problem is that no one yet knows exactly how. We are too close to the beginning of this path.</p><p>And yes, I agree that almost any complex concept can potentially be explained to a five-year-old on a single notebook page during an elevator ride. So if Kepler’s laws can be explained during an elevator ride, they can also be explained in a video lasting as long as an elevator ride. The only problem being that after such an explanation, no one will be able to calculate planetary orbits independently. And after a video of identical length — they still will not.</p><p>Information is not a single message. It is networks of separate concepts, a complex structure of individual messages and logical links between them. Frames and zones of indeterminacy, if narratology is your language. Topoi and tropes, if classical poetics is closer to you. And parasitic content that relies on algorithms (and on engagement as the key metric of effectiveness) is incapable of conveying any systematic information. It is anti-structure by its very nature; the logical links between separate messages lie inside the black box of AI.</p><p>And then there is the fact that we lag behind: our nervous system still survives in the primordial savannah, so seeking patterns where none exist is always only a matter of time. Our chances of falsely reading a nonexistent message into an algorithmic mass of data are much higher than our chances of correctly identifying a genuinely present one. How does our enemy (from here on meaning Russia) use these platforms so effectively? Very simply: it does not even attempt to create a stable structure of messages. The task is to multiply interpretations.</p><p>The enemy does not try to convince us all of one idea. It tries to convince separate groups of people that their own ideas and interpretations are profoundly correct, and that the enemy is their natural ally in defending those interpretations and acting upon them. For such destructive influence, platforms like TikTok are ideal. I have still heard no well-founded strategies for constructive narrative design in this specific information environment. Incidentally, symmetrical counteraction is also pointless, because the enemy does not rely on active horizontal structures within its own society — quite the opposite. And that is the lesson most our partners (as well as ourselves, to be honest) have yet to learn.</p><p>I would say we are returning, in an interesting way, to a phenomenon of the pre-Gutenberg era. If you did not have money for a book, information could always be obtained from another source — you could hear it from someone. Many literary works were written primarily for public recitation. And such information, as you understand, was not chosen by the individual. The only difference is that in those times, messages had to be heard at the moment of physical delivery. Without the act of performance, the message did not exist, and each performance meant recreating the message from the speaker’s mind. In our time, however, these messages exist perfectly well even when no one reproduces them. It is simply that your ability to access this specific message through an act of will, your ability to consciously choose to engage with information… well, let us not dwell on unpleasant things.</p><p>Lately I have little time to write public texts, as most time is consumed by military service and development of practical tools for informational and cognitive security during hybrid and active warfare. You can support our work via PayPal: yourhumanities@gmail.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a552ea65891f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[There are no anti-fascists in Russia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Ukrostap/there-are-no-anti-fascists-in-russia-ee508be58996?source=rss-3b5cf1b45e47------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ee508be58996</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[propaganda]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fascism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ostap Ukrainets]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 May 2023 08:10:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-11T08:10:08.709Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In most cases, when true fascists (who always constitute a minority of the population) managed to come to power, it was due to the support of a larger group of potential fascists. The potential fascist is a very interesting person. They themselves do not plan or want to dirty their own hands, but at the same time, they are completely fine with the idea that someone will torture and kill on their behalf if it’s done for the greater good.</p><p>In the second part of “Borat,” there is a wonderful scene in which Borat finds himself among alt-right rednecks, who happily welcome him into their midst for a few days, putting up with his quirks. Nevertheless, they accepted him (as he was a guest, not an immigrant). And in their conversations about torturing, imprisoning, or killing their imagined Other, that hated part of the society that “creates all the problems,” they were genuinely joyful. Borat’s stories about fictional atrocities towards women and Jews in Kazakhstan inspired them.</p><p>In the same episode, in a performance at a conservative rally, he stirs up the crowd with the song, asking, “And with journalists, what we’re gonna do?”, offering two options: “Inject them with the Wuhan flu” or “Chop them up like the Saudis do.” The audience enthusiastically supports the second option. This theme of latent fascism arises in the movie again and again, because it is currently quite relevant to the United States — racially motivated and other hate crimes are committed by a relatively small group of people, but these people have powerful social (often even political) support.</p><p>Fascism, ultimately, is a promise of unity, strength, and protection. An unspoken subtext to this promise is the alienation of the group designated as one “opposing unity” by the state, strength is an internal projection of the right to violence, and protection primarily deals with imagined threats. But the <em>feeling</em> that fascism offers people is real enough for many to find it sufficient.</p><p>Latent fascists do not want to commit crimes themselves, they are “too civilized” for that, but they are very much okay with someone else committing those crimes for them. Because they see the victim as “less civilized”, and therefore less worthy. And as soon as fascism presents itself as a system in their society, they gladly support it precisely because of a series of implied promises made by fascism. Blaming the “responsible party” for the problems, pursuing and using violence against them, fulfills all three promises: the leader unites the group of “their own” in hatred and hostility towards “social pests,” he demonstrates strength by getting rid of the “pests,” and he protects this newly consolidated community from the harmful influences of the rest of the world.</p><p>All of this, of course, has been theorized and re-theorized since World War II ad nauseam. Erich Fromm defined the “authoritarian personality” (the desire to feel a “strong hand” above oneself, intolerance of anything that contradicts traditional beliefs*). And the problem with the authoritarian personality is that, like all people on this earth, it tries to solve existential questions and inevitable contradictions of its being. Like all of us, the authoritarian personality fails to do so, but its coping mechanism is unique: frustration turns into hatred towards an external group that must be imagined as responsible.</p><p>“The traditional” structures life and seemingly removes the contradictions of existence, but the responsibility for preserving everything that is traditional and rightful rests on a strong supreme figure. There must be an internal agreement, a covenant between the authoritarian ruler and the authoritarian society. The latent fascist, as a rule, will not want to embody this covenant, or if necessary, will do so “without pleasure,” “simply carrying out orders.” However, that same person is more than happy to be a small part of the greater Self, which does embody it.</p><p>Crimes are planned and carried out by the state. But the very fact of performing the crimes requires complicity, direct involvement of a significant portion of the population. Fascism always brings violence closer to every individual: through hate speech, through (at times) performative nature of punishments, through public and demonstrative trials and executions. Citizens, therefore, face another need: to somehow explain to themselves how that previously unheard of violence that appeared before their eyes all of a sudden, corresponds to one of these unwritten agreements.</p><p>This is where mental gymnastics begin. The persecution of yesterday’s members of the community, that is, the sudden emergence of the “other” within society, should directly reject the idea of unity, but is mostly interpreted as the society rallying against the threat.</p><p>State violence is that very performance, aimed at demonstrating power. Hate crimes against the “other,” sanctioned and enacted through the state monopoly on violence, provide a sense of protection. Because many people are inclined to intuitively equate the state monopoly on violence with citizen protection. This is the card that the pro-Russian Yanukovych government tried to play in Ukraine at the end of 2013, but they miscalculated.</p><p>Seeing a fascist regime in Russia is not difficult: it unequivocally corresponds to all 14 points which define the development of fascism in Umberto Eco’s “Five Moral Pieces”:</p><ol><li>Cult of tradition: the glorification of “grandfathers” who fought in WWII so the present day society has a moral obligation to follow their steps (including the occupation of Central Europe, as shown in their “We can do it again!” slogan), and the preservation of timeless ideals of immaculacy and spiritual superiority of the Russian people.</li><li>Rejection of modernism (rejection of intellectual, but not technological development): the decaying West and its “progressive thinking” lead to degradation.</li><li>Action for action’s sake: complete absence of reflection on state policy, causes and consequences, anti-intellectualism as the basis for defining “others.”</li><li>Dissent is a treason: a great example could be seen when a Russian from Estonia published a list of “contemporary Russian authors,” which also included Ukrainian authors from the occupied territories. In response to the protest of these authors (“we are not Russians”), he declared, “Well, good, we don’t need traitors.”</li><li>Fear of difference: Russia offers an inclusive imperial system where to become a part of the empire, it is enough to consider yourself one. (And if you refuse, see n.4) Together with deep Russian racism and xenophobia, this urges subjugated peoples to try to be “more Russian than Russians.”</li><li>Existence through appeal to the disillusioned masses: the Putin regime promised to avoid the crisis that accompanied the first years of the Russian Federation outside the USSR. That was the bargain Russians were happy to accept in exchange for totalitarianism.</li><li>Obsession with conspiracies against the community: Anglo-Saxons, evil NATO, Soros, all the “secret powers at play”. By the way, stories about “external Western control” of Ukraine belong here too, because in the ideal Russian scenario, we are “one people.”</li><li>Simultaneously strong and weak enemies: strong in words, weak in practice. The imagined enemy must be a symbol of great threat, but in practice, regime’s victory should not disrupt the usual balance of society too much. Ukraine was supposed to be such an enemy. Russia also has various “foreign agents” and marginalized communities on the domestic market for this same purpose.</li><li>Life is war (and pacifism is treason): of course, this is not about defensive wars, but about the need to constantly commit aggression beyond one’s territory, allegedly for the sake of defense.</li><li>The weaker is insignificant: membership in a community already gives fascists an illusory power. In fact, all talks about “go to Russia, it’s great, unlike you” is already self-sufficient evidence of fascism, implanted in society itself. Fascism is a normalized way of thinking.</li><li>Everyone grows up to become heroes: you have all seen this horror in their kindergartens and schools, preparing children for death in your state’s wars “for the sake of peace” from an early age. Or, as the Romans said, dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.</li><li>Machismo: “if you don’t serve, you’re not a man,” and the dissemination of the image of the “true citizen,” clear fixation of roles. Interestingly, medieval oratores and bellatores are very clearly fixed in today’s Russian society. I include the clergy, the press, and artists among the former, for all of them serve fascism simply by carrying out regular activities within the so-called legal framework that it sets.</li><li>Selective populism: the leader supposedly responds to the demands of the masses, but at the same time, he himself formulates and interprets the “true” demand. State policy is individualized, however even if every individual citizen does not agree with it, the policy is still presented as reflecting the demand of the masses. When you behave as an individual, you stop being a part of society for which fascism exists, so you can be disregarded (or, if you strongly disagree, see point 4).</li><li>Newspeak: the world of fascism is constructed through linguistic memes that gradually replace the usual picture of the world and reduce reality to political clichés. It’s not reality that generates language, but rather language dictates how we interpret reality.</li></ol><p>Russia complies with all 14 points, but what interests me the most is one point of the social contract that the so-called Russian opposition and liberals have accepted massively and sincerely: “The most important is that there is no war.” The totalitarianism of Russia, whether one likes it or not, for the majority of Russians, even supposedly “democratic,” now serves as a barrier against the imagined “totalitarianism of others.” If Russians did not obey their leader, they would obey the leaders of NATO, it goes literally like this. Russians regard the Second World War, the last precedent of an attack on Russia itself, as their own end of history — everything that happened after it was supposedly done to avoid repetition. Just as the consolidation of power in Russia itself is supposedly necessary to avoid the “sovereign chaos” that prevailed in the 1990s. Remember that for modern Russia, the biggest geopolitical catastrophe is not the Second World War (because they won), but the collapse of the USSR (because they could not hold on).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/959/1*wuBttsdkecYUTyDLMvyU5g.jpeg" /><figcaption>This propaganda piece literally translates to “One people. One history. One state!”</figcaption></figure><p>Who is the Other in this coordinate system? Well, first of all, practically everyone. And secondly, especially those who resist the desires of the state, thus undermining the social contract according to which “you are all no one, but the state you belong to is great.” Russia offers a paradoxical social division in which initiative fascism opposes latent fascism. The latter accepts the social contract, but does not fully accept the nature of the system and somehow thinks that it retains the right to criticize — however, this criticism somehow exists mainly in the discourse of the Russian political system itself. It’s about “how to improve what we are already doing” (like Navalny’s investigations), not “how do we stop doing it”.</p><p>One must understand that the anti-war sentiment of practically all Russians (in the public sphere, we are talking about rare exceptions, and even then I can only recall Kasparov) is external. Putin is certainly to blame because he started this war, but Ukrainians are also to blame for resisting for so long. And since “Ukrainians are resisting” is a process, while “Putin started the war” is a one-time action, over time we are witnessing a more massive transition of people from latent fascists to real fascists. Shenderovich is a perfect example of such “fascist liberal”: he illustrates the transition from uncompromising condemnation of the war at the very beginning to sympathy for “our boys” who are dying in Ukraine, as the corpses pile up. This idea of “the other’s guilt”, now prevalent even within seemingly liberal circles, even when unconscious, stems from several reasons:</p><p>Firstly, it undermines their relative comfort. A failed and prolonged war causes not only a general crisis in Russia (breaking the promise of stability), but also a stronger slide into complete totalitarianism. And they barely reconciled with the previous one!</p><p>Secondly, it undermines their social contract. A short victorious war won’t provoke the dissatisfaction of a latent fascist, but a prolonged and unsuccessful one will. Under the pretext of preventing war, Putin brought war to them.</p><p>Thirdly, see points 1, 3, 5, 10. All these elements of the social contract in one form or another are cracking at the seams. People who expected the war (which was sad but “there was no other choice”) to end in a day or two or a week, without being a big personal loss for them, are now witnessing the ruin of stable structures within Russia, as well as the gradual leveling of its soft power abroad. Everything that used to give them a sense of superiority, including culture and a powerful international presence, is gradually (though not fast enough, of course) being diminished, disappearing from the face of the earth. Including the greatness of Russian culture and victory in World War II. Present war turns a page that, from the point of view of internal Russian propaganda, was not to be turned forever and ever.</p><p>See, consistent opposition to fascism requires a complete rejection of the community that gave birth to this fascism. It requires voluntary identification of oneself as the “other” in relation to the system and the community that a person once considered their own. But neither state propagandists, nor paid-loyal enforcers, nor so-called opposition members within this pan-Russian identity have no tools to identify themselves with humanity as such. Humanism is deeply alien to them. They consistently choose fascism because, like Putin, they have no Plan B. They have not created any intellectual alternatives because they did not need to. They have always been an organic part of the regime. The world without it is unimaginable to them.</p><p>With each passing week and month, with each case where some “good” Russians speak out publicly, we see more clearly that for each of them, “just not having war” never meant “just Russia relying on soft power to increase its influence.” It has always been “we hope those whom Russia has designated as enemies would not be putting up too much resistance.” The difference is that fascists do not care about methods, but latent fascists would prefer us to be killed as quickly as possible. And if people resist, one must inevitably find a thousand and one reasons why these people themselves are to blame. Fortunately for all these pseudo-liberals, the Russian state apparatus is happy to try and generate reason after reason for them. So when everything does not go according to plan, latent fascists easily turn into ordinary fascists. It takes far more than that for them to become an opposition.</p><p><em>*I mean tradition in a political sense, as an invented historical deontology of society. This factor has little in common, if at all, with the cultural and anthropological dimensions of tradition. Fascism does not operate with real traditional models; it invents them depending on political expediency.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee508be58996" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[I am an Untermensch]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Ukrostap/i-am-an-untermensch-d8d0a1ce9699?source=rss-3b5cf1b45e47------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d8d0a1ce9699</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[genocide]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nazis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russian-war-crimes]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ostap Ukrainets]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Apr 2022 08:52:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-05T10:20:41.978Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“The death is so easy to comprehend, as long as it’s not yours.”<br>/Serhii Zhadan/</p><p>I am an Untermensch. A sub-human. The one to either be killed or re-educated until I believe that I am not myself but a part of a greater Russian nation. I belong to it because Russia says so, and who am I to argue with the entire state propaganda machine?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Pzv_BsiUwhJ29loZqMP9Xw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Don’t mess it up, we are the Nazis. Russians killing civilians in occupied cities are liberators.</figcaption></figure><p>I should be put into a filtration camp and next — either perish in a lime pit or perish in exile to Siberia, Sakhalin, or any other part of the Russian Empire. Alas, I am a writer and philologist, which makes me guilty of knowing and spreading the knowledge they want us to forget. Alas, I spoke out about being Ukrainian, which makes me a Nazi. Alas, my family name literally translates as “Ukrainian”, so one look at my passport would suffice. All this makes death a much more probable outcome. The same can be said about most of my friends. We are guilty of being Ukrainians. That’s what Russia says and we’re supposed to listen to “both sides”, aren’t we?</p><p>It’s not that bad, though. People in more “safe” professions would have a choice. You don’t need to die for being Ukrainian if you pretend you’re a Russian. Even if you don’t believe that at first. Fake it till you make it, till this mimicry becomes part of your skin. Have you ever wondered why so many Ukrainians speak Russian? That’s why.</p><p>Being a Ukrainian was not tolerated in the past and cannot be accepted now. Russian ideology is based on the fact that Ukrainians are one people with Russians, and denying this means confronting Russia. Those guilty of it will be punished. Even if we’re talking about a country with at least one-third of the Russian population. Even worse, there is an entire country of Ubermenschen. They dare to think they are humans with their dignity, rights, language, and culture. That is genuinely convenient: you cannot commit war crimes against us sub-humans because it is no war, a mere “special operation”. You cannot be guilty of genocide of Ukrainian people if you don’t recognize they exist. Your point is as valid as the point of those you kill. And it really works out just fine, doesn’t it?</p><p>I am an Untermensch, but I know that well. This was Russian state propaganda for years. But now they’ve decided to declare it to the entire world, publishing it in their state media. The only thing that bothers me here is double standards. If we do not exist, why do I keep hearing, “It’s horrible, but Russia also has a point, and both sides are to blame”? If Russia has a point, there are no sides to this. We don’t exist, after all.</p><p>“The truth is somewhere in between”, as many “liberal-thinking” media keep reporting. I’m not sure what lies between a will to survive and a genocide. Sure, we can’t suppose that one side of this war not only lies constantly but has been doing it for decades for this same goal. After all, this side was a respectable business partner all these years. And if your respectable business partner tells you that his neighbors are his sphere of interest, this sounds reasonable enough. After all, according to this respectable business partner, this neighbor doesn’t even exist. All you have to do is wait until this business partner murders all who disagree. This is not their first time, and they know what to do.</p><p>I stop existing every time I see a Communist or a Russian flag. They eliminate me. They show me that I do not exist, should not exist, and must be eliminated for dissenting. But then, these are just flags. How can I be against symbols under which my kinsmen were massacred time and again since 1917? That was years ago. How could it possibly hurt me to see people proudly waving them in European capitals? How, indeed. How can I be against my own death if there is no “I”; there is only Russian “we, the brothers”? Sure, I should shut the fuck up and listen to what Russian liberals have to say. After all, they are adults here. It should be about them once again.</p><p>Meanwhile, I’m just an Untermensch. Thanks for the constant reminders.</p><p>You can read about Russian plans for Ukraine here:</p><p><a href="https://vigilantinfo.net/en/2022/04/04/what-should-russia-do-with-ukraine">https://vigilantinfo.net/en/2022/04/04/what-should-russia-do-with-ukraine</a> (ENGLISH)</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/Schmetterlinka/status/1511100044136620037">https://twitter.com/Schmetterlinka/status/1511100044136620037</a> (GERMAN)</p><p><a href="https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1585114901865468&amp;id=100011009207502">https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1585114901865468&amp;id=100011009207502</a> (HEBREW)</p><p>You can support me:<br>yourhumanities@gmail.com (PayPal)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d8d0a1ce9699" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Philosophical Background of Ukrainian Resistance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Ukrostap/the-philosophical-background-of-ukrainian-resistance-182e730c20f6?source=rss-3b5cf1b45e47------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/182e730c20f6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freedom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[existentialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukrainian-culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ostap Ukrainets]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Mar 2022 08:28:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-29T08:28:16.197Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After a month of a war in Ukraine, a month of global help we keep getting, and a month of incredible self-organization of my compatriots, it may be the time to try and analyze the role of Ukrainian culture in all that. In this piece, I will discuss four prominent Ukrainian figures, their interpretations of freedom and the common good, and how we as a society naturally imply this way of thinking to baseline ideologies in a moment of crisis.</p><p>I do not say that these four thinkers are of a direct intellectual lineage. Sure, they influenced one another, but we are not talking about a certain school. To my mind, it makes more sense to explore a general mindset of a society that preserved some particularities over time, manifesting them all over the ideological spectrum.</p><p>I tend to explore this mindset through the lens of existentialism. What we call “humanity” is the ability to make a choice. To behave humanely, one must have an option not to, determined by some pre-accepted values (morals). We can know our humanity only in the limit situations (<em>Grenzsituation</em>) that allow us to self-actualize. In general terms, how we use our freedom defines us as humans.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qFKSugCdMaNF8fhbYjJ3jg.jpeg" /><figcaption>A queue in a recruiting office to volunteer for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Far more people are willing to fight than are needed on the front line.</figcaption></figure><p>Baroque. Hryhorii Skovoroda</p><p>Skovoroda is a late-baroque philosopher and writer with a classical background. He studied at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, a Ukrainian university responsible for founding the Russian Academy of Sciences. Humanities in Ukraine held upon Ancient Greek and Greek Orthodox traditions with a considerable Catholic influence leaked in mainly through Poland.</p><p>An independent Cossack state emerged in the Early Modern Age on this background. The rule of the land was founded mainly on the concept of <em>права і вольності</em> (rights and liberties) of different social strata. The leader of the state, <em>hetman </em>(headman), was to be elected and could be impeached. The rule of law was above everyone in the state, so a peasant could sue a nobleman to protect his rights or dignity. While the model itself stemmed from a political system in the Commonwealth, of which Ukraine was a part, it gained new traction after the Khmelnytsky uprising (1648)against the arbitrary treatment of Ukrainian and Polish nobility.</p><p>The Uprising (and the liberties it represented) was a cornerstone of the national identity of the time. A hundred years later Skovoroda would call Khmelnytsky “a father of liberty” in his poem “De Libertate” (About the Liberty). This connection is both philosophical and political. The political action Khmelnytsky took as a leader (leaving the Commonwealth) and its implications for Ukraine (self-governed state) as a whole was depicted to reflect his personal values and worldview. These close ties between individual and collective (or, rather, the way personal reflects on the collective) is a recurrent theme in Skovoroda’s poetry and philosophy.</p><p>For Skovoroda, there is a close connection between freedom, consciousness, and sanity. A “conscious” person is both moral and politically active; the Ukrainian language implies this relation. Immoral actions cause “unclear consciousness,” while a “conscious” person is the one who makes decisions according to reason, which in turn is fueled by higher values. No wonder this adjective, <em>свідомий</em>, has become a slur in the Russian language, an in-joke to insult politically or culturally active Ukrainians (or, more general, all those who don’t think they are the Russians).</p><p>In his poem “Each town has its custom and rights,” Skovoroda lists many different types of vane behavior, setting them against his approach. Two main points: “The only thing on Earth that bothers me is to keep a sane mind till I die”; “Who doesn’t care about the sharp blade of Death? Only he with the crystal-clear consciousness”. Freedom presents us with a choice, while sanity helps us make this choice correctly, granting us calmness in times of turmoil.</p><p>Thus the ultimate life goal is self-knowledge. We must know our needs to do our duties and achieve our goals. Skovoroda used the image of Narciss, contemplating his reflection in the pool, as a symbol for a thinker who explores himself to find the correct course of action: “Blessed is he who finds a source of joy in his own house”. The ultimate goal of this “knowing yourself” is to understand your place in this world better. Knowing ourselves, we can better satisfy our needs, make ourselves useful and understand the limits of one another’s personal space.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*SlijgR3iVcpUV9x_xjGSwA.jpeg" /><figcaption>An allegorical drawing by Skovoroda: “The equality is not equal for everyone. Different streams spring from different pipes to fill in different vessels equally”.</figcaption></figure><p>This approach is best summed up in the notion of “congenial toil”. We are destined to act, so everyone should choose a course of action according to their inner selves. This notion has a simplified explanation: every person has a job they suit best (they are good at it, like doing it, and are helpful) to help bring the common good. In Skovoroda’s philosophy, this concept has a broader meaning of harmony between the world and inner self. The primary means to achieve this harmony are sane reason and freedom of choice.</p><p>Romanticism. Taras Shevchenko</p><p>Not long after Skovoroda, Russian Empire has successfully canceled the Cossack’s liberties, and in 1783, full-scale slavery was introduced. History textbooks usually call the Russian system “serfdom”; however, in practice, it was slavery. Peasants were banned from leaving their village; they could have been bought and sold on special markets and had no personal rights whatsoever. Shevchenko was born into slavery, became noticed for his painting, and eventually, his friends raised some money and bought him out. Then he was put on trial for his satirical poetry and sent into exile with the prohibition to paint and write. This all was to the great disdain of his fellow painters who thought he is wasting his talent, writing poetry in Ukrainian. But it was poetry that made him a national symbol.</p><p>Sure, this bumpy life road and peculiar education (he learned to read with the “drunk sexton” in a local church but ultimately studied at Saint Petersburg Academy of Arts) has greatly influenced his works. For Shevchenko (himself of Cossack descent), old liberties existed within living memory but were gone from the real life. His poetry shows a wicked and degraded world, where children of those who were once equal became masters and slaves. He rightfully blames Russia for causing this state of affairs but does not absolve his compatriots from guilt. According to his worldview, people have the right to revolt and should do so, given the horrible attitude.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yaJZ2Gec7uxgLrEQuw9mxA.jpeg" /><figcaption>This is, perhaps, the best-known painting by Shevchenko. The woman, Kateryna, also appears in his poem of the same name. Shevchenko uses a Ukrainian women, betrayed by a Russian soldier, as an allegory for Ukrainian common folk of the time.</figcaption></figure><p>On the other hand, enslavers should remember that they are one with other Ukrainians. For Shevchenko, compatriotism and solidarity are a source of humanism. A joint effort is the root of a common cause, and this requires treating a neighbor as one of your own. While enslaved and uneducated peasants have neither enough knowledge, nor spare time to give it a thought, educated slave owners are without any excuse. The history is waiting to repeat itself: “All the bound people will soon break the chains / The Judgement will come / Dnipro and the Mountains will speak / And blood of your children in a hundred rivers / Will flow to the Black Sea”.</p><p>Sure, the ideals of the French Revolution are at work here, but Shevchenko rebuilds these ideals upon the ground of former liberties. Something not to find or create but to regain. Liberty is not a political ideal, it is the local version of a Romantic “former glory” narrative.</p><p>Socialism. Ivan Franko</p><p>While most of Ukraine’s territory was conquered by Russia, a few regions in the West went to the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the Partitions of Poland. These regions, already distinct enough, fell into a much more liberal empire which allowed Ukrainian culture to relatively prosper (especially taking into account countless prohibitions of the Ukrainian language in Russia). There was serfdom in Austria, but that was it. Peasants did not own the land but were not considered property for sale either.</p><p>Serfdom was abolished in 1848, and the democratic Constitution was issued almost two decades later to create some unexpected problems. Lack of proper education prevented former serfs from career growth or decent perspectives. Austrian Ukrainians were sometimes called “a nation of peasants and priests,” which was partly true as many educated people were of the clergy or had deep ties with the Greek Catholic Church. This state of affairs allowed for power abuse and corruption.</p><p>However, in the wake of the national revolutions of 1848 (the Spring of Nations) and national Romanticism, a new type of thinking appeared. The sentiment was fueled by several bloody uprisings that ended in vain due to the lack of organization or a common goal. Those who understood the problems strove to “open the eyes” of the common folk.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/530/1*8AoTdv_HRxzZ_Iabs7Wjxg.png" /><figcaption>A picture of Lukian Kobylytsia uprising against Polish and Romanian landowners who denied them access to forests and meadows while using their unpaid labor. Such uprisings were commonplace but often lacked any political goals.</figcaption></figure><p>Franko’s views are best described as a continuing shift from classic socialism toward national democratism as he gradually became disillusioned with the Marxist reading of society and progress. For him, progress is not a thing to superimpose but rather to nurture. A person who possesses knowledge that the community can benefit from is due to spread this knowledge, as that is the right thing to do — society benefits from such transactions. As Franko puts it in his poem “Stonemasons”: “We are bound; however, we willingly took chains, we are slaves of freedom, mere stonemasons on the path of progress”.</p><p>Education helps one better understand the borders of other’s freedom. If we want to remain humane, we are bound to act a certain way, and freedom from this point of view works as a realized necessity. This approach is a more pessimistic counterpart to Skovoroda’s congenial toil. Given the circumstances, it’s here that baroque humanism has adequately met anti-colonial criticism. Later in his life, exhausted by petty struggles within a narrow framework Austria allowed for, Franko shifted from “paving the road” for freedom to a more “exhausted” view of Moses, who leads the Jews out of the desert despite all the opposition and despite spending all his life in an effort that yet bears little fruit.</p><p>This idea is already present in the “Stonemasons”: “Each of us knew that we would find no glory / Nor people’s memory for all this bloody toil. / That people would walk this road / When it is done and ready, / When our bones would turn to dust beneath”. However, closer to XX century this perspective matures: though some progress can already be seen, it is never enough.</p><p>Anarchism. Nestor Makhno</p><p>In the wake of the Russian Revolution, many communist, socialist and anarchist parties emerged. The question of land and the right to own it was the cornerstone for many communities, especially in central and southern parts of Ukraine, which naturally relied on farming on vast expanses of the Steppe. The communities there performed well in accord with the earlier lifestyles of Cossacks.</p><p>Makhno is the only person on this list who is not a writer. He was a charismatic leader of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine, an anarchist movement in the territories around Huliaipole. From the political standpoint, he is pretty far from everyone else — Makhno disdained both the socialist Central Council and traditionalist Hetmanate; he proposed a state without a government, but worst of all, he did believe in “brotherly union with Russian people”.</p><p>I say “worse of all” because it makes him quite inconvenient in a standard political narrative. That’s part of his devilish appeal: we kind of feel worm towards his style, but not his ideas as such. We can easily understand the mindset of his actions, “taking the liberties,” as a part of our national mythos, though from earlier times.</p><p>Makhno prioritized guerilla warfare and local action, working in mobile units which were assembled when needed and armed with machine gun-mounted carts. This “nomadic” fighting style bears too many associations with the heroic past to ignore its appeal. He claimed that “anarchy is the mother of order”, meaning that communities must act upon their needs and not rely on some center to manage them. In the moment of need, one works according to the good of the community; full cooperation and support are crucial to success. In mainly peasant regions, that was the lifestyle anyway, so for the most part, Makhno was using the ideology of anarchism to support the approach which was already natural for the locals.</p><p>The Red Army ultimately defeated the Makhno movement after using their help. Nothing new here. His refusal to cooperate with other Cossack insurgents or the central government cost him dearly. While wrong in the short run, Makhno exemplifies the same approach that existed in Ukrainian thought for tens of generations: a moment of need requires a voluntary action, treated as a necessity. Luckily, we have developed a better tuning for such cooperation over time, integrating this anarchic self-help into a state apparatus.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=182e730c20f6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Eternal Cycle of Russian War Effort]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Ukrostap/the-eternal-cycle-of-russian-war-effort-ee3eab672bc8?source=rss-3b5cf1b45e47------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ee3eab672bc8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ostap Ukrainets]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Mar 2022 12:41:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-25T12:45:22.549Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This Russian war against Ukraine is quite medieval. That’s not a metaphor for Russian atrocities against the Ukrainian people because this one is relatively modern. But the premise, motivation, and overall ideological coverage of the situation within Russia itself tell a very archaic story.</p><p>Putin’s belief (as well as justification and the only strategy) was that he was dealing with some rebellious vassal who, 30 years ago, chose another sovereign. If you listen to his pre-war speech (that god-awful hour-long lecture in alternative history), you may notice more than one pre-modern political sentiment.</p><p>First and foremost — since Ukraine “had been given” its lands by the USSR (it’s easy to spot Kremlin spokespeople abroad by this particular lie), it’s up to Russia, its historical and political progenitor, to take it back. The way it was supposed to be done is telling as well: by toppling the government and installing a puppet one. One that would behave according to how Kremlin expects him to. When a feud you think of as your property misbehaves, you kick a vassal out and give the land to a more loyal vassal. That’s how Russian internal affairs work. We don’t count the people as they go with the land and simply don’t matter. This may look ugly today, but in 19 century, it was a common approach most people shared. However, this never changed for Russia on a grand level.</p><p>In Ukraine, we understand this approach well. After all, that’s what we protested against during the Revolution of Dignity. One more thing to understand here, before we properly start: Putin is a history buff, but he never was a good history student. He is of the KGB, so his domain is a constant war of narratives, not real politics. To understand how wishful reading of history shapes wishful thinking in the present, we should consider how Russia fought similar wars in the past. Since the October Revolution, there have been more than enough conflicts to notice and analyze specific behavior patterns.</p><p>We start with the Civil War, which followed the revolution. “Red Russia” (this term I use to describe the communist party in this war pre-USSR) proclaimed freedom to the nations and immediately began to conquer everyone it could. In 1918–1920 they waged war against the Ukrainian Republic, which local parties declared after the Russian Empire fell. This was a war of colonial conquest but also a war of dire need.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/898/1*A8kufFd7tkNclRwbs3N-Bg.jpeg" /><figcaption>World peace in Ukraine! (G. Hasenko, 1919)</figcaption></figure><p>Ukraine has held the reputation of “Europe’s breadbasket” for centuries. Today you can see troubles on world markets of grain and sunflower oil and the risk of famine in Africa, which depends on Ukrainian export. In 1919 the goal was to supply war-exhausted Russia. Lenin had said enough regarding Ukraine’s role in his vision in his speech for workers: “Having conquered Ukraine, having strengthened our presence on Don river, we are growing in power. Now we say that food sources are secure, we can get fuel from Donetsk Basin (Donbas). Ukraine has grand reserves excesses of grain; they do not lie there for our taking; guerilla fighters still operate in the region. We must move 3000 workers, partly peasants from hungry northern Russia, into Ukraine. Ukrainian government (puppet government, installed after the initial success in the war) has already declared the reappointment of available bread, that is, 100 million puds (about 1,6 bln kilograms).</p><p>Ukrainian government retook Kyiv short after this speech but was ultimately defeated. Among the main reasons for their defeat was the lack of international support, which prevented the Ukrainian government from building a constant supply of ammunition and medications. Though several years later, Lenin’s plans were fulfilled nonetheless. In 1921, Ukrainian peasants in eastern and southern regions faced a communist-made famine for the first time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*Z6JPnV8xR_pbOqigjnX6-g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Famished children in Berdyansk, 1922</figcaption></figure><p>This “reappointment of grain” was not to feed the hungry, as one may have thought. It was meant to fuel the war, to spread the communist revolution even further. And Poland was next. Supported by Ukrainian troops, who managed to retreat, the Polish army made a stand. The Polish state had broader international support; its military was better supplied and ultimately defeated the Red Army. The conquest has stopped for a moment.</p><p>Poland, however, was regarded as just conquest by many in Russia. A big part of the country, including Warsaw, used to be a part of a Russian empire. It was a war within “own” borders from an imperialistic standpoint and a war of liberation from a communist one. Moreover, it was about a rule over Eastern Galicia region, aimed to unify most Ukrainians under the soviet rule. Subduing this “enclave of Ukrainian Nationalism” was regarded pivotal to holding power over Ukraine in general.</p><p>The next big war of conquest that the USSR waged in Europe was a so-called Winter War in Finland. It was the most shameful defeat in the history of Russia and arguably in the entire Russian history. First of all, it was supposed to be an easy walk of liberation. The USSR had Otto Kuusinen as the head of the “people’s government” they planned to install. The propaganda was as filled with rape overtones as today: “Let us in, beautiful Suomi in a necklace of clear lakes […] Be trusting, open us the halves of your wide gates”. The idea was to “liberate” people from their government according to the concept of the World Revolution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/988/1*oELri4mqxwiXcXojT6xaAw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The signing of Terijoki Pact, creating a puppet government</figcaption></figure><p>It didn’t play out to their expectations. Troops were dragging along the narrow roads in freezing winter, and soldiers were dying in hundreds from frostbites and sniper fire. Supply lines were difficult to maintain as local troops constantly harassed them. However, it was in the thirties, so nobody cared that much, except France and Britain, who helped Finland with supplies.</p><p>The war lasted for 105 days. Finland won due to the incredible resolve and many circumstances that had played in their favor. Soviets suffered approximately 350000 dead, wounded and captured, more than a third of all the forces available. And yet Finland lost all the territory that the Russians managed to conquer. These lands to this day are a part of the Russian Federation.</p><p>Although Soviet aggression was unprovoked, a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact regarding spheres of influence, Russian historiography views it differently. It was named a “defensive war of the USSR against aggressive bourgeois Finland.” Yes, it sounds as true as a “defensive war of the Russian Federation against aggressive Nazi Ukraine.” But that is not even the point.</p><p>Territorial losses aside, the war nonetheless ended in a peace treaty. Kuusinen’s government was scrapped, at least for the time being. We don’t know how this solution could have worked out in the long run. A year after the treaty, WWII broke out, and world security architecture has dramatically changed.</p><p>However, the Winter War itself was the aftermath of yet another conflict — the division of Poland. That division, too, was a part of a Soviet-German pact. However, while Reich attacked Poland directly, the USSR took its time for 17 days before coming as a “savior.” Many troops in that relief force were of Ukrainian origin to better integrate with the locals. While some Ukrainians who lived in Poland were relieved at first (it didn’t last), most were not. They correctly assumed that political repressions were to follow. Meanwhile, for the USSR, it was still a part of its early doctrine — assimilating Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia was seen as pivotal to eliminate Ukrainian “nationalistic” identity on behalf of a Soviet one.</p><p>That strategy has been used time and again:</p><ol><li>Any government that embraces the Russian dictate is legitimate.</li><li>Any government that opposes “Russian interests” is illegitimate.</li><li>Anyone who opposes the Soviets and wishes to defend his home is a “bandit.”</li></ol><p>Thus, it was enough to establish a puppet government anywhere, conquer some land in its name, and this is it. Finland was possible because the USSR faced no repercussions for Poland. Yes, the Soviets faced a bitter defeat, but we don’t know if they were, in fact, ready to let it go. Before WWII, the USSR was still growing according to its own doctrine of a supranational union of the “free republics.” But the way that war was fought changed everything.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*hJSDUTu36cSbNs56Vljx4w.jpeg" /><figcaption>“”For the Motherland! For Stalin” is one of the best-known Soviet propaganda pieces. Back in the day it was the only state-approved way to show patriotic feelings.</figcaption></figure><p>First of all, we must establish that the concept of World War II is entirely alien to the Russian view on the subject. Soviet national mythos is built around the Great Patriotic War, which conveniently starts on June 22, 1941, ignoring two years of the USSR participating in war as an ally of Nazi Germany. At the same time, victory in that war is the essence of any patriotic feelings today. Not only was it a legit war of liberation, but it also became a pinnacle of Russian conquest. Yalta conference granted the USSR a protectorate over most of Central Europe and legitimized its power there.</p><p>The security architecture changed, though. The USSR became a founding member of the UN, as well as Ukraine (then the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) and Belarus (BSSR). The latter two were made founding members for their heavy toll and effort during the war. Ukraine and Belarus were entirely occupied; they suffered years of occupation, years of cleansing afterward, and a frontline passing through their lands along the parallel twice. Russia was hardly occupied, except for the border regions with many Ukrainians and Belarusians there. Though these two republics were re-shaped and reforged to accord with the Soviet view, a direct conquest in Europe became obsolete after the war. Having grown more extensive than ever before, Russia agreed to new rules, setting the status quo for Ukraine and Belarus as separate, though not de facto independent entities.</p><p>The Cold War featured new struggles for influence: proxy war and an extensive espionage system. The Soviet Union after Stalin heavily relied on two things: getting advocates (and possible rebels or insurgents) around the world and getting high technology from the West to copy it. The USSR was eager to support communist movements worldwide, even by impeding the state’s ability to satisfy basic needs. What’s essential for us is that the USSR had had vast properties abroad as well as systems of agents and informants, most of which were inherited by Russia.</p><p>More often than not, Russia was more successful as a power of support. Cuba, Korea, Vietnam are just the most famous examples. At the very least, one should agree that the post-war USSR accepted the rules he helped establish: expansion war bad, proxy-war good.</p><p>However, the USSR was already very complex, with different republics granted different levels of autonomy; plus, the Warsaw Pact countries, such as Hungary and Chechoslovakia, were its recognized spheres of influence. So when democratic changes began to arise in these two countries, the USSR invaded them and harshly suppressed any opposition in 1956 and 1968 respectively.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mQ6SOpARkmPnzjcAN214FQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Budapest uprising, suppressed under claims of “liberation”</figcaption></figure><p>However, direct interventions into other countries without a ready-made astroturf government often ended badly for Russia. The war in Afghanistan was a disaster and its economic repercussions, along with the Chornobyl aftermath, were among the main factors that collapsed the USSR.</p><p>Post-Soviet Russia was never peaceful (despite the image they were creating in the West). Protecting direct control over old Soviet military bases, Russia engaged in a war with Moldova, creating a frozen conflict in Transnistria (and keeping those military bases). To secede from the Russian Federation in any way, though legal de jure, was a mortal sin. Thus, the First Chechen War was also the first war of direct conquest for Russia after the USSR.</p><p>The road from the First to Second Chechen War marks the rise of Vladimir Putin and his aggressive approach to other countries. For him, Chechnya was an easy target with relatively prepared internal publicity. It was also a show of strength — Russia may fail once but will come back later. But so that we can better understand the early context of this approach, we must note one peculiar process that took place in the late sixties, during Brezhnev, back when Putin was just a teenager.</p><p>The Day of Victory was (and in Russia still is) celebrated on May 9. At first, it was more of a commemorative holiday used for propaganda purposes in the West of Ukraine, which fiercely resisted Soviet re-occupation but overall was quite sincere. Then it became a big state holiday of military might and, for all purposes, transformed into a weapon carnival over time. The point was not to commemorate the dead but to show off the big missiles. Showing off went along with the adoration of war veterans and old “more experienced” people. This approach can be traced in contemporary Russia, but we’re interested in a veteran cult here.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*UvsFugCPErklI1Vs2nORFg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The parade is not only weapons demonstration, but a way to integrate Soviet and Russian narratives and concentrate them in a feeling of domination.</figcaption></figure><p>So, Putin came to power due to fabricated terrorist attacks that gave him the mandate to start a Second Chechen war. It was a disaster for Chechnya, it was a disaster for the Russian troops and population, but it was a success for Putin. And it was one more proof that local conflicts will be tolerated. All this time, Russia was already engaged in several political conflicts with Ukraine over different issues, including Crimea. Soviet Black Sea Fleet was stationed there, so the territory was prone to Transnistria-like problems in many regards. The last iteration of conflict for the time being happened in 2003 over Tuzla Island in Kerch Strait. Russia was building a dam that threatened to close the Azov Sea.</p><p>The conflict was scrapped but never truly resolved; at that time, the voices, saying that Ukraine had no say when Russia was trying to pursue its goals on our territory, started rising. The loudest of these voices at the time was Vladimir Zhirinovsky. In 2004 he was mocked for speaking mad things about Ukraine as a failed state and a part of Russia. We eschewed it as chauvinist delirium, but here we are. Now with all this “chauvinist delirium” as an official political stance.</p><p>2004 is likely the key to these decades- or centuries-long (depending on which status quo you accept) struggle. In 2004, a Revolution happened, and peaceful protesters achieved a re-count on Presidential elections. Instead of a Kremlin-approved candidate and fraud, Ukrainians choose Viktor Yushchenko. In Ukraine these events were called Orange Revolution, and protesters wore orange ribbons to show their support for the democratic election. Russian state media declared that the revolution was staged by the US State Department and repeatedly accused the USA of “shadow-governing Ukraine.”</p><p>In 2005 on the Day of Victory in Russia, the ribbon of Saint George became more prominent than ever before. It was used as an “answer” to the orange stripes of the Ukrainian revolution, which was harshly condemned in Russia. The meaning was more profound than that — as we all know, Russia blames any dissenting side of being Nazis. The same happened here: while Ukrainians were proclaimed pro-American “Nazi-lovers,” Russia was supposed to appear a single keeper of the “Great Victory” traditions. The idea of victory became performative, as a yearly memo about the meaning of life. Cult of veterans in Russia was born out of the fact Ukrainians have a different (a post-colonial one) view of our past. Since 2005 there was a state-allowed, aggressive way to remember the past. WWII was regarded not as a tragedy but as a great war of conquest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*fNtKu6Q1ur2FWlyKx8K59A.jpeg" /><figcaption>“We will tear the USA apart with Putin’s rocket” art piece, decorated with St. George stripe.</figcaption></figure><p>And then there was Georgia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been fueled for conflict since Soviet times. The invasion of Georgia, apart from the apparent political goal of securing these regions, had had at least two other purposes:</p><ul><li>Test out the invasion of a sovereign neighbor on a relatively small and poorly armed opponent;</li><li>Re-create the image of a heroic soldier and create a new set-up for veterans who fight Nazis (existential arch-enemy in Russian propaganda; broadly speaking, anyone who views the world differently from Russia is a Nazi).</li></ul><p>It was a huge success. Despite mediocre backlash from the UN and NATO, the world swallowed the pill. Russia got to dictate the terms after 5 days of war, and Putin’s support skyrocketed. Meanwhile, that Victory propaganda was becoming more and more toxic: it included shaming the living with the memory of their dad (“Grandfathers were fighting,” “They (veteran ancestors) were dying for you, and you don’t even know their names”).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EugsOGO27knG6LkoAf6mDw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Heavy involvement of children into this hate campaign is staggering but still nothing new. Kids from the early waves of this propaganda are now Russian soldiers dying in Ukraine.</figcaption></figure><p>The discourse of victory itself was leaning more to what is summed up in one brief propaganda cliché: “We can repeat!” This phrase, along with the Saint George ribbon and massive reenactments of WWII events, became the basis for a new ancestor cult. It is a world of heroic dead who require the same sacrifice from the living. And as dead veterans were fighting the Nazis, propaganda required the same enemy for the living. Victory became a holiday to be reenacted.</p><p>That’s why we see Russia acting according to very old playbooks during this invasion. It was supposed to be a performance. A reenactment to support the narrative. It became in small steps, testing the borders of what is allowed in this new post-Cold War world. It turned out that quite a lot is if you tread carefully. However, all this time, state propaganda was centered on one single idea: we must live up to our dead ancestors by fighting Nazis wherever possible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*G0LPAab5SARp-myEAuRNbQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Compare this to any other ancestors-centered carnival: Halloween, winter holydays in Central and Eastern Europe. You look like your ancestor so that you may act like one.</figcaption></figure><p>And yes, this approach has a political and economic goal. Every propaganda does. Anti-Jew propaganda in Nazi Germany was used to take their possessions and assets; anti-kulak propaganda was used to take land from the farmers and destroy the middle class. Yes, getting hold over Ukraine will create a buffer zone with NATO and secure Russian presence on the Black Sea. And historical pretexts to this war run far deeper than WWII. But securing this interest would mean to wage war on a sovereign state. Unless it is your “anti-state,” that existential enemy you swore to eliminate. And, same as always, you are liberating common folk (who, in your mind, shouldn’t care) from the “oppressors” who stand between you and your goal. That usually means eliminating political, cultural, and scientific elites right after taking over. You lie and then you try to make it look like it was true.</p><p>In some sense, the extreme performance role of victory for Russia was indeed “provoked” by social transformations in Ukraine. As Ukrainians “turn away” from participatory engagement in this sole victory narrative, drifting towards contemplation of western united triumph narrative, they become opposed to the “correct” way of interpreting victory. The antagonism went down to symbolic: during Maidan protests, the Russian-backed government wound up an astroturf movement, “Anti-Maidan,” which was later behind separatist demarches in several regions, including Donbas. And, as Russia is a successor of the USSR, which Ukraine was a part of, it should naturally hold power over what now is its “historical domain”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/901/1*N6eD_LsKtceXpaHXX36mjw.png" /><figcaption>Anti-Maidan action “We are not mayDOWNS”. The word “даун” is a Russian slur for a person with Down syndrome, synonym for a “retard”. Red flags are all over the place.</figcaption></figure><p>All these old textbooks work with one single method: you try to persuade everyone that you have a point and whenever someone is trying to question you, just lie. Lie about everything, as if you really live in a world where your words are true. Lie long enough, and someone on the outside will sure thing that maybe you really have a point behaving like a bloodthirsty monster. After all, they need your gas.</p><p>The problem is, this concept “We can repeat” is nothing without actual repetition. This is an annual celebration, a festival dedicated to eliminating an existential enemy. This is a cult of veterans who should be adored as a moral example, who are to be followed. And when your real veterans die of old age, there’s only one way you can get yourself new ones. There is nothing new here, but on the contrary, the Soviet tradition of reenacting the past to raise spirits. We never wanted this “We can repeat!” rhetoric. Ukraine suffered horribly during that war, from the Soviets as well. Hardly anyone wanted to repeat that. We steadily became far more comfortable with “Never again.” As any sane people would do. Well, here we go again.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee3eab672bc8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Zeitgeist. Dostoevsky as a reason for war]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Ukrostap/zeitgeist-dostoevsky-as-a-reason-for-war-cb5ab6351ed2?source=rss-3b5cf1b45e47------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cb5ab6351ed2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russian-literature]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colonialism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ostap Ukrainets]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Mar 2022 18:53:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-22T15:41:09.819Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am sure that Western Academia uses the argument of “innocent Russian culture” not due to lack of knowledge or understanding of respective contexts but as a means of psychological protection. The approach is akin to what we see in “good Russians” who support peace but at the same time “are not sure because they say different things on TV.” A discussion regarding Russian culture and its place requires a complex revision of everything it has meant to us before.</p><p>They say Russian culture is impossible after the Mariupol. But it was already impossible after the Holodomor, after the Cleansing, after the dissident movement, etc. History knows tons of occasions where humanism demanded acknowledging Russian culture as impossible or at least in dire need of a revision. Human culture had survived such revisions more than once, even before the Holocaust. But now, some dare to say, our experience is not untrivial enough to allow for such a revision.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1003/1*o7DUaiyNqxwKX_Vd9gMGmg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mariupol theatre after the bombing. 1200 civilians were hiding inside.</figcaption></figure><p>The logic of this revision is simple. We cannot ignore the lies of Russian propaganda anymore. However, despite lacking consistency, Russian propaganda has a “theme tune.” This theme is found both in state-funded patriotic cinema and in “immortal classics”. And this theme is what justifies the war.</p><p>The list looks like this: exclusive rights to a thousand-year history based in Kyiv, Russia’s historical mission, its “unique way,” rule of force based on the Old Testament spirituality, an incoherent system of values which at the same time detests Western trends and tries to appropriate them. These views and images are so common in Russian mass culture that it’s hard to drive them off as a sheer coincidence.</p><p>Sure, I do not suppose that all contemporary Russian mass culture, from the “Kadetstvo” series to the “Viking” movie, is created as a part of a grand clandestine plan. That would be a conspiracy theory. However, the concurrence of themes, ideas, and images present in otherwise different products point to a particular Zeitgeist. The Spirit of Time is far more powerful than any ideological agenda. The latter can change its story every day, adapting to momentary needs. Zeitgeist, however, defines the framework to discuss specific topics within.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WyZviCvJCYkcmBs9djyGoA.jpeg" /><figcaption>A poster to the movie “Crimea” (2017), which glorifies the annexation. The subtitle says “Don’t break up with your loved ones.”</figcaption></figure><p>So Russian movie-makers and showrunners make what they make (alongside direct contracts with their Ministry of Defense) because it conforms. It concurs with the environment it is made for. Add huge grants such conforming movies often receive. Grants under totalitarianism tend to have a side effect: the state that finances them is likely to spend the money on something that agrees with the “official view.” Hence, the creators are encouraged to perpetrate state propaganda as it becomes the best way to succeed.</p><p>“American New Wave” was about anti-war sentiment, paranoia and absurd of post-American-Dream society. That was the Zeitgeist, reflected in thousands upon thousands products. And if we take a look at contemporary Russian culture, we shall see many red flags of its Zeitgeist almost wherever we look.</p><p>First of all, it’s about the military cult. This military cult is post-soviet, including nostalgic adoration of baggy uniform, just cause of a Russian soldier and Soviet army traditions. The “Soldiers,” “Kadetstvo,” and “Trainees” series (three top-rated sitcoms covering all the spheres of Russian military service), as well as countless military movies, helped shape the aesthetic and tone of this approach. We are looking at the idea of military service as an ultimate life goal, a must for “everyman” in a country that has never waged a defensive war but regularly attacks its neighbors. This is fascism.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/787/1*A62XxkQestA0YrWzZ4GpdQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Boris Korchevnikov as a poster child for a soldier career in the “Kadetstvo” series (left) and as one of the top media advocates for war and genocide in Ukraine (right).</figcaption></figure><p>Secondly, it’s about the way Russia presents itself to others. There is Russian classics and there are Russian movies and TV series. The latter, exploiting western trends, has created an archaic and nostalgic picture appealing specifically to those within a post-Soviet world.</p><p>Any attempt to emancipate from this cultural world meets fierce resistance. We faced it more than once as Russia was constantly trying to impose its language and culture, eschewing our own media as “Nazi” jest because they were in Ukrainian. The thing is, Russians often don’t understand Ukrainian literature, cinema, and other media. We were forced to understand theirs. It is a colonizer-colonized dynamics that any contemporary humanities scholar understands. That these dynamics even exist should be enough to revise familiar Russian narratives.</p><p>Russia has its image of Ukrainians — it’s a soft-bodied sucker and silly but cunning woman. One could think they have a quota on this character in military series. A clumsy but friendly “Ukrainian” Russian soldier or a trainee per series, but only one (sometimes with a family) is allowed. This is how colonial exoticism works. It won’t be an exaggeration to say that such an image is what most Russians know about Ukraine at all. “My Wonderful Nanny” series, a Russian version of “The Nanny,” features a Ukrainian starlet from Mariupol in Moscow. According to the narrative, she (and thus “the Ukraine” for Russians) feels completely one with the “Russian world.” In the real world, the Russian army is bombing and starving the city, which refuses to surrender.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*iuAx1RHT2518WadD_xV9ag.jpeg" /><figcaption>A stereotypical Ukrainian turned Russian in the Russian military (from “Soldiers” TV series)</figcaption></figure><p>It is a trivial example of exoticization and appropriation of other’s space. At the same time, acting against the colonizer’s expectations imposes aggressive alienation. In this case, the colonized is pronounced not “the other” but “the enemy” that interferes with the rightful brotherly union. That’s how you use gaslighting as a tool in foreign affairs.</p><p>Maybe some refuse to revise Russian culture thinking “If I ignore it, maybe it will go away.” But at least as likely is the explanation proposed by Belarusian poet and translator Anton Bryl: “the way part of the West is nerding over “Great Russian literature” should be finally recognized as one of the last examples of Victorian orientalism.” I believe it is a precise understanding of this problem. The West understands only bits and pieces about Russian contexts, and even these bits and pieces are often a result of a post-war Soviet influence in European Slavic studies.</p><p>Russian media almost have a quota on silly Ukrainians, but we were lucky here. It was a mere mockery, which we were nevertheless allowed. More than a hundred stateless ethnic groups incorporated into Russian Federation have no such luxury. Russian mass culture, which propagates a military cult, is deeply racist. Although many occupiers that attacked Ukraine belong to non-Slavic ethnic groups, Russian military media lack Turks, Sino-Tibetans, or indigenous peoples of Northern Siberia.</p><p>That is the implicit racism that Slavoj Zizek noted, and it is somewhat responsible for how Western countries viewed Russia over these years. Europe helps Ukraine partly because it is “their own,” but there’s more to it. Russia kept its distance from Western culture on purpose. She didn’t try to avoid exoticization — she embraced it as a smokescreen for aggravating internal issues. The problem is that hundreds of different peoples are caught within these exoticized constraints. And we tend to neglect their lack of voice as it fits the standard “Russian” narrative.</p><p>Sure, Russian culture, per se, is not guilty of the current war, and it would be weird to blame Tolstoy or Saltykow-Shchedrin for bombing Kharkiv. But we must understand that this culture has a prominent place in Russian ideological matrix. No matter “what did the author wanted to convey,” this classical Russian culture <em>nowadays </em>is deeply integrated into a fascist way of thinking. So before we even start talking of culture being “beyond politics,” before declaring that our enemy is “Putin, not Pushkin,” we must realize how Pushkin works within the ideology that approves of killing civilians. One would think such is the intellectual responsibility of every person with proper education and adherence to any democratic ideals and humanism.</p><p>I’ll limit myself to just two media pieces. To my mind, they fully represent that “Russian way,” which is ironically (I hope so) called a “mysterious Russian soul”: “Crime and Punishment” by Dostoevsky and the “Viking,” financed by Cinema Foundation of Russia.</p><p>Dostoyevsky is one of the “faces” of Russian literature abroad. We know the general interpretation from our school classes, and this broad view was copied and pasted in every Russian literature department, and Western interpretations, more often than not, are based on Russian studies.</p><p>The simplified interpretation of “Crime and Punishment” goes like this: describing the immense depth of human fall, the author still finds a place for some deep psychologism, exploring humanity where we are used to noticing none. This interpretation is a standard school view, and the same understanding, if somewhat more complex, prevails in universities. No wonder, as every curriculum in the USSR was to follow the general narrative. Yes, there is psychologism. Yes, there is proto-existentialism. But they work within a strict moral framework: people still show humanity even in their worst. Such is a set hierarchy of values.</p><p>This explanation has always seemed insincere, despite being intuitive. The moral is there, but the surrounding “rock bottom” looked more grotesque. But it makes much better sense if you try reading Dostoevsky as a literal grotesque, hyperbolic mockery of all the social vice. The “Idiot” became the key to understanding “Crime and Punishment.” It is a story of a man who believes in something and has a nurtured set of his own values. This man enters the “common” Russian society, and it crushes him because the society cannot help it. Personal aspirations don’t matter because Russia as a whole is destructive by its nature. Dostoevsky’s diaries support this perspective: “The main, root problem of Russian people is their need to suffer, eternally and unwaveringly, always and everywhere.” If we accept this view, the hierarchy changes: yes, these are regular people, and it’s easy for us to recognize them as such. But the hellish circumstances they are in are created and perpetuated by their actions and choices. Moreover, there is no choice to offer us a way out. Dostoevsky offers us <em>bewilderment from normality</em>. It is not a Hegelian philosophy of Law, where recognizing humanity behind the crime is crucial. On the contrary, every crime is technically justified as long as we remember that a criminal is also a human. Somehow Russian discourse around their war effort in Ukraine provides more than enough support for this interpretation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q6FyLdGOXr1JXcATvsnR4g.jpeg" /><figcaption>A shot from the movie “Down House” (2001). An interpretation of “The Idiot” that depicts Myshkin as a weird one, debilitated by Western trends.</figcaption></figure><p>Now let’s take a look at the “Viking” movie. Volodymyr the Great as a historical figure is a “forefather” of both Russia and Ukraine. The histories of both countries center around Kyiv. Sure, we’re not talking about some concrete bloodline during the last millennium. The medieval state was multi-ethnic, with different influences in different regions. But such a nuanced view doesn’t matter in the founding mythos.</p><p>The myth of Volodymyr matters because it is a rebirth myth. A cruel pagan who achieves power by crime is later blessed by God’s Grace and decides to baptize everyone else with fire and sword. It is a typical image of a medieval “barbaric baptizer,” not that different from the image of Clovis I. However, Germany and France do not deny each other’s existence based on Merovingian history. So this issue with Volodymyr is at least more problematic.</p><p>The story of Volodymyr in medieval sources is a vita, a typical genre in Eastern Orthodoxy. A male vita follows either the life of Jesus (divine vocation since childhood) or the life of Paul (adult vocation/sinner reborn). Volodymyr, like most German kings, belongs to the latter. Here it is crucial to remember that we are dealing with religious literature. In Russia, where orthodoxy and religious education are state-forced, it is reasonable to treat vitae as moral lessons.</p><p>How this moral translates into the mass culture? Volodymyr is depicted as a barbarian wildling. He murders innocents, rapes women, and commits other atrocities. Hardly an icon for a loved ruler. But he (in the movie) becomes one as soon as God touches him. This choice of Orthodoxy is a pivotal moment for Russian ideology, an illustration of an eternal schism between the West and “Russian World.” However, it should be noted that this Grace is no personal achievement of a hero. He suffers no life-changing transformation except for this Grace ex Machina. All this happens just because Volodymyr choses the right God. This grace brings no redemption; on the contrary, it legitimizes all the previous crimes as achievements.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Fb2EIGyWqf4VQO28o2JMrg.png" /><figcaption>Epiphany moment is the “Viking”.</figcaption></figure><p>This story is not read as a spiritual transformation from ugly to good. Good and ugly become two morally equal parts of Volodymyr’s life. This cinematic orthodox epiphany is something we’ve already heard from Putin: “We, as martyrs, are going to heaven, while others will simply perish.” From a Russian orthodox standpoint, the main achievement is the Grace itself, which guarantees absolution despite any actions. I’m not sure if Europe has seen such policies since Albigensian Crusade.</p><p>And now we’re back to problems with Dostoevsky. He was familiar with vitae as a genre and composed his “Crime and Punishment” according to its typical plotline. Whereas the “Viking” shows us a specific moral, adapted for a ruler Putin openly wishes to associate with, Dostoevsky provides the same adaptation for a classic “small man” of Russian literature.</p><p>This small man fulfills himself only through violence as he doesn’t know better. Similarly, he can be redeemed only through God’s interference, as if this world was inherently too evil for personal good will even to exist. This interference does not change things for the better, does not cause any moral rebirth, and does not make one question himself and evaluate personal responsibility. At no point of this external punishment can we talk of an internal atonement. The world around the hero is still damned; that is the default condition. Blithe, however, grants acceptance of this state of affairs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mpXtlgLVfuUCObKn0jH4jQ.png" /><figcaption>A collage by Andriy Hryshchuk. Dostoevsky peering into Ukrainian kindergarten through a shell-hole.</figcaption></figure><p>The state of blithe is essential both in Russian culture and ideology. In religious terms, it’s about one’s ability to see God’s grace even in the most profound depth of inhumane and immoral. From this perspective, a madman is a saint, with God’s gift to see goodness even where none exists. This is the “mysterious Russian soul” of Dostoevsky’s humanism. Darkness, desperation, obscurantism, and violence don’t even matter if we put on the shades of Grace. This Grace never changes the world for the better and never solves any pivotal problems; it makes us accept it all as part of a plan.</p><p>Once again, it doesn’t mean we should cancel Dostoevsky or Russian culture itself into oblivion. But the writing is on the wall: Russian culture works as another source of soft power and propaganda right now. In many cases, it justifies fascist policies and aggressive warmongering. Cultural canon can exist within totalitarianism only as a servant of the regime. We’ve already revised Wagner, Hamsun, and other names associated with Nazism not that long ago. That’s not to mention thousands of authors, reinterpreted under post-colonial optics.</p><p>Russian part in WWII prevented this revision in the 20 century, shaping Slavic studies in Europe. But without a proper post-colonial revision of Russian culture, we can’t even begin to hear hundreds of colonized and half-assimilated voices springing through this war-imposed “brotherhood.” Without this revision, we can’t seriously say that we understand Russian culture to any degree. No author is personally responsible for this. But such is an intellectual responsibility of any scholar or critic.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cb5ab6351ed2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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