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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Winslow Hall on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Winslow Hall on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Winslow Hall on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Source Significance: A New Framework For Evaluating Trademarks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/source-significance-a-new-framework-for-evaluating-trademarks-badf13593bd1?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[trademark]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Sep 2019 00:12:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-24T00:12:48.607Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A thing’s ability to distinguish the source of goods or services is an essential element in determining whether the thing can be a trademark. A thing that can do this is a trademark, a thing that does not do this cannot be a trademark¹ (there’s been recent talk in academic circles as to whether footnotes are important parts of a piece. I assure you they are). I think that there are problems in how we think about, evaluate, and talk about distinctiveness. First of all, the type of thing a thing is plays a greater role in its potential ability to distinguish source that we currently acknowledge. Second, there is a fundamental difference between being merely distinctive — something that sticks out from its surroundings — and being source distinguishing — something that is perceived as distinguishing certain goods and services as coming from a specific and distinct source.² And third, use and function as a trademark, represented by commercial strength, is evaluated using imprecise proxies and given short shrift when compared to “distinctiveness.”</p><p>I worry that through confused use distinctiveness might have become too muddied to be useful, that too often something is considered trademark distinctive merely based on the thing’s ability to assault the senses.³ I’d like to propose a new term and framework to use in evaluating things that would be trademarks, one that I think better highlights what trademarks do that distinctive does today.⁴</p><p>I’d like to propose <em>source significant</em> as the term to use when evaluating the ability of a thing to signal that the goods or services marked by that thing come from a certain source. A thing can be more or less source significant, it can act better or worse as a source signifier, and its source significance would be used to evaluate the registrability of a thing,⁵ the likelihood it will be confused with similar things, and the scope of protection it should have.⁶</p><p>The three factors for evaluating source significance would be: (1) the type of thing being evaluated; is this type of thing currently perceived as source significant; (2) the conceptual strength of the thing, a combination of Beebe’s <em>differential distinctiveness </em>and <em>source distinctiveness</em>;⁷ and (3) any commercial strength the thing has acquired; secondary meaning, which is a proxy for (and which itself must be measured by proxies) whether something is being used and functions as a mark.</p><p>In <em>An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness</em>,⁸<em> </em>Thomas R. Lee shows that the context a thing is encountered in is important to whether or not, and to what extent, we perceive the thing as source significant.⁹ And, like context, I think type of thing is important in whether or not, and to what extent, we perceive a thing as source significant. The context of a thing affects our perception of the thing because we have developed heuristics that color how we understand things based on context. Depending on the context of things, the size, location, and style of things relative to their surroundings our heuristics could encourage us to understand those things as source significant, descriptive or generic, informational or laudatory, functional, ornamental, or just background noise. Similarly, I believe that we have heuristical understandings of different types of things that make us more naturally understand different types of things as having different roles, being source significant, descriptive or generic, informational or laudatory, functional, ornamental, or just background noise.¹⁰</p><p>Sartre said that existence precedes essence.¹¹ I agree. And what that means is that we as perceiving humans have imbued different types of things with different types of roles and meanings so that we understand and encounter different types of things as doing different functions. Trademark law should reflect that.</p><h4><strong>A. Type of Thing</strong></h4><p>The first factor of source significance is the type of the thing: ‘is this thing that we’re considering of a type that — because of how consumers are currently conditioned to understand things, products, and source-signifiers — consumers currently more immediately understand as source significant?’ ¹² Depending on the type of the thing, it will or will not be of a type consumers are currently conditioned to understand as source significant. Whether it is a type of thing that is currently source significant factors into what degree of conceptual and commercial strength needs to be shown for the thing to be sufficiently source significant to be registrable and the degree of protection given.¹³</p><p>When initially wrangling with trade dress protection, courts assumed that because trademarks and trade dress were meant to serve the same statutory purpose, and because there was no statutory language to the contrary, that the same rules and analysis should apply to trade dress as did to trademarks. The <em>Two Pesos </em>court asked whether secondary meaning (<em>i.e.</em>, commercial strength) should be required to be shown for trade dress that was already determined to be inherently distinctive (<em>i.e.</em>, conceptually strong). The <em>Two Pesos</em> court decided that because commercial strength was not required for conceptually strong marks to be protectable that the same should be true for trade dress.¹⁴</p><p>This fails to take into account our heuristics, that we perceive different types of things differently. Context shapes how we perceive something (whether we perceive it as descriptive, functional, ornamental, informational, source distinctive). Similarly, the type of thing a thing is shapes how we perceive the thing.</p><p>This first factor represents that we are currently accustomed to encountering and perceiving certain things as source significant — words and logos placed in certain locations, in certain sizes, and related to the rest of the design in a certain way, these are things that because of what they are we expect them to serve as source significant.¹⁵ Other types of things we are not currently accustomed to encountering and perceiving as source significant — ornaments, furniture, product design, hashtags, chandeliers made out of hairdryers, these things we more immediately perceive as something else, as serving a primary function that is not source-identifying. For things in this second category, we might expect to find a source signifier <em>on</em> one of these, can still be or become source significant if they are conceptually strong and acquire commercial strength things, but we do not as readily expect these things in themselves to serve as source identifiers.¹⁶</p><p>The type of thing a thing is significant in how we perceive that thing. We heuristically understand different types of things as doing different things, though those heuristics may change over time, and trademark law should account for type of thing as the starting point in the analysis of whether a thing is source significant. We do not need to evaluate different types of things differently, but we should require higher degrees of conceptual and commercial strength for them to be source significant enough to be registrable or protectable. Some types of things start more source significant, and other types of things start less source significant. L3ss source significant type of things could be sufficiently sourced significant, making up for an inherent lack of source significance through conceptual and commercial strength.</p><p><strong>B. Conceptual Strength</strong></p><p>Moving to factors two and three, conceptual strength and commercial strength, we are no longer concerned with the type of thing, but about the particular thing, about how this particular thing, which is of a certain type, looks or is otherwise perceived.¹⁷</p><p>The second factor of source significance is the conceptual strength of the thing; not the source significance of the type of thing but of this particular thing which is of a type of thing. Conceptual strength is a combination of Beebe’s <em>source distinctiveness </em>and <em>differential distinctiveness</em>.¹⁸ A thing’s conceptual strength is determined by: (A) the thing’s relation to the goods or service it is used with (<em>i.e.</em>, whether how this thing looks or is otherwise perceived is descriptive or informational of or normal to the goods or services it is in connection with, if it is arbitrary or suggestive in relation to the goods or services, or just fanciful in the abstract); and (B) the relation of the thing to other things that mark the same kinds of goods and services (<em>i.e.</em>, do lots of brands use a thing that looks this same way to signify their own goods or services, or is this thing that looks this certain way unique or unusual among source signifiers for this kind of good or service?). And those two relationships of the thing (first, to the goods or services it marks, and second, to other things marking the same kinds of goods or services) combine to determine how conceptually strong a thing is.¹⁹ These two relationships mirror Beebe’s source distinctiveness and differential distinctiveness, respectively. Thus, a thing’s conceptual strength is based on its degrees of source distinctiveness and differential distinctiveness, and the more conceptually strong something is the more source significant it is.</p><p>Conceptual strength maps more or less well to the <em>Abercrombie </em>categories. Based off its relationship to the goods or services it is in connection with, and based on how similar it is to other things that are in connection with the same kinds of goods or services, a thing could be considered generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.²⁰</p><p>My problem with the current evaluation of conceptual strength and the application of the <em>Abercrombie</em> categories is that it has focused too much on differential distinctiveness, focusing on fancy or trendy names and designs, over-emphasising the new, bold, and unique, but neglecting source distinctiveness and whether as a whole that differential and source distinctiveness of the thing is likely to make consumers encounter the thing as a source signifier.²¹</p><p>For example, the <em>Two Pesos</em> court did not bother with whether the latin iconography decorating a Mexican restaurant was source distinctive, but was only concerned with whether Two Pesos’ particular version of latin iconography was unique within latin iconography. Measuring this kind of uniqueness is part of the conceptual strength evaluation, the differentially distinctive part, but is not the whole the evaluation; focusing on <em>differential distinctiveness</em>, this fails to ask whether the combination of non-distinctive elements combines into something <em>source distinctive</em> in relation to the goods and services provided under the mark.</p><p>The insufficient analysis of conceptual strength in trade dress goes as far back as the <em>Seabrook </em>case establishing the factors of trade dress conceptual strength forty-odd years ago. In determining conceptual strength, the <em>Seabrook</em> test considers whether the thing in question is: (A) a “common” basic shape or design; (B) unique or unusual in a particular field; (C) a mere refinement of a commonly adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods; or (D) capable of creating a commercial impression distinct from [any] accompanying words.²²</p><p>Only the fourth <em>Seabrook</em> factor could be seriously considered as indicating whether a thing has source distinctiveness, and this factor also implicitly recognizes that we more readily perceive words as source significant than other types of things.²³ The other three factors focus on differential distinctiveness; they only look at things vis-a-vis other things in the industry and not at things in relation to the industry in which the things are applied. This foundation has set up conceptual strength analysis to focus primarily, or solely (notice the “or” before the fourth factor), on differential distinctiveness. Where only differential distinctiveness is considered, and if such differential distinctiveness exists, then copyright rather than trademark is the appropriate means of protection, if there is an appropriate means.²⁴</p><p><strong>C. Commercial Strength</strong></p><p>The third factor of source significance is the thing’s commercial strength.²⁵ A thing’s commercial strength is the degree to which the thing — through being used as a source signifier and consumers having come to recognize it as a source signifier — acquires source significance, even though it may not be either a type of thing people are accustomed to perceiving, encountering, and understanding as source signifying or conceptually strong.</p><p>Commercial strength is where it makes sense to consider use and function as a mark, and is typically relegated to something necessary for things that are not conceptually strong, an alternative to conceptual strength to back-door a thing onto the principal register. However, this sells short the importance of use and function of a mark. Even the most conceptually strong thing cannot be a trademark if it is not used as a trademark, if it is not used in a manner where consumers see the thing in public functioning as a trademark.</p><p>Like factors one and two, we have to use proxies for measuring commercial strength. Without being able to (conveniently) scan someone’s brain to find out what things they do and do not recognize as commercially strong, we have to rely on proxies out in the wild that we can use to approximate when something is commercially strong and perceived as source significant.</p><p>Currently, the following proxies are generally considered indicative of commercial strength: (A) the amount and manner of advertising in connection with the thing; (B) the volume of sales of goods and services sold under the thing; (C)the length and manner of use of the thing; and (D) results of consumer surveys regarding consumers’ perception of the thing.</p><p>The amount and manner of advertising, volume of sales, and the length of use are types of circumstantial evidence used to suggest when a thing has been used commercially for long enough and in ways to have potentially established commercial strength in consumers’ minds. Presenting circumstantial evidence like this, especially sales figures and length of use, effectively amounts to brute forcing a thing into being deemed source significant; an applicant or registrant tries to simply pile up enough evidence of sales figures or length of use to assert that their thing *must* be source significant.</p><p>But these arguments amount to little more than sweat of the brow protection for trademarks, and are not grounded in trademark law’s legitimizing objectives of preventing likelihood of confusion and incentivizing investment in producing consistently quality products and incentivizing brands to cultivate goodwill. Trademark law should not reward brands’ mere efforts in getting in front of consumers, it should reward brands who have created and used a thing in a way that has come to function as source significant.²⁶ Rewarding the mere act of getting a thing in front of customers does not necessarily promote the source-identifying objectives of trademark law. It instead opens the door to anti-competitive expansions of trademark law, even if many of the results will be innocuous.</p><p>Manner of advertising is somewhat better than length of use and sales figures. Some manners of using a thing will make that thing more or less likely to be encountered by consumers as source significant (this is what failure to function refusals recognizes). Evaluating the manner of advertising and the effect it can be expected to have is an imprecise art, but it’s a better proxy for source significance than either length of use or sales figures are.</p><p>Alongside manner of advertising (which is, essentially, the question of whether this thing is, and if so, to what degree is it, used in a manner that is encountered as source significant) other more relevant proxies we should be looking for include:</p><p><em>Actual recognition</em>: this proxy is already used, if there is evidence of media coverage emphasizing the trademark and how distinctive it is. This can be hard to prove though, most people’s things won’t be highlighted for how well it source signifies.</p><p><em>Look-for advertising</em>: this is a tough factor to talk about; just because a brand employs look-for advertising (“look for the box with the _____!”) in connection with their trademarks does not mean that consumers have internalized that advertising so as to recognize what is being look-for’d as source significant. What can probably be said of look-for advertising though, is that perhaps more than anything else, look-for advertising is calculated to influence how consumers encounter the thing being look-for’d.</p><p><em>Reference to a famous word or logo mark</em>: this may only apply to measure the commercial strength of something like a product design, packaging, ornament, etc., but if a thing refers back to another thing that is already famously source significant, that referential thing is perhaps more likely to be perceived as source significant than it would be without that reference.²⁷ For example, if a hair salon used a yellow hairdryer logo, if that logo became famously source significant enough, maybe a 3D rendering of a yellow hairdryer, or even a chandelier made out of yellow hair dryers, would have some source significance because of the source significance of the logo mark it referred to.</p><p><em>Parody / proof of intentional copying</em>: this is somewhat like the intent to confuse or bad faith element some circuits use to evaluate likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement evaluation. If someone is parodying your thing it is because your thing is so well understood as significant of a particular source that a parody would make sense to begin with. A parody cannot function without communicating a double-meaning. On the one hand, communicating the original meaning of the thing being parodied, and on the other communicating the parody meaning.²⁸</p><p><em>Consistent use: </em>is the thing used consistently be the user? This may be most relevant where there is a brick-and-mortar establishment; if there is a thing that otherwise might appear ornamental but it shows up consistently in different locations, that could create a source significant impression on consumers.</p><p>In her article <em>Failure to Function</em>, Professor Alexandra Roberts ends with a graphic showing the subset of things that should be protectable:²⁹</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*xQDite8veDDrx1D_" /><figcaption>Roberts’ graphic of the subset of protectable things.</figcaption></figure><p>I love Roberts’ article. But Iwould add a z-axis to Roberts’ graph to represent type of thing;</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dbCY8WOYezOhnZW68tn3Xw.jpeg" /><figcaption>My graphic of the subset of protectable things.</figcaption></figure><p>Protectable things are of different combinations of types of things that are varying degrees of source significant, conceptually strong, and commercially strong. The starting point of each examination is the type of thing we are looking at. Our (evolving) heuristics encounter and interpret different types of things as fulfilling different roles, some source signifying and some not. I do not think we need to evaluate different types of things differently, but different types of things start with more or less source significance, and therefore different types of things should require greater or lesser degrees of conceptual and commercial strength (the evaluation of both of which needs to be improved) to be registrable and protectable.³⁰</p><p>[1] Saying ‘things’ may seem informal, but dear reader, I assure you, it is not, I think ‘things’ is maybe the most precise word we can use for things that either are or are not trademarks. Before they are trademarks what are they? They could be virtually anything — at least under the current Lanham Act — and to say ‘distinctive trademarks’ makes no sense because, apparently, distinctiveness is the definition of a trademark. It’s also important to say a thing that distinguishes source ‘can’ rather than ‘is’ a trademark, because use is a fundamental component of any trademark and distinctiveness alone can’t be enough.</p><p>[2] In some notable cases, however, it has been enough for something to be unique and not common in the industry for it to be “distinctive” and thus protectable as a trademark. A thing’s ability to be source distinguishing, distinguishing the good or service the thing is on as coming from a specific source, is what trademark law is concerned with and it is harder to prove than simply pointing at something that is uncommon or that calls attention to itself and sticks out from the other things around it.</p><p>[3] See, for example, the recent discussion around the decision in <em>Brunetti</em>, specifically, whether the mark in question, FUCT, even functions as a trademark at all, or whether it is merely expressive, loud, rude, and draws attention from those around it onto itself. In this manner FUCT is distinctive, but I don’t think it distinguishes the source of the goods on which it appears (and let’s not even get into “trademarks” on t-shirts.).</p><p>[4] But really dear reader, this is just the lie I’m telling myself. Distinctiveness probably works fine. The real reason I’m rejecting this definition is that I’m insufferable, miss undergrad, and want to make up my own term. So, if you’d like to, substitute “distinctive” or “strong” wherever I say “source significant,” and that will probably work just fine. More important takeaways than the new name are that type of mark should be considered fundamental to evaluating anything and critiques of conceptual strength and commercial strength evaluations.</p><p>[5] The level of source significance required to be registrable, the weight of the burden the applicant needs to carry, should depend on the benefits conferred by registration. This article will assume the current benefits and perception of registration, but I also believe that those benefits (including the mistaken belief by the courts and public that a registered mark is inherently stronger than a non-registered mark (See Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration In Modern American Trademark Law) are too high, especially considering that non-conceptually strong marks are those that benefit the most from being registrable via commercial strength, but are also those the registration of which provide the least in terms of socially beneficial notice. Whether we should change the benefits conferred by registration is a larger conversation taken up by those smarter than I am (See Tushnet, Registering Confusion). Depending on how valuable registration is, the level of source significance required for registration would change. However, I’m in general in favor of fewer registered marks — registrations create some chilling effect, and people mistakenly think you need a registration to be protectable, and it would be easier to change what is registrable to match expectations (that registration is only for powerful marks) than it would be to educate the public and change their perception of registration — so am in favor of a higher burden of registration.</p><p>I am sympathetic to the need to give notice of rights so that business owners can efficiently choose a mark that does not conflict with other marks, and that to incentivize people to record their marks there has to be an incentive to do so, but in the internet age Google is a great tool for finding out if there is a potentially conflicting mark, and if a brand is not established enough to have an internet presence it is reasonable to say they should have a nation-wide priority for a mark?</p><p>For now though, assuming the existing system and benefits of registration, I might require a showing of two of the three source significance factors to be registrable.</p><p>[6] The relationship of source significance to scope of protection, however, might not work the way you expect. In <em>The Scope of Strong Marks: Should Trademark Law Protect The Strong More Than The Weak</em>, Barton Beebe and Scott Hemphill propose that the most source significant marks may actually merit less protection than only moderately source significant marks. <a href="https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NYULawReview-92-5-BebbeHemphill.pdf">92 New York University Law Review 1339 (2017)</a>. Marks that are highly source significant may be less likely to be confused with other marks: mark’s that are very strong conceptually, or have a high degree of secondary meaning built over years of perception, are perhaps easier for consumers to identify, and easier for consumers to notice when something is slightly off.</p><p>[7] <a href="http://www.bartonbeebe.com/documents/Beebe%20-%20Semiotic%20Analysis.pdf">The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA Law Review 621 (2004)</a> (“Corresponding to the semiotic relation of signification, source distinctiveness describes the extent to which a trademark’s signifier is distinctive of its signified. Corresponding to the semiotic relation of value, differential distinctiveness describes the extent to which a trademark’s signifier is distinctive from other signifiers in the trademark system.”)</p><p>[8] Available via <a href="https://works.bepress.com/thomas_lee/3/">bepress</a>.</p><p>[9] Obviously, he called it something other than source significant.</p><p>[10] There is extensive research behind this. My dad is a retired professor of neurobiology. I emailed him about my thoughts and he replied “I can’t be much help on any specifics. But, I do think the argument is a reasonable one.” (email saved in my gmail.)</p><p>[11] Jean-Paul Sartre, <em>Existentialism &amp; Humanism</em>. Not sure there’s a thinker more relevant to trademarks than JPS.</p><p>[12] The “currently” qualifier is important but tough. What consumers perceive as inherently source significant can change over time, and we can only focus on what is currently inherently understood as source significant. What’s tough about this is determining what is currently inherently understood as source significant. And of course, what types of things mean what to us evolves over time. Types of things that are at one point not considered source significant could develop source significant significance over time.</p><p>[13] We already require a greater degree of commercial strength to register a mark that has less conceptual strength.</p><p>[14] Of course, there is the, sometimes hazy, difference between product packaging trade dress (capable of being inherently distinctive) and product design trade dress (incapable of being inherently distinctive).</p><p>[15] <em>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.</em>, 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000). (“Consumers are… predisposed to regard [word marks and product packaging] as indication of the producer, which is why such symbols almost <em>automatically</em> tell a customer that they refer to a brand.”)</p><p>[16] McKenna, Mark P. and Canahai, Caitlin, The Case Against Product Configuration Trade Dress (February 18, 2019). Trademark Law and Theory: Reform of Trademark Law, Graeme Dinwoodie &amp; Mark Janis, eds. (Edward Elgar, 2019, Forthcoming); Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper №1925. Available at SSRN: <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=3336366">https://ssrn.com/abstract=3336366</a> or <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3336366">http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3336366</a>.</p><p>Caitlin Canahai and Mark McKenna recently proposed that product configurations no longer be protectable under trademark law. Instead, these things could be protected by unfair competition law, and the remedies available would be to require markings and other distinguishers to protect against any consumer confusion caused by the similar product configuration design. I’d like to adopt that approach here where a thing is neither of a type currently encountered as source significant or conceptually strong. If a thing is neither a type of thing currently immediately perceived as source significant nor conceptually strong, its protection should be limited to protection under unfair competition law, not trademark law. This would help avoid any inefficiencies caused by affording these things protection under trademark law (not even everything that is source significant should be protected as a trademark, because doing so may cause other social burdens, such as when functional or descriptive things are protected, even if they do have some source significance, the harm done by protecting them may result in a net negative), but still allow some ways for rights holders to prevent consumer confusion or passing-off by competitors. This would also encourage the use of things that are more efficient source signifiers and better achieve trademark law’s objectives.</p><p>[17] When discussing conceptual and commercial strength we are concerned with type of thing to the extent that for things of a type not currently readily perceived as source significant we will require greater conceptual strength and commercial strength. What I mean by factors two and three not being concerned with type of thing is that when evaluating how much conceptual and commercial strength a thing has we are not concerned with the type of thing.</p><p>[18] Beebe supra FN 7.</p><p>[19] The first factor dealt with types or species of things, this second factor (and the third too) deals with the specific instance of the thing at hand, and how source significant this instance of thing is.</p><p>[20] This spectrum does not track perfectly to differential distinctiveness, but I think we can imagine and graft on an understanding that works.</p><p>[21] A complicating factor is that the distinction between signifier and signified continues to erode, so that increasingly the trademark is the product. Beebe supra FN 7.</p><p>[22] <em>Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd.</em>, 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977).</p><p>[23] It’s also, unfortunately, the most subjective and hard to measure of the four.</p><p>[24] Trademarks and copyrights are different, <a href="https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/what-we-should-mean-when-we-say-trademark-and-copyright-are-different-6c253c3d1d03">after all</a>.</p><p>[25] Like the second factor, commercial strength deals with a particular instance of a thing, whereas the first factor deals with a type or species of thing.</p><p>[26] Something I see all the time in legal circles is dismissiveness or ridicule of those who talk of the law in terms of *should,* as if this is naive and idealistic and that lawyers should only think about the law in terms of what is or has been. I truly feel sorry for you if you don’t have the imagination and optimism to think about what the law should be.</p><p>[27] And really, this is not so much a proxy for a thing’s own commercial strength, but recognizing that one thing can likely benefit from the source significance already built up in a second thing.</p><p>[28] If you think of other useful proxies, let me know <a href="https://twitter.com/WinslowTHall">@winslowthall</a></p><p>[29] <a href="https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-104-issue-4/trademark-failure-to-function/">https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-104-issue-4/trademark-failure-to-function/</a></p><p>[30] Again, I want to endorse Beebe’s argument that more source significant things should actually have less protection. Beebe supra note 7.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=badf13593bd1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Get Rid of Design Rights, A Modest Proposal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/get-rid-of-design-rights-a-modest-proposal-ef235407b976?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef235407b976</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trade-dress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[design-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[patents]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[copyright]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Dec 2018 18:37:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-24T18:37:22.187Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>People smarter than me have <a href="https://law.stanford.edu/publications/intelligent-design/">thoroughly examined and produced nuanced solutions</a> for improving the design right regimes and their confusing overlap.</p><p>I would like to submit a much blunter solution to fix design rights: get rid of them. No trade dress, no design patents, and no copyright over useful articles at all. Producers should only have their word and logo marks, and the goodwill those marks are imbued with (the same good will any trade dress would have been imbued with) to use to sell products and protect their market share from competitors.</p><p>From the producer point of view, all three types of design rights are meant to protect market share from competitors. Trademark rights are also supposed to protect the time and energy producers invest in cultivating goodwill and expectations and consistent quality and value.</p><p>From the consumer point of view, the limited monopoly of design patent and copyright should promote innovation (based on the, debatable, notion that the solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short state of nature lurks below society and without the right to exclude, backed up by the state, no one would invest time or energy in producing art, science, or culture), and that of trademark protection is supposed to protect consumer expectations.</p><p>However, producers can extend these monopolies beyond their justifiable bounds in anticompetitive ways. It is not clear that the product design or copyright monopolies are prerequisites to innovation, the open source community alone offers a powerful rebuttal. Trade dress is too easily used as a backdoor to a perpetual (or at least renewable) design right, without offering counterbalancing increases to competition that word and logo marks offer. And word and logo trademarks protect producers’ ability to source-identify just as well as trade dress would.</p><p>Instead of allowing producers to default into a market share because they hold a monopoly through design right protection, getting rid of design right protection would force producers to compete for market share by cultivating goodwill and expectations of consistent quality and value in their word and logo marks. This is where the social benefit of trademark protection comes from in the first place. With a design right monopoly, even a limited one, producers can rest on their laurels and feel less need to make products of a higher quality, at a better value, or to otherwise innovate.</p><p>Thus, a design right monopoly does not necessarily incentivize innovation as copyright and patents are intended to. When it comes to the objectives of trademark law, protecting producers’ ability to source identify and protect market share can be done with word and logo marks without needing design rights. Thus, while not every trade dress right produces harmful effects, protecting only word and logo marks gets rid of those design rights that do, without depriving producers or consumers of any material benefit that word and logo marks cannot provide.</p><p>It is cute and harmless that someone can get trade dress protection for their yellow smiley face sponge. That does not mean that getting that protection helps the producer or consumers.</p><p>Is there any material benefit the smiley face sponge producer loses if they not able to protect the trade dress of their smiley face sponge? They still have potentially protectable trademark rights in their name and logo, and the goodwill they have imbued in those word and logo marks (or at least the goodwill that they should have if they deserve market share to begin with).</p><p>Using just word and logo trademark protection would not provide producers materially less protection than they have today from design rights, would remove those design rights that do produce anti-competitive effects, and would promote competition and innovation between producers. Instead of consumers being forced to buy from whoever had the monopoly over the design, they would have the choice between competing producers striving to make the design better or cheaper to win market share. These producers could still protect what market share they did carve out using their word and logo marks.</p><p>Of course, not every instance of design right protection impairs competition or innovation. Unfortunately, the law must deal with generalizations to a degree. But more importantly, and as argued above, those instances of product design that do not impair competition or innovation also do not need design right protection to protect market share or consumer expectations. They can be sold via word and logo trademarks, which are able to signal consistent quality and value just as well, and maybe better, than trade dress can, and without the same risk of negative externalities trade dress protection brings. Getting rid of design rights loses very little protection, and will help us avoid those instances where design rights really do have deleterious effects on development and innovation.</p><p>This is not about saying that designs or designers do not merit protection, leaving designers without protection, or prescribing inherent value in logos and words that is not in other designs or creative endeavors. It is about re-considering what we protect and why, and whether there is a better way of achieving the protections we need and that producers deserve, while minimizing any negative externalities.</p><p>Copyright and design patent protection should be about promoting innovation. Trademark protection should be about protecting consumer expectations and protecting producers’ abilities to distinguish themselves from competitors and protect market share.</p><p>We can achieve these objectives, while avoiding the negative externalities the current overlapping regimes of trade dress, design patent, and copyright bring (unjustified monopolies that last longer and longer, strains on innovation, lack of incentive for competition, and increased litigation and billable hours) through word and logo trademark protection alone.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef235407b976" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What We Should Mean When We Say Trademark and Copyright Are Different]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/what-we-should-mean-when-we-say-trademark-and-copyright-are-different-6c253c3d1d03?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6c253c3d1d03</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[copyright]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Aug 2018 23:15:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-18T18:38:39.397Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Tl;dr</strong></p><ul><li>This was born out of a day-long argument on twitter about an IKEA lamp.</li><li>Trademarks are not copyrights. It’s one thing to understand that semantically, but it’s more important for public policy reasons. And, many who expound that the two are different don’t actually recognize or respect the differences.</li><li>Stop using trademarks for the types of work copyright is meant to protect, even if your client’s particular mark is not eligible for copyright protection due to the useful article doctrine or other limits. This mutilation only hurts trademarks.</li><li>And while you’re here…if you’re trying to help someone build a brand and considering trademark protection, you should know copyright, too, and from the get go you should teach them trademark’s use and function requirements, and about creating specimens.</li></ul><p><strong>Trademark and Copyright are Different, Truly Different</strong></p><p>If you spend any time in or around the trademark discourse, you’ve probably run into a slick practitioner or pro-trademark advocate / brand expert who will tell you and anyone who will listen that “trademark and copyright are different.” That conclusion is correct, the distinction between trademark and copyright is real. Although, I’m not sure these “pro-trademark-ers” understand what that distinction actually is, why it’s important, and why it might should probably invalidate some of the trademarks these folks are enamored by.</p><p>Trademark doctrine, like many things meant to be pro-consumer, has been and is continuing to be expanded by corporate interests, such that it is continuing to losing sight of what should be trademark law’s core objectives — protecting against consumer confusion and incentivizing good brand building and competition.</p><p>Such expansion has led attorneys to use trademark law where copyright law is more appropriate, protecting and incentivizing the creation of artistically distinctive works.(1) I think this expansion, more than any poorly researched article on the ambiguous umbrella of “IP Law,” has led to a real confusion as to the differences between copyright and trademark law, in terms of what they are founded on and the competing interests they are meant to protect.</p><p><strong>Source Distinctiveness v. Artistic Distinctiveness</strong></p><p>Distinctiveness is a central tenet of trademark law. Trademark law, however, has its own brand of distinctiveness, source (or trademark) distinctiveness, which is distinct from artistic distinctiveness. (2) Artistic distinctiveness can be one aspect of source distinctiveness, but to be source distinctive, the mark must be <em>used </em>as a trademark, it must <em>function </em>as a trademark. (3)</p><p>Trademark law’s limited monopoly is intended to incentivize companies to produce consistently quality goods, invest in source distinctive brands, and smart brand building and trademark use. Copyright law is meant to protect creative works and incentivize the creation of artistically distinctive works.(4) Artistically distinctive works <em>can</em> become source distinctive, but the two are not necessarily the same, and incentivizing one is not the same as incentivizing the other.</p><p>Every day we see attorneys mock journalists and other attorneys for confusing trademark and copyright, insisting that trademark and copyright are different. However, many of these same attorneys don’t seem to appreciate the contrasting objectives these doctrines are founded on. As a result, despite what they might say, a lot of attorneys do seem to think a trademark is a copyright, meant to protect artistic distinctiveness, while viewing the use, function, and source distinctive requirements as the redheaded stepchildren of trademark law.(5)</p><p>Trademark law, and the limited monopoly it provides, is being used to protect works that are artistically distinctive but not necessarily source distinctive. But, we already have copyright for that. Ignoring source distinctiveness and expanding trademark law into the realm of copyright law perpetuates the confusion between the two, threatening to subrogate the consumer interests trademark law is meant to protect to the competing interests of the creators copyright law is meant to protect.</p><p>This over-emphasis on artistic distinctiveness rather than source distinctiveness is especially clear in the treatment of 3D marks and other “non-traditional marks.” Non-traditional marks are supposedly not inherently protectable. They’re supposed to prove acquired distinctiveness, that is, required to prove that they have source distinctiveness.(6)</p><p>Until source distinctiveness can be demonstrated, 3D and other non-traditional marks should only be eligible for copyright protection, not trademark protection.</p><p>I’d like to propose that the relegation of source distinctiveness represents a larger problem for trademark law; that trademark law has become too sexy for its own good.</p><p>For one to say that trademark and copyright are different, it is important to understand the distinction is more than just a pedantic one, used to dunk on unsuspecting twitter users. The distinction is a matter of public policy, and failing to understand this means you may not actually believe that a trademark is not a copyright.</p><p><strong>Competing Objectives of Trademark and Copyright Law</strong></p><p>Trademark law should be a pro-consumer counterbalance against copyright’s pro-creator doctrine. The limited monopoly of trademark law should be aimed at preventing consumer confusion by incentivizing investment in source distinctive brands, and incentivizing fair competition by forcing creators to win market share through consistently quality goods rather than preventing competitors from making competing goods. On the other hand, the limited monopoly of copyright law is aimed at protecting creative works and incentivizing creators to produce more artistically distinctive works.</p><p>If trademark law secondarily leads to artistically distinctive works then very well. But artistic distinctiveness should not be trademark law’s primary aim, it’s already copyright’s primary aim. If trademark law is co-opted by companies and creators to protect artistically distinctive works, what is left to protect consumer interests?</p><p>Any particular instance of expanding trademark law to the domain of copyright law may not harm consumers. However, each instance does contribute to the erosion of the differentiation between trademark and copyright. It contributes to the erosion of the core tenants of trademark law, protecting against consumer confusion and incentivizing source distinctiveness, such that trademark law would no longer be a mechanism of consumer protection.</p><p>We see this expansion most often with 3D and other non-traditional marks, where creators attempt to claim trademark protection for something that is not inherently source distinctive, when copyright protection would be more appropriate.</p><p>If an artistically distinctive 3D or other non-traditional mark can be shown to be source distinctive, it should be afforded trademark protection, in that case protecting the mark protects consumer interests. Until then, merely artistically distinctive 3D and other non-traditional works should be limited to copyright protection.</p><p><strong>Traditional/Non-Traditional Marks as Source Distinctive</strong></p><p>(Shout out to Ed, you’re going to hate this part!)</p><p>How consumers recognize a mark as being used and functioning as a trademark differs based on what kind of mark it is they are a perceiving.</p><p>We as consumers are conditioned to instinctively understand logos and words when displayed on goods in certain as source identifiers (“traditional marks”). We don’t necessarily have the same instinctive understanding that shapes, ornamentation, and product configurations are source identifiers (“non-traditional marks”).</p><p>We have heuristic shortcuts that let us immediately recognize traditional marks as source-identifying. Without secondary meaning, non-traditional marks don’t immediately communicate to us that same source-identifying quality.</p><p>Consider the two marks below, both for the drybar hair salon brand.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/390/0*XBo7gCD3j9T5DGD8" /><figcaption>Most consumers instinctively understand <br>a logo like this to be source distinctive.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/670/0*-OsBJ6X7kL8eO9-e" /><figcaption>Would consumers instinctively understand a chandelier like this to be source distinctive? I don’t think so. Which is not the same thing as saying it could not acquire source distinctiveness from long term trademark use.</figcaption></figure><p>Consumers are trained to instinctively understand word marks as source distinctive. Ornaments, however, while artistically distinctive, are not instinctively understood as source distinctive.</p><p>That isn’t to say this or other non-traditional marks can not become source distinctive, but unlike traditional marks we do not have the heuristics yet to instinctively understand them as source distinctive. Indeed, that’s why we have acquired distinctiveness, recognizing that things can acquire source distinctiveness overtime.(7)</p><p>With a first use in commerce in 2010, the mark had seven years to acquire source distinctiveness before the application was filed. However, in this case the examiner never requested evidence the mark had acquired distinctiveness, and the application doesn’t include any evidence to suggest that it had.(8) Without any acquired distinctiveness, the impression this and other 3D ornaments leave on a consumer is of an artistically distinctive IKEA lamp rather than source distinctive trademark.(9)</p><p>Attorneys in private practice and those in the USPTO need to take the use, function, and source distinctiveness requirement more seriously. And more often than not this becomes a problem with 3D and other non-traditional marks. Trademark protection should not be available until a 3D or other non-traditional mark can be proved to be source distinctive. And instead of distorting trademark law, we as attorneys should do a better job utilizing copyright law to protect our clients, and respect its limitations when it is rightfully unavailable. Failing to do so tangles these doctrines and confuses their objectives.</p><p><strong>Why have trademark and copyright gotten tangled</strong></p><p>How have we ended up with this mess? Why do attorneys, even some who love to flaunt their knowledge that trademarks and copyrights are different, actually think a trademark is a copyright?</p><p>First, I think there’s a lack of understanding in some circles as to what the objectives of trademark law should be, incentivizing source distinctiveness, not necessarily artistic distinctiveness, and preventing consumer confusion. Any lack of understanding here is in part caused by the slow expansion of trademark law over the years, fueled in large part by corporations looking for any way possible to prevent competition. This has gone on so long that this status quo might appear to some as what trademark law ought to be about. But there’s a real is/ought problem here. The fact that large companies have been able to expand the reach of their trademark rights should not convince us that they ought to be able to do so.</p><p>More to that point, perhaps because we’ve made trademarks so sexy, or perhaps just attorneys see trademark protection as a backdoor to monopolizing an assets when, because of important limitations on the eligibility for and scope of copyright protection, a work may be barred from copyright protection due to useful article or other concerns.</p><p>And finally, I think attorneys and the media have just made trademarks, or having a trademark, too sexy for trademark law’s own good. The appeal of a trademark has led to a #trademarkeverything movement. Such a movement, because it emphasizes artistic distinctiveness over source distinctiveness, while on the surface feels pro-trademark actually destroys trademark law by making everything into one. Unfortunately, many lawyers, even those who preach that trademark and copyright are different, only encourage the notion of #trademarkeverything by continuing to glorify artistic distinctive while ignoring use, function, and source distinctiveness, and failing to educate clients about alternative more appropriate means of protection.</p><p>We’ve tangled trademark and copyright, increasingly using trademark protection as a backdoor for locking up works that, while they could be eligible as non-traditional marks, copyright protection may be more appropriate for considering the different objectives and foundations these doctrines rest on. Continuing to ignore the differences and tangle the doctrines erodes those same objectives and foundations. So far, the erosion has most severely undercut by the trademark doctrine, its use, function, and source distinctiveness requirements, and its legitimizing objective of protecting against consumer confusion.</p><p><strong>What can we do to untangle trademark and copyright</strong></p><p>What can we do to untangle the two doctrines and revive the distinction between trademark and copyright? We need to revive the use, function, and source distinctiveness requirements, and re-orient the doctrine around protecting against consumer confusion rather than remain enamored with the sexiness of artistic distinctiveness.</p><p>First, the USPTO can get its act together. The USPTO should better enforce the use, function, and source distinctive requirement, and require a more rigorous showing, or any showing at all, of source distinctiveness for non-traditional marks. I understand the difficulty though.</p><p>I’d probably agree with anyone who argued that the metrics we currently judge acquired source distinctiveness by are not necessarily the best ways to measure whether consumers perceive a mark as source distinctive.</p><p>I’d probably also agree that it’s difficult to prove source distinctiveness.</p><p>And I’d certainly agree that the trademark examination process is inherently subjective.</p><p>But I’m not sure the logical conclusion is to give up on one of the cornerstones of trademark law because it would be hard for applicants to prove use, function, and source distinctiveness.</p><p>Trademark registration isn’t necessary to have or even enforce a trademark. I don’t think it would be inappropriate to require applicants to have to provide rigorous and clear evidence of source distinctiveness in a 3D or other non-traditional mark. And failings at the USPTO have only made it easier for attorneys to pursue trademark protection as a backdoor to monopolizing a client’s work.</p><p>Unfortunately, reforming the USPTO is beyond the scope of this article. (10)</p><p>Second, lawyers can do better. Appreciate the actual differences between trademark and copyright. “Trademark and copyright are not the same” is not just a matter of pedantics, but one of substance with public policy ramifications.</p><p>It’s fine, and sort of useful, to dunk on journalists and lawyers who don’t understand the difference between trademark and copyright. But if you do so, be sure that you yourself have thought out the boundary between the two doctrines, what that boundary is meant to protect.</p><p>If you think trademarks are great because you believe trademarks are sexy, maybe you don’t actually think trademarks are great?</p><p>Footnotes:</p><p>(1) Artistically distinctive works are not the only things copyright is meant to protect, but it represents the point at which trademark and copyright overlap.</p><p>(2) Take the word “Apple” for example. There is nothing artistically distinctive about the word apple. However, now that it has been used to sell computer products for over 40 years, despite it having no artistic distinctiveness, it has tremendous source distinctiveness when it comes to selling computer products.</p><p>(3) Use and function as trademarks are two sides of the same coin, and both are inexorably wrapped up in source distinctiveness, but the three do have important differences such that they probably should not be used interchangeably.</p><p>A mark <em>functions</em> as a trademark when in the perception of consumers it source-identifies, when it distinguishes goods as coming from a certain (not necessarily identifiable) source.</p><p>A mark functions as a trademark after it is <em>used</em> in commerce as a trademark (but it also requires perception, use alone is not enough).</p><p>Thus, only after a mark is <em>used</em> as a trademark can it <em>function</em> as a trademark, at which point it is source distinctive.</p><p>Some marks will be more-or-less source distinctive, based on how different they are from other trademarks in the relevant field. See Barton Beebe’s idea of “differential distinctiveness” as opposed to “source distinctiveness.” <a href="http://www.bartonbeebe.com/documents/Beebe%20-%20Semiotic%20Analysis.pdf">Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law</a>, at 625. Being artistically distinctive can give a mark more differential distinctiveness, but it does not necessarily make the mark source distinctive. Source distinctiveness takes <em>use, </em>and more importantly, <em>function</em>.</p><p>(4) I understand that “originality” is the legal standard for copyrightability. But I think that arguing that the use of“distinctiveness” in this article invalidates the underlying point is a failure to engage made in bad faith.</p><p>(5) <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2916731">Roberts, Alexandra J., Trademark Failure to Function (February 14, 2017). Iowa Law Review, Forthcoming</a>.</p><p>(6) This is where the definition of non-traditional marks gets messy. I wish there was time here to come up with a good one. I don’t think I consider product packaging non-traditional, because in the same way we look to word and logo marks for an indication of source, we also naturally look to packaging for the same indication.</p><p>Whether or not the existing standards for proving acquired distinctiveness are adequate is another question. But even if the existing standard is too low or inappropriate, I can’t imagine assuming that marks failing to meet the existing standard have acquired distinctiveness.</p><p>(7) This does raise the question about what kind of trade dress this lamp is. It doesn’t seem like product configuration trade dress, because while it is a configuration of a product, the product is not one sold by the source the mark identifies. So, is this product packaging? Part of packaging for salon services? Perhaps, in which case this could be inherently distinctive. Despite its artistic distinctiveness, I would have a hard time seeing this as inherently source distinctive.</p><p>(8)<a href="http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=87581977&amp;caseType=SERIAL_NO&amp;searchType=statusSearch">http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=87581977&amp;caseType=SERIAL_NO&amp;searchType=statusSearch</a></p><p>(9) The point was raised that as someone who gets cheap hair cuts and just asks for the “usual, leave about an inch on top and a little shorter on the sides. Sorry, no, I don’t know what size guard that means even though you told me last time,” that I’m not the relevant consumer. While I appreciate that the relevant consumer is an important fictional figure in trademark law, I don’t think this objection is relevant. If I walked into a soccer store with a chandelier made of cleats, or a video game store with one made of game discs, stores for which I would certainly be the relevant consumer, instead of thinking of it as source distinctive, my first instinct would be to think “huh what a distinctive chandelier that I’ve never seen before. What weird store do you buy that in?”</p><p>Now, if over a period of years I visited other branches of that soccer or game store and saw the same chandelier, and if I saw the respective brands using their chandeliers in look-for advertising, over time perhaps those chandeliers would come to acquire source distinctiveness in my mind. Until then, I’d instinctively think of them as artistically distinctive rather than source distinctive.</p><p>(10) Even for such a well footnoted article.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6c253c3d1d03" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Trademark Protection and the Look of the Other]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/trademark-protection-and-the-look-of-the-other-f00df6d73d76?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f00df6d73d76</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[existentialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Apr 2017 16:48:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-05T00:28:21.108Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Trademark law gives a limited monopoly to exclude others from using confusingly-similar trademarks. We generally disfavor monopolies as anti-competitive, bad for innovation, and over all bad for consumers. However, we justify trademark law’s limited monopoly because it advances consumer interests, protecting fair competition in the market, incentivizing investment in producing consistently quality goods, and ensuring consumers can safely identify and buy goods they mean to, safe in the knowledge that those goods will meet the standard of quality the consumer values.</p><p>This is great, however, we aren’t buying goods for their qualities anymore, we’re buying them for the trademark on that good or service. Actually, even more than that, we’re buying goods so that others will perceive us as being associated with the trademark on that good. Instead of buying authentic, consistently-quality goods, we’re buying goods for that appear to other to be authentic.</p><p>This is a shift in what we value, what value means in the marketplace. We don’t value one shoe brand over another because of differences in the quality of the sewing and the durability of the undersole. Instead, what we value is being seen in the<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being_and_Nothingness#Part_3.2C_Chapter_1:_The_look"> eyes of the “Other”</a> as wearing one brand rather than another (so we’re all on the same page, everyone please go read Sartre’s <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nausea-Directions-Paperbook-Jean-Paul-Sartre/dp/0811220303"><em>Nausea</em></a><em> </em>before we keep going). We want to be seen wearing whatever brand is “popular,” “cool,” or “right” at the time, we want to use the goods to craft a narrative about ourselves, and derive whatever value might be had in being able to dictate the way theOther sees us.</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/lexlanham">Alexandra Roberts</a>, Professor at the University of New Hampshire School of Law, touches on this in her <a href="https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=143119101106098069113071010125106064029078039067056007087006124097103102090072106077049049044034012025110029098028122004000098049001036077001003082103103086086125024065024074031094094020123107005096127094030025119117093105119029092066091008000082127&amp;EXT=pdf">article on athletes and trademarks</a>, that the athlete’s trademark on a product “serves less as a way to find something and distinguish it from other products and more as a way to express allegiance and fandom.” I agree with Roberts here, and again when she goes on to say that this doesn’t exactly match with our traditional objectives of trademark law.</p><p>*Sidebar: I know that for some consumers the authenticity of the good or mark is most important. I think for many though, or at least an increasing group of buyers, what is important is not the authenticity of the good or the mark (or, unfortunately, anything), but that the Other perceives that you are wearing a good or mark associated with a brand, or with the celebrity associated with that brand.</p><p>Maybe the difference is that some goods are still (maybe will forever be) bought consistent quality (plywood, cereal, for example), and others for perceived appearance we want (shoes, bags, clothes, etc.), and maybe some are in both. Still, we see <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_athletes_on_Wheaties_boxes">cereals look for athlete endorsements</a>, trying to trade on the popularity of the athlete, and is it be crazy to <a href="https://www.timbers.com/matchday/supporters/timber-joey">imagine something similar eventually happening for plywood</a>? (@ Portland Timbers, let’s talk marketing strategy). Goods bought for perceived appearance have a value outside the objective value of the product, they have an extra value in some socially manufactured importance the Other attaches to the product, an importance consumers look to buy, often at the cheapest price possible.*</p><p>What does this change in value mean for trademark law, and the limited monopoly it affords? What does it mean that less consumers value a brand’s consistently-quality and authentic goods, and instead value just the appearance of wearing what looks to be a brand’s authentic good? Does this shift in values undermine the pro-consumer justifications behind trademark law’s limited monopoly?</p><p>I’m not sure, but it’s an interesting question. To begin looking into it, let’s start by looking at the traditional objectives of trademark law, how they apply when consumers buy a brand’s goods for their quality and authenticity, and then how they apply when consumers buy goods to appear to be wearing a brand’s authentic goods.</p><p><strong>Three Objectives of Trademark Law: Justifying the Limited Monopoly</strong></p><p>Trademark law gives a company a limited monopoly over its trademarks. It lets a company prevent others from using trademarks that are confusingly-similar to its trademarks. Generally, we think of monopolies as anti-competitive, and anti-consumer interest, but we’re willing to grant this limited monopoly because of how it can actually benefit consumers. There are three objectives of trademark law, and the extent to which these objectives benefit the consumer justifies the limited monopoly we award companies.</p><p>First, and most important in my mind, trademark law’s limited monopoly helps protect against harmful consumer confusion. Consumer confusion refers to when consumers cannot correctly identify or differentiate goods as coming from different sources. The harm of consumer confusion is when trying to buy Brand X, because the consumer has bought and enjoyed Brand X in the past, the consumer mistakenly buys Brand Y because it was unable to distinguish between the two, wasting the consumer’s time and money.</p><p>Trademarks, and trademark protection, prevent consumer confusion because distinctive trademarks allow consumers to quickly and easily differentiate between brands (“do I like the shoes with the Swoosh or the Three Stripes?”). Standing in the cereal isle, a consumer can make informed purchasing decisions, based off their past experiences with different cereals, just by looking at the trademarks on the different boxes of cereal.</p><p>Trademark infringement claims lets Company A stop Company B from using a trademark that is confusingly similar from Company A’s mark. Without this, Company B could put a mark on their goods that are confusingly-similar to a Company A’s popular mark, so that next time a consumer is standing in the cereal isle, they might buy Company B’s good when they meant to buy Company A’s. Without knowing it, when we reflexively grab our favorite brand of cereal, deodorant, or beer based off the trademarks we see on the packaging, we can do so securely because trademark law lets companies stop competitors from using confusingly-similar marks. That’s how trademark protection helps prevent harmful consumer confusion; it makes sure consumers always get what they want, instead of being misled into buying a competitor’s good that might not have the same quality the consumer expected.</p><p>Second, trademark law’s limited monopoly can benefit consumers by incentivizing and rewarding companies for producing products of consistent quality and building brand equity. It lets companies cultivate distinctive brands (and hopefully, cultivate good will in their brands), and prevent competitors from free-riding off of their brands (if there’s good will to free-ride off!).</p><p>Spending the time and money necessary to cultivate a distinctive brand with good equity is a long term investment, and trademark protection gives companies the security they need for their investment to make sense.</p><p>A company can build brand equity over time by (a) ensuring their goods always meet the consistent level of quality consumers want when the consumers makes a purchase based off the company’s trademark, and (b) by providing good customer service (returns, fixes, etc.), generally treating their consumers right, responding to their feedback, and making the effort to have otherwise positive engagement with consumers.</p><p>The brand equity that comes from spending the time and money needed for real quality control, good service, and positive engagement pays off for companies over the long run, as they retain happy customers, and these happy customers make referrals.</p><p>But, a company can only make these investments because trademark law’s limited monopoly, preventing competitors from using confusingly-similar trademarks to masquerade their own products as the company’s, in attempt to free-ride off the brand equity the company has fostered through investment in quality products and good consumer engagement.</p><p>If competitors could free-ride off the company’s investment, the company would have no incentive to invest in the first place. Thus, trademark law’s limited monopoly can benefit consumers by bringing quality products and services to the market.</p><p>*Sidebar: this is Hobbes’ state of nature, where no one has property, that is, without laws to create and protect property rights, no one has the incentive or security to invest in the future.*</p><p>Third, and a benefit that follows closely behind the first , is that trademarks cut down on research and transaction costs for customers. When we’re in the cereal isle, we feel comfortable immediately grabbing a certain box off the shelf simply based-off the trademark on the box. Whether or not we recognize this every time we take the box off the shelf, trademark law is the reason we can do this, the reason we can comfortably make distinctions between products based solely off the marks on the packaging. As consumers, how do we know the box labeled Fruit Loops is *the* Fruit Loops cereal we want it to be?</p><p>*Sidebar: <a href="http://www.ipbrief.net/2011/09/17/no-toucan-for-you/">Kellogg actually did go after a golf equipment manufacturer for using a Toucan trademark that Kellogg thought was too similar</a>. The court disagreed, and also (rightfully) didn’t think that the goods in question (cereal and golf equipment) were similar enough to cause confusion. Good decision. Bad attempt at trademark bullying)*</p><p>Do we need to secretly open the box to do a taste-check? No. Whether we recognize it or not, simply seeing the marks on the box, the Kellogg word mark, the dastardly and distinctive Toucan Sam, always trying to steal some poor kid’s fruity goodness, these marks are enough to reassure us that this box contains the Fruit Loops we’re looking for. No research, no taste-testing, no calling customer support to make sure. We’re in and out of the isle, on the way home to get our sugar high.</p><p>The ability to exclude competitors from using confusingly-similar marks means the trademark is all a consumer needs to see to know exactly what good they’re purchasing. The trademark immediately and unambiguously identifies the source of every box of cereal in the isle, reducing the time and transaction costs consumers expend when shopping, ensuring consumers can feel secure in purchasing decisions.</p><p><strong>Justifying Trademark’s Monopoly in the Marketplace for Perceived Appearance</strong></p><p>Traditionally, the value of a good came from the qualities of the good itself. Consumers bought one good over another because it was long lasting, made with well stitched fabrics or healthy and natural ingredients, or the consumer simply preferred the taste of one cereal over the other. Whatever the reason, it was something about the good itself the consumer valued. In contrast however, now what’s valuable, what’s being bought and sold, is not something about the good itself, but what that good, or the trademark on that good, communicates to the Other about the owner of that good. Consumers aren’t buying the consistent quality of a good, and therefore aren’t necessarily buying authenticity. Consumers are putting a value onto, and trying to buy the way they appear in the eyes of Others.</p><p>The example which first got me wanting to write this article came (long, long ago at this point) from Kanye West, and some DIY knock-off Adidas. In 2016, <a href="http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/a-look-at-the-legality-of-kanye-wests-sneakers?rq=kanye%20west">West wore what looked like Adidas sneakers during a performance on Saturday Night Live</a>, which would make sense, because of West’s relationship with Adidas.</p><p>But, it turns out these were actually Vans sneakers, with something resembling Adidas’ iconic three stripes drawn on the side of the shoes. This caused some interesting conversation on trademark twitter. Was this *just* a breach of contract issue between a brand and its designer, who happens to be a popular endorser as well? Or, are there also trademark implications? Did West infringe Adidas’ mark by drawing the stripes on Vans, leading consumers to believe these Vans were actually Adidas? Putting aside any breach of contract implications, is there any consumer harm here that would justify trademark action?</p><p>I don’t see the confusion or the harm.</p><p>Would consumers be harmed? No, because they wouldn’t be confused as to what they got. They bought exactly what they meant to buy.</p><p>Regardless of what brand of shoe West was *actually* wearing, the consumer wouldn’t buy the shoe because it was an authentic Adidas or Van, known for it’s high quality craftsmanship.</p><p>Customers would buy the shoe West appeared to wear, because he appeared to wear it. First, regardless of what brand he was actually wearing, they want the brand he was supposed to be wearing. And second, they only want it for the value there is in influencing how they appear to the Other. This isn’t a question of valuing one brand’s quality over another’s, it’s a question of valuing the perceived appearance of wearing one brand over another.</p><p>Think of the young basketball player who buys the shoe worn by (or at least endorsed by) his favorite NBA player. What is this consumer buying? A quality brand, or the appearance of being linked with a popular athlete? Framed another way, if a young player’s favorite athlete, Lebron James or Kevin Durant, both Nike Athletes with popular shoe lines, left Nike and went to Adidas (Lebron can’t because he has a lifetime deal)? Would the young basketball player keep buying Nikes without his favorite players there? Some maybe would, but I think most would happily follow them to Adidas. They weren’t buying Nike because it was higher quality than Nike. They were buying it because of what was associated with Nike (their favorite players), and so they valued the appearance of being associated with Nike too.</p><p>The consumer is buying a certain appearance in the eyes of the Other, the appearance that the consumer is wearing a Nike, or a Lebron or a KD, and whatever value there is in an association with something or someone which the Other defines as “popular,” “cool,” or even “right” (read the scene in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nausea-Penguin-Modern-Classics-Sartre/dp/014118549X/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1491073121&amp;sr=1-5&amp;keywords=nausea+jean+paul+sartre"><em>Nausea</em></a><em> </em>where the ladies in black are taking solace in the statute set in bronze, it’s page 46 in my copy. Read it, and then read it again).</p><p>If the consumer can get the perceived appearance it values from a shoe that costs $50, but looks like a $150 Lebron-endorsed Nike, why not save the $100 bucks and buy a knock-off? The consumer is getting exactly what it wants. Here, the company might be being harmed by a breach of it’s limited monopoly, losing sales to cheaper alternatives, but there’s no harm for the consumer. The consumer wanted to buy the appearance of wearing the shoe Kanye worse, or the one Lebron endorsed, and that’s exactly what they’re buying. They aren’t confused as to what they want, and they buy what it is they wanted, without confusion.</p><p>*Sidebar: brands understand this. It’s why Adidas and Nike sell the *<a href="http://store.nike.com/us/en_us/pd/magista-obra-ii-mens-firm-ground-soccer-cleat/pid-11391144/pgid-11558957">real</a>* version of their soccer cleats, the ones Messi and Ronaldo wear, for two or three-hundred dollars, and then cheaper versions for a <a href="http://store.nike.com/us/en_us/pd/mercurial-veloce-iii-mens-firm-ground-soccer-cleat/pid-11391004/pgid-11149182">half</a> or <a href="http://store.nike.com/us/en_us/pd/mercurial-victory-vi-dynamic-fit-mens-firm-ground-soccer-cleat/pid-11398802/pgid-11558989">third</a> of the price*</p><p>Would Adidas be harmed? On the one hand, Kanye’s DIY still make consumers want to buy Adidas (or what appear to be Adidas), because that’s what Kanye was wearing. On the other hand, what if instead of buying authentic Adidas, consumers buy knock-off or counterfeit Adidas that look enough like what Kanye was wearing. Which would happen because many consumers value the appearance of authenticity over authenticity itself (again, I wouldn’t say all consumers don’t care about authenticity, there are still true sneakerheads out there). A shoe that appears to be an authentic Adidas will do just as well for the consumer as an authentic Adidas.</p><p>So, there would be harm to Adidas, diverting sales. Adidas’ limited monopoly over the three stripes would be breached, and the company is being harmed as a result. Should Adidas be able to enforce its rights? Adidas would certainly say so. But it’s consumer interests that justify the limited monopoly of trademark protection.</p><p>Is the Other harmed, the person who perceives the buyer as wearing an authentic? The Other a consumer too after all. Harm? Maybe? But probably not. And if they are, this certainly isn’t the <a href="http://ipmetrics.net/likelihoodofconfusion.html">point-of-sale confusion trademark protection</a> is about.</p><p>What about the second justification for the limited monopoly, that it incentivizes investment in quality and brand equity? I don’t think this stands up any more either, for the same reason consumer confusion no longer works as a justification, because quality and authenticity are secondary now. Consumers don’t buy a pair of shoes for their utility, but to have the appearance of wearing the authentic goods. If the consumer isn’t concerned with consistent quality, is incentivizing consistent quality really a benefit to the consumer? Maybe, but only in a they-don’t-know-what’s-good-for-them or an eat-your-vegetables-because-they’re-good-for-you kind of way. Is trademark law really the place for paternalism? Probably not.</p><p>Finally, what about the third justification, that trademark protection lowers transaction costs? If consumers don’t care whether what they buy is necessarily authentic, are they going to care about the transaction costs necessary to authenticate something? Nope.</p><p><strong>What does this Mean for Trademark Law’s Limited Monopoly?</strong></p><p>Personally, I think the theory and psychology behind trademarks is fascinating. I’ll go so far to say I Love Trademarks. Unfortunately, more and more we see trademarks distorted from their noble and interesting purpose. We have companies who try to abuse trademark law to quash competitors in ways that don’t necessarily benefit consumers, and maybe even hurts consumers. There are even some whose sole purpose is to snap up rights to trademarks and troll others and extract fees for their rights they hold.</p><p>But, it’s the anti-competitive abuse of trademarks that makes me wonder if the traditional justifications for trademark protection still hold up.</p><p>When quality and authenticity matters to consumers trademark law’s limited monopoly serves consumer interests. The ability to exclude competitors from using a confusingly-similar mark serves to (1) prevent consumer confusion, making sure consumers can get the authentic product they are looking for, (2) makes companies invest in quality goods and goods consumer engagement, and (3) makes it as easy as possible for consumers to immediately and confidently distinguish the cereal they want from the rest of the boxes in the cereal isle.</p><p>So long as it’s the quality and authenticity of goods that matters to consumers, the limited monopoly (so long it is actually limited, something courts seem less and less concerned about) benefits consumers enough to justify this otherwise anti-competitive grant.</p><p>Does trademark law’s limited monopoly still protect consumer interests? Do the traditional justifications still hold up? What is trademark law today, what will it be tomorrow, and who or what is it meant to protect?*</p><p>*DISCLAIMER: I’m not sure I really think there’s some crisis in trademark law, but I think it’s important to stretch the ‘ol thinker with different questions every now and then.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f00df6d73d76" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Breaking Down False Advertising Laws]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/breaking-down-false-advertising-laws-2910260a0c88?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2910260a0c88</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[advertising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Feb 2017 17:32:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-17T17:32:03.845Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the <a href="https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/jumping-into-false-advertising-ab74fed846f1#.n2wvaku7s">first article of this series </a>on false advertising I looked at false advertising cases from <a href="https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/oregon5hour.pdf">Oregon</a> and <a href="https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/5hourenergyruling.pdf">Washington</a>, brought against 5-Hour Energy, to introduce some core concepts of false advertising law.</p><p>Today I’ll have a high-level nuts-and-bolts discussion of false advertising law. This will begin at the federal level, looking at section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and then move to the state level, where states have largely mirrored federal law to create their own false advertising laws. At the state level, I’ll use the 5-Hour Energy cases to highlight important similarities and differences between the Lanham Act and the false advertising statutes of Washington and Oregon.</p><p><strong>Federal False Advertising Under Lanham 43(a)</strong></p><p>The Lanham Act is a part of the United States Code — the general and permanent Federal statutes — and mostly covers federal trademark law. Lanham Act 43(a) also contains a broad cause of action against false advertising, used to prevent false, misleading, or confusing statements made in commercial advertising:</p><p><em>43(a)</em></p><p><em>(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which…</em></p><p><em>(1)(B) … in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities…</em></p><p><em>….shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.</em></p><p>Next, lets look at the constituent elements of a false advertising claim, and explain important concepts and terms.</p><p>—</p><p><strong>The Elements of Lanham 43(a)</strong></p><p>Breaking down the text of Lanham 43(a), courts look for the plaintiff to show the following <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/false_advertising">elements</a> to have a false advertising claim under Lanham 43(a):</p><p>(a) Defendant made false or misleading statements as to his own products (or another’s);</p><p>(b) Actual deception, or at least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience;</p><p>(c) That deception is material, in that it is likely to influence purchasing decisions;</p><p>(d) The advertised goods travel in interstate commerce; and</p><p>(e) A likelihood of injury to the plaintiff.</p><p><a href="http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cpub%5C00/00-10071.cv0.wpd.pdf">Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000)</a>; <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/false_advertising">False Advertising, Cornell Legal Information Institute</a>.</p><p>There is some overlap and interplay between the elements when courts actually apply them to the facts of a case. For example, the second and third elements tend merge in the court’s application, so that showing materiality is actually a matter of showing that the false statements actually deceived or had the capacity to deceive. See <a href="http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/reichmancannady-rp.pdf">Courtland L. Reichmann and Melissa Cannady, False Advertising Under the Lanham Act</a>.</p><p>Now, let’s look at three big topics within these elements of a false advertising claim. First, what kinds of statements are subject to false advertising laws? Second, what does it take to show a statement is false or misleading? And third, what does it mean to advertise goods, or to travel in interstate commerce?</p><p><strong>What Kinds of Statements are Subject to False Advertising Laws?</strong></p><p>The preliminary question in false advertising is whether the statement in question, the allegedly misleading or false statement is “actionable.”</p><p>So, what statements are actionable, what statements are subject to our false advertising laws at all?</p><p>To be actionable, “the statement at issue must be a ‘specific and measureable claim, capable of being proved false or of being reasonable interpreted as a statement of objective fact.’” Pizza Hut at 496 (quoting Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999)).</p><p>In contrast, “puffery” is a common example of non-actionable statements. Puffery is the common exaggeration or boasting in advertising you would expect from a car salesman on the showfloor. It is typified by subjective and exaggerated statements, general, boastful or blustering claims to superiority that are too vague to be relied-on by consumers. Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 1997);</p><p>A recognizable example is Papa John’s slogan, “Better ingredients. Better pizza. Papa Johns.” <a href="http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cpub%5C00/00-10071.cv0.wpd.pdf">Pizza Hut argued</a> that Papa John’s use of this slogan was false advertising under Lanham 43(a). The court disagreed. The court thought that this slogan was subjective, a general claim to superiority, that epitomized “the exaggerated advertising, blustering, and boasting by a manufacturer upon which no consumer would reasonably rely.” Pizza Hut at 499.</p><p>If the court does decide that the statement in question is actionable, it next moves on to determine whether it was false or materially-misleading.</p><p><strong>False or Materially-Misleading</strong></p><p>Here we see the ways that the elements begin to blend together. There are two ways a statement could be “false” advertising under Lanham 43(a). It could be literally false, or misleading or confusing in a way that would affect the consumer’s purchasing decision. Pizza Hut at 495.</p><p>If a statement is literally false, the plaintiff does not need to provide evidence that the falsity was material, it is presumed to be material. In other words, if the claim is literally false, the plaintiff does not need to prove the false statement affected consumers’ decision-making, or that consumers relied on the false statement.</p><p>On the other hand, if the statement is not literally false, but only misleading or confusing, the plaintiff must prove that the falsity was material, that the falsity affected purchasing decisions, that consumers relied on that falsity when purchasing. Pizza Hut at 495, 502. The plaintiff can prove the misleading statements were material by introducing market research, consumers surveys, and other extrinsic evidence. <a href="http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/reichmancannady-rp.pdf">Reichmann and Melissa Cannady at 189.</a></p><p>If a statement is both actionable and either literally false or materially-misleading, the third major component of a false advertising claim is whether the statement was made in commercial advertising or promotion.</p><p><strong>Commercial Advertising or Promotion</strong></p><p>Putting together the first and fourth elements, courts ask whether the defendant made the false or misleading statement in “commercial advertising or promotion.”</p><p>Commercial advertising and promotion is generally defined by courts as (1) commercial speech; (2) by a defendant who competes with the plaintiff; (3) meant to influence consumers to buy the defendant’s goods or services; and (4) that is “disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public to constitute advertising’ or promotion within that industry,” even if not part of a “classical advertising campaign”. Gordon &amp; Breach Science Publishers S.A. v. American Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).</p><p>In many cases it will be easy to spot commercial advertising and promotion. National or regional ad campaigns, using TV, radio, or common print publications, are the kinds of “classical advertising campaigns” which easily satisfy this element.</p><p>However, courts have interpreted “commercial advertising and promotion” to include not just advertising to the common consuming public, but targeted and internal distribution to commercial manufacturers and wholesalers, and to non-commercial societies and organizations.</p><p>When the case involves something other than the commonly-understood classical advertising campaign, this commercial advertising or promotion element often turns on the nature and norms of the industry, and how large the “relevant purchasing public” is.</p><p>Where there are fewer players in an industry, solicitation to even a single buyer could satisfy the “commercial advertising or promotion” element. In smaller, tight-knit industries, individual telephone calls or email surveys could satisfy the “commercial advertising or promotion” if these kinds of communications are common in the industry</p><p>Another common topic: materials that are sold with goods, particularly those inserted into the packaging of a good, are not promotional or advertising, and thus are not subject to these false advertising laws.</p><p>For these and more examples of what is and is not “commercial advertising or promotion”, see <a href="http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/reichmancannady-rp.pdf">Reichmann and Melissa Cannady at 190.</a></p><p><strong>—</strong></p><p><strong>State Laws False Advertising Laws</strong></p><p>States have introduced their own false advertising laws that largely mirror the federal statute. Let’s look at the Washington and Oregon statutes, referring to the <a href="https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/5hourenergyruling.pdf">Washington</a> and <a href="https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/oregon5hour.pdf">Oregon</a> 5-Hour Energy cases from the introductory article (referred to as WA 5HE and OR 5HE, respectively) to see how the statutes are applied.</p><p><strong>Washington</strong></p><p><a href="http://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=19.86">The Washington Consumer Protection Act</a> (CPA) prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” <a href="http://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=19.86.020">Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 19.86.020</a>.</p><p>Under RCW 19.86.080, a claim for deceptive business practices requires:</p><p>(a) An unfair or deceptive act or practice;</p><p>(b) Committed by the defendant in trade or commerce; and</p><p>(c) That has a public interest impact.</p><p>WA 5HE at 44 (citing State v. Kaiser, 161 Wn. App. 705, 719, 254 P.3d 850 (2011)).</p><p>Washington courts follow Federal Trade Commission guidance to decide whether business acts are deceptive. To be deceptive means (1) that an advertisement conveys a representation through either express or implied claims; (2) that the representation is likely to mislead consumers; and (3) that the misleading representation is material. WA 5HE at 45 (citing F.T.C. v. Direct Mktg Concepts, Inc., 569 F.Supp.2d 285, 297 (D. Mass. 2008), aff’d, 624 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010)).</p><p>Breaking down this “deceptive” requirement, the first step is to find what message the advertising is meant to convey to consumers — to understand if the message of an ad is false, we need to know what that message is. This is a simple question of fact for the court. WA 5HE at 46.</p><p>Second, the plaintiff must show that this intended message is likely to mislead consumers, and whether that misleading is material. Courts must consider the overall impression and context of the message; even truthful statements can be misleading if its “net impression” is deceptive. <em>Id</em>. (citing Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wn.2d 27, 50, 204 P.3d 885 (2009)).</p><p>There are two ways to prove the message is likely to mislead consumers; by showing either (1) actually false express or implied claims, or (2) that the defendant lacked a reasonable basis for asserting the message was true.<em> Id</em>. at 46–47 (citing F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir.1994)). Like under the Lanham Act, express and deliberately implied false claims are presumed to be material. Otherwise, it is up to the plaintiff to show that the misleading message affected purchasing decisions and was relied-on by consumers. <em>Id</em>. at 49.</p><p>Finally, to be actionable under the CPA the practice must have a “public interest impact,” which in the context of deceptive business acts means the act has the capacity to deceive a ‘substantial portion’ of the public. Some of the factors a court considers to determine whether the act has the capacity to deceive a ‘substantial portion’ of the public include:</p><p>(a) Were the alleged acts committed in the course of defendant’s business</p><p>(b) Did defendant advertise to the public in general?</p><p>(c) Did defendant actively solicit this particular plaintiff, indicating potential solicitation of others?</p><p>(d) Did plaintiff and defendant occupy unequal bargaining positions?”</p><p>(e) If the case involves “intentional trademark infringement,” that on its own can satisfy the public interest impact requirement.</p><p>See Beacon Plumbing &amp; Mechanical Inc. v. Sposari Inc., 2016 WL 5795282, No. C15–1613 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2016); <a href="http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2016/10/initial-interest-false-advertising-aka.html">Rebecca Tushnet, Initial interest false advertising (aka bait and switch) in Google ads</a>.</p><p><strong>Oregon</strong></p><p><a href="http://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/2013/646.608">Oregon Revised Statute 646.608, Additional Unlawful Business, Trade Practices</a> is Oregon’s state false advertising statute.</p><p>Subsection (1)(e) deals with misleading representations regarding the characteristics, uses, benefits, or qualities of goods. Under (1)(e) the plaintiff has to show that the defendant:</p><p>(a) Made representations in Oregon about the goods;</p><p>(b)Represented that the goods have “characteristics, uses, benefits, or qualities that the goods do not have;”</p><p>(c) Made representations that are actionable, objective claims;</p><p>(d) Made representations that were material to consumer purchasing decisions; and</p><p>(e) Acted willfully.</p><p>Oregon 5HE at 2.</p><p>Subsection (1)(b) deals with misleading representations regarding source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods/services — for example, the “Doctors Recommend” claim in the 5-Hour Energy case. Under (1)(b) the plaintiff has to show that the defendant:</p><p>(a) Acted in Oregon;</p><p>(b) Caused a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the approval or certification of the goods;</p><p>(c) Caused confusion of misunderstanding that was material to consumer purchasing decisions; and</p><p>(d) Acted willfully.</p><p><em>Id</em>. at 11.</p><p>The elements of Oregon’s false advertising claim largely mirror those of the Lanham Act and Washington’s CPA, with the additional requirement, however, that the defendant must have acted willfully. Acting willfully, willfulness, means that the defendant knew or should have known that their conduct was a violation. <em>Id</em>. at 7 (citing State ex rel. Redden v. Discount Fabric, Inc., 289 Or. 375, 381 (Or. 1980)); <a href="http://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/2013/646.605">ORS 646.605.10</a>. This precludes defendants from being willfully-ignorant, hiding from the truth or reality of a falsity on purpose.</p><p>In 5-Hour Energy, the state claimed that 5-Hour Energy’s “lack of scientific expertise and failure to consult with anyone knowledgeable about the effect of” the ingredients meant that the company’s false statements were willful. That is, that there was no scientific basis on which the company could truthfully make its claims, and that because 5 Hour Energy knew this and still made the claims, it willfully committed false advertising. <em>Id</em>. However, the court disagreed that there was no scientific basis for 5-Hour Energy’s claims, pointing to multiple reliable scientific studies conducted by 5-Hour Energy and third-parties, that the court said 5-Hour Energy could justifiably rely on. Because 5-Hour Energy was justified in making its advertising claims, even though these claims ultimately turned out to be false, 5-Hour Energy had not “willfully” committed false advertising, as required by the Oregon statute. <em>Id</em>. at 7–8.</p><p>While neither Washington nor the Lanham act require willfulness, other state false advertising statutes may also require it. It’s important to consult an attorney familiar with the laws of your jurisdiction.</p><p><strong>—</strong></p><p><strong>Coming Up</strong></p><p>The third article in this false advertising series will go deeper into the concept of Puffery, something introduced in the first article, and touched on today.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2910260a0c88" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Trademark Law is F***ing Fun]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/trademark-law-is-f-ing-fun-df46e5e2c4d8?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df46e5e2c4d8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Jan 2017 23:38:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-07T23:38:40.192Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>(And (maybe) other kinds of law are too!)</h4><p>Hello.</p><p>There are a lot of people who talk and write about the law in ways that make it sound boring and/or scary.</p><p>But the law doesn’t have to be boring or scary. A lot of law is really interesting, and made with good intentions. I’d love to see experts in other fields try to peel back the curtain and show how awesome other areas of law are. But, I’m really interested in trademark law (among other equally great fields like copyright, false advertising, and competition), so today we’ll start with trademark law.</p><p>A friend of mine, and fantastic trademark attorney, likes to say that trademarks are magic. That’s a neat thing to say, but couldn’t be further from the the truth. Trademarks are more like brain science and chemistry, and psychology and behavioral psychology (I have Ph.Ds in all of these, so please don’t @ me). More importantly, even though trademarks aren’t magic, the “science” of trademarks is fascinating. Or, as fascinating as science class was to you…</p><p>Because I think they’re so interesting, I wanted to write some words about trademarks, and the theory and law behind them. Theses won’t be concise summations of law, (I try doing that elsewhere on this Medium page). They’re meant to be interesting, and make the law “fun”. It’s probably mostly for my own enjoyment, but if you follow along you might find it interesting too! So try out this intro, give me any feedback, and then let’s romp through trademark law together.</p><p><strong>Consumers are at the heart of trademark law</strong></p><p>The central objective of trademark law is to prevent consumer confusion — that is, to make sure a consumer knows what brand of product she is buying, consumers can base purchases off the past experiences and goodwill they feels towards a brand, to feel confident that what they buys live up to the expectations she has for that brand.</p><p>To begin the science analogy I mentioned in the intro, let’s imagine consumer goodwill — the positive impression a product makes on a consumer, the positive association the consumer forms as a result of a good experience with a product — as a gas. The consumer has a positive experience with a product (that cereal tastes really great!) and his or her brain emits this gaseous goodwill, representing that positive association with and impression of that product the consumer now feels. Of course, as we know, left on its own a gas will just dissipate into the atmosphere (or whatever).</p><p>And, this is where the amazingness of trademark law comes in…</p><p>First, trademarks are the reason to want to trap that goodwill before it evaporates. Trademarks give consumers the reason to want to capture and hold onto that good will in the first place — the ability identify, remember, and re-identity brands of products, so as to base future purchases off past experiences; and</p><p>Second, trademark law is the means of turning that gas into something capturable, more like a liquid consumers can hold onto. Protection against trademark infringement, and the way trademarks hold brands accountable for producing consistent quality gives consumers the confidence and security to rely on those past experiences — on that goodwill the consumer remembers feeling towards a brand of product — it lets consumers trust the market and prevent consumer confusion; so that</p><p>Third, the mere ‘mark’ a company initially sends out into the market is really just an outline a potential trademark. It becomes a trademark when consumers form associations with it, recognize it as a trademark. A real trademark is like the crystallization of consumers impressions of and associations with the brand of products, a physical representation of the goodwill consumers have come to feel towards the brand. The trademark is the crystallized form of that gaseous goodwill, accumulated and bound up within a company’s mark; that is</p><p>Finally, A trademark IS that consumer goodwill, just trapped within a company’s mark and turned into a beautiful, distinctive crystal. See, it’s just science!</p><p>With this absurd intro out of the way, let’s look into these steps a wee bit more technically.</p><p><strong>Trademarks let us identify, remember, and re-identify brands, let them try to base future purchases off past experience/impression.</strong></p><p>Trademarks are distinctive source-identifiers. A trademark signals to consumers that products bearing that mark come from the same specific source, and distinguish those products from similar products bearing a different trademark, that signals a different source.</p><p>This source-identifying function means trademarks let consumers identify brands they like, a certain brand of cereal for example. The next time the consumer goes to the store, she can quickly identify that (hashtag) brand again by looking for the trademark.</p><p>Before we could identify (and re-identify) brands we did and did not like we had no reason to remember our experiences with a brand, or care what brand we bought, because we wouldn’t be able to find that brand again. Trademarks, because they let us identify (and re-identify) brands we do and don’t like, give us a remember brands, and care about them.</p><p>Now, let’s return to our goodwill-as-a-gas idea. Without trademarks, we have no *reason* to hold onto any goodwill we feel, we have no reason to care about trapping the goodwill our brains emit in reaction to a good brand. Trademarks, because they let us identify brands we like, let us base future purchases off past experiences, and this is our reason to hold onto the goodwill we feel towards a product, good will we come to associate with the trademark the product bears.</p><p>And from the company’s perspective, they have to either live up to the positive association consumers have of their mark, or change the negative impression consumers have built in their trademark.</p><p>A company with a successful brand will have to live up to the expectations consumers have for its products; it will have to maintain the same nature and quality of goods consumers expect, that the company’s goodwill was born from.</p><p>On the other hand, a company with an unsuccessful brand, face an uphill battle against their own trademark, and the negative history embodied in their trademark.</p><p>By giving consumers the ability to base future purchases off past experiences, trademarks give consumers reason to hold onto the goodwill they feel towards a brand, forming the basis for brand building, and giving consumers a way of holding company’s accountable for the quality of goods and services they put out.</p><p>When we choose between two boxes of cereal, we can base that decision off our experiences with each brand, experiences we remember because of the positive or negative associations we’ve formed with the trademark identifying each brand of cereal. We try to base future purchases off our past experiences with a good, based-off the goodwill or badwill we feel towards a brand’s trademark.</p><p><strong>We should like trademark law because it lets us actually rely on our past experiences, we can’t (legally) get tricked by confusingly-similar trademarks)</strong></p><p>If competitors were free to use identical or confusingly-similar marks on their own products, they could unfairly capitalize on the goodwill consumers feel towards a trademark. A consumer could buy a box of cereal thinking it was from our brand — basing their purchase on the trademark, the goodwill they associate with our trademark — but it turns out to be a competitor’s cereal, using a confusingly similar trademark to pose as our own. Once again, it becomes impossible for consumers to feel secure in their purchasing decisions.</p><p>Here, the consumer can identify trademarks she likes, and has reason to hold onto the gaseous goodwill, but still can’t make secure purchasing decisions based off those marks. Without trademark protection, the consumer couldn’t be sure if the trademark she recognizes on the second box of cereal really is from the same brand she enjoyed, or if it’s from a competing brand she might not like.</p><p>That’s where trademark protection comes into. Speaking generally, trademark law lets us stop others from using a trademark that is identical or confusingly similar to our own on its own goods or services, in a way that could confuse consumers into thinking their goods are actually ours, or sponsored by us.</p><p>This is what it means to prevent consumer confusion, what trademark law is/should be all about. It’s meant to make sure consumers *can* rely on their past experiences with a mark to make future purchases; that consumers can accurately identify products based on the trademark, secure knowing the trademark indicates that the product comes from the brand the consumer expects it to, at the quality expected from that brand. Law, that terrible, boring, no good thing provides the security for consumers to rely on a brand’s trademarks when making a purchase, to feel secure in the market place.</p><p>***And here’s something very important that will probably be the topic of a future post. Protecting brands isn’t the objective of trademark law, or it’s not supposed to be (big brands have been doing their darndest to make trademark law all about protecting their interests against competitors. The objective of trademark law is protecting consumer interests: it’s about preventing consumer confusion, protecting consumer interests, letting them feel confident building good will towards a trademark, knowing they can use that mark to base future purchasing decisions off their good or bad experiences towards it. That the law protects brands against competitors using their marks IS NOT for the brand’s sake — it’s not out of some idea of unfairness. The law only (or <em>should</em> only) protect brands insofar as it is preventing consumer confusion, from there being some *<em>actual harm</em>* suffered by a consumer as a result of the identical or similar marks. OK, see? Fascinating. /rant over***</p><p><strong>The actual trademark is what we, the consumers, make of it.</strong></p><p>The ‘mark’ a brand initially puts onto its goods and services and presents to the marketplace isn’t really a ‘trademark’ yet, per se. Try thinking of it like an empty vessel, an outline of (what could blossom into) a trademark, to be filled up by consumer’s association with and impressions of that brand, by that gaseous goodwill (or badwill) the consumer creates in association with the brand. It’s the consumer recognition of the brand that develops over time that really makes a trademark, that turns the mere ‘mark’ or vessel into a real source identifying trademark.</p><p>So, the mark a brand puts on its goods is a vessel, to store consumer experiences, goodwill, perceptions and impressions of that good. It’s once that vessel gets filled-up with crystallized consumer impression that it really becomes a trademark.</p><p>And that’s what I meant at the outset — the fully-realized, valuable and source-identifying trademark is created by the consumer’s association with and recognition of the mere mark a brand puts out into the marketplace.</p><p>A real trademark is what we get when a brand’s mark get’s completely filled up and crystallized with that gaseous goodwill. And that filling-up can only happen when consumers feel secure basing future purchases off past experiences with a mark, when the protection of trademark law gives them this security in the marketplace.</p><p>So, that’s my probably needlessly weird explanation of what trademarks are, and why we need trademark laws, to make these beautiful trademark crystals!</p><p>First, the mark a company initially puts out into the market is merely the vessel, the outline of a potential trademark. It lets consumers initially identify, then remember, and re-identify brands, and so remember what brands they have good or bad experiences with. Consumers now want to base future purchases off past experiences.</p><p>But second, it’s only trademark law — letting us stop others from using a trademark that is confusing similar to our own on their goods — that lets consumers rely on these past experiences, associations, and impressions they have with a trademark, secure knowing that the trademark they see really does represent the brand they associate it with.</p><p>Finally, third, that mark the company put out into the market, that potential trademark, becomes a trademark as we the consumer form associations with it and come to recognize it as source identifying. A “great” design is a worthless trademark if it means nothing to consumers.</p><p>I said the goal of trademark law was to protect consumer confusion. Another (Disney movie) way of thinking of this, is that trademark law’s objective is to facilitate the “fusion” of as many beautiful trademark crystals as possible — these shining, crystalized accumulations of consumer goodwill, built up in and fused into the marks that companies put onto their goods and send into the marketplace, crystals that protect consumer expectations and let us make informed purchases, that let us get what we want.</p><p>The last thing I’ll say, trademarks are actually really simple, everyone understands how they work — even without realizing they understand — but do we necessarily appreciate what they do? How powerful they are? And how… cool they are?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df46e5e2c4d8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Jumping into False Advertising!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/jumping-into-false-advertising-ab74fed846f1?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab74fed846f1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[competition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advertising]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Jan 2017 22:28:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-07T22:28:47.593Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello! This post is meant as the intro to a series I’d like to get running (time permitting), to explore false advertising law, recent cases, and interesting topics. I admit, I’m doing this in large part out of my own interest in learning more about the topics — I think teaching is the best way to *really* learn a subject—but, I think this is a really interesting field of law, and maybe you will too! (and if you’ve got questions or topics you’re interested in, please do let me know!).</p><p>To start with, Washington and Oregon courts recently (or, not so recently anymore) came down on opposite sides of identical false advertising lawsuits brought against the popular energy drink 5-Hour Energy, and offers an accessible first look into false advertising.</p><p>Each case centered around allegations that 5-hour Energy ads mislead consumers into believing that doctor’s endorsed the drink, that the drink offers better energy benefits than coffee, and that it is the unique combination of ingredients that creates such benefit.</p><p>The Oregon case is much less interesting, with the judge ruling in favor of 5-Hour Energy, that its claims were not misleading or deceptive. Instead, lets focus on the Washington case, looking for early take-aways regarding what constitutes false advertising.</p><p>—</p><p><strong>The Washington Case</strong></p><p>The <a href="https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/5hourenergyruling.pdf">Washington case</a> came out of investigators looking into 5-Hour Energy’s claims that it was mix of vitamins and amino acids, not the caffeine, that were the key energy-boosting ingredients of their sugar-free drink.</p><p>The State noted that a “Ten Reasons To Trust” list put out by 5-Hour Energy listed caffeine ninth out of ten key ingredients, only above “Other Ingredients”. TV advertisements also highlighted the fruits, vegetables, and vitamins in the drink, and that it was because these “key ingredients”… “work in concert [with the caffeine] to provide a feeling of alertness and energy that lasts for hours.” Opinion at 14.</p><p>The State claimed 5-Hour Energy was being deceptive regarding the importance of its non-caffeine “key ingredients”, and attempting to gloss-over the caffeine in the drink by marketing it as an alternative to caffeine and sugar-based energy drinks. <em>Id</em>. at 11.</p><p>The Washington court did not agree the company was deceptive regarding the caffeine contents of the drink. The court cited substantial nutritional studies backing the claims by 5-Hour Energy, and there was expert testimony that the studies themselves were credible. <em>Id</em>. at 50.</p><p>The court did, however, take issue with three advertising statements made by 5-Hour Energy: First, the claim that the energy boost from 5-Hour Energy was greater than coffee; second, claims regarding the energy boost from the decaffeinated version of the drink; and third, that the drink was “doctor recommended.” <em>Id</em>. at 3–4, 13–20.</p><p>—</p><p><strong>Three Claims by 5-Hour Energy</strong></p><p>Ads claimed that 5-Hour Energy “would provide energy that would last longer than” coffee, with some ads claiming a better energy boost than three or four cups. <em>Id</em>. at 50. There were a number of studies conducted before and after the product’s release, each of which the court reviewed to determine whether they supported the energy-boosting claims by 5-Hour Energy. According to the court, “the studies do not clearly establish that 5-Hour energy vitamins and nutrients work synergistically to make these benefits last longer than they would last with caffeine alone.” <em>Id</em>. at 51. There was some evidence that the caffeine and other key ingredients did provide an energy boost, but not enough to support the specific benefit 5-Hour Energy boasted. <em>Id</em>. Therefore, the court held that the statements regarding the energy boost were deceptive.</p><p>Next, the court looked into the advertising for the decaffeinated version. Ads claimed that even the decaf version would “generate energy and alertness that ‘lasts for hours.’” <em>Id</em>. at 54. Again, there were scientific studies done on the energy-boosting effects of the decaffeinated version, but in the court’s opinion the results of the studies failed to support 5-Hour Energy’s claims. <em>Id</em>. at 55.</p><p>Finally, the court addressed the “Ask Your Doctor” campaign, a series of advertisements claiming that doctors would recommend 5-Hour Energy to patients. The ads were based on surveys of doctors, asking the doctors if they would recommend the drink to patients. <em>Id</em>. at 56. However, there was expert testimony arguing that the surveys were biased and leading, and thus couldn’t substantiate the claims made by 5-Hour Energy. <em>Id</em>. at 56–57. The court agreed. The survey didn’t ask whether the doctors thought the drink was healthy or safe, as the ads suggested. Instead, the doctors were told that the drink was low fat, low calorie, low sodium, and sugar-free, and then asked if they would recommend the drink for healthy patients who already used energy supplements. <em>Id</em>. at 56.</p><p>—</p><p><strong>Take-Aways</strong></p><p>What do these statements — that the energy boost from 5-Hour Energy is better than coffee, the energy benefits of the decaffeinated version, and the doctor’s “recommendations” — have in common? They are all boastful or exaggerated statements, objective and verifiable, regarding the quality of the product.</p><p>Boasting and exaggerating falls right on the line between false advertising and common “puffery” — promotional statements that are understood to be exaggerations the consumer should not take literally, subjective, boastful opinions of the seller, and general claims of superiority too vague to be relied on. 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademark and Unfair Competition § 27.38 (4th ed. 1996).</p><p>The question to ask of these boastful claims is whether they can be objectively proven true or false, and whether they are too vague for consumers to take them seriously. See <a href="http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2012_food_supplements_2nd_annual_cle_wrkshp/2012_aba_panel3_the_worlds_most_trusted.authcheckdam.pdf">Abhishek K. Gurnani and Ashish R. Talati, The World’s Most Trusted Article on Puffery”: Non-Actionable Puffery or Misleading?</a>.</p><p>Here, each of the statements is verifiable, they are objective, and each are concrete enough that the consumer could take them seriously. Therefore, when they turn out to be false or misleading, that’s illegal false advertising.</p><p>In contrast, common examples of puffery are statements like “World’s best pizza!” or “The most comfortable socks imaginable.” Statements like this are vague and not reasonably verifiable. Moreover, they are the kind of commercial exaggeration that consumers are accustomed to and expect, and that consumers are unlikely to take seriously. Unless <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvaja9AE2rs">you’re from the North Pole</a>, in which case puffery could very well trick you.</p><p>—</p><p><strong>Coming Up</strong></p><p>So, this 5-Hour Energy case is a nice jumping-off point into the law of false advertising, and into the distinction between puffery and false advertising.</p><p>Hopefully, you’re still here, and maybe your interest is piqued. If so, stick around, share, ask questions. In upcoming posts we’ll build off this simple intro, moving on to break down the elements of a false advertising claim at the state and federal levels, and use a wonderful case between Pizza Hut and Papa Johns’ to explore the core concept of puffery some more.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab74fed846f1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Brand Smarter, Not Harder]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/brand-smarter-not-harder-ff0bbfd4ff20?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ff0bbfd4ff20</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advertising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[branding]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 10 Sep 2016 15:01:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-10T15:01:06.436Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The beginning of a new season of European soccer once again has a bleary-eyed me waking up before dawn on weekends to watch games live on NBC’s online streaming service.</p><p>In my excitement to once again trade sleep for soccer, I forgot how terrible the ads are on NBC’s platform. It’s the same 3–4 commercials on repeated over and over again, sometimes even repeated within the same commercial break.</p><p>This isn’t limited to NBC, but is common across all the streaming platforms I’ve used, be it ESPN3 or YouTube.</p><p>For me, I come to really dislike these commercials — the same catchy music, the same dumb jokes, the same overplayed stereotypes — and, by association my mind forms a negative association with the brand being advertised.</p><p>I’ve always wondered how much companies pay for these ads, how valuable these slots are. I think the small number of ads on these platforms could be interpreted one of two ways.</p><p>This could indicate that companies don’t think these slots are valuable, and thus without competition for the slots a few companies have bought these slots on the cheap. Or, it could indicate that companies find these slots extremely valuable, enough that a few have spent the money to essentially monopolize this airspace.</p><p>My gut reaction is to agree with the second possibility, that companies recognize these slots are potentially very valuable. More and more people are cord-cutting, moving away from traditional TV packages and using streaming services instead. It seems like there’s potentially a lot of advertising value in these slots, so there should be competition, and thus reasonably high prices for the slots.</p><p>So, how much do these slots cost, and are companies getting good value for the money they spend to advertise?</p><p>Trademarks are meant to be distinctive, they distinguish one brand of product from the other, and in doing so, allow the mark owner to build and commercialize the goodwill and positive association consumers have for his or her product.</p><p>It’s simple then, that the opposite of what you want to do is for your trademarks to create a negative association with your product in the mind of consumers.</p><p>Unfortunately, that’s exactly what happens, at least for me, with the advertising on streaming services.</p><p>A few brands dominate the streaming airspace, and in doing so they have ruined this valuable commercial property.</p><p>The overexposure their monopoly affords them creates a negative impression on consumers. They would do better to have fewer, better ads, ads that are distinctive, distinguishing the brand from those others sharing the airspace.</p><p>Think of the use of white-space in writing. Use blank white areas of the page to create a contrast with the black writing. Good use of this contrast can highlight important areas of text, helping them stick in the minds of the reader.</p><p>Companies should use other ads as their white space. If the only commercials are for your product, the best case scenario is that the repetition causes the commercials to lose all effect on the consumer. The overexposure to your brand de-sensitizes the consumer to your branding, and you dilute the distinctiveness of your own brand.</p><p>The worst case scenario is that the repetition instead breeds contempt for your product, and by overexposing the consumer you actually tarnish whatever goodwill you had built in your marks, and any positive association consumers had turns to a negative association.</p><p>Returning to my initial questions, how much do these slots cost, and are companies getting value out of them?</p><p>The first question turns out to be a non-starter, because no matter how little you’re paying, you’re paying to harm your brand.</p><p>At best, incessantly repeated and generic ads de-sensitize consumers to your marks and dilute your brand — even distinctive marks lose effect on the consumer through overexposure, try saying the worst curse word you know to yourself 100 times, by the end you forget what that word even means.</p><p>At worst, incessantly repeated and generic ads are actually tarnishing any positive association with your marks and losing whatever goodwill consumers held for your brand.</p><p>I still think these commercial slots are potentially very valuable, but the lack of variation between ads — in that there are only two or three brands advertising, and they all follow the same generic formula — means these ads and marks lose whatever distinctive qualities they could have had, and can do serious harm to the brand.</p><p>We’re overexposed to the same advertising, and it either dilutes or tarnishes our association with the brands.</p><p>What’s the point of this blog? What nugget of practical advice could you take out of this?</p><p>It means you should use your trademarks smarter, not harder. Brand smarter, not harder.</p><p>The greater issue the NBC advertising example illustrates is that the sheer volume of advertising and media we consume everyday has probably already de-sensitized us to much of the branding we encounter, so that very little stands out at distinctive.</p><p>Don’t make things worse for yourself by continuing to mindlessly bombard eyes and ears with your ads and trademarks.</p><p>Instead, be smart, do less to do more.</p><p>Without a doubt, there’s value to being ahead of the curve and securing advertising space on the next hot platform. But, the streaming services example shows that there is clearly a point of diminishing returns. At a certain point, more advertising becomes harmful.</p><p>This leads to a larger lesson for marketers today,</p><p>Use the noise of other ads as your white space, invest in ways to differentiate yourself from the crowd, rather than in keeping up with and getting lost in the crowd.</p><p>This was probably a big inspiration behind native advertising. Finding a new way and space to advertise on, where you could subtly stick out and leave a lasting impression on consumers. Now, the average consumer is probably already too smart for that.</p><p>That’s a second take away, consumers are smart, smarter than brands give them credit for, and understand branding and trademark practices better than they know. Treat them as if they’re smart, and you’ll probably end up with better, more distinctive branding.</p><p>This isn’t easy, but whoever can do it gets a huge advantage as the media’s assault on our senses continues.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ff0bbfd4ff20" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[3D Printing and Digital Fabrication’s Role in the Rehabilitation of Local Ecosystems: The Battle to…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/3d-printing-and-digital-fabrications-role-in-the-rehabilitation-of-local-ecosystems-the-battle-to-8017003b9369?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8017003b9369</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[3d-printing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[makers]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jun 2016 16:39:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-10T16:39:40.360Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>3D Printing and Digital Fabrication’s Role in the Rehabilitation of Local Ecosystems: The Battle to Control the Decentralization of American Production</strong></p><p>3D printing will change the way production is done in America — moving away from the centralized corporate model, and back to where production was originally done, the a local or regional level. It is the 3rd Industrial Revolution.</p><p>Amazon’s traditional distribution model already provides the corporate example for this. Using regional distribution centers, Amazon has already slashed the time between a customer making an order and the good’s delivery, no matter where “local” is.</p><p>But Amazon is already going even further. The company recognizes the power of 3D printing, of hyper-local production. Amazon has experimented with <a href="http://mashable.com/2014/07/28/amazon-3d-printing-store-2/#4k1c_luv_Zq6">on-demand 3D printing at its warehouses</a> (and drone delivery, as if it had to be more streamlined), and has even filed <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/02/26/when-drones-arent-enough-amazon-envisions-trucks-with-3d-printers/">patent applications for 3D printing services out of the company’s delivery trucks</a> (Imagine ordering a new set of china, and having it printed in the back of a delivery truck on its way to your house).</p><p>Now, these technologies are still too slow and the materials too expensive for Amazon to efficiently mass-3D print consumer goods today. But the rate at which the technology is advancing means these hurdles will be overcome.</p><p>With Amazon well ahead in the race to provide local production (at least in setting up the infrastructure for when the technology is ready), <a href="http://3dprintingindustry.com/2016/05/18/79207/">and UPS recently entering the race</a>, the US economy is at a crossroads. 3D printing, and the larger digital fabrication movement, will be the 3rd industrial revolution.</p><p>It will hyper-localize production again.</p><p>The question will be how, and who benefits from this change? Will it be Amazon, UPS, with profits going to CEOs, CFOs and other acronyms? Or, will it be <a href="http://spaces.makerspace.com/">your neighborhood makerspace</a>, with profits going to neighbors, and in turn spreading throughout the local commonity? The answer to this will have profound consequences on the health of local American communities, and for citizens across the country.</p><p><strong>Rise and Fall of the Corporation, the Old New Social Safety Blanket</strong></p><p>Since its rise, the corporation has defined the American economy and society.</p><p>At its height, <a href="http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/gfdavis/Papers/Davis_P&amp;S_2013.pdf">the American corporation played four crucial roles in american society</a>: Corporations were the main sources for both the production of goods and services, and the provision of employment, but were also crucial sources of social welfare services, and the predominant vessel for individual retirement savings.</p><p>However, we have seen, and are still seeing the last throws, the<a href="http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/gfdavis/Papers/Davis_P&amp;S_2013.pdf"> collapse of the traditional, monolithic corporation</a>. And with them, the loss of the social functions they provided.</p><p>In place of the monolithic corporation we see “agile” companies. Amazon is the prototypical example of this new corporation, with Uber, AirBnb, and their corollaries in other following Amazon’s lead, disrupting every industry.</p><p>At its height, when it still dominated our economy, the traditional corporation was the primary provider of four crucial things for American families. (1) Income, (2) Social services, and relatedly, (3) retirement savings, and (4) goods.</p><p>In the form of income, social services, and retirement savings, these corporations provided for the social welfare of the American families.</p><p>The need to replace these social functions is why the question of what replaces the traditional corporation is so important. Who or what can provide the income and social safety net we need? These things that used to be provided by corporations?</p><p>The Federal government is currently incapable of supporting an adequate social safety net, for the current generation, let alone coming generations.</p><p>The minimalist nature of Amazon and its progeny of agile corporations means these new corporations cannot provide these fourt the same way the traditional corporation could.</p><p>Which brings us to the alternative.</p><p><strong>Re-De-Centralizing US Production, Politics, and Society: Amazonification v. Small Businesses and the Maker Movement</strong></p><p>Unlike the new agile corporations, our local communities have the potential to provide the social utilities the corporation used to. This isn’t anything new. Before the corporation, local communities were the lifeblood and social safety net of America — they served the four functions the corporation later took up, and that we are now struggling to replace: payment of the wages to live on, the provision of social and retirement security, and the production of goods and services.</p><p>Ever since our economy was centralized into corporations, with wealth spiraling up to line the pockets of executives, rather than flowing down to nourish the roots of the community, local economies and communities have been struggling for relevance. There has been a recent enthusiasm for localism. But so far this is more of a luxury trend, enjoyed by the upper-middle class, rather than a wholesale reorientation of society around the local community back as the provider of wages, goods, and insurer of our social welfare.</p><p>The shift away from a society centered around the local community began when production moved into the corporation. With production, economic and then political relevancy shifted to the corporation, and the local community was left as little more than a novelty for tourists to explore and locals to reminisce about.</p><p>As the thing that issued in the decline of the local community, the production economy will be at the heart of the revitalization of the local community. And harnessing the potential of 3D printing offers just that opportunity. Instead of letting the Amazons and UPS’s of the world control it, we need to make sure the hyper-localization of production ends up moving into community production hubs [as I mentioned in this blog post].</p><p><strong>It All Starts With Production…</strong></p><p>As production shifts back into local communities, political relevance, civic engagement, and community engagement all follow.</p><p>Instead of wealth continuing to accumulate in a couple production corporations, it begins to re-distribute back into the corners of our communities, to our friends, family, and neighbors. (A gross over-simplification) this initial redistribution will spread from the producers, as they spend in and hire from within their communities, kick-starting other local businesses.</p><p>In the long run, this means the local community replaces the corporation as the provider of wages and jobs. With wealth better distributed through communities, with greater employment opportunities, we have fewer citizens simply fighting to secure their necessities. In turn, when necessities are provided for, community members are more willing and able to support neighbors in need, confident of reciprocation when circumstances reverse.</p><p>Thus, by re-de-centralizing US production, we reorient US society back around the local community, finally replacing the corporation as the primary provider of income, wages, goods, and services, and these stronger, wealthier communities will be able to absorb losses and provide for members who fall on hard times, and to support elderly citizens as they move out of the work force.</p><p><strong>Which is Why The Future of 3D Printing Is So Important!</strong></p><p>But this all starts by returning US production jobs back into the hands of local business. That is why the *how* of the re-de-centralization of US production is so important; that is why it is so important that instead of Amazon and UPS, that local businesses and maker spaces harness 3D printing’s potential, and become the future of american production.</p><p>3D printing and digital fabrication will re-localization American production. How this localization happens — whether through Amazonification, or through a re-vitalizing of our local economies and communities — will go a long way to determining the health of local US communities and our social safety net.</p><p>That then is the where we draw battle line for the future of America:. Amazonification v. the maker movement, new corporations v. our local businesses.</p><p><strong>That’s The Why, But How’s The How?</strong></p><p>Then question turns to what we can do to help make sure our local small businesses win this battle.</p><p>Of course, makerspaces across the country are already doing amazing work (<a href="http://spaces.makerspace.com/makerspace-directory">find a makerspace nearby! And then take a class!</a>), but I think there are concrete ways we can help set the table for maker and local success.</p><p>First we need to help help make 3D printers, CNC tools, and other means of distributed manufacturing as accessible as possible. This doesn’t mean getting a printer into every household or garage, but encouraging makerspaces across the country. The success of the <a href="http://www.wired.com/2013/04/30-million-bet-that-shapeways-becomes-a-factory-for-everyone/">Shapeways model</a> shows that consumers don’t necessarily want a 3D printer, they want the goods the printers make. That’s a subtle but important difference.</p><p>Part of this is to prevent industry interests from pushing an IP structure that hamstrings the widespread use of 3D printers and other digital fabrication technologies. I touched on this in a blog post, <a href="https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/3d-printing-ip-and-production-small-look-at-a-big-picture-9d78f33167f2#.vehp9xmgk">here</a>, and <a href="https://twitter.com/mweinberg2D">Michael Weinberg</a> has a <a href="https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/3DPrintingPaperPublicKnowledge.pdf">great white paper</a> on this for <a href="https://www.publicknowledge.org/">Public Knowledge</a>.</p><p>Second, we need to actually *use* these local printers. In services such as <a href="http://www.100kgarages.com/">100K Garages</a> and <a href="http://www.100kgarages.com/">OpenDesk</a> we already have what are in essence local alternatives to Amazon.com, sites that allow consumers to find and hire local designers and makers. Say you have a file you’d like manufactured, these communities can put you in touch with a local maker with access to a printer or other tools who will produce it for you. They are also places for sharing files for objects and projects, one-stop-shops for finding the objects you want, and then connecting with a maker nearby to make it for you! Using 100K Garages and OpenDesk, you can end up with much more unique items, and support your local maker community in the process.</p><p>With 3D printing, digital fabrication, and the re-localization of production, we have the chance to recapture the American production economy in our local communities, empowering our communities to once more be the lifeblood of America, re-invigorating local culture, and re-vitalizing the original social safety net, the neighborhood. Let’s do that.</p><p>You made it to the end of another blog post, congratulations and thank you! I’d love for this to include a dialog between you and I, so if you have any questions, comments, or just think I’m wrong, please get in touch. Find me <a href="https://twitter.com/WinslowTHall">@WinslowTHall </a>on Twitter, and please share the blog with anyone you think might be interested!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8017003b9369" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My 3D Printing and Trademark Manifesto]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/my-3d-printing-and-trademark-manifesto-a3a106d0759a?source=rss-a3cbbb0f101e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[3d-printing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[makers]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Winslow Hall]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2016 01:16:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-01T11:05:40.239Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a quick response to another great Idea Channel video—available <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gg-_wqvOplE">here</a>, answering listener questions about 3D printing and IP.</p><p>In particular, just after the 4:50 mark, the presenter states the simple (but true!) idea that the best way of protecting your brand from being ripped-off is to “be the best provider.”</p><p>It’s such a simple thought, and essentially what I tried to express in previous blog posts, <a href="https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/trademark-protection-in-our-3d-printed-world-an-early-look-at-a-not-new-problem-461a0e15cb8c#.43i9gio8n">here</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/3d-printing-ip-and-production-small-look-at-a-big-picture-9d78f33167f2#.13h51qevd">here</a>.</p><p>After the video, I wanted to concisely offer my advice/thoughts on protecting oneself from being ripped-off, and why our current trademark doctrine is the best means of that protection.</p><p>The three (BROAD) steps to protect oneself and one’s brand from being ripped-off: (1) Create a strong brand and cultivate consumer goodwill, (2) license your marks for production and police for infringement, and (3) make the best products you can, better than the competition — both legitimate competitors and infringers. Make the consumer want to buy from you.</p><p>If you do these three things, you protect your brand and your IP as well as you can under our current IP system.</p><p>There are plenty of articles warning that 3D printing will gut our IP protection. They’ll call for expanding and changing copyright or patent protection, and/or implementing complex verification systems for our 3D printers and any printed goods.</p><p>We could do either of those thing. But I don’t think either is a good idea.</p><p>IP protection is not the only thing on the line here. Virtually any time IP protection is implicated, so too is the freedom to create, the freedom to compete, and the ability to capitalize on technological advancements.</p><p>These things are in play here too, and the real challenge is to balance the legitimate interest in protecting one’s IP and brand with these other important values of creativity and competition, and society’s ability to capitalize on technological advances [like 3D printing!].</p><p>Extending copyright and patent protection *might* offer stronger protection, but at what cost? Let’s do a quick pro/con.</p><p>(a) If you develop good will, create good brand association and use your marks well enough, trademark law already affords strong protection [of course, this isn’t *easy* but the ability to do has always been what separates the most successful brands from the competition].</p><p>(b) Any increase in protection gained by extending the monopoly that copyright and patent law affords would be *vastly* offset by limiting our freedoms to create and compete, and limiting our ability to best utilize the amazing potential of 3D printing, digital fabrication, and other new and emerging technologies.</p><p>We could invest in more robust ways of verifying the authenticity of goods (especially 3D-printed goods), but the costs of implementing a system that actually made a difference would be high, both in money and time, especially when it comes to smaller, cheaper, mass-produced commercial goods.</p><p>I go into more detail on all of this <a href="https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/trademark-protection-in-our-3d-printed-world-an-early-look-at-a-not-new-problem-461a0e15cb8c#.43i9gio8n">here</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/@WinslowTHall/3d-printing-ip-and-production-small-look-at-a-big-picture-9d78f33167f2#.13h51qevd">here</a>, but this post is the best summation of my advice I’ve produced so far, something of a young idealist’s manifesto.</p><p>3D printing does not break our trademark doctrine. To paraphrase <a href="https://twitter.com/mweinberg2D">Michael Weinberg</a>, <a href="https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/3DPrintingPaperPublicKnowledge.pdf">3D printing is awesome, let’s let it be awesome</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3a106d0759a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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