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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Joe Morgan on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Joe Morgan on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@_Bok_Choy?source=rss-9bed54fb48a6------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Joe Morgan on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@_Bok_Choy?source=rss-9bed54fb48a6------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Understanding the EigenLayer Whitepaper]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@_Bok_Choy/understanding-the-eigenlayer-whitepaper-592807bb1d93?source=rss-9bed54fb48a6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/592807bb1d93</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[restaking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eigenlayer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[staking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Morgan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Sep 2023 17:45:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-12T17:45:21.488Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Learning about major new developments in Web3 is essential to staying ahead of the game. But, not everyone has the time to go through a technical 19-page whitepaper. So the following is a summary of the most important points from EigenLayer’s whitepaper to get a strong grasp of what&#39;s to come.</p><p>TLDR: EigenLayer is a layer built on Ethereum that allows outside services to receive mainnet quality security while deployed off-chain.</p><h3>Problem</h3><p>Many web3 services cannot be built 100% on Ethereum because they require off-chain inputs that can’t be verified on-chain. Here are the problems that occur when creating off-chain trust:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/630/1*C6x6I2phjHeS5dxIQuumdQ.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Bootstrapping Security</strong>: Services have to create their own security</li><li><strong>Loss of Value</strong>: Users have to pay more fees for this security on top of Ethereum</li><li><strong>Capital Cost</strong>: The service also has to pay people to secure their network</li><li><strong>Lower Trust</strong>: Services are less secure than Ethereum</li></ul><h3><strong>Restaking</strong></h3><p>Restaking is just as it sounds. It is the process of taking a version of staked eth on Ethereum and staking it again on EigenLayer. There are two aspects that EigenLayer points out to sum up this process:</p><p><strong>Pooled security via restaking</strong>: Current Ethereum validators can restake their own eth on Eigenlayer to provide security to any Actively Validate Service (AVS) with an on-chain slashing mechanism. <em>An AVS is a service that requires off-chain inputs that can’t be built 100% on Ethereum, i.e. oracles, bridges, sidechains, DA layers, etc.</em></p><p><strong>Open Marketplace</strong>: Validators decide which AVS they want to allocate their restaked eth towards. Each AVS will offer specific parameters that determine the yield they offer and slashing penalties.</p><p>Users can restake on EigenLayer in 4 ways:</p><ul><li><strong>Native restaking</strong>: Ethereum validators point their withdraw credentials to EigenLayer</li><li><strong>Liquid Staking</strong>: LSDs approved by EigenLayer, <em>i.e. Lido (stETH) and Rocket Pool (rETH)</em></li><li><strong>LP staking</strong>: LP tokens</li><li><strong>LSD LP</strong>: LSD LP tokens,<em> i.e. stETH-ETH</em></li></ul><h4><strong>Delegation</strong></h4><p>Delegating your tokens works essentially the same as Ethereum. People who are not validators can delegate their tokens to an operator (EigenLayer validator). The operator sets their own fees for how much they make and how much the delegator makes.</p><h3><strong>Slashing Analysis</strong></h3><p>The idea of slashing is derived from cryptoeconomic security. This term is defined as when the cost of corruption(CoC) is greater than the profit of corruption(PoC). Therefore, it would be unprofitable for someone to attack a network. If a restaker on EigenLayer misbehaves, they will no longer be able to participate with any other AVSs.</p><p>There will be no fungible positions to represent the positions of a restaker on EigenLayer. Since a single validator can secure multiple AVSs at the same time, a fungible token would not be able to capture multiple coexisting positions accurately.</p><h4><strong>Comparison to Merge Mining</strong></h4><p>Merge mining is when PoW validators use the same hardware to mine on multiple different networks at the same time, which is similar to how PoS validators will be validating on Ethereum and EigenLayer at the same time. These two concepts are similar, but in a PoS scenario, validators are punished correctly, here’s how:</p><ul><li>In PoW, if validators are “slashed” they are only punished on the sidechain that they misbehave on as their capital is their hardware, which can’t be punished</li><li>In PoS, if validators are slashed, they are punished on the sidechain (EigenLayer) and main chain (Ethereum). Since their capital is their staked position, being slashed on EigenLayer results in a loss of money that is also translated to mainnet</li></ul><h4><strong>Risk Management</strong></h4><p>There are two main risks that EigenLayer has identified, operator collusion and unintended slashing.</p><p><strong>Operator collusion</strong>: Operators working together to attack the network</p><ul><li>The fact that a single operator can participate in multiple AVSs at the same time increases their PoC while keeping their CoC constant. Therefore, corrupting the network can be profitable when attacking multiple AVSs together.</li><li>To protect against this, AVSs can put a limit on the number of different AVSs a single operator can be validating at one time. Therefore, these AVSs are inherently more secure by having operators that can only validate a few different AVSs at once</li></ul><p><strong>Unintended Slashing</strong>: An operator that gets slashed when they did nothing wrong</p><p>This can simply happen since EigenLayer is a new protocol that may contain bugs. EigenLayer has two strategies to mitigate this:</p><ul><li><strong>Audits</strong>: Just like how smart contracts get audited, so will each AVS before going live</li><li><strong>Veto Slashing</strong>: A committee of trusted individuals from Ethereum and EigenLayer in a multi-sig will be able to reverse accidental slashes from AVSs that opt into their program</li></ul><h4><strong>Governance</strong></h4><p>Governance will be based on a reputation-based system instead of a token infrastructure. This way, a single entity can’t buy a ton of tokens to gain a large share of control.</p><p>Governance will be in charge of upgrading EigenLayer contracts, vetoing slashes, and onboarding new AVSs to the slashing process.</p><p>The veto committee(as described above) needs to be sure that they actually do veto unjust slashes and not wrongfully reverse slashes that were in fact malicious.</p><p>Here are two designs that EigenLayer ideated that can help increase security and decentralization for AVSs:</p><ul><li><strong>Hyperscale AVS</strong>: Essentially just an AVS that horizontally scales. Therefore, operators will split up the computational work instead of it being done by one node</li><li><strong>Lightweight</strong>: There are numerous tasks such as attestation, verifying zk proofs, and running oracle price feeds that can be done by operators that all require minimal work</li></ul><h3><strong>A World with EigenLayer</strong></h3><p>Here are some ideas of what can be built on EigenLayer:</p><ul><li><strong>Data Availability Layer</strong>: DA layers with a high DA rate and low-cost</li><li><strong>Decentralized sequencers</strong>: Rollups that use restakers for ordering transactions</li><li><strong>Light-Node Bridges</strong>: Restakers can verify off-chain inputs to verify bridge transactions in the case of optimistic verification</li><li><strong>Fast-Mode Bridges for Rollups</strong>: Same as light-node bridges but for verifying ZK rollups off-chain and sending proofs on-chain</li><li><strong>Oracles</strong>: With enough restaker participation, price oracles can be built on EigenLayer</li><li><strong>Opt-in Event-Driven Activation</strong>: Events like liquidations and collateral transfers</li><li><strong>Opt-in MEV Management</strong>: MEV management and improvements</li><li><strong>Settlement chains with ultra-low Latency</strong>: New consensus protocols with low latency and high throughput</li><li><strong>Single-Slot Finality</strong>: Instant finality compared to 12 minutes on Ethereum</li></ul><p>Ethereum nodes with excess computational power can take advantage of EigenLayer by putting their extra resources to work and earn more yield.</p><h4><strong>Democracy and Agility Tradeoff</strong></h4><p>EigenLayer claims to solve the tradeoff between democracy and agility by excelling in both</p><ul><li>Democracy = A decentralized governance system</li><li>Agility = The speed at which changes can be made</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/622/1*9M-Om9igyQ0ri4NhC4oobA.png" /></figure><p>To visualize this tradeoff, they note that Ethereum is democratic while not being agile. In contrast, BSC is very agile, yet not democratic. EigenLayer argues that they do both by allowing protocols to experiment on their chain by testing new innovations while still having the underlying security of Ethereum.</p><p><em>I personally disagree with this claim. Based on the diagram above from their whitepaper, I would push Eigenlayer closer to the inside of the chart while still being somewhat democratic and agile. They are centralized by having a core set of people with the power to make important changes to the chain. Also, these people still have to come to an agreement, which can take time and isn’t always an overnight process.</em></p><h4>Business Models</h4><p>Lastly, EigenLayer highlights some token systems that can be applied by combining restaked eth with a native AVS token ($AVS). <em>Nothing new here, in my opinion, it just states some already established multi-token systems that we see today.</em></p><ul><li><strong>Pure Wallet</strong>: web2 / traditional companies deploy on EigenLayer for increased security. Fees go to the company and restakers</li><li><strong>Tokenizing fees</strong>: Instead of a traditional company, insert a web3 protocol. Fees now go to $AVS holders and restakers</li><li><strong>Native token fees</strong>: Same as above except fees are paid in $AVS instead of eth</li><li><strong>Dual staking</strong>: Protocols can be secured by staking $AVS and restaked eth</li></ul><h3>My Thoughts</h3><p>I see EigenLayer as a promising and under-looked addition to the Ethereum ecosystem. It appears as a net positive for all parties. Off-chain protocols no longer have to bootstrap their own security and instead take advantage of Ethereum-level security with ease while still being super customizable in regards to security requirements and yield outputs. Moreover, current Ethereum stakers get to participate in securing more of the ecosystem while generating extra yield.</p><p>A popular concern that has come up that is worth mentioning is centralization issues with LSDs when restaking on EigenLayer. A select few LSDs take up a large percentage of the total market share, i.e. Lido. So it is important to keep track of the assets and entities that actually do transfer over to restake on EigenLayer as the restaked proportions could cause more centralization issues compared to what currently exists on Ethereum. It seems like EigenLayer doesn’t intend to solve this issue and it is up to each AVS to manage their own risk so they are not susceptible to an attack.</p><p>For more details, you can view the full whitepaper here: <a href="https://docs.eigenlayer.xyz/overview/whitepaper">https://docs.eigenlayer.xyz/overview/whitepaper</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=592807bb1d93" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Polymer Labs Breakdown]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@_Bok_Choy/polymer-labs-breakdown-b1f170aac675?source=rss-9bed54fb48a6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b1f170aac675</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ibc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cosmos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zksnark]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[interoperability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Morgan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 May 2023 17:51:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-12T17:51:28.154Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Current status of interoperability</h3><p>The blockchain ecosystem today has a long way to reaching mass adoption with many issues standing in the way. These issues include limited real-world applications, difficulty onboarding new users, poor user experience, and many more. But arguably the biggest roadblock existing within the industry is surrounding interoperability. There are hundreds of different blockchains causing liquidity to be fragmented. Moving assets from one chain to another is currently a pain. Users have to trust third-party applications that often result in a lengthy process with several clicks. <a href="https://twitter.com/PolymerDAO">Polymer</a> aims to solve this issue in web3 by using the Cosmos IBC to connect all chains in a scalable and secure fashion.</p><p>Other interoperability solutions currently exist, but tend to include some of these drawbacks:</p><ul><li>Not all solutions are compatible with intrachain blockchain ecosystems like Cosmos.</li><li>Solutions can rely heavily on third-party, off-chain entities to secure their protocol. Interoperability solutions should aim to derive their security from existing networks that have a proven track record.</li><li>Solutions have previously gotten exploited, hurting their future reputation and raising concern for future security vulnerabilities.</li><li>Interoperability networks that rely on internal nodes for validation are a concern. These nodes are often not permissionless, putting restrictions on who can become a validator, and are not decentralized by having a low validator count that is susceptible to an attack.</li></ul><h3>Polymer Labs</h3><p>Enter Polymer. Polymer is able to connect all chains in a decentralized, secure, and scalable manner by leveraging zkSNARKS and recursive proofs. Polymer can connect two chains whether they are both non-native to the IBC network or when one is and one isn’t. This technology is enabled by the <a href="https://polymerlabs.medium.com/the-multi-hop-ibc-upgrade-will-take-ibc-to-ethereum-and-beyond-b4bee43523e">multi-hop IBC upgrade.</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*agoWBGllGfk-vItIyVpu0g.png" /><figcaption>Visual of IBC connections before and after multi-hop upgrade</figcaption></figure><p>Prior to the upgrade, intrachain blockchains within the IBC ecosystem would only be able to communicate with one another if they were directly connected, 1:1. Having all of these connections is inefficient, especially as newer chains deploy over time. Therefore, being able to “hop” through various chains and channels to get a packet of data to its end connection is key for the longevity of Cosmos. This upgrade is not only good for the internal Cosmos ecosystem, but allows Polymer to connect a Cosmos native chain to a non-cosmos native chain like Ethereum by acting as a “hop.” So Ethereum connecting to Osmosis is now as easy as Osmosis connecting to Kava.</p><p>Although the multihop IBC upgrade makes it capable for Cosmos to become interoperable with outside chains, that does not mean that it is inherently efficient. Polymer was able to make this process efficient through two zk innovations they coined <a href="https://polymerlabs.medium.com/zkmint-the-first-zk-friendly-tendermint-consensus-engine-116000b9d4f9">zkMint</a> and <a href="https://polymerlabs.medium.com/introducing-zktree-a-zk-recursion-tree-with-zkp-membership-proofs-571a244e3169">zkTree.</a></p><h4>zkMint</h4><p>ZkMint is Polymer’s muti-sig Tendermint BFT consensus engine that allows other chains to verify transactions posted from Cosmos native chains and visa versa. There were other solutions similar to zkMint prior to its existence. But, these solutions were not practical due to the high gas costs of around 26 million per header. Therefore, the Polymer team eventually landed on optimizing the core Tendermint consensus algorithm to be SNARK-friendly which lowered gas to only 300k per header, a decrease of about 98.8%. How zkMint actually works is it can produce multiple signed headers per round of consensus. Therefore, it customizes the format of the light block header to be compatible with any environment and existing light nodes on that network.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*AQp3hTgMvtgc9lgiiwL3IQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>zkMint</figcaption></figure><h4>zkTree</h4><p>ZkTree is a tree data structure that works in a similar fashion to a Merkle Tree, hence both have “tree” in their name. Seeing that zkMint uses SNARKs, Polymer inherently wants to optimize the computational effort required to verify its zk proofs so that it can scale most efficiently across chains. ZkTree accomplishes this by distributing the computational power of one final proof into many smaller, more manageable computations across various machines. The entire zkTree is composed of three different types of proofs:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*z5fnJJTpGRQMEbSRXqSkuQ.png" /><figcaption>zkTree</figcaption></figure><ol><li>User proof: One of many initial zk proofs that are included at the base of the tree structure that can be generated from any circuit</li><li>Leaf proof: Essentially wraps the user proof into a format that the zkTree structure can understand and recursively prove</li><li>Node proof: A node proof is used to recursively prove two leaf proofs. A node proof can also recursively prove two other node proofs, eventually leading to one node proof at the top of the zkTree</li></ol><p>The exciting aspect about zkTree is that it can technically be infinitely scalable, distributing as many user proofs as it can to most efficiently prove a zk proof. Additionally, as hardware becomes more powerful over time, the verification time of zk proofs will shorten as well. ZkMint and zkTree are two significant innovations that will enable the Polymer team to “scale beyond the Cosmos.”</p><h4>Source</h4><p><a href="https://polymerlabs.medium.com/">Polymer Labs - Medium</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b1f170aac675" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Understanding ve(3,3)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/illiniblockchain/understanding-ve-3-3-5aab82add91e?source=rss-9bed54fb48a6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5aab82add91e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dex]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Morgan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 May 2023 14:18:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-15T03:37:13.512Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>The DeFi space moves faster than you can blink, with different projects coming out daily. No matter what each and every project offers, they all share a key dilemma: incentivizing users to provide liquidity for their tokens. Providing liquidity is essential for growth and success, but as it has been proven in many cases, it is very hard to incentivize all parties and keep them happy.</p><p>Now enter the idea of ve(3,3). Ve(3,3) is a unique, economic development that focuses on balancing long-term incentives between LPers (Liquidity Providers), token holders, ecosystem projects, and DEXs. Andre Cronje, who created a plethora of DeFi projects, initially presented this idea, which combines the vote escrow tokenomics (‘ve’) from Curve Finance, with the (3,3) game theory design used by OlympusDAO.</p><p>There are a couple of issues with traditional DEXs since they incentivize liquidity instead of fees, which Cronje wanted to fix:</p><ol><li>The rewards from liquidity pools (LPs) are in the form of the DEX’s native token, which could face dilution as more rewards are distributed.</li><li>There is no loyalty to the protocol. To keep LPers onboard, the protocol must offer a high APR, otherwise, the LPers would just migrate to another platform.</li><li>If LPers are incentivized based on the amount of liquidity they provide, there can be too much liquidity for a low amount of fees, which is harmful to the protocol in the long run.</li><li>Since LPs want the highest APY, most of the liquidity is in a couple of large pools, while the rest suffer from low liquidity. This can cause difficulties in buying or selling tokens with high slippage.</li></ol><p>In order to best understand how ve(3,3) solves these issues, let’s break it down section by section starting with the (3,3) game theory framework.</p><h3>(3,3)</h3><p>OlympusDAO, the first implementer of (3,3), uses protocol-owned liquidity to give users extra yield on their LP tokens. How it works is they buy their liquidity from users (in the form of LP tokens or another specified token) in exchange for their native token ($OHM) at an average discount of 6–7%, in a process called bonding. These tokens are locked (staked) for a set amount of time (1-week minimum), with the longer it’s locked, the more yield it generates. This is a win for the buyer, as they get a discounted token. This is also a win for the protocol, because it adds money to the treasury (DAI, WETH, etc.) or owns an LP token, meaning owning liquidity you provided to a pool.</p><p>For example, let’s say Bob provided $100 to a LUSD/OHM pool on SushiSwap, and he receives an LP token worth $100. This LP token will be used if he wants to get his $LUSD and $OHM back from SushiSwap, but he decides to sell it to OlympusDAO for $107 worth of bonded $OHM. Then, OlympusDAO owns his $100 LUSD/OHM LP token, essentially owning the liquidity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8YBVXiGUBEbcL0lZQrkwYA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Zay9KcViy1Xmgk7I8JMvqQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Using bonding, OlympusDAO can grow its treasury by collecting LP token fees, which raises the value of the treasury, and $OHM’s price. When $OHM’s price outpaces the market value in the treasury, OlympusDAO issues more $OHM to create more supply and decrease the price. When $OHM is underperforming compared to the treasury, OlympusDAO burns $OHM from the supply to increase its price. This keeps the $OHM value and the treasury synced.</p><p>Both bonding and staking operations benefit the platform while selling the token negatively impacts the platform. Here is a table that illustrates the possible outcomes for users:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nU_BYKAzLZW_4r-Vq_KkBA.png" /><figcaption>Source: Mettalex</figcaption></figure><ol><li>If both users stake, it is the best outcome for them and the protocol (3+3=6)</li><li>If one stakes and one bonds, it is also great because staking takes $OHM off the market and puts it in the protocol, while bonding provides more liquidity to the treasury (3+1=4)</li><li>If both bond, it is still good for the protocol because it receives liquidity in the treasury, but also requires the protocol to give discounted $OHM tokens (1+1=2)</li><li>If one user sells, it diminishes the efforts of another who stakes or bonds (1–1=0)</li><li>When both users sell, it creates the worst outcome for them and the protocol (-3–3=-6)</li></ol><p>With this model, the platform has a net positive, with users incentivized to either stake or bond. The platform then enjoys a net positive, and it’s a win-win.</p><h3>Ve</h3><p>The ve aspect of ve(3,3) comes from Curve Finance and stands for vote-escrowed. I will try not to go into too much detail covering every single aspect of Curve as there are a lot of resources out there for that. So for this article, I will only cover what you need to know to understand the ve(3,3) DEX structure.</p><p>So at its core, Curve Finance is an Automated Market Maker (AMM) which is a fancy term for a type of decentralized exchange. In a traditional order book structure, people trade by matching an individual buyer and seller. With an AMM, people provide liquidity into a pool in exchange for a share of the trading fees. Curve achieved its initial goal of creating an exchange specializing in low slippage and fees for stablecoins. Since 2020, it has grown and stands today as the largest DEX by TVL.</p><p>So in traditional DEXs like Uniswap, it is a simple system in regard to fees. People provide liquidity for a trading pair and then get trading fees proportional to their percentage of total liquidity, i.e. Bob provides $10 into a pool with $100 of total liquidity. If the pool generates $1 of fees, he will receive $0.10.</p><p>Curve is a bit more complicated. So $CRV (the native token of Curve Finance) was created to incentivize liquidity. At the end of the day, you need to have a lot of liquidity to provide low slippage. So to do this, the $CRV emissions (newly created $CRV) are given straight to liquidity providers. Now what is the utility of $CRV? The $CRV token has three main uses. But to receive these benefits, you need to first lock your $CRV. You can lock $CRV for a minimum time of 1 week all the way up to 4 years. If you lock your $CRV for 4 years, you will receive an equal amount of $veCRV since it is 1:1. But for any lock time less than 4 years, you will receive less $veCRV than that amount of $CRV deposited. This concept incentivizes people to lock for longer periods of time. As you can see there is a trade-off here. With a short lock time, you are losing a substantial amount of your position. But locking $CRV for 4 years also has its obvious risks since you can only receive your liquid $CRV once those 4 years have passed.</p><p>So now let&#39;s talk about the benefits you earn as a result of taking on this risk. There are three of them you get as a $veCRV holder:</p><ol><li>Staking: Earn 50% of all platform trading fees</li><li>Boosting: Up to a 2.5x reward boost on your provided liquidity</li><li>Voting: Vote on governance proposals and pool parameters</li></ol><p>All the benefits are pretty self-explanatory except the last one in regard to pool parameters. Remember that people who provide liquidity get rewarded in newly minted $CRV. How these emissions are distributed to the different liquidity pools is determined by people who vote with their $veCRV. The percentage of votes that a pool receives is equal to the percentage of total emissions a specific pool gets.</p><p>As you can see from this structure, all parties are incentivized much better than before in Uniswap. Liquidity providers are incentivized to provide liquidity on the pair with the most votes so that they get more emissions. In return there is lower slippage/fees, more people trade on that pair, more fees go to the LPers and $veCRV holders, etc. Everyone’s happy, right?</p><p>Yes, but there are still some inefficiencies with Curve’s system: Lots of liquidity exists on trading pairs that don’t have a lot of trading volume. Also, people can vote for trading pairs that don’t generate fees, yet don’t get punished for voting inefficiently. Therefore, the main overarching question we are trying to answer is how do we best incentivize fees instead of liquidity?</p><h3>ve(3,3)</h3><p>Ok now that we know how Curve Finance and Olympus DAO work we can build off of that to understand how ve(3,3) DEXs function. Many aspects are taken from each protocol and expanded upon, hence the name ve(3,3). For example, the “ve” structure from Curve is taken directly. Users can lock the native token to earn protocol fees, vote in governance, and boost their own earnings on liquidity. So let us go through what makes it different and we’ll explain the impact of each.</p><h4><strong>Lockers earn all protocol fees</strong></h4><p>This is the biggest change and there is a lot to explain here so let’s dive in. Instead of earning 50% of the fees in Curve, lockers earn 100% of the fees. The fees are also distributed differently. So in Curve Finance lockers vote for a specific pool to delegate how emissions are distributed. This structure stays the same. But now, lockers <strong>only</strong> earn fees from the pool they vote on instead of a total share of protocol fees. To simplify the process further, the fees are paid out directly in the tokens that are being swapped (lockers who vote for an ETH/USDC pair will earn rewards in $ETH and $USDC)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Az8o4Ad3Zx-24QKmR651RQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OV7P38q5gqLJUVvy4lRO0A.jpeg" /></figure><p>There are a lot of positive impacts from this change. People are now incentivized to vote for the pool with the highest trading fees (which generally correlates with the pair that has the most trading volume) since they will maximize rewards that way and not voting correctly will result in not receiving as many rewards. Also, with more people voting for that pool, there will inherently be more liquidity since liquidity providers will want to earn the most emissions. Now you can see how the incentives are aligned for LPers and lockers.</p><h4>Outside protocols can place bribes on trading pairs</h4><p>One main problem in DeFi is that it is tough for new protocols to bootstrap, or gain a lot of liquidity for their token in its early stages. “Bribing” helps to solve this issue. These newer protocols can put “bribes” or extra rewards that are received from people who vote on their token pair. Therefore, people who vote for a token pair with a bribe will not only earn the trading fees generated from swaps but also a share of the bribe.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2qdP3m7w_Md1ZOTv9qeBjQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>As a result, token pairs with a bribe will have a higher APR than without one. We know that lockers will vote for the token pair with the highest APR to maximize their rewards. So, bribing will increase the number of votes that a token pair gets, which as mentioned before increases liquidity, … etc. The currency that lockers receive from bribes is decided by the bribe issuer. They can be paid out in either the ve(3,3) DEX’s native token or the bribe issuer’s native token. ($VELO or $SONNE respectively in an example of Velodrome being the ve(3,3) DEX and Sonne Finance being the bribe issuer)</p><h4>Locked positions are now transferable</h4><p>Before with Curve, a locked position was not transferrable. Ve(3,3) introduced a new idea that these positions can be transferrable, which in theory makes sense. If you know how bonds work, it is a similar structure. A basic example of how a bond works is the following: You purchase a semiannual bond for $1000 that has a maturity date of 4 years. Assuming an annual coupon rate of 1% and holding till maturity, you earn $5 every six months and then receive the $1000 at the end of 4 years, netting $1040. But bonds trade on the secondary market, so lets say you needed that $1000 in cash, you can sell it to someone else, generally for less than what you initially paid, to liquify your position.</p><p>Since these locked positions are now transferrable, people can sell their locked tokens on a secondary market just like bonds. As I said in theory this makes sense, but there is not a lot of demand currently for secondary market sales of these positions. At the end of the day, most crypto users are degens who don’t want to hold a position for months let alone years, so this doesn’t come as a huge surprise to me.</p><h4>Lockers do not have their position diluted</h4><p>As we know from before, ve(3,3) emissions get distributed to liquidity providers. Emissions are newly issued tokens hence the total supply increases with emissions. To support long-term believers of the ve(3,3) DEX who lock their tokens, their position doesn’t get hurt by the token’s inflation. So they, in turn, earn a respective amount to hold their current position (if a locker had 1% of the total supply when first locking their tokens, they would still own 1% of the total supply in the future). Also, with a higher percentage of supply locked, rebase increases and dilution decreases. So, if you just hold the native token and do not lock it, you will be diluted by LP emissions. This incentivizes you to lock your tokens. To visualize, if 100% of the tokens are locked, all new emissions go to token lockers and the below graph will be all orange with no blue. This graph shows how emissions are distributed. (blue = emissions to LPers | orange = emissions to lockers):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/903/1*wdkELSsAUv1HHkvGjWWMcg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Solidly Documentation</figcaption></figure><p>To wrap this section up here is a simplified diagram that shows how the tokens flow throughout a ve(3,3) DEX.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_ms_hAwFFECkjcCdBmGHIw.png" /></figure><ul><li>Lockers place their vote on a pool</li><li>Lockers receive trading fees from that pool</li><li>Lockers receive any bribes placed on that pool</li><li>Emissions are given to LPers based on the percentage of votes that pool receives</li><li>Lockers are protected from dilution and receive proportion emissions to maintain their current position</li></ul><h3>Rise and Fall of Solidly</h3><p>Andre Cronje had an ambitious vision with the first ve(3,3) DEX, Solidly, aiming to become the most autonomous and decentralized exchange. One of the main objectives of Solidly was to align protocol emissions with fees generated. The protocol achieved this by implementing the components described above.</p><p>The airdrop in January 2022 was the peak of Solidly’s hype. 20 veNFTs were to be released to Fantom’s top 20 DeFi protocols by TVL, and those chosen ones would own 25% of Solidly. As a result, the TVL of Fantom rose tremendously, from $3.7 billion in December 2020 to $12.2 billion at the launch of Solidly.</p><h4>Why Solidly failed?</h4><p>As Cronje stated early on, he was building a protocol for protocols, which means that anyone is able to build upon Solidly and seek deeper liquidity if they wished to do so. Much hype and excitement was focused on this new decentralized exchange, particularly on its creator. So when Andre Cronje announced through his collaborator Anton Nell that they were both leaving the defi/crypto space in March, everything was destroyed. SOLID lost 50% of its TVL in just a few hours. Further, the flaws in Solidly’s code and an unsustainable token emission schedule led to its decline.</p><h4><em>What is next and why Velodrome?</em></h4><p>Now, Velodrome Finance comes into the picture, launched in March 2023 by a team that had created veDAO. It claims to address the main issues with Solidly whilst adding new improvements. To go over the main ones, Velodrome aims to maintain a better balance between LPers, voters, and external bribers by ensuring that rewards are claimable only after each epoch starts. They also added an on-chain governor to manage major protocol decisions such as determining tokens that are eligible for bribes and added an emergency “Commissaire” to kill unproductive bribes. Velodrome today stands as the largest ve(3,3) DEX and continues to drive the Optimism ecosystem.</p><p><em>Written with the help of Savya Raghavendra and Brianna Cheung</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5aab82add91e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/illiniblockchain/understanding-ve-3-3-5aab82add91e">Understanding ve(3,3)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/illiniblockchain">Illini Blockchain</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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