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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Centre for International Governance Innovation on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Centre for International Governance Innovation on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Centre for International Governance Innovation on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@_cigi?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[We Can’t Blame All Global Trade Chaos on Trump]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/we-cant-blame-all-global-trade-chaos-on-trump-c636c5012bfb?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[world-trade-organization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[maga]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Aug 2025 15:01:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-15T15:01:53.363Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Many of the WTO’s structures and procedures are broken and we should acknowledge that failure. By Hector Torres.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UB4LFI5jKwGbqiUVGQIhMQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>When the WTO was established in 1995, there was a broad confidence in the fairness and robustness of the rules-based trading system it oversaw. (Denis Balibouse/REUTERS)</figcaption></figure><p><em>This article was first published by the </em><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f399fccb-20fc-4d7a-88f5-a878f0c13b61"><em>Financial Times.</em></a><em> For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/we-cant-blame-all-global-trade-chaos-on-trump/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>The strength of institutions rests on their capacity to deliver fair and just outcomes. But when people feel excluded or left behind, their legitimacy erodes. Multilateral bodies such as the World Trade Organization are no exception.</p><p>When the WTO was established in 1995, there was a broad confidence in the fairness and robustness of the rules-based trading system it oversaw. The US had been its chief architect and the ultimate guarantor of that system. However, over time Washington developed legitimate concerns about how the multilateral trading system evolved. American public opinion also shifted.</p><p>Which brings us to Donald Trump. Let’s be clear: the WTO has many dysfunctional working practices, all of which precede Trump’s first term in office. <strong>So it would be unfair to suggest that the US president is bulldozing a previously well-oiled institution.</strong></p><p>The WTO currently has 166 member nations. Roughly two-thirds of them claim “developing country” status: this entitles them to “special and differential” treatment, which allows them to make slower and less ambitious tariff reductions. But here’s the catch: WTO rules allow any country to self-declare as “developing” and remain in that category indefinitely — China included. Unsurprisingly, this undermines negotiations, as talks quickly become bogged down in demands for carve-outs or flexibilities for the self-declared developing countries.</p><blockquote><em>WTO rules were crafted under the assumption that trade would be driven primarily by private actors seeking to maximise profits. That assumption no longer holds.</em></blockquote><p>The paralysis goes beyond new negotiations. The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is also not working, with the US refusing to approve new appointments to the appellate body (where I once worked).</p><p>WTO rules were crafted under the assumption that trade would be driven primarily by private actors seeking to maximise profits. That assumption no longer holds. China was the first major economy since the creation of the WTO to use trade as a tool for achieving political goals. Increasingly, many western countries — not least the US — are doing the same.</p><p>Of course, <strong>Trump should be criticised for undermining what remains of the rules-based system</strong> that the US once championed. But his hostility towards the WTO reflects a broader, collective failure.</p><p>Many of us believed deeply in the benefits of trade liberalisation and the economic interdependence it fostered. We assumed that the gains from globalisation would outweigh the costs. Job losses were anticipated, but we believed they would be offset by the creation of better paid, more productive jobs. But that turned out to be a serious political miscalculation. We are now living with the consequences.</p><p>We assumed — often more on faith than on evidence — that displaced workers could transition smoothly into more competitive sectors, aided by unemployment benefits, retraining programmes and portable pensions. Those assumptions may have been theoretically sound, but they dissolved on contact with the real lives of millions of workers and communities.</p><p><strong>We now understand that labour is much more than just a factor of production.</strong> Jobs shape our identities and our roles in society. For many, trade liberalisation has meant precarity. Moving from a stable job to unemployment felt to them like betrayal by political and economic elites. Trump recognised this. So rather than stigmatising voters who support populists like the American president, we must start with a mea culpa.</p><p>A good start would be to acknowledge that the failure to manage the transition from declining industries compassionately and effectively helped create the very conditions in which populism thrives.</p><p>So before blaming Trump, let’s first look in the mirror.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Author</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/hector-torres/">Hector Torres</a> is a senior fellow at CIGI and a former executive director at the International Monetary Fund.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c636c5012bfb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/we-cant-blame-all-global-trade-chaos-on-trump-c636c5012bfb">We Can’t Blame All Global Trade Chaos on Trump</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation">CIGI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Canada’s Procurement System Is Broken. More Transparency Could Fix It]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/canadas-procurement-system-is-broken-more-transparency-could-fix-it-3ecc67c730d6?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[procurement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mark-carney]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[canada]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2025 15:01:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-14T15:01:53.555Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Transparent procurement in Canada is not just a policy ideal; it is also a proven way to curb corruption, save money and restore public trust. By Matt Malone.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kGz0pgJYgSorPnEFDXo_tw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Canada’s complex purchasing processes might be the greatest barrier to enhancing our security posture. (Carlos Osorio/REUTERS)</figcaption></figure><p><em>For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canadas-procurement-system-is-broken-more-transparency-could-fix-it/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>“Procurement is going to be our biggest obstacle here,” former Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Armed Forces Rick Hillier <a href="https://www.securitydisruptors.ca/episodes/war-drones-national-security">recently said</a> on a panel hosted by Security Disruptors, a group focused on hybrid warfare. In a discussion about how technologies like artificial intelligence and drones are reshaping military strategy, his statement was a stark conclusion: Canada’s complex purchasing processes might be the greatest barrier to enhancing our security posture.</p><p>As Hillier put it: “We are going to need a procurement revolution that we have never seen.”</p><p>Most Canadians have known this for some time. Procurement disasters like ArriveCAN, the Phoenix pay system, the Canada Border Services Agency Assessment and Revenue Management system, and the colossal contracts awarded to McKinsey &amp; Company and Accenture have long demonstrated the <strong>need for greater transparency in procurement to prevent their reoccurrence, fight corruption and generate much-needed savings.</strong></p><p>So far, the Carney government’s early moves in procurement have been well-intentioned on all these fronts. The government is making <a href="https://www.hilltimes.com/story/2025/07/04/feds-tighten-grip-on-consultant-contracts-with-new-procurement-rules-20m-cap-on-time-based-work/466071/">an obvious effort to save</a>, although cuts across the public service are <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-federal-public-service-job-cuts-fall-heavily-on-young-workers/">falling hardest</a> on young people who bear little blame for the above-noted scandals. Worryingly, the government may also <a href="https://www.hilltimes.com/story/2025/07/04/feds-tighten-grip-on-consultant-contracts-with-new-procurement-rules-20m-cap-on-time-based-work/466071/">be adding complexity</a> to an already overwrought system of procurement rules by adding yet more fine print to a Byzantine system of rules.</p><blockquote><em>Transparent procurement is not only a low-cost way to save money; it also makes it easier to engage in evidence-based policy and law reform to improve accountability.</em></blockquote><p>It also remains to be seen whether an <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2025/07/canadas-new-government-implements-interim-reciprocal-procurement-to-protect-canadian-businesses-from-unfair-trade-practices.html">interim policy</a> on reciprocal procurement actually reduces the approximately 10 percent of Canadian federal procurement spending that <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/corporate/transparency/briefing-materials/march-2025-minister-transition/book-2-general-business.html">goes to American suppliers</a>.</p><p>If cutting costs is the goal, Canada might want to look at countries like the United Kingdom, where the recently passed Procurement Act — with enhanced transparency measures such as the default publication of contracts worth more than £5 million — is anticipated to save <a href="https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/46429/documents/1767?utm_source=chatgpt.com">hundreds of millions of pounds each year</a>. Such transparency will allow easier benchmarking and price visibility as well as stronger accountability when it comes to contractual performance. When Slovakia introduced similar transparency requirements, <a href="https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/46429/documents/1767?utm_source=chatgpt.com">procurement costs declined dramatically</a>.</p><p>Transparent procurement is not only a low-cost way to save money; it also makes it easier to engage in evidence-based policy and law reform to improve accountability. When more contractual information is published by default, it inherently provides better value for money by allowing oversight actors to identify unnecessary or improper spending and competitors to propose better services.</p><p>By contrast, Canada’s answer to proactive transparency in procurement has been the <a href="https://open.canada.ca/en">Open Government portal</a> — a repository of often unreliable data that has been known to <a href="https://deanbeeby.substack.com/p/an-error-prone-transparency">amplify misinformation</a>. <strong>The data on that site is not subject to meaningful oversight or review,</strong> and quality control audits of the data are not proactively published.</p><p>Shopify CEO Tobias Lütke <a href="https://x.com/tobi/status/1875365100951044332">has rightly identified the possibility</a> of scouring such public data sets for “monkey business.” But this is a fruitless exercise if the data is unreliable. Journalists covering the federal procurement beat in Canada — most of whom do not use that data — know that all too well.</p><p>It is also astounding that Canada has lost so much through procurement scandals, yet continues to deprive the Procurement Ombud of the power to issue binding orders to address problems and intervene before spending mishaps turn into scandals. The Ombud does not even have the power to compel documentation in their investigations and is often forced, like an average citizen, to use the Access to Information system to do their job, a system that is mired in excessive delays and overuse of exemptions.</p><h3>A Promised Review That Falls Short</h3><p>Mark Carney campaigned on a pledge to conduct an “<a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/carney-access-to-information-1.7518620">objective review</a>” of that system. Instead, his government has launched a <a href="https://www.biv.com/news/newly-launched-access-to-information-review-is-flawed-transparency-advocates-say-10850081">perfunctory review</a> that can hardly be described as objective: it essentially amounts to the government reviewing itself, which creates a massive conflict of interest and little incentive for change. This initiative represents a significant missed opportunity for savings, since the current law relies on a burdensome, reactive approach to accessing government records that urgently needs to be replaced by a shift to a model based on proactive disclosure.</p><p>The cost savings of such a system would be enormous. For example, a push toward centralization and openness by default — like Norway’s <a href="https://einnsyn.no/">easy-to-use system</a>, in which public servants can elect to release records and the public can request them without intermediation — would cut much unnecessary work, such as processing of records, by giving access to information coordinators. Additionally, AI-driven technologies could find, translate or publish documents in many cost-effective ways.</p><p><strong>The problem is that freshly elected governments quickly grow addicted to foot-dragging and spin.</strong> It remains to be seen whether this prevents the Carney government from taking <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/modernizing-access-information/the-review-process/access-information-review-report-parliament.html">long-needed measures</a> like streamlining government record-keeping and updating the outdated systems used to store and manage government information.</p><p>Too often, rather than fixing such problems, instruments of transparency and accountability become seen as irritants. This is why the Access to Information Act has not been updated in more than four decades. It is also why the statutory obligation to review the Lobbying Act every five years has been ignored, and such a review has not been conducted since 2012. Inaction on that last item is likely to be <a href="https://theijf.org/carney-disclosures-lobbying">an ongoing political vulnerability</a> for Carney.</p><p>The recent history of inaction has resulted in an inevitable string of procurement scandals from which our governments have not learned that basic transparency would go a long way in ensuring our prosperity and repairing trust in government.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Author</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/matt-malone/">Matt Malone</a> is an assistant professor at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law and the director of the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ecc67c730d6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/canadas-procurement-system-is-broken-more-transparency-could-fix-it-3ecc67c730d6">Canada’s Procurement System Is Broken. More Transparency Could Fix It</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation">CIGI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Robot Revolution Will Trigger New Fault Lines for Democracies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/the-robot-revolution-will-trigger-new-fault-lines-for-democracies-5b31d9075125?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[science-fiction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[robotics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2025 15:01:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-12T15:01:46.079Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Labour displacement will be just one part of the story. By Kyle Hiebert.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EJejBApkUiqhp9jxp5Lo6w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Before long, synthetic androids will permeate the real world alongside humanity. (REUTERS/Tyrone Siu)</figcaption></figure><p><em>For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/the-robot-revolution-will-trigger-new-fault-lines-for-democracies/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>Internet <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sq1QZB5baNw">videos</a> of human-like machines doing intricate tasks while voicing their inner thoughts are a portal into the future. Before long, synthetic androids will permeate the real world alongside humanity. But compared to uncertainties about artificial intelligence (AI) software, public reaction to intelligent robots — and their embodied nature — will be far more visceral.</p><p><strong>Managing the pitfalls of this generalized anxiety will be most difficult for open societies in the West.</strong> Authoritarian states obsess over co-opting new tools into existing control structures. By contrast, power in liberal democracies is diffuse by design. New technology thus amplifies pre-existing trends or elevates new kingmakers within business, media and politics — for better or worse. Think of the epic clout now held by Sam Altman, Jeff Bezos or Mark Zuckerberg, among others.</p><p>The robot revolution will be no different. Advanced humanoids will be especially easy to anthropomorphize, provoking both excitement and fear. This will convince some groups that robots should be granted rights and privileges akin to human citizens. Indeed, entire <a href="https://humanoidssummit.com/">conferences</a>, subcultures and <a href="https://deepmind.google/discover/blog/shaping-the-future-of-advanced-robotics/">design principles</a> originating in the West are dedicated to shaping the personhood of intelligent machines.</p><p>Such efforts will be met with fury and resistance from others. Union activists in the United States, for example, are already <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250604-us-labor-unions-fight-to-contain-ai-disruption">lobbying to ban autonomous freight trucks</a> from public roads.</p><p>To prepare, economists are busy calculating the possibility of mass labour displacement. But technological change is always a non-linear process with unintended knock-on effects. Western policy makers must recognize the spread of robots — vital to twenty-first-century prosperity and security — will disrupt more than just the job market.</p><blockquote><em>Chatbots are already functioning as stand-ins in all kinds of intimate human relationships. Conversant, lifelike humanoids are bound to increase this dramatically.</em></blockquote><h3>Robots Needed — but Are They Wanted?</h3><p>The emergence of general-purpose machines is colliding with several other trends.</p><p>Populations across the industrialized world are aging, fast. Yet even as longevity is increasing, seniors are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/03/well/live/health-span-aging.html">not necessarily becoming healthier</a>. Public health care systems designed decades ago are thus crumbling under enormous financial strain. Elsewhere, Western governments are rearming amid rising authoritarian adventurism. Climate change is rendering swathes of territory inhospitable to human life, and anemic productivity growth risks unravelling the high living standards most Westerners are accustomed to.</p><p>These are just a few scenarios where smart, nimble robots could provide immense value. But it is not that simple.</p><p>The thought of automating elder care — as Japan has <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/01/09/1065135/japan-automating-eldercare-robots/">experimented with</a> for a decade — will horrify many voters. Eyeing the ballot box, <strong>political candidates may soon launch strident attacks against pragmatic ideas for using robots to improve service delivery.</strong> Yet pledging to bring in tens of thousands of immigrant workers to support a robust care economy amid a housing crisis is also a losing electoral strategy. Ultimately, these decisions could stall public health care reform at precisely the wrong time.</p><p>The adoption of <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/the-united-states-quietly-kick-starts-the-autonomous-weapons-era/">autonomous weapons</a>, meanwhile, could shrink chronic military recruitment deficits and deliver new strategic advantages. However, these weapons are almost guaranteed to cause fatal accidents at some point. Instances of friendly soldiers or innocent civilians killed by rogue algorithms and robotic guns would likely damage public acceptance of huge military budgets now required in a hostile and fragmented world.</p><p>A steep drop in openings for <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-labour-market-an-overview/">roles disproportionately filled by foreign workers</a> could also strain ties between the West and labour-exporting countries in the Global South. At present, remittances to low and middle-income nations — roughly <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/peoplemove/in-2024--remittance-flows-to-low--and-middle-income-countries-ar">US$685 billion</a> in 2024 — keep countless communities afloat and help offset states’ limited fiscal agency. These cash flows are crucial, especially as wealthy countries keep slashing their international aid.</p><p>“Raw labour power is the most important (and often the only) asset low-income people around the world have,” reads a 2023 <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/global-economy-immigration-before-automation-people-over-robots">essay</a> from former World Bank economist Lant Pritchett. He argues immigration reform makes more economic and moral sense than subsidizing automation. “The drive to make machines that perform roles that could easily be fulfilled by people not only wastes money but helps keep the poorest poor.”</p><h3>Navigating The Extremes</h3><p>Unless governments get ahead of these social, political and other related issues, opportunistic actors will capitalize on this gap.</p><p>For one, androids displaying the hallmarks of consciousness will create new allure around <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/29/business/elon-musk-longtermism-effective-altruism-doge.html">long-termism</a>. This ideology — popular among technologists, philosophers and Silicon Valley elites — prioritizes humanity’s prospects over thousands of years above the needs of people alive today. The ability for robots to do <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/amazon-warehouse-robots-automation-942b814f">jobs at scale</a> that many persons are unable or unwilling to do will represent a tipping point for the movement. True believers of this ideology will feel self-affirmed in their antidemocratic ethos that humans, as individuals, hold little intrinsic value. Despite how far-reaching it may sound, their political influence should not be discounted.</p><p><strong>The most high-profile adherent to long-termism is Elon Musk.</strong> In a February <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/05/politics/elon-musk-rogan-interview-empathy-doge">appearance</a> on Joe Rogan’s podcast, the tech baron called empathy the “fundamental weakness of Western civilization.” In an earlier <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2024-10-29/musk-expects-more-humanoid-robots-than-people-by-2040">interview</a> with Bloomberg, Musk predicted with glee that humanoid robots will outnumber people globally by 2040.</p><p>By contrast, new factions of counter-elites will detest AI-powered robots for further eroding traditional conceptions of family, work, gender and religion. Indeed, chatbots are already functioning as stand-ins in all kinds of intimate human relationships. Conversant, lifelike humanoids are bound to increase this dramatically.</p><p>Expect a type of <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/tech-fuelled-inequality-could-catalyze-populism-20/">populism 2.0</a> to take hold among disaffected voters across the Western world. Caught on the wrong side of economic transformations and alienated by the steady decay of collective life, they will throw their support behind charismatic leaders pitching simplistic solutions to complex problems. Political violence directed against robot units, <strong>advocates and infrastructure may even become a source of personal meaning and tribal affiliation.</strong></p><p>In 2015, many residents in Philadelphia delighted in the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/03/us/hitchbot-robot-beheaded-philadelphia-feat">decapitation of HitchBOT</a> when it visited their city. The benign, hitchhiking robot was created by researchers at Canadian universities to test public reaction to novel technology. Imagine this dynamic playing out on a much grander scale. The recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/tesla-targeted-by-vandalism-over-musks-right-wing-activism-2025-04-01/">vandalism of Tesla dealerships</a> and harassment and intimidation of Tesla vehicle owners, or <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/09/photos-waymo-fire-la-protests.html">torching of Waymo robotaxis</a>, could likewise be harbingers of future anti-establishment backlash.</p><p>For democracies to avoid being undone by today’s breakneck pace of technological change, including the popularization of humanoid robots, such extremist responses must be challenged and defused.</p><p>“When both conservatives and progressives resist the temptation of radical revolution, and stay loyal to democratic traditions and institutions,” historian Yuval Noah Harari writes in his <a href="https://www.ynharari.com/book/nexus/">latest book</a>, <em>Nexus,</em> “democracies prove themselves to be highly agile.” Such self-correcting mechanisms enable open societies “to ride the technological and economic waves better than more rigid regimes.”</p><p>The alternative is to squander the opportunity to grow collective prosperity and, instead, embolden political provocateurs.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Author</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/kyle-hiebert/">Kyle Hiebert</a> is a researcher and independent political risk analyst focused on globalization, conflict and emerging technologies.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5b31d9075125" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/the-robot-revolution-will-trigger-new-fault-lines-for-democracies-5b31d9075125">The Robot Revolution Will Trigger New Fault Lines for Democracies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation">CIGI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Then and Now: How Does AI Electoral Interference Compare in 2025?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/then-and-now-how-does-ai-electoral-interference-compare-in-2025-4cfb1eaf8854?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4cfb1eaf8854</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections-canada]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deepfakes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pierre-poilievre]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2025 15:01:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-07T15:01:50.476Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Artificial intelligence is a groundbreaking technology that will shape the world as we know it. But how will it impact future politics? By Cameron McKay and Inga Trauthig.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wBiA7qyRIgFEXS7kNHXW8g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Widespread access to the internet and online discourse frequently exposes individuals to misleading and often harmful narratives. (Mathieu Belanger/REUTERS)</figcaption></figure><p><em>For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/then-and-now-how-does-ai-electoral-interference-compare-in-2025/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>The year 2024 was pivotal for AI interference in elections. Ironically, commentators were quick to swing from declaring elections in 2024 as <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/21/politics/ai-2024-election-interference-dhs-warns">doomed</a> by artificial intelligence (AI), to <a href="https://time.com/7131271/ai-2024-elections/">diminishing</a> the impact it had to a minimum — or even denying that AI had any impact at all. Instead of operating in these cycles of doom and reprieve, we should be looking at the data and deriving lessons for future elections. In 2025, ballots have already taken place in Australia, Canada, Germany, Lebanon and Romania. In the second half of 2025, the world anticipates important elections in Argentina, Chile, Iraq, Moldova and the Netherlands, among others. Electoral observers and participants have flagged close ballot races and hotly debated political surprises in countries where electoral processes have already concluded, including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/may/03/peter-dutton-lost-seat-dickson-electorate-australian-federal-election">Australia</a>, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/canada-election-trump-carney-poilievre-861f5b00794355b231ee3f218568949b?utm_">Canada</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/28/far-right-chega-party-becomes-main-opposition-in-portugals-parliament">Portugal</a> and various subnational <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2025/apr/01/donald-trump-elon-musk-special-elections-florida-wisconsin-texas-arizona-us-politics-live?filterKeyEvents=false&amp;page=with%3Ablock-67ebb3618f0826a011330f6e">US elections</a>.</p><p>AI is a groundbreaking technology that will shape the world as we know it. But how will it impact future politics? As part of a recent <a href="https://www.ipie.info/research/tp2025-2">study</a> by the International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE), we examined how AI has been employed in elections around the world in 2024, and what this might teach us about current and future trends.</p><p>As with any such controversy in the twenty-first century, <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/132906/pdf/">widespread access to the internet, social media platforms and online discourse</a> frequently expose individuals to misleading and often harmful narratives online, limiting their ability to distinguish between amplified falsehoods and reality. Even more evident in the modern political environment, <strong>our collective online interconnectedness now presents an irreplaceable opportunity to shape the potential voting patterns</strong> of billions around the world who rely on the digital space to educate themselves and others on key political issues. Whether national or subnational, first-round voting or a complete rerun (as in the case of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crk2xxzxkzxo">Romania</a>), modern and future elections share this common theme: an increasingly digital nature vulnerable to manipulation. In the modern context, this commonality is intrinsically tied to the workings of AI, predominantly through AI’s contribution to the generation of mass information and misinformation.</p><blockquote><em>Across countries as diverse as Bangladesh, France, Namibia, South Africa and Taiwan, AI was relied upon to create content designed to misguide voters, defame candidates or prop up unrealistic images of political parties.</em></blockquote><h3>Dominance of AI Content Creation and the Internationalization of Misinformation</h3><p>In 2024, more than 80 percent of countries experienced observable instances of AI usage relevant to their electoral processes. <strong>By far, the most popular employment of AI across elections was for content creation</strong> (accounting for 90 percent of all observed cases), <a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/643ecb10be528d2c1da863cb/682f5ae442fffdff819ef830_TP%202025.2.pdf">compared</a> to content proliferation (24 percent), hypertargeting (three percent) and unclear uses (four percent). AI content creation could include anything from audio messages to AI-powered avatars, fake political endorsements by celebrities and AI-generated messages from dead politicians.</p><p>Across countries as diverse as Bangladesh, France, Namibia, South Africa and Taiwan, AI was relied upon to create content designed to misguide voters, defame candidates or prop up unrealistic images of political parties. Notably, content creation was often highly targeted, specifically aimed at underlying societal predispositions or prejudices. For instance, in elections across India, Indonesia and Mexico, <strong>AI was used to create defamatory images of female candidates</strong>, specifically building on and amplifying misogynistic stereotypes. This finding builds on <a href="https://cdt.org/insights/report-hated-more-online-violence-targeting-women-of-color-candidates-in-the-2024-us-election/">a substantial body of evidence</a> suggesting that disinformation has disproportionate consequences for minority groups typically targeted by racist, misogynist, xenophobic and other hateful beliefs.</p><p>In general, our data confirms that AI allows for high proportions of tailored content. As part of this trend, in countries across Africa and Asia, political campaigners produced AI content, such as video deepfakes, of former US President Joe Biden and current US President Donald Trump endorsing local political parties and candidates. AI technologies offered these campaigners an opportunity to have world-leading figures “speak” on highly localized, niche topics (imagine Trump commenting on African agriculture). This increased granularity of misinformation has brought with it the trend of further internationalization by injecting avatars of world leaders or celebrities into local election campaigns.</p><h3>Increased AI Experimentation</h3><p>While AI interference in elections is frequently imagined at the national level, subnational elections offer insights into AI experiments that some campaigners would be <a href="https://mediaengagement.org/research/generative-ai-elections-and-beyond/">cautious</a> to emulate nationwide. Further, with some improvements of information security measures in national elections around the world,<strong> nefarious actors can look to local and regional campaigns as easy targets for influence.</strong> With less regulations and resources available to authorities, local campaigns provide a key testing ground for new AI technology, which can similarly influence significant election results, albeit on a smaller and more localized scale. Elections across the Americas, Africa, Asia and Europe saw cases of AI content emulating specific regional dialects and slang, or the presence of synthetic audio to impersonate local officials in a key battleground state, province or region.</p><p>This development is particularly worrisome as the AI capabilities of language translation are among the main benefits for political candidates trying to reach more voters. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for example, <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bengaluru/bjp-to-use-ai-to-translate-pms-speeches/articleshow/108318912.cms">used</a> AI to translate campaign speeches into more than 100 languages to diverse constituents across the country. <strong>This example underlines how these technological advancements can be beneficial to democracy if they are used transparently.</strong> In Japan, an independent candidate for the Tokyo gubernatorial race, Anno Takahiro, used an AI avatar to <a href="https://futurepolis.substack.com/p/meet-your-ai-politician-of-the-future">respond to 8,600 questions</a> from voters, which increased voter engagement and potentially interest in the electoral race. Given these examples, the question is how to harness positive use cases while reigning in malevolent AI exploitation.</p><p>Arguably, the most concerning observation our research posits is that, in some cases, AI can contribute to an outsized, manipulative impact on elections. This finding is most evident in the case of Romania, where its 2024 presidential election results were <a href="https://www.ifes.org/publications/romanian-2024-election-annulment-addressing-emerging-threats-electoral-integrity">annulled</a> after evidence showed AI-powered interference using manipulated videos. Although this case accounts for a very small portion of the global data set, the targeted and proficient nature of the interference — very likely foreign sponsored — had serious ramifications for future Romanian electoral integrity. Cases like that demonstrate an important lesson in understanding that AI can act as an accelerator in the tool kit of traditional disinformation campaigns.</p><h3>2025 Elections: Same, Same but Different</h3><p>Elections around the world this year have underscored many of the standout takeaways presented in the IPIE report; that is, that the majority of races are seeing AI-generated content entering the fray, that the impact of AI is often supplementary but in some instances pre-eminent and that, generally, AI allows for even more targeted campaigning.</p><p>In the Australian and Canadian elections this year, the ruling political parties experienced unexpected boosts in support in the final weeks before voting, contrary to earlier polling that anticipated results favouring conservative parties in both countries. While both countries now settle into their current political leadership, federal authorities in both <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/canada-says-china-india-may-seek-meddle-election-2025-03-24/">Canada</a> and <a href="https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/files/eiat/election-security-environment-overview.pdf">Australia</a> warned against the risk of AI interference, predominantly singling out hostile foreign actors as potential culprits.</p><p>In a notable Canadian case, an AI deepfake of Prime Minister Mark Carney, originally released directly before the election, reached <a href="https://dfrlab.org/2025/06/19/deepfake-video-of-canadian-prime-minister-reaches-millions-on-tiktok-x/">more than one million views</a> on social media by June. With <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/byelection-called-battle-river-crowfoot-1.7573605">an August byelection in Alberta, Canada</a>, to determine the political future of Conservative opposition leader, Pierre Poilievre, AI-related threats remain latent. This example shows that <strong>foreign actors continue their assault on democracies through information campaigns.</strong> In our 2024 data, a fifth of all observable AI incidents were <a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/643ecb10be528d2c1da863cb/682f5ae442fffdff819ef830_TP%202025.2.pdf">produced</a> by foreign actors (20 percent), but a declared 46 percent of incidents had “no known source” since attribution is often hard.</p><p>South of the Canadian border, subnational US elections continue to face AI-generated content from a wide variety of sources. Even in the wake of the 2024 US presidential election, local, regional and state elections offered a breeding ground for wider polarization, conspiracy theories and disinformation spurred on by nefarious applications of AI. In New York state, accusations were levied against both <a href="https://nypost.com/2025/04/23/us-news/nyc-mayoral-candidate-zohran-mamdani-accused-of-using-ai-to-fake-spanish-fluency-but-socialist-says-critics-are-loco/">Zohran Mamdani in New York City’s mayoral primary</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/campaigns/3468322/stefanik-challenger-bizarre-deepfake-video-governor-bid/">Democratic candidate Blake Gendebien in the state’s twenty-first congressional district</a> for potentially improper AI usage. Whether these allegations are accurate or not, these cases affirm that even an accusation of AI use (false or otherwise) can be a useful political means to sway voters against a candidate.</p><p><strong>Across Europe, worsening polarization and political division increase national susceptibility to AI-generated interference</strong> — a trend that is exacerbated during election years. In Germany, although it had a limited impact, an <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-far-right-harness-artificial-intelligence-win-election/">AI-generated deepfake</a> containing nostalgic images of the past was employed by candidates of the far-right party, Alternative for Deutschland (AfD). This case reminds us of the earlier mentioned trend to resurrect dead politicians with AI to bolster the popularity of current political candidates and parties. It remains unclear whether voters consider this tactic creepy or are positively impacted. Regardless, the AfD saw a substantial popularity boost, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-results-explained-in-graphics/a-71724186">receiving</a> the second-highest share of votes (after the Christian Democratic Union).</p><blockquote><em>AI is not a stand-alone disruptor but rather a powerful new layer in existing influence operations, with the potential to outpace rules and regulations if not managed appropriately.</em></blockquote><h3>Fostering Democratic Developments with AI</h3><p>In 2025, we should move away from considering AI a looming threat and instead acknowledge its incorporation into daily activities. This shift includes the fact that political campaigners have added AI to their tool kit: they are testing the boundaries of what is acceptable not only from a regulatory standpoint but also for citizens. This attempt at AI mainstreaming does not only happen during election seasons, as seen in how President Trump repeatedly embeds AI into his communications from <a href="https://www.instagram.com/reel/DGhfpgHsOg6/?hl=en">Gaza</a> to the <a href="https://x.com/WhiteHouse/status/1918502592335724809?lang=en">Vatican</a>.</p><p>Importantly, <strong>data shows that at least 16 percent of AI employment was for seemingly benevolent purposes,</strong> such as translating content and using generative AI chatbots to connect with more voters.</p><p>In order to curtail the <a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/643ecb10be528d2c1da863cb/682f5ae442fffdff819ef830_TP%202025.2.pdf">overwhelming</a> amount of malevolent applications of AI, robust, democratic and forward-looking policy responses are needed. These include <a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/643ecb10be528d2c1da863cb/682f5a4f6e67bd3f03885d4a_SFP%202025.1.pdf">recommendations</a> ranging from short-term transparency requirements and platform accountability to long-term legislative frameworks and AI watermarking. A strategic road map is needed, not only for mitigating the immediate threats but also to reshape and strengthen the information ecosystems to reinforce our collective resilience.</p><p>Of particular concern is the current ability to self-detect the use of generative AI, especially as AI content progressively improves and rapidly increases its sense of realism. Ultimately, AI is not a stand-alone disruptor but rather a <strong>powerful new layer in existing influence operations,</strong> with the potential to outpace rules and regulations if not managed appropriately. To protect electoral integrity, governments, platforms and civil society should act together, utilizing both the technical know-how and institutional reforms necessary to safeguard democratic legitimacy in a new information age.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Authors</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/cameron-mckay/">Cameron McKay</a> is a security analyst and M.A. candidate at King’s College London. He has worked on intelligence and foreign policy with Canada’s federal government.</p><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/inga-trauthig/">Inga Trauthig</a> is a research professor at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University. She is a security studies scholar and received her Ph.D. from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4cfb1eaf8854" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/then-and-now-how-does-ai-electoral-interference-compare-in-2025-4cfb1eaf8854">Then and Now: How Does AI Electoral Interference Compare in 2025?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation">CIGI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Pax Americana to Pax “Multipolaris”: The Rise of a Fragmented Global Order]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/from-pax-americana-to-pax-multipolaris-the-rise-of-a-fragmented-global-order-d8fcded759f9?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d8fcded759f9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pax-americana]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[america]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2025 15:01:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-05T15:01:27.404Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Global power is shifting from US unipolarity to Pax Multipolaris, an unstable order driven by risk, great-power rivalry and existential threats. By Daniel Araya.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jwSJZD1Pftansx_Vmmxzgg.jpeg" /><figcaption>US foreign policy is accelerating a shift toward multipolarity, where “America First” ultimately means “America alone.” (Adrees Latif/REUTERS)</figcaption></figure><p><em>For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/from-pax-americana-to-pax-multipolaris-the-rise-of-a-fragmented-global-order/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>The global order is undergoing a profound transformation, marked by a shift away from American unipolarity and toward a new era defined by multipolar rivalry. At the heart of this transformation is the role of risk and crisis as the cornerstones of a loosely coupled global system. Unlike the institutional certainties of the Bretton Woods order, today’s multipolar system is governed by the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2025/?gad_source=1&amp;gad_campaignid=22143132231">spectre of cascading collapse</a> — climate tipping points, nuclear proliferation, technological disruption and the threat of great-power war.</p><p>The result is a global order not of harmony but of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-sustainability/article/global-polycrisis-the-causal-mechanisms-of-crisis-entanglement/06F0F8F3B993A221971151E3CB054B5E">continuous risk management</a> — held together less by ideological alignment than by a pragmatic recognition that cooperation, however limited or transactional, is the only alternative to catastrophe. These risks do not eliminate geopolitical competition, nor do they mitigate economic rivalry. Rather, they impose boundaries on the scope of multipolar struggle, as the costs of unchecked conflict rise to the level of existential peril.</p><p>This new era reflects not only the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/05/usa-china-multipolar-bipolar-unipolar/">decline of <em>Pax Americana</em></a> but also the rise of a new order best described as <em>Pax “Multipolaris</em>.” More than a redistribution of power, <em>Pax Multipolaris</em> denotes a redefinition of how power operates across civilizational, ideological and technological lines of control. <strong>Under</strong> <strong><em>Pax Multipolaris</em>, no single power sets the rules.</strong> Rather, peace is shaped through military deterrence and the shared threat of global extinction.</p><h3>Beyond Pax Americana</h3><p>The truth is that the era of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/donald-trump-foreign-policy-america-first/616872/"><em>Pax Americana</em> has been eroding for some time</a>. President Donald Trump’s return to the political spotlight signals a deepening retreat of the United States from its postwar role at the centre of the global system. Reframing global engagement as a burden rather than a strategic asset, the Trump administration has deliberately undermined transatlantic ties abroad while expanding America’s regional focus at home. Far from reaffirming global hegemony, US foreign policy is accelerating a shift toward multipolarity, where “America First” ultimately means “America alone.”</p><blockquote><em>In this emerging order, no single hegemon dictates the terms of global stability.</em></blockquote><p>Cemented after the Cold War, America’s unipolar moment was underpinned by liberal international institutions, US dollar hegemony and the unrivalled reach of American hard power. However, military overreach, economic overextension and internal polarization have eroded the credibility and coherence of American primacy. Internally, American policy has become a series of transactional gambles underscored by imperial hubris. Externally, rising powers such as China, India, Iran and Russia have begun <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/03/05/the-global-balance-of-power-is-rapidly-shifting/">reconfiguring the global order around a new balance of power</a>.</p><p>The shift from <em>Pax Americana</em> to <em>Pax Multipolaris</em> marks a new configuration in power shaped by the singular threat of existential crisis. In this emerging order, no single hegemon dictates the terms of global stability. Instead, peace is sustained by a precarious balance of hard-power deterrence and economic interdependence. This fragile equilibrium does not preclude confrontation; it simply reaffirms the Cold War imperative to avoid collapse.</p><h3>Multipolar Peace</h3><p>In this context, <em>Pax Multipolaris</em> is less an ideal than a necessity — an enforced stability forged not through shared values but through shared vulnerabilities. Unlike the ideological frictions of the Cold War, today’s multipolar landscape is defined by pragmatic alignments and contingent partnerships, shaped as much by fear of collapse as by pursuit of power. As the threat of existential risk continues to move up the escalation ladder, nations are increasingly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/19/world/canada/canada-eu-military-industry-trump.html">seeking strategic insulation from systemic shocks</a>. The result is a world in which military deterrence and strategic supply chains now form the pillars of a delicate coexistence.</p><p>Rather than a return to Cold War bipolarity, global multipolarity is defined by a complex and fluid equilibrium, where peace — such as it is — stems from negotiated coexistence rather than from multilateral compliance. Where superpower rivalry once enforced a precarious balance through ideological and nuclear standoffs, <strong>today’s multipolar system operates without a unifying framework,</strong> replacing ideological confrontation with a patchwork of transactional alliances and ad hoc constraints.</p><p>In this new order, the old lines between allies and adversaries are being redrawn, with countries in the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en">Global South aligning around new spheres of influence</a>. Only the logic of survival provides the connective tissue linking the system as a whole. Indeed, only the shared recognition of potential system collapse provides the incentive for multipolar balance. This fragile equilibrium hinges on the ability of major powers to limit the scope of geopolitical rivalry, preventing localized conflicts from spiralling into system-wide contagion. Thus, multipolar peace persists not through trust or institutional strength but through exhaustion with chaos — a grudging acknowledgement that the alternative to uneasy coexistence is existential crisis.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Author</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/daniel-araya/">Daniel Araya</a> is a CIGI senior fellow, a senior partner with the World Legal Summit, and a consultant and an adviser with a special interest in artificial intelligence, technology policy and governance.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d8fcded759f9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/from-pax-americana-to-pax-multipolaris-the-rise-of-a-fragmented-global-order-d8fcded759f9">From Pax Americana to Pax “Multipolaris”: The Rise of a Fragmented Global Order</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation">CIGI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From MAGA to MTGA: How Trump’s Foreign Policy Became about Making Trump Great Again]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/from-maga-to-mtga-how-trumps-foreign-policy-became-about-making-trump-great-again-338e60b6926f?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/338e60b6926f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[us-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[maga]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 31 Jul 2025 15:02:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-31T15:02:07.359Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Trump’s second-term foreign policy isn’t about putting America first — it’s about putting Trump at the centre. By S. Yash Kalash.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6cksn1NvLcNq2vPwEHmpig.jpeg" /><figcaption>Donald Trump employs a strongman foreign policy, but one that serves the man and keeps him at the centre of it, not the state. (Gretchen Ertl/REUTERS)</figcaption></figure><p><em>For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/from-maga-to-mtga-how-trumps-foreign-policy-became-about-making-trump-great-again/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>Donald Trump swept into office in 2024 on the promise of “America First” — a rejection of costly foreign entanglements and a renewed focus on rebuilding the American economy, industry and national spirit. His appeal rested on a vow to avoid unnecessary wars, dismantle globalist entrenchments and redirect US attention inward. For millions, Trump was the anti-war president, the pragmatic isolationist, the builder-in-chief who would restore American greatness by putting American needs above global adventures.</p><p>But Trump 2.0, as seen in his recent foreign policy stances and actions, suggests a different agenda is at play. His aggressive posturing toward Iran, bizarre embrace of Pakistan and escalating friction with allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Group of Seven (G7) are raising questions not only about strategic coherence but about personal motivations. <strong>What was once MAGA now looks more like MTGA — Make Trump Great Again.</strong></p><p>The essence of Trump’s evolving foreign policy is not ideological consistency or strategic vision. Rather, it is the use of diplomacy, military leverage and international spectacle to centre Trump himself as a global brand. He does not aim to reshape the world order based on US national interest, but rather to project himself as its most indispensable character: the dealmaker, the peacemaker, the strongman who can bring adversaries to heel and allies to heel harder.</p><blockquote><em>In this model, foreign policy becomes theatre, and Trump is always the lead actor.</em></blockquote><p>Take, for instance, his recent rhetoric about brokering peace between India and Pakistan. Trump has repeatedly claimed credit for causing a ceasefire between the nuclear neighbours. These assertions are not rooted in verifiable diplomacy but in the performative logic of reality TV politics: take the credit, own the narrative, even if it wasn’t your show to begin with. In this model, foreign policy becomes theatre, and Trump is always the lead actor.</p><p>More troubling is the apparent shift in Trump’s posture toward Pakistan. Historically a hub of strategic ambiguity, Pakistan has long been both ally and adversary to Washington. Yet Trump’s recent flirtations suggest a willingness to re-engage Islamabad’s military establishment for transactional gain. Rumours abound of covert cooperation channels being revived, not just in intelligence but potentially in frontier technologies such as digital assets. Allegations of backdoor crypto deals or political favours via opaque channels evoke a disturbing image: <strong>a foreign policy shaped less by statecraft and more by personal or familial business interests.</strong></p><p>Trump’s business empire and business associates have already faced scrutiny over questionable real estate ventures in places such as <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/13/donald-trumps-worst-deal">Azerbaijan</a>, the <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/trumps-business-ties-in-the-philippines-are-an-ethics-nightmare?srsltid=AfmBOoobZTeHPD7ylso42vm8d2z_hfo9Da6ugikvNDPMuLNhtpm_O1KS">Philippines</a>, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-business-ethics-white-paper-foreign-deals-golf-hotels-260a4343d52bb21614f04cfded7fd19a">Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab E</a>mirates. If similar relationships are developing in unstable but strategically useful nations, such as Pakistan, the implications are serious. Not only does this raise ethical red flags, it weaponizes the presidency for personal profit.</p><p>Meanwhile, Trump’s approach to long-standing US allies is increasingly antagonistic. He routinely disparages NATO, questions defense commitments and levies tariffs against G7 partners. These acts are not part of a larger doctrine of rebalancing global power but seem driven by a desire to dominate headlines and dictate terms. Trump wants to be seen as the man who bends Europe to his will, not as a steward of alliances built on shared values and mutual trust.</p><p>This behaviour poses a problem for his core political base. Many of the voters who backed Trump for a second term did so out of a belief that he would withdraw America from costly global misadventures and focus on domestic renewal. <strong>But now, they see a president increasingly embroiled in foreign dramas</strong>, often of his own making and sometimes with alarming opacity. The promise to “end forever wars” is being replaced with strategic ambiguity and transactional engagement, not far removed from the very behaviours he once condemned.</p><p>Indeed, Trump’s foreign policy is neither isolationist nor interventionist. Even on matters such as China, Iran or Ukraine, Trump shifts stances with dizzying speed. It is a strongman foreign policy, but one that serves the man and keeps him at the centre of it, not the state.</p><p>This emerging Trump doctrine undermines both America’s credibility and its strategic coherence. It tells allies that they are disposable and adversaries that they can cut deals if they flatter him. It also fractures the very nationalist base that once powered his ascent. The America First movement wanted sovereignty and not a reality show spectacle for presidency. As Trump continues to entangle himself in opaque foreign dealings, he risks alienating the movement he once championed.</p><p>In the end, what we are witnessing is not the revival of American greatness on the global stage but an attempt of a man to use his presidency to solidify his personal brand using the levers of US power. This is not the foreign policy of a republic, but the marketing strategy of a man who seeks not to lead the world, but to headline it.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Author</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/s-yash-kalash/">S. Yash Kalash</a> is a senior fellow at CIGI and an expert in strategy, public policy, digital technology and financial services. He has a distinguished track record advising governments and the private sector on emerging technologies.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=338e60b6926f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/from-maga-to-mtga-how-trumps-foreign-policy-became-about-making-trump-great-again-338e60b6926f">From MAGA to MTGA: How Trump’s Foreign Policy Became about Making Trump Great Again</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation">CIGI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Taking the Wrong Lesson from China’s AI Strategy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/taking-the-wrong-lesson-from-chinas-ai-strategy-bf04b156ed4c?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bf04b156ed4c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[chinese-ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:01:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-29T15:01:56.810Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The United States is mimicking China’s approach to centralized data, risking privacy, security and democratic accountability in the name of AI leadership. By Susan Ariel Aaronson and Michael Moreno.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mjgnxFPYbwyMn7Dmv5hOqg.jpeg" /><figcaption>In 2014, Beijing announced that it would allow government agencies to share data about Chinese companies and citizens. (Aly Song/REUTERS)</figcaption></figure><p><em>For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/taking-the-wrong-lesson-from-chinas-ai-strategy/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>Chinese leaders early on recognized the importance of data for artificial intelligence (AI). In 2015, officials <a href="https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/china-wants-to-put-data-to-work-as-an-economic-resource-but-how/">announced incentives to treat data as a key factor of production</a>. More recently, China became the first country to create official markets for data. Chinese policy makers developed standards that enabled private entities to claim data as an asset on balance sheets. <strong>But China may have made a data “misstep.”</strong> In 2014, Beijing announced that it would allow government agencies to share data about Chinese companies and citizens, create a centralized scoring mechanism to assess the financial creditworthiness of individuals and companies, and use that data to nudge citizens toward state-sanctioned “moral values.” Observers noted that the plan has <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/11/22/1063605/china-announced-a-new-social-credit-law-what-does-it-mean/">yielded mixed results,</a> and spillover effects such as corruption and distrust. Nonetheless, on April 1, 2025, the government announced new guidelines on the social credit system, intended <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202503/1331257.shtml">to create a “unified national market.”</a></p><p>Although the Trump administration has worked to thwart China’s AI leadership, it is copying some aspects of China’s data policies by creating a unified federal data set. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/stopping-waste-fraud-and-abuse-by-eliminating-information-silos/">On March 20, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order to “eliminate information silos”</a> across federal agencies by requiring that agencies share unclassified data with each other to fight fraud and waste. The White House has released few details about this “master database.” However, both <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;opi=89978449&amp;url=https://newrepublic.com/post/195904/trump-palantir-data-americans&amp;ved=2ahUKEwin75rUg9mNAxVNFVkFHeHzKlAQFnoECBkQAQ&amp;usg=AOvVaw0RBfVXuC7Ob1IP_5OTmKWI"><em>The New Republic</em></a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/30/technology/trump-palantir-data-americans.html"><em>The New York Times</em></a> reported that the White House “tapped Palantir,” a large data analytics company, to build it. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2025/05/01/nx-s1-5372776/palantir-tech-contracts-trump">In the wake of rising public concern about its work</a>, Palantir has claimed these reports are incorrect.</p><p>But such a data set <strong>risks Americans’ privacy and appears to violate US law.</strong> AI can make it easier to extract, re-identify and act on sensitive information about people such as their location or interests. The Privacy Act of 1974<a href="https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974"> sets limits on how and when US government agencies can collect and utilize data. Specifically, agencies must justify any “system of records,” limit how data can be used and grant individuals’ access to their files so mistakes can be corrected.</a> With these privacy protections in place, Americans felt comfortable expressing their opinions and ideas.</p><blockquote><em>Congress can build on this regulation by setting clear rules on how Americans’ personal data can be collected, stored and analyzed with AI and other sophisticated analytical techniques.</em></blockquote><p>Moreover, a unified federal data set presents other problems for the American people. First, <strong>it is much easier to hack a unified data set</strong> than multiple agency data sets. Once information is hacked or stolen, malign actors could sell that information and/or use it to manipulate and target US individuals and groups. Second, without clear rules governing the creation and use of such data sets, US policy makers could use the data to create detailed profiles of Americans, as China is trying to do with its citizens under its social credit program. Administration officials could also target individuals or groups that are out of favour with the current administration.</p><p>Third, over the long term, if Americans feel their data is being exploited or misused, they may lie about their data or stop sharing it, which could, over time, compromise the accuracy, completeness and representativeness of federal data sets. If companies don’t believe federal data has integrity, they may be less willing to invest in US bonds. Finally, no one company should be granted access to information about US individuals, since it would give such a company a competitive advantage in data and access to data troves they should not collect, use, reuse or sell. The Digital Trade and Data Governance Hub has created <a href="https://datagovhub.elliott.gwu.edu/">a literature guide delineating the Trump administration’s efforts</a> to create a data set, as <a href="https://datagovhub.elliott.gwu.edu/digital-trade-and-data-governance-hubs-data-governance-mapping-consultation/">well as documenting efforts to challenge its creation</a>.</p><p>But there is a potential upside to the Trump administration’s attempts to create a unified data set. It could motivate Congress to finally update privacy laws for the information age and forbid the creation of such a data set. <a href="https://trahan.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3491">In March, Congresswoman Lori Trahan (D-MA) sought to catalyze these efforts</a> when she wrote a letter seeking information from experts and citizens on how to re-evaluate the Privacy Act. Building on her findings, Trahan plans to focus on rules governing governmental use of personal information.</p><p>Ironically, the Trump administration recognizes <strong>data aggregation poses national security risks.</strong> In April, it issued rules governing foreign access to Americans’ data. The <a href="https://www.justice.gov/nsd/data-security">Data Security Program</a> establishes a form of export controls that prevent foreign adversaries, and those subject to their control, jurisdiction, ownership and direction, from accessing US government-related data and bulk genomic, geolocation, biometric, health, financial and other sensitive personal data.</p><p>Congress can build on this regulation by setting clear rules on how Americans’ personal data can be collected, stored and analyzed with AI and other sophisticated analytical techniques. <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;opi=89978449&amp;url=https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/CDT-Comment-re-Trahan-Privacy-Act-RFI-04302025.pdf&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjplsPbhtmNAxW7D1kFHUlAJn8QFnoECBgQAw&amp;usg=AOvVaw1V7aArTLJDkV_DjzlLFgCH">As the Center for Democracy and Technology has noted</a>, the 1974 act allowed agencies to disclose personal information if the disclosure is “routine,” meaning compatible with the purpose for which it was collected. Future iterations of the act should limit such disclosure. Moreover, Congress must prohibit government use of personal data for tracking or discriminating against individuals. Congress should require the US government to report quarterly on how they use AI to analyze federal data sets containing personal information and delineate who is responsible for data use and reuse. Finally, Congress should learn from China and <strong>forbid the creation of a unified data set on Americans.</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/02/public-comment-invited-on-artificial-intelligence-action-plan/">President Trump has declared that US leadership in AI is essential to America’s economic and national security</a>. But leadership abroad in AI begins at home by protecting Americans’ personal data.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Authors</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/susan-ariel-aaronson/">Susan Ariel Aaronson</a> is a CIGI senior fellow, research professor of international affairs at George Washington University (GWU) and co-principal investigator with the NSF-NIST Institute for Trustworthy AI in Law &amp; Society, where she leads research on data and AI governance.</p><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/michael-moreno/">Michael Moreno</a> is an AI and data governance researcher at the Digital Trade and Data Governance Hub at George Washington University.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bf04b156ed4c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/taking-the-wrong-lesson-from-chinas-ai-strategy-bf04b156ed4c">Taking the Wrong Lesson from China’s AI Strategy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation">CIGI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Raquel Garbers — Canada Must Guard Against China’s Economic Aggression — Or Risk Its Place in the…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/raquel-garbers-canada-must-guard-against-chinas-economic-aggression-or-risk-its-place-in-the-1c1ff826a3c1?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1c1ff826a3c1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[xi-jinping]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump-administration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Jul 2025 15:46:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-25T15:46:58.651Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Raquel Garbers — Canada Must Guard Against China’s Economic Aggression — Or Risk Its Place in the New Global Order</h3><h4>Canada’s place in the new global order depends in large part on making reforms to meaningfully contest Beijing.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3meoMx0KbAHf6Q0RU5Qb5A.jpeg" /><figcaption>U.S. President Donald Trump at a bilateral meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping during the 2019 G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan. (Kevin Lamarque/REUTERS)</figcaption></figure><p><em>This article was first published by the </em><a href="https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/canada-must-guard-against-chinas-economic-aggression-or-risk-its-place-in-the-new-global/article_de73a927-420e-4fa2-8576-41b125d20111.html"><em>Toronto Star.</em></a> <em>For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canada-must-guard-against-chinas-economic-aggression-or-risk-its-place-in-the-new-global-order/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>The post-Cold War order has collapsed, and NATO allies face the prospect of one day finding themselves in a war for which they are ill-prepared.</p><p>Despite years’ worth of evidence that the hostile axis anchored by China and Russia was preparing for conflict and growing more powerful by the day, <strong>America’s allies failed to make the investments</strong> needed to rebuild their military power and help the United States deter war.</p><p>Only when confronted with the reality that the U.S. would no longer backstop them if they continued to shirk their obligations did they honour their longstanding commitment to spend 2 per cent of GDP on defence. And at the recent NATO summit, under increasing U.S. pressure and the growing risk of war, NATO leaders set a goal of spending up to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035–3.5 per cent on core military needs and 1.5 per cent on defence- and security-related infrastructure.</p><p>While large-scale defence investments are long overdue and urgent, they will matter for nothing if the allies — America included — fail to secure themselves against the decades-long economic warfare Beijing has perpetrated against the West.</p><p>Almost without exception, key allies made themselves vulnerable to Beijing at the end of the Cold War, as foreign policy and economic elites championed the misguided belief that economic interdependence would pave the path to peace and prosperity. Enchanted by this fantastical view of the world, the allies made themselves easy targets, reducing their defence spending and opening up their economies to rival states.</p><blockquote><em>As the allies prepare to rebuild their defence capabilities, their top priority must be a hard decoupling from Beijing.</em></blockquote><p>Seizing the opportunity to attack the allies from inside their own economic systems, China pioneered a sophisticated form of economic warfare. Weaponizing its market size, as well as offers of easy money and cheap labour pools, it used malign trade and investment, research partnerships and other economic activities to buy, bully and cheat its way into the allies’ military supply chains, industrial systems and sensitive technology networks.</p><p>Once inside, it set to work: theft, espionage, sabotage, bribery and manipulative market practices helped China amass the economic and military power it needed to harass and intimidate other states into doing its bidding. And as its power grew, so did its brazen aggressions. <strong>China now routinely uses political interference,</strong> hostage diplomacy, cyberattacks, military intimidation and harassment, disinformation campaigns and transnational repression in its daily attacks on other states.</p><p>The military effects that flow from this economic warfare are especially serious, not to mention dangerously underappreciated. Having secured critical chokepoints in military supply chains and made itself the world’s manufacturing hub, China has the ability to stop the allies from producing critical weapons at scale, if at all. It has also erased the technology gap that the allies long relied on to deter it from making credible military threats against them, and it has positioned itself to execute sabotage and espionage attacks on the <strong>critical resources allied militaries need in order to mobilize</strong>, communicate and fight.</p><p>In other words, Beijing has made economic interdependence a Trojan horse.</p><p>Efforts by some allies to combat this economic warfare have been made in half-measures, if only because an open economy can never be secured against a determined state actor that’s nested within it. But as the allies prepare to rebuild their defence capabilities, their top priority must be a hard decoupling from Beijing. If they fail to shut China out of their economic systems, the hundreds of billions of dollars they’re promising to spend on defence may serve as yet another unintended contribution to its war machine.</p><p>Canada’s place in the new global order depends in large part on making reforms to meaningfully contest Beijing. In a world readying itself for sustained and intense competition between the major powers, if not widespread war, allies able to secure themselves against Beijing’s economic warfare will be critically important. Our natural resources, geographic distance from “hot zones” and deep interconnectivity with the U.S. — still the world’s single most powerful country — position us well to secure a place for ourselves among them.</p><p>If we instead follow the counsel of those who would have us deepen our relations with Beijing to reduce our dependence on the U.S., we will soon find ourselves <strong>suffering the consequences of partnering with an adversary.</strong> Beijing will attack us because it can, and the allies will bypass us because they must.</p><p>What’s more, the U.S. will treat us as a threat to its security — because we will have made ourselves precisely that.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Author</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/raquel-garbers/">Raquel Garbers</a> is a CIGI visiting executive from the Department of National Defence, where she held the role of director general, strategic defence policy, since April 2018. She is also a visiting practitioner with the US Department of Defense (Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies). Raquel served as the principal architect of Canada’s new defence policy, <em>Our North, Strong and Free.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1c1ff826a3c1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/raquel-garbers-canada-must-guard-against-chinas-economic-aggression-or-risk-its-place-in-the-1c1ff826a3c1">Raquel Garbers — Canada Must Guard Against China’s Economic Aggression — Or Risk Its Place in the…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation">CIGI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[S. Yash Kalash & Paul Samson — Mapping the Money Multiverse: From Cash to Crypto and Everything In…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@_cigi/s-yash-kalash-paul-samson-mapping-the-money-multiverse-from-cash-to-crypto-and-everything-in-e2de916f495c?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e2de916f495c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cbdc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stablecoin-cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2025 15:01:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-24T15:48:50.795Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>S. Yash Kalash &amp; Paul Samson — Mapping the Money Multiverse: From Cash to Crypto and Everything In Between</h3><h4>An analysis of the evolving money landscape, from fiat and bank deposits to stablecoins, CBDCs and beyond.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i5yYMTUTPpZ1SRjKzJ-uNQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/mapping-the-money-multiverse-from-cash-to-crypto-and-everything-in-between/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>In the span of just a few decades, the universe of money and financial assets has exploded. Once dominated by coins, banknotes and bank deposits, the landscape now stretches into digital and virtual assets — from central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and tokenized deposits to stablecoins, cryptocurrencies and tokenized real-world assets. <strong>Understanding this ever-growing spectrum is no longer simply an academic exercise.</strong> It is essential in order for policy makers to design regulations, for banks and fintechs to build the future of payments, and for investors to navigate the opportunities and risks of a rapidly digitalizing financial system.</p><p>This universe of assets and currencies can be visualized along two axes. On the horizontal axis is the issuer spectrum: from state-issued money on the left to private or decentralized issuance on the right. On the vertical axis is the purpose: from general-purpose money at the bottom to specialized utility at the top. Cash and CBDCs sit near the lower-left corner, representing state-issued general-purpose money. Cryptocurrencies and niche tokens cluster in the upper right, reflecting private, often decentralized, issuance with more specific utilities. In between, we find hybrid functions such as stablecoins, tokenized deposits and tokenized assets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4IhTDmJdlxiTqtnOdUU_Fw.png" /></figure><p>At one end of the spectrum lies traditional sovereign money. Physical fiat — banknotes and coins issued by central banks — is still the most tangible and widely trusted form of money. It is universally accepted within a jurisdiction and represents the authority of the state. Closely related are commercial bank deposits, the digital claims you hold in chequing and savings accounts. These are technically liabilities of private banks yet are fully regulated and convertible into cash. Economically, they form the backbone of credit creation and payment systems; politically, they balance private issuance under public oversight.</p><p>Layered onto these traditional foundations are digital forms of value. One variation is e-money: prepaid balances stored electronically, often by licensed non-banks. Think of services such as M-PESA in Kenya or PayPal globally. E-money expands access to payments for those without full bank accounts. Alongside this sits another innovation: fast payment systems, or FPS. These are infrastructures that allow instant bank-to-bank transfers at a low cost. India’s UPI and Brazil’s Pix are classic examples. Though not new forms of money themselves, <strong>they redefine the speed, cost and convenience of moving value.</strong></p><p>CBDCs occupy a special space in this ecosystem. They are digital forms of sovereign money — direct liabilities of the central bank. Unlike bank deposits or e-money, they are not just claims on an intermediary; they are themselves the money. CBDCs promise the efficiency of digital transactions combined with the safety and trust of state-issued cash. India’s digital rupee pilots, China’s digital yuan (e-CNY) and the Bahamas’ Sand Dollar illustrate how countries are testing CBDCs to <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/DADW_Kalash_3.pdf">strengthen inclusion, enable programmable payments and ensure monetary sovereignty</a> in a rapidly digitalizing world.</p><blockquote><em>Money is no longer just cash in your pocket or numbers on a bank screen. It is becoming programmable, borderless and contested.</em></blockquote><p>Between state-issued money and fully decentralized crypto-assets lies another fascinating category: <strong>tokenized bank deposits.</strong> These are traditional deposits represented as tokens on distributed ledgers, issued by regulated banks. They combine the safety of existing banking systems with the programmability and efficiency of blockchain infrastructure. JP Morgan’s JPM Coin and the <a href="https://www.mas.gov.sg/schemes-and-initiatives/project-guardian">Monetary Authority of Singapore’s Project Guardian</a> are examples of how financial institutions are exploring this space. Economically, tokenized deposits could reduce settlement costs and unlock new efficiencies. Politically, they reinforce the role of regulated banks while offering a state-aligned alternative to unregulated private tokens.</p><p>Then there are stablecoins, which are digital tokens pegged to a reference asset, usually fiat currency such as the US dollar or the euro, but exist and move on blockchain networks. Stablecoins are generally issued by private entities. They bridge the benefits of crypto (speed, borderless transfer, low transaction cost) with the stability of traditional money. Tether (USDT) and Circle’s USDC are dominant examples. While they can provide a useful service, <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/could-stablecoins-create-financial-instability/">they also raise regulatory questions.</a> Should private companies be allowed to issue instruments that mimic state money? Stablecoins highlight a core tension between innovation and oversight.</p><p>Beyond payment instruments, <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/publications/opportunities-for-digital-assets-in-a-fractured-world/">tokenization is transforming capital markets.</a> Tokenized assets can represent real-world assets such as securities, real estate and commodities on a blockchain. For instance, Pax Gold offers digital tokens backed by physical gold, while Ondo Finance has pioneered tokenized US treasuries. This approach enables fractional ownership, global liquidity and transparent settlement. Economically, tokenization can make capital markets more accessible; politically, it challenges traditional gatekeepers such as central securities depositories and raises questions of jurisdictional control.</p><p>On the more experimental side of the spectrum are utility tokens and cryptocurrencies. Utility tokens are native to specific crypto platforms, such as Filecoin for decentralized storage or Binance Coin (BNB) for corporate transaction discounts. They are not designed to function as general money but as access keys or incentives within digital ecosystems. At the farthest edge lie cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin (BTC) and Ethereum (ETH): highly decentralized, censorship-resistant and ideologically rooted in reducing reliance on governments and intermediaries. But, as they have evolved, these cryptocurrencies have increasingly been used for speculation and digital collateral rather than for regular financial transactions given the high cost of transactions. <strong>They represent a libertarian vision of money,</strong> one that exists beyond borders and state control.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MqgxUbBMctp4cr5_KWkfAw.png" /></figure><p>Why does this mapping matter? Because each category carries its own economic logic and inherent political ideology. Cash and CBDCs reinforce sovereign control and inclusivity. Tokenized deposits and stablecoins can drive efficiency while testing the boundaries of private issuance. Tokenized assets can democratize access but disrupt regulatory norms. Cryptocurrencies can challenge the foundation of state money. And through it all, fast payment systems and e-money can improve the pipes that connect these instruments.</p><p><strong>For policy makers, this spectrum reveals both opportunity and risk.</strong> It shows the need to innovate without undermining stability, to regulate without stifling progress. For investors and businesses, it highlights new models for value creation and transfer. And for citizens, it underscores a simple truth: money is no longer just cash in your pocket or numbers on a bank screen. It is becoming programmable, borderless and contested. The world of money is no longer binary. It is a vibrant continuum stretching from centuries-old coins to cutting-edge cryptographic tokens. By understanding this spectrum — its definitions, value propositions and underlying ideologies — we gain a clearer view of the future of finance and our place within it.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Authors</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/s-yash-kalash/">S. Yash Kalash</a> is a senior fellow at CIGI and an expert in strategy, public policy, digital technology and financial services. He has a distinguished track record advising governments and the private sector on emerging technologies.</p><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/paul-samson/">Paul Samson</a> is president of CIGI. He has 30 years of experience across a range of policy issues with partners from around the world. He is a former senior government official and also served for many years as co-chair of the principal G20 working group on the global economy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e2de916f495c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Raphael Racicot & Kurtis H.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/raphael-racicot-kurtis-h-cee2c7111c79?source=rss-ec61b56fef73------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cee2c7111c79</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xi-jinping]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai-china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 15:01:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-22T15:01:55.984Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Raphael Racicot &amp; Kurtis H. Simpson — China’s AI Governance Initiative and Its Geopolitical Ambitions</h3><h4>The launch of the Global AI Governance Initiative (GAIGI) frames China’s AI goals as global and safety-driven, but the policy also reflects Beijing’s broader foreign policy ambitions.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MDjA5H6ldOs5eG3IPYysdw.jpeg" /><figcaption>In 2023, President Xi Jinping launched the Global AI Governance Initiative (GAIGI), laying out Beijing’s proclaimed principles and objectives to ensure safe AI for all. (Aly Song/REUTERS)</figcaption></figure><p><em>For more content, visit </em><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/chinas-ai-governance-initiative-and-its-geopolitical-ambitions/"><em>CIGIOnline.org.</em></a></p><p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the key opportunities and challenges of our time. Every year, hundreds of billions of US dollars are invested <a href="https://blogs.idc.com/2024/08/21/idcs-worldwide-ai-and-generative-ai-spending-industry-outlook/">in and on matters related to AI</a>. The technology promises to revolutionize most industries, but also security and military affairs. Given the potential <a href="https://safe.ai/ai-risk">safety risks</a> (ranging from biases to the unethical use of AI, to algorithms going rogue), ensuring effective governance of AI and its rapid development is becoming a critical concern. Governments, think tanks, private sector actors and various other invested stakeholders are all striving to develop laws and guidelines for safe and ethical AI use. At the international level, state and non-state actors alike are working on global AI governance, from <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/programs/global-ai-risks-initiative/">studying the challenges</a> posed by AI, to gathering to discuss ways forward at <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023">AI Safety Summits</a>.</p><p>Seeing science and technology (S&amp;T) efforts in key fields as essential to ensuring its continued prosperity, <strong>the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has</strong> <a href="https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2024/06/12/china-has-become-a-scientific-superpower"><strong>invested heavily in AI</strong></a><strong> and has developed incentives to attract top talent.</strong> Already the frontrunner in 57 of 64 <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3313212/us-still-reigns-over-china-tech-race-gaps-are-quickly-closing-harvard-report">emerging and disruptive technologies</a>, it aims to become the <a href="https://www.morganstanley.com/insights/articles/china-ai-becoming-global-leader">world leader</a> in AI by 2030. China has also sought to <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/militarizing-ai-how-to-catch-the-digital-dragon/">militarize AI</a> (as a tool, an enabler or a methodology across technologies spanning defence, such as space, biotechnology, robotics, quantum, computing and advanced materials, as well as in the nuclear and cyber domains) to make the People’s Liberation Army a world-class fighting force.</p><p>Nationally, Beijing has been very active in developing domestic governance of AI, being the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/02/tracing-the-roots-of-chinas-ai-regulations?lang=en">first country</a> to implement binding regulations on select applications, such as algorithm guidelines and content generation. It has also sought to participate in global AI governance efforts, although its role until now has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2022.2107391">been limited</a>.</p><p>In 2023, President Xi Jinping launched the <a href="http://gd.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zxhd_1/202310/t20231024_11167412.htm">Global AI Governance Initiative (GAIGI)</a>, laying out Beijing’s proclaimed principles and objectives to ensure safe AI for all. This policy should, however, be seen in the context of China’s broader foreign policy objectives and its rhetoric on international affairs, which demonstrates that its commitments to AI governance are more than simply a search for a governance framework; they serve China’s broader global ambitions.</p><h3>Contextualizing the GAIGI</h3><p>The GAIGI is Beijing’s <a href="http://gd.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zxhd_1/202310/t20231024_11167412.htm">enunciation</a> of its proclaimed objectives for international AI governance, aiming to “promote AI technologies to benefit humanity and contribute to building a community with a shared future for mankind.” It advocates for a <strong>“people-centered approach” to AI governance,</strong> stresses the importance of respecting state sovereignty and calls for “mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit.” Furthermore, it argues in favour of broad consultation in the development of governance frameworks, championing the involvement of <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/09/10/chinas-ambitions-for-global-ai-governance/">the Global South</a>. For example, in 2024, <a href="http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/202412/t20241206_11539640.htm">China and Zambia co-hosted</a> the Group of Friends for International Cooperation on AI Capacity-building, an informal venue organized on the sidelines of the United Nations. That same year, China proposed a <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/02/content_WS668394a7c6d0868f4e8e8c58.html">resolution at the UN General Assembly</a>, calling for AI capability building as well as the involvement of Global South countries in governance efforts. China has also been working within international organizations responsible for setting technical standards, which could give it opportunities to <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-great-global-ai-governance-divide">shape AI-related standards</a> to serve its own preferences. Moreover, Shanghai now hosts the annual <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/05/content_WS66874e0bc6d0868f4e8e8e66.html">World AI Conference on global governance</a>.</p><blockquote><em>In many cases, Chinese foreign policy has been rebranded to simply reinforce desired policy outcomes. Nevertheless, the associated rhetoric and targeted end states reinforce China’s growing international leadership efforts.</em></blockquote><p><strong>The GAIGI should, then, first and foremost, be situated within the context of China’s rhetoric, diplomacy and soft-power ambitions.</strong> Since his ascension to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has been promoting the idea of a “community for a shared future for mankind,” which is China’s <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202403/t20240308_11256416.html">proclaimed vision</a> for a reformed international order. It lays out numerous ideas on how to improve the world on a broad range of issues, from economic development and climate change to security cooperation. It preaches, among other things, the importance of mutually beneficial cooperation and the respect of state sovereignty, themes fully incorporated into the GAIGI. Conceptually linked to this narrative, and further supporting China’s rise, are a shortlist of other <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/trends-in-southeast-asia/china-as-a-rising-norm-entrepreneur-examining-gdi-gsi-and-gci-by-manoj-kewalramani/">global initiatives</a> often linked to AI.</p><p>Launched from 2021 to 2023, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) each embodies central parts of China’s stated futures’ vision. While rich in ideas, and rife with platitudes, none offers clear measurables nor tangible next steps. In many cases, Chinese foreign policy has been rebranded to simply reinforce desired policy outcomes. Nevertheless, the associated rhetoric and targeted end states reinforce China’s growing international leadership efforts. For example, the emotive language of these mutually reinforcing global undertakings increasingly permeates international fora, China-organized <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202409/1319329.shtml">regional events</a> and multinational <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/11th-beijing-xiangshan-forum/">conferences</a>. To further leverage buy-in from other states, the PRC’s practice of establishing “strategic partnerships” is also now increasingly associated with the laudatory aim of <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/china-and-eu-candidate-serbia-sign-agreement-to-build-a-shared-future/">building a “shared future.”</a> In other words, AI is frequently associated with a means of moving like-minded countries forward toward a common end.</p><h3>Why Is China Doing This?</h3><p>Leading global AI governance benefits China in numerous ways.</p><p>First, it provides an opportunity for Beijing to shape the norms, values and rules that will govern AI in the future. This is consistent with China’s often-voiced grievance that it has previously been excluded from this role by Western nations in the immediate postwar institution-building era.</p><p>Second, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is concerned about AI safety, its perspective is determined by the primacy of maintaining its authoritarian, one-party system and its use of AI for state control. In being a rulemaker and influencer, <strong>Beijing strives to build international consensus on regulation development in</strong> <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/aligning-ai-with-chinas-authoritarian-value-system/"><strong>areas sensitive for the regime</strong></a><strong>,</strong> such as in ensuring that generative AI respects CCP political direction. In a similar fashion, contrary to Western assertions that AI should not infringe on individuals’ rights, China is actively normalizing the use of advanced algorithms in <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/china/2025/02/20/china-ai-neuro-quantum-surveillance-security-threat/">surveillance operations</a>.</p><p>Third, China actively seeks to promote its image as a benevolent power and a positive force in world affairs. The aspirations of the GAIGI (and the promotion of AI in the GDI, the GSI and the GCI) collectively provide China with a “veneer of good intentions” to clothe its often-self-interested aims. As President Xi has stressed, cultivating a perception of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57327177">“credible, loveable and respectable China”</a> is central to its global ambitions of pre-eminence in world affairs. For decades, the PRC’s narrative of <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm">“peaceful development”</a> has been used to try to reassure the world about the possible negative implications of China’s rise. International leadership, stressing shared advancement through AI and purported commitments to achieving “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202501/t20250127_11546599.html">win-win cooperation”</a> (particularly with states in the Global South), is proving a positive message capable of fostering broad and diverse support among disadvantaged less-developed countries.</p><p>A fourth and final motivation for China’s leadership efforts in AI governance is the affirmation status it secures as a global power, bolstering its pre-eminence in cutting edge S&amp;T domains, as well as demonstrating its capability to offer an alternative to Western, hegemonic and liberal internationalist models of norm setting and standardization. Xi aspires to secure <a href="https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/">leadership roles</a> in international affairs for both himself and China more generally. In so doing, Beijing strives to fill the role of what Trump critics refer to as America’s increasing “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/xis-davos-speech-is-china-the-new-champion-for-the-liberal-international-order/">international absenteeism</a>.” AI governance provides China with an ideal soft-power test case to trial and learn from, as it is generally non-controversial, a challenge area faced by all nations, and one where new models and approaches are possible as precedence is lacking.</p><h3>Beyond Technology</h3><p>The case of China’s global AI governance efforts reminds us that rarely are technical considerations and purported good intentions the only factors that drive efforts to bring change and innovation to regulatory processes and governance, especially in novel S&amp;T domains. This is not to say that Chinese leaders do not have concerns over AI’s use and safety. Quite the opposite: the CCP released a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/08/china-artificial-intelligence-ai-safety-regulation?lang=en">policy document</a> on AI safety in 2024. Xi stressed the unprecedented risks and challenges posed by AI during a <a href="https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/forum-xis-message-to-the-politburo-on-ai/">2025 Politburo study session</a>. The potential dangers of emergent technologies were also noted as a security concern in China’s first <a href="https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0003vjd">national security white paper</a>, and Beijing has recognized the complexity of the <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjfywj_665252/202504/t20250421_11598983.html">military applications of AI</a>.</p><p>However, all that said, <strong>China has its own vision for what is acceptable and unacceptable for algorithms, which at times may contradict Western values,</strong> norms and standards. Moreover, Beijing’s motivation in leading the world on AI governance is not apolitical in nature; rather, it offers an opportunity to demonstrate global leadership, exercise soft power and mobilize the Global South in common cause, as well as demonstrate an alternative approach to existing rules-based international order institutionalist practices.</p><p>This leaves the West in a challenging position where it must both engage China and embrace its leadership on this front, while at the same time prevent Beijing from distorting norms that do not work in the best interests of the common good. Excluding China from multilateral platforms promoting AI safety, best practices and standard setting is not practical, risks overlooking major gaps in effective governance, and presupposes that Western interests hold all the right answers, which is clearly not the case.</p><p>Moreover, China’s massive AI sector, multi-year state commitment to advancing this technology, and growing economic dominance in many areas of this research domain make it a critical player. This will continue to be true for years to come. What is required, then, is a <strong>dispassionate approach that recognizes Chinese contributions, while it also openly critiques normative biases</strong> (particularly those that undermine individual rights and liberties) and avoids the tendency for any one country to advantage itself at the expense of others, and one that strives for consensus through the application of critical thinking, the implementation of a strong challenge function, and the full realization that all states have a profound stake in getting this as close to right as <em>humanly possible</em>.</p><p><strong>Authors’ Note</strong></p><p>In addition to the research cited, this work has been informed by earlier and ongoing work by Defence Research and Development Canada. See, for example, the authors’ article <a href="https://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/On-Track-Issue-35.pdf#page=8">“Weaponizing AI: How to Catch the Dragon?”</a> written with co-authors <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/samuel-paquette/">Samuel Paquette</a> and <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/samuel-villanove/">Samuel Villanove</a> and researcher Adam MacDonald, and published in January 2025 by the CDA Institute’s journal, <em>On Track</em>. A shorter, revised version of that article was <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/militarizing-ai-how-to-catch-the-digital-dragon/">published by CIGI in February</a>.</p><p><em>The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.</em></p><h3>About the Authors</h3><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/raphael-racicot/">Raphael Racicot</a> is a graduate student attached to the strategic joint staff at the Department of National Defence working for Defence Research and Development Canada.</p><p><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/people/kurtis-h-simpson/">Kurtis H. Simpson</a> currently serves as a special advisor, Indo-Pacific Affairs, with the Strategic Joint Staff at the Department of National Defence.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cee2c7111c79" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation/raphael-racicot-kurtis-h-cee2c7111c79">Raphael Racicot &amp; Kurtis H.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/centre-for-international-governance-innovation">CIGI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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