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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Abderrahmane Chaoui on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Abderrahmane Chaoui on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Abderrahmane Chaoui on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Startup Support Organizations in Africa — Part III: the way forward.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/startup-support-organizations-in-africa-part-iii-the-way-forward-5a00d2342c01?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 11:21:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-10T11:21:54.737Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Recap</strong></p><p>Our previous article drew a bleak outline of African SSOs. We theorized African SSOs’ “anatomy of a fall” and why 90% of surveyed founders were dissatisfied with their SSO experience.</p><p>That 90% implies a remaining, satisfied 10%. A couple of African SSOs work well. Understanding why they do when most don’t is key.</p><p><strong>From a clear mission to clearly defined objectives, targets… and a sustainable business model</strong></p><p>Successful African SSOs share the same trait: they are founder-centric by design and have a strong brand. This enables them to attract quality founders as well as capital, both private and public. How does one establish a strong brand?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bqNHC4y0-wyZoqmmckvM8w.png" /></figure><p>A “strong brand” means your brand is desirable. People want to be associated with it. In the African SSO context, creating a strong brand requires the following:</p><p><em>A clear mission</em></p><p>Successful African SSOs are crystal-clear on what they have set to achieve. “Supporting entrepreneurship in Africa” is vague.</p><p>M-Studio’s “creating 3 unicorns in francophone African in the next 10 years” is limpid.</p><p>An SSO’s mission clarity not only guides its internal team, it gives visibility to founders about what to expect. Logically, this reduces founder disillusionment.</p><p>Inkomoko’s mission statement is a good reminder that it is okay to have other beneficiaries than just startups: “Inkomoko’s mission is to <strong>empower</strong> <strong>Micro and Small Entrepreneurs across Africa</strong>, including refugees, <strong>through capacity building, access to finance, market linkages, and advocacy</strong>. As the largest lender to refugees on the continent, we provide affordable financing to businesses, fueling growth, job creation, and improved livelihoods.”</p><p>This clarity of purpose and regularity in their action allowed Inkomoko to raise $100m from the Mastercard Foundation in 2023.</p><p><em>Defined objectives and granular target persona</em></p><p>One of African SSOs’ central issues is the diversity of business types they support in single programs. This isn’t conducive to bespoke programs and drives founder dissatisfaction. African SSOs should clearly define who they want to support and seek funding based on that thesis. It shouldn’t seek funding and adapt its thesis in turn. Doing it in the right order matters.</p><p>More than supporting one business type, the best African SSOs are adamant about targeting a precise founder persona.</p><p>For 54 Collective (ex Founders Factory Africa), in the African early stage scene, you do not invest and support businesses but founders. 54Co has clearly identified 5 very specific profiles (personas) that are the most likely to succeed, then adapted all its internal resources to the support of these types of profiles and the types of businesses they are interested in. 54 Collective only invests in founders whom they know they can accelerate and help reach pre-defined growth targets. One key component that 54Co tries to reveal is the founder’s coachability: their ability to listen and to implement others’ advice, their openness to an external look on their business.</p><p>Flat6labs, the M-Studio, Grindstone ventures and basically all SSOs with a strategic link to a VC fund would share the same characteristic. They would probably focus on different profiles according to what they want to achieve, but they always have pre-defined and detailed personas to target.</p><p>Prospective founders from M-Studio won’t apply to Inkomoko and vice-versa. Both SSOs’ stance is clear. This creates homogeneity between these SSOs’ cohorts, allowing for tailored programs and fruitful cohort collaboration.</p><p><em>An adapted business model</em></p><p>Once the mission and the target personas are defined, the SSO will have to pick an adequate business model. This is easier when you know what you’re doing and who you’re serving.</p><p>In the context of high-growth startups, the most “natural” business model is for an SSO to take equity in the startups it supports. Why? Because the SSO’s survival is linked to its founders’ success. If founders don’t exit, the SSO makes no money. KPI alignment is complete.</p><p>As we said though, doing so in Africa is tough. An “equity” business model implies you only make money when startups exit. There’s a “valley of death” period, during which you fund startups but they haven’t exited yet. But no one wants to fund you during that period, since proxies of African tech startup exits are still rare.</p><p>Another approach is for the SSO to think of its different activities as different products, with their own targets and their own revenue sources.</p><p><a href="https://www.haskeventures.com/">Haskè</a> was built in Senegal as a VC fund, a venture builder and an ecosystem player. From the beginning, Haskè understood these three activities require different set-ups, different timeframes and different KPIs and has separated its activities into:</p><p>-&gt; <a href="https://www.haskeventures.com/">Haskè ventures</a> : a VC fund and venture studio<br>-&gt; <a href="https://haskeconseil.com/haske-conseil-assainissement/">Haskè conseil</a> : a consulting agency working independently, but sharing strong synergies<br>-&gt; <a href="https://www.ignitee.org/">Ignitee</a> : the impact arm / ecosystem-building activity of Haskè.</p><p>Separating these three activities allows Haskè to attract specific partners for each of them, while demonstrating a holistic and complementary approach.</p><p><a href="https://concree.com/"><strong>Concree</strong></a>, in Senegal but active in West Africa, has pushed this productized approach to its best. Concree has defined 4 specific objectives it wants to achieve. For each objective, Concree has developed a specific product.<strong> Designed as a product, used as a product and sold as a product.</strong></p><p>&gt; <strong>Raising awareness</strong> -&gt; Startup Ludo<br>&gt; <strong>Ignite</strong> -&gt; Adia + Komkombox<br>&gt; <strong>Connect</strong> -&gt; Wekomkom<br>&gt; <strong>Amplify</strong> -&gt; Lezgo</p><p>Defining a proper business model comes with a granular understanding of your business(es). Having different activities targeted at different personas should imply different revenue lines generated through different business models. Just as it should imply a different engineering and design.</p><p>Start by unboxing your different activities, identifying your personas and then figure out a way to generate revenues to make them sustainable and synergistic.</p><p><em>African SSO inspiration</em></p><p>A select few have figured it out. SSOs such as Founders Factory, M-Studio, Flat6Labs and P&amp;P have each financially engineered a more efficient way of going about it.</p><p><a href="https://www.foundersfactory.africa/">54 Collective</a> was created in 2018 in South Africa as a VC fund and a venture builder in a mission to<em> create a thriving african startup economy that drives prosperity across the continent</em>. Their mission, <em>to fuel the early stage entrepreneurs driving Africa’s startup economy</em>, then decomposes in a clear objective: <em>find the best entrepreneurs in the most promising markets and sectors, and deliver the best possible support to drive them towards PMF.</em></p><p>It is crystal clear: 54 Co is a conviction-based investor that invests and supports the growth of the most promising early stage founders in the most conducive markets in Africa.</p><p>54 Collective only invests when they are convinced they can help the founder reach a certain level, carefully defined by a number of milestones. The whole company is designed for this purpose. 54 Collective is the largest investor in Africa, in terms of number of people, with 60+ talents working both for 54 Collective and its portfolio (60+ companies) and covering all the needs founders might have. Every 54 Collective internal function is also designed to provide support to founders, from fundraising to HR, legal or communication. In addition to that, from its previous positioning as a venture builder, 54 Collective has internalized a number of ‘studio capabilities’ including Tech, Product, Growth… that are now made available to every portfolio founder.</p><p>At 54 Co, support to founders is not programmatic anymore but precisely tailored to founders, for growth. And support to founders is now embedded in every investment made. The investment itself has evolved, making 54 Co standard tickets among the most founder-friendly structurations around the continent, being made of a $100K charitable loan + $150–250K equity investment against 10%.</p><p>Beside that, 54 Co kept its venture building offering, now packaged into a specific program called Gen-F, with a clear process, value proposition to founders and perks. Another specific program is The Academy, FFA’s value proposition to local SMEs and underserved founders with a strong capacity building component.</p><p>54 Co is built to operate efficiently, with clear business objectives, while being resolutely defined as an impact investor, aiming at “driving prosperity across the continent”. Both are not contradictory. But relevance to founders and efficiency in the business must remain mandatory.</p><p><a href="https://www.flat6labs.com/">Flat6Labs</a> was spun out from an Egyptian VC that bemoaned the region’s lack of early-stage capital. Flat6Labs has two main components: its funds and its programs. When entering a geography, Flat6Labs will establish a VC fund and settle on an investment thesis. Then, it will run a bunch of programs: either their own “flagship” seed program or a program sponsored by a partner.</p><p>Its venture capital activity provides a strategic framework to the rest of Flat6’s activities. Its seed program is oriented by-design and serves as a de-risking mechanism to help secure its investments.</p><p>Running sponsored programs for partners also helps Flat6 VC activity, and vice versa. The key here is that, unlike other SSOs, running programs isn’t the end-all-be-all: it is a way to simultaneously stay financially afloat while scouting for and building an investable pipeline.</p><p><a href="https://www.plugandplaytechcenter.com/">Plug&amp;Play</a> works in a similar way. They make money by running corporate-sponsored accelerators, but also have their own VC. When building their program cohorts, they are thus incentivized to choose well, to get first dibs on an early investment down the line. All P&amp;P needs to “open” a new country is a corporation willing to sponsor an accelerator program. This has enabled P&amp;P to expand at the speed of light. Today, P&amp;P has offices in 40 countries.</p><p>P&amp;P also engages in consulting/research projects for corporate partners. This might seem antinomic to what we said earlier. But in P&amp;Ps case, one can assume that their consulting gigs creates relevant connections with relevant companies, which they can then connect their portfolio startups with. It’s very different from running a donor-funded program, whose long-term usefulness for the SSOs’ founders are limited, if any.</p><p><a href="https://www.mstudio.vc/?gad_source=1&amp;gclid=CjwKCAjwjeuyBhBuEiwAJ3vuoX2N-yC49ceUsKTXJew4t-ipw7uxPB-X_FrotTs2ksZMnsPGs3wP9BoC2MQQAvD_BwE">M-Studio</a> took yet another route, that of “venture building”. M-Studio crafts business theses and handpicks founders to carry them out. They make money when the startups they support exit. To weather the “valley of death” mentioned earlier, M-Studio simply raised a lump sum that should (theoretically) last them until their first exits. Their founders put their own money into the venture, the definition of “skin in the game”.</p><p>M-Studio takes few, highly-concentrated bets. What this means is that they don’t have much room for failure. So they derisk everything they can. This has led to a data-driven, quasi-scientific way of building their cohorts. Business theses are inspired by what works in other emerging markets: for example, M-Studio is currently building <a href="https://www.djoli.africa/">Djoli</a>, a copy-paste of <a href="https://www.frubana.com/">Frubana</a>, a Colombian startup. M-Studio has also distilled its co-founder selection to a T: it only works with teams of 2 and privileges co-founder associations between Africans and Europeans.</p><p>These SSOs go about their business in different ways. There clearly isn’t a clear-cut playbook. All of them maintain a similar North Star however, one which “failing” African SSOs seem to have lost. Their founders’ financial success is inextricably tied to their own financial success as an SSO.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EGc5n8WEsfdv8hsG9sDrNg.png" /></figure><p><strong>A guide for existing SSOs</strong></p><p>These lessons are easy to dispel but many readers already run an SSO. They cannot start from scratch, they have to adapt what exists. How does one course-correct if they feel their SSO stumbling into the abyss?</p><p><em>Narrow down</em></p><p>Survey your SSO’s activities and ask yourself what value you provide. Is it education? Ecosystem building? Infrastructure? Capital? Business services? A jolly mix of the above?</p><p>Within the services you provide, which ones do you think are the most productive? What do founders profusely thank you for? Why do you think that thing in particular is so valuable to them? Conversely, try to identify what services founders don’t gain much value from (even if you think they do).</p><p>This work should culminate in you figuring out your “killer value proposition”. In other words: the service that makes your SSO stand out. Now, it’s time to narrow down. How can you build a business model around that service?</p><p><em>A few ideas</em></p><p>If your killer value add is ecosystem building, you can milk events revenue. No need to pretend you’re going to make money from equity in startups. You are in the ecosystem building business and that’s fantastic. Build a business that serves that purpose.</p><p><a href="https://www.africarena.com/">AfricArena</a> stands as a perfect example in that matter. Originated as an ecosystem building endeavor from <a href="https://www.fsatlabs.com/">French South African Tech Labs</a> (Fsat-labs), a consulting agency and venture builder in Cape Town, then quickly turned into a self-sustaining business. AfricArena now organizes 10+ events across Africa’s largest ecosystems and beyond.</p><p>If your killer value add is education, you can sell courses. No need to pretend you’re going to make money from equity in your startups. You are in the startup education business and that’s fantastic. Build a business that serves that purpose.</p><p><a href="https://www.africanmanagers.org/about/">The African Management Institute</a> recently published its impact report and has proudly contributed to inject $130m to African economies, creating 97K jobs and impacting 1.5m livelihoods through support to 37K businesses. How? By focusing exclusively on the training of business and management skills. In 10 years, AMI has built a business that operates across East, Southern and West Africa and delivers tailored solutions to meet the training needs of aspiring entrepreneurs, established SMEs, survival entrepreneurs or growing businesses. It has developed a sustainable business, with clear revenue streams. It also has secured key partnerships with both educational institutions and fund providers.</p><p>If your killer value add is infrastructure, you can buy a nice building and charge coworking rent. No need to pretend you’re going to make money from equity in your startups. You are in the startup infrastructure business and that’s fantastic. Build a business that serves that purpose.</p><p><a href="https://nairobigarage.com/">The Nairobi Garage</a>, in Nairobi is now one of the busiest and fanciest coworking spaces in town. It is also now a profitable business. Just as described, Nairobi Garage used to run programs for startups before realizing its true value could come from monetizing its space. And it worked. Both for the founders who have found the infrastructure they needed, and for the business in itself.</p><p>On infrastructure precisely, 100% funded initiatives are interesting too in a few cases. <a href="https://thedot.tn/">The Dot</a> or <a href="https://massdesigngroup.org/work/design/norrsken-kigali-house">Norrsken House</a>, respectively in Tunis and Kigali, are both very nice buildings financed through external funding, whose value proposition is systemic. It is not directed only to a few specific founders who can pay. They exist at a specific development stage of the ecosystem and act as value exchange platforms for the ecosystem as a whole: early stage founders, students, established companies, support organizations, investors… All can meet and let the magic happen. These places foster communities, create a feeling of belonging and help kickstart and ecosystem and foster a dynamic. Their value is hard to measure because they are never directly involved when success happens, but without them, a lot of successes wouldn’t happen.</p><p>If your killer value add is your ability to provide access to network or capital, it may be time to work on precising things a bit more. What networks? Is it market access? Is it human expertise? Is it a lobbying power? One thing for sure, it cannot be all at once. But you can find a way to work on each of those.</p><p>54 Collective, again, through its <a href="https://www.connectingafrica.com/document.asp?doc_id=786749">portfolio value creation department</a>, has a dedicated team of 5 people working all year long to establish key partnerships with market leaders, in the name of FFA, for its portfolio. If a founder is building a new skincare product in Kenya, FFA already has secured a partnership with leading retailers in the country and introductions can be made. The capital FFA provides is also tailored to the specific needs they noticed with founders, leading FFA to add a working capital to its offering through its charitable loan component. But also when it comes to provide founders with a $15K test budget when they get enrolled at the Gen-F program and must demonstrate the validity of their concept.</p><p><strong>Wrapping up</strong></p><p>Trying to be everything to everyone ends up having the opposite effect. Scattered focus, hazy mission and vague objectives breed founder dissatisfaction. Unfortunately, that is the trap many African SSOs have fallen into.</p><p>We’d like to be clear here: this is in no way a diss towards African SSOs. What they are doing is hard and useful. They are operating in markets where the businesses they support have shown little commercial viability. The result has been a difficulty to raise commercial funds and a turn to donors.</p><p>This turn to donors has had nefarious effects because donors don’t place much importance on financial returns. This can seem good: maybe donor-funded SSOs have more time and less pressure to scale. But donors replace their expectation of financial returns by expectations of “impact”. To them, a successful SSO is one that incubates “impactful” companies.</p><p>Unfortunately, that isn’t how growing companies work. Companies don’t grow and thrive because they are having whatever impact donors have deemed impactful. Companies grow when they sell their products more and more. If their product is useful, selling it more and more has an inherent impact. Overthinking this is futile. Burdening young African companies with “impact” metrics when their European counterparts are encouraged to grow as fast as possible is sterile at best, patronizing at worst.</p><p>What donors’ expectation of “impact” disguises is actually a desire to help small, underserved entrepreneurs. Such as informal roadside vendors and SMEs. This is laudable. But organizations that do that aren’t “startup support organizations”. They are donor-funded business schools. Their role is paramount, but has nothing to do in the SSO debate.</p><p>The SSOs that actually aim to support startups have an issue because the best African founders shun them. Or, they prefer to go to YC. There is an attractivity problem.</p><p><strong>Recommendations</strong></p><p>To foster this paradigm shift, we propose both curative and palliative measures.</p><p>Curative, on two fronts.</p><p>First, African SSOs need to collaborate. They need to share content, best practices, networks and data. In ecosystems where knowledge is scant, treating it as classified secrets is vain. YC’s <a href="https://www.startupschool.org/">startup school</a> has both been a great value add to the global startup ecosystem, but also a great way for YC to attract the best founders.</p><p>Second, SSOs need to engage more relevant stakeholders. Donors have the money but let’s be frank: their expertise isn’t startups. They stitch together what they can but objectively, this isn’t their core job. SSOs should rely on more relevant partners: corporates, VCs and universities.</p><p>Palliative, on two fronts.</p><p>First, there needs to be increasing SSO specialization. As we said, lack of focus breeds inefficiency. More African SSOs should double-down on a specific vertical and become references in the field. Hopefully, they will produce the localized knowledge and playbooks that the ecosystem lacks.</p><p>Second, SSOs should take an undaunted commercial approach. Doing this has been dimmed by the involvement of donors who, as we stated, place a higher premium on “impact” than commercial success. The reality is that if African SSOs had successful commercial proxies to show for, they wouldn’t need donor money. So the onus should be set on breeding these commercial successes.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>These articles might’ve come out as harsh but we qualify them as tough love.</p><p>The vast majority of SSOs, donors and founders have good intentions and are putting in serious work. The African startup phenomenon is young and its SSO landscape can’t be expected to copy-paste the American one overnight. What we’ve pointed out are growing pains, which have logical and solvable causes.</p><p>We hope this was useful to you and remain available to discuss this further or help you implement these learnings at your own level.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5a00d2342c01" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Startup Support Organisations in Africa — Part II : not incompetence but rather the failure of a…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/startup-support-organisations-in-africa-part-ii-not-incompetence-but-rather-the-failure-of-a-dbad2fcacde1?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 10:18:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-06T10:18:51.315Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Startup Support Organisations in Africa — Part II : not incompetence but rather the failure of a system.</h3><p><strong>Recap</strong></p><p>In our previous article, we identified the ailments African SSOs face: a shaky business model and dissatisfied founders, resulting from a lack of focus and resources.</p><p>These ailments tend to get worse with time. Some African SSOs are beleaguered by these issues but are artificially maintained alive by their funders, contradicting market logic. This isn’t healthy and is a recipe for founder disappointment.</p><p>Our research points to a domino effect for why this happens, an “anatomy of a fall” if you will. It starts with an original sin.</p><p><strong>On a strategic level, African SSOs face an inherent business model challenge that results in a shift in their mission</strong></p><p><em>The original sin: a business model challenge</em></p><p>There are three ways an SSO makes money: charge service fees, take equity in startups or be funded by a stakeholder (government, university, corporate, VC…)</p><p>In Africa, these three models are tough to operate.</p><p>Service fees are hard to leverage because SSOs support cash-strapped, young businesses. So there’s only so much you can charge them. Add on to that African SSOs operate in Africa, where average buying power is lower than on virtually every other continent.</p><p>Equity shares are supposed to be the gold standard of SSO business models. But it’s laborious to do in Africa. The equity business model implies that the SSO makes money when its alumni startups exit. Theoretically, said SSO makes no money until its first exit. This means the SSO needs funding to survive the revenue drought of the first 5–7 years. But lucrative startup exits in Africa are still rare, so few investors are willing to fund such SSOs. There aren’t enough proxies for success, yet.</p><p>Being bankrolled by a stakeholder (corporate, university, etc…) seems like the best way for African SSOs to finance themselves. Unfortunately, the reservoir of African stakeholders with the desire, means and expertise to efficiently fund a SSO is limited. From our conversations on the ground, many African corporates see SSOs as “CSR initiatives”, not as a serious commercial endeavor. This complicates things.</p><p>Independent African SSOs face <strong>a contradictory double injunction</strong>: they need to generate revenues and grow while serving a demographic with little cash on-hand. Plus, none of the aforementioned business models seem to work for them. So they find another way.</p><p><em>Mission shift</em></p><p>With commercial capital sparse, African SSOs end up relying on donor money AKA DFI money. This money comes in two ways. Either the SSO manages to raise funds to operate as it is for a certain period of time, but they need to show a strong track record and a strong thesis (<a href="https://www.inkomoko.com/">Inkomoko</a> and <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/16/founders-factory-africa-to-deploy-114m-using-learnings-from-past-programs/">Founders Factory Africa both raised $100m+ from the Mastercard foundation</a>), or the SSO starts making money out of the execution of programs for partners. The latter comes with strings attached. When they start making money out of the execution of programs two things happen: they shift their mission and blur their focus.</p><p>Donors have a wide range of businesses they want to support, from roadside vendors to tech startups. 48% of surveyed SSOs target informal entrepreneurs and micro-entreprises. We can infer that this is because donors asked them to. There’s nothing wrong with that, inherently. But an SSO supporting informal entrepreneurs isn’t an SSO, it’s a subsidized business school. Startup founders, as in founders of high-growth potential companies, have nothing to do there.</p><p>Donors also measure success differently than investors would. For donors, the key metric is often “impact” (a frustratingly hazy term). The financial success of the SSOs’ companies seems secondary. 82% of surveyed SSOs incorporate some element of “impact” in how they measure success. And only 46% of surveyed SSOs track business achievement KPIs for their programs. <strong>If a “startup support organization” doesn’t track its startups’ business achievements, we could argue that supporting startups is not its priority anymore</strong>…</p><p>This creates a blatant KPI misalignment: an SSO funded by donor money aims to satisfy its donors’ definition of “success”, not its founders’.</p><p>On the contrary, a model such as <a href="https://www.flat6labs.com/">Flat6Labs</a> establishes a local investment fund before running its programs. When it does come time to execute these programs, Flat6Labs already has a strategic grid to follow on which founders to let in, what program to design for them, what KPIs to track for their success. Flat6Labs’ success and its founders’ success are linked by design.</p><p>Today, most independent SSOs in Africa have become subsidized business schools with few credentials or low-cost consulting agencies, heavily dependent on 1–2 customers (mostly DFIs). While they do so, they divert their limited resources, a restricted team of people and no ability to recruit, from the attention that founders require. It then becomes obvious that their mission has shifted from supporting startups to executing ecosystem related services for their donors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a6EAMZV57nJp6ZTZzNmZkg.png" /></figure><p><em>A problematic, “programmatic” approach</em></p><p>These services (consulting, program implementation, event organization, etc…) come on top of the SSO’s supposed core business: supporting its founders. 80% of surveyed SSOs make money through these services.</p><p>Remember, SSOs are cash-strapped, which is why they need donor money in the first place. They are thus incentivized to execute many programs/consulting gigs to financially survive, creating competition among SSOs working in the same ecosystem. This mentality, once again, is contrary to the interests of the founders. Effectively supporting a startup takes time and money.</p><p><a href="https://www.mstudio.vc/">M-Studio</a> in Abidjan allocates $250,000 and 12 months to each of its startups. It also gives founders access to M-Studio’s internal team, consisting of HR, product and tech experts. More importantly, M-Studio’s main revenue stream is its startups’ exits (M-Studio takes equity in startups it supports).</p><p>On the other hand, other SSOs dedicate between $5–10K to each founder. And their internal teams might be busier executing a donor-funded gig than actually supporting founders. The contrast is striking.</p><p>African SSOs thus face another paradox: they need to run many donor-funded, short-term programs to make money, but effectively supporting startup founders takes a long time. Only 1 surveyed SSO reported doing post-program assessments to truly track progress and business achievements.</p><p>This is what we mean by “programmatic” approach: SSOs end up incentivized to “close” as many programs as possible and show quickly demonstrable results, taking it one step further from the long-term perspective that is needed to truly track their founders’ success.</p><p>This makes sense: an SSO serves who feeds it. If it makes money from donors, it will serve donors. Y-Combinator makes money from its founders, so it serves its founders. YC has perfectly understood this paradox and tries to bring an answer through a strong community in which every founder is granted a lifelong membership, granting them access to domain experts and peers long after the acceleration program they took.</p><p><em>Loss of founder-centricity</em></p><p>To effectively serve its founders, an SSO’s survival has to be intrinsically linked to their success. This isn’t the case with most independent SSOs in Africa today, barely maintained alive through financial perfusion from donors.</p><p>Running several programs with limited resources inexorably leads to standardized programs lacking adaptation. Most SSOs (70%) feel constrained financially from recruiting, so they end up trapped in their pursuit of financial stability.</p><p>Because the program is designed prior to assessing the specific needs of the founders, it is standard and in most cases unadapted to their expectations and needs. Add to that the fact that, in a hurry and in an ecosystem lacking bench strength, they fill their cohorts randomly, reducing once more the probability of matching the founders’ needs with their pre-designed program.</p><p>In other words: we really need to implement this program to make money, so let’s just fill it with who we find. It doesn’t matter if different business types are mixed. The result of this hurry is unsurprising: 90% of surveyed founders felt their cohorts were not suitably built for their specific business requirements.</p><p>Programs can also end up being unadapted to the local context, because the SSO doesn’t have the time, resource nor expertise to create bespoke content.</p><p>In other words: an SSO needs to implement a program, the clock is ticking and they need content, so they’ll just copy-paste Western startup content. This ignores the complexities of the African market and further disillusions founders.</p><p>Once SSOs bake in program implementation as their main revenue stream, they inevitably lose their founder-centricity. The onus isn’t set on making founders financially succeed, but rather carry out lots of programs and make sure the donor is happy. At that point, an SSO essentially becomes a donor-subsidized event agency.</p><p>Doing a startup is hard and odds of success are low. SSOs’ whose internal teams are distracted by non-founder related revenue streams dramatically reduce their usefulness.</p><p>Some have figured that out: <a href="https://www.foundersfactory.africa/">Founder Factory Africa</a> stands out for its unabashed founder-centricity. Founders Factory’s team literally works for its founders. They have a team called “portfolio value creation” dedicated to finding partnerships and high-ticket clients for startups in their portfolio.</p><p><a href="https://open-startup.org/">Open Startup Tunisia (OST)</a> is another striking use case of building partnerships around the founders’ interest and not the opposite. Since its inception in 2016, OST has been closely in touch with founders. Understanding their needs and the obstacles they face to thrive.</p><p>OST now operates 6 different programs with their team of 20+ passionate people. Each program has been designed to answer concrete observations from founders on the ground, has clearly defined targets and objectives.</p><p>This allowed OST to build very relevant partnerships, for each of its programs, with the most relevant organizations that could 1- be interested, and 2- be relevant to the topic.</p><p>For its deeptech program, BRAIN, OST partners with MIT, Polytechnique, HEC and Instadeep…<strong> </strong>For its flagship OSTX, OST partners with Columbia Business School, AfricInvest, Drosos foundation, la DER in Senegal and AfricaGrow… For its OST Grow, OST partners with BPIFrance and GoVentures …</p><p><em>A vicious cycle</em></p><p>As we’ve seen, a vast majority of African founders aren’t satisfied with their SSO experience. This has had a pernicious effect: the best African founders actually avoid SSOs. Deprived of its brightest founders, SSOs’ chances to produce stellar results erodes. This makes it hard to attract commercial capital. And so, SSOs continue relying on donor funding, with everything that implies.</p><p>Donors have skewed market logic: most SSOs are artificially maintained alive, but not supported enough to thrive. Donor funding is also limited, meaning existing SSOs compete for a piece of the same pie. This reduces collaboration and knowledge sharing, a shame in such young ecosystems, where contextualized knowledge about building, growing, investing in or supporting a startup is still wanted…</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>To summarize, in chronological order:</p><p>(I) African SSOs struggle to find a sustainable business model and thus struggle to attract commercial capital.<br>(II) To start making money, African SSOs act as service providers for donors.<br>(III) In doing so, African SSOs shift their focus from serving the founders to serving the donors. This results in a programmatic approach, where cohorts are jumbled and programs aren’t adapted.<br>(IV) This breeds founder frustration. The best African founders shun SSOs, reducing SSOs chances of breakaway success even more.<br>(V) If an SSO can never demonstrate commercial success, it can never attract commercial capital. It is thus stuck with donors.</p><p>African SSOs need to demonstrate commercial success potential if they want to attract commercial capital. Some have used donor funding as a crutch to get to that point, but that is unsound. Donors’ non-commercial objectives diverts SSOs from the commercial objectives they were originally pursuing. And perpetually reduces the SSO’s commercial success goals it actually needs.</p><p>This bleak panorama willfully omits one component: the African SSOs that work. We’ve mentioned a couple, but there are more. And they deserve a look under the hood, to understand how they have solved the quandary.</p><p>Stay tuned.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dbad2fcacde1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Startup Support Organizations in Africa — Part 1: what does the landscape look like?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/startup-support-organizations-in-africa-part-1-what-does-the-landscape-look-like-c19d7fec3d33?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c19d7fec3d33</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 09:59:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-06T09:59:48.496Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Why do they exist and what do they look like around the World?</strong></p><p>Startups, very high-growth companies, are a risky endeavor. They are worth attempting because the prospective upside is potentially superior to every other asset class’ and because they bring new solutions to existing (major) problems. Logically, in underserved markets and communities, maximizing startups’ chances of success becomes a no-brainer. We coin organizations created to do just that “startup support organizations” (SSOs).</p><p>Worldwide, SSOs follow three models: incubators, accelerators and venture builders. In 90% of cases, these are directly owned / funded by one specific ecosystem stakeholder with broader objectives: universities, investors, government or corporates. They were created as a tool for SME development to serve macro-economic objectives and have now become the same tools for more precise and dedicated objectives.</p><p>Incubators, accelerators and venture builders come in many shapes. The shape they take often boils down to a simple question: who is funding them? This heavily influences the alignment between the founders and the SSO’s objectives.</p><p>Once again, three buckets appear.</p><p><em>Independent, for-profit</em></p><p>Independent, for-profit structures can’t rely on program fees, since startups are by definition cash-strapped. What most of them do is invest and take equity in the startups they support. This creates perfect alignment with the founders: both them and the SSO only make money if the startup achieves a liquidity event. Their goals are identical.</p><p>This is a tricky business model. If we assume that a successful startup will reach its series A in 2–3 years (if it ever does), the SSO is theoretically operating at a 100% loss during its first years of existence. These structures are expensive to launch, let alone guide to profitability.</p><p>Done correctly, these structures can become VCs on steroids. YC is the best example. By imposing their own terms and valuations on hyper-early, potential unicorn founders, YC doesn’t need to get many of them right to achieve financial success. Created in 2005, YC’s alumni network now has a combined valuation of $600B.</p><p>It’s a hard flywheel to launch, but an incredibly powerful one: show that your SSO creates unicorns and attract future unicorn founders on your own terms and valuations. YC famously runs a “standard deal” for all of its startups ($500,000 for 7% equity).</p><p><em>Stakeholder-attached</em></p><p>SSOs attached to a stakeholder (corporate, university, VC) are a different breed. Some are for-profit and others are non-profit but it doesn’t really matter: they are usually a drop in the ocean in their stakeholder’s P&amp;L. These SSOs exist to satisfy their stakeholder’s strategic motive.</p><p>For a university, this might be to improve brand image and mobilize the alumni network (cf the <a href="https://www.edhec.edu/en/about-us/entrepreneurship-business-school/edhec-entrepreneurs/programmes/incubation">programs</a> run by EDHEC). For a corporate, this might be to gain exposure to new technology or market (ie the <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/startups/pegasus">Pegasus</a> program by Microsoft). For a VC, this might be a way to gain exposure to early deal-flow and derisk early investments (ie <a href="https://500.co/">500 global</a> for example).</p><p>In both cases, founder alignment has slightly shifted: the SSO’s “<em>raison d’être</em>” is not its startups’ liquidity events. Sure, it might be one of the goals and the SSO might even invest. But that isn’t the primary reason the SSO exists.</p><p>From that postulate, a spectrum exists: a corporate-run accelerator can either be a “CSR” stunt or a hyper-competitive endeavor. It’s up to the founders to do their due diligence. But in any case, founders should recognize that stakeholder-attached SSOs have ulterior goals in mind.</p><p>For founders, stakeholder-attached structures might give access to interesting resources (corporate partners, professors, investor networks, labs and resources) which a young, independent for-profit SSO could lack.</p><p><em>Government-backed</em></p><p>These are SSOs that are financed by the government. They are technically a shade of “stakeholder-attached” but deserve their own section.</p><p>Government-backed SSOs benefit from longer timeframes. After all, the SSO’s funding is likely part of a multi-year governmental plan. These SSOs rarely take equity: their objective is to foment an exciting local deal-flow for private investors to seize. Government-run SSOs can also serve as a magnet to attract foreign talent. This is the case of <a href="https://startupchile.org/en/">Startup Chile</a>, for example.</p><p>In a counter-intuitive way, government-backed SSOs can be aligned with founders despite taking no equity. If the SSO’s survival depends on continuous funding from the government, it will (in theory) have to show satisfactory results. And it will only do so by attracting the best founders, nudging it to craft performant programs. <a href="https://www.agoranov.com/">Agoranov</a>, in France, exemplifies a well-respected, publicly-funded SSO.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SSd8OXceT7e97RWUuKhchg.png" /></figure><p><strong>In Africa, SSOs seem far less clearly positioned and set up</strong></p><p>Understanding African SSOs requires internalizing two simple facts.</p><p>First, Africa’s tech startup ecosystems are still young overall. Napkin math says the oldest ecosystems hatched in the early 2000s. As a proxy, one of America’s most storied VC firms, Sequoia Capital, was established over 50 years ago.</p><p>Second, Africa is heterogenous. The continent’s 54 countries vary drastically in terms of market sophistication, political system, talent presence, infrastructure quality, capital availability, not to mention culture… On the other hand, the “West” (North America and Europe) are relatively uniform in those aspects.</p><p>These two facts have influenced how the African SSO landscape has evolved.</p><p><em>A complex and heterogeneous reality on the ground</em></p><p>Startups basically need the same ingredients, wherever they are born.</p><p>They need capital, they need talent, they need a market, protected by a stimulative and protective regulatory framework, they need information, and finally they need a sufficient infrastructure to move their goods, people, money and knowledge around. A conducive environment would present a consistent level for each of these ingredients.</p><p>African countries are more or less equipped with these ingredients. Surely less than their Western counterparts. But each country presents a different picture, making it more or less conducive to the appearance of high growth ventures.</p><p>African SSOs are born in these different realities and witness to the obstacles they mean to early stage founders. By design, African SSOs were born as ecosystem gap fillers, bringing together the missing pieces in the ecosystem to give fair chances to their founders.</p><p>As a result, African SSOs are not only startup support organizations, although they are judged only on that aspect. They often carry several mandates that can include: ecosystem building, the provision of business education, of some sort of capital, supporting SMEs and very small businesses and / or finally supporting startups.</p><p>52% of surveyed SSOs say they engage in all four of these activities. This is not feasible. Each of these activities is a full-time job and requires a distinct skill set.</p><p>On another note, YC, TechStars or any other Western-based SSO wouldn’t have to worry about juggling these different tasks.</p><p><em>Taxonomy confusion</em></p><p>African startup ecosystems’ youth makes it hard to engage private capital. Indeed, juicy tech startup exits on the continent are few. And that’s what investors are looking for. African SSO operators thus have to scour for different, less commercial-minded funding sources.</p><p>Enter DFIs, NGOs and impact investors for whom immediate financial returns have less importance. They fund most African SSOs.</p><p>These institutions’ “impact” objectives, such as job creation, women empowerment or informal business support, and the complex reality on the ground in most countries, where the type of businesses to support includes anything from roadside vendors, to SMEs, to startups, has created a general taxonomy confusion.</p><p>Most African SSOs are prone to mixing these businesses in the same program, sometimes encompassing all of them under the “startups” banner. This reinforces confusion.</p><p>In our survey, 51% of SSOs claim they accompany both informal entrepreneurs as well as startups. This means one of two things: either the SSO hasn’t well-defined what a “startup” is or they are actively accompanying two diametrically different businesses. In any case, something’s off.</p><p>For the record, we define a “startup” as a company with stated high-growth potential and ambition.</p><p>Many African SSOs have adopted a hazy definition of “startup”, which includes both SIM card vendors and university students with an app idea. While laudable, mixing support for both of these fictional businesses is erroneous. This existing confusion is compounded by the appearance of VC funding in an overall scarcity, nudging every business to label itself a startup.</p><p>For “true” African startup founders, this has made it harder to figure out which SSOs are truly dedicated to their needs. And for founders who took the leap without necessary due diligence, has led to disappointment. 90% of African founders interviewed in one of Sendemo’s previous research (13 countries in Africa) said that SSOs yielded little to no value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TMIQZfkVgUAPKYJpu0vtUQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Attempting a categorization of a very heterogenous landscape</strong></p><p><em>Dissipation of resources and focus</em></p><p>Holding four different mandates doesn’t build coherent business models. It makes it impossible to double-down on a narrow value proposition and milk it. As a result, many African SSOs have had to launch new activities to stitch together new funding sources: program implementation for partners, consulting, events…</p><p>These revenue sources all have a similarity : none of them is correlated to their founders’ financial success. In other words: the way the majority of African SSOs make money isn’t by making their founders financially succeed but instead to divert their resources from them. This is an issue.</p><p>This patchwork of revenue streams doesn’t foster solid financial standing either: 67% of surveyed SSOs aren’t financially profitable.</p><p><em>A very fragmented landscape of SSOs</em></p><p>For all of these specificities in our African environments, we can consider eight categories of SSOs instead of 3 around the world.</p><ul><li>The venture builders: <a href="https://www.foundersfactory.africa/"><em>Founders Factory Africa</em></a><em> ; </em><a href="https://www.mstudio.vc/"><em>M-Studio</em></a><em> ; </em><a href="https://www.haskeventures.com/"><em>Haské</em></a><em><br></em>&gt; They internalize and mutualize the resources needed by early-stage founders, develop concepts, recruit talent-entrepreneurs and invest against a majority stake that they exit as soon as possible.</li><li><em>The brand names: </em><a href="https://www.flat6labs.com/fr/"><em>Flat6labs</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.plugandplaytechcenter.com/"><em>Plug&amp;Play</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://500.co/"><em>500…</em></a><em> <br></em>&gt; They have managed to build a strong brand that helps in: attracting the best founders, raising funds, securing strong partnerships and expanding their footprint. They are often attached to a VC fund or external partners, providing a strategic compass.</li><li><em>The seeker heads: </em><a href="https://open-startup.org/"><em>OST</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://concree.com/"><em>Concree</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.inkomoko.com/"><em>Inkomoko</em></a><em> … <br></em>&gt; Flexible and constantly evolving organizations. They are small, agile, resolutely founder-centric, they constantly develop and adapt their programs to their founders. They manage to build successful and sustainable programs in different ways.</li><li><em>The corporate backed: </em><a href="https://www.efgev.com/"><em>EFGEV</em></a><em> ; </em><a href="https://orangefab.com/fr/"><em>Orange fab</em></a><em> &amp; </em><a href="https://www.orangedigitalcenters.com/"><em>digital centers</em></a><em>… <br></em>&gt; Not so many of them across the continent. They vary in their intentions (<em>see before</em>) but offer some sort of framework and resources.</li><li><em>The public incubators: </em><a href="https://www.212founders.co/"><em>212 founders</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://falakstartups.com/"><em>Falak Startups</em></a><em><br></em>&gt; Similar to the corporate backed, they vary in their intentions and may be subject to complete strategic shift. Yet, we find some relevant initiatives that produced results.</li><li><em>The ecosystem builders: </em><a href="https://thedot.tn/"><em>The Dot</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://forbesafrique.com/tech-norrsken-house-kigali-pipeline-entre-investisseurs-et-startups/"><em>Norrsken house<br></em></a>&gt; They serve a systemic purpose, it is harder for them to demonstrate their value and find a business model. They act as a value exchange platform to the ecosystem.</li><li><em>The philanthropists: </em><a href="https://www.orangecorners.com/"><em>Orange corner,</em></a><em> </em><a href="https://mawahub.fr/"><em>MawaHub <br></em></a>&gt; 100% funded by donors or institutional partners. They are clearly an impact / CSR initiative that may demonstrate some good results when precisely oriented.</li><li><em>The survival SSOs: surviving organizations under financial perfusion from donors<br></em>&gt; They represent the overwhelming majority of SSOs operating in Africa. They are organizations that are stuck in a loop that doesn’t produce any value to both their founders and funders.</li></ul><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>African SSOs have been under the fire of criticism for not being able to give birth to enough exitable unicorns. I believe no one has truly understood the uniqueness of their duty in our African ecosystems, and I haven’t seen so far many satisfying metrics to help measure the value they bring, in the long term, to their ecosystem.</p><p>In Africa, funding is scarce so funding dictates the rules. From that perspective, it is true that SSOs have, in their majority, failed to provide investors with a sustainable deal flow.</p><p>But maybe they were busy providing the business education that universities and business schools have failed to provide, or maybe they were lobbying for a new policy and startup act in the country? Or just maybe the founders’ landscape is still mostly made of SMEs and informal businesses? In any case, it seems hard to put the blame on the SSO itself.</p><p>The SSOs funding partners need to understand this when evaluating their impact. And also while dictating new objectives and KPIs to follow.</p><p>To circle back to our initial taxonomy, most African SSOs would classify as SME incubators. A tiny minority would make it to the “accelerator” classification.</p><p>The challenges described above (lack of business persona clarity, weak business model and founder dissatisfaction) happen an awful lot to SSOs on the continent. It seems like a trap even the best intentioned SSOs fall into.</p><p>Is there some sort of “anatomy of a fall” we can decipher?</p><p>Stay tuned.</p><p><em>Data used to produced this article is based on hundreds of hours of interviews with SSOs of all sorts, founders and investors across 16 African countries, a thorough survey (60+ answers) and strategic benchmarks across the world. It was originally published by Sendemo and </em><a href="https://www.digital-africa.co/en"><em>Digital Africa</em></a><em> in 2024. A longer report can be downloaded </em><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/107x_rOUVr0m3TQMTgBsaFpgTM8kfhGp0/view"><em>here</em></a><em>. <br></em><a href="https://sendemo.org/"><em>Sendemo</em></a><em> is a research and strategy studio that helps international donors and African governments arbitrate and design context-specific vehicles and mechanisms to enhance productive entrepreneurship and scaling.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c19d7fec3d33" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cote d’Ivoire Deep Dive Part IV: A regional hub for Francophone countries]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/cote-divoire-deep-dive-part-iv-a-regional-hub-for-francophone-countries-5dcdb2c970b4?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5dcdb2c970b4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Feb 2024 09:41:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-15T04:10:45.799Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*n7n3ulA3AyrEIolnFEfQ1A.jpeg" /><figcaption>The beach of Assinie Mafia, in the heart of West Africa. Image credit: Abderrahmane Chaoui</figcaption></figure><p>Welcome back to the final edition of our four-part Deep Dive into the Cote d’Ivoire tech ecosystem and the historical factors that shaped its current state. Where Part I and II covered Cote d’Ivoire’s socio-economic past, and Part III considered its more recent history and nascent tech beginning, Part IV will assess the current state of the ecosystem, its essential players, its role in the broader regional ecosystem, and its future growth prospects.</p><p>What stands out about Cote d’Ivoire’s ecosystem is that despite all the aforementioned structural challenges, it attracts the most startups and scaleups from its neighbouring Francophone countries.</p><p>Cote d’Ivoire counts as its advantages a specific availability of capital in diversified forms (DFIs, corporate, VC and PE, microfinance) and a network of corporates involved in stimulating the ecosystem while maintaining a sustained demand for tech/software products. Surprisingly, startup support organisations have been missing from the picture — certainly an Ivorian exception — but they are now stepping up, with many corporates launching set-ups in the country, such as CMA-CGM in the freight industry.</p><p>The most recent shop opening in the country is M-Studio, an ambitious venture studio led by serial entrepreneur <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leslieossete?miniProfileUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_miniProfile%3AACoAAAk79J0B846r8CapUm8iPKkrvMUeXYXiYE0&amp;lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_search_srp_all%3BwQhuSn3OSOq0TEMlcnEd7A%3D%3D">Leslie Ossété</a>, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/cedricmangaud?miniProfileUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_miniProfile%3AACoAAAACL34Bie1j5xYbIJxROys-qF1lJ09Pfq4&amp;lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_search_srp_all%3BWxdHB0zEQdGSd3UU%2By1uGg%3D%3D">Cédric Mangeaud</a> — co-founder of <a href="https://www.saviu.vc/">Saviu Ventures</a> — and Clyde Fakhoury, general manager of PFO Africa, a PE fund focused on infrastructure. M-Studio’s thesis is simple: reproduce winning mobile-based business models from other regions or continents that target the informal economy. As of January 2024, M-Studio is expected to reach its target of creating 10 startups within its first year of activity.</p><p>The venture studio is also engaging in ecosystem-building activities, hosting a large number of ecosystem events, taking part in many programs and training sessions and federating the ecosystem through different communities.</p><p>Among them is the VC-friendly community, a program that is free and accessible to all VCs interested in knowing more about the ecosystem in Cote d’Ivoire. M-Studio’s team offers a coworking space in their office and an updated list of ecosystem stakeholders they can facilitate meetings with.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/cote-divoire-deep-dive-part-i-akwaba-an-attractive-land-of-prosperity-9241b37a6032">Cote d’Ivoire Deep Dive Part I: Akwaba, an attractive land of prosperity</a></p><h4>Local founders, expat advantage, and fintech’s prominence</h4><p>The entrepreneurial sphere is clearly divided into two types of founder profiles. One is local founders. Part of the pipeline at the concept stage faces a glass ceiling, preventing most local founders from attaining the traction that would make them investable from pre-seed and above. A lot of capacity-building access to networks and markets is needed for founders at this stage, while universities currently have poor entrepreneurial curriculums. Moreover, the ratio of single sign-on (SSOs) per founder is meagre, excluding them from the entrepreneurial culture they need to scale meaningfully.</p><p>On the other hand, most (fast) growing startups that made it to market are led by expat founders — mostly from France — or members of the diaspora returning to Cote d’Ivoire with a deepened background (second-time founders or past experience in the industry). This last group logically attracts all VC funding in the country.</p><p>From an industry perspective, fintech is particularly dynamic and concentrates the majority of VC funding…</p><p><em>You can read the full story </em><a href="https://www.foundersfactory.africa/blog/regional-hub-for-francophone-countries"><em>here</em></a><em>…</em></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abderrahmane-chaoui/"><em>Abderrahmane Chaoui</em></a><em> is an African ecosystem researcher, consultant, and writer.</em></p><p><em>Learn more about </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/foundersfactoryafrica"><em>Founders Factory Africa</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5dcdb2c970b4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cote d’Ivoire Deep Dive Part III: An ecosystem as an image of the country: unstructured but full…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/cote-divoire-deep-dive-part-iii-an-ecosystem-as-an-image-of-the-country-unstructured-but-full-of-5dc8f01c6978?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5dc8f01c6978</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Feb 2024 09:29:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-05T14:38:12.635Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lry-xZrvkVWXqK8HuLSzNw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Cote d’ Ivoire’s ecosystem can become a vital driver of tech-supported growth within the broader African tech ecosystem, but challenges remain. Image credit: <a href="https://unsplash.com/@thumbsup225">Sangaré Amara</a> via <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/man-in-red-polo-shirt-holding-yellow-banana-bf7m8Et8ZW8">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Cote d’Ivoire Deep Dive Part III: An ecosystem as an image of the country. Unstructured but full of potential</h3><p>Welcome to Part III of our four-part Deep Dive into the Cote d’Ivoire tech ecosystem. In <a href="https://www.foundersfactory.africa/blog/cote-divoire-deep-dive-part-ii-francafrique-liberal-state-capitalism-and-socio-ethnic-tensions">Part II</a>, we delved into d’Ivoire’s post-independence history, heavily influenced by the French colonial experience and Felix Houphouët-Boigny keeping Cote d’Ivoire close to its former colonisers. Following Houphouët-Boigny’s death, internal unrest ensued until 2011, when Alassane Ouattara came to power. This is where we resume our story, with the development of the Cote d’Ivoire tech ecosystem coming to the fore.</p><p>Alassane Ouattara built on Felix Houphouët-Boigny’s bet that maintaining unity and stability in the country was a vital step to economic prosperity. His efforts in preserving peace coincided again with an economic rebound. Cote d’Ivoire entered a 6-year period with a steady 8% growth rate between 2011 and 2017 that rhymed with strengthened investments, a reinforcement of the private sector and a diversification of Cote d’Ivoire’s agricultural products, with the country becoming the world’s leading producer of cashew nuts.</p><p><a href="https://www.foundersfactory.africa/blog/cote-divoire-deep-dive-part-i-akwaba-an-attractive-land-of-prosperity">&quot;Akwaba&quot; - A multiethnic land of welcome</a></p><h4>The diaspora’s outsized role in Cote d’Ivoire</h4><p>Yet, in 2012 and at the beginning of its third period of sustained growth, 60% of the population was illiterate, while there were 1.5 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants. Life expectancy did not exceed 55 years. Again, growth without development. Beyond the illiteracy rate, which characterises the inequality gap among the population, the country’s education system has fallen behind international and even regional standards, struggling to build the skills that Cote d’Ivoire needs for its development.</p><p>As a result, most corporations in the country turn towards the Ivorian diaspora in Europe (France especially) or from the region (Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso) to hire executives.</p><p>This lack of human capacity-building capability is also reflected in the country’s ecosystem. There is an overwhelming majority of expat founders who have, in recent years, been joined by a restrained club of diaspora founders educated abroad. Both these groups also turn towards expat executives to manage their ventures in key strategic positions.</p><p>The inefficiency of the education system in Cote d’Ivoire is also reflected in the quality of the country’s scientific research and its broader innovation capabilities. The number of publications and their quality, with Cote d’Ivoire ranked 120th by the Global Innovation Index on its published scientific and technical articles, and the lack of investments in R&amp;D and research considerably reduces the country’s innovation capacity. Only two companies operate in Deep Tech, both with intellectual property acquired from or developed in another country. As such, both Cote d’Ivoire’s entrepreneurial and innovation capacities are seriously hindered by its inability to transform its education system and produce local talent.</p><p>Following the country’s long tradition of state liberalism and openness to foreign trade and foreign businesses, the Ivorian ecosystem’s emergence is a lagging indicator of these conditions and long-awaited. The first building blocks of the ecosystem were laid down by international organisations such as Seedstars, who opened the first coworking space in Abidjan in 2012 and implemented some of its programs, raising awareness and stimulating the not-even-nascent ecosystem at the time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0SqUIbS2C4spXdHZW8UVQA.png" /><figcaption>Extract from Sendemo’s discovery report on Cote d’Ivoire that ou can download <a href="http://discoveryreport.sendemo.org/">here</a></figcaption></figure><p>Seedstarts was later joined by other international organisations (Founders Institute, Impact Hub Abidjan) and startups such as Jumia, who were creating the basic business infrastructure (market education, logistics, payments etc.) for startups to emerge in the country. These changes, as is so often the case in Africa’s different ecosystems, came alongside telcos such as Orange and MTN bringing mobile money technology to the country. Therefore, Coet d’Ivore’s ecosystem has followed an unstructured bottom-up developmental path, mostly carried by international organisations, individuals and corporates.</p><p>It was around 2018 that things started to accelerate…</p><p><em>You can read the full story </em><a href="https://www.foundersfactory.africa/blog/ecosystem-image-country-unstructured-potential"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abderrahmane-chaoui/"><em>Abderrahmane Chaoui</em></a><em> is an African ecosystem researcher, consultant, and writer.</em></p><p><em>Learn more about </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/foundersfactoryafrica"><em>Founders Factory Africa</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5dc8f01c6978" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cote d’Ivoire Deep Dive Part II: Françafrique, liberal state capitalism and socio-ethnic tensions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/part-2-70a7da5ab311?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/70a7da5ab311</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 2024 09:38:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-27T18:49:54.389Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rQsUFtFFNTryV-PMrwsrmw.jpeg" /><figcaption>A craft market in Grand-Bassam, the first capital of Cote d’Ivoire under French rule. Image credit: Abderrahmane Chaoui</figcaption></figure><p>Welcome back to this four-part Deep Dive into Cote d’Ivoire. In Part I, we considered Cote d’Ivoire’s history pre-colonisation and how French administration changed the country’s fabric and laid the seeds for its future into the latter half of the 20th century.</p><p>In Part II, we focus on understanding Cote d’Ivoire’s post-independence period. Cote d’Ivoire’s journey occurred in the broad context of French colonial rule in Africa, with the economies and social fabrics of its former colonies indelibly shaped by the French experience.</p><p>We can observe two distinct trajectories:</p><ul><li>Countries that joined the socialist movement and adopted an anti-imperialist philosophy focused on developing their human stack (infrastructure, education, health…)</li><li>Countries that adopted a liberal development based on opening to Western markets, foreign investments and private sector development.</li></ul><p>These represent very good case studies to analyse the consequences of liberalism/neoliberalism and Keynesianism. But let us focus on Mr Houphouët-Boigny to understand better the trajectory taken by Cote d’Ivoire and its consequences on the country today.</p><h4>Dia Houphouët-Boigny’s long and lingering relationship with French-controlled Cote d’Ivoire</h4><p>As the nephew to the chief of a small Baoulé tribe near Yamoussoukro, Young Dia Houphouët-Boigny had the privilege of attending colonial administration schooling, attending the Bingerville superior school, where he converted to Christianity and adopting Félix as a surname to the West Africa medicine school in Dakar where he became a physician.</p><p>His background would eventually allow him to become a leading political force under French rule as the leader of his Baoulé tribe and one of the most important farmers in the country. He founded the Agricultural Union in 1944, joined the French Assembly in 1945 and finally became a French Administrator in Cote d’Ivoire during the 1950s. Eventually, the end of the Second World War and the wind of decolonisation that followed allowed Felix Houphouët-Boigny to become the first president of the independent Republic of Cote d’Ivoire.</p><p>Even so, the country’s independence is written in half-truths. Félix Houphouet-Boigny’s personal experience and his past as a political leader within the colonial power structure, added to the fact that he never hid his “regrets” at leaving “the great French family”, are evidence…</p><p><em>You can read the full story </em><a href="https://www.foundersfactory.africa/blog/cote-divoire-deep-dive-part-ii-francafrique-liberal-state-capitalism-and-socio-ethnic-tensions"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abderrahmane-chaoui/"><em>Abderrahmane Chaoui</em></a><em> is an African ecosystem researcher, consultant, and writer.</em></p><p><em>Learn more about </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/foundersfactoryafrica"><em>Founders Factory Africa</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=70a7da5ab311" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cote d’Ivoire Deep Dive Part I: Akwaba, an attractive land of prosperity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/cote-divoire-deep-dive-part-i-akwaba-an-attractive-land-of-prosperity-9241b37a6032?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9241b37a6032</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2024 10:30:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-08T18:12:11.146Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OnmRlCl12Ig3IlK2NC7YKg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image Credit: <a href="https://unsplash.com/@evablue">Eva Blue</a> via <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/assorted-color-textiles-SfPOkp6-2eA">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>In the late 70s, after only 2 decades as an independent nation under the presidency of Félix Houphouët Boigny, observers had high hopes for Cote d’Ivoire’s development and its ability to become a model for neighbouring West African countries. The growing demand for Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa and coffee, driven by the industrialisation and the consequent improvement of living standards in Europe, had stimulated the country’s economy and industrialisation to the point of being referred to as “The Ivorian Miracle” on the international scene.</p><p>Only 10 years later, the country sunk irretrievably into a tragedy that is unfortunately too well known to the continent. Ten years of economic recession during the 80s plunged the country into political instability against a backdrop of corruption and ethnic tensions, eventually leading to a series of coups and civil wars during the early 2000s that undermined Cote d’Ivoire’s economic potential. That potential still demonstrates its existence every time the country experiences stability.</p><p>In power since the early 2010s, Alassane Ouattara won his third mandate in 2020, ensuring a degree of stability in defiance of the country’s Constitution. The economy seems to be picking up again (7–8% <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CI">GDP growth rate</a>), the fastest-growing in West Africa, demonstrating once again Cote d’Ivoire’s immense economic potential. Since then, an ecosystem with a unique form has developed in the country, following a bottom-up dynamic and driven by expat entrepreneurs from the region, attracted to the country’s economic potential, its welcoming framework to foreign investments and its relatively large market (30m+ people).</p><p>In the shadow of neighbouring behemoth Nigeria and competitor Ghana, and less loud than its more outspoken French-speaking competitor Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire’s ecosystem is interesting from many perspectives. No mega-deal ($100m+) has ever happened in the country as of January 2024, no unicorn has popped up, yet it is home to some of the most successful entrepreneurial stories in the continent and the first destination market for neighbouring African startups.</p><p>In this Deep Dive, we will look at Cote d’Ivoire’s history and political and economic trajectory to understand the current shape of its ecosystem. We will look at the specificities of this ecosystem, its strengths, weaknesses and short and mid-term perspectives, with our journey taking place in 4 parts. Part I focuses on Cote d’Ivoire’s pre-independence period, with Part II considering the country’s economic development post-independence. Part III looks at the ecosystem’s early beginnings and development, while Part IV considers the Ivorian ecosystem’s recent history and its role within the broader West African ecosystem.</p><h3>“Akwaba” — A multiethnic land of welcome</h3><p>The present-day territory of Cote d’Ivoire stretches from the Gulf of Guinea in the south to the 11th parallel in the north, where it shares borders with present-day Burkina Faso and Mali. It is bordered in part by Liberia and Guinea in the west and Ghanain in the east in the heart of West Africa. From a climate perspective, the country is divided in two with what used to be a heavy rainforest in the south and a savannah in the north with its driest climate, a demarcation line that would hold its importance over the course of history. As of the 2020s, Cote d’Ivoire is now home to over 60 different ethnic groups, with the largest including the Akan, Voltaique (also known as the Gur), the Northern Mande, the Kru, the Southern Mande, and a large expat population.</p><p>Similar to what happened in Benin or Ghana, the first trade relations with Europeans involved the wealthiest tribes, mostly living in the resource-rich rainforest in the south around the 15th Century. The Portuguese and Dutch merchants established their first trade counters along the shores of Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Benin. Early European traders were later joined in the 17th Century by the French and the British, attracted to the region for its ivory and gold. Cote d’Ivoire’s name attests to this predatory colonial mindset, with the Gold Coast (now Ghana) another example, with both countries also victims of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.</p><p>Competition between European colonial powers turned firstly in favour of the British, pushing from the east (Nigeria, Niger, Ghana), then in favour of the French, counter-attacking to fill the gaps with their Western possessions (Senegal, Mali). In March 1893, following a series of exploratory missions carried out in the hinterland, the status of Cote d’Ivoire and the nature of its relationship with France changed from a privileged trading partner to an autonomous French colony administered by France with subordinate ties to the indigenous population.</p><p>The French colonisation of Cote d’Ivoire took place in two phases…</p><p><em>You can read the full piece </em><a href="https://www.foundersfactory.africa/blog/cote-divoire-deep-dive-part-i-akwaba-an-attractive-land-of-prosperity"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abderrahmane-chaoui/"><em>Abderrahmane Chaoui</em></a><em> is an African ecosystem researcher, consultant, and writer.</em></p><p><em>Learn more about </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/foundersfactoryafrica"><em>Founders Factory Africa</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9241b37a6032" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How smaller African economies can become leading innovation ecosystems — Case in point with Tunisia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/how-smaller-african-economies-can-become-leading-innovation-ecosystems-case-in-point-with-tunisia-eff8c0ed4e11?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eff8c0ed4e11</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Oct 2023 10:11:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-05T08:27:16.556Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*naLBDuarP-kOb2BReWiUbg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image credit: <a href="https://unsplash.com/@haythemgataa">Haytem Gaata</a> via <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/NULfCuLFTLg">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3>How smaller African economies can become leading tech ecosystems, with Tunisia a case study</h3><p>In the Africa of 2023, four countries still dominate the continent’s startup ecosystem, attracting 75% of VC funding and most of the media’s attention. Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya and South Africa dominate the continent on almost every relevant metric: market size, doing business, access to capital, openness to foreign markets, infrastructure development, access to talents and so forth. As a result, most startups — the ones operating basic digital businesses that bring incremental innovation to traditional value chains — have better chances to thrive in these ecosystems, which is reflected in all sorts of statistics.</p><p>Yet in the shadow of the Big 4, mired in what appears to be a deep political and economic crisis with severe consequences for the country’s economic and social fabric, Tunisia nurtures some of the most innovative startups in the continent. The dazzling rise of Instadeep is more than an epiphenomenon. It is rooted in solid foundations and could become the bedrock of a deeptech cluster in the country.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/no-two-investors-conduct-due-diligence-the-same-way-learn-what-you-dont-know-476eb9f4af7b">No two investors conduct due diligence the same way. Learn what you don’t know</a></p><h4><strong>Tunisia, STEM education and AI expertise</strong></h4><p>Tunisia is a small country of 12 million people, at the northernmost point of Africa between Algeria and Libya and facing Italy across the Mediterranean Sea. After a peaceful independence obtained from France’s protectorate, Tunisia was ruled for 30 years by President Habib Bourguiba, a primary advocate for Tunisian independence who abolished the one-year monarchy that followed and was elected president in 1957. Bourguiba’s priorities were the development of the education system, equality between men and women, and economic development that gave birth to considerable achievements during his 30-year reign. Tunisia’s education system is a legacy of the Bourguiba regime, now ranking first in Africa by the <a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2011-12/17.GCR2011-2012DTVHigherEducationandTraining.pdf">World Economic Forum</a>.</p><p>In January 2011, the nation rose against the rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, president since 1987 and former prime minister under Bourguiba. The revolution triggered a strong feeling of involvement among all spheres of the population in rebuilding the country, which carried into its entrepreneurial ecosystem. A strong bottom-up dynamic emerged from a handful of dedicated and passionate people: entrepreneurs, support organisations, ecosystem builders, and investors all sat together to put together the first building blocks of today’s ecosystem.</p><p>The result is that Tunisia’s ecosystem today is arguably the most structured, transparent and inclusive in Africa. Tunisia’s Startup Act (passed in 2018) and Startup Act 2.0 are a perfect case study of governance and clarity of processes. Led by Smart Capital, the ecosystem’s responsibilities are well shared among public and private structures across the country, answering pragmatically the country’s evolving challenges and perspectives regarding entrepreneurship and innovation.</p><p>Tunisia’s strong legacy in education system quality (STEM especially), the return of the diaspora after the Jasmin revolution and a well-structured ecosystem empowering local talents with entrepreneurial capacities have led to Tunisia’s ecosystem becoming one of the most prolific in terms of innovative startups that leverage product innovation based on scientific research.</p><p>Besides Instadeep, recently <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2023/01/10/biontech-acquires-tunisian-born-and-u-k-based-ai-startup-instadeep-for-562m/">acquired</a> by biotech giant Biontech, several deeptech nuggets are blossoming inside a turmoiled economy.</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/kumulus-water/"><strong>Kumulus Water</strong></a>, for instance, is building self-sufficient water kiosks that produce 30l of drinking water per day, out of sun and air. <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/nextprotein/"><strong>nextProtein</strong></a> is building a large-scale and self-sufficient insect-based source of protein for livestock. Many more local scientific talents are finding the entrepreneurial capacity they need in Tunisia to turn their research into a business. Many face important challenges in scaling their business in a small market not so connected continentally. Yet, the scientific evidence that combining quality education, a democratic and structured ecosystem, and entrepreneurial capacities can offer a small economy the opportunity to punch above its weight in terms of innovation cannot be denied.</p><p>Another African example of this phenomenon is Ghana. While sporting a different history and background, the country now presents similar characteristics to Tunisia, with a region-leading education system, an added legacy of STEM education and a strong network of support structures and capital providers. Again, this results in a unique ecosystem able to produce some of the continent’s most innovative healthtech and biotech startups. <a href="https://disrupt-africa.com/2022/03/25/ghanaian-diagnostics-startup-yemaachi-raises-3m-seed-round/">Yemaachi Biotechnology</a>, a YC-backed startup, raised $3.2m from investors such as Tencent and LoftyInc to accelerate the development of cancer detection and cure strategies using cutting-edge immunogenomics, bioinformatics, and artificial intelligence.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/1-whats-the-deal-with-startup-corporate-partnerships-in-africa-222b6bbf5c6">#1 — What’s the deal with startup-corporate partnerships in Africa?</a></p><h4><strong>Amid promise, the brain drain continues to hamper innovation capacity</strong></h4><p>Scientific talent on the continent can live a strained existence. While vital for the continent’s future growth, bar a few exceptions, they do not always find at-home opportunities they want to pursue in the form of research, funding or venture development. Algeria is, unfortunately a perfect illustration. For example, Professor Mabrouk Aib, head of the Industrial Design, Data Science and Artificial Intelligence at the National Polytechnic School of Algiers, testifies, “In my department, we are witnessing an alarming exodus: for some years now, the overwhelming majority of our students have been leaving Algeria within three months of graduating (in some years, up to 90% of the graduating class)”.</p><p>One of these local talents left the National Polytechnic School of Algiers some years ago and later graduated with a Ph.D. in electrical engineering from Stanford in the United States. His name is Noureddine Tayebi, the founder of Yassir, North Africa’s most valued startup. Noureddine knows that reality too well, and through Yassir, he nurtures the ambition to offer local tech talents an opportunity to stay and contribute to their country’s ecosystem.</p><p>In Tunisia once, <a href="https://www.open-startup.org/">OST</a> launched a pilot program in 2022, <a href="https://www.open-startup.org/brain">BRAIN</a>, in partnership with MIT, to foster the development of a deeptech ecosystem in the country. This program aims to empower scientific talents with the entrepreneurial capacities they need to help them transform their idea into profitable businesses. It is hoped that BRAIN can seed the creation of strong local expertise and give birth to an economic cluster that can impact economic growth in the region.</p><p>This program is being extended Africa-wide, bringing together experts to advocate locally and lay the foundations for future deeptech ecosystems in the continent. It is an excellent example of an initiative that can not only shed light on small ecosystems’ hidden gems but, most importantly, help retain some of the continent’s most talented minds by offering them opportunities to build upon their research and contribute to the development of their country.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/2-how-to-partner-with-a-corporate-a-conversation-with-3-experts-d55de9d67f1c">#2 — How to partner with a corporate — a conversation with 3 experts</a></p><h4><strong>Aiming for the infinite value loop</strong></h4><p>As Ghana and Tunisia demonstrate, with the right ingredients, small ecosystems can produce among the most innovative businesses on the continent. The secret is to rely on three pillars: an enabling environment (legal, financial, etc.), entrepreneurial capacities (support structures, access to capital, stakeholders’ involvement) and innovation capacities (education, research centres, corporates and so on). Combining these three elements can help retain talent, drive local research and help turn some of this research into innovative businesses.</p><p>This should be the end game for ecosystems outside the Big Four, small or complicated markets that possess a reliable education system. By strengthening local expertise, it can create local opportunities that, in turn, help retain some talent. The wider the talent pool, the greater the chance of projects and innovations that capture the interest of national and international capital providers, corporations and other stakeholders.</p><p>This cycle strengthens the business environment and creates more economic development opportunities, which incentivises local talent to remain in-market, thereby deepening expertise.</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abderrahmane-chaoui/"><em>Abderrahmane Chaoui</em></a><em> is an African ecosystem researcher, consultant, and writer.</em></p><p><em>Learn more about </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/foundersfactoryafrica"><em>Founders Factory Africa</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eff8c0ed4e11" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Egypt Deep Dive Part II: An ecosystem awash in concern, resilience, and bottomless potential]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/egypt-deep-dive-part-ii-an-ecosystem-awash-in-concern-resilience-and-bottomless-potential-580bf33f332a?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/580bf33f332a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[egypt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Jun 2023 07:54:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-19T07:54:02.151Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aQIxB--AQ3yYrT4GtHhBDg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Alexandria, Egypt’s second largest city and an important contributor to the Egyptian ecosystem. Image credit: <a href="https://unsplash.com/@nattyflo">Flo P</a> via <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/zpmvpEXM_Qc">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Welcome back to this two-part deep dive into the Egyptian tech ecosystem. In Part I, we considered how the winds of history have shaped the Egyptian economy and political life, which has inevitably bled into the country’s tech ecosystem, one rife with potential but hampered by a less than favourable macro-economic environment.</p><p>In Part II, we will investigate the Egyptian ecosystem and its actors in greater detail, discuss how the revolution continues to reverberate in the tech sector plus review the immense challenges and opportunities that lie within.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/egypt-deep-dive-part-i-early-successes-and-the-rise-of-bottom-up-tech-entrepreneurship-ee9c525225c4">Egypt Deep Dive Part I: Early successes and the rise of bottom-up tech entrepreneurship</a></p><h4><strong>Private enterprise begins to flex its strength amid government ecosystem involvement</strong></h4><p>To pick up where Part I concluded, the Egyptian government between 1993 and 2004 established a range of agencies to guide the development of digital-first industries in the country, with these efforts continuing into the 2010s.</p><p>These government efforts were accompanied by early isolated private initiatives in Internet-based businesses, such as Otlob.com, a food delivery service that first appeared in the ecosystem in 1999, quickly followed by local and MENA based e-commerce websites. The most notable were Souq.com, which not only paved the way for a future e-commerce industry in Egypt, but whose acquisition by Amazon in 2017 had a resonating impact on the local ecosystem.</p><p>A few years before, <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2009/08/25/confirmed-yahoo-acquires-arab-internet-portal-maktoob/">Maktoob</a>, an Arabic internet service provider (emails, instant messaging, online advertising) based in Dubai, was acquired by Yahoo in 2009. This early acquisition paved the way for the first investments in Souq. And so began the waterfall… Fawry, an e-payment solution created in 2009, that later became Egypt’s first unicorn grew rapidly and was eventually acquired in 2015 by a consortium of investors that included the MENA Long-Term Value Fund in a deal worth $100 million.</p><p>Fawry quickly engaged in startup support activities within the ecosystem through direct investments or indirectly through incubation programs or the provision of their core APIs and technology to new businesses. One of Fawry’s co-founder, stepped back in 2020 to start a $25 million fintech-focused fund in Egypt. By 2023, it was already pursuing its seventh investment.</p><p>A significant effect of the entrepreneurship dynamics that began in the Middle East and spread to Egypt was the $3.1 billion acquisition of <a href="https://www.uber.com/en-JO/newsroom/uber-careem-close-jo/">Careem by Uber</a>, which proved catalytic to the Egyptian ecosystem. Two former Careem employees, <a href="https://restofworld.org/profile/mostafa-kandil/">Mostafa Kandil</a> and <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/nagaty/">Mohamed Aboulnaga</a>, who went on to build Swvl and MNT Health respectively, the two other unicorns to emerge in the Egyptian ecosystem.</p><p>From the perspective of many Egyptians, the January 25th Revolution in early 2011 has democratised this entrepreneurial culture and triggered a sense of empowerment among the population. This feeling was encapsulated by a fierce willingness to tackle economic and social challenges on one hand and finally being responsible for the future of their community on the other. After several years, with a sustained commitment from the government, in parallel with the combined involvement of a wide range of stakeholders including universities, financial institutions, startup support organisations and corporations, many Egyptians — from the diaspora to the less privileged — found the support needed to realise their efforts in growing their ventures. This third period of entrepreneurial boom in Egypt’s recent history of country differs from its predecessors in two critical aspects:</p><p>1- It is democratic through crowding in a wider variety of entrepreneur profiles than ever before (although some gender inequalities remain consequent)</p><p>2- A specific venture profile has emerged, described by Dr. Phil Budden and Prof. Fiona Murray as “innovation-driven enterprises”, in MIT’s<a href="https://innovation.mit.edu/assets/Assessing-iEcosystems-V2-Final.pdf"> systemic approach for assessing ‘innovation-driven entrepreneurship’ in ecosystems</a>. They are the type of businesses that are able to reshuffle industries and generate new cycles of growth at a macro level.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/the-great-reset-in-african-vc-what-it-means-for-the-ecosystem-d6fd658ae109">The Great Reset in African VC: What It Means for the Ecosystem</a></p><h4><strong>The revolution, the build up of an ecosystem and the democratisation of entrepreneurship</strong></h4><p>With approximately 60% of its 100 million+ population under 30, the 2011 revolution in Egypt concerned first and foremost its youth. A massive generation between 20 and 30-years-old, driven by their individual vision for a better country, hope, and energy that needed guidance and support to make an impact.</p><p>Similarly to what happened in Tunisia, the first stakeholders to step in were startup support organisations and business angels. We can mention the <a href="https://tiec.gov.eg/English/Pages/default.aspx">Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Center</a> (TIEC), a government-funded incubator established in 2010 to support technology innovation and entrepreneurship. There’s Flat6labs, active in Egypt since 2011, offering support and seed funding to startups, Innoventures LLC, which eventually launched Instabug, and lastly the Cairo Angels network of business angels that started investing in early stage startups in 2011.</p><p>These organisations were the first to offer coworking spaces, and access to funding and the necessary expertise needed by the first generation of young Egyptian founders. They were quickly followed by eminent diaspora entrepreneurs and investors willing to contribute to this bottom-up dynamic. Examples include Ahmed Al-Alfi, an Egyptian-American entrepreneur, founder of the GrEEK Campus, a massive tech hub in downtown Cairo offering coworking space and other services to 100+ companies, and later a VC fund, <a href="https://sawariventures.com/">Sawari Ventures</a>, that closed a $71 million fund in 2021. In 2015, the reputed American University of Cairo (AUC) launched the Entrepreneurship Chair and the AUC Venture Lab, which continues to play a key role in providing the ecosystem with quality founder profiles and continuous support to founders and other stakeholders.</p><p>In the second half of 2010, convinced by the ecosystem’s bubbling energy and groundswell of innovative ideas on the ground plus the early acquisition of Fawry, the government accelerated its efforts to support entrepreneurial and innovation ecosystem. This shift is well illustrated by the Innovation Cluster Initiative, launched in 2016 and aims to develop innovation clusters in Egypt’s different regions, followed by the National Innovation Strategy in 2018, focusing on key areas such as education, research, and development and investments.</p><p>Similarly, many international telecom companies and financial institutions have also committed, through CVCs or their own incubators/accelerators, to providing financial support, mentoring, and technical support in various forms to startups in the Egyptian ecosystem. We can mention Vodafone Ventures, Orange Digital Ventures and Orange Corners, as well as Etisalat Misr that launched the Etisalat Egypt Technology and Innovation Center (EETIC). EFG Hermes, a financial services and investment bank, is partnering with Egypt Ventures on the EFG EV Fintech accelerator to invest in rising fintechs in Egypt. Google Ventures and Salesforce Ventures are other examples of corporate ventures that have actively invested in startups in the region. Another notable initiative has been driven by Egyptian banks and other financial institutions, who have partnered to launch the <a href="https://waya.media/egyptian-banks-consortium-launched-fund-of-funds-avans-manara/">Avans Manara Fund</a>, which invests in venture capital and startup-dedicated investment funds.</p><p>This growing support ecosystem and entrepreneurial dynamic kept convincing more and more youth, researchers, and seasoned professionals to become entrepreneurs, raising the Egyptian ecosystem’s attractiveness and bringing more and more risk capital providers into the ecosystem in different forms.</p><p>In particular, international VCs such as Global Ventures, Algebra Ventures or Silicon Badia have entered the ecosystem. Other angel investor networks have been spurred on too, such as AUC Angels, Kamelizer Angel Studio or Alexandria Angels, located in Alexandria, which hosts a more discrete but vibrant nascent ecosystem. International brands have also chosen Egypt as a first destination in the African continent, such as Plug and Play and more recently 500 Startups, which both partnered with the ITIDA, under the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, to develop the CREATIVA Hubs, a network of tech hubs to support startups located on the country’s university campuses.</p><p>Finally, aside from AUC and the University of Cairo, which both have been at the forefront of the ecosystem animation since the revolution, the government has prioritised reinforcing the overall level of the Egyptian university education and turn them into founder-producing organisations that can provide the ecosystem with the quality startups needed to feed and grow the ecosystem.</p><p>The combination of all these dynamics from different stakeholders in a large market with an educated population and good level of infrastructure has created the vibrant entrepreneurial dynamic witnessed in Egypt today. The ecosystem’s foundations are solid and Egypt has developed its own internal entrepreneurial and innovation capacities to sustain and enhance this positive dynamic, leading it to become Egypt’s third entrepreneurial boom.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/a-systematic-tool-to-help-african-startups-find-product-market-fit-5ed089f26fa8">A tool to help african startups systematically find product-market fit</a></p><h4><strong>Amid founder concern, resilience and remaining potential</strong></h4><p>After the hopes for democracy faded after the revolution, with many activists and journalists imprisoned when the Egyptian military took back power in 2013, recent economic uncertainty is raising fears that its entrepreneurial ecosystem may follow a similar tragedy.</p><p>Even so, the third entrepreneurial boom in Egypt continues to show resilience supported by its strong internal entrepreneurial capacity.</p><p>The $800 million+ bagged by Egyptian startups in 2022 is relatively small compared to world-leading ecosystems such as Boston, London or Shanghai, but still enough even in difficult economic times to make Egypt a continental giant driven by its bottom-up dynamic. And that, in my opinion, is a strong factor of resilience. Egypt’s potential resides within its young and rather educated population. All it needs is the right environment and support to thrive. Today’s Egyptian founders are witness to its foundations and tomorrow’s founders shall be able to enjoy it.</p><p>Besides, if the impact of this entrepreneurial dynamic on the Egyptian economy is still minor, one characteristic of innovation-driven ecosystems is their ability to bring to market companies with the potential to create technology clusters, comparative advantages for the local economy, and new cycles of sustainable growth. This type of enterprise is yet to be seen in Egypt, but no doubt their impact is much desirable in times of economic crisis. The Egyptian government seems to be moving in that direction, as illustrated by the aforementioned 2016 Innovation Cluster Initiative. Talking about clusters, Egypt can rely on its legacy in the space industry and its strong military institutions (directly and indirectly) to become drivers for future innovation-driven startups.</p><p>The creation of the National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences (NARSS) in 1994 has put together the foundations in research and in-house capabilities that led to the launch of Egypt’s first satellite in 2007. Since then, the country has accelerated the path to become a continental leader in the space industry by further strengthening its in-house capabilities and by establishing international partnerships, such as <a href="https://www.space.com/china-launches-second-horus-satellite-egypt">the recently announced launch</a> of remote-sensing satellites, co-developed with China. The opening of the industry and its technology to universities and the private sector could lead to the transformation of what is now a government-led industry with a security and research-based approach to a dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystem, host to innovation-driven enterprises.</p><p>On the same scale, similar to what Israel managed to achieve in transforming its army from a cost centre to one of the main drivers of innovation in the country, the important role given to the military in Egyptian economic life can become a strong asset in generating innovation clusters. The Israeli Defense Force has a much more open approach to collaboration compared to its Egyptian peer, with this approach inspired by the US. Over time the “open source” approach to military technology allowed many Israeli former officers to build startups and technology companies based on military technology (NSO Group, Cellebrite, Verint Systems etc.). The existing expertise among the military in developing its own economic activities, added to the right mindset and framework of collaboration, can become a fertile ground for future innovation driven enterprises.</p><p>To conclude, I would like to warn once again that funding statistics alone should not be considered a marker of the robustness of an entrepreneurial ecosystem, nor should they be considered as prophecies. If the Q1 2023 statistics in Egypt are indeed worrying, Q1 2023 has observed the rise of the third Egyptian unicorn at a time when VC investments have been cut in half worldwide. The robustness and resilience of the Egyptian startup ecosystem comes from its population, its connection to the Middle East and from the bottom-up dynamics that found resonating support in a balanced, diversified and efficient ecosystem.</p><p>“Numbers are to analysts what street lamps are to a drunkard: they are much more a support than a light” — Jean Dion.</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abderrahmane-chaoui/"><em>Abderrahmane Chaoui</em></a><em> is an African ecosystem researcher, consultant, and writer.</em></p><p><em>Learn more about </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/foundersfactoryafrica"><em>Founders Factory Africa</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=580bf33f332a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Egypt Deep Dive Part I: Early successes and the rise of bottom-up tech entrepreneurship]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abderrahmane.chaoui/egypt-deep-dive-part-i-early-successes-and-the-rise-of-bottom-up-tech-entrepreneurship-ee9c525225c4?source=rss-bb60ad61563a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ee9c525225c4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[egypt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abderrahmane Chaoui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Jun 2023 15:49:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-12T07:53:48.929Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zNIqj1iYLvmQF3rRhgS35A.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Pyramids of Giza with the crawling city of Cairo in the background, gaining more ground everyday. Image credit: <a href="https://medium.com/u/bb60ad61563a">Abderrahmane Chaoui</a></figcaption></figure><p>Om El Donya (Earth’s Mother) — this is how Egyptians like to see their 5000+ years old nation. At the crossroads of continents and civilisations, on the shores of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, Egypt has been humanity’s favoured playground throughout history and shelters among its most beautiful treasures, marks of a great civilisation that have survived the ravages of time.</p><p>The Egypt of 2023 could not be more different. And thus begins Part I of a two-part deep dive into the Egyptian tech ecosystem, with Part I covering Egypt’s political and economic history, and how its modern incarnation has been shaped by the military’s powerful influence on daily Egyptian life.</p><p>Part II will focus on the early players within the still nascent Egyptian ecosystem and international acquisitions before turning to the revolution, the growth of the ecosystem, its democratisation, and what may be in store for North Africa’s largest tech ecosystem.</p><p>While its sites and heritage continue to raise wonder and admiration, the country has lost the influence it once had. For the past 10 years, Egypt has been caught up in an economic crisis punctuated by stressful IMF deadlines and marked by political unrest, high inflation, a recurrent devaluation of the Egyptian Pound and a worsening budget deficit. While the situation is particularly burdensome for the most vulnerable people (30% of the population lived under poverty in 2019 according to the World Bank), the country can count on several tailwind factors. These are strong levels of local investment, a renewed attractiveness to foreign direct investment and one of the most dynamic startup scenes in Africa and MENA that is able to foster innovation and growth in its economy.</p><p>These tailwinds, combined with it having the 3rd largest population in Africa (100 million+) and GDP ($378 bn) makes Egypt an economic giant on the African continent. Admittedly part of the Big Four since the early days of startup funding statistics (alongside Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya) and home to several unicorns with successful exits (Fawry, Swvl, MTN Halan), the Egyptian ecosystem is showing signs of fragility in light of the current poor economic climate, with startup valuations cut in half and international funds becoming less and less easily available. A reality that is reflected in <a href="https://thebigdeal.substack.com/p/q12023">Q1 2023’s</a> funding statistics. As revealed by data from the Baobab Network, if the MNT-Halan deal ($340m) removed from the equation, Egyptian startups only raised $23m during Q1 2023 versus an average $150m per quarter between 2020 and 2022.</p><p>One point of particular interest is the bottom up nature of the entrepreneurial dynamic that has happened since the Spring Revolution in the wake of a military-led interventionist economy, and its evolution since. This evolution is recently come into sharp focus in the light of recent <a href="https://www-businesstodayegypt-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.businesstodayegypt.com/amp/1/2543/Egypt%E2%80%99s-PM-issues-decision-to-form-a-unit-for-startups%E2%80%99">announcements</a> from Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly to create a dedicated permanent unit focused on startup regulations and policies in the country.</p><p>The unit includes representatives from 5 ministries, the country’s Central Bank, and two other public agencies. In light of the ecosystem’s importance to the continent and North Africa, plus this announcement, its an apt time to delve into the intricacies of Egypt’s entrepreneurial and innovation ecosystem to understand their foundations and assess their long-term vulnerability to the fluctuations of the country’s economy.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/algeria-a-two-part-deep-dive-into-a-potential-startup-giant-part-1-1dec387061b0">Algeria - A two-part deep dive into a potential startup giant (Part 1)</a></p><h4><strong>Om El Donya — A giant with feet of clay</strong></h4><p>Culturally, Egypt is one of the greatest civilisations in the world. No history book across the globe can afford not to mention its influence at different points of history. Strategically positioned between the Middle East and North Africa at the shores of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and bordered by Libya and Sudan while looking at Saudi Arabia, Israel, Lebanon and Turkey across the sea, Egypt is one of the few iconic places on Earth where history actually happened.</p><p>Strolling in Cairo in 2023 gives you a good sense of that, from the iconic Giza pyramids to the old city of Heliopolis, passing by the Khan Al Khalili in the Islamic City, the 2000 years-old Old Citadel to the trendy neighbourhood of Zamalek — home to the singer Om Kalthoum, who considerably influenced Arab culture in the 60s. Summing up this wonderful civilisation in one paragraph is a risky exercise. For the purpose of this deep dive, we will focus on the last century, from the end of British rule in 1922 until now.</p><p>If British rule, from 1882 to 1922, introduced some political and economic reforms that helped the country’s development, it was mostly characterised by the suppression of indigenous rights and the promotion and defence of British interests — the Suez Canal especially. After 1922, a new political regime was promoted by the British after giving political independence through King Fuad I. The British military remained, along with British control over the country’s affairs, until 1952. During that time, some minor families were given privileges and economic power, but most of the population was used as low cost labour and had limited ability to participate in Egypt’s economic and political life.</p><p>Yet, some early family-owned businesses thrived at the time, trading in agriculture products, cotton especially, or manufacturing, eventually becoming heavy conglomerates in what can be defined as the first entrepreneurial dynamic in this period of Egypt’s economic history. Outside the bubble of some privileged families, the 30 years of monarchy were marked by social tensions and political unrest, giving birth to movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers Movement, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser would abolish the monarchy and establish Egypt as a republic after a military coup in 1952, marking a brutal shift in the last century’s trajectory.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/algeria-a-two-part-deep-dive-into-a-potential-startup-giant-part-2-6d2a268322dd">Algeria - A two-part deep dive into a potential startup giant (Part 2)</a></p><h4><strong>From imperial to military rule: Nasser, Al Sadat, Muburak and El-Sisi</strong></h4><p>The early days of the Republic under Gamal Abdel Nasser were marked by a fierce anti-imperialism, an adhesion to the socialist cause and a leading role in the non-aligned movement. Firmly opposed to religious extremism but carrying a modern vision of the Arab world, Nasser committed Egypt to the path of pan-Arabism, forging close ties with the Middle East and Gulf countries. Economically, the country’s early socialist policies reversed a century of capitalistic development in the country, ushering in a strategy of redistribution. The promotion of land reform in 1952, the nationalisation of industries (banking, insurance, transportation) and the promotion of social welfare programs were among the most noticeable and impactful measures in terms of poverty reduction and increasing access to basic necessities.</p><p>After his death in 1970, Nasser was replaced by Anwar Al Sadat who took Egypt back towards economic liberalism, free trade, and a more flexible foreign policy while maintaining a strong military institution. This pivot was called “infitah” (openness). Economically, the infitah strongly emphasised free trade, encouraging foreign direct investment in the country and greater openness to international institutions and donors especially.</p><p>The infitah marked the beginning of a long collaboration period with donor institutions on large transformational projects in exchange for structural reforms in Egyptian society. Importantly, in 1978, in an attempt to fake a reduction in the military budget, the armed forces were given a direct right and role in undertaking profitable activities, marking the beginning of a strong military nexus within the national economy and can be described as Egypt’s own <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/military-industrial-complex">military industrial complex</a>.</p><p>The legacy of this decision is that in Egypt today, the military as an institution is now everywhere in the economic landscape. From direct involvement in key industries through a network of subsidies (production of cement, steel, home appliances, or tourism) or as <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/10/26/egyptian-economy-in-clutches-of-deep-state-pub-83027">described</a> by the Carnegie Middle East Centre, directly influencing “a vast network of retired senior officers who occupy high managerial positions or sit on company boards throughout the sprawling public enterprise sector and in parts of the private sector. The majority of regional governments and almost all public authorities (in maritime transport, aviation, railways, and the Suez Canal) have been headed by former generals or other high-ranking retired officers for decades.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*ZbZ2kPsyxG8wsocULMWFiw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Suez Canal in 1988. Approximately 10% of all global trade and 7% of oil produced globally moved through the canal in 2022. Image credit: <a href="https://nara.getarchive.net/media/an-aerial-view-of-the-suez-canal-679d87">Getarchive.net</a></figcaption></figure><p>In 2014, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi further expanded the role and influence of the military in the economy by placing all “public and vital facilities” under their institution’s jurisdiction. For instance, the military are responsible for the massive infrastructure works behind New Cairo, a brand new city, 1 hour east of Cairo’s “old” centre, with New Cairo being greener, less polluted, and more expensive to live in.</p><p>From a macro point of view, these structural characteristics have undermined Egypt’s economic potential for decades, leading it to rely on an economic rent made of a unique legacy of tourist sites, trade through the Suez Canal, worker remittances and financial aid from Gulf countries, and strong industries such as agriculture (cotton), transportation, or banking. Aside from that, decades of publicly-funded large infrastructure projects have created a recurrent budget deficit that triggered rising interest rates, a recurring devaluation of the EGP and crawling inflation in the country.</p><p>Moreover, the country’s openness to international trade and finance has made it highly vulnerable to external shocks, exemplified by the 2008 financial crisis and more recently Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These economic factors, combined with the 2011 revolution which caused a sharp drop in tourism and foreign investments and thus, in the country’s foreign reserves, has plunged Egypt into a deep economic crisis and urge for a series of loans from the World Bank and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-24/egypt-says-imf-approves-last-installment-of-12-billion-loan#:~:text=The%20International%20Monetary%20Fund%20said,criticism%20for%20painful%20austerity%20measures">IMF</a> in a 15% inflation context.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/senegal-a-deep-dive-look-e0760ead9eab">Senegal — A three-part series focused on an early African adopter (Part I)</a></p><h4>The ignition of digital entrepreneurs and the waterfall effects of early success from the Middle East</h4><p>In 2015, Egyptian startups raised $4.75m in total. This is tiny compared to the $812m they raised in 2022, highlighting the incredible speed at which the Egyptian startup and innovation ecosystem have managed to play a leading role both in the MENA region and at a continental level. In the case of Egypt, there are 3 dynamics in play that occurred in different moments of time and which has favoured the development of such performant ecosystems. These factors are a century-old entrepreneurial capacity, solid technology foundations laid down by the government and military, and lastly a bottom-up entrepreneurial explosion that was fuelled by the early exits of the Middle East (such as <a href="https://www.careem.com/">Careem</a> and before them Mektoob or Souq.com). These factors were triggered shortly before the 2011 Revolution and have subsequently led to the democratisation of the dynamics and the involvement of a whole range of stakeholders.</p><p>As noted above, 20th century Egypt has seen different periods impacting its society and entrepreneurial capacity differently. The monarchy of King Fuad I in 1922, although deeply unequal and close to British interests, allowed the emergence of a first generation of successful entrepreneurs. The legal framework inherited from the British, rather liberal and favourable to private initiative, promoted the growth of family businesses, which gradually became massive conglomerates with tentacles in several sectors.</p><p>One iconic example of this first entrepreneurial dynamic is <a href="https://egyptianstreets.com/2022/03/24/the-one-man-show-talaat-harbs-legacy-in-egypt/">Talaat Harb</a>, founder of Banque Misr and two dozen other companies in a wide range of industries. If this dynamic was suspended during the country’s socialist years, similar to what happened in <a href="https://medium.com/founders-factory-africa/algeria-a-two-part-deep-dive-into-a-potential-startup-giant-part-1-1dec387061b0">Algeria</a> after independence, it essentially changed form, taken over by public institutions such as the army, before the return to liberalisation under President Sadat. Two of Egypt’s largest private corporations, the Mansour Group and Orascom, respectively established in 1952 and 1950, were nationalised by the socialist government of Nasser in the 1960s before being eventually returned to private ownership in the 1970s via the Mansour Group and 20 years later for Orascom, which then became Orascom Construction Industries.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/280/1*oAclCGAlqMZUgwD5iwStlQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>President Anwar Sadat in 1973. Image credit: <a href="https://jenikirbyhistory.getarchive.net/amp/media/egyptian-president-anwar-sadat-flickr-the-central-intelligence-agency-1-737f6d">Jenikirbyhistory.com</a></figcaption></figure><p>Both companies grew to become international conglomerates and leaders in different industries including engineering, construction, energy or retail. Since then, especially during the liberal years of President Sadat and Mubarak, other large family-owned businesses have emerged, including the Amer Group in real estate or the tobacco producers that are the Mansha brothers, marking Egypt’s second entrepreneurial dynamic in the last century.</p><p>This second entrepreneurial period in Egypt did trigger a sort of entrepreneurial culture in the country and erected role models to follow but it was in fact limited to a handful of powerful families, often with strong ties to the government. At the same time, through a series of structural economic and legal reforms, the government had slowly created a healthy environment for business in the country, allowing more private entrepreneurs as well as local and foreign investors to do business in this large market with strong connections to the Middle East.</p><p>These efforts to sanitise the economy were accompanied by more structural and long-term efforts to develop in-house capabilities. For instance, the military has been critical in the build-up of technological human capacity, as it is exemplified by the establishment of the Military Technical College (MTC) in Cairo in 1967 or the Military Factory for Engineering Industries (MFEI). This ambition was renewed many years later with the creation of the Information Technology Institute (ITI) in 1993 to provide digital literacy and training to the local workforce.</p><p>The third period of entrepreneurial boom in Egypt was only witnessed 20 years later but its foundational institutions were put together during the late 1990s. The first initiatives were aimed at promoting the adoption of digital technologies and modernising IT infrastructure, illustrated by the establishment of the <a href="https://itida.gov.eg/English/Pages/default.aspx">Information Technology Industry Development Agency</a> (ITIDA).</p><p>A few years later, the government engaged in the reform of the telecommunications industry, which gave birth to the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) in 2003, which is in charge of regulating and promoting the adoption of digital technologies. At the same time, the military was involved once again to support the development and the promotion of the Smart Village Egypt project in 2001, which aimed to create a hub for technology companies and startups. The project provided state-of-the-art infrastructure and facilities to attract both local and international companies to Egypt. Finally, in 2004, the e-government initiative aimed to provide citizens with easier access to government services through an online portal helped to educate the market and create early digital habits among the population.</p><p>Government efforts would continue into the 2010s, but it was time for a new bottom-up dynamic to emerge, triggered in the Middle East and that found a resonating echo in post-revolution Egypt.</p><p>This will conclude Part I of our deep dive into the Egypt ecosystem. See you soon for Part II, covering the Egypt ecosystem’s present and potential future.</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abderrahmane-chaoui/"><em>Abderrahmane Chaoui</em></a><em> is an African ecosystem researcher, consultant, and writer.</em></p><p><em>Learn more about </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/foundersfactoryafrica"><em>Founders Factory Africa</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee9c525225c4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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