<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Abhishek Pandey on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Abhishek Pandey on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@abhiet01?source=rss-4a74599fd622------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 13:04:53 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@abhiet01/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ZT assessment tool]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abhiet01/zt-assessment-tool-971c5e3da878?source=rss-4a74599fd622------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/971c5e3da878</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhishek Pandey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 09:01:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-11T09:02:01.550Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://ztassess.netlify.app/">https://ztassess.netlify.app/</a></p><p>It will give assessment score of Zero trust in just 7 min.</p><p>After assessment, it will show what is prioritized recommandations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/820/1*DZvMPacLjfVP96fBDO4lTA.png" /></figure><p>#ZeroTrust<br>#Security<br>#ZTImplemeation<br>#SimplifyZT</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=971c5e3da878" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How to detect an attack from an APT group and prepare a defence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abhiet01/how-to-detect-an-attack-from-an-apt-group-and-prepare-a-defence-786f4a995b17?source=rss-4a74599fd622------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/786f4a995b17</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhishek Pandey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 May 2025 17:43:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-15T17:43:49.658Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In modern times, warfare extends beyond traditional battlefields into the cyber realm. The state-sponsored Pakistani threat group APT36 has targeted government, military, and educational institutions, employing tactics such as malware deployment, phishing, and social engineering attacks.</p><p>Detection:</p><ol><li>Monitor for Anomalous Network Activity</li><li>Identify Spear-Phishing and Social Engineering</li><li>Endpoint Monitoring for Malware and Persistence</li><li>Detect Watering Hole Attacks</li><li>Leverage Threat Intelligence — YARA rule and signature</li><li>Monitor for Lateral Movement and Privilege Escalation</li></ol><p>How to prepare the defence strategy at the enterprise level</p><p>Securing an enterprise against APT36 requires a defense-in-depth approach, combining robust email and endpoint security, network monitoring, threat intelligence, and employee training. Prioritize preventing phishing and malware infections, detecting lateral movement, and protecting sensitive data.</p><ol><li>They primarily can gain access via spear phishing(target-specific group or Org) or water hole attack( attacker observe which site often org use and inject malware) prevent should be blocked at entry points.<br>Email security —</li><li>Hardening network- ZTNA,</li><li>Enhance detection capabilities</li><li>Protect sensitive data — PII, PHI</li><li>Incident response and recovery :</li><li>Org and policy measures :</li></ol><h4>Recommended Tools</h4><ul><li><strong>Email Security</strong>: Proofpoint, Mimecast, Barracuda.</li><li><strong>EDR</strong>: CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.</li><li><strong>SIEM</strong>: Splunk, Elastic Stack, IBM QRadar.</li><li><strong>Network Security</strong>: Palo Alto Networks, Cisco Secure, Fortinet, Versa.</li><li><strong>Threat Intelligence</strong>: Recorded Future, ThreatConnect, MISP.</li><li><strong>Mobile Security</strong>: Lookout, Zimperium, Microsoft Intune.</li><li><strong>DLP</strong>: Symantec DLP, Forcepoint, McAfee.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=786f4a995b17" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cybersecurity is moving from reactive to preemptive. Are we ready?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abhiet01/cybersecurity-is-moving-from-reactive-to-preemptive-are-we-ready-a4709ce1fd2f?source=rss-4a74599fd622------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a4709ce1fd2f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhishek Pandey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 May 2025 17:38:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-13T17:38:38.123Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently, I was reading about a Fortune 500 company that had an attacker inside for 39 in their public Cloud infrasture-Completely undetected. Not because they lack security, but because whatever they have for securing was after the damage was done.</p><p>Since cloud infrastructure is increasing, more threats are also growing at a double rate, and waiting for an alert may not be enough. There are below reasons,</p><ol><li>SIEM is flooded with false positives.</li></ol><p>2. Cloud misconfiguration goes unnoticed until exploited.</p><p>3. Bypass traditional detection.</p><p>By the time SOC knows about the attack, the hacker has already moved laterally.</p><p>Most orgs are structured around incident response, not threat anticipation</p><p>a) Preemptive security needs cross-team collaboration (DevOps, Cloud, SecOps)</p><p>b) It’s a mindset shift — from “react to alerts” to “anticipate failure and block it early”</p><p>c) “The biggest blocker to preemptive cybersecurity isn’t tools — it’s culture.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SD5NSOrXDwkJZPSI" /><figcaption>Cybersecurity approach</figcaption></figure><p>The future of cloud security isn’t about watching dashboards. It’s about designing environments where attackers fail silently and quickly.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a4709ce1fd2f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Possible attack in ZTNA AWS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abhiet01/possible-attack-in-ztna-aws-16f15d0de278?source=rss-4a74599fd622------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/16f15d0de278</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhishek Pandey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 May 2025 17:44:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-07T17:44:51.528Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In last article, I have described how to design ZTNA in AWS for a simple web application. in this article, I will briefly discuss possible attacks</p><ol><li>Credential-based attacks: In simple terms, someone breaking the house with real keys without triggering alarm</li></ol><p>Description: Phishing, credential stuffing, and password spraying to steal SSO.</p><p>Impact: Unauthorized application access</p><p>Mitigatation: MFA via SSO, training,Login Monitoring</p><p>Residual risk: Advanced phishing bypass MFA. it require web based MFA(maybe in future will discuss more on this)</p><p>2. Device Compromise: Someone gain access without permission</p><p>Description: Malware or spoofed devices bypassing checks</p><p>Impact: Unauthorized application access</p><p>Mitigation: Verified access device checks, SG in AWS</p><p>3. API and web application attacks: Querying database by changing query or sending multiple request to make service down.</p><p>Description: SQL injection, XSS, API abuse( e.g. DDOS)</p><p>Impact: Data leakage, downtime.</p><p>Mitigation: AWS WAF, API Gateway throttling, input validation, IAM</p><p>Residual risk: Zero-day vulnerability.</p><p>4. MITM attacks: Men in middle attack</p><p>Description: Session hijacking</p><p>Mitigation: TLS, Strong encryption</p><p>Residual risk: End points</p><p>5. Insider Threats:</p><p>Description: Overprivileged accounts, Malicious employee</p><p>Mitigation: IAM, least privilege</p><p>Residual risk: Social Engineering</p><p>6.DoS/DDoS Attacks:</p><p>Description: Volumn or application layer DoS</p><p>Mitigation: Cloudwatch, AWS shield</p><p>Residual risk: Scaling limit</p><p>7. Misconfiguration exploits</p><p>Description: Exposure reosuces, weak policies.</p><p>Mitigation: Private subnets, IAM, AWS config</p><p>Residual risk: Human errors</p><p>8. Lateral movement: When hackers get into network and move around sideways to find valuable data or reach more imp device/system/services.</p><p>Description: Privilege escalation, service to service attacks</p><p>Mitigation: Least privilege, IAM, SG</p><p>Residual risk: Misconfigured roles.</p><p>There are others attack as well, based on real time examples I have included these, since security needs to update so regular audits needed to make everything secure.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=16f15d0de278" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Threat modelling in ZTNA AWS web app]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abhiet01/threat-modelling-in-ztna-aws-web-app-f809fa495eda?source=rss-4a74599fd622------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f809fa495eda</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[aws-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-modeling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aws]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhishek Pandey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2025 18:14:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-30T18:14:41.062Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the last article we have discussed about how to design AWS web app with ZTNA here is article link<br><a href="https://medium.com/@abhiet01/ztna-in-aws-65bd60a5b5b5">https://medium.com/@abhiet01/ztna-in-aws-65bd60a5b5b5</a></p><p>In this article we will discuss about threat modelling, we are going to use 4 steps threat modelling</p><p>1. Identify Assets → What are you protecting?</p><p>2. Identify Entry Points &amp; Trust Boundaries → Where can attackers interact? Where are boundaries enforced?</p><p>3. Identify Threats → What can go wrong? The STRIDE model is often used.</p><p>4. Mitigate Threats → How to defend?</p><p>Let me describe each</p><ol><li>Identify key assets —</li></ol><ul><li>The private web application (hosted on EC2).</li><li>User identities are managed by IAM Identity Center.</li><li>Verified Access policies that control access.</li><li>Load Balancer endpoint (public internet-facing).</li><li>Session tokens and cookies (auth artifacts).</li><li>Network traffic inside the VPC (post-authentication).</li></ul><p>2. Identify Entry Points &amp; Trust Boundaries</p><ul><li>User Browser → Verified Access → Trust Boundary (authentication enforced).</li><li>Verified Access → Load Balancer → Trust Boundary (policy enforced).</li><li>Load Balancer → Private EC2 → Trust Boundary (network segmentation).</li></ul><p>Trust boundaries are key: each jump between services should assume attacker presence if security is not enforced.</p><p>3️. Identify Threats (using STRIDE Model)</p><p><strong>Category</strong></p><p>Example Threats in this ZTNA Setup</p><p>Spoofing: impersonating a valid user to access Verified Access.</p><p>Tampering: Manipulating Verified Access tokens/cookies during transmission.</p><p>Repudiation: User denies accessing the app (no audit logging).</p><p>Information Disclosure: Sensitive app data leaks over HTTP or weak SSL.</p><p>Denial of Service: Flooding the ALB or Verified Access endpoint.</p><p>Elevation of Privilege: Misconfigured Verified Access policy allows broad access.</p><p>4.Mitigations</p><p>Threat Mitigation<br><strong>Spoofing. </strong>Use strong IAM Identity Center authentication (MFA, SSO, identity federation).<br><strong>Tampering</strong>Ensure end-to-end TLS encryption everywhere (browser → Verified Access → ALB → EC2). Rotate tokens frequently.<br><strong>Repudiation</strong>Enable access logs in Verified Access and ALB. Record user actions<br><strong>Information Disclosure</strong> use HTTPS (TLS 1.2+). Encrypt data at rest on EC2.<br><strong>Denial of Service</strong>Enable AWS Shield (basic/free) protection. Configure WAF on ALB.<br><strong>Elevation of Privilege</strong>Very strict Verified Access policies. Least privilege principle. Separate apps and Verified Access groups if needed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f809fa495eda" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ZTNA in AWS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abhiet01/ztna-in-aws-65bd60a5b5b5?source=rss-4a74599fd622------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/65bd60a5b5b5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhishek Pandey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2025 05:38:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-25T05:38:58.507Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To simplify ZTNA in the AWS cloud, let&#39;s take an example: A company wants to create an employee portal for 10k users. The goal is to secure and simplify, but always verify access to the application without relying on a traditional VPN.</p><p>step-by-step process</p><ol><li>Set up identity verification: AWS SSO with external AD</li><li>Deploy the application in a secure environment: VPC and EC2</li><li>Implement secure access with ZTNA: SSO, define policy, API gateway in front of ALB , WAF to prevent SQL injection</li><li>Encrypt the Data: enable TLS and Amazon RDS for data at rest</li><li>Monitor and log the activity: AWS Cloudtrail, Cloudwatch</li></ol><p>Key service used <br>Identity AWS SSO , IAM<br> Networking: VPN, Security groups<br>Access: AWS verified access, API gateways, WAF, ALB<br>Data: RDS<br>Monitoring : CloudTrail and Cloudwatch</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_uqS_abA47ufW8Je" /></figure><p>This is the simplest cloud design for ZTNA, for automation, AWS Lambda can be used.</p><p>Traffic flow<br>1. User Authentication Packet Flow<br>User → AWS SSO</p><p>HTTPS (TCP 443) request initiated from user’s browser to AWS SSO login page.</p><p>User submits credentials; authentication packets go to AWS SSO endpoint.</p><p>Auth success → SSO returns a token (SAML/OIDC/JWT).</p><p>SSO → IAM</p><p>Token exchanged for temporary security credentials via AssumeRoleWithSAML or AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (HTTPS).</p><p>These creds include Access Key, Secret, and Session Token.</p><p>2. VPN Tunnel Establishment (if applicable)<br>User → VPN Gateway</p><p>IPsec/IKE packets (e.g., UDP 500, ESP protocol) establish a secure tunnel.</p><p>After the tunnel setup, traffic is encapsulated and encrypted (ESP packets).</p><p>DNS resolution may occur before tunnel setup, typically via UDP 53 or DoH (TCP/443).</p><p>3. Traffic Ingress and Access Control<br>User → API Gateway or ALB</p><p>HTTPS request to API Gateway or ALB (TCP 443).</p><p>Packet traverses:</p><p>Security Groups → checks allow rules (source IP, protocol, port).</p><p>WAF (if enabled) → inspects payload for OWASP Top 10, SQLi, XSS, etc.</p><p>AWS Verified Access (inline or ahead)</p><p>Verifies device posture and identity via request headers or tokens.</p><p>Allows or denies based on policies (zero-trust architecture).</p><p>4. Backend Request to Database<br>API Gateway / ALB → App / Lambda → RDS</p><p>Application code parses user request and forms a SQL query.</p><p>A TCP connection (default port 3306 for MySQL, 5432 for PostgreSQL) is opened to RDS.</p><p>Packets carrying the SQL query flow through the VPC, passing security groups attached to RDS.</p><p>Encrypted via TLS (if enabled) for DB access.</p><p>5. Data Return Path<br>RDS → App → API Gateway / ALB → User</p><p>Data is returned in TCP segments back through the same network path.</p><p>Response may be paginated or streamed if large.</p><p>WAF and Verified Access can re-check egress traffic (optional).</p><p>VPN may re-encapsulate packets before returning to user.</p><p>6. Monitoring Packets (Passive)<br>CloudTrail</p><p>No packets, but captures API calls made by IAM identities (e.g., rds:DescribeDBInstances, sts:AssumeRole).</p><p>CloudWatch</p><p>Collects metrics and logs, including application logs, VPC flow logs, error rates.</p><p>May involve internal AWS service-to-service HTTPS packets for metric push (via embedded agents or SDKs).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=65bd60a5b5b5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How to design a zero-trust architecture in the cloud?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abhiet01/how-to-design-a-zero-trust-architecture-in-the-cloud-6b52029b0ee3?source=rss-4a74599fd622------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b52029b0ee3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zero-trust-architecture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhishek Pandey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Apr 2025 09:05:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-24T09:05:31.555Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While designing ZTNA, one first needs to follow the core principles of Zero trust</p><p>a) Never Trust, always verify<br> b) Assume breach<br> c) Least Privilege Access<br> d) Micro-Segmentation<br> e) Strong Authentication and Authorization</p><p>Step by step</p><p>1) Define the protected surface- set of critical assets</p><p>Data (PII, IP, business data)<br>Application ( web apps, APIs)<br>Assets ( VM, containers)<br>Services (Database)</p><p>Why important<br>Smaller than the attack surface, it is easier to protect.<br>Provide granular policy control</p><p>2) Understand how the user and service interact with resources</p><p>it’s the deciding factor<br> <br>Who is accessing<br>What app/data are accessing<br>How communication happens<br>Where it coming or going<br>When connection occurs<br>Why access is needed</p><p>3) Establish Micro-Segmentation<br> a) User security groups, firewall rules, iptables etc<br> b) Implement subnets<br> c) VPC peering rules</p><p>4) Strong IAM</p><p>Enforce MFA<br>User SSO/OIDC with AD<br>ABAC or RBAC</p><p>5) Device and Endpoint Verification</p><p>Use EDR<br>Use MDM tools</p><p>6) Policy Enforcement at Access Points</p><p>Use WAF and API gateways</p><p>7) Monitoring and Analytics</p><p>Enable cloud native logging ( CloudTrail, Azure monitor)</p><p>Use SIEM/SOAR</p><p>8) Automated Threat Response</p><p>Use playbooks in tools that can automate the response</p><p>AWS Zero Trust Architecture</p><p>IAM: Enforce least privilege policies</p><p>PrivateLink: Secure service-to-service access without exposing public IPs</p><p>Security Groups + NACLs: Enforce network segmentation</p><p>CloudTrail + GuardDuty: Detect anomalies</p><p>Control Tower + SCPs: Governance and policy enforcement</p><p>Activate to view larger image,</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/711/0*f1uvfq5eSlL8oVOf" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b52029b0ee3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>