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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Synchronising Democracy: A Theoretical Analysis of One Nation, One Election in India]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/politics-for-india/synchronising-democracy-a-theoretical-analysis-of-one-nation-one-election-in-india-fb1feaef6c6d?source=rss-fbb003f28dc5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fb1feaef6c6d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics-for-india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psir-optional]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[upsc-exam-preparation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2025 07:16:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-21T07:16:20.330Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*h5bmV4NtYA23k_7BJMyizg.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>Back in 1971, DMK’s Karunanidhi supported simultaneous elections — saying they aligned well with governance efficiency. Fast forward to the 2024–25 debate: his third son, M.K. Stalin, opposes it, arguing that ONOE undermines federalism and regional voices.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>This contrast across generations in the same party shows how ONOE isn’t just a technical fix — it’s a battle over India’s political identity. Should national efficiency trump regional autonomy? Or is preserving diverse local voices more important than cutting costs?</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE) proposal seeks to realign India’s federal electoral cycle — synchronizing Lok Sabha, state assemblies, and eventually local elections — to streamline governance and reduce costs. Simultaneous elections were held in 1951–67; the cycle broke in the late ’60s due to assembly dissolutions.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Read full article for theoretical analysis of the whole issue and its implications for Indian federalism and polity.</em></blockquote><h3>1] Introduction</h3><p><strong>One Nation, One Election</strong> (<strong>ONOE</strong>) refers to holding elections to the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and all State Legislative Assemblies simultaneously. In this, voters across India cast ballots for the national parliament and their state assemblies on the same day (though in multiple phases).</p><p>ONOE<strong> </strong>has become politically significant as it touches deeply held values of Indian democracy. In (March 2024 — Reference), a Government’s High-Level Committee (HLC), headed by former President of India Dr. Ramnath Kovind submitted its report favouring ONOE. The report noted that such a system could “enhance administrative efficiency, reduce election-related expenditures, and promote policy continuity”.</p><h3>2] Historical Background</h3><p>ONOE is not a new concept to Indian polity. Between <strong>1951–1967, i.e., </strong>immediately after independence, India conducted simultaneous polls. The Constitution itself implicitly anticipated this by fixing five-year terms for both Parliament and state legislatures (Article 83 and 172) from a common starting point.</p><p>However, that unbroken pattern ended in the late 60s when several state governments fell prematurely. In 1970 , the Lok Sabha was also dissolved a year early by Indira Gandhi. Since then, elections for Parliament and various state assemblies started occurring in different years.</p><p>The idea of ONOE, however, did not disappear. The Election Commission first formally endorsed synchronized elections in its 1983 Annual Report.</p><p>Later, the Law Commission, and a Parliamentary Standing Committee too recommended reviving the practice with necessary constitutional amendments. Even policy think-tanks like the NITI Aayog took note of the “wastage of public money” due to frequent elections in the country.</p><h3>3] Constitutional and Legal Dimensions</h3><p>Implementing ONOE in India requires substantial changes to the law.</p><p>Under the present Constitution, the tenure of Parliament and state legislatures are fixed at five years from their first sitting <strong>(Articles 83(2) and 172(1)).</strong> Elections must be held before the expiry of this term. If a House is dissolved early, the replacement elections starts a new five-year cycle.</p><p>The government’s <strong>129th Constitution Amendment Bill (2024) </strong>aims to rewrite this electoral architecture so that future elections are “locked together.” This would insert a new Article 82A permitting synchronized elections to the Lok Sabha and all state assemblies. It would also amend Article 83 and 172.</p><p>Under Article 368, any change that affects the powers or structure of state legislatures must be ratified by at least half of the state assemblies. The Law Commission has also stressed this point, noting that at least 50% of states would need to agree to proposed amendments.</p><h3>4] Theoretical Frameworks</h3><p>Joseph Schumpeter famously defined democracy as the ‘method of competitive leadership selection through elections’. In that sense, ONOE is a desirable step as it promotes an “efficient” electoral system</p><p>Robert Dahl’s model of <strong>polyarchy</strong>, on the other hand, emphasizes broad citizen participation. He lists features like universal suffrage, free speech, and frequent elections as essential democratic conditions.</p><p>From Dahl’s perspective, more frequent elections and local contests deepen democracy by giving voters continual feedback mechanisms. In this regard, ONOE would make politicians complacent and voters disenchanted- undermining democratic deliberation.</p><p>Another relevant theory is <strong>electoral-cycle politics</strong>. Governments facing constant election focus more on preparing for upcoming elections rather than long term developmental goals. Parties frequently halt development work under the Model Code of Conduct. A NITI Aayog report rightly describes this as the <strong>“perpetual campaign mode.”</strong></p><p>It is argued that synchronising elections would let governments pursue long-term policies without continual electioneering.</p><h3>5] Political Implications</h3><p>Advocates of single election insist that simultaneous elections preserve regional influence. In fact, the government’s report explicitly states that holding simultaneous polls “encourages a more localized focus during elections.”</p><p>Critics, however, worry that ONOE could nationalize state elections, favouring large national parties. They accuse the ruling party of pushing ONOE to concentrate power in their own hands.</p><p>A unified election with pan-India slogans could <strong>overshadow local issues</strong>. <strong>Indonesia’s</strong> recent experience illustrates this risk.</p><p>In 2019 and 2024 Indonesia held five simultaneous elections. In mid-2025 the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled that — starting 2029 the country must separate national and local elections, because that would “elevate the importance of local issues”.</p><p>The implication is clear: when everything is bundled, local matters tend to be subordinated.</p><p>Further, some scholars also worry that simultaneous elections will undermine the parliamentary character of Indian democracy and shift India towards a more <strong>presidential-style politics</strong>. If all of India votes simultaneously, attention would naturally gravitate to the top leader. This might marginalize parliamentary coalition-building and weaken state leaders.</p><h3>6] Administrative and Logistical Challenges</h3><p>Putting ONOE into practice also poses huge logistical hurdles. The scale of India’s elections is vast. The Election Commission estimates that synchronising polls will require nearly 48 lakh voting machines and associated control units and VVPATs which is far beyond the current equipment stock.</p><p>Additionally, each election requires massive security deployment, who needs to be trained for multi-layer ballot and managing double the normal counting process. Warehousing, transporting, and safeguarding this extra machinery adds complexity.</p><p>In short, even if overall costs may fall, the one-shot election would demand a tremendous one-time surge in resources.</p><h3>7] Comparative Global Perspective</h3><p>A few countries can provide perspective on simultaneous polls. <strong>Sweden</strong> conducts all its elections together every four year. However, in Sweden this practice has not sparked a federalism debate because the nation is relatively homogenous. Still, it provides a model — a mature democracy where simultaneous multiple-level elections function smoothly.</p><p><strong>South Africa</strong> also groups most elections every five years, except municipal elections. However, South Africa’s federal division of powers is also quite different from India’s (it is technically “unitary with devolved provinces”).</p><p><strong>Indonesia </strong>is another country that has experimented with the idea of simultaneous elections. The controversies around it has already been discussed.</p><p>Notably, large federal democracies like the <strong>United States, Brazil, and Germany</strong> hold elections at different times for federal and state/regional offices. No major large federation has attempted full synchronization, which further underscores the novelty of India’s discussion.</p><h3>8] Arguments In Favour of ONOE</h3><p>Elections are expensive. The Law Commission and HLC emphasize that ONOE would “significantly <strong>cut down the financial costs </strong>associated with multiple election cycles.”</p><p>ONOE would give a big boost to <strong>efficient governance</strong>. Currently, each election invokes the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) period. During this period, government work freezes. Under ONOE there would still be a single MCC period. This would give a big boost to efficient governance.</p><p>With only one election every five years, governments could also spend the rest of the term on policy rather than perpetual campaigning.</p><p>It would also promote a stable, predictable environment for the economy, that would create better <strong>entrepreneurial environment</strong>. Therefore, several business groups, such as CII, FICCI, ASSOCHAM, etc have supported ONOE.</p><h3>9] Arguments against ONOE</h3><p>The criticism of ONOE is mainly based on larger normative questions around democracy. ONOE is often cast as “<strong>efficiency vs. deliberation</strong>.” It is also feared that ONOE centralizes national politics at the expense of <strong>regional</strong> <strong>autonomy</strong>.</p><p>Further, overhauling electoral timing midstream involves ethical questions. It might be viewed as subverting the democratic mandate, unless there is widespread consent. Some legal experts dub this a violation of “constitutional morality” if done without broad citizen agreement.</p><p>At the end, the large capital expense of extra EVMs/VVPATs and other transition costs will offset the estimated ₹45billion annual saving from fewer polls- One of the most vocal argument in support of ONOE. Apart from that, potential political costs (like <strong>voter alienation</strong> from the elections) are hard to quantify but could be substantial.</p><h3>10] Conclusion</h3><p>Simultaneous elections suggest a fundamental change in Indian Polity. India has refrained from such large scale experiments since independence. While there is lure of reduced election expenditure and avoiding the ‘perpetual campaigning mode’, the fears are also real.</p><p>The government of the day may become unaccountable for the next five years. This will reduce the role of citizens as well as those of pressure groups and social movements.</p><p>Plato predicted that a democracy (rule of the people with political equality) will eventually degrade into a tyranny (rule of a despot). While there is similar fear associated with ONOE, let us hope that just like his idea of philosopher king, the theory of ‘decline of an ideal state’ also remains a theory.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb1feaef6c6d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india/synchronising-democracy-a-theoretical-analysis-of-one-nation-one-election-in-india-fb1feaef6c6d">Synchronising Democracy: A Theoretical Analysis of One Nation, One Election in India</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india">Politics for India</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Judicial Activism in India: Evolution, Implications and the Way Forward]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/politics-for-india/judicial-activism-in-india-evolution-implications-and-the-way-forward-46eb62677bce?source=rss-fbb003f28dc5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46eb62677bce</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-judiciary]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics-for-india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[judicial-activism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2025 04:46:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-14T04:46:56.480Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5IZ6UGalC2snnzQHSxJoKg.png" /></figure><h3>1] Introduction</h3><p>Judicial activism refers to the proactive role played by the judiciary in interpreting and applying the Constitution and laws in a manner that goes beyond the traditional boundaries of adjudication. It suggests judiciary getting involved itself in issues of governance, public policy, social justice etc.</p><p>The concept of judicial activism originated in the USA. In India, this doctrine was introduced in the mid-1970s by the efforts of justice V R Krishna and P N Bhagwati.</p><p>Judicial activism is often confused with the idea of judicial review. Judicial review (article 13) empowers the court to declare the laws which are inconsistent with the Constitution as void. Judicial activism, on the other hand, goes a step forward. In this, the judiciary may even force the other two organs of the government to discharge their constitutional duties. They can also participate in law-making policies. The aggravated version of judicial activism is called judicial overreach, which are the antithesis of judicial restraint — self-control exercised by the judiciary.</p><h3>2] Constitutional Vision: Judiciary vs Parliament</h3><p>The makers Indian Constitution envisioned a balance of power with Parliament as the supreme legislative body and the judiciary as the guardian of the Constitution.</p><p>Dr. B R Ambedkar was an ardent advocate of constitutionalism. He believed that the Parliament should be the engine for constitutional change as it is the representative of the people. But he also famously called article 32 (right to constitutional remedies) as “the very soul of the Constitution” as it empowered judiciary to counter majoritarian dictates. He favoured a degree of executive influence to maintain democratic accountability in judicial appointments.</p><p>Jawaharlal Nehru, on the other hand, emphasised that the parliament should be supreme in matters of social reform., and that courts should not act as a “third house of correction” in such matters. The first constitutional amendment and the introduction of the ninth schedule reflected his stance.</p><p>The text of the Constitution itself encodes the framers’ Intent to restraint judicial intervention in certain domains.</p><p>For example, article 122 and 212 bar courts from inquiring into proceedings of Parliament or state legislatures, preserving legislative autonomy.</p><p>The framers intentionally avoided the U.S. term “due process of law” in Article 21, opting for the phrase “procedure established by law,” to limit the judiciary’s ability to invalidate socio-economic legislation on subjective grounds.</p><p>Furthermore, the amendment procedure in Article 368 contained no substantive limits on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution (until the basic structure doctrine was later formulated).</p><p>Constitutional experts, like Granville Austin, have described India’s system as one of “bounded parliamentary sovereignty.” He holds that the framers wanted the judiciary to police the constitutional boundaries, and not supplant the role of the executive or the legislatures.The assumption was that each branch would stick to their respective roles.</p><p>In the past few decades, this equilibrium has shifted with the expanding role of judiciary.</p><h3>3] Evolution of Judicial Activism in India</h3><p>Judicial Activism in India has emerged gradually and often in response to perceived governance failure. In the pre-1970s, the courts mainly played a passive role and focused on interpreting laws. In many cases, it acceded to the Parliament’s will.</p><p>The first major shift came with the landmark Keshavanand Bharti case (1973), where the supreme court limited Parliament’s power to amend constitution by creating the Basic Structure doctrine. Pratap Bhanu Mehta observes that this case exemplified the Court “creating its own powers” to preserve constitutional governance.</p><p>The Emergency period (1975–1977) witnessed the domination of the executive over the judiciary. The court also failed to defend civil liberties in the ADM Jabalpur case (1976). This caused the judiciary to undergo a profound change post-emergency. Legal scholars like Upendra Baxi believe that the post Emergency judicial activism emerged due to a sense of “institutional guilt” and a resolve to never be a bystander to state repression again.</p><p>This resolve culminated in the birth of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the late 1970s and 1980. The PIL revolution dramatically expanded access to justice by allowing individuals and organizations to approach courts on behalf of those who couldn’t do so themselves.</p><p>In 1980s, the Court actively intervened to protect bonded labourers, undertrial prisoners, and other disadvantaged groups. Article 21 (right to life) was broadened to include rights to live with dignity, livelihood, health, education, a clean environment, etc.</p><p>The next phase of judicial activism in India began in the 1990s and 2000s. During this time, the judiciary expanded into Governance matters. For example, the supreme court ordered pollution controls, closed industries (e.g., Delhi tanneries, Ganga cleanup), monitored corruption probes (e.g., Jain hawala case), mandated food distribution, prison reform, police reform etc.</p><p>Court’s intervention was primarily triggered by the collapse or paralysis of other institutions. Baxi defended the activism as “people’s judicature” necessary to advance social justice when the state fails.</p><p>On the other hand, critics called it judicial overreach. For example, the striking down of NJAC (2015) by the supreme court sparked severe backlash. The NJAC had been unanimously passed by Parliament and ratified by states, reflecting an overwhelming legislative consensus to replace the collegium (judges-appoint-judges) system with a more accountable mechanism. Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision to invalidate the NJAC was seen as a disregard to the ‘mandate of the people.’</p><h3>4] Judicial Activism: Recent cases</h3><p>The years 2023–2025 have witnessed several high-profile examples of judicial proactiveness in India, underlining both the judiciary’s continued role as a constitutional watchdog and the controversies around its far-reaching interventions.</p><h4>A] Electoral Bonds Verdict (2024)</h4><p>In a landmark decision delivered in February 2024, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme as unconstitutional. The scheme (introduced 2017) had allowed anonymous, unlimited donations to political parties via bank instruments, raising concerns about transparency and quid pro quo corruption.</p><p>Further, the judgment directed the State Bank of India to disclose the identities of past donors and stopped further issuance of bonds.</p><p>While the judgement was necessary, there are two major issues with it.</p><p>First of all, the timing of the judgement felt politically motivated. The verdict was given on even of 2024 general elections, when the ruling government was powerless to do anything about it — given the election sensitivities and also model code of conduct. The Court’s ruling led to intense political debates, with various media outlets linking donations events with political events. This disproportionately gave advantage to the opposition political parties.</p><p>Then there was also issue of state going back on its own word. While the various organs of state may have their rivalry, for people it represents a single entity — state. The bond scheme promised anonymity to donors when it was formulated. The courts overturned it. For people, it was state going back on its own word. Events like this undermine the legitimacy of state.</p><h4>B] Governor and President Assent Judgment (2025)</h4><p>In April 2025, responding to Tamil Nadu’s complaint, the Court laid timelines for Governors and the President to act on bills — citing constitutional accountability. It ruled that indefinite inaction is unconstitutional, indirectly ending the misuse of “pocket vetoes”. It even used Article 142 to deem certain pending bills as law.</p><p>While celebrated as a pro-federalism move, critics argued the judiciary rewrote Article 200 without formal amendment — raising separation-of-powers concerns.</p><h4>C] Cash Scandal Involving High Court Judge</h4><p>In March 2024, an accidental fire at the judge’s official bungalow led firefighters to stumble upon a huge cache of half-burnt currency notes hidden in a storeroom. The judiciary’s handling of this scandal became a litmus test of its transparency and accountability in dealing with corruption in the judiciary.</p><p>After a 10-day inquiry in early 2025, the panel held the misconduct serious enough to warrant removal of the judge. CJI wrote to the President of India and the Prime Minister recommending Justice Varma’s impeachment. The judge was simultaneously repatriated to his original HC (Allahabad) and effectively benched (no judicial work).</p><p>In terms of transparency, however, the process remained largely opaque. The proceedings of in-house judicial inquiries are not open to public or press, unlike court trials. This raised the perennial question: Can judges be objectively and transparently held accountable by themselves, or is an external oversight needed?</p><p>Notably, in January 2025, the Lokpal itself ruled on this question. While dismissing a complaint against the former CJI, the Lokpal held that Supreme Court judges (including the CJI) are <em>not</em> “public servants” under its jurisdiction. However, the Lokpal distinguished that High Court and subordinate judges might come under its remit.</p><p>In February 2025, a special bench of the Supreme Court, in <em>suo motu</em> mode, stayed the Lokpal’s decision asserting jurisdiction over High Court judges, calling it “very disturbing”. The case (still pending as of mid-2025) pitches the judiciary against the Lokpal in a tussle over “who will judge the judges.”</p><h3>5] Implications for Governance</h3><p>The rise of judicial activism in India carries profound implications for the functioning of democracy. On one hand, an activist judiciary can fill institutional vacuums, protect rights; on the other, it can create a new power imbalance by encroaching on the domain of elected bodies, raising questions about democratic legitimacy (and accountability).</p><p>Persistent activism by judiciary poses a risk of <strong>systemic imbalance</strong>. Legislative autonomy can be undermined if lawmakers feel the courts will anyway redraw policies. Executives might develop a tendency to punt hard problems to the courts instead of resolving them. This <strong>“judicialization of governance</strong>” can distort the intended collaborative functioning of democracy.</p><p>Judiciary has both strengthened and strained <strong>federalism</strong>. On one hand, the Supreme Court has been a referee ensuring fair play between Centre and States. For example, in the Governor Assent case, it enhanced state autonomy.</p><p>On the other hand, when the Supreme Court directly entertains issues of state policy (via PILs that affect states or by transferring cases to itself), it can bypass state institutions. For instance, it has centralised issues (like pollution) that override local governance discretion.</p><p><strong>Legitimacy of state</strong> is perhaps the crux of the debate. Courts derive legitimacy not from popular vote but from constitutional role and public trust. But when they make broad policy pronouncements, their lack of electoral accountability becomes a concern.</p><p><strong>Democratic accountability</strong> also suffers when too many decisions are made by a few unelected judges behind closed doors. Unlike politicians, judges cannot be voted out if people dislike their decrees. Public trust can be eroded if the Court is perceived to be imposing values not shared widely or if its actions produce suboptimal results.</p><h3>6] The Way Forward</h3><p>Pratap Bhanu Mehta remarks that “ the weakness of the political process provides fertile soil for judicial activism.” To revive the balance between the three branches of the government, it is vital to bring legislative and executive reform. Revitalising parliamentary debates and robust standing committees would reduce judicial intervention.</p><p>Also, strengthening alternative institutions, like CAG, CIC, Lokayuktas, and Parliamentary Committees can reduce reliance on judiciary. Courts should focus on rights enforcement, not day-to-day governance.</p><p>While the Constitution implicitly demarcates domains, it may be worthwhile for the three branches to have an open dialogue to define guiding principles of restraint. A mutual understanding — even if informal — can help reduce friction.</p><p>The higher judiciary itself could introspect and calibrate its activism. Former Chief Justice S.H. Kapadia once warned that the Court must respect the separation of powers and not run the government. For instance, the Supreme court can limit PILs to rights-based violations.</p><p>Judicial appointments is one of the most contentious issues between the executive and the judiciary. A revised NJAC 2.0, addressing earlier flaws (e.g., judicial primacy), could restore balance.</p><p>Parallelly, a credible judicial accountability framework is needed. The in-house procedure for misconduct is viewed as opaque and inadequate. Short of bringing judges under the full ambit of Lokpal (which the judiciary resists for independence reasons), a middle path could be establishing a National Judicial Oversight Committee by statute, comprising retired judges and perhaps a respected jurist or retired civil servant, to handle complaints against judges.</p><h3>7] Conclusion</h3><p>Judicial activism in India has safeguarded constitutional values, protected rights, and corrected executive overreach. But its expansion into governance raises important questions about democratic legitimacy and separation of powers.</p><p>As India matures as a democracy, the path forward lies in ensuring:</p><ul><li>Parliament legislates boldly but constitutionally</li><li>Executive governs transparently and responsively</li><li>Judiciary intervenes sparingly but decisively</li></ul><p>This delicate balance — of accountability, restraint, and cooperation — must be restored for India’s constitutional democracy to remain vibrant and sustainable.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46eb62677bce" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india/judicial-activism-in-india-evolution-implications-and-the-way-forward-46eb62677bce">Judicial Activism in India: Evolution, Implications and the Way Forward</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india">Politics for India</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Answer Writing Etiquettes for PSIR and Other Optiona]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/politics-for-india/answer-writing-etiquettes-for-psir-and-other-optiona-83af506e6e60?source=rss-fbb003f28dc5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/83af506e6e60</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics-for-india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[upsc-civil-services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mains-answer-writing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Jul 2025 06:41:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-12T06:41:50.542Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Answer Writing Etiquettes for PSIR and Other Optional Subjects</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/753/1*CF9v81gnd9Z5wK0sllYfvQ.png" /></figure><p>While evaluating answers in a Test Series, I often tend to observe some mistakes which feel very obvious to avoid. While I do mention things in feedback, its difficult to give details about everything in that space.</p><p>Further, it also left me wondering — how many students must be losing our marks, just because they don’t know such simple aspects of answer writing. For this reason, we thought of compiling all such Frequently Asked Questions regarding PSIR Answer writing or the basics that all of you must be aware of.</p><p>As you must have realized over time, writing high-scoring answers in PSIR Optional isn’t merely about knowledge — it’s about presentation as well as articulation.</p><p>Whether you’re a first-time writer or refining your approach, these insights will help you write cleaner, sharper, and more effective PSIR answers that actually fetch marks. Feel free to comment if you feel something else can also be added.</p><h3>1. Ideal Answer Length for PSIR Optional</h3><p>In PSIR Optional, UPSC prescribes word limit only for 10 mark-questions (150 words). You get 2 pages for 10 mark-questions. For 15 and 20 mark-questions, you get 3 and 4 pages respectively, with no prescription about maximum number of words.</p><p>In practice, it’s acceptable to exceed the limit slightly (by, say, 5–10%).</p><p>Considering all these, it is suggested to write about 80 words /page. If your handwriting is big/small, you should adjust spacing in a way that overall answer looks good.</p><p>Try using the available space fully — writing “end-to-end” so it creates a good impression. Also, remember that quality matters over sheer quantity — don’t fill pages with fluff just to increase word count. At times, if you don’t have much to write, you can wrap up your answers early and give time to other questions.</p><h3>2. Paragraphs vs Points in PSIR Answers</h3><p>For PSIR optional, paragraph form is generally preferred. Unlike GS answers, which often use bullet points, PSIR answers should read more like a brief academic discussion. Writing in well-structured small paragraphs (about 3–5 lines each) keeps the answer scholarly in tone.</p><p>You should also maintain a logical flow of argument, which is crucial in PSIR.</p><p>That said, you can mix in a few bullet points or numbered points within an answer if the question demands enumeration (for example, 3 principles of justice by Rawls) — but do so sparingly.</p><p>The overall presentation should still feel like a coherent exposition rather than a list. You need to come across as an expert, almost as if writing a focused mini-essay.</p><p>To improve readability, you should break long paras into multiple short paragraphs, each covering a specific dimension of the answer.</p><p>Also, avoid use of headings to different parts of answer, as far as possible.</p><h3>3. Structure of Introduction and Conclusion</h3><p>Every PSIR answer should have a brief introduction and conclusion — both are must-haves.</p><p>The introduction is typically a single short paragraph (perhaps 2–3 sentences) that directly addresses the question’s theme. It can be of two paras for 20 mark questions.</p><p>In those first lines, you might define a key term, provide context, or quote a relevant theory to set the stage. If the question is complex — you should just simplify the question in introduction.</p><p><strong>There’s usually no need for a very long intro; avoid wasting too many words here.</strong> If you struggle to craft a fancy opening, a simple, general statement related to the question is fine to begin with — just ensure it’s relevant.</p><p>The conclusion should also be concise — spanning 2–3 sentences. A conclusion might link back to the introduction or comment on the discussion you had in the body of the answer.</p><p>Overall, intro and conclusion should each take up 10–15% of total words allowed for the answer.</p><p>And yes, if you don’t know much about the core part of answer — you can write long intros or conclusions just to fill up the space.</p><h3>4. Underlining Key Words</h3><p>Underlining important words or phrases is a common practice to draw the examiner’s attention to your key points. It is recommended to underline selectively — for example, names of scholars, important concepts, constitutional articles, or any “catchphrase” in your answer that is crucial to your argument.</p><p>This helps the evaluator quickly see that you’ve mentioned critical keywords (which they often scan for).</p><p>However, do not overdo it. If you underline too many things, nothing stands out and the answer might look messy. Aim to underline only the core terms or arguments in each paragraph.</p><p>Many aspirants prefer to write the answer first and then underline during a quick review, so that underlining doesn’t break the flow of writing. Others lightly underline as they go — find what works in practice.</p><h3>5. Diagrams, Tables, and Flowcharts in PSIR Answers</h3><p>While PSIR is a text-heavy subject, diagrams or visual elements can be used judiciously to enhance your answer. If a diagram or flowchart can add value by simplifying a complex idea or showing relationships clearly, you should use it. It should not be used for sake of using it.</p><p>These tools are especially handy in International Relations (Paper II) — e.g., a map sketch to show India’s border clashes.</p><p>Tables should <strong>not </strong>be used for side-by-side comparisons or listing pros and cons.</p><h3>6. Quoting Scholars: How Many and How to Manage</h3><p>In PSIR answers, bringing in scholars’ views or theories is highly valued because it lends a scholarly touch. However, this doesn’t mean you must have a direct quote every time.</p><p>It’s not compulsory to stuff every answer with multiple quotations if the question doesn’t demand it. In fact, some toppers have scored well even in answers without quotes, simply by explaining concepts effectively. Scholars aren’t everything… You must do justice to the question.</p><p>Also, if you forget the exact wording of a quote, it’s perfectly fine to paraphrase the idea in your own words and attribute it to the thinker. The examiner will still appreciate the reference.</p><p>Also, make sure the scholar you quote is relevant to the question’s context — quoting randomly won’t fetch marks.</p><p>Lastly, you can also prepare a repository of a few important scholars per topic (with their key ideas or one-liners), so you’re ready to deploy them when needed.</p><h3>7. Tackling Questions You Don’t Fully Understand</h3><p>It’s not uncommon in PSIR to face a question that seems unfamiliar or confusing. In such cases, it is usually better to attempt something reasonable than to leave it blank. An unanswered question is a guaranteed zero, whereas a partially correct attempt might fetch a few crucial marks.</p><p>The first step is to break down the question: identify any keywords or themes you recognize. Try to relate it to something you’ve read — perhaps a known theory, a thinker’s perspective, or a contemporary example that fits.</p><p>This strategy ensures that even if you aren’t directly hitting the exact point of an obscure question, you’re at least writing relevant material in a political science context.</p><p>Structurally, maintain intro-body-conclusion format to show a coherent attempt. Evaluators can give some marks for a logically structured answer that addresses the theme, even if it isn’t a perfect answer to the question.</p><p>Those extra 1–2 marks you earn by attempting a tough question can make a difference. If truly stumped, you might write a broad overview related to the topic and conclude briefly.</p><h3>8. Using Hindi or Sanskrit Terms in Answers</h3><p>Using Hindi or Sanskrit terms occasionally can add a nice touch to your answers, especially if they capture an idea succinctly or are the exact name of a concept/policy. In PSIR, you might find opportunities to include famous phrases like “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (the world is one family) in an IR context, or mention Indian concepts like “dharma” or “Ram Rajya” when relevant.</p><p>This is perfectly okay — UPSC answers need not be devoid of Indian languages as long as the usage is appropriate and understood. In fact, many aspirants prepare a few Sanskrit quotes or Hindi slogans to sprinkle in essays or ethics/optional answers for emphasis.</p><p>Also, don’t overuse non-English terms — your answer should not become cryptic. A phrase or two in an answer is sufficient. The medium of the exam is still English, so the bulk of your answer must be intelligible to an English speaker.</p><p>Using Hindi/Sanskrit mainly for proper nouns (schemes like “Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao”) or for famous quotes is the safest.</p><h3>9. Using Abbreviations (IR, USA, SC, etc.)</h3><p>Abbreviations are generally acceptable in PSIR, as long as they are commonly known or you’ve defined them initially. For instance, writing “USA” instead of “United States of America,” “UN” for United Nations, “SC” for Supreme Court or Security Council (depending on context), or “IR” for International Relations is perfectly fine.</p><p>However, a few guidelines: if an abbreviation is very common (widely used in news and books) — like GDP, NATO, EU, USSR, NGOs — you can use it directly. If it’s less obvious or specific to the subject, it’s safer to introduce it by its full form once and then use the short form thereafter. For example, you might write “Constructivism in IR (International Relations)…” at first use, and then just “IR” subsequently. This way you ensure the examiner knows what you mean by the acronym.</p><p><strong>Also, avoid creating your own ambiguous acronyms on the fly.</strong></p><p>Also, ensure that in a single answer, if you use many abbreviations, you don’t over-clutter the answer making it look like an alphabet soup. Clarity is king. So use abbreviations for efficiency, but not at the cost of clarity.</p><p>Just maintain consistency and ensure your abbreviations are commonly used or explained. This will make your answer succinct and easy to read.</p><h3>10. Common Mistakes in PSIR Answers (Red Flags for Examiners)</h3><p>There are several recurring pitfalls that PSIR candidates should be wary of when writing answers. Being aware of these common mistakes can help you avoid the red flags that evaluators notice:</p><ul><li><strong>Not addressing the question’s demand:</strong> A very common error is writing a generic answer that tangentially relates to the topic but doesn’t specifically answer what was asked.</li><li><strong>Lack of theoretical integration:</strong> In PSIR, failing to mention relevant theories or scholars is a missed opportunity. A good answer should invoke the thinkers or theoretical frameworks pertinent to the question. You can refer <a href="https://politicsforindia.com/psir-optional-current-affairs-2025-ir-igp/">our current affairs articles</a> for more illustration in this regard.</li><li><strong>Overloading current examples without analysis:</strong> While examples (especially current affairs or case studies) are useful, another mistake is to let them dominate the answer at the expense of analysis. Some candidates, in an effort to show awareness, keep listing facts or recent events without tying them to the political science concept asked. Examiners might see this as lack of deeper insight. Balance is key: use examples to support arguments, not to replace them.</li><li><strong>One-sided arguments:</strong> Writing an answer that is entirely one-dimensional (all positive or all negative, ignoring counterpoints) is a pitfall. PSIR questions often demand a balanced analysis or a critical approach. Always try to include multiple perspectives — if you argue one side, acknowledge the other. For instance, if asked about democracy’s merits, also note its challenges, and vice versa. An answer devoid of any counter-argument is considered analytically weak.</li><li><strong>Poor organization and presentation:</strong> If an answer is haphazard — no clear intro/conclusion, no logical flow — it frustrates the examiner. Sloppy handwriting or very dense paragraphs without breaks can be a red flag. Essentially, “poor presentation”– makes the answer less reader-friendly.</li><li><strong>Missing key keywords or examples:</strong> PSIR examiners often have certain “keywords” in mind for topics. For example, in an answer on Marxism, terms like “dialectical materialism,” “surplus value,” etc., are expected. Similarly, not mentioning a crucial case study or relevant current event can be a mistake in an IR question (e.g., omitting mention of QUAD in a question on Indo-Pacific strategy). The solution is to revise syllabus topics thoroughly and know the buzzwords for each.</li></ul><h3>11. How Does Handwriting Matter in UPSC‑CSE and PSIR Optional?</h3><p>According to UPSC notifications:</p><p><strong>“If a candidate’s handwriting is not easily legible, a deduction will be made on this account from the total marks otherwise accruing to the candidate.”</strong></p><p><strong>“Suitable deduction of marks may be made for bad handwriting. Where the handwriting is illegible and the written matter in the subjective view of the examiner cannot be evaluated, no credit will be given.”</strong></p><p>This means that even a well-structured answer, brimming with theory, examples, and analysis, could lose value if the examiner struggles to read it. Clarity in writing ensures your knowledge isn’t held hostage by sloppy penmanship.</p><p>While you don’t need calligraphy-level beauty, readability is non-negotiable. If you don’t have a good handwriting, working steadily on it will ensure that your hard-earned knowledge is not undermined by illegibility.</p><h3>12. Making Your PSIR Answer Stand Out</h3><p>In a competitive exam like UPSC, distinctiveness in your answers can fetch extra credit. Here are some practical ways to make your PSIR answers stand out from the rest.</p><ul><li><strong>Use the language of Political Science:</strong> Your answer should read like it’s written by a political science specialist, not a generalist. This means employing the proper terminology, theory references, and analytical style that a student of PSIR would use. You must appear to the examiner as “a serious student of the subject rather than a layman”.</li><li><strong>Interlinkages and multi-dimensional analysis:</strong> An outstanding PSIR answer often draws connections across different areas of the syllabus and even between theory and current events. For instance, you could use a theoretical concept from Paper I to illuminate an IR issue in Paper II. These cross-linkages stand out because they show you’ve internalized the subject as a whole, not in silos.</li><li><strong>Provide insightful analysis:</strong> A standout answer doesn’t just enumerate points — it provides insight. If you can include a subtle analysis or a unique angle that others might miss, it catches attention.</li></ul><p>Consistent use of all the above elements — scholarly language, inter-linkages, balanced insight, etc. — will inevitably make your PSIR answers stand out to the examiner. It signals that you are not only well-prepared but also genuinely interested and proficient in the subject. And that is often the hallmark of a top scorer in the optional.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=83af506e6e60" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india/answer-writing-etiquettes-for-psir-and-other-optiona-83af506e6e60">Answer Writing Etiquettes for PSIR and Other Optiona</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india">Politics for India</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How UPSC Mains Copies are Evaluated in Real]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/politics-for-india/how-upsc-mains-copies-are-evaluated-in-real-6baed022bdc3?source=rss-fbb003f28dc5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6baed022bdc3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[upsc-main]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[upsc]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Jul 2025 03:26:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-06T03:26:34.688Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/799/1*m1eCPtZtBDbVuhk0roU0xQ.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong><em> First of all, the entire article is based on what is heard from others over internet and my conversations with other students/teachers. You may very well treat it as a work of fiction. We cannot confirm any of the information given below. Also, our purpose is not to inspire activism against UPSC through this article. We wish to give a realist understanding to students regarding the process, and save them from naïve expectations.</em></p><h3>1] Introduction</h3><p>In the high-stakes world of UPSC, it’s not enough to know everything — you must know what the evaluator wants to see. An iconic character Harvey Specter’s (from <em>Suits</em>) advice — “Don’t play the odds, play the man” — is gospel for UPSC aspirants too. Behind every answer sheet is a human being with preferences, fatigue, and expectations. Cracking that code is half the battle.</p><p>In this article, we’ll try to understand that how UPSC Mains answer copies, including optional, are evaluated in real world. Although there is no direct communication from UPSC regarding this process to protect the confidentiality, a lot is discussed on the internet. This article is based on such research, based on the what’s told by teachers who’ve been evaluators in the process, or by the people who know such evaluators.</p><h3>2] Panel Constitution of Examiners</h3><p>UPSC maintains strict confidentiality in selecting examiners. Typically, the person who sets the paper (an <em>“eminent person”</em> in that field) is appointed as the Head Examiner for that subject. The Head Examiner and Additional Examiners form a panel responsible for evaluation of a given paper.</p><p>Examiners are drawn from academia, usually experienced professors or college lecturers with expertise in the relevant subject. This means they typically have advanced degrees (often PhDs) and good subject knowledge. Technical subjects (like engineering optionals) might be evaluated by professors from IITs or other specialized institutes.</p><p>To prevent regional bias, answer booklets are anonymized and mixed before distribution. UPSC itself has clarified that answer sheets from different exam centers are randomly mixed and assigned coded roll numbers before evaluation. This ensures an examiner isn’t grading only candidates from one region.</p><p>UPSC examiners are qualified professionals, usually at least at the level of assistant professor. In practice, very senior professors may not opt for evaluation given the renumeration offered. However, the Head Examiner is almost always a distinguished senior faculty.</p><p>Before evaluation begins, UPSC conducts a formal Examiners’ Meeting to ensure all examiners are on the same page. In this meeting — they discuss the question paper thoroughly, go over what constitutes appropriate answers, and decide on the standard marking scheme.</p><h4>A] General Studies (GS) Papers</h4><p>Since GS questions are specific and point-based, the brief is usually to look for factual accuracy, clarity, and a multi-dimensional perspective in answers. Examiners have a generalist approach — UPSC expects that <em>“even though a GS paper covers many subjects, the knowledge required is at a general level, not expert level”</em>.</p><p>Examiners are given what is effectively a marking guide or “model outline” for answers, often described as a skeleton framework highlighting the major points expected in a good answer. (This guide is confidential and meant for evaluators only.) All GS examiners are instructed to follow common standards while evaluation.</p><h4>B] Essay Paper</h4><p>In essay paper they do not have a single “model essay” answer. Essay evaluators often come from humanities or English backgrounds.</p><h4>C] Optional Paper (e.g. PSIR)</h4><p>In optional subjects like PSIR, the evaluation is more specialized and demanding of depth. Examiners (political science professors) expect a higher level of subject knowledge and <strong>the use of discipline-specific terminology.</strong></p><p>Evaluators tend to reward answers that demonstrate theoretical insight, use scholarly references (political theorists, IR scholars, key political terminology), and have critical analysis.</p><p>In PSIR, you should <strong>“appear to the examiner as a serious student of the subject rather than a layman”. </strong>This means PSIR examiners look for the language of political science — for example, answers on political theory should mention key concepts (a Marx question should mention terms like <em>“dialectical materialism”</em>, <em>“Communist Manifesto”</em>, etc.), and IR answers might be expected to reference doctrines or scholars (e.g. an Indo-Pacific question referencing concepts like “String of Pearls” or realist scholars like Mearsheimer).</p><p>As far as we could find, examiners are NOT provided with model answers for Optional papers. Plus, the knowledge level of these evaluators may also vary.</p><h4>D] Compensation to Examiners</h4><p>UPSC compensates its examiners with an honorarium for the evaluation work, typically calculated on a per-copy (per answer script) basis. While exact official rates are not publicly disclosed in detail, informal information suggests something like ₹500–1000<em> </em>per copy. It is definitely not a lavish honorarium. Examiners often receive their assignment in “bundles” — e.g., 50 or 100 answer booklets at a time. Payment may be processed per bundle completed.</p><p><strong>Thus, while the financial incentive is there, UPSC relies on the examiners’ sense of responsibility and academic interest to do justice to the copies beyond just the pay.</strong></p><h3>2] Evaluation Criteria and Practices — a Realist Take</h3><p>While a lot can be discussed how answer evaluation is done (in theory) and what are best practices… that is not the focus of this article. In this article, we are discussing ‘how it really happens’.</p><p>Most likely, there will be a paucity of time when it comes to evaluation. UPSC does say that examiners are given more time compared to university exams. But given the contemporary work culture and work ethics, everybody does the assigned work at the last moment, compromising in quality.</p><p>Thus, the likelihood that your whole paper will be read line by line — is very less. <strong>Nonethless, some answers or some paras will be read line by line, and you don’t know which ones. So you’re supposed to write good answers anyway.</strong></p><p>However, it does tells us that <strong>presentation will be rewarded disproportionately. </strong>While the famous saying goes <strong>‘content is king’,</strong> we can extend it further by saying that <strong>‘presentation is queen’, and she has to look pretty</strong>.</p><h4>A] Handwriting</h4><p>Have you noticed that why almost all of toppers copies made available by institutions have exceptional handwriting and presentation. The reason is — those are the people who get selected. A good handwriting creates a strong positive bias, which even if increases half mark a question, results in increase of overall 50–60 marks. And please don’t rush to quote examples of toppers with bad handwriting. Such cases will always be exception rather than norm. As they say ‘ exception is not the rule’.</p><p>Officially, UPSC only says that handwriting should be legible (readable without extra efforts). If its difficult to read — you’ll be either penalized or your copies may not be checked altogether (according to UPSC).</p><p>In real, examiners prefer not to waste time deciphering messy script. If writing is just moderately poor but decipherable, they will read it, but it could slow them down, and you cannot expect good marks from an examiner frustrated with your copy.</p><p>So,</p><p>If you have a bad handwriting which is difficult to read — either you should work on your handwriting or look for another career option. Perhaps an exam which only has MCQs.</p><p>If your handwriting is legible but not so goodlooking, you should improve that. If you cannot improve beyond limit, you will need exceptional content to compensate for such handwriting. But still, you will remain at mercy of examiner.</p><p>And, if your handwriting is already good, you should study nicely. Because you have good prospects, but if you remain complacent, you may miss your chance.</p><h4>B] Structure of the Answer</h4><p>Additionally, your answer should be examiner friendly, it should be easy to follow. In GS it should be structured in various sections and points so reader can easily grasp the content. Similarly in PSIR, use short sentences and small paras to write. If you can reduce trouble of examiner while evaluating your copy, you will get extra marks for that.</p><p>Also, since examiner will not read the complete answer, in the beginning itself you should show how you’ve understood the ‘core demand’ of the question. This is important especially for complicated questions in subject like PSIR. Sometimes, you’ll be rewarded good marks just on basis of introduction.</p><p>In GS — presentation elements like underlining , using bullet points, diagrams and maps, all help communicate the answer effectively. Examiners will award marks for such value addition.</p><p>For a subject like PSIR, the keywords, the ‘language of the subject’, are important aspects.</p><h4>C] Command Over English</h4><p>For getting good marks in UPSC Mains, you should have very good command over English language. Without mastery over English, you cannot articulate your thoughts nicely. Sometimes you may even miscommunicate what you want to say. This will have severe impact on your marks.</p><p>Grammatical mistakes are also not welcome. Don’t expect UPSC to be kind towards you. I’m aware that many of you might be coming from rural background and may have difficulty in English, but this is the harsh truth. If you are not good at English, you need to work on it. Don’t expect anything else.</p><h4>D] Inter-subject Moderation</h4><p>It is learnt that UPSC also does inter-subject moderation to address variation across optional subjects. The idea is to ensure no optional subject gives an undue advantage. In the past, UPSC sometimes scaled marks of optionals that had very high or low averages. However, UPSC is silent on such inter-subject moderation practices and nothing can be said with certainty.</p><p>In practice, I would suggest there is no need to dig further on this part since we’ll never know the truth. Further, they can change the practice any time, without informing us. Also, whether scaling is done or not, has not practical utility in the way you study. Therefore, please don’t waste more time on this.</p><h4>E] No Re-evaluation Policy</h4><p>As you must be aware, after the results are declared, UPSC famously does not allow re-evaluation or re-checking of answer sheets on request. The evaluation process is deemed comprehensive and final. Even Supreme Court has upheld this non-disclosure and no re-marking policy. So candidates cannot get their papers re-marked by an independent examiner to challenge scores.</p><h4>F] Activism Against UPSC</h4><p>To be clear: whatever is written below is completely based on hearsay. I can neither confirm or deny the information in this section.</p><p>There is something called as ‘blacklisting’. If someone shows over activism against files RTI, goes to SC etc. they can blacklist you. It means, your name will be remembered, and you will never clear the black-box of UPSC Mains. Whatever happens inside Mains evaluation is protected by confidentiality of process, and you’ll never know what’s going wrong. Sometimes you’ll not clear the language paper, sometimes essay or GS… but be assured, the doors of UPSC are closed for you (probably this is the reason some famous UPSC mentor of economy never cleared UPSC).</p><p>This is also practiced in state PSCs. (again, based on hearsay)</p><p>Now, you may not like this practice, but you don’t have a say. There is an interesting incident in Shanti Parva of Mahabharata, where Yudhishthira asks a question to his grandad Bhisma, lying on a bed of arrows on the battlefield. The king asks — what a weak person should do when his enemy is a strong person? The wise Bhishma answers — the weak should not make enmity with the strong.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6baed022bdc3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india/how-upsc-mains-copies-are-evaluated-in-real-6baed022bdc3">How UPSC Mains Copies are Evaluated in Real</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india">Politics for India</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Grammar of Anarchy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/politics-for-india/grammar-of-anarchy-a70ae1fda602?source=rss-fbb003f28dc5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a70ae1fda602</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ambedkar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Jul 2025 18:04:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-06T15:36:51.402Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UqAQnGGVIpK4ujTmKpltfw.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote><em>On 25 November 1949, a day before adoption of Indian constitution by constituent assembly, Dr. Ambedkar gave a famous speech, often called Grammar of Anarchy. Here are some of the important excerpts from the speech, in his own words.</em></blockquote><h3>A] Evaluation of Constitution</h3><p>“… I feel, however good a constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot. However bad a constitution may be, it may turn out to be good if those who are called to work it, happen to be a good lot. The working of a Constitution does not depend wholly upon the nature of the Constitution. The Constitution can provide only the organs of State such as the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The factors on which the working of those organs of the State depend are the people and the political parties they will set up as their instruments to carry out their wishes and their politics. Who can say how the people of India and their parties will behave? Will they uphold constitutional methods of achieving their purposes or will they prefer revolutionary methods of achieving them? If they adopt the revolutionary methods, however good the Constitution may be, it requires no prophet to say that it will fail. It is, therefore, futile to pass any judgement upon the Constitution without reference to the part which the people and their parties are likely to play.</p><h3>B] Criticism of Indian Constitution</h3><p><strong>The condemnation of the Constitution largely comes from two quarters, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party.</strong> Why do they condemn the Constitution? Is it because it is really a bad Constitution? I venture to say ‘no’. The Communist Party want a Constitution based upon the principle of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. They condemn the Constitution because it is based upon parliamentary democracy. The Socialists want two things. The first thing they want is that if they come in power, the Constitution must give them the freedom to nationalize or socialize all private property without payment of compensation. The second thing that the Socialists want is that the Fundamental Rights mentioned in the Constitution must be absolute and without any limitations so that if their Party fails to come into power, they would have the unfettered freedom not merely to criticize, but also to overthrow the State.</p><p>These are the main grounds on which the Constitution is being condemned. I do not say that the principle of parliamentary democracy is the only ideal form of political democracy. I do not say that the principle of no acquisition of private property without compensation is so sacrosanct that there can be no departure from it. I do not say that Fundamental Rights can never be absolute and the limitations set upon them can never be lifted. <strong>What I do say is that the principles embodied in the Constitution are the views of the present generation…</strong> Jefferson, the great American statesman who played so great a part in the making of the American constitution, has expressed some very weighty views which makers of Constitution, can never afford to ignore. In one place he has said:</p><p>“We may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the will of the majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding generation, more than the inhabitants of another country.”</p><p>In another place, he has said:</p><p>“The idea that institutions established for the use of the nation cannot be touched or modified, even to make them answer their end, because of rights gratuitously supposed in those employed to manage them in the trust for the public, may perhaps be a salutary provision against the abuses of a monarch, but is most absurd against the nation itself. Yet our lawyers and priests generally inculcate this doctrine, and suppose that preceding generations held the earth more freely than we do; had a right to impose laws on us, unalterable by ourselves, and that we, in the like manner, can make laws and impose burdens on future generations, which they will have no right to alter; in fine, that the earth belongs to the dead and not the living;”</p><p>I admit that what Jefferson has said is not merely true, but is absolutely true. There can be no question about it…</p><p>One has only to examine the provision relating to the amendment of the Constitution…I challenge any of the critics of the Constitution to prove that any Constituent Assembly anywhere in the world has, in the circumstances in which this country finds itself, provided such a facile procedure for the amendment of the Constitution<strong>. If those who are dissatisfied with the Constitution have only to obtain a 2/3 majority and if they cannot obtain even a two-thirds majority in the parliament elected on adult franchise in their favour, their dissatisfaction with the Constitution cannot be deemed to be shared by the general public.</strong></p><h3>C] Future of India</h3><p>My mind is so full of the future of our country that I feel I ought to take this occasion to give expression to some of my reflections thereon…</p><p>In addition to our old enemies in the form of castes and creeds we are going to have many political parties with diverse and opposing political creeds. Will Indians place the country above their creed or will they place creed above country? I do not know. But this much is certain that if the parties place creed above country, our independence will be put in jeopardy a second time and probably be lost forever. This eventuality we must all resolutely guard against. We must be determined to defend our independence with the last drop of our blood.</p><h3>D] Future of Indian Democracy</h3><p>It is not that India did not know what is democracy. There was a time when India was studded with republics, and even where there were monarchies, they were either elected or limited. They were never absolute. It is not that India did not know Parliaments or parliamentary procedure. A study of the Buddhist Bhikshu Sanghas discloses that not only there were Parliaments — for the Sanghas were nothing but Parliaments — but the Sanghas knew and observed all the rules of parliamentary procedure known to modern times…Although these rules of parliamentary procedure were applied by the Buddha to the meetings of the Sanghas, he must have borrowed them from the rules of the political assemblies functioning in the country in his time.</p><p>This democratic system India lost. Will she lose it a second time? I do not know. But it is quite possible in a country like India — where democracy from its long disuse must be regarded as something quite new — there is danger of democracy giving place to dictatorship. It is quite possible for this new born democracy to retain its form but give place to dictatorship in fact. If there is a landslide, the danger of the second possibility becoming actuality is much greater.</p><p>If we wish to maintain democracy not merely in form, but also in fact, what must we do? The first thing in my judgement we must do is to hold fast to constitutional methods of achieving our social and economic objectives. It means we must abandon the bloody methods of revolution. It means that we must abandon the method of civil disobedience, non-cooperation and satyagraha. When there was no way left for constitutional methods for achieving economic and social objectives, there was a great deal of justification for unconstitutional methods. But where constitutional methods are open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional methods. These methods are nothing but the Grammar of Anarchy and the sooner they are abandoned, the better for us.</p><h3>E] Hero Worship</h3><p>The second thing we must do is to observe the caution which John Stuart Mill has given to all who are interested in the maintenance of democracy, namely, not “to lay their liberties at the feet of even a great man, or to trust him with power which enable him to subvert their institutions.”</p><p>There is nothing wrong in being grateful to great men who have rendered life-long services to the country. But there are limits to gratefulness. As has been well said by the Irish Patriot Daniel O’Connel, no man can be grateful at the cost of his honor, no woman can be grateful at the cost of her chastity and no nation can be grateful at the cost of its liberty.</p><p>This caution is far more necessary in the case of India than in the case of any other country. For in India, Bhakti or what may be called the path of devotion or hero-worship, plays a part in its politics unequalled in magnitude by the part it plays in the politics of any other country in the world. <strong>Bhakti in religion may be a road to the salvation of the soul. But in politics, Bhakti or hero-worship is a sure road to degradation and to eventual dictatorship.</strong></p><h3>F] Social Democracy</h3><p>The third thing we must do is not to be content with mere political democracy. We must make our political democracy a social democracy as well. <strong>Political democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of its social democracy. </strong>What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life which recognizes liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are not to be treated as separate items in a trinity. They form a union of trinity in the sense that to divorce one from the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy. Liberty cannot be divorced from equality, equality cannot be divorced from liberty. Nor can liberty and equality be divorced from fraternity. Without equality, liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the many. Equality without liberty would kill individual initiative. Without fraternity, liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the many. Equality without liberty would kill individual initiative. Without fraternity, liberty and equality could not become a natural course of things. It would require a constable to enforce them.</p><p>We must begin by acknowledging the fact that there is complete absence of two things in Indian society. One of these is equality. On the social plane, we have in India a society based on the principle of graded inequality which we have a society in which there are some who have immense wealth as against many who live in abject poverty. On the 26th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions? How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. We must remove this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this Assembly has to laboriously built up.</p><p><strong>The second thing we are wanting in is recognition of the principle of fraternity. </strong>What does fraternity mean? Fraternity means a sense of common brotherhood of all Indians-if Indians being one people. It is the principle which gives unity and solidarity to social life. It is a difficult thing to achieve…</p><h3>G] Nation Building</h3><p>I remember the days when politically-minded Indians, resented the expression “the people of India”. They preferred the expression “the Indian nation.” I am of opinion that in believing that we are a nation, we are cherishing a great delusion. How can people divided into several thousands of castes be a nation? <strong>The sooner we realize that we are not as yet a nation in the social and psychological sense of the world, the better for us.</strong> For then only we shall realize the necessity of becoming a nation and seriously think of ways and means of realizing the goal. The realization of this goal is going to be very difficult…<strong>The castes are anti-national.</strong> In the first place because they bring about separation in social life. They are anti-national also because they generate jealousy and antipathy between caste and caste. But we must overcome all these difficulties if we wish to become a nation in reality. For fraternity can be a fact only when there is a nation. Without fraternity, equality and liberty will be no deeper than coats of paint.</p><h3>H] Conclusion</h3><p>These are my reflections about the tasks that lie ahead of us. They may not be very pleasant to some. But there can be no gainsaying that political power in this country has too long been the monopoly of a few and the many are only beasts of burden, but also beasts of prey. This monopoly has not merely deprived them of their chance of betterment, it has sapped them of what may be called the significance of life. These down-trodden classes are tired of being governed. They are impatient to govern themselves. This urge for self-realization in the down-trodden classes must not be allowed to devolve into a class struggle or class war. It would lead to a division of the House. That would indeed be a day of disaster. For, as has been well said by Abraham Lincoln, a House divided against itself cannot stand very long. Therefore, the sooner room is made for the realization of their aspiration, the better for the few, the better for the country, the better for the maintenance for its independence and the better for the continuance of its democratic structure. This can only be done by the establishment of equality and fraternity in all spheres of life. That is why I have laid so much stresses on them.</p><p>I do not wish to weary the House any further. Independence is no doubt a matter of joy. But let us not forget that this independence has thrown on us great responsibilities. By independence, we have lost the excuse of blaming the British for anything going wrong. If hereafter things go wrong, we will have nobody to blame except ourselves.</p><p>There is great danger of things going wrong. Times are fast changing. People including our own are being moved by new ideologies. They are getting tired of Government by the people. They are prepared to have Governments for the people and are indifferent whether it is Government of the people and by the people. If we wish to preserve the Constitution in which we have sought to enshrine the principle of Government of the people, for the people and by the people, let us resolve not to be tardy in the recognition of the evils that lie across our path and which induce people to prefer Government for the people to Government by the people, nor to be weak in our initiative to remove them. That is the only way to serve the country. I know of no better.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a70ae1fda602" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india/grammar-of-anarchy-a70ae1fda602">Grammar of Anarchy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india">Politics for India</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From iCET to TRUST — Indo US Tech Collaboration and Its Strategic Significance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/politics-for-india/from-icet-to-trust-indo-us-tech-collaboration-and-its-strategic-significance-d39081aa8011?source=rss-fbb003f28dc5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d39081aa8011</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indo-us-relation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[upsc-current-affairs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psir]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Jul 2025 17:55:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-06T15:37:05.405Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>From iCET to TRUST — Indo US Tech Collaboration and Its Strategic Significance</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*Wyk4vNOrdlVaq3_IisPmvw.png" /></figure><h3>1] Role of Technology in International Relations</h3><p>Critical and Emerging Technologies (CETs) such as artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, quantum computing, and biotechnology are central to 21st-century statecraft. They are deemed “critical” because mastery in these fields is now integral to national security, economic growth, and geopolitical stature. Nations that lead in CETs can enhance their sovereignty and global influence, as technological power increasingly underpins military strength, economic competitiveness etc.</p><p>Because these emerging technologies can decisively tip the scales of military and economic power, they have become a new dimension of state power alongside traditional elements like armies or GDP. Global powers now invest heavily in domestic R&amp;D, enforce export controls, and pursue techno-nationalist policies to maintain strategic superiority.</p><p>Interestingly, no single country dominates all CET sectors, creating a fragmented innovation landscape where partnerships become essential.</p><p>Accordingly, states forge tech-based alliances to co-develop systems, enhance interoperability, and protect sensitive knowledge. Simultaneously, technology denial regimes (e.g. NSG, MTCR etc.) and sanctions illustrate how tech is weaponised in strategic rivalry.</p><h3>2] India–U.S. Tech Partnership: Motives and Strategic Logic</h3><p>With such increasing role of technology in state power, the focus on technology cooperation in the India–U.S. strategic partnership has grown dramatically in recent years.</p><p>For India, a key motive is to accelerate its own technological and industrial modernization. India recognizes that to become a leading power and a $5 trillion+ economy, it cannot remain just a consumer of foreign tech — it needs to move up the value chain into high-tech manufacturing and innovation. Partnering with the United States offers India access to advanced technologies, capital, and best practices that can jump-start its domestic capabilities.</p><p>India also seeks to reduce dependency on Chinese imports and diversify from legacy ties with Russia. Strategically, India views technological capability as critical to countering Chinese assertiveness and maintaining deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.</p><p>For the United States, the motivations are equally compelling. Strategically, the U.S. sees India as a pivotal partner to counterbalance China’s rise. This logic is often framed as part of “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy — essentially, empowering allies so that no single power (China) can dominate the region.</p><p>U.S. National Security Council officials have called India a “good bet” in a complex geopolitical world. India today has “a wide range of strategic capabilities” — from space and biotech to an emerging startup ecosystem. The U.S. wants to tap into India’s human capital and growing innovation base for mutual benefit.</p><p>Economically, India is a huge market and an alternative manufacturing hub. Moreover, U.S. companies and universities see India as a partner for joint R&amp;D and as a source of talent.</p><p>There is also an ideological motive: the U.S. and India share a vision for technology that upholds openness and freedom. By collaborating with India, the U.S. hopes to tilt the global technology order toward a liberal, rules-based paradigm rather than one dominated by authoritarian norms.</p><p>Finally, from a geopolitical perspective, closer cooperation with India in tech also helps to lock in India’s strategic alignment with the U.S. Although India is not a formal U.S. treaty ally, American policymakers calculate that deep entanglement of the two will solidify India ’s position in the U.S.-led ‘coalition of democracies’.</p><h3>3] iCET Initiative</h3><p>Launched in January 2023 and announced in 2022, the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) is led by the National Security Council (NSC) of both nations. It seeks to elevate the India-U.S. strategic tech partnership across multiple sectors.</p><p>Unlike past agreements limited to defence or trade, iCET is a comprehensive framework encompassing government, private sector, and academia. It is not a single project, but an overarching platform coordinating multiple streams of cooperation across critical tech sectors.</p><p>Under iCET, there is emphasis on co-development, rather than one-way transfers. This also underlines its departure from transactional models.</p><p>The NSAs of both countries steer iCET, with help of NSCs. This high-level stewardship ensures continuous political attention. It is unusual — and significant — that a tech partnership is led by security councils, reflecting the strategic importance.</p><p>iCET involves defence cooperation under Defence Industrial Cooperation Roadmap and Indus X Platform. Similarly, a new telecommunications dialogue (public-private) has been launched to discuss 5G/6G R&amp;D, Open RAN (Radio Access Network) deployment, and regulatory alignment.</p><p>A notable one is the Indo-U.S. Quantum Coordination Mechanism — a formal channel bringing together industry, academia and government researchers from both countries to coordinate quantum science &amp; technology efforts.</p><p>There are also university-level exchanges and STEM mobility programs under iCET.</p><h3>4] Indo US TRUST Initiative</h3><p>TRUST stands for Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology. It was officially launched during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Washington in February 2025, as a follow-up to iCET. The vision remains the same, shared ambition to deepen collaboration across technology and innovation domains.</p><p>TRUST expands into new critical sectors — including critical minerals, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, clean energy, and space. However, the focus on foundational domains such as AI, quantum technologies, biotechnology, and defence continues to remain a priority.</p><p>TRUST continues with high-level oversight from National Security Advisors.</p><h3>5] Criticisms and Constraints</h3><p>Despite optimism, TRUST faces structural challenges. There are concerns about unequal technology transfer, dependence on U.S. firms, and lack of clarity in IP sharing. Without enforceable mechanisms for joint ownership or open access to core technologies, India risks being locked into low-end roles.</p><p>Export control regimes like ITAR remain a hurdle, as do U.S. end-use monitoring expectations, which India finds intrusive.</p><p>The bureaucratic inertia and regulatory fragmentation in both countries can also contribute to slow progress. Political changes in either nation may alter priorities. The recent change from iCET to TRUST, reflects the influence of politics on such initiatives.</p><p>Further, the U.S. lawmakers also question India’s strategic consistency, citing its Russia ties and reluctance to align on certain international issues.</p><p>Even with access to tech, India’s absorptive capacity remains limited. The execution on the ground may falter without robust human capital and infrastructure.</p><p>From a regional perspective, TRUST might exacerbate security dilemmas. Rivals like China and Pakistan perceive it as a tilt in the regional balance, potentially fuelling arms races. To mitigate this, India and the U.S. must manage perceptions and maintain diplomatic transparency.</p><h3>6] Theoretical Insights</h3><p>TRUST signals the rise of tech-centric diplomacy. In such system, innovation, access and standards are as critical as military alignments. The global order is increasingly bifurcated into tech blocs, and TRUST positions India within the democratic sphere, albeit on its own terms.</p><p>Realism focuses on states’ pursuit of power and security in an anarchical world. From a realist lens, TRUST exemplifies balancing behaviour, with India and the U.S. aligning against a shared threat: China. It reflects interest-based cooperation rather than value-driven idealism. In fact, technology is a means to hard power — so such tech collaboration is fundamentally about increasing relative power (vis-à-vis China) by pooling resources.</p><p>Such cooperation also exemplifies smaller powers aligning with a distant great power against a nearer threat, as suggested by Kautilya’s Mandala theory.</p><p>Liberal institutionalism, would see it as win-win cooperation that creates absolute gains and complex interdependence between India and the U.S. From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective (Robert Keohane), even though the international system is anarchic, cooperation is possible and institutions (formal or informal) can mitigate mistrust. Liberals would argue that iCET is locking the U.S. and India into positive-sum interdependence, raising the cost of conflict and giving each a stake in the other’s success.</p><p>Constructivists focus on how shared identities, values, and norms shape state behaviour. From this angle, the partnership reflects a constructivist alignment of identities. The narrative of a “Techno-democracies vs Techno-autocracies” world. It can said to be a social construct that both India and the U.S. have started to internalize.</p><p>TRUST also exemplifies India’s ‘multi-alignment’ or ‘issue-based alignment’, where India suggests that it will align with multiple countries to secure India’s national interest.</p><p>The coming together of two large republics show an increasing role of technology in securing national interest. While the two have remained ‘estranged democracies’ over last few decades, we can hope that such initiatives will pave the way for ‘interlocked democracies’, shaping twenty-first century.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d39081aa8011" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india/from-icet-to-trust-indo-us-tech-collaboration-and-its-strategic-significance-d39081aa8011">From iCET to TRUST — Indo US Tech Collaboration and Its Strategic Significance</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india">Politics for India</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China’s Renaming of Places in Arunachal Pradesh: Historical and Strategic Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/politics-for-india/chinas-renaming-of-places-in-arunachal-pradesh-historical-and-strategic-analysis-01ea932cb43e?source=rss-fbb003f28dc5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/01ea932cb43e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 2025 02:30:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-26T02:30:40.831Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LrNlH1IsD72uNPchE472KQ.png" /><figcaption>Official map of Arunchal Pradesh</figcaption></figure><h3>1] Historical Background of Arunachal Pradesh</h3><h4>A] Geography and Early History</h4><p>Arunachal Pradesh is a rugged Himalayan frontier in India’s northeast, long isolated by geography and home to numerous tribal communities. The region’s steep terrain and dense forests historically hindered large-scale governance, allowing tribes to maintain autonomous sociocultural systems.</p><p>In the northwest, especially Tawang and West Kameng, Tibetan influence was pronounced, with local communities</p><p>acknowledging the Tibetan authority, exemplified by tax collection and administrative appointments. The Tawang Monastery, founded in 1681, symbolised these ties.</p><p>Conversely, the southern and eastern foothills intermittently came under the influence of Assamese like the Chutia kingdom. Throughout history, much of the highlands remained self-governed.</p><p>The pre-colonial region was thus a mosaic of independent tribal domains, Tibetan monastic control in the west, and Assamese interactions in the plains.</p><h4>B] British Annexation and the McMahon Line</h4><p>Following a treaty with Myanmar in 1826, British India annexed Assam but initially avoided the frontier hills (including now Arunachal Pradesh). The British were primarily concerned with protecting the fertile Brahmaputra valley (tea plantations and trade routes) from tribal raiders.</p><p>Later in 1873, British introduced the Inner Line Permit. It authorised the government to define a so-called “Inner Line” beyond which “British subjects” (i.e., the people of the British Indian provinces) could not travel without a pass. The initiative was ostensibly to protect tribal lifestyles but in reality to shield colonial economic interests from tribal incursions.</p><p>It was only by 1912–1914 that the British began demarcating and administering the area, creating the North-East Frontier Tracts.</p><p><strong>At the 1914 Shimla Conference, British India and Tibet agreed to the McMahon Line, which demarcated the boundary along the crest of the Himalayas, placing present-day Arunachal within British India.</strong></p><p>China rejected the Shimla Accord, claiming Tibet lacked treaty-making authority. Nonetheless, the British treated the McMahon Line as the frontier, although their governance remained indirect, relying on tribal leaders and punitive expeditions rather than consistent administration.</p><h4>C] Post-Independence Integration</h4><p>After 1947, India undertook efforts to integrate the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) into its administrative framework. India’s “forward policy” saw military and civil posts established up to the McMahon Line. India gradually consolidated control.</p><p>Arunachal Pradesh attained full statehood in 1987.</p><h3>2] India–China Dispute Over Arunachal Pradesh</h3><p>China disputes the McMahon Line, claiming it was imposed by colonial Britain in collusion with a non-sovereign Tibet. From 1950, China has published maps including Arunachal (termed “South Tibet”) as its territory. India, since Nehru, has maintained that the McMahon Line constituted the legitimate boundary, dismissing China’s ludicrous claims.</p><p>The border dispute escalated with Chinese incursions in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. China launched a major offensive, temporarily occupying parts of NEFA, including Tawang, before unilaterally withdrawing to the McMahon Line.</p><p>India subsequently reasserted control and fortified its presence. Although large-scale conflict has been absent since, minor incidents persist.</p><p>China continues to assert that Arunachal is part of Tibet — now part of China — and refers to it as “Zangnan” (South Tibet). Its rationale includes historical religious and trade linkages, such as Tawang’s subordination to Lhasa.</p><p>India counters with both legal and practical claims: the Shimla Accord, uninterrupted administration since 1947, and full integration into Indian democracy. Arunachal’s residents participate in elections and governance under Indian law. De facto and de jure, India asserts unambiguous sovereignty.</p><p>India controls the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh; China controls none of it but continues to claim it. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) broadly follows the McMahon Line in this sector, though undefined on the ground. China has invested heavily in border infrastructure north of the McMahon Line, matched by India’s military build-up and road networks.</p><p>The stalemate persists — India asserts its territorial integrity, while China refuses to acknowledge Arunachal’s statehood.</p><h3>3] China’s Renaming of Places in May 2025</h3><p>In May 2025, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs released a list of “standardized” names for 27 locations in Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing refers to as Zangnan (South Tibet). This marked the fifth batch of such renaming exercises since 2017.</p><p>The list included a mix of topographical features like mountains, villages, mountain passes, rivers, lakes etc. These were given Mandarin Chinese names.</p><p>India categorically rejected the move, calling it “vain” and “preposterous” and “meaningless propaganda exercise”<strong>.</strong></p><p>Interestingly, each naming exercise has coincided with events that irked China: the Dalai Lama’s 2017 visit, Vice President Naidu’s 2021 visit etc. The 2025 timing — amidst India’s military tension with Pakistan — suggests deliberate strategic signalling, part of China’s broader toolkit of psychological and legal warfare.</p><p>Officially, China frames the renaming as an administrative measure: the Ministry of Civil Affairs is “standardising” place names for administrative clarity. However, this rationalisation belies deeper strategic motives — tied to narrative-building, legal positioning, and geopolitical pressure.</p><h3>4] Strategic Analysis of the Renaming</h3><h4>A] Legal and Psychological Warfare</h4><p>Renaming locations forms part of China’s <strong>“Three Warfares” strategy</strong> — legal, psychological, and media. By publishing Chinese names, Beijing creates a paper trail of administrative continuity. This may serve future diplomatic or legal arguments, even if control on the ground remains unchanged. A constructivist would note that repeated assertion can, over time, shape reality or at least public belief.</p><h4>B] Domestic Nationalism and Symbolism</h4><p>Renaming also serves to stoke nationalistic sentiment within China. It signals to Chinese citizens that the government is upholding territorial integrity, reinforcing the narrative of lost lands and colonial injustice. Further, this discourages any Chinese leader from appearing weak on territorial integrity, a core legitimacy issue for the CCP.</p><h4>C] Pressure Tactics</h4><p>From a Realist perspective, one could see these renaming episodes as part of applying pressure on India without resorting to force. A form of psychological warfare, aiming to unsettle India, to remind New Delhi that China has lingering leverage or claims, potentially to make Indian policymakers think twice about moves Beijing dislikes (e.g., high-profile visits to Arunachal, or strengthening ties with the U.S.).</p><h4>D] Incremental Encroachment</h4><p>Renaming can be a precursor in salami-slicing tactics — gradual steps to assert control without triggering war. China has a history of using incremental steps to solidify territorial assertions: in the South China Sea it started with maps, then names, then placed markers, then built reefs into islands, and finally militarized them — each step small enough to avoid war, but cumulatively altering the status quo.</p><p>India calls it <strong>“cartographic aggression”</strong> because it starts on maps and in nomenclature — a prelude to more tangible moves.</p><h4>E] Retaliatory Signalling</h4><p>Each renaming is often a reaction to Indian actions — Dalai Lama’s visit, strategic infrastructure, or diplomatic developments. In this lens, China’s deeper motive is to counter what it sees as India’s attempts to strengthen its hold on disputed land.</p><h4>F] Strategic Messaging</h4><p>Renaming counters any notion that the eastern sector is resolved. China might envision a future grand bargain where it could trade concessions — for instance, not pressing claims in Arunachal if India cedes claims in Aksai Chin. By inflating the importance of Arunachal through such naming and claims, China creates a card it could hypothetically relinquish for something else.</p><p>India, for its part, rejects this premise, since it claims both sectors and is not inclined to trade territory.</p><h3>5] The U.S. Position on the Issue</h3><p>The United States has unequivocally backed India’s stance on Arunachal Pradesh. Following China’s 2025 announcement, and indeed during previous episodes, Washington voiced strong opposition to China’s unilateral assertions.</p><p>A White House statement in April 2023 (after an earlier renaming of 11 places) exemplified this: “The United States recognizes Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory and we strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to advance territorial claims by renaming localities.”</p><p>Additionally, in 2023, a bipartisan resolution was passed in the US Senate reaffirming that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India.</p><p>From a Realist perspective, the US support for India here aligns with its grand strategy of balancing a rising China. The U.S. sees India as a crucial partner in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China. By backing India’s territorial sovereignty, the US strengthens the broader coalition resisting China’s assertiveness.</p><p>States often ally against common threats; by visibly backing India, the US cements the perception of a de facto alignment with India against Chinese hegemony. This is part of a larger tapestry that includes the Quad, aimed at counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific.</p><p>The US might also see value in tying down China on multiple fronts. Encouraging India to be firm on the Himalayan frontier forces China to expend resources and attention there. A China that is heavily focused on its land border disputes might be less free to assert itself in, say, the South China Sea or against Taiwan, which are primary US concerns.</p><p>From an idealist or liberal perspective, the US backing can also be framed in terms of supporting democracy and international law, upholding sovereignty and rejecting unilateral changes to borders.</p><p>The US support can also be seen as an opportunity to cement ties with India.</p><h3>6] India’s Strategic Response</h3><p>India’s immediate response to China’s renaming gambit has been uncompromising rhetoric and diplomatic rebuttal. By calling China’s move “vain”, “preposterous”, and “cartographic aggression”, New Delhi signalled both to Beijing and the Indian public that it regards this as a propaganda stunt with zero validity.</p><p>In line with that, India did not alter any of its activities in Arunachal: infrastructure projects continued, political leaders plan visits as usual, and the state’s administration carried on calling places by their Indian names.</p><p>The elements of India’s grand strategy on the issue can be summed up as follows:</p><h4>A] Strategic Autonomy but Closer Alignments</h4><p>India doesn’t enter formal alliances, but it has moved closer than ever to the United States and other like-minded partners (Japan, Australia, France etc.) — something C. Raja Mohan describe as “aligning for own advantage while retaining independence.”</p><p>The effectiveness of this is evident: today, India has access to high-end military technology, intelligence sharing (e.g., under the BECA agreement, the US provides satellite imagery — useful in tracking Chinese moves), and diplomatic backing. This is arguably working as a force multiplier for India.</p><h4>B] Deterrence by Denial</h4><p>Militarily, India seems to pursue deterrence by denial — making it infeasible for China to achieve a quick victory or territorial grab. By fortifying the LAC, India wants to ensure any Chinese aggression would be costly and slow, allowing time for international pressure to kick in.</p><p>This is a rational strategy given India cannot match China troop-for, but can exploit difficult terrain and improving infrastructure on its side to deny easy gains.</p><h4>C] Economic Resilience and Decoupling</h4><p>India’s economic aspect of grand strategy is to become less dependent and more capable — essentially to boost comprehensive national power.</p><p>India also undertook a series of economic retaliations and decoupling moves aimed at China. While not directly about Arunachal, these form part of India’s broader strategy to reduce vulnerability to Chinese leverage.</p><p>For example, India banned over 200 Chinese mobile apps citing security concerns. It also tightened FDI rules to block Chinese investments in sensitive sectors. The idea is to limit China’s economic foothold which could translate into strategic dependency or influence.</p><p>Further, India’s relatively high economic growth is vital because to compete with China, India needs resources. Initiatives like Make in India, Digital India, etc., are geared toward this. India is indeed the world’s 4th largest economy now and has robust foreign exchange reserves, which provides stability.</p><p>However, its trade with China is still large and skewed. Reducing that dependence remains a work in progress.</p><h4>D] Information Warfare and Tibet Card</h4><p>India is increasingly active in countering Chinese narratives, using media, think tanks, and diaspora engagement.</p><p>The Indian government has also allowed more leeway for the Tibetan government-in-exile (based in Dharamshala, India) to be vocal, which irks Beijing. For instance, there was mention that the Tibetan exile administration might issue a map of Tibet that counteracts China’s version.</p><p>If India facilitates or even just tolerates such actions, it can be seen as a strategic use of the Tibet card. While India still officially recognizes Tibet as part of China, these subtle shifts — send signals to China that it does not hold all the cards.</p><h3>7] Conclusion</h3><p>The renaming of places in Arunachal Pradesh by China is emblematic of a broader contest: not just over territory, but over history, perception, and legitimacy. India’s response seeks to defend both its sovereignty and the principles of international order.</p><p>The dispute reflects a clash between post-colonial statecraft and revisionist ambition, where maps, names, and narratives become tools of strategic competition. Arunachal Pradesh remains firmly within India’s constitutional and administrative domain, and India’s strategy aims to ensure that no cartographic aggression can undermine this enduring reality.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=01ea932cb43e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india/chinas-renaming-of-places-in-arunachal-pradesh-historical-and-strategic-analysis-01ea932cb43e">China’s Renaming of Places in Arunachal Pradesh: Historical and Strategic Analysis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india">Politics for India</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Resurgence of Right-Wing Politics in Advanced Democracies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/politics-for-india/resurgence-of-right-wing-politics-in-advanced-democracies-d6eb3c1ead21?source=rss-fbb003f28dc5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6eb3c1ead21</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[western-democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[comparative-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[right-wing-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Jun 2025 05:23:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-22T05:50:36.408Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Now is the Time of Monsters: Resurgence of Right-Wing Politics in Advanced Democracies</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BThD0YJotMYQBtdtP3Asxw.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Since the 2008 global financial crisis, many advanced democracies have witnessed the rapid rise of right-wing populist movements. Once-stable political party systems have begun to unravel, voter alignments have shifted, and populist parties or leaders have gained unprecedented support.</p><p>This surge has reshaped patterns of political participation and disrupted traditional forms of political representation. The Tea Party in the United States, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD aka Alternative for Germany), in Germany, and the National Rally in France exemplify how right-wing populism has emerged not as an outlier, but as a central force in contemporary politics.</p><p>This article explores the causes and consequences of this resurgence through theoretical lenses. It then assesses how this political transformation has redefined political participation — through grassroots mobilisation, protest, and digital activism — and concludes by examining its implications for liberal democracy.</p><h3>Theoretical Explanations for the Right-Wing Resurgence</h3><h3>Cultural Backlash and Post-Materialism</h3><p>One of the most compelling explanations for the rise of the populist right is rooted in value-based conflicts. <strong>Ronald Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism</strong> argued that with the rise of affluence in post-war societies, people began to prioritise values like autonomy, tolerance, environmentalism, and self-expression over material concerns.</p><p>However, not all sections of society embraced these values. Older, rural, and less-educated populations often remained attached to traditional norms — hierarchy, national identity, family values — and viewed cultural liberalisation with suspicion.</p><p>Pippa Norris and Inglehart have conceptualised this backlash as a cultural reaction: the <strong>“once-dominant majority” segments feel culturally marginalised </strong>by multiculturalism, LGBTQ rights, gender equality, and globalism. This perceived loss of status fuels support for populist leaders who claim to defend national identity and traditional values. In effect, <strong>the old economic left–right cleavage is being replaced by a cultural authoritarian–libertarian one.</strong></p><h3>Economic Grievances and Relative Deprivation</h3><p>Beyond culture, economic dislocation and perceived inequality have been central to the right-wing populist surge. While absolute poverty in advanced economies may not be widespread, many feel relatively worse off due to stagnant wages, insecure jobs, and regional disparities.</p><p><strong>Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation</strong> helps explain this: when expectations rise but outcomes stagnate, frustration can become politically explosive.</p><p>Post-2008 austerity policies, coupled with job losses in manufacturing and rural decline, fostered resentment toward both domestic elites and foreign competition. Globalisation, outsourcing, and immigration are often framed as threats to national prosperity.</p><p>Right-wing populists tap into these grievances by promising economic protectionism, privileging native workers, and demonising outsiders.</p><h3>Globalisation Cleavages: Winners vs. Losers</h3><p>Cleavage theory, initially developed by Lipset and Rokkan, explained party systems based on enduring social divides — class, religion, centre–periphery, etc. But in recent decades, these traditional cleavages have eroded.</p><p>A new divide has emerged: globalisation’s winners vs. losers. Those benefiting from the knowledge economy, international networks, and urban cosmopolitanism are at odds with those suffering from industrial decline, automation, and demographic change.</p><p>Populist right parties have successfully constructed narratives of “betrayal” by urban elites who embrace supranational institutions (like the EU) and multiculturalism. By positioning themselves as defenders of sovereignty and ordinary citizens, parties like UK Independence Party (UKIP), France’s National Rally, or the Danish People’s Party channel resentment against both global capitalism and progressive politics.</p><h3>Institutional Failure and the Crisis of Representation</h3><p>Over time, many mainstream parties — especially centre-left and centre-right — moved toward the political centre, adopting similar policies on economics, governance, and international relations. This depoliticised key issues and led to what Katz and Mair term the <strong>“cartelisation” of party politics: </strong>parties became state-subsidised entities, less connected to grassroots members and more integrated into elite networks.</p><p>Populists portray themselves as the antidote to this elite consensus.</p><p>The 2008 crisis magnified these failures — governments bailed out banks while cutting social spending, reinforcing the view that elites were corrupt and out of touch.</p><p>Populists step into this vacuum, presenting politics as a moral battle between “the people” and “the elite”. Their conception of representation is plebiscitary — leaders embody the general will directly, unmediated by traditional institutions.</p><h3>Means of People Participation</h3><h3>Grassroots Mobilisation</h3><p>The resurgence of right-wing politics has been marked by vigorous grassroots mobilization, often outside traditional party structures. The Tea Party movement in the US (2009–2011) rallied against government spending and taxation, galvanising previously inactive conservative voters and reshaping the Republican Party.</p><p>In Germany, PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) mobilised thousands against refugee policies, while France’s National Rally fed on widespread protests like the Yellow Vests to amplify discontent.</p><p><strong>Unlike traditional parties, populist movements mix protest culture with electoral mobilisation.</strong> Rallies, petitions, and direct action events are used not only to pressurise governments but also to sustain in-group identities and political momentum.</p><h3>Protest Politics and Street Activism</h3><p>Traditionally associated with the left, street protests have become central to right-wing populist strategy. The PEGIDA marches in Germany, anti-immigrant demonstrations in Sweden and the Netherlands, and the farmer-led highway blockades in the Netherlands are examples of how right-wing movements adopt extra-parliamentary tactics to express dissatisfaction.</p><p>In the US, the culmination of protest politics was the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot. After Donald Trump’s electoral defeat, thousands of his fervent supporters — convinced by populist narratives of a “stolen election” — stormed the U.S. Capitol in an unprecedented attempt to overturn the result. The event showed showed how a populist movement can morph from peaceful rallying into direct attacks on democratic institutions when fuelled by conspiracy and grievance.</p><h3>Digital Engagement and Online Networks</h3><p>Digital media has revolutionised political participation. Populist leaders and parties have exploited platforms like Twitter (X), Facebook, and YouTube to bypass traditional media. Now leaders can communicate directly with supporters, and dominate narratives.</p><p>A prime example is Donald Trump’s use of Twitter: he sent approximately 57,000 tweets over nearly 12 years, with roughly 8,000 during his 2016 campaign and over 25,000 while in office.</p><p>These platforms favour sensational, emotionally charged content, often blurring facts and fostering echo chambers. Although digital participation democratises access, it also facilitates the spread of misinformation, polarisation, and radicalisation — creating challenges for fair deliberation.</p><p>Online “keyboard warriors” translate into offline action as well. Social media engagement isn’t merely slacktivism– it often correlates with conventional activism by the same individuals. The digital sphere has thus become a crucial incubator for right-wing populist communities, allowing them to network, reinforce their narratives, and coordinate activities without needing large formal party bureaucracies.</p><p>Additionally, digital engagement has lowered barriers to political participation. It has enabled individuals who might never join a party meeting or attend a rally — to engage politically by sharing content, donating small amounts online, or debating issues on social networks.</p><p>For better or worse, the online sphere is the new arena of populist participation, democratizing political communication even as it sometimes “hijacks” civic debate.</p><h3>Changing Party System in West</h3><h3>Party System Fragmentation</h3><p>The post-2008 surge of right-wing populism has profoundly altered party systems in many advanced democracies. Long-standing patterns of two-party or two-bloc competition have been disrupted, leading to greater fragmentation and the entry of new political players.</p><p>In Europe, the collapse of established parties has been striking. In France, in the 2017 presidential election, neither of the two parties that had alternated in power for decades (the Socialists and the Gaullist Republicans) even made it to the run-off. Italy’s traditional parties have also collapsed, replaced by movements like Five Star and the Brothers of Italy. In Germany, the AfD broke post-war taboos by entering parliament in 2017.</p><p>This fragmentation means that parliaments are more diverse, but coalition-building has become complex. In proportional systems, populist parties may act even as kingmakers or disruptors; in majoritarian systems like the US or UK, populists have captured traditional parties from within.</p><h3>Elite–Mass Linkages in Populist Politics</h3><p>Traditional modes of political representation relied on stable linkages between elites (political parties, elected representatives) and social groups (class, religious, regional bases, etc.). These linkages have been profoundly altered by populist politics.</p><p>The intermediary institutions like labour unions, mainstream media etc. all played a lesser role in linking citizens to government during the populist surge. Populist movements, instead, utilized rallies, referendums, social media polls, and other direct appeals to create a sense of unmediated connection.</p><p>For example, the Five Star Movement’s Rousseau platform allowed online voting on parliamentary decisions. Trump tweeted policy positions directly to his followers, bypassing Congress or party platforms.</p><p>However, this style often weakens accountability and fosters personality cults. When representation depends on charisma rather than institutions, political loyalty may hinge on leader popularity rather than programmatic policy. A danger, captured in the concept of ‘hero worship’ as suggested by Ambedkar.</p><h3>Country Cases</h3><h3>United States</h3><p>In the United States, the right-wing populist upsurge began in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis and reached a climax with the election of Donald Trump in 2016. The Tea Party movement (2009–2010) rallied conservative citizens against bailouts, deficits, and Obama’s policies, staging protests in hundreds of cities and injecting populist energy into the Republican Party (aka GOP — Grand Old Party).</p><p>Trump drew on nationalism, anti-immigration sentiment, and anti-elite rhetoric. His presidency was marked by attacks on the press, judiciary, and electoral system. Though he energised alienated voters, he also undermined democratic norms, culminating in the Capitol attack of 2021.</p><h3>France</h3><p>France has been a bellwether of right-wing populist strength in Europe. After 2008, France experienced economic stagnation, rising unemployment (especially among youth), and social tensions over immigration and Islamist terrorism .</p><p>Le Pen succeeded her father Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2011 and rebranded the National Front to appeal to broader voters, focusing on immigration, Islam, and EU scepticism. The 2017 and 2022 presidential elections saw her reach the runoff stage, signalling deep cultural divides.</p><p>The Yellow Vest protests in France also reflect broader discontent with liberal elites, taxes, and centralisation.</p><h3>Germany</h3><p>In Germany, post-war politics long resisted any far-right party in Parliament, due in part to historical memory. That changed after the Eurozone and migrant crises, when AfD rose to prominence. Founded in 2013 initially as an anti-Euro party, the AfD quickly shifted focus to immigration and Islam after Germany admitted a large wave of refugees in 2015.</p><p>In 2025 Federal elections, AfD secured around 21% of total votes, emerging as second largest party. A massive growth from securing 10% of total votes in the previous 2021 elections.</p><p>Movements like PEGIDA is also notable mention which has helped anchor far-right issues in the public sphere, despite strong civil society pushback.</p><h3>Implications for Liberal Democracy</h3><p>The resurgence of right-wing populism since 2008 has had profound implications for liberal-democratic values. It raises pressing questions about the future of representative democracy in advanced states.</p><p>On one hand, populism has injected new energy into democracy — engaging citizens who were estranged from politics, broadening representation to include neglected viewpoints, and reasserting the principle that government should be accountable to the popular will.</p><p>On the other hand, the populist style of politics often conflicts with liberal norms of pluralism, minority rights, and institutional checks and balances. Populist nationalism often defines “the people” in exclusionary terms. Muslims, migrants, LGBTQ+ individuals, and other minorities are frequently portrayed as threats to national identity.</p><p>This duality creates a paradox: populist movements increase the responsiveness of democratic systems to public concerns, yet in doing so they may undermine the liberal safeguards that prevent tyranny of the majority and protect constitutionalism.</p><p>This points to another key implication: erosion of rule-of-law and institutional checks.</p><p>Populist leaders in power often chafe against independent institutions — courts, central banks, civil services, media — portraying them as obstacles imposed by elites to thwart the people’s will. The future of representative democracy thus hinges on whether institutional norms can be maintained when populist forces achieve power.</p><p>Another implication is the quality of democratic discourse and deliberation. Populism’s penchant for <em>simplistic, emotive rhetoric and misinformation</em> can degrade the public sphere. This inhibits reasoned debate and fuels polarisation. Social media has exacerbated this shift toward post-truth politics, where feelings and loyalty often matter more than facts and deliberation.</p><p>Despite risks, the populist wave reveals real failings: technocracy, inequality, unaccountable elites. It has re-energised voter engagement and expanded the scope of debate. Mainstream institutions can use this moment to innovate — via decentralisation, transparency, participatory tools, and renewed ideological clarity.</p><p>In fact, one should consider that populism’s rise could be cyclical. It was, in part, a response to the failures of the preceding era (inequality, corruption, cultural alienation). If governments manage to address those issues — say, by reducing inequality or controlling immigration — the appeal of extreme solutions might wane. The voters may eventually tire of anti-establishment anger if it doesn’t deliver results and may seek more pragmatic leadership.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The post-2008 resurgence of right-wing populism has been a stress test for liberal democracies. Moving forward, preserving the liberal democratic order will require addressing the root grievances that populists exploit, without compromising core values of democracy.</p><p>This trajectory also reveals that even the most mature democracies in the West are far from being “perfect”. Even in the heartlands of liberal democracy, the struggle to balance popular will with institutional limits, persists, and the efforts to make institutions genuinely responsive, continues.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6eb3c1ead21" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india/resurgence-of-right-wing-politics-in-advanced-democracies-d6eb3c1ead21">Resurgence of Right-Wing Politics in Advanced Democracies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india">Politics for India</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[BRICS Expansion, Prospective BRICS Currency and De-Dollarization: A Theoretical Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/politics-for-india/brics-expansion-prospective-brics-currency-and-de-dollarization-a-theoretical-analysis-1f99003c3eef?source=rss-fbb003f28dc5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1f99003c3eef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[de-dollarization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brics-expansion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump-tariff-brics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brics-currency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABHIJEET PIMPARKAR]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jun 2025 11:56:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-20T11:56:08.846Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/939/1*W-PkH1sxDqsGEG0jT7NRIA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>The BRICS bloc — originally Brazil, Russia, India, China (the “BRIC” coined by Jim O’Neill in 2001), later joined by South Africa — has evolved from an acronym into a geopolitical coalition of emerging powers. In recent years, BRICS has embarked on an expansionary path and intensified efforts to challenge the dollar-centric global financial order. This article examines the theoretical underpinnings of BRICS’ formation, expansion, and financial initiatives through the lenses of international relations and political economy.</p><h3>Origins and Geopolitical Rationale of BRICS</h3><p>Early on, BRICS advocated <strong>reforming global financial governance</strong>. This reflected a cooperative, reformist impulse. Not to antagonize the West, but to offer an alternative voice within an order long dominated by the West.</p><p>BRICS’ creation can also be interpreted as an attempt by emerging countries to institutionalize their cooperation, without relying on a Western benevolence. Keohane’s concept of <strong>“cooperation after hegemony”</strong> argues that states can build regimes and norms to serve common interests when hegemonic leadership is absent or distrusted. BRICS exemplifies this.</p><p>Critical theories like Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis or dependency theory cast BRICS in another light — as a rebellion of the semi-periphery against core dominance. By uniting, they sought to amplify the voice of the Global South and contest the rules set by the traditional core powers. Indeed, Brazilian President Lula da Silva lamented that under the current system <strong>“emerging and developing economies fund the developed world.”</strong></p><h3>Phases and Drivers for BRICS Expansion</h3><p>For more than a decade, BRICS remained a relatively exclusive club of five countries. After South Africa’s entry in 2010, no new members were added throughout the 2010s. Only recently has BRICS initiated a major expansion with inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE in 2023, and in January 2025, Indonesia.</p><p>This marks a significant shift from the earlier cautious approach to membership.<strong> Why did BRICS long remain closed, and why now the sudden surge of enlargement? </strong>Several theoretical frameworks shed light on these questions:</p><p>Initially, keeping BRICS small may have been about maintaining a balance among the founding members. Admitting new powers might align BRICS more closely with Chinese or Russian agendas, potentially at Brazil or India’s expense. The reluctance shows a classic balance-of-power concern– a desire to prevent any one member from dominating the group through added allies or economic leverage.</p><p>The global context by the 2020s provided new incentives for expansion. During the recent pandemic (Covid-19), many developing nations felt let down by the hoarding of vaccines and “structural disadvantages” in crisis response.</p><p>The dramatic Western sanctions on Russia after 2022 and the U.S.–China strategic rivalry have made it attractive for countries in the Global South to hedge their bets and join a bloc not aligned with the West. U.S. pressure and the perceived use of the dollar and sanctions as geopolitical weapons pushed even neutral countries to consider BRICS membership as a way to diversify their partnerships and gain some insulation from Western dominance.</p><p>The international system has noticeably shifted toward multipolarity. U.S. unipolar dominance is receding, and it is making the last ditch effort under present administration. As the dominant power’s relative position erodes, secondary states have greater incentive to bandwagon together for protection or influence.</p><p>That said, expansion also brings new challenges. A larger BRICS is more heterogeneous — including rivalries like Iran vs. UAE or varied political systems — which could make consensus harder. With many members, it risks internal fractures or a slower decision-making. The BRICS also must balance between those pushing a more anti-West stance (China, Russia, now Iran) and those preferring a more moderate, reformist posture (India, Brazil, South Africa).</p><h3>The Strategic Direction of BRICS</h3><p>Looking ahead, BRICS’ strategic direction likely involves walking a fine line: pushing for changes in the global system that favour multipolarity, while not formalizing into a rigid bloc that forces countries to choose sides.</p><p>In practice, we see BRICS pursuing initiatives like: expanding trade in local currencies — to reduce dollar dependence, cooperating on technology and energy to avoid Western chokepoints, and championing reforms at the UN/IMF/WTO to give developing countries more voice.</p><p>It is also suggested that if U.S.-China rivalry worsens, and the if USA’s confrontational policies continue, BRICS could harden into an anti-West axis. The president Trump is openly hostile to BRICS and it might <strong>“force middle powers to choose” </strong>between BRICS and Western alignment.</p><p>On the other hand, most BRICS members do not want a new Cold War-style bifurcation. They value strategic autonomy and will resist being subsumed into a China-Russia anti-West front. India and South Africa frequently reiterate non-alignment; even as they deepen BRICS ties, they engage the West on other fronts. This suggests BRICS’ likely path, as suggested earlier, is a nuanced one: assertive in seeking alternatives to Western dominance, but careful to avoid formal hostility or military alignment.</p><p>As said by Indian Prime Minister PM Modi,<strong> “BRICS is not an anti-Western group, it’s just a non-Western group’.</strong></p><h3>Prospects of a BRICS Currency and the Status of BRICS Pay</h3><p>One of the most provocative ideas circulating around BRICS is the creation of a common BRICS currency — an alternative to the U.S. dollar. Additionally, BRICS countries are actively developing a digital payments system (“BRICS Pay”) to facilitate trade in their own currencies.</p><h3>The Idea of a BRICS Currency</h3><p>Talk of a unified BRICS currency largely stems from the desire to accelerate de-dollarization and strengthen economic ties. Brazilian President Lula has been one of the vocal proponents of BRICS currency. Russian leaders likewise showed enthusiasm, especially after sanctions cut Russia off from the dollar system; a BRICS currency appeals to Moscow as part of building a sanctions-proof alternative.</p><p>Despite the chatter, <strong>no concrete plan for an actual common currency has emerged to date</strong>. There are<strong> significant hurdles </strong>which make the prospect doubtful in the near term.</p><p>Each BRICS nation values control over its own currency and monetary policy. Unlike the Eurozone countries — which are geographically proximate, politically aligned democracies with similar levels of development — BRICS members have vastly different economies and political systems. Coordinating a single currency would require ceding sovereignty to a supranational monetary authority, which seems improbable. The Euro’s creation was the culmination of decades of integration and trust-building; BRICS lacks that depth of integration or trust.</p><p>Furthermore, even within BRICS, China looms disproportionately (its GDP is larger than all others combined). A BRICS currency might in practice be dominated by the Chinese yuan or Beijing’s monetary stance, which India or Brazil would not accept. In fact, India has been notably cool on the idea of a BRICS currency, prioritizing its own rupee internationalization instead.</p><p>Thus, BRICS governments currently favour de-dollarization via local currencies over creating a brand-new currency. This strategy is sometimes called the <strong>“R5 initiative,”</strong> referring to the five BRICS currencies all coincidentally starting with R (Real, Ruble, Rupee, Renminbi, Rand).</p><p>The idea is to encourage trade among BRICS to be settled in these currencies rather than USD. Indeed, with the addition of new members, more currencies (Saudi riyal, etc.) join the mix, but the principle remains to “prioritize use of BRICS+ currencies over the U.S. dollar in intra-BRICS activities”. This is a more pragmatic approach to currency cooperation — essentially a currency bloc without a single currency, where multiple national currencies are interoperable for trade and finance.</p><h3>BRICS Pay</h3><p>A crucial enabler for a local-currency bloc is the BRICS Pay system. BRICS Pay connects central banks of BRICS countries and allows seamless cross-border payments in each other’s currencies. Technically, it is blockchain-based decentralized system where participating banks (or users) operate with no central hub — making it resistant to external control. In essence, BRICS Pay is a tool to bypass Western-controlled networks, like the Brussels-based SWIFT payment system.</p><p>By enabling direct communication between BRICS financial institutions, BRICS Pay would allow, say, a South African importer to pay a Indian exporter in rupees, routed through a BRICS Pay channel, without touching the U.S.-dominated correspondent banking system. This is strategically significant: <strong>it reduces exposure to sanctions and transaction costs in dollar conversions.</strong></p><p>The 2024 Kazan Declaration explicitly endorsed exploring “cross-border payment instruments” and local currency use. BRICS Pay is thus on track to become an operational reality within few years.</p><p>The implication for the dollar is that it could lose its intermediary role in a growing volume of transactions within this bloc. It would effectively create a parallel financial circuitry insulated from Western oversight, a tangible form of financial multipolarity.</p><h3>Trade in BRICS Currencies vs. USD/EUR:</h3><p>Presently, neither the euro nor the currencies of BRICS nations have yet made a significant dent in global reliance on the dollar. The U.S. dollar’s share of official foreign exchange reserves is still about 55% (as of early 2024), with the euro around 20%. The Chinese renminbi, despite China’s economic size, accounts for only roughly 2–3% of global reserves.</p><p>However, when we narrow focus to intra-BRICS or BRICS-to-partner trade, the share of local currencies is slowly rising. Russia-China trade has seen a dramatic swing toward settlement in rubles and yuan since 2022, after Western sanctions on Russia. Similarly, India has begun settling some of its oil purchases from Russia in Indian rupees and UAE dirhams, and India and UAE recently agreed to use rupees for trade in a limited scope.</p><p>If BRICS Pay becomes operational by 2025–26, we might see a leap in local currency usage as the barrier of payment processing will be lowered.</p><p>This could gradually carve out a multi-currency system where, instead of one dominant global currency, there are regional spheres: a dollar zone, a yuan zone, perhaps a euro zone — and countries choosing which to use based on context. Some scholars describe the possibility of an emerging <strong>“currency pluralism”.</strong></p><h3>Trump’s Tariff Threats</h3><p>The discussion of BRICS currency plans took a dramatic turn with the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. In early 2025, Trump warned that if BRICS members tried to create a new currency or replace the dollar’s reserve role, the U.S. would retaliate with 100% tariffs on their exports. In his own words, <strong>“Any Country that tries [to replace the USD] should say hello to Tariffs, and goodbye to America!”.</strong></p><p>Offensive realism as given by John Mearsheimer, posits that great powers are always seeking opportunities to gain power at the expense of others, and they fear the rise of peer competitors. A hegemonic power, in this view, will go to great lengths — including aggressive means — to maintain its dominance.</p><p>As John Mearsheimer predicts, <strong>“the hegemon will not concede its position gracefully but will rather coerce or punish those who challenge it”.</strong></p><p>Notably, Russia responded that any U.S. attempt to force dollar use would “backfire”, which indeed is consistent with realist security dilemmas — coercion can provoke countermeasures. Such threats perhaps could drive BRICS closer together. This feedback loop is exactly what realism would foresee in a power transition rivalry.</p><h3>De-dollarization and Dollar Devaluation</h3><p>De-dollarization refers to reducing the global economy’s reliance on the U.S. dollar — in reserves, in trade, and in finance. For decades, the dollar has been the ubiquitous lubricant of globalization, often comprising 60–70% of central bank reserves, invoicing more than 50% of international trade, and being on one side of ~88% of forex transactions.</p><p>This bestows the U.S. with what former French President Valéry d’Estaing (aka VDE) called an <strong>“exorbitant privilege” — the ability to print currency for the world, run deficits without immediate crises, and exert influence</strong> (the U.S. can sanction countries by restricting dollar access, as seen with Iran and Russia). Naturally, many countries chafe at this dollar dominance and the implicit U.S. hegemony it represents.</p><p>De-dollarization thus has a theoretical appeal rooted in sovereignty and equality: a more multipolar currency order could dilute U.S. power and be more stable if it better reflects the current distribution of economic power.</p><p>From a world-systems or dependency perspective, the dollar-centric system is part of core (U.S.) dominance. Periphery nations often have to adjust their economies to U.S. monetary policy (when the Fed raises rates, emerging markets suffer capital outflows, for instance).</p><p>De-dollarization is seen as a path to escape that dependency, allowing countries to regain monetary sovereignty — control over one’s currency and not being overly subject to another country’s currency decisions.</p><p>There’s also the notion of the <strong>Triffin Dilemma</strong>: the issuer of the global reserve currency must supply the world with liquidity (dollars) which often means running trade deficits, but over time this can undermine confidence in the currency’s value. The U.S. has managed this dilemma so far, but with growing national debt.</p><h3>Impracticality of De-dollarization</h3><p><strong>Despite increased chatter, full-scale de-dollarization remains difficult due to multiple structural reasons:</strong></p><p>The dollar is deeply entrenched — it’s accepted everywhere, from a bank in Kenya to an oil deal in Tokyo. This network effect means everyone uses dollars because everyone else does, which creates immense inertia. The U.S. capital markets are by far the deepest and most liquid.</p><p>International currency status ultimately relies on trust — trust that the currency will hold value (low inflation), and that it will be widely accepted by others. The U.S. has a long track record of providing a stable currency. In contrast, other contenders have issues: the Euro had/has internal crises (e.g. eurozone debt crisis) and lacks a unified fiscal authority. The Chinese Yuan (Renminbi) is tightly managed; China doesn’t allow free capital flow and could freeze assets in political disputes (just as the U.S. does via sanctions — so some might say “why trade one risk for another?”).</p><p>So, ironically, while U.S. sanctions push people away from the dollar, Chinese alignment with Russia or potential conflict over Taiwan makes them wary of the yuan — a catch-22.</p><p>Additionally, many emerging economies have dollar-denominated debt; True de-dollarization would involve restructuring debt into other currencies too, which creditors might resist unless there’s a clear benefit.</p><p>The U.S. will not sit idle either, as we’ve seen with Trump’s threats. There is also peer pressure: some allies may hesitate to join de-dollarization initiatives for fear of U.S. retaliation or because they still see value in the U.S.-led system.</p><p>With fiat currency dominance being questioned, some suggest a return to gold or commodity baskets. Gold is seen as a neutral reserve asset as no country can block your gold in your vaults. However, gold as a currency for trade is impractical — it’s not easily divisible for transactions, using it as backing still means you need to fix conversion rates, and its supply remains limited.</p><h3>Dollar Devaluation</h3><p>Amid these trends, it’s reported that Donald Trump’s administration (in 2025) has considered actively weakening the dollar’s value to address U.S. trade deficits — a proposal dubbed the <strong>“Mar-a-Lago Accord”</strong> . Its core goal is to devalue the dollar while preserving its role as the world reserve currency, a careful balancing act intended to avoid the contradictions described in the Triffin paradox.</p><p>However economist like Kenneth Rogoff note that, this strategy is flawed and “could make it too expensive for Americans to import, and it undermines faith in the dollar long-term. Another economist Jeffrey Frankel argues that the way Trump is considering weakening the dollar “would almost certainly spell the end of the U.S. dollar’s reign as the dominant international currency.”. Overt politicization of the dollar’s value could cause investors and central banks to diversify away, no longer seeing the dollar as a reliable store of value.</p><p>From a hegemonic stability viewpoint, a controlled decline of the dollar to a new equilibrium might be manageable, but if miscalculated, it could cause disorder in markets and weaken the pillar of U.S. financial hegemony — trust in the dollar.</p><p>However, it’s also possible this talk is a bargaining chip or populist posturing by Trump. If USA actually tries to devalue, the outcome could be chaotic.</p><p>Unless there’s a seismic event (e.g., a U.S. debt default or hyperinflation, which are unlikely but not impossible in far future), de-dollarization will likely be incremental. Efforts like BRICS Pay, local currency swaps, and perhaps Trump’s own unpredictable policies will harm dollar dominance. But for now, the twin anchors of U.S. economic/military might and the lack of a ready replacement mean the dollar-centric system will persist. In effect, the international political economy is stuck with what one might call the <strong>least-unattractive hegemon’s currency.</strong> The structural power of the dollar — embedded in contracts, central bank habits, and even people’s psyche– is formidable.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The interplay of BRICS expansion, de-dollarization, and potential BRICS currency moves is at the heart of the evolving international political economy.</p><p>Using theories from realism to world-systems, we see a coherent narrative: Rising powers are pushing back against an aging hegemon. They are employing institutional innovations and economic strategies to secure a more multipolar system. The U.S., especially under nationalist leadership, is responding forcefully, which could either reassert its dominance or accelerate the birth of a new order.</p><p>The concepts like multipolarity, balance of power, and dependency are no longer abstract — they are manifest in BRICS’ initiatives and the global reactions they spark. The next decade will likely prove critical in determining if the BRICS can translate their combined potential into a sustained realignment of the global financial architecture, or if the dollar-centric order will adapt and endure despite the challengers.</p><p>For a student of international relations, these developments offer a real-time case study of theory meeting practice on the world stage — a reminder that the evolution of global order is an ongoing and dynamic process, driven by both power and ideas.</p><h3>References</h3><p>1. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/indonesia-join-brics-bloc-full-member-brazil-says-2025-01-06/">Reuters — “Indonesia joins BRICS bloc as full member, Brazil says”</a></p><p>2. <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en">Carnegie Endowment — “BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order” (Stewart et al., 2025)</a></p><p>3. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/trump-repeats-tariffs-threat-dissuade-brics-nations-replacing-us-dollar-2025-01-31/">Reuters — “Trump repeats tariffs threat to dissuade BRICS nations from replacing US dollar”</a></p><p>4. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/brazils-lula-urges-brics-create-alternative-payment-methods-2024-10-23/">Reuters — “Brazil’s Lula urges BRICS to create alternative payment methods”</a></p><p>5. <a href="https://stratnewsglobal.com/world-news/us-dollar-remains-worlds-primary-reserve-currency-atlantic-council-study/">Atlantic Council/StratNewsGlobal — “US Dollar Remains World’s Primary Reserve Currency: Atlantic Council Study”</a></p><p>6. <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/mar-a-lago-accord-would-spell-the-end-of-dollar-dominance-by-jeffrey-frankel-2025-03">Project Syndicate — Jeffrey Frankel, “Is Trump Engineering the Decline and Fall of the Dollar?”</a></p><p>7. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/may/07/why-donald-trumps-plan-to-weaken-the-dollar-is-flawed">The Guardian — Kenneth Rogoff, “Why Donald Trump’s plan to weaken the dollar is flawed”</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1f99003c3eef" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india/brics-expansion-prospective-brics-currency-and-de-dollarization-a-theoretical-analysis-1f99003c3eef">BRICS Expansion, Prospective BRICS Currency and De-Dollarization: A Theoretical Analysis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/politics-for-india">Politics for India</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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