<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Abidakun Samuel (Uebercracker)  on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Abidakun Samuel (Uebercracker)  on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@abidakunsamuel74?source=rss-defb0dd07ddc------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:15:21 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@abidakunsamuel74/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Disclosing your Unreleased Apple Apps for fun and profit]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abidakunsamuel74/disclosing-your-unreleased-apple-apps-for-fun-and-profit-09da99ed28a0?source=rss-defb0dd07ddc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/09da99ed28a0</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abidakun Samuel (Uebercracker) ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 21:51:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-02T23:59:30.351Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Disclosing Your Unreleased Apple Apps For Fun and Profit.</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/590/1*5_HD3uPSftVZarJ4vCOWdQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>If there’s one lesson I’ve learned in security research, it’s this: **authorization is simple to explain, but devilishly easy to break**. Last year, I found that out the hard way on Apple.</p><p>I discovered a vulnerability in Apple’s Developer Program that exposed unpublished app metadata – the kind of information companies guard fiercely before launch. This isn’t a complex exploit with custom payloads or zero-days. It’s what happens when you combine thorough recon, understand your target, and test what should be tested. Here’s how I found it.</p><p><strong>The Reconnaissance Phase</strong></p><p>I started with recon using Chaos by ProjectDiscovery. The goal was simple: search for Apple infrastructure that might be interesting. Did that and After filtering through subdomains, two stood out:</p><ul><li><strong>developer.apple.com</strong> – Apple’s portal for building apps, games, and services across iOS, macOS, watchOS, tvOS, and visionOS</li><li><strong>register.apple.com </strong>– Handles business profiles, health data integrations, and enterprise communications tied to Apple Business Connect</li></ul><p>The developer portal was the obvious target. But I’ve learned that obvious doesn’t always mean exploitable.</p><p><strong>Understanding the Target</strong></p><p>Before I wrote a single payload, I did what I always do: I got comfortable with the application. What does it do? Who’s supposed to have access? What could realistically go wrong?</p><p>I signed up, clicked around, and proxied every request through Burp Suite in the background. This is where most researchers miss things – they look for endpoints, not behavior. Behavior is what reveals the cracks.</p><p>I spent couple of week testing developer.apple.com thoroughly. No luck. Then I switched focus to register.apple.com and discovered something interesting: a GraphQL endpoint at `/pb-api/graphql`.</p><p><strong>GraphQL again, I thought</strong>. But here’s the thing – GraphQL vulnerabilities aren’t rare because GraphQL is inherently broken. They’re common because developers often implement it carelessly.</p><p>I feel like REST API get to many bad rep compare to how many things could go wrong with Graphql API.</p><p>Back to the story.</p><p>Introspection is disabled in production, sure. But the schema? It usually lives somewhere in the frontend code.</p><p>Let’s find out together.</p><p><strong>Extracting the Schema</strong></p><p>My first move with any GraphQL API is always the same: try introspection. The endpoint had it disabled, and no bypass worked. So I did what you always should – sweep discoverable endpoints and go back to basics.</p><p>JavaScript file analysis. Lucky for me, some of the GraphQL schema was right there in the frontend code. I didn’t need to guess; it was already exposed.</p><p>I ran `SchemaFinder`, a Node.js CLI tool I built for extracting GraphQL operations from JavaScript – including minified and bundled code:</p><p>```bash</p><p>schemafinder -i https://register.apple.com/javascript.js -o results.json – postman</p><p>```</p><p>Download here -: <a href="https://github.com/abidakun1/schemafinder">https://github.com/abidakun1/schemafinder</a></p><p>I got dozens of results. Most were expected. But one resolver stood out and caught my attention:</p><p>```graphql</p><p>wwdrBundles(teamId: ID!, query: String)</p><p>```</p><p>This resolver returned WWDR bundle metadata: app names, bundle IDs, seed IDs, creation info. Exactly the kind of sensitive data Apple would want to protect.</p><p><strong>Testing Authorization</strong></p><p>The critical question: does it check if you’re authorized to see other teams’ data?</p><p>I tested against my own session and teamId first. It worked fine – I got my own data back as expected. That’s normal. But then I did what you’re supposed to do in security research: I tested the assumption.</p><p>A quick primer: a Team ID is a unique 10-character alphanumeric code Apple assigns when you join the Developer Program. It’s essentially your corporate identifier in the Apple ecosystem. These aren’t exactly secret – many signed Mac apps expose them.</p><p>The easiest way to grab one:</p><p>```bash</p><p>codesign -dv – verbose=4 /Applications/AppName.app 2&gt;&amp;1 | grep -E ‘TeamIdentifier|Authority’</p><p>```</p><p>I took the same GraphQL query and swapped in a Team ID belonging to another account I controlled – for impact demonstration purposes.</p><p><strong>The Vulnerable Request</strong></p><p>```bash</p><p>$ curl ‘https://register.apple.com/pb-api/graphql’ \</p><p>. – http2 \</p><p>. -X POST \</p><p>. -H ‘Host: register.apple.com’ \</p><p>. -H ‘Cookie: {REPLACE WITH YOUR COOKIE}’ \</p><p>. – data-raw ‘{“operationName”:”wwdrBundles”,”variables”:{“teamId”:”7Y73D7NRTY”,”query”:””},”query”:”query wwdrBundles($teamId: ID!, $query: String) {\n. wwdrBundles(teamId: $teamId, query: $query) {\n. id\n. name\n. seedId\n. __typename\n. }\n}”}’</p><p>```</p><p>The server responded with **200 OK**.</p><p>Full bundle metadata for a team I should have had absolutely zero authorization to view. Not just public apps – unpublished ones. Apps that were still under development. Apps that hadn’t shipped yet.</p><p><strong>The Impact</strong></p><p>This was a textbook IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) vulnerability with zero authorization checks. Any authenticated user on the Apple Developer Program could pull unpublished app metadata for *any* team just by changing one parameter.</p><p>Think about what that means: competitive intelligence on apps that haven’t shipped. A developer at Company A could see what Company B is building before the public ever learns about it. feature sets, internal naming conventions – all exposed.</p><p>I submitted the finding to Apple through their security vulnerability disclosure program. They acknowledged it and issued a four-figure bounty.</p><p>None of this required advanced techniques. No custom exploits. No bypasses. Just understanding the application, finding where data flows, and testing whether authorization was actually enforced.</p><p><strong>Timeline</strong></p><p>Reported – 11/10/2025</p><p>Fixed – 12/2/2025</p><p>Paid – 12/10/2025</p><p><strong>Context is King</strong></p><p>Before you break something, understand it. Understand what it does, who uses it, and what could go wrong.</p><p>*This research was conducted responsibly and disclosed through Apple’s official vulnerability disclosure program. All testing was authorized and limited to impact demonstration.*</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=09da99ed28a0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>