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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by ABO3JRAM on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by ABO3JRAM on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by ABO3JRAM on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abo3jram389?source=rss-648e0ab76e3a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I Found an IDOR That Exposed Cancer Patient Identities on a Government Healthcare Portal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abo3jram389/how-i-found-an-idor-that-exposed-cancer-patient-identities-on-a-government-healthcare-portal-d109fc6ffe08?source=rss-648e0ab76e3a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[idor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABO3JRAM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 02:46:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-01T02:46:54.215Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How I Found an IDOR That Exposed Cancer Patient Identities on a Government Healthcare Portal</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8dJc2y-BQbjSFIud6GrrKA.jpeg" /></figure><p>## Introduction</p><p>During an authorized bug bounty engagement with my collaborator <strong>itsnotthathard</strong> on a program, I discovered an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in a patient-facing oncology portal. The application was an <strong>**Odoo 17.0**</strong> instance running a custom cancer center module, used to manage appointments, medical findings, and treatment workflows for cancer patients.</p><p>A self-registered portal user — with zero relationship to any patient record — could enumerate the **full names of every cancer patient in the system** by abusing a single JSON-RPC method that the developers forgot to lock down.</p><p>The result: **~2,800+ medical finding records**, **~3,000+ appointment records**, and **~48,900 internal medical messages** — all leaking patient identities to anyone who could create an account.</p><p>— -</p><p>## The Target</p><p>The portal allowed patients to self-register using basic personal information and a national social security number. The registration only validated the **checksum format** of the ID number — it never verified it against any backend database. This meant anyone could generate a valid-format number and create an account.</p><p>Once registered and logged in, the UI was locked down tight. You could only see your own data. No other patient names, no other appointments, no other records. On the surface, everything looked correct.</p><p>But the surface isn’t where bugs live.</p><p>— -</p><p>## Reconnaissance: Understanding Odoo’s RPC Layer</p><p>If you’ve hunted on Odoo before, you know that the web interface is a thin client sitting on top of a powerful **JSON-RPC API**. Every button click, every page load, every data fetch is ultimately a call to `/web/dataset/call_kw` with a model name, a method name, and arguments.</p><p>Odoo has several data-access methods on every model:</p><p>| Method | Purpose |<br>| — — — — | — — — — -|<br>| `read` | Fetch full record fields by ID |<br>| `search_read` | Search + fetch in one call |<br>| `web_read` | Frontend-optimized read |<br>| `export_data` | Bulk export |<br>| `name_get` | Return `(id, display_name)` pairs |</p><p>The first four are the “heavy” methods — they return full record data and are typically the first things developers lock down with access control lists (ACLs). But `name_get`? It’s the quiet one. It just returns a name. How dangerous could a name be?</p><p>On a cancer treatment portal? **Very.**</p><p>— -</p><p>## The Discovery</p><p>I started by testing the obvious. As my low-privilege self-registered account, I tried calling `read` on a medical finding record that didn’t belong to me:</p><p>```<br>Model: vcc.medical.finding<br>Method: read<br>IDs: [3809]<br>```</p><p>**Result:** `odoo.exceptions.AccessError` — blocked. Good.</p><p>Same for `search_read`, `web_read`, `export_data`. All blocked. The access control rules were doing their job.</p><p>Then I tried `name_get`:</p><p>```json<br>{<br> “jsonrpc”: “2.0”,<br> “method”: “call”,<br> “params”: {<br> “model”: “vcc.medical.finding”,<br> “method”: “name_get”,<br> “args”: [[3809, 3808, 3807, 3800, 3700, 3500, 3000, 2000, 1000]],<br> “kwargs”: {}<br> }<br>}<br>```</p><p>Every single record returned. Real patient names. Real people undergoing cancer treatment.</p><p>The `display_name` field was constructed as `”Medizinsche Befunde: [Patient Full Name]”` (German for “Medical Findings”), directly embedding the patient’s identity into the response.</p><p>— -</p><p>## Digging Deeper: How Far Does It Go?</p><p>Once I confirmed the pattern on `vcc.medical.finding`, I tested other models in the custom cancer center module:</p><p>**`vcc.appointment`** (~3,000+ records):</p><p>**`res.users`** (all registered patients):</p><p>**`mail.message`** (~48,900 records — the biggest exposure):</p><p>The `mail.message` model was Odoo’s internal messaging system, logging every treatment handoff, every medical finding update, every internal workflow communication — all with patient names baked into the subject line.</p><p>Meanwhile, `res.partner` (the core contact model) correctly blocked `name_get`. And `read` was blocked across the board. This wasn’t a blanket failure — it was **selective** and **inconsistent**, which made it worse because it meant someone had thought about access controls but missed specific models.</p><p>— -</p><p>## Root Cause: The `.sudo()` Anti-Pattern</p><p>A stack trace from an error response revealed the smoking gun in the source code:</p><p>```python<br># tumor_board.py, line 74<br>record.display_name = _(“Tumor Board: %s”) % record.sudo().case_id.patient_id.name<br>```</p><p>The `.sudo()` call. In Odoo, `.sudo()` elevates the operation to run as the superuser, bypassing all access control rules. The developer used it to compute the `display_name` field — probably because computing the name requires traversing a relationship chain (`case_id -&gt; patient_id -&gt; name`) that the current user doesn’t have permission to follow.</p><p>The fix they likely intended: compute the name with elevated privileges so it displays correctly in the UI for authorized users.</p><p>What actually happened: `name_get` calls the `display_name` compute method, which runs with `.sudo()`, which bypasses ACLs, which returns the patient name to **anyone** who asks — authorized or not.</p><p>This is a pattern I’ve seen across multiple Odoo deployments. The `display_name` compute function is treated as “safe” because developers think of it as metadata, not data. But when the display name **contains** the sensitive data, the distinction collapses.</p><p>— -</p><p>## Key Takeaways for Hunters</p><p>### 1. Always Test Every RPC Method Independently<br>Access controls on `read` don’t mean access controls on `name_get`, `name_search`, `fields_get`, or any other method. Test each one separately, especially on Odoo targets.</p><p>### 2. `display_name` Is an Attack Surface<br>In Odoo, the `display_name` field is computed dynamically. If it contains sensitive data (names, emails, internal IDs), and the compute function uses `.sudo()`, you have a potential IDOR through `name_get`.</p><p>### 3. Healthcare Targets Multiply Impact<br>The same bug on a project management tool might be P4. On an oncology portal, it’s a GDPR Article 9 violation affecting thousands of vulnerable individuals. Context matters — frame your impact accordingly.</p><p>### 4. Inconsistency Is Your Best Evidence<br>When arguing for a finding, the strongest evidence is the application contradicting itself. “Model A blocks `name_get`, Model B doesn’t” or “`read` is blocked but `name_get` isn’t” proves the behavior is unintended.</p><p>### 5. Initial Triage Isn’t Final<br>A “Not Applicable” response doesn’t mean your finding is invalid. It means the triager didn’t see the impact. Reframe, simplify, and resubmit. Two of my response requests expired before the finding was accepted — persistence matters.</p><p>## Final Thoughts</p><p>This bug was technically simple. One API method, one missing access check, one `.sudo()` call in a compute function. But simplicity doesn’t diminish impact. Thousands of cancer patients had their identities exposed through a portal that was supposed to protect them.</p><p>The best bugs aren’t always the most complex. Sometimes they’re hiding in the method everyone assumes is “safe.”</p><p>— -</p><p>*This research was conducted under an authorized bug bounty program. All testing was performed within the program’s scope and rules of engagement.</p><p>*Found this interesting? Connect with me on [<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mohammad-ajarmeh-997b26317/">LinkedIn</a>] — I write about web application security, access control vulnerabilities, and the art of not giving up after “Not Applicable.”*</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d109fc6ffe08" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[When CAPTCHA Fails Silently: A Hidden Authentication Logic Bug]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@abo3jram389/when-captcha-fails-silently-a-hidden-authentication-logic-bug-d59356e5522f?source=rss-648e0ab76e3a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ABO3JRAM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Apr 2025 21:38:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-18T21:38:34.153Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*GX0aUY1DVPzLp-LjjuIOLw.png" /></figure><p>Hi Everyone .</p><p>This write-up is a reminder that when it comes to security testing, <strong>what you see on the surface isn’t always what’s happening under the hood</strong>.</p><p>During a recent bug hunting session, I came across an interesting <strong>logic flaw</strong> in a login flow — one that, at first glance, looked like a minor CAPTCHA issue, but turned out to enable <strong>username enumeration</strong> and laid the groundwork for a <strong>brute force attack</strong>.</p><p>🔍 What Was the Vulnerability?</p><p>The login endpoint of the application implemented CAPTCHA to deter brute-force attacks. However, during testing, I realized something important:</p><blockquote>Even when the CAPTCHA was missing or incorrect, the server still processed the login credentials and returned detailed error messages.</blockquote><p>This wasn’t a traditional “CAPTCHA bypass.” The CAPTCHA was present, the frontend enforced it, and users couldn’t log in without solving it.<br> But the flaw was deeper — a <strong>backend logic error</strong> where the CAPTCHA <strong>was not actually enforced before authentication</strong> was attempted.</p><p>Where It All Started :</p><p>After successfully solving the CAPTCHA on the login page, I intercepted the request using <strong>Burp Suite</strong> and sent it to the <strong>Repeater</strong> for further testing.</p><p>I expected the server to reject any login attempt that didn’t include a valid CAPTCHA response. But when I replayed the request, something unusual caught my eye:</p><blockquote>The server responded with:<br> <strong>“The password you entered for the username admin is not correct.”</strong></blockquote><p>It also returned another message saying:</p><blockquote>“Please solve the CAPTCHA.”</blockquote><p>At first, I assumed the request hadn’t been processed — that the CAPTCHA error meant the server blocked the login attempt entirely. But the presence of a <strong>password-specific error message</strong> suggested otherwise.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PEbulY5uaA2PrINlI4Yq2Q.png" /></figure><p>That’s when my instinct kicked in. I modified the <em>log=</em> parameter and changed the username from <em>admin</em> to <em>admin1</em>.</p><p>To my surprise, the response changed:</p><blockquote>The username admin1 is not registered on this site.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7h8K8MLCcKvrGxGYxDxuvg.png" /></figure><p>This confirmed it — the server was still <strong>processing and validating the login data</strong>, even without a valid CAPTCHA. That meant I could test usernames and passwords freely, bypassing the intended anti-automation mechanism.</p><p><strong>Hope It was helpful and Good Write Up.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d59356e5522f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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