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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Accutive Security on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Are 47 Day Certificates? Dates and the 10-Day Rule]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@accutivesecurity/what-are-47-day-certificates-dates-and-the-10-day-rule-5a3b07ffe735?source=rss-e6a5e4a69d90------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ssl]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tls]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pki]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[certificate-management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Accutive Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 09:10:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-20T09:10:42.596Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>47 Day Certificates: The Dates, the 10-Day Rule, and How to Prepare</h3><p>47 day certificates are publicly trusted TLS certificates that can be valid for no more than 47 days. The limit applies to certificates issued from March 15, 2029. It arrives in three steps: 200 days since March 2026, 100 days in March 2027, then 47 days in March 2029. The same schedule shrinks how long a CA can reuse proof of domain control, down to 10 days. For the enterprise view of this change, read our guide to <a href="https://accutivesecurity.com/the-shift-to-47-day-certificates-shorter-ssl-tls-cert-windows-are-a-defining-moment-for-cybersecurity/">47 day certificates</a>.</p><h4>The short version</h4><ul><li>The limit is 200 days today and drops to 100 days on March 15, 2027.</li><li>By 2029, domain validation is only good for 10 days, so validation has to be automated along with renewal.</li><li>Plan on eight to twelve renewals a year for every public certificate.</li><li>Start with an inventory and owners, then automate renewal, then validation.</li></ul><figure><img alt="Maximum TLS certificate validity shrinking from 398 days to 200, 100 and 47 days between 2026 and 2029" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I0dgECVubWhIs636xJlt3Q.png" /></figure><h3>The 47 day certificate timeline</h3><p>The CA/Browser Forum approved ballot SC-081v3 in April 2025. Apple proposed it, Sectigo backed it, and it passed with no votes against. It sets a schedule for two things at once: how long a certificate can live, and how long a CA can reuse proof that you control a domain.</p><figure><img alt="TLS Certificate Validity Timeline" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*59cOlxYd6XBbvkfUA-is1Q.png" /></figure><p>Organization details for OV and EV certificates can be reused for 398 days from March 15, 2026, down from 825.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WtVP4A3t3YV8p3Avlr1iNA.png" /></figure><p>The date that matters most right now is not 2029. It is <strong>March 15, 2027</strong>, when the limit drops from 200 days to 100 and your renewal volume roughly doubles.</p><h3>The 10-day rule is the one that bites</h3><p>Everyone talks about the 47 days. Fewer people talk about domain control validation, or DCV: the check a CA runs to confirm you control a domain before it issues a certificate.</p><p>Today a CA can reuse a successful check for 200 days. In 2027 that falls to 100, and in 2029 to just 10. A certificate lasts 47 days, but your proof of control goes stale after 10.</p><p>That has three consequences:</p><ol><li>You cannot validate once and issue a batch of certificates to use over the coming weeks. That workaround stops working.</li><li>Almost every renewal needs a fresh validation, so validation becomes part of the issuance pipeline, not an occasional admin task.</li><li>If someone approves validation by email or edits a DNS record by hand, that step will fail before anything else does.</li></ol><figure><img alt="certificate validity with domain validation reuse" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qgd9V9ea8X6NAzT1YKejTA.png" /></figure><p>Automated validation usually means DNS validation through your DNS provider’s API, or HTTP validation placed automatically on your web servers. Many teams also delegate the validation record to a zone they control, so renewals never need someone to edit production DNS. [Add one sentence from your own experience: what did a client’s DNS setup look like when you first assessed it?]</p><h3>What 47 day certificates mean for your workload</h3><p>A certificate you renew once a year today will need about eight renewals a year at 47 days if you wait until the last day. Most teams renew earlier to leave a margin. Renew about two-thirds of the way through the lifetime and you are closer to twelve a year.</p><p>Take 3,000 public certificates. At eight to twelve renewals each, that is 24,000 to 36,000 renewals a year. A spreadsheet and calendar reminders will not cope, and one missed renewal means customers see a browser warning.</p><figure><img alt="renewals per certificate per year" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sSRqUu8stWqN4lH5SPY5gw.png" /></figure><h3>What the rule does and does not cover</h3><ul><li><strong>Covered:</strong> publicly trusted TLS certificates, including DV, OV and EV.</li><li><strong>Not directly covered:</strong> <a href="https://accutivesecurity.com/what-is-pki-in-cyber-security/">private or internal PKI</a>. Many organizations choose to match the same lifetimes internally, because running two renewal processes is expensive.</li><li><strong>Separate rules:</strong> other certificate types, such as code signing and S/MIME, follow their own requirements. Do not assume this schedule applies to them.</li></ul><h3>Why the industry is doing this</h3><p>There are four reasons people give, and they are worth knowing because they explain why the date is unlikely to move.</p><ul><li><strong>A smaller window for a stolen key.</strong> If a private key leaks, the certificate is useful to an attacker until it expires.</li><li><strong>Fresher validation.</strong> A certificate should reflect who controls a domain now, not a year ago.</li><li><strong>Pressure to automate.</strong> Supporters of the change are open that this is part of the point.</li><li><strong>Crypto agility.</strong> Teams that can replace certificates every few weeks cope better when post-quantum algorithms arrive and many certificates need replacing at once. See our <a href="https://accutivesecurity.com/quantum-readiness/">quantum readiness guidance</a>.</li></ul><p>You can argue about whether 47 is the right number. The schedule is set.</p><h3>Where manual processes break first</h3><p>In assessments, these are the places that usually fail before the certificate count does. [Confirm this list matches your own experience and reorder if needed.]</p><ul><li><strong>Domain validation done by a person.</strong> See the 10-day rule above.</li><li><strong>Load balancers and network appliances.</strong> They need the vendor’s API or built-in ACME support, and some older ones have neither.</li><li><strong>Certificate pinning.</strong> Mobile apps and clients that pin a specific certificate can break when it rotates. Pin to something more stable, or retire the pin.</li><li><strong>Windows services that need a manual step after renewal,</strong> such as services that must be told to pick up the new certificate.</li><li><strong>Third-party and SaaS custom domains</strong> where someone else controls the renewal process.</li><li><strong>Kubernetes and containers</strong> where certificates are issued by one team and consumed by many. See our guide to machine identity management for Kubernetes.</li><li><strong>No owner.</strong> Expiry problems sit between security, infrastructure and application teams.</li></ul><h3>How to prepare for 47 day certificates: six steps</h3><figure><img alt="Six steps to prepare for 47 day certificates" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gf_j9zPS5AcZ90VudzquqQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>1. Inventory every certificate.</strong> Find the ones on servers, load balancers, cloud services, containers and appliances. Include certificates issued outside your normal process. Teams are often surprised by how many nobody was tracking. Our guide to cryptographic asset discovery covers how to start.</p><p><strong>2. Assign owners.</strong> Put a named team next to every certificate. If a certificate has no owner, it will expire on a weekend.</p><p><strong>3. Automate issuance and renewal.</strong> ACME (RFC 8555) covers many cases. Check whether your tools support ACME renewal information (ARI), which lets a CA tell clients when to renew. For the rest, a <a href="https://accutivesecurity.com/certificate-management-and-machine-identities/">certificate lifecycle management</a> platform handles discovery, policy and workflows. See our certificate lifecycle management services.</p><p><strong>4. Automate domain validation.</strong> Use API-driven DNS validation or delegated validation records. Test it before the limit drops to 100 days.</p><p><strong>5. Deal with the exceptions.</strong> List the systems that cannot automate: old appliances, embedded devices, hosted services. For each one, replace it, put a proxy in front of it, or write down the manual process and who does it.</p><p><strong>6. Monitor, rehearse, and add a backup CA.</strong> Alert on failed renewals within hours, not at expiry. Try short-lived certificates in a test environment while mistakes are cheap. Consider setting up and testing a second CA. At 47 days, a problem at your only CA leaves very little time for a manual fallback.</p><h3>Do you need a CLM platform, or are ACME scripts enough?</h3><p>For a small estate with a few web servers, ACME clients and some scripting may be enough. A CLM platform starts to earn its keep when you have many teams, many certificate types, more than one CA, audit requirements, or a lot of appliances. We implement and support platforms from Keyfactor, CyberArk Venafi, AppViewX, DigiCert and others, so the recommendation depends on your environment, not on what we resell.</p><h3>A realistic timeline</h3><ul><li><strong>Next 90 days:</strong> inventory, owners, and a list of exceptions. Pick the tooling approach.</li><li><strong>Before March 15, 2027:</strong> automate renewal and validation for your highest-risk public certificates.</li><li><strong>Through 2028:</strong> extend automation to everything, add a backup CA, and test failure scenarios.</li><li><strong>By March 15, 2029:</strong> manual renewal is the exception, not the process.</li></ul><h3>Frequently asked questions</h3><p><strong>What are 47 day certificates?</strong> They are publicly trusted TLS certificates with a maximum validity of 47 days. The limit applies to certificates issued from March 15, 2029.</p><p><strong>When do 47 day certificates start?</strong> The change is phased. The limit fell to 200 days on March 15, 2026, falls to 100 days on March 15, 2027, and reaches 47 days on March 15, 2029.</p><p><strong>Do 47 day certificates apply to private or internal PKI?</strong> Not directly. The CA/Browser Forum rules cover publicly trusted certificates. Many organizations match the same lifetimes internally to keep one renewal process.</p><p><strong>What is domain validation reuse, and why does the 10-day limit matter?</strong> Before issuing a certificate, a CA checks that you control the domain. Reuse is how long it can rely on an earlier check. From March 15, 2029 that is only 10 days, so validation has to be automated with renewal.</p><p><strong>Can we keep renewing certificates manually?</strong> It is technically possible at 200 days, but it becomes unrealistic as the limit falls. At 47 days you will have eight to twelve renewals a year per certificate, plus fresh domain validation, so manual processes will fail.</p><p><strong>Do we need a certificate lifecycle management platform?</strong> Not always. Small estates may manage with ACME clients and scripts. A CLM platform helps when you have many certificates, teams, CAs or audit requirements.</p><h3>Get ready with a fixed-scope assessment</h3><p>We run a PKI and CLM readiness assessment that shows what certificates you have, where renewal and validation will break, and what to automate first. <a href="https://accutivesecurity.com/pki-clm-assessments/">Get a 47 day certificate readiness assessment</a>.</p><p>Read the full <a href="https://accutivesecurity.com/the-shift-to-47-day-certificates-shorter-ssl-tls-cert-windows-are-a-defining-moment-for-cybersecurity/">47-day TLS certificates guide</a> for more.</p><p><strong>Sources:</strong> <a href="https://cabforum.org/2025/04/11/ballot-sc081v3-introduce-schedule-of-reducing-validity-and-data-reuse-periods/">CA/Browser Forum ballot SC-081v3</a>, and ACME, RFC 8555.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5a3b07ffe735" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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