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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Adam J. White on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Adam J. White on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Thinking hard about old tweets]]></title>
            <link>https://adamjwhite.medium.com/thinking-hard-about-old-tweets-d065b299cf30?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:27:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-16T12:19:49.030Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today a reporter reached out to me about some of my older tweets.</p><p>Specifically, she sent a list of tweets, from 2014 to 2017, which pertained mostly to gender identity — that is, to then-burgeoning policy debates related to gender identity, or to particular transgender people (Chelsea Manning and Caitlyn Jenner). She asked if I had any comments about those tweets, and how my views might affect my public work on constitutional issues.</p><p>Suffice it to say that trying to think hard about old tweets is is strange experience—trying to remember what occasioned the tweets, or what I meant by specific phrases.</p><p>Still, the reporter had asked me about them, and I thought that she deserved honest, thorough responses. And because she might not be the last reporter to ask me about them, I figured that my colleagues and students deserved honest, thorough responses, too. Since the emergence of often heated debates about gender identity and pronouns a few years ago, my core substantive views haven’t changed—but the way I think about those views, and the ways they inform my day to day life, has changed.</p><p>As with virtually every other cultural or political debate of our time, Twitter seems a terrific way to make everything even worse. At least, that was my experience with it, as evidenced by my often glib tweets on this subject and other subjects. (Which is why lately I’ve tried to tweet less and think more.) The more I’ve recognized that, and the more I’ve recognized the need to follow not just the Catholic Church’s teachings on any one particular issue but also the Catholic Church’s teachings on mercy, charity, and dignity in all respects of our life, the less I’ve wanted to tweet.</p><p>But I don’t generally delete old tweets, and so my old tweets are out there for anyone to see, for better or for worse. And for that reason, I thought I’ve give the reporter a full answer. And, having invested the time in sending that answer to her, I thought I’d post it here, too (minus a few opening words to the specific reporter).</p><p>So here it is:</p><p>[T]his is my best effort to answer your questions thoroughly and honestly.</p><p>Needless to say, these are complicated and sensitive subjects (which is why I long ago stopped tweeting about them, as I’ll explain further below). It is hard to do justice to them under your quick two-hour clock. So please pardon any typos, etc.</p><ol><li>In October 2014, I <a href="https://twitter.com/adamjwhitedc/status/519142900001935361">tweeted</a> that the question of constitutional rights to same-sex marriage was effectively decided by the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear five cases involving states’ marriage laws. A few months later the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the <em>Obergefell</em> case and declared a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.</li><li>My September 2017 <a href="https://twitter.com/adamjwhitedc/status/909401671402434560">tweet</a> regarding Chelsea Manning was in reference to her bizarre assertion that Harvard was part of a CIA “military/police/intel state” plot against her.</li><li>My January 2017 <a href="https://twitter.com/adamjwhitedc/status/821561952841437185">tweet</a>, regarding President Obama’s commutation of Chelsea Manning’s conviction for violating the Espionage Act, was a criticism of the politicization of a criminal case involving major national security issues. It is a grave mistake for elected officials to politicize the enforcement of national security laws.</li><li>On January 13, 2017, I <a href="https://twitter.com/adamjwhitedc/status/819951847293276160">tweeted</a> an observation that the New York Times’s account of Chelsea Manning used Manning’s chosen pronouns, instead of the pronouns reflecting her biological sex at birth. While such an approach is less controversial in 2021, it was highly controversial in 2017, as reflected by the New York Times’s own <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/insider/reporting-limits-of-language-transgender-genderneutral-pronouns.html">explanation</a> of the subject in another story just a few weeks later. A friend, Mike Sacks, responded to my tweet, criticizing me as being insensitive toward LBTQ people; I replied and reiterated my position that gender is best understood as a matter of biological sex. While my view of the subject of gender pronouns has not changed since then, my view of how to relate to people has changed significantly. I concluded soon after those tweets that my tone in the tweets was glib and uncharitable; and that, whatever one’s views of the subject, it is important to treat all people with kindness and charity. Hence my use of people’s chosen pronouns more recently.</li><li>To the best of my recollection (I had to go back and refresh my memory on this), my 2017 <a href="https://twitter.com/adamjwhitedc/status/850113120882237440">tweet</a> about Kendall Jenner’s Pepsi ad was a glib reference to the fact that Pepsi Co. issued a public apology for her Pepsi ad, because that ad grossly trivialized Black Lives Matter; my allusion to Caitlyn Jenner was in reference to the criticism that she had recently received for her own political statements, including her support for President Trump and her attendance at his inauguration.</li><li>The <a href="https://twitter.com/adamjwhitedc/status/605743161214922752">two</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/adamjwhitedc/status/605744762994479104">tweets</a> on June 2, 2015, regarding fact-checking one’s assertions of gender identity, reflected my view that if gender identity were to be separated from one’s sex at birth, then it would become largely subjective and thus difficult, if not impossible, to “fact-check” as a matter of journalism.</li><li>I do not recall the context of my February 7, 2016 <a href="https://twitter.com/adamjwhitedc/status/696412270994268160">tweet</a> asking about the term “LGBT inequality,” because the tweet I was responding to no longer exists. But my best guess is that I was surprised by the use of that specific term. By which I mean: while in February 2016 debates were well established regarding discrimination against people on the basis of sexual orientation or identity, my tweet reflected the fact that I was struck by a framing of those issues with the term “inequality,” which at the time was being used mostly in terms of economics, race, and sex. But, again, it is impossible for me to know exactly what news development I was replying to.</li></ol><p>I noted at the start of my email that these are years-old tweets. In the years since then, it became clear to me that Twitter is a profoundly bad forum for debate, quips, or any kind of discussion; it rewards glib quips and personal attacks, at the cost of dignity, charity, and thoughtfulness. At least that’s how I experienced it, and for that reason, I’ve largely stopped using Twitter for anything other than links or announcements.</p><p>But more to the point: My views of gender identity remain largely unchanged, consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church. But my view of how people should relate to one another in discussing this subject has changed. My change is itself inspired by the Church’s teachings on treating all people with grace, mercy, and kindness; and it also has been inspired by the sheer awfulness of the last few years’ political and cultural discourse in general.</p><p>Obviously, my old tweets are now becoming the subject of a news story because President Biden selected me for his bipartisan commission on the Supreme Court. I agreed to join that commission because I believe that bipartisan discourse and collegiality have never been more desperately needed, and that profoundly important constitutional issues such as the future of the Supreme Court must not be dominated by personal attacks and political demagoguery. To that end, for the last few years I’ve tried to do my part in recent years by hosting diverse, bipartisan dialogues in my own institutions.</p><p>And now I’m grateful for the chance to serve on the President’s commission, in no small part because I knew that President Biden’s decision to appoint conservatives to the commission would arouse significant criticism. I hope to do justice to its mission of bipartisanship and civil inquiry. Such things are needed now more than ever.</p><p>Best,</p><p>Adam White</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d065b299cf30" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is religious liberty “dismantling” progressive legal victories—or making them possible in the…]]></title>
            <link>https://adamjwhite.medium.com/is-religious-liberty-dismantling-progressive-legal-victories-or-making-them-possible-in-the-5bcce0482c6c?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2020 15:56:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-12T19:12:55.740Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Is religious liberty “dismantling” progressive legal victories—or making them possible in the first place?</h3><h4>On reactions to the Supreme Court’s religious liberty decisions after Bostock</h4><p>Sometimes history seems just “<a href="https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Arnold_J._Toynbee">one damned thing after another</a>.” Sometimes Supreme Court opinions seem that way, too.</p><p>The Court issues its decision one at a time, or maybe a handful in a day. We read the latest opinions on scattered subjects; if a particular case involves an issue we care about, then we declare victory or defeat—for that day, at least. Tomorrow will bring new wins and losses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/570/1*vQ7Qm8EGMP4V2BJOen44DA.jpeg" /></figure><p>But the justices themselves experience something totally different. The case that they decide one day has been argued, drafted, deliberated, and decided within the Court’s walls over the course of months, all while the justices hear other cases’ arguments, draft other cases’ opinions, consider other cases’ newly arrived “cert” petitions, and so on.</p><p>And on top of all that, of course, justices with life tenure take the long view; they understand that a decision today will have real effects in days, months, and years to come.</p><p>I mention this at the end of the Court’s just finished term not to be pedantic, but because as I read much of the year-end analysis (and try to write some of my own), I’m struck by complaints about two of the Court’s religious liberty decisions.</p><p>The decisions, of course, are in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-431_5i36.pdf"><em>Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania</em></a>, which affirmed religious organizations’ exemptions from contraceptive-coverage requirements under the Affordable Care Act; and <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-267_1an2.pdf"><em>Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrisey-Berru</em></a>, which affirmed religious schools’ First Amendment exemption from employment laws that would have restricted their ability to fire a particular teacher who is not furthering the school’s religious mission. Those decisions were both announced on July 8, and both were decided by strong 7–2 supermajorities.</p><p>Specifically, I’m struck by progressives who complain that these two decisions undermine the Court’s decisions a few weeks earlier, in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf"><em>Bostock v. Clayton County</em></a>, where the Court concluded that the Civil Rights Act’s Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of “sex,” prevents employers from discriminating against people for the sexual orientation or gender identity; and in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf"><em>June Medical Services v. Russo</em></a>, where the Court reaffirmed and reapplied a recent precedent limiting state regulations on abortion clinics.</p><p>Just days after those two decisions, when the Court announced its decisions a in <em>Little Sisters of the Poor </em>and <em>Our Lady of Guadalupe School</em>, progressive analysts promptly complained that the two new decisions would harm the earlier decisions. Prof. Leah Litman, for example, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/supreme-court-birth-control-ruling-shows-how-civil-rights-abortion-ncna1233196">complained</a> that “the justices just made clear just how they will go about limiting — if not outright dismantling — any judicial wins like these that the left ekes out”; the Court’s protection of religious liberty, she wrote, will “will whittle away the recent victories for LGBTQ rights and abortion.” Americans United for Separation of Church and State <a href="https://www.au.org/media/press-releases/supreme-courts-ministerial-exception-decision-invites-religious-schools-to">voiced</a> similar concerns.</p><p>This framing of the Court’s work was not limited to ideologues or partisans; news reports framed the July decisions in similar terms. NBC News reported that the “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/supreme-court-s-religious-employer-ruling-could-weaken-lgbtq-protections-n1233461">Supreme Court’s religious employer ruling could weaken LGBTQ protections</a>”; <em>Bloomberg Law</em> reported, similarly, “<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/religion-lgbt-rights-again-on-collision-course-at-high-court">Religion, LGBT Rights Again on Collision Course at High Court</a>.” The <em>New York Times </em>called <em>Our Lady of Guadalupe</em> “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/us/job-bias-catholic-schools-supreme-court.html">a setback for L.G.B.T.Q. workers, who just weeks ago gained protections under a federal employment-discrimination law</a>.” And <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/supreme-court-religious-school-teachers-discrimination-lgbtq">so on</a>.</p><p>This blunt view of the July decisions threatening the June decisions might make sense if one takes each decision, one at a time, in the order that they are published. But given how the Court actually works, and how the Justices actually grapple with the many issues simultaneously before them (and on the horizon) at a given moment in time, here is a more realistic notion: <strong>the Court’s earlier decisions on sexual orientation, gender identity, and other issues might have been <em>facilitated</em> by the fact that religious liberty moderates their impact.</strong></p><p>Stated another way, perhaps at least some of the justices in the <em>Bostock</em> majority—including its author, Justice Gorsuch, as well as Chief Justice Roberts and perhaps even others—might well have been made more comfortable announcing broadly that the Civil Rights Act protects gender identity and sexual orientation because they knew that some of the most significant ramifications of such a decision would be moderated by the protections of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.</p><p>We have seen this before, even recently, and on very similar issues. The same justice who wrote the Court’s opinions in the canonical LGBTQ-rights cases—<em>Romer, Lawrence</em>, <em>Windsor</em>, and <em>Obergefell</em>—completed the series with <em>Masterpiece Cakeshop</em>, protecting the rights of the religious baker who was being forced by state regulators to bake a bespoke cake for a same-sex wedding. Those cases were not a “collision” in the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy; <em>Masterpiece Cakeshop </em>did not “dismantle” or “whittle away” rights protected in the earlier cases. Rather, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in <em>Masterpiece Cakeshop</em> <a href="https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/adam-white/cake-boss/">made clear what his homosexual-rights opinions genuinely meant from the start</a>. Indeed, Kennedy’s own opinion for the Court in <em>Obergefell </em><a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/bake-now-or-forever-hold-your-peace">highlighted</a> the importance religious liberty, an issue that <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/obamas-reformation">surrounded and informed</a> the Court’s consideration of the case from start to finish<em>.</em></p><p>The inherent relationship between a body decisions, and the inherent limits of the earlier decisions, might have been harder to appreciate in Kennedy’s line of cases running over the course of many years. But it certainly should not be hard to see here, where <a href="https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2020/june-web-only/bostock-gorsuch-supreme-court-ruling-religious-liberty.html">Justice Gorsuch and his colleagues emphasized religious liberty in the <em>Bostock </em>decision itself</a>, just days before the Court released its religious liberty decisions.</p><p>Simply put, the Court’s appreciation of religious liberty isn’t rolling back progressive legal victories. It may well be helping to make those victories, <em>rightly understood</em>, possible in the first place.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5bcce0482c6c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Whitaker Chambers on the Crisis of History and Man’s Turn to Terror and Tyranny]]></title>
            <link>https://adamjwhite.medium.com/whitaker-chambers-on-the-crisis-of-history-and-mans-turn-to-terror-and-tyranny-14efea84a1e6?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/14efea84a1e6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2020 18:36:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-14T19:03:29.316Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Reading “Witness” in the era of “Defund the Police,” “MAGA,” and “Flight 93 Elections”</h4><p>I’m often reminded of Whitaker Chambers,* and all the more so lately.</p><p>For the last few years, I’ve watched, astonished, and wondered how so many political elites and intellectuals could be so easily seduced by iconoclastic and anti-institutional movements. In all of this, I’m reminded of Chambers’s <em>Witness—</em>specifically<em> </em>Chapter 3, “The Outrage and the Hope of the World,” which begins with Chambers’s explanation of how men become Communists. It feels as relevant as ever today, in the era of “Defund the Police,” “MAGA,” and all the rest.</p><p>So here are some long quotes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WcBCaMPzzFRyLXFnc5f7xw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Whittaker Chambers, 1948</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Sooner or later, one of my good friends is sure to ask me: How did it happen that a man like you became a Communist? Each time I wince, not at the personal question, but at the failure to grasp the fact that a man does not, as a rule, become a Communist because he is attracted to Communism, but because he is driven to despair by the crisis of history through which the world is passing.</blockquote><blockquote>I force myself to answer: In the West, all intellectuals become Communists because they are seeking the answer to one of two problems: the problem of war or the problem of economic crises.</blockquote><blockquote>… Few Communists have ever been made simply by reading the works of Marx or Lenin. The crisis of history makes Communists; Marx and Lenin merely offer them an explanation of the crisis and what to do about it.</blockquote><blockquote>… Under pressure of the crisis, his decision to become a Communist seems to the man who makes it as a choice between a world that is dying and a world that is coming to birth, as an effort to save by political surgery whatever is sound in the foredoomed body of a civilization which nothing less drastic can save—a civilization foredoomed first of all by its reluctance to face the fact that the crisis exists or to face it with the force and clarity necessary to overcome it.</blockquote><blockquote>Thus, the Communist Party presents itself as the one organization of the will to survive in a crisis where that will is elsewhere divided, wavering, or absent. <strong>It is in the name of that will to survive the crisis, which is not theoretical but closes in from all sides, that the Communist first justifies the use of terror and tyranny, which are repugnant to most men by nature and which the whole tradition of the west specifically repudiates</strong>.</blockquote><p>And then later, in the opening chapter of <em>Cold Friday</em>:</p><blockquote>This is the real crisis of the West and the point at which, across a No Man’s Land of apathy, it confronts itself. Communism is only a secondary manifestation of this crisis, although Communism has reached a strength where it complicates and threatens to solve in its own terms the crisis of the divided West. … [It] is a way of thought and action, a way of reading history and its forces, which was developed in the culture capitals of the West. The growth of its power is inexplicable except as Communism appeals to the divided mind of the West, making each of its advances exactly along the line of the West’s internal division, paralyzing each effort of the West ot cope with it by touching some sympathetic nerve. The success of Communism, as I have written elsewhere, is never greater than the failure of all other faiths. Just as the threat of Communism is not the true crisis of the West, Communism is not the true revolution of our time. Communism is only one form and one sector of that revolution.</blockquote><p>* I’ve written about Chambers from time to time over the years. If you’re interested, then see <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/faith-for-another-lenten-age">here</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/cass-sunsteins-unreliable-witness">here</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-ghosts-on-the-roofs-still">here</a>, <a href="https://lawliberty.org/witness-to-george-wills-flight-from-politics/">here</a>, and especially <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/trump-mccarthy-worthy-causes-and-unworthy-champions">here</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=14efea84a1e6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Congress’s Decline Makes Bad Problems Even Worse]]></title>
            <link>https://adamjwhite.medium.com/why-congresss-decline-makes-bad-problems-even-worse-c795d8dc814e?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c795d8dc814e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2020 22:41:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-01T22:53:29.407Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>As Ezra Klein notes, our political system is dysfunctional, and Congress’s decline is a major part of that problem.</h4><p>After a brutal week, from the murder of George Floyd to the riots in America’s capital and other cities, <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/6/1/21275746/trump-protests-police-floyd-george-riots">Ezra Klein compares our moment to the 1960s</a> and laments that today’s dysfunctional political institutions make our social problems even worse:</p><blockquote>But there was one thing the 1960s had, that we, today, do not: <strong>a political system designed to absorb conflict and find consensus, or at least stability</strong>. I do not seek to smother the age in nostalgia. That calm was often purchased at terrible moral cost, as in the union of Dixiecrats and New Deal Democrats that upheld segregation for decade after decade. But our divisions did not track our parties, and so they were muffled in our politics. <strong>What our political system could not solve, it suppressed. What it could no longer suppress, it sought to solve</strong>. When the Civil Rights Act passed, it did so with Republican votes, even as it was signed by a Democrat. Imagine legislation of such consequence passing without partisan valence today. <strong>The compromises of that era saved the country, but they ended that political system</strong>.</blockquote><p>This is all true. But the conclusion that Klein draws—“This is the story of American political polarization”—is only part of the truth.</p><p>The last five-plus decades are also a story of Congress’s utter decline as the nation’s major policymaking and governing institution; today we are governed primarily by institutions outside of Congress. Instead of a legislature’s slow, deliberative, and compromising process to make laws such as the Civil Rights Act, our political energies are channeled toward the swift and unilateral decisions of administrative agencies, or the sweeping pronouncements of federal courts that stand athwart them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/917/1*cGrgt1e_jn6RALW6ho77GQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Congress at the peak of our constitutional government. It’s a nice thought, at least.</figcaption></figure><p>This is why our entire political system hinges on the presidential election. Every four years, we elect someone to appoint the people who will actually govern us—the agency heads and the judges. Meanwhile, we elect people to Congress mainly to criticize or support the president’s administration. And upon taking office, as <a href="https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/yuval-levin/congress-weak-members-want-weak/">Yuval Levin observed in <em>Commentary</em></a>, those congressmen see Congress not as an institution for bipartisan compromise but a platform for partisan complaints. They assume that the real work of governance will be done by administrative agencies, or by the judges who block the agencies’ work. This dynamic amplifies and exacerbates the polarized and dysfunctional political system that Klein rightly laments.</p><p>Worst of all, the accumulation of lawmaking power in the administrative state—a problem that long preceded the 1960s, but which has accelerated since then—<a href="https://www.hoover.org/research/democracy-delegation-and-distrust">creates a feedback loop that makes reform even more difficult</a>. Each time Congress vested agencies with more power over new matters, it created less incentive for Congress itself to legislate on that subject: the president’s team in Congress has much less incentive to compromise when their party can advance its agenda in agencies; and in turn his opponents in Congress, knowing compromise is unlikely, have much less to work toward compromises in the first place.</p><p>(But to the extent that Supreme Court justices are increasingly interested in revisiting the delegation problem, they are reliably and loudly denounced, in Klein’s <a href="https://www.hoover.org/research/democracy-delegation-and-distrust"><em>Vox</em></a><em> </em>and elsewhere, as dangerous threats to American health and safety.)</p><p>Klein is right: the American political system’s utter inability to “absorb conflict and find consensus, or at least stability,” makes it even more difficult for us to grapple with our national crises. We need to look hard for ways to make Congress responsible for the actual work of governance, to function as a producer of consensus and stability. But to make Congress a responsible legislative institution, we must make it the institution that is responsible for legislating.</p><p><em>Adam J. White is a resident scholar at the </em><a href="https://www.aei.org/"><em>American Enterprise Institute</em></a><em> and director of </em><a href="https://administrativestate.gmu.edu/"><em>George Mason University’s Center for the Study of the Administrative State.</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c795d8dc814e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Covid-19, Regulatory Recalibration, and Learning for the Long Run]]></title>
            <link>https://adamjwhite.medium.com/covid-19-regulatory-recalibration-and-learning-for-the-long-run-2d4bb3a133ef?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2d4bb3a133ef</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2020 19:06:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-29T19:06:39.147Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>(Originally </em><a href="https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/covid-19-regulatory-recalibration-and-learning-for-the-long-run/"><em>posted</em></a><em> at the Yale Journal on Regulation’s “Notice and Comment” blog.)</em></p><p>Yesterday the White House issued a new executive order titled “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-regulatory-relief-support-economic-recovery/">Executive Order on Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery</a>.” It is intended, most immediately and obviously, to amplify the economic recovery so sorely needed amid the Covid-19 crisis. But President Trump’s order could have significant long-term effects, because it contains what we can think of as “pilot projects” or “case studies” for broader and more fundamental administrative reforms.</p><p>[<em>Update: the order has been </em><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/05/22/2020-11301/regulatory-relief-to-support-economic-recovery"><em>published</em></a><em> as </em><a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf"><em>E.O. 13924</em></a><em>.</em>]</p><p>The executive order’s immediate impact is to align agency regulatory programs with the current economic relief and stimulus efforts being undertaken by Congress, the Trump Administration, and the Federal Reserve. It announces a broad policy that all agencies “should address this economic emergency by rescinding, modifying, waiving, or providing exemptions from regulations and other requirements that may inhibit economic recovery,” subject to the requirements of applicable laws and other key considerations. And in the substantive provisions implementing that broad policy, President Trump’s order focuses significantly on the need for agencies to temporarily recalibrate their enforcement and adjudication activities for the sake of short-term economic relief and stimulus.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*xlT30SeFKs1UrDHEliAWQA.jpeg" /></figure><p>This strikes me as <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/deregulate-for-the-coronavirus-recovery-11588542052">precisely the right approach</a> for aligning regulatory policy with Congress’s fiscal stimulus. Given the broad discretion that regulatory statutes often leave to agencies, and the broad enforcement discretion that agencies retain (as emphasized in <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/470/821/"><em>Heckler v. Chaney</em></a>), the temporary recalibration of enforcement discretion, combined with good guidance from agencies, can be the quickest way to provide temporary but significant regulatory relief.</p><p>There are limits to this approach, of course — especially the limits that prevent an agency from using nominal assertions of enforcement discretion or guidance to circumvent obligatory rulemaking processes. But this executive order does not test those limits; rather, it strikes a good balance: ordering agencies to look for situations where enforcement recalibration is necessary and appropriate, but leaving genuine discretion in the hands of the agencies.</p><p>Now, let’s consider the longer term implications. Specifically, we should take note of the several ways in which this executive order could serve as a “pilot project” for broader reforms of the administrative state.</p><p><em>First</em>, as already noted, this order brings the White House into closer contact with the enforcement/adjudication side of agency policymaking. For the first four decades of modern “<a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/2010/05/presidential-administration/">presidential administration</a>,” the White House has focused predominantly on rulemaking, not enforcement and adjudication. That initial prioritization was sensible for several reasons, but the distinction between rulemaking and enforcement/adjudication created peculiar systemic incentives and biases in an administrative state where — <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/332/194#writing-type-1-MURPHY">as the Court recognized long ago</a> — agencies can make policy both through rulemaking and adjudication. Years later, even as the Trump Administration significantly expanded <a href="https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol93/iss4/8/">the use of executive orders to drive the substance of agency policymaking</a>, the Administration still largely avoided using executive orders to drive policy in the enforcement-adjudication context. This new executive order takes a step in the direction of reforming this artificial asymmetry: embracing the Supreme Court’s principle that rulemaking and enforcement/adjudication are two sides of the same administrative coin, it follows that principle to its logical conclusion in the limited context of the Covid-19 recovery, ordering agencies to align not just their <em>rulemaking</em> activities with the Covid-19 response and recovery, but also their <em>enforcement/adjudication</em> activities.</p><p><em>Second</em>, and relatedly, the new executive order takes broader concerns of administrative due-process and attempts to apply them in the specific and temporary context of Covid-19 economic relief and stimulus. Last year, in <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/15/2019-22624/promoting-the-rule-of-law-through-transparency-and-fairness-in-civil-administrative-enforcement-and">Executive Order 13892</a> (“Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication”), President Trump announced general principles for improving liberty-minded due process protections for administrative enforcement and adjudication. In January, OMB followed it up with <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/30/2020-01632/improving-and-reforming-regulatory-enforcement-and-adjudication">a January 2020 <em>Federal Register</em> notice</a> identifying specific ways to promote due process and constitutional liberty in agency enforcement and adjudication, and inviting public comment. Yesterday’s executive order specifically codifies several broad due-process principles for agency enforcement and adjudication, and directs agencies to implement them as they deem appropriate in their broader efforts to recalibrate regulatory enforcement in the Covid-19 economic recovery.</p><p>(I note in passing that this focus on expanding due-process protections for individual liberty and property highlights an important constitutional asymmetry in at least one aspect of modern administrative law. While the Supreme Court <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/272/52">long ago warned</a> that presidential micromanagement of individual agency adjudications might unconstitutionally “affect interests of individuals,” this concern does not cut equally in both regulatory and deregulatory directions. A president’s attempt to <em>deprive </em>people of liberty or property through agency adjudication raises <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fifth_amendment">constitutional problems</a> that are not implicated by a president’s efforts to <em>preserve</em> liberty and property. This means that there is greater constitutional space for presidents to intervene on the side of regulatory <em>relief</em> than regulatory <em>burden</em>, though subject perhaps to particular statutory limits.)</p><p><em>Third</em>, yesterday’s executive order contains a pilot project for <a href="https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/retrospective-review-for-tomorrows-sake/">retrospective review</a> of preexisting agency regulations. It directs all agencies to “review any regulatory standards that they have temporarily rescinded, suspended, modified, or waived during the public health emergency” and their other Covid-related regulatory recalibrations, and determine which of those reforms, if any, should be “made permanent.” Surely agencies would already be learning from their respective experiences during the Covid-19 crisis, but given the competing demands on agencies’ time, resources, and attention, an executive order is a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/deregulate-for-the-coronavirus-recovery-11588542052">good and useful way</a> to help ensure that agencies will actually take care to learn from this brutal experience. And in so doing, this specific exercise in retrospective review should help serve as a case study from which regulatory reformers and modernizers can learn how best to build a more permanent framework for systematic and ongoing retrospective review of regulations.</p><p><em>Finally</em>, yesterday’s order is a significant pilot project for extending White House regulatory oversight to the traditionally “independent” agencies that have long enjoyed a special exemption from White House regulatory oversight. The order’s directives apply to all “agencies,” and the order expressly defines “agency” (via <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/44/3502">44 U.S.C. § 3502)</a> as including “any independent regulatory agency.” Independent agencies’ compliance (or not) with this order could help to inform broader reforms to the perennial question of whether <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf">Executive Order 12866</a> and other <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/03/2017-02451/reducing-regulation-and-controlling-regulatory-costs">framework orders</a> should be reformed or eliminated in the broader project of regulatory modernization.</p><p>Necessity is the mother of invention. And it will be interesting to see how the immediate necessities of America’s Covid-19 public health response and the related economic relief and stimulus help to invent regulatory reforms and modernizations worth instituting more broadly and permanently.</p><p><em>Adam J. White directs George Mason University’s C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State, and is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2d4bb3a133ef" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The New Executive Order on Social Media Is Primarily About Consumer Protection Laws, Not…]]></title>
            <link>https://adamjwhite.medium.com/the-new-executive-order-on-social-media-is-primarily-about-consumer-protection-laws-not-a10a5516eda6?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a10a5516eda6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2020 18:55:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-29T18:55:46.737Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The New Executive Order on Social Media Is Primarily About Consumer Protection Laws, Not “Publisher” Status</h3><p><em>(Originally </em><a href="https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-new-executive-order-on-social-media-is-primarily-about-consumer-protection-laws-not-publisher-status/"><em>posted</em></a><em> at the Yale Journal on Regulation’s “Notice and Comment” Blog.)</em></p><p>By the time he actually signed it, President Trump’s “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-preventing-online-censorship/">Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship</a>” was no surprise. His complaints about social media platforms, and his calls for Congress to rescind Internet platform companies’ immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, are long-familiar refrains. More recently, he practically <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1265985660898459655">shouted</a> his intentions to take unilateral action. And in the final days of the process, a draft copy of the order was <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EO-Preventing-Online-Censorship.pdf">widely circulated online</a>.</p><p>But perhaps because of the prolonged public debates of the social media “fairness doctrine” issue in the months, days, and hours leading up to the order’s signing, there seems to be some misunderstanding of precisely what legal mechanism the order is trying to use in order to punish the social media platforms that attracted Trump’s ire.</p><p>Leading news organizations, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/trump-twitter-explained.html?campaign_id=4&amp;emc=edit_dk_20200529&amp;instance_id=18913&amp;nl=dealbook&amp;regi_id=33732762&amp;segment_id=29526&amp;te=1&amp;user_id=1a84b7375cd97e3ad8c28849447301e3">such as the <em>New York Times</em></a>, are focusing on the order’s assertion that social media companies should be treated as “publishers,” not neutral platforms. This refers to Section 230(c)(1) of the 1996 statute, which provides that “No provider or user of an <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&amp;height=800&amp;iframe=true&amp;def_id=47-USC-1900800046-1237841278&amp;term_occur=999&amp;term_src=title:47:chapter:5:subchapter:II:part:I:section:230">interactive computer service</a> shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&amp;height=800&amp;iframe=true&amp;def_id=47-USC-10252844-1237841279&amp;term_occur=999&amp;term_src=title:47:chapter:5:subchapter:II:part:I:section:230"> information content provider.</a>” Depriving social media companies of “publisher” status could open them up to the limited but significant liability that publishers bear for the content they publish.</p><p>In the statute, Section 230(c)(1)’s legislative removal of “publisher” status is followed by Section 230(c)(2)’s legislative grant of immunity for civil liability for certain editorial activities: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of … any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable[.]”</p><p>The first provision, Section 230(c)(1) grant of non-“publisher” status, has been at the center of <a href="https://www.hawley.senate.gov/sen-hawley-writes-twitter-ceo-twitter-should-lose-immunity-if-editorializing-political-speech">political fights over social media companies</a>, and it was the centerpiece of this week’s widely discussed <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EO-Preventing-Online-Censorship.pdf">draft executive order</a>: specifically, the draft asserted that Section 230(c)(1)’s “publisher” status was implicitly qualified by Section 230(c)(2)’s civil-immunity provision. That legal argument has already been widely criticized, and rightly so: <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/trumps-social-media-order-rewrites-internet-law-decree">it’s clearly wrong</a>. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation emphasized this week, Section 230(c)(1) and Section 230(c)(2) are “<a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/trump-executive-order-misreads-key-law-promoting-free-expression-online-and">two separate and independent protections</a>” for Internet platform companies.</p><p>But critics of Trump’s executive order need to recognize that the final version of the executive order actually <em>deemphasized</em> the Section 230(c)(1) argument, taking what was a nearly page-long discussion in the draft order and reducing it to just a few sentences in a sub-sub-section of the final order.</p><p>Instead, the final executive order now makes Section 230(c)(<strong><em>2</em></strong>), not Section 230(c)(1)’s “publisher” rule, the centerpiece of President’s new social media policy. The order asserts that social media companies’ editorial activities are often not “good faith” efforts to remove inappropriate content, but rather “deceptive or pretextual actions (often contrary to their stated terms of service) to stifle viewpoints with which they agree.”</p><p>And the legal mechanism for its implementation is also slightly more nuanced that many commentators have highlighted. So far, attention is being paid mostly to the order’s direction to the Secretary of Commerce (via the National Telecommunications and Information Administration) to petition the Federal Communications Commission for a new rulemaking to specify what editorial activities do or do not merit civil liability protection under Section 230(c)(2). The Commerce/NTIA/FCC provision is important, but it is only one part of the order’s regulatory enforcement mechanism.</p><p>The other part of the enforcement mechanism — perhaps the <em>more</em> important part — is <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-preventing-online-censorship/">Section 4 of the order</a>, which directs the Federal Trade Commission to “consider taking action” to deem particular Internet platform companies’ editorial practices as “<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/45">unfair or deceptive acts or practice[s]</a>” because they “restrict speech in ways that do not align with those entities’ public representations about those practices.”</p><p>This directive to the FTC dovetails with the order’s reinterpretation of Section 230(c)(2)’s civil immunity provision: if a social-media company’s editorial practices fall outside of Section 230(c)(2)’s protection, then the company would be liable for violation of consumer protection laws, such as federal law’s aforementioned “<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/45">unfair or deceptive acts or practices</a>” standard, and also the State consumer protection laws to which the order’s Section 5 alludes.</p><p>And while it is fair to ask whether the long-independent FTC and FCC will ever actually take the actions that President Trump wants them to take, it is important to keep in mind that President Trump’s attempt to reinterpret Section 230(c)(2) could have an impact even without the federal agencies’ help. Private plaintiffs, and state attorneys general, could bring lawsuits in state or federal court premised upon the same substantive legal theories announced by this order. If anything, President Trump’s amplification of this legal theory about Section 230(c)(2), through an executive order, makes such lawsuits at least somewhat more likely.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/939/1*utAuKTNh2aS4muQPowCw-w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Of course, the lawsuits may well fail. The order’s interpretation of Section 230(c)(2)’s civil immunity provision, though less flagrantly wrong than its interpretation of Section 230(c)(1)’s “publisher” provision, seems manifestly unreasonable — the latest example of an impatient President and his administration, dissatisfied with legislative inaction, suddenly finding vast <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol163/iss1/1/">new regulatory powers in old statutes</a>. President Trump’s addition to that list seems likely to meet <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-1146_4g18.pdf">a similar fate</a> — ironically, in <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/trumps-judges-vs-trumps-social-media-policy/">a judicial branch increasingly populated by judges (of President Trump’s own choosing) who are skeptical of such broad and novel assertions of administrative power</a>. Still, even unsuccessful lawsuits can have real effects; and, more broadly, President Trump’s particular tactics here, like his use of emergency powers on immigration, <a href="https://thebulwark.com/trumps-executive-order-on-social-media-grows-the-administrative-state/">might inspire future presidents in pursuit of their own particular regulatory goals</a>.</p><p>But in all of this, the key point is that these will be arguments about Section 230(c)(2), not about Section 230(c)(1)’s “publisher status” — again, as EFF emphasizes, these are “<a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/trump-executive-order-misreads-key-law-promoting-free-expression-online-and">two separate and independent protections</a>.” The “publisher” issue, though previously at the center of political and legal debates over social media companies, is not at the center of this particular executive order. At some point in the process between the draft order that floated online and the finalized order that President Trump signed, the White House relegated the “publisher” issue to practically an afterthought; a sideshow.</p><p><em>Adam J. White is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and director of George Mason University’s C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a10a5516eda6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A brief reply to a friend’s argument about impeachment]]></title>
            <link>https://adamjwhite.medium.com/a-brief-reply-to-a-friends-argument-about-impeachment-99ba65faa3c6?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/99ba65faa3c6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2020 06:31:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-31T14:16:23.255Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>No, President Trump is not being impeached for things that all presidents do. And he’s not like Lincoln in the Civil War, either.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1AdL-8G1QYrkQ3xkhLgLVw.jpeg" /><figcaption>“<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Peacemakers">The Peacemakers</a>”</figcaption></figure><p>During the Cold War, William F. Buckley Jr. would sometimes poke fun at those who tried to equate the CIA with the KGB. He recounts this in <em>Miles Gone By</em> (2004):</p><blockquote>[Some say] there is little to choose between the KGB and the CIA. Both organizations, it is fashionable to believe, are defined by their practices. … [T]o say that the CIA and the KGB engage in similar practices is the equivalent of saying that the man who pushes an old lady <em>into</em> the path of a hurtling bus is not to be distinguished from the man who pushes an old lady <em>out</em> <em>of</em> the path of a hurtling bus: on the grounds that, after all, in both cases someone is pushing old ladies around.</blockquote><p>I thought of Buckley’s quip as I read my friend Josh Blackman’s argument, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/opinion/trump-impeachment-defense.html">in the <em>New York Times</em></a>, that President Trump can’t be impeached for politically motivated actions because <em>all</em> presidents are politically motivated.</p><p>Criticizing the House Impeachment Managers’ <a href="https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/in_re_president_trump_house_impeachment_trial_brief_and_sof_1.18.20.pdf">contention</a> that President Trump’s dealings with Ukraine were motivated by “his personal political benefit rather than for a legitimate policy purpose,” Josh argues that “our Constitution does not allow Congress to take a vote of ‘no confidence’ for a president who pursues legal policies that members of the opposition party deem insufficiently publicly spirited.” Politically motivated actions aren’t impeachable, Josh writes — they’re normal.</p><p>Needless to say, it is often good for presidents to carry out their duties with an eye to winning political support. As Alexander Hamilton <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed72.asp">explains</a> in <em>Federalist № 72</em>,<em> </em>this is why the original Constitution did not prohibit a president from running for re-election: “to give to the [president] himself the inclination and the resolution to act his part well,” convincing “the people, when they see reason to approve of his conduct, to continue him in his station.”</p><p>In that respect, political motivation is not inherently bad or inherently good. The public — and impeachment — judges a president according to his actions, his intent, and their effects on the national interest. And when a president’s political self-interest motivates him to commit acts constituting “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” it is no excuse to say, <em>well, all presidents are political.</em></p><p>Josh’s criticism of the House Democrats’ theory of impeachment rests upon a dubious premise: namely, that President Trump’s actions with respect to Ukraine were actually motivated by a <em>mix</em> of genuine policy interest and political self-interest. “Politicians pursue public policy, as they see it, <em>coupled with</em> a concern about their own political future,” he writes. “Politicians routinely promote their understanding of the general welfare, while, <em>in the back of their minds</em>, considering how those actions will affect their popularity ... And there is nothing corrupt about acting based on such competing and overlapping concerns.” (<em>Emphases added</em>.)</p><p>But this is not actually the case that the House is making. The House is not arguing that President Trump was motivated <em>partly</em> by political self-interest and partly by the public interest. Rather, the House is arguing, rightly or wrongly, that President Trump was motivated by political self-interest <em>instead of </em>the public interest, and that the action he took on those motives was wrongful and harmful. It is plain on the face of the House’s <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/755/text">first article of impeachment</a>: “In all of this, President Trump abused the powers of the Presidency by ignoring and injuring national security and other vital national interests to obtain an improper personal political benefit. He has also betrayed the Nation by abusing his high office to enlist a foreign power in corrupting democratic elections.”</p><p>Indeed, the House’s view of Trumps’s singularly self-interested motivation is stated plainly even in the line that Josh quotes from the <a href="https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/in_re_president_trump_house_impeachment_trial_brief_and_sof_1.18.20.pdf">the House managers’ impeachment trial memorandum</a>: The House seeks to expel Mr. Trump because he acted “for his personal political benefit <em>rather than</em> for a legitimate policy purpose.”</p><p>When Josh concludes his op-ed, he reiterates this mistake framing of the House’s argument: he asserts that the House impeached President Trump for pursuing “policies that the opposition party deem <em>insufficiently</em> publicly spirited.” But the House’s real argument, right or wrong, is that President Trump’s actions <em>were not publicly spirited at all </em>and did <em>affirmative harm</em> to the American national interest.</p><p>Similarly, Josh frames the President’s own conduct as being motivated partly by the public interest and partly by political self-interest. “Politicians pursue public policy, as they see it,” he writes, “coupled with a concern about their own political future.” Later, Josh suggests that Trump’s actions were motivated first and foremost by the general welfare, and that political self-interest was just in the background: “Politicians routinely promote their understanding of the general welfare, while, <em>in the back of their minds</em>, considering how those actions will affect their popularity.”</p><p>I think these characterizations of Trump’s interactions with Ukraine’s government—trying to get Ukraine to announce a corruption investigation into the son of Trump’s own major political rival—require a willing suspension of disbelief. But more importantly, it is only by reframing the Trump impeachment case as an argument about mixed motivations, and by presuming that President Trump was motivated partly or mostly by genuine concern for the public good and not purely self-interested motivations, can he suggest that the House impeached President Trump for something that all presidents do.</p><p>Josh goes so far as to analogize President Trump’s Ukraine episode to President Lincoln’s conduct of the Civil War. At risk of being harsh to my friend, I think this is a profoundly inapt analogy.</p><p>In September 1864, <a href="https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-william-t-sherman/">President Lincoln sent a letter</a> to General Sherman, asking Sherman to let at least some of the solidiers from Indiana return home to vote in the upcoming state elections, so that control of the state government might not be won by “those who will oppose the war in every possible way.”</p><p>Josh presents this as an example of “dueling motives” or “competing … concerns”—a “public motive” of winning the war and preserving the Union, and a “private motive” of political victory. Josh is clearly trying to be evenhanded here, but even this framing of Lincoln’s actions and motivations are profoundly wrong. As Lincoln’s letter makes clear, his entire purpose was to sustain the Union’s ability to win the Civil War. To the extent that a political calculation was involved, it was only a calculation of whether more votes were needed to win a state election that seemed necessary to win the war and save the Union. Those are not “dueling motives” or “competing” concerns—they are a singleminded (and righteous) pursuit of the public interest.</p><p>Moreover, while Josh frames Lincoln’s letter to Sherman as an example of a president who was “considering his political future while executive the office,” Lincoln specifically emphasized in his letter that he was <em>not</em> asking the soldiers to stay for a vote in the <em>presidential</em> election.</p><p>And while Josh suggests that “Lincoln’s request risked undercutting the military effort by depleting the ranks” and putting the remaining soldiers in greater peril, Lincoln told Sherman that he should do only what “you safely can, yourself being the judge of what you can safely do.”</p><p>In short, there is no plausible analogy between President Lincoln’s motives and actions in the Civil War, and the motives and actions that House Democrats ascribe to President Trump in the Ukraine episode. The only way one can make such an analogy is by simply assuming away all of President Lincoln’s publicly minded motivations and concerns. Having assumed them away all, one might say <em>yes, all presidents wants to win elections. </em>Like<em> </em>Buckley, the CIA, the KGB, and the little old lady all over again.</p><p>I’ll repeat myself one last time: House Democrats are not impeaching President Trump because they don’t like the particular mix of selfish and public-minded motives that allegedly spurred him to undertake the Ukraine gambit. They are impeaching him because they believe he acted out of selfish motives <em>instead of </em>public motives, and because they believe that those actions—attempting to leverage US assets to force a foreign nation to announce an investigation into the President’s chief political rival’s son for purposes of influencing the next presidential race—were an abuse of power and harmful to the country.</p><p>At risk of understatement, that is not the sort of thing that Presidents “routinely” do<em>.</em> For the things that President Trump is accused of having done, I struggle to find even a single apt analogy to another president. And definitely not Abraham Lincoln.</p><p><strong>One closing thought: </strong>a newspaper op-ed is an extremely tight format for making nuanced historical or legal arguments. (I know that all too well!) I wonder how much of the different the points that I’m criticizing here would look slightly in a longer format. Josh is a very careful and smart scholar, which is why his arguments always need to be taken very seriously.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99ba65faa3c6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Thoughts on the House’s Impeachment of President Trump, and on the Senate’s Trial of The…]]></title>
            <link>https://adamjwhite.medium.com/thoughts-on-the-houses-impeachment-of-president-trump-and-on-the-senate-s-trial-of-the-16683439364b?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/16683439364b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[president-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[impeachment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[house-of-representatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[constitution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[senate]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Dec 2019 17:27:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-30T17:27:57.100Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Thoughts on the House’s Impeachment of President Trump, and on the Senate’s Trial of The Impeachment</h3><p>Before we turn the calendar to 2020, I have a few thoughts on the merits of <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/755">the House’s impeachment of President Trump</a>, and on the Senate’s trial of the House’s impeachment.</p><p>I started writing about impeachment in July 2018, with a long <em>Weekly Standard</em> essay on “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20181214200943/https://www.weeklystandard.com/adam-j.-white/coming-constitutional-storm">The Coming Constitutional Storm</a>.” A few months later, when Democrats won control of the House, I <a href="https://thebulwark.com/ready-for-aggressive-house-oversight-not-so-fast-or-furious/">warned in <em>The Bulwark</em></a><em> </em>that the Trump Administration would likely undertake massive resistance to House oversight, expanding the Obama Administration’s own approach.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UbGrrT6csHTANyQxnb2DTw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In October, as the House opened its impeachment inquiry, I wrote about the <a href="https://thebulwark.com/28641-2/">collision of the House’s oversight powers and the President’s executive privilege</a>, and I argued that if the House wanted its eventual judgment to be taken seriously by history, then the House needed its proceedings to be more transparent and thorough.</p><p>And finally, after <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/755">the House voted to impeach President Trump</a>, I wrote <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/12/the-senates-trial/">a long essay for <em>National Review</em> on how to think about the Senate trial</a>, and <a href="https://thebulwark.com/how-pelosi-got-her-impeachment-trump-card/">a short piece for <em>The Bulwark</em></a><em> </em>pointing out that President Trump had handed Democrats significant leverage in negotiating over the Senate trial rules.</p><p>But in all of those articles, I never really delved into my own thoughts of the merits of the impeachment articles. I discussed it a little in various inteviews and podcasts, and I tweeted about it, but I never collected things into one place.</p><p>My own views on the merits are not of any real value. (<em>Some would say that’s true of all my opinions</em>.) But for the sake of collecting my thoughts in one place, here you go. I am not going to comprehensively analyze every issue—<em>this is a Medium post, not a law review article</em>—but these are my general thoughts so far.</p><h4>1. It was reasonable for the House to impeach President Trump for Ukraine request.</h4><p>As I told my colleague Jonah Goldberg on his “Remnant” podcast <a href="https://ricochet.com/podcast/remnant-jonah-goldberg/impeachy-keen-democrats/">in late October</a>, I have always seen the Ukraine allegations as an impeachment-level event. If the President intentionally leveraged US resources to spur a foreign country to undermine one of the President’s own major political opponents, then the House should impeach the President for abusing his power in a way that directly threatens our Constitution’s democratic processes.</p><p>That position was contingent on a number of factors:</p><p><em>First</em>, and most importantly, it requires some difficult line-drawing: every act that a first-term President takes will affect his prospects for re-election. Indeed, that’s the point! As Hamilton explained in <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed72.asp"><em>Federalist № 72</em></a>, a President’s eligibility for re-election is “necessary to give to the officer himself the inclination and the resolution to act his part well,” in the hopes of winning re-election. The Constitution, after all, was designed to steer a President’s “<a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp">ambition</a>” toward the public interest. But at the same time, this entails a profound threat of presidential abuse of power, because vests the executive power—the power to pardon, the power to prosecute, powers of war and diplomacy—in someone running for re-election. This delicate and frankly dangerous balance can be maintained only if there is a suitably strong power to prevent the President from abusing those powers—namely, impeachment. So we need to draw difficult lines between what assertions of presidential power rise to the level of threatening our democratic processes, and which assertions of presidential power are “mere politics.” That’s a hard line to draw in theory, but an easy line for me to draw in this case; cajoling a foreign country to pursue your own biggest political threat, would be a clear example of abuse of power.</p><p><em>Second, </em>and most saliently, this calls for factual judgments regarding the President’s actions and intentions. What did the President do, and why did he do it?</p><p>On the factual point, I found that that <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Unclassified09.2019.pdf">original memorandum recounting President Trump’s July 2019 conversation with Ukraine’s President Zelensky</a> created at least a <em>prima facie</em> case of presidential abuse of power. I recognize that the President did not expressly frame the discussion in terms of a <em>quid pro quo</em>, but I think it requires a “willing suspension of disbelief” to not see what the President was trying to do here. For the non-lawyers out there, “a <em>prima facie</em> case” is an initial factual showing that would be enough to support factual judgments against the President; with those initial facts on the table, I think the House was justified in holding hearings and calling witnesses, to further develop factual evidence, and (<a href="https://thebulwark.com/28641-2/">as I wrote in the <em>Bulwark</em></a>) I thought it was crucial that the Democrats carry out that process as transparently and fairly as possible.</p><p>Those hearings proved to be less than ideal (<em>as I explain in my second point below</em>), they produced an evidentiary record that reinforced the strength of the allegations against the President.</p><p>Meanwhile, instead of defending himself, the President asserted executive privilege widely. I recognize and respect the importance of executive privilege in our constitutional structure: <a href="https://thebulwark.com/28641-2/">like Congress’s “oversight” power, the power of executive privilege is an unstated but necessary corollary to the President’s express constitutional powers</a>.</p><p>At the same time, <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/html/ethics-executive-15056.html">as I have been arguing since the very beginning of President Trump’s term in office</a>, the President undermines his own office, and his own presidential “energy,” but not dispelling clouds of ethical impropriety surrounding his administration. If he had a case on the merits, then he should have made it. And if he believed that the House impeachment hearings were not a fair forum to make his case, then he should have made that case outside of the hearing rooms.</p><p>He didn’t do that, of course. And looking at the evidence that has been provided to the public (to say nothing of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/us/politics/trump-ukraine-military-aid.html">the <em>New York Times</em>’s stunning report in late December</a>), I think that there was more than enough to support impeachment of the President for his dealings with Ukraine.</p><p>By the way: I suppose it’s now ironic that I started <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20150502033112/http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/beware-russians-bearing-gifts_935198.html">writing about foreign influence on U.S. presidential politics</a> back in 2015. Of course, back then, I was worried about the Clinton Global Initiative.</p><h4>2. The House should have called more witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the President’s actions and better knowledge of his intentions.</h4><p>As I said above, I think that the factual evidence produced so far was enough to support House impeachment. But the House should have done more: it should have worked harder to secure the testimony of people with firsthand (or better secondhand) knowledge of the President’s intentions: John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, Mick Mulvaney, and Rudy Giuliani.</p><p>I recognize that pushing them to testify would have triggered litigation over privilege, and given the timeline I don’t expect the House to wait for the conclusion of litigation before moving forward. But the House Democrats should not have set such an early, arbitrary deadline of finishing their process before Christmas. If impeachment is worth doing, it is worth doing right, and not fast-and-cheap.</p><p>Again, I think the facts adduced so far were enough to justify impeachment. <a href="https://thebulwark.com/28641-2/">But as I’ve said from the start</a>, House Democrats should have done more, for the sake of the judgments of history.</p><h4>3. I am very, <em>very</em> wary of the House’s impeachment of President Trump for “obstruction.”</h4><p>Keith Whittington makes <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/opinion/impeachment-article-2-trump.html">a very good argument</a> in favor of the “obstruction” charge, but in the end I am very, <em>very</em> wary of turning “obstruction” of congressional oversight hearings into an impeachable offense.</p><p><a href="https://thebulwark.com/ready-for-aggressive-house-oversight-not-so-fast-or-furious/">The Trump Administration’s resistance to congressional oversight was entirely predictable</a>: the Trump Administration predictably took the examples of Eric Holder and Lois Lerner, and grew them exponentially, recognizing (as the Obama Administration recognized) that stiff-arming oversight can be a political winner with a President’s base.</p><p>And as I noted above, the clash between Congress’s oversight power and the President’s executive privilege is a clash between two implicit constitutional powers. The Constitution doesn’t expressly grant Congress an “oversight power,” and it doesn’t expressly grant the President an “executive privilege.” Instead, these two powers are necessary and important corollaries to the Congress’s and President’s express constitutional powers. And they are both familiar features of two centuries of Presidents and Congresses pushing back against one another.</p><p>Now, I have long been skeptical of the courts being dragged into these political fights; if nothing else, it strikes me as somewhat pathetic with a house of Congress, the “first branch” of our Constitution, goes hat-in-hand to a federal trial judge and pleads to the judge to tell the President what to do. I think it would be much better for those disputes to be settled political, even if it requires some political hardball.</p><p>But outright <em>impeachment</em> strikes me as more than just hardball, especially when the House phrased its impeachment resolution so broadly. In its second impeachment article, the House denounces President Trump for “direct[ing] Executive Branch agencies, offices, and officials not to comply with [the House’s] subpoenas.” More specifically, the House criticizes the President for (1) directing White House officials to defy subpoenas and withhold documents from Congress, (2) directing other Administration officials to defy subpoenas and withhold documents from Congress, (3) directing current and former Executive Branch officials to not cooperate with the House’s inquiry.</p><p>The House describes this as the President’s attempt to “interpos[e] the powers of the Presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House” and “assume[e] to himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of [the House’s] ‘sole power of impeachment.’’ But of course that’s not true: the President did not and cannot strip away the House’s power to impeachment him … as evidenced by the fact that <em>the House</em> <em>just impeached the President for his dealings with Ukraine.</em></p><p>So I think the House was wrong to try to categorically de-legitimize the President’s assertion of his own (implicit) constitutional powers, even if the President made the House’s job more difficult.</p><p>And I think that the House is opening a truly awful Pandora’s Box, inviting a new era in which the House impeaches Presidents and executive branch officers simply for asserting executive privilege.</p><h4>4. I don’t know whether the Senate should vote to remove President Trump.</h4><p>Now that the House has impeached the President, should the Senate remove him? I don’t know.</p><p>Like the House, the Senators will need to make three types of judgments: <strong>(1)</strong> legal, <strong>(2)</strong> factual, and <strong>(3)</strong> prudential. As noted above, I think the legal issues are fairly simple. The factual issues might be affected by the introduction of new witnesses or documents; surely they’re already affected by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/us/politics/trump-ukraine-military-aid.html">the <em>New York Times</em>’s detailed account of the White House’s handling of the Ukraine issue</a>.</p><p>But there remain prudential judgments. An election is approaching; should Senators let the voters decide whether to remove Trump from office, or does that leave too great a risk that he will commit such abuses between now and November 2020? Also, the President’s abuse of power was ultimately for naught, because it was uncovered in time to force the President to change course; should Senators still remove Trump from office when his plot failed Perhaps impeachment itself is enough of a sanction, for the sake of history.</p><p>The Senate has never removed a President from office, and while our constitutional system needs impeachment-and-removal to be a credible deterrent to presidential abuses of power, it’s not yet clear to me that President Trump’s abuse of his power, terrible as it was, justifies the Senate from taking such an unprecedented, momentous step. Once the nation crosses that threshold, we may tip balances toward many more impeachments.</p><p>These are judgments that deserve the Senate’s serious and dispassionate deliberation. As I <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/12/the-senates-trial/">explained in <em>National Review</em></a>, we don’t need the Senators to become “jurors.” We need them to become the kind of Senators that the Constitution intended for them to be from the start—the kind of Senators that the Constitution <em>depends</em> upon them being.</p><p>The Constitution vests the Senate with the power and duty to “try … Impeachments.” That constitutional provision is now so familiar that we risk glossing past its precise words: <strong>The impeachment <em>itself</em> is on trial.</strong> A Senate impeachment trial is not just a trial of the President <em>per se</em>. It is a trial of the House’s impeachment, and thus a trial of <em>both</em> the President’s actions <em>and</em> the House formal response to his actions. The Senate’s own role must begin with rules that enable it <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/12/the-senates-trial/">do its constitutional job</a>, without bias for or against the President, and without bias for or against the House.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=16683439364b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Doing Justice to APA Modernization]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/agency-problems/doing-justice-to-apa-modernization-43f108b32abf?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43f108b32abf</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Dec 2019 05:17:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-17T02:07:02.045Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Or, a View from the Justice Department’s Summit</h4><p>The Justice Department’s recent “<a href="https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/friday-12-6-livestream-justice-departments-summit-on-modernizing-the-administrative-procedure-act/">Summit on Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act</a>” proved to be a great step toward the goal of reforming the APA to reflect and respond to modern administrative reality. If you were interested in the event but couldn’t attend, then you can find the videos online: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/video/summit-modernizing-administrative-procedure-act-apa-part-1">here</a>, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/video/summit-modernizing-administrative-procedure-act-apa-part-2">here</a>, and <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/video/summit-modernizing-administrative-procedure-act-apa-part-3">here</a>. The text of Deputy Attorney General Jeff Rosen’s keynote remarks are also available, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-jeffrey-rosen-delivers-keynote-remarks-department-justice-summit">here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5ZXHSNmfYWO7kRcxsSB3Xw.jpeg" /></figure><p>APA modernization <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20181205201931/https://www.weeklystandard.com/adam-j-white/regulatory-rollback">needs substantial involvement and direction by the Justice Department</a>, because the Attorney General and his colleagues are uniquely well situated to analyze both the practical reality of the modern administrative state, and the merits and deficiencies of current administrative law. The DOJ is not the only department or agency that matter, of course; the work of reform benefits from a variety of executive-branch participants, especially <a href="https://www.acus.gov/">ACUS</a>. But the Justice Department’s unique role in the actual exercise of executive power (in the course of both the execution of laws and then the defense of government action in litigation), and its combination of both expertise and political accountability, makes it indispensable in the work of modernizing administrative law. It is no coincidence that the Justice Department played a central role in creating the original APA nearly 75 years ago, first in diagnosing the actual character of administrative agencies, and then in analyzing the law that Congress eventually enacted.</p><p>So the best version of APA reform would do what the original APA did: <a href="https://nationalaffairs.com/storage/app/uploads/public/doclib/20170111_Booklet2_chap4.pdf">map pragmatic rules on top of actual administrative reality</a>. And for that reason, the DOJ team did a real service in assembling not just panels of scholars and legislative staff, but also a panel of agency lawyers to detail the agencies’ own efforts to reform their own practices. Agencies, like states, can be “laboratories” for reform, giving Congress examples of “best practices” that could ultimately be legislated for all agencies. (The Department of Transportation, for example, recently proposed <a href="https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/regulations/359656/administrative-rule.pdf">new standards for formal hearings for some significant or “high-impact” rules</a>, a test-drive for the long-debated Regulatory Accountability Act.) In that respect, APA reform is an example of the best kind of legal realism — namely, a realistic assessment of what the law actually is and does, for the sake of writing new law. The DOJ team sees this too, as evidenced by a panel title — ”<em>Lessons from the Life of Administrative Law: What Experience Teaches…</em>“ — that points us back <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2449/2449-h/2449-h.htm">to Holmes</a>.</p><p>Listening to the discussions, I was struck by how clearly the discussion illustrated the fact that the task at hand is not to “deconstruct the administrative state,” but rather to <em>reconstruct</em> a more republican state. Modernizers and reformers need to think not in terms of demolishing institutions, but rather in terms of building new and better institutions.</p><p>On that point, the best modern example of reform remains the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. It succeeded not because President Reagan signed an executive order, but because he signed an E.O. that built upon what already was taking root inside of agencies for years, and then the Reagan and Bush Administrations undertook the years-long work of building the institution, so that President Clinton inherited an institution that could overcome whatever lingering ideological opposition remained in 1993. Today’s modernizers need to read Andrew Rudalevige’s study of OIRA, in <a href="https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/regulation-beyond-structure-and-process"><em>National Affairs</em></a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-policy-history/article/beyond-structure-and-process-the-early-institutionalization-of-regulatory-review/BC6E697B7B2CA84186BC332E58A082A9"><em>The Journal of Policy History</em></a>, to see why regulatory reform requires sustained investment of political capital. Executive Orders, such as the ones that are a good start of something, but far from the achievement of anything.</p><p>The same can be said of the Justice Department’s terrific summit: it was a tremendous first step, and it would be a shame to see it wasted by not building upon it with further work. Let’s hope that the Justice Department leads reform-minded agencies in producing reports comparable to <a href="https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112070707085&amp;view=1up&amp;seq=3">the Attorney General’s Committee’s seminal 1941 report</a>, and<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brownlow_Committee"> the Brownlow Committee reports that preceded it</a>. (Deputy Attorney General Jeff Rosen, well versed in these reports and <a href="https://www.hoover.org/events/second-hoover-commissions-60th-anniversary">those of the Hoover Commissions</a>, knows this well.)</p><p>None of this is to say that APA modernization is simple. It is, at its root, an effort to refine the practical allocation of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in an area of law — namely, administrative law — that exemplifies the blurry lines that separate all three. As James Madison observed in <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed37.asp"><em>Federalist № 37</em></a><em>,</em> “[e]xperience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces the legislative, executive, and judiciary.”</p><p>Madison’s words still ring true; they shouldn’t deter lawyers and legislators from persisting in their commitment to our Constitution’s separation of powers, but they should remind us to approach the matter with appropriate humility, and with care paid to the hard-earned lessons of American experience.</p><p>On that note, I’m happy to note that <a href="https://administrativestate.gmu.edu/">the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State</a> has already been working with friends to plan our third annual Administrative Law Symposium, this time dedicated to the APA’s upcoming 75th anniversary. Look for more details in the new year.</p><p>(<em>Originally posted at “</em><a href="https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/doing-justice-to-apa-modernization"><em>Notice and Comment</em></a><em>.”</em>)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43f108b32abf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/agency-problems/doing-justice-to-apa-modernization-43f108b32abf">Doing Justice to APA Modernization</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/agency-problems">Agency Problems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Few Words of Gratitude for the Hoover Institution]]></title>
            <link>https://adamjwhite.medium.com/a-few-words-of-gratitude-for-the-hoover-institution-2bbc786a4dd0?source=rss-6b82698d8e99------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2bbc786a4dd0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stanford-university]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hoover-institution]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam J. White]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Aug 2019 02:36:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-06T17:48:51.330Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*ybktvCYE0tae57rS8RCzzw.jpeg" /></figure><p>This week I’ll leave the Hoover Institution, my professional home for the last few years. And because I am leaving with a heart full of gratitude for the institution and my colleagues, I want to take a moment to say “thanks.” This place, which I’ve admired for so long, changed my life. I will be forever indebted.</p><p><a href="https://www.hoover.org/">The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace</a> has no peers in the worlds of academia or public policy, precisely because it lives in <em>both</em> of those worlds. It was <a href="https://www.hoover.org/research/making-hoover-history-telegram">founded 100 years ago, by Herbert Hoover</a>, to be part of his beloved Stanford University but with a prudent measure of independence from the university’s day-to-day control. Today, having grown from its initial library and archives to also include a full public policy research organization, the Hoover Institution is without a doubt the nation’s most scholarly “think tank.” And it also is the nation’s best example of how policy can be both studied and advocated from within a university.</p><p>And this year, amid its centennial celebrations, the Hoover Institution finds itself in a singular position for yet another reason. With century-deep roots in what’s now Silicon Valley, but also with a recently established office in Washington, the Hoover Institution is singularly well suited to serve as a bridge between Silicon Valley and Washington at the moment when the two cities’ relationship is the most important political issue of our time. I often say that Hoover’s DC office is the institution’s “embassy” in Washington; in fact, the same can be said of its headquarters: the Hoover Institution at Stanford is the conservative policy world’s embassy in Silicon Valley.</p><p>And for those reasons, the next few years could be among the most important in the institution’s entire history. And the institution’s leadership and scholars face the future with the generous support of those who are making possible not just the institution’s beautiful new Traitel Building, but <a href="https://www.stanforddaily.com/2019/01/22/hoover-institution-to-undergo-renovations-new-building-to-be-constructed/">also soon another beautiful building named in honor of George Shultz</a>. Few institutions are blessed with such resources and support, to be invested at <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/hoover-institution-100-year-anniversary-conservative-stronghold/">the very moment</a> when the institution has the opportunity to play a central role in a generational turn of events.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M9EJa4sUF4J9xiidxu1SDw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Hoover Institution’s beautiful campus today.</figcaption></figure><p>Of course, that all makes it even harder for me to leave. As I cheer on my Hoover colleagues and the institution, I will be very sorry not to be a part of their crucial moment myself.</p><p>When I joined the Hoover Institution almost four years ago, it was nothing less than a dream come true. It’s a story I’ve recounted often, maybe too often. Growing up in eastern Iowa, near <a href="https://hoover.archives.gov/#event-/timeline/item/1929-inauguration">President Hoover’s birthplace and presidential library</a>, the Hoover Institution was the first “think tank” that I ever heard of. I’d often read Hoover publications in my college apartment; that’s where I’d watch Peter Robinson’s “Uncommon Knowledge,” too. When I visited Stanford Law School to kick the tires on a legal education, my first question to the admissions counselor was, “do Stanford law students ever work as Hoover research assistants?” (<em>She sighed and replied, “yeah, we have some of those.”</em>) Even after attending another law school out east, and then pursuing a legal career, I still would read Hoover’s publications—and even its sort-of-annual reports—as often as possible.</p><p>As my family settled comfortably into Washington fifteen years ago, it never occurred to me that I might someday be part of the west coast’s Hoover Institution myself. But five years ago, to my happy surprise, Hoover announced the opening of a new DC office. I became acquainted with the Hoover team as they prepared to launch the office, and eventually they reached out to me to invite me to join as a fellow.</p><p>The experience proved even better than I expected. I became a colleague to many of the scholars whom I most admire, not just in law but also in the fields of political philosophy, history, and economics. I got to spend days and weeks on Stanford’s campus, chatting with them, learning from them, and arguing with them.</p><p>And Hoover gave me countless opportunities within the institution. I had the daunting honor of addressing Hoover’s Board of Overseers and other supporters at events on campus and around the country. In the Washington office, I had the pleasure of not just researching and writing, but also helping to build the office’s footprint in DC, by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/HooverInstitution/search?query=%22adam+white%22">hosting discussions with Senators, scholars, and other assorted thinkers and policymakers</a>. I had the honor of being invited to Hoover’s <a href="http://missionbell.com/projects/stanford-annenberg/index.php">stunning Annenberg Conference Room</a>, to brief George Shultz and leading figures in energy policy on the current state of energy and environmental regulation; and the honor of standing on the stage in Hoover’s beautiful new <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2017/10/19/hoover-opens-new-david-joan-traitel-building/">Hauck Auditorium</a>, to give talks on the state of the Supreme Court, among other things. The Hoover team was incredibly generous to give me these opportunities.</p><p>Perhaps the most fun of all was <a href="https://www.hoover.org/publications/reasonable-disagreements">the podcast that Hoover’s team invited me to host with Richard Epstein</a>. We called it “Reasonable Disagreements.” (I liked to joke about the title, “I’m reasonable; he disagrees.”) If you know Richard Epstein, then you know what a daunting but fun experience it all was. I can’t thank Richard enough for partnering with me on it.</p><p>I could go on and on. (I already have, I suppose.) <strong>But the point of all of this is to say “thank you,” one last time, to the Hoover Institution—to its leadership team, its scholars, its indefatigable staff, and its Overseers and other immensely generous supporters.</strong> The years that I got to spend in the Hoover Institution changed my life. I am so hopeful for Hoover in the years to come, and so heavyhearted not to be part of it anymore. Thank you, my friends and colleagues, for making me part of it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2bbc786a4dd0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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