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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Adedapo Adeduro on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Adedapo Adeduro on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Adedapo Adeduro on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[New Tax Laws: Nigeria’s Approach to Taxing Crypto]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/new-tax-laws-nigerias-approach-to-taxing-crypto-fb824a10e575?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[taxation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria-revenue-service]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria-tax-act-2025]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-asset]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Mar 2026 11:03:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-21T11:03:39.923Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nigeria has crossed an important threshold in its tax evolution. With the enactment of the Nigeria Tax Act (NTA) and Nigeria Tax Administration Act (NTAA), 2025, digital and virtual assets, including cryptocurrencies, have been brought squarely into the tax net and embedded in core fiscal legislation. This signals that, from the perspective of tax law, crypto is no longer experimental or peripheral, it is now simply another taxable asset class. Yet, as is often the case, the law is only one side of the story. The more difficult question is whether Nigeria can realistically enforce taxation in a market that is decentralised, largely informal, and structurally resistant to traditional oversight.</p><p><strong>The Legal Position: Crypto Is Taxable</strong></p><p>The NTA adopts an intentionally expansive approach to defining taxable income. It provides that income tax applies to profits or gains from a wide range of sources, including “<em>profits or gains from assets in digital or virtual form.” </em>In addition, the Act defines taxable income to include gains arising from the disposal of assets, while also recognising that assets extend beyond physical property to encompass incorporeal rights and interests. Digital assets, despite their intangible nature, fit comfortably within the statutory framework with covered items including crypto assets, utility tokens, security tokens, non-fungible tokens (NFTs), etc.</p><p>The Act also provides clarity on a key issue, <em>where digital assets are deemed to be located for tax purposes</em>. Digital assets will be treated as situated in Nigeria where the person who holds the beneficial ownership, control, or interest is resident in Nigeria or has a permanent establishment in Nigeria to which the asset is connected. This ties crypto to the tax residence of the owner rather than its virtual location. A Nigerian tax-resident cannot argue that assets held on a decentralised network or offshore platform fall outside Nigeria’s tax net simply because they lack a physical presence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/661/1*_wNuHsZY3BE4C9JP85wadg.png" /><figcaption>Source: EquityTrust</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Capital or Business? The Classification Question</strong></p><p>As with most asset classes, the tax treatment of crypto depends not merely on what is being traded, but on how it is being used. Where an individual acquires cryptocurrency as an investment; buying, holding and eventually disposing at a profit, the resulting gain is treated within the capital gains framework. The disposal of a chargeable asset triggers taxation, and the gain is computed as the difference between disposal proceeds and acquisition cost. In this context, ‘disposal’ is interpreted broadly. It is not limited to conversion into fiat currency. Swapping one token for another, or using crypto to acquire goods or services, may equally constitute a taxable event. The law focuses on the realisation of value, not the form it takes.</p><p>However, the position shifts where the activity becomes systematic or profit-driven in a commercial sense. A taxpayer who trades frequently, engages in arbitrage, operates a crypto desk, or otherwise conducts activities resembling a business, may fall within the scope of business income taxation. In such cases, the profits are taxed not as capital gains, but as trading income, subject to personal income tax or companies income tax, as applicable.</p><p><strong>Ring-Fencing Digital Asset Losses</strong></p><p>One of the more interesting provisions in the Act is its treatment of losses associated with digital and virtual assets. Whether relating to income or capital, losses from the disposal of digital assets are only deductible against profits from digital or virtual assets. This suggets that lawmakers view crypto as a separate asset class that carries particular risk characteristics, and by ring-fencing losses, limits the ability of taxpayers to use crypto volatility to offset gains from other sources. It is, in effect, a protective measure, designed to preserve the integrity of the tax base in the face of a highly volatile and, at times, opaque market.</p><p><strong>Bringing Structure to the Ecosystem: VASPs and Tax Administration</strong></p><p>Beyond recognising digital assets as taxable, the NTAA goes a step further by attempting to create an administrative framework around crypto activity. It introduces the concept of the Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASP) and requires any person engaging in activities such as exchange, trading, custody, or issuance of virtual assets to register with the relevant tax authority for tax purposes.</p><p>The scope of taxable transactions is deliberately broad. It covers not only the obvious: sale, exchange, or transfer of crypto, but also extends to mining, staking, airdrops, bounties, and any form of reward received in virtual assets. Even more telling is the treatment of crypto as a medium of exchange. Where goods or services are paid for using virtual assets, the law requires that such transactions be treated exactly as if they were conducted in fiat, valued at market price at the time, and reported as taxable income by the recipient.</p><p>The NTAA also attempts to solve the valuation problem by anchoring tax computation to prevailing market prices on recognised exchange platforms, removing ambiguity around pricing. Taxpayers are required to maintain proper records of their virtual asset activities and report them, accordingly, bringing crypto into the same compliance framework as more traditional forms of income.</p><p>The most consequential provisions, however, are those imposed on VASPs themselves. Providers are required to maintain robust reporting as well as Know-Your-Customer (KYC) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) systems, including the reporting of large or suspicious transactions to both the tax authority and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit within strict timelines. They must keep detailed customer records, conduct ongoing monitoring, and retain transaction data for extended periods.</p><p>In essence, while the tax law recognises crypto, the administrative law attempts to recreate the traditional tax enforcement model within a digital ecosystem, placing reporting and compliance obligations on intermediaries. The challenge, of course, is that much of Nigeria’s crypto activity does not sit neatly within this intermediary-driven structure. And that is where the gap between law and reality begins to show.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Mm18VGLaDPam4G4eV-2_XA.avif" /><figcaption>Richard Teng, CEO, Binance. Source: FNLondon</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Enforcement Problem: Visibility Without Control</strong></p><p>If the legal position is relatively settled, the same cannot be said for enforcement. At first glance, crypto appears easier to monitor than traditional financial activity. Blockchain transactions are public, immutable and traceable. Every transfer is recorded. Every wallet interaction leaves a footprint. But visibility is not control. The fundamental challenge lies in linking transactions to identifiable taxpayers. A wallet address, on its own, does not reveal the individual behind it. Without a reliable mechanism for connecting on-chain activity to real-world identities, enforcement becomes speculative.</p><p>This challenge is compounded by the structure of Nigeria’s crypto market. A significant portion of activity occurs through peer-to-peer (P2P) channels, often facilitated by informal networks and offshore platforms. Centralised exchanges, which might otherwise serve as points of regulatory leverage, are frequently outside the jurisdictional reach of Nigerian authorities. This challenge became most visible in the government’s confrontation with Binance, the world’s biggest cryptocurrency exchange. In 2024, officials of the platform were detained following investigations by Nigerian authorities, including the FIRS, over alleged regulatory non-compliance and potential tax exposure linked to its operations in the country. At the centre of the dispute were claims that Binance’s P2P market facilitated large volumes of trading outside formal channels, contributing to exchange rate distortions during a period of currency instability. Authorities also raised concerns around the platform’s failure to properly account for and remit taxes on economic activity connected to Nigerian users. While Binance pushed back on aspects of these claims, the episode highlighted a critical issue for tax administration: the difficulty of asserting fiscal control over offshore, decentralised platforms that play a significant role in domestic financial markets.</p><p>Where transactions occur through self-custody wallets, the difficulty increases further. There is no intermediary. No reporting obligation. No centralised data repository. The system functions exactly as designed; decentralised, borderless and resistant to oversight. Traditional tax systems rely heavily on intermediaries. Employers deduct PAYE. Banks facilitate withholding tax. Vendors collect VAT. Crypto, in its current form, offers no equivalent structure. The absence of such mechanisms means that enforcement must rely on audits, voluntary disclosure, or indirect data matching, none of which scale efficiently in a large, informal market.</p><p><strong>Looking Outward: How Other Jurisdictions Are Responding</strong></p><p>Can Nigeria realistically tax crypto? If the question is whether Nigeria has the legal authority to tax crypto, the answer is clearly yes. The NTA and NTAA have resolved that issue. If, however, the question is whether Nigeria can effectively and consistently collect tax from crypto transactions across the market, the answer is more nuanced. At present, enforcement is likely to be selective rather than systemic. Taxpayers who interact with the formal financial system, those who convert crypto to naira through identifiable channels, or who operate through regulated entities, are more visible and therefore more exposed. Others, operating entirely within decentralised or P2P environments, may remain outside the practical reach of the system.</p><p>This does not mean that crypto is untaxable. It means that enforcement, in its current state, is incomplete.</p><p>Nigeria is not alone in facing this challenge, but what separates it from other jurisdictions is not the law, it is the infrastructure behind it. In the United States, crypto is treated as property, but the real force of enforcement comes from mandatory third-party reporting. Exchanges are now required to file detailed transaction reports (e.g. IRS Form 1099-DA), and failure to comply attracts significant penalties. The result is tangible: significant additional tax revenue have been unlocked, and the IRS has successfully pursued high-profile enforcement actions using blockchain analytics tied directly to taxpayer identities. The system works not because crypto is understood perfectly, but because data flows to the tax authority automatically.</p><p>The United Kingdom has taken a more guidance-heavy approach, but with precision. HMRC does not just state that crypto is taxable, it issues detailed manuals covering staking, mining, DeFi, and even airdrops, with clear distinctions between capital and income treatment. More importantly, it actively uses data-sharing powers to obtain information from exchanges and has issued <em>nudge letters</em> to thousands of taxpayers identified as crypto users. Compliance has improved not by accident, but by design, through clarity backed by targeted enforcement.</p><p>India, on the other hand, has prioritised simplicity over nuance. By imposing a flat 30% tax on crypto gains and a 1% tax deducted at source (TDS) on transactions, it created a real-time reporting mechanism embedded within the market itself. While this arguably reduced trading volumes on domestic exchanges, it gave the government direct visibility into transactions and a steady stream of tax data.</p><p>South Africa offers perhaps the closest parallel to Nigeria, but with one critical difference, administrative follow-through. SARS has issued clear public guidance, integrated crypto into its audit frameworks, and increasingly leverages third-party data and exchange cooperation. It has also publicly warned taxpayers that crypto transactions are under scrutiny, reinforcing that non-compliance carries consequences. The message is consistent: crypto may be decentralised, but enforcement is not.</p><p>What these jurisdictions demonstrate is that taxation of crypto does not succeed on legal provisions alone. It succeeds where there is compulsory reporting, usable data, and visible enforcement outcomes. Nigeria, for now, has the law, and hopefully soon the system that makes compliance inevitable will follow.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/678/1*N40tN28uMiTIEP1REYYN6w.jpeg" /><figcaption>NRS emerges from FIRS, with heightened expectations for a modern tax system.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Way Forward</strong></p><p>Nigeria’s inclusion of digital assets within its primary tax legislation is both timely and necessary. It removes ambiguity and establishes a clear expectation of compliance. But taxation does not operate on legal provisions alone. It requires systems; mechanisms for identifying taxpayers, tracking transactions and enforcing obligations at scale. For crypto, this likely means developing a framework that brings exchanges within the regulatory perimeter, introduces reporting obligations and integrates financial data across platforms. It also requires clear administrative guidance on classification, so that taxpayers understand how their activities are to be treated. Until these elements are in place, Nigeria’s crypto tax regime will remain, in a sense, ahead of its own infrastructure.</p><p>At the same time, the tax authorities themselves must evolve. Effective taxation of digital and virtual assets requires more than broad legal provisions; it demands technical understanding and institutional capacity. Authorities need to deepen their grasp of how crypto markets function: wallet structures, on-chain transactions, DeFi protocols, and the nuances of trading activity, and translate that into purpose-built compliance frameworks. This means investing in blockchain analytics, developing specialised audit capabilities, and designing systems that can capture data from both exchanges and indirect financial flows. Without this shift, enforcement will remain reactive and fragmented, rather than structured and scalable.</p><p>The new Tax Acts represent a decisive step forward. They acknowledge the economic reality of digital assets and integrate them into the formal tax system, but they also highlight a broader truth: in a decentralised financial landscape, the effectiveness of taxation depends less on the breadth of the law and more on the depth of the system that supports it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb824a10e575" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Reassessing Nigeria’s Land Use Act in a Modern Economy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/reassessing-nigerias-land-use-act-in-a-modern-economy-004019f06678?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/004019f06678</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[land-use-planning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[land-and-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[property-taxes]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 20:47:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-23T20:47:14.891Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Land Use Act (LUA) was introduced in 1978 under the military regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo. Its aim was to unify Nigeria’s disparate pre-independence land laws and to curb rampant land speculation by vesting ownership of all urban land in the office of the state governors, who hold it in trust for the people. This was done to centralise administration, theoretically ensuring fair allocation for all uses. Private land and property owners hold only long-term rights of occupancy rather than an absolute freehold title. Section 22 of the Act makes it illegal to sell, mortgage or transfer urban land without the Governor’s consent.</p><p><strong>Criticism</strong></p><p>Over the decades, the LUA has come to be viewed by many as badly outdated and an obstacle to growth. Requiring gubernatorial consent for urban land and property transactions adds expense, delay and uncertainty. In many states, obtaining consent can take years. This process could impede the development of modern finance by effectively constraining the use of mortgage-backed securities and similar land-linked financial instruments. Banks and Finance houses can be reluctant to accept Nigerian land as collateral because the requirement for Governor’s consent creates lengthy sale or mortgage processes, making rapid loan recovery difficult in the event of default, in essence, land and property collateral are seen as highly illiquid. Nigeria scores just 25 out of 100 on the <em>Global Economy’s Property Rights Index</em>, ranking 155 out of 182 countries; below Benin, Guatemala, Honduras, Togo, the Republic of Congo, Niger and Gabon. By contrast, countries like New Zealand make property registration almost frictionless: ownership can be transferred through two online procedures completed in minutes, reinforcing confidence, liquidity and investment.</p><p>Land records under the LUA remain largely fragmented, paper-based and prone to abuse. Multiple parties, communities, chiefs, local councils and state bureaucrats, can issue overlapping occupancy rights, leading to double allocations, forged documents and endless title disputes. In practice, a lot of Nigeria’s land is not formally titled under leases, far less than in many other countries. Outdated, inconsistent records mean even honest owners struggle to prove title. Weak titles and buried records keep vast swaths of land dead capital unusable for loans or investment. One PwC study quoted a staggering $300 — $900 billion of trapped value in Nigeria’s land and homes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JYbeLMIk63nGAl5bOEihUA.png" /><figcaption>Image Created from ChatGPT</figcaption></figure><p>Other criticisms abound: the Act’s blanket power of eminent domain has been abused for political ends and permits too much speculative hoarding of urban and rural land. In effect, land distribution remains unequal and opaque. Efforts at piecemeal amendments have mostly failed as the Act is entrenched in Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, meaning even slight changes require a supermajority, making repeal or overhaul extremely difficult. Many experts now argue for outright abolition of the Act rather than fiddling with it. Politically, we have had state governors abuse authority by using their powers under the LUA to target political enemies, demolishing their property on short notice.</p><p>At least Nigeria is beginning to see examples of better practice. Some states and agencies have moved ahead with electronic registries. In Lagos State, for instance, the government launched an electronic GIS-based land portal (e-GIS) in 2024 to allow Lagosians to apply for titles online from home. In Enugu, the new ENGIS platform promises title issuance within 48 hours. These initiatives can demonstrate how technology can be leveraged to mordernise and secure titles.</p><p><strong>The U.S. Example</strong></p><p>By contrast, in the United States, land (and mineral) rights are held privately, with governments playing a minimal ownership role. Many Americans own their homes and land outright, and in many cases, even adjourning water bodies. The effect is that home ownership has historically been the main vehicle of wealth for most families. U.S. Federal Reserve data show that the median American’s wealth drops from about $192,900 with home equity to just $39,040 without it, meaning a property is typically the single largest asset contributing to wealth. In other words, Americans can leverage property into collateral for business or investment (e.g. mortgages, home equity loans), fueling entrepreneurship and credit access. This deep pool of privately held land equity underpins the U.S. economy: over 60% of American millionaires are ‘property-rich’, having made or held their wealth in houses and real estate.</p><p><strong>Other Global Case Studies</strong></p><p>Good land registry models exist elsewhere. Germany’s Grundbuch is a nationwide land register maintained by local courts; every parcel is recorded with all ownership interests and charges, giving buyers immediate legal certainty. In much of Australia (and other Commonwealth countries), the Torrens title system similarly centralises records: property is transferred and guaranteed via state-run registries, which eliminates old-title clouds and fraud. Notably, developing countries have also shown dramatic gains from modern titling. Rwanda’s Land Tenure Regularisation Programme (completed by 2009) mapped and formally registered roughly 11 million rural parcels. According to the World Bank and local reports, this halved land disputes and led to an 80% decline in conflicts over land, while sparking a surge in rural borrowing (farmers could now use titled land as loan collateral). More recently Rwanda has launched an electronic ‘e-Title’ system to issue certificates online. These experiences confirm that clear, digitised titles can unlock credit, investment and economic growth.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/820/1*VhCiMGzcVG0ee2onUZfIJw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Overview of IITA Forest cover and lake. Source: IITA</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Recommendations</strong></p><p>If the LUA is to remain in force in any form, one critical amendment is unavoidable: the Governor must be removed from direct, personal control of land transactions. The requirement for the Governor’s personal consent for every assignment, mortgage or transfer of land is unnecessary, and inefficient. It should be replaced with a digital and possibly automated, administrative consent regime, exercised by an independent land authority operating under clear statutory rules, timelines and service standards. This should operate in a manner similar to the Nigerian Exchange (NGX), where shares worth over ₦11 trillion were traded in 2025 under a largely automated framework, with the NGX and its subsidiaries providing rule-based oversight. Where all statutory requirements are satisfied, consent should be deemed granted automatically, without political discretion.</p><p>Similarly, while the Governor’s powers to revoke land for public purpose should remain, they must be narrowly defined, tightly ring-fenced and transparently exercised. Overriding public interest should be exhaustively listed in law, not left open-ended. Every compulsory acquisition should require published public-interest justification, independent valuation, prompt and adequate compensation, and a clear right of appeal before a specialised land tribunal or court. Most importantly, affected citizens must have effective legal recourse to challenge abuse, delay or selective enforcement. To be clear, land and property taxation and levies would still stay with states, as envisaged in the Constitution but the military style system imposed by the LUA is no longer workable.</p><p>Build a national digital land registry. Establish a single, uniform register under federal auspices (possibly the proposed National Land Commission), mandated to compile all parcels across Nigeria. All states would integrate their records into this system. This platform should be fully digital and accessible: use drones, satellites and AI to survey and map every plot. Interfaces could use familiar tools like Google Maps for citizens to visualize their land. Crucially, the registry must cover all land types; residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, ranches and forests alike, with clear and public maps. These land titles must be legally defined and protected. Pastoral lands and forests need full surveys and titles or leases, not just informal occupation, to prevent clashes and ensure responsible use.</p><p>Streamline all charges and levies. Abolish or unify the current hodgepodge of fees associated with land. Ideally, only one simple tax (perhaps ground rent or annual property tax) should apply statewide, replacing the myriad of local levies that now dampen transactions.</p><p>Above all, reform must be bold and technology driven. International experience shows that digitised records and open titles drive economic inclusion. Nigeria has an urgent opportunity; while courting foreign investment, the country should first unleash the vast wealth already <em>beneath its feet</em>. By amending the outdated Act, digitising land titles and securing rights for all, Nigeria can free billions, maybe trillions of dollars of hidden capital for local development, housing and industry. In short, comprehensive land reform, underpinned by modern technology, will help turn Nigeria’s land into one of its greatest assets.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=004019f06678" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unpacking Nigeria’s 5% Fuel Surcharge]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/unpacking-nigerias-5-fuel-surcharge-de5a6ed4efdc?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taxact]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fuel-surcharge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fossil-fuels]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 22:45:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-09T22:45:39.239Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Origins: The 5% Fuel Levy That Never Took Off</h3><p>Nigeria’s new 5% fuel surcharge isn’t exactly a novel invention; it has roots in a law from nearly two decades ago. In 2007, the government amended the Federal Roads Maintenance Agency (FERMA) Act to include a 5% levy on the pump price of petrol and diesel. FERMA, established to maintain federal roads, was supposed to get 40% of this levy while 60% would go to state road agencies. The idea was straightforward: drivers would pay a small charge on fuel, and that money would be earmarked to fix Nigeria’s bad roads.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*KdVHa8LiR3c4P8FU1xloDg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fuel retail station attendants wait for customers. Source: BusinessDay</figcaption></figure><p>In theory, the levy could have generated hundreds of billions of naira for road repairs. In practice, it never got off the ground. The then-regulator, the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), simply did not enforce or remit the charge. When pressed by lawmakers in 2016, PPPRA officials justified their inaction by warning that adding the levy would raise fuel prices, a politically touchy move when fuel was heavily subsidized. Essentially, the levy languished on paper because Nigeria’s priority at the time was keeping fuel cheap. By 2025, the situation had not improved. A House of Reps committee noted that neither the PPPRA nor its successor, the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA) had enforced the charge, leaving an estimated ₦634 billion in uncollected road funds from 2007–2015 alone. This long dormancy helps explain why most Nigerians had never heard of the levy before now.</p><h3>Nigeria’s History of Fuel Taxes and Exemptions</h3><p>Historically, Nigeria has been reluctant to tax fuel at the retail level. As Africa’s biggest oil producer, the country instead spent decades subsidizing petrol and diesel, making fuel far cheaper domestically than international prices. Any form of consumption tax on fuel was seen as counterproductive when the government was already paying the bill to keep prices low. In fact, key petroleum products have long enjoyed Value Added Tax (VAT) exemptions by law. This meant that unlike most goods and services, filling your tank did not include a VAT charge, a policy explicitly aimed at affordability.</p><p>Over time, there have been tweaks to these tax exemptions. For example, a 2021 Finance Ministry order redefined “petroleum products” in a way that excluded diesel from the VAT-exempt list, effectively making diesel subject to VAT. This move was justified as part of deregulating diesel (which had been unsubsidized for years), but it stirred controversy over rising costs. Facing public pressure when diesel prices spiked, the government backtracked by waiving VAT on diesel to ease inflation.</p><p>Beyond VAT, Nigeria imposed virtually no excise taxes or surcharges on fuel for most of its history. The FERMA levy was the notable exception on record, but as discussed, it was not enforced. This hands-off approach made Nigeria an outlier globally. While most countries treat fuel as a convenient item to tax (since demand is large and relatively inelastic), Nigeria joined a small club of nations that instead kept fuel prices artificially low with subsidies and imposed minimal taxes.</p><h3>Reviving the Levy: Introducing the New Fossil Fuel Surcharge</h3><p>Fast forward to 2025, and Nigeria has overhauled its tax laws. President Bola Tinubu signed four major tax reform bills into law, one of which — the Nigeria Tax Act 2025 — introduces a surcharge on fossil fuel products at a 5% rate. This new surcharge is essentially the old FERMA levy repackaged under the national tax code. It applies a 5% charge on the retail price of petrol, diesel, and other chargeable fossil fuel products, whenever they are supplied or sold in Nigeria. In practical terms, that means at the petrol station or any point of sale, 5% of the pump price would be added as tax, once implementation begins.</p><p>Notably, this surcharge was not part of the original reform proposals drafted by the Presidential Tax and Fiscal Policy Committee, it was introduced by the National Assembly during deliberations, arguably to formalize a levy that had technically existed since 2007. There was even talk during the legislative process of setting the surcharge at 10% in an initial harmonized draft, but the gazetted Act ultimately settled on 5%. This lower rate aligns with the legacy FERMA provision and perhaps reflected political caution given Nigeria’s sensitive fuel prices.</p><p>So, what exactly does the new surcharge stipulate? The law spells it out clearly:</p><ul><li>Rate and Base: A 5% surcharge on all ‘chargeable fossil fuel products provided or produced in Nigeria’, calculated on the retail price. In effect, if petrol is ₦‎900 per liter, a 5% tax would be ₦‎45, making the consumer price ₦‎945 (all else being equal). The “chargeable transaction” is defined as the supply, sale, or payment for the fuel, whichever comes first, essentially ensuring the tax hits the point at which fuel enters commerce or is purchased. The surcharge is collected at that point of sale.</li><li>Administration: The Nigeria Revenue Service (NRS), which the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) will be renamed to, is tasked with collecting and administering this tax on a monthly basis. The tax authorities may issue regulations to facilitate implementation. Importantly, the law includes a trigger mechanism: it empowers the Minister of Finance to decide the start date. The surcharge will commence only when the Minister issues an order published in the official Gazette specifying the effective date. This means the levy is not automatically in force alongside other tax law changes commencing in January 2026.</li><li>Exemptions: To shield households and promote cleaner energy, the law explicitly exempts several products from the surcharge. Household kerosene (used by many low-income families for cooking and lighting) will not be taxed. Cooking gas (LPG) is exempt, as is compressed natural gas (CNG) which the government is encouraging for vehicle fuel. All clean or renewable energy products defined as energy from solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, or biomass sources, are also exempt. In short, the 5% charge targets fossil fuels like petrol, diesel, aviation fuel, etc., but spares basic household fuels and greener alternatives.</li><li>Purpose: While not explicitly written into the Act, government officials have been positioning the surcharge as a transportation infrastructure fund. The federal government has stated that revenues from the 5% fossil fuel charge will be dedicated to financing road construction and maintenance across the country. The logic is that as people pay more for fuel, they should see the benefits in smoother highways, safer travel, and lower vehicle wear-and-tear. It is effectively an earmark in intention. The presidency and its reform committee emphasize that Nigeria desperately needs a dedicated, predictable stream of funding for transport infrastructure, and that many countries around the world successfully use fuel levies for this purpose.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/998/1*UjJmL1HODxTQLQihEhxdUA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The recently constructed Dangote Refinery. ICIR Nigeria</figcaption></figure><h3>How Does Nigeria Compare? Fuel Taxes in Global Context</h3><p>One striking fact shared by the reformers is that Nigeria has been one of the few countries worldwide not taxing fuel at point of sale. In many nations, fuel taxes are a major source of government revenue and a key tool for funding infrastructure. Nigeria’s planned 5% surcharge is modest by comparison, essentially a small charge in a world where heavy fuel taxes are virtually universal.</p><p>Consider a few examples:</p><p>- Oil-producing peers like Norway heavily tax gasoline and diesel. Norway channels fuel tax revenue into both general coffers and investments in transportation. It also incentivizes electric cars using those funds. The United Kingdom similarly has high fuel duties that fund road maintenance and public transport, among other budgetary items.</p><p>- Developing countries often earmark fuel taxes for road funds. For instance, Ghana has a Road Fund Levy built into fuel pump prices that goes directly to road maintenance programs. Kenya imposes a Road Maintenance Levy which is securitized to raise financing for road projects. These are analogous to what Nigeria’s FERMA levy was meant to be — a dedicated pot for transportation infrastructure.</p><p>- United States (a major oil producer and consumer) has federal and state gasoline taxes used to fund highways and transit. Though low by European standards, the U.S. fuel tax still exemplifies the norm that users pay into infrastructure funds (e.g., the U.S. Highway Trust Fund) when they buy fuel.</p><p>- In contrast, countries with extremely cheap fuel usually achieve that by forgoing taxes and providing subsidies. Venezuela has been a classic example. For years, gasoline was almost free at the pump due to heavy subsidy, meaning effectively a negative tax. Some Middle Eastern oil giants (e.g., Kuwait, Saudi Arabia in past decades) also levied minimal taxes on fuel, treating cheap fuel as a citizen benefit. However, even many of these countries have been moving toward market pricing and modest taxes (for example, the Gulf states introducing VAT of 5% or more on fuel in recent years).</p><p>Nigeria, until recently, aligned with the latter group with no fuel taxes and big subsidies. But with the fuel subsidy removed in 2023, the new 5% surcharge would mark a significant shift, placing Nigeria more in line with global practice by having motorists contribute to public revenue for roads.</p><p>It’s worth noting Nigeria’s plan is still cautious relative to others. A 5% fuel tax is low; many countries charge several times that between excise and VAT. Additionally, the government here has pledged to exempt critical household fuels and reinvest the proceeds into infrastructure, whereas some countries tax even cooking and heating fuels. The reformers have also pointed out that Nigeria’s fuel levy is not about punishing consumption or climate policy, but about fixing infrastructure, a stance similar to some developing nations’ approach of ‘road-user charges’. On the flip side, a few nations continue without significant fuel taxes (often due to political sensitivities or resource wealth), so Nigeria’s historical abstention wasn’t unique, just increasingly rare. By implementing this surcharge, Nigeria would join the mainstream and shed the distinction of being among the only countries with zero fuel taxes on end consumers.</p><h3>Timing and Implementation Controversy</h3><p>One critical clarification is that the new fuel surcharge will not kick in immediately and certainly not at the very start of 2026 when other parts of the tax reforms come into effect. The Nigeria Tax Act 2025 builds in a delay mechanism; the Finance Minister must issue a gazette order to activate the surcharge. Until that happens, the 5% levy is just a provision on paper, although backed by the National Assembly already.</p><h3>Why a Fuel Levy Could Be Good Policy for Nigeria</h3><p>For some analysts, the 5% fossil fuel surcharge carries a compelling logic: it establishes a user-pays principle that could help solve Nigeria’s perennial transportation infrastructure funding gaps. Here are the main arguments in favor:</p><ul><li>Dedicated Fund for Road Infrastructure: Nigeria has struggled for decades to adequately fund road construction and maintenance. Federal highways and even many state roads are in disrepair, contributing to accidents, high vehicle operating costs, and transport delays. The funds allocated to the Ministry of Works each year is quite insufficient given the scale of work needed. By adding a dedicated fuel surcharge, Nigeria could create a reliable, ring-fenced stream of revenue specifically for transport infrastructure, particularly roads. Proponents say this predictability is key, rather than roads competing with other items for budget funds, they would have their own ongoing funding source. Countries with such dedicated road funds (often fed by fuel levies) tend to see more consistent maintenance and less politicization of funding.</li><li>Earmarking Improves Transparency and Accountability: When a tax is linked to a specific use, it can boost public trust that the money isn’t just disappearing into the general treasury. In theory, motorists will see the connection between paying 5% more at the pump and improvements in the highways they drive on. This can create a virtuous cycle of accountability, if roads don’t improve, there will be pressure on government to explain where the surcharge money went. The reform committee explicitly notes that this move “harmonises” the old FERMA levy into the main tax system for greater transparency. Instead of a hidden charge embedded in fuel pricing templates, it becomes an on-the-books tax collected by the NRS and reported publicly.</li><li>Economic Efficiency and User-Pays Fairness: Economists often favor taxes on goods like fuel because they act as a user fee — those who use the roads more, end up paying more for their upkeep. It can be seen as fairer than, say, funding roads out of income taxes that everyone pays regardless of how much they drive. If implemented well, the benefits could outweigh the costs: smoother roads reduce vehicle damage, improve travel times, and cut fuel consumption (ironically), yielding savings for businesses and individuals in the long run. This is especially true if funds are used to fix critical corridors that today cause major bottlenecks and high transport costs. In short, a naira invested via the fuel surcharge could return many more naira in economic benefits if managed properly.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4QJmiEqvByiNp_Uyeszfdg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Section of the Lagos — Calabar Coastal Highway. Source: Author</figcaption></figure><ul><li>Global Best Practice and Climate Alignment: While Nigeria’s motive isn’t climate policy, it’s worth noting that many countries justify fuel taxes as a way to account for environmental externalities and encourage efficiency. Nigeria’s exemption of renewables and cleaner fuels from the surcharge is explicitly meant to support the energy transition. Over time, having a fossil fuel tax (even a small one) can send a price signal favoring alternatives like CNG, solar, or electric vehicles. Adopting this measure could integrate Nigeria into this global practice, potentially opening doors for climate finance or international support.</li></ul><h3>Policy and Legal Concerns to Watch</h3><p>Despite the potential upsides, the proposed fuel surcharge raises several policy and legal concerns:</p><ul><li>Inflation and Economic Timing: Perhaps the loudest warning is about inflationary impact. Fuel prices in Nigeria have an outsized effect on the cost of transportation, food distribution, and general price levels. After the subsidy removal in 2023, inflation spiked into the 30% range (before rebasing), which has just began to ease downwards by mid-2025. Adding a new 5% tax on petrol and diesel could immediately bump up headline inflation and reverse disinflation momentum. Even if delayed, whenever the surcharge is implemented, the risk is that it stokes price pressures in an economy that has finally started cooling off. If inflation resurges, it could force the central bank to raise interest rates further, counteracting any economic benefit from better roads. Timing is everything — introduce the levy too soon, and it could be counterproductive, effectively an austerity measure in an already tight economy. This is likely why the law wisely allows flexibility on the start date; however, the concern remains that whenever it kicks in, it will still nudge fuel prices upward (all else equal) and thus requires a very carefully chosen moment.</li><li>No Formal Link to Transport Spending (Disconnect from FERMA): Another critique is the lack of an explicit legal earmark. Unlike the FERMA Act 2007 which clearly stated the levy’s distribution (40% FERMA, 60% state road agencies), the new Tax Act simply imposes the surcharge and doesn’t specify where it goes. It presumably will enter the federation’s accounts or a special fund by administrative arrangement, but nothing in the law says ‘this fund must be used for transport infrastructure’. In theory, a future government could collect the 5% and channel it to general revenue or another project entirely. The current administration has expressed intent to use it for transport infrastructure, but intent is not binding. The absence of a guaranteed allocation to FERMA or a road fund means accountability will rely on political will or future regulations. Legally, it’s just a tax, not a trust fund. This disconnect could also cause institutional friction. FERMA might have expected a direct funding source but now has to rely on budgetary transfers from whatever the NRS collects.</li><li>Ministerial Discretion and Legal Challenge: The surcharge’s implementation is left to the Finance Minister’s discretion (to set the date, and the NRS to issue regulations). While this flexibility has advantages, it also sits in a grey zone constitutionally. Nigeria’s courts have increasingly been striking down provisions that give extensive tax-altering powers to the executive without legislative approval. For instance, a 2020 Federal High Court judgment voided the Finance Minister’s power to amend the tax schedule under the Taxes and Levies Act, deeming it an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Also, the Act allows the NRS to make regulations for administration; if those regulations tried to redefine what’s “chargeable” or how the base is calculated, it might stir controversy. The Federal High Court recently held that the FIRS’ Income Tax (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulation, in force since 2018, is unconstitutional because it was issued pursuant to the OECD Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, which has not been domesticated by the National Assembly as required under the Constitution. Even when laws explicitly empower a Minister (as many past finance acts did for certain fees), those provisions can be overturned if seen as overreach. This concern is a check against arbitrariness, but it also means implementing the surcharge could get tangled in legal challenges if not managed transparently and according to the book.</li><li>Federal-State Fiscal Dynamics: The introduction of a national fuel tax raises questions in Nigeria’s federal system about revenue sharing. Under the constitution, most federally collected taxes (like VAT, duties, etc.) go into the Federation Account to be split among federal, state, and local governments. If the 5% surcharge is treated as a form of excise or sales tax on goods, one could argue it should be part of that distributable pool. However, if it’s treated as a dedicated fee for federal roads, the federal government might want to keep it off the top for that purpose. Originally, as noted, the FERMA levy did account for state roads (giving 60% to states’ road agencies). The new law’s silence on sharing could be a brewing source of tension. State governors may ask: will the proceeds of this surcharge be paid into the Federation Account (and thus ~48% ultimately passed to states and local governments via the usual formula)? Or will the federal government retain and spend it through its agencies? If the latter, some states could object that the federal level is usurping revenues that should be broadly shared. We saw analogous disputes with things like the Excess Crude Account and other unilateral federal revenue decisions. It’s easy to imagine state governments arguing that while improving federal highways is good, their own budgets might suffer if, say, people buy less of other VATable goods because fuel is pricier, or if they simply feel entitled to a cut of any new national tax. This is somewhat speculative, but Nigeria’s fiscal federalism has always been delicate — any new revenue source prompts debate over who gets what. The safest resolution would be for the government to be transparent: possibly crediting the surcharge into a separate road fund that could even allocate some portion to state projects. Without clear legal guidance, this remains a grey area that could lead to intergovernmental wrangling or even litigation.</li><li>Public Trust and Execution Risks: Finally, a more general concern is whether the surcharge will truly deliver its promises. Nigerians have understandable skepticism given past experiences. If the 5% surcharge is implemented and fuel prices rise, but roads remain riddled with potholes, the policy could backfire badly in terms of public opinion. It puts pressure on the government to earmark in reality, not just rhetoric. As noted, the law doesn’t compel usage for roads, so it will be up to the administration (and its successors) to honor the commitment. Any misuse or redirection of funds could become a political scandal, eroding trust in future reform efforts. Additionally, Nigeria must improve how it manages road contracts and maintenance efficiency to get the best bang for buck from the new funds; otherwise, it could be pouring more money into a leaky bucket.</li></ul><h3>Conclusion: A New Road Ahead, Paved with Caution</h3><p>The 5% fossil fuel surcharge in Nigeria’s 2025 tax law is a study in policy revival and reform trade-offs. On one hand, it represents a prudent solution to a very real problem: funding the roads that carry Nigeria’s economy. It dusts off a levy that was meant to exist all along and aligns Nigeria with a global norm that those who use fuel (and by extension the roads) should contribute to their upkeep. If executed well, this surcharge could finally translate Nigeria’s immense road traffic into a steady cash flow for fixing potholes, building bridges, and expanding highways, delivering tangible benefits to businesses and citizens alike. It embodies a forward-thinking approach where fiscal reform meets infrastructure planning.</p><p>On the other hand, the timing and context make it a delicate gambit. Nigerians are emerging from a period of economic strain, with fuel prices having soared and inflation only just moderating. Introducing a new fuel tax — however justified in principle — is bound to cause concern about cost-of-living impacts. The government’s decision to hold off on immediate implementation shows a recognition of this concern. It opens up a space for debate: when will the economy be ready, and how to ensure the funds truly go to their intended purpose? Moreover, legal frameworks still need tightening, without formal earmarks or revenue-sharing agreements, the surcharge’s success will rely on good-faith execution and public oversight, areas where Nigeria has been challenged in the past.</p><p>In a larger sense, the 5% fuel surcharge debate encapsulates Nigeria’s broader reform journey: finding ways to pay for what we need without overburdening a weary populace. It’s a tough needle to thread. The surcharge is neither a silver bullet nor a doom prophecy; it is a tool. Like any tool, its value will depend on how and when it’s used. As Nigeria navigates this new path, the conversation will and should continue about fiscal responsibility, infrastructure priorities, and protecting citizens from undue hardship. In the end, a well-implemented fuel levy could be a cornerstone of more sustainable economic management, but it will require vigilance, transparency, and perhaps a healthy dose of patience and compromise to get there. The road ahead — much like Nigeria’s highways — may be bumpy, but with careful steering, this policy could yet drive the country toward sturdier ground.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=de5a6ed4efdc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nigeria’s Next Frontier: Building an Exported Services Industry]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/nigerias-next-frontier-building-an-exported-services-industry-23133d868501?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/23133d868501</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bpo-outsourcing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[outsourcing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[remote-working]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fiscal-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2025 08:06:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-15T08:06:31.592Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nigeria faces a pressing revenue and unemployment challenge that calls for new thinking. The nation’s oil income is no longer sufficient as public revenues, which have improved in recent times, are still thin. This has resulted in successive budget deficits of 5–6% of GDP financed by heavy borrowing which then goes on to further consume a lot of federal revenue, an unsustainable path. Adding to the concern, Nigeria’s capital markets and industries are relatively underperforming. The entire Nigerian Exchange (NGX) equity market is worth only about ₦80trillion ($55 billion), with daily trading of just ₦20 billion ($13 million). By comparison, South Africa’s Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) sees roughly ZAR22 billion traded per day ($1.2 billion), and its market capitalization is about $1.07 trillion.</p><p>Nigeria is a young nation of over 200 million people with around 70% under age 30, a huge potential workforce that could be an asset if productively employed. Yet traditional jobs are scarce. Official unemployment was 33.3% in late 2020, and though a recent methodology change reported just 4.2% unemployment (Q2 2024), that drop is misleading. The new definition counts anyone who worked at least one hour in the past week as employed. This means many youths doing only odd jobs or minimal gigs are deemed ‘employed’, masking underemployment. Joblessness remains around 23% by metrics employed by the World Bank. The situation is dire: millions of young Nigerians are not gainfully engaged, even as the population grows rapidly and Nigeria’s private sector simply isn’t large or liquid enough to absorb our labor force or generate the taxes needed to effectively grow the economy. We need a new engine of growth, and a promising candidate is exportable services.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*llojm6RYnrbLzafghBY5Ag.jpeg" /><figcaption>Itana’s planned 72,000 sqm mixed-use district digital free trade zone in Alaro City, Lagos, Nigeria. Source: <a href="https://www.itana.africa/location">https://www.itana.africa/location</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Case for an Exported Services Industry</strong></p><p>While Nigeria has struggled with industrialization and commercial agriculture (efforts that must continue but take time and massive capital), building an export-oriented services sector could yield quicker wins. Services are less constrained by physical infrastructure; with the right skills and connectivity, Nigerian talent can remotely earn revenue from anywhere in the world. This means foreign exchange inflows, higher GDP, more tax revenue, and directly addressing youth unemployment; all without waiting decades for factories or farms to scale.</p><p>We’re already seeing the seeds of this trend. Thousands of young Nigerians now work remotely for foreign companies, especially in IT. Others freelance on platforms like Upwork, Fiverr, and Toptal offering design, writing, programming, and support services to global clients. These digital “brain circulation” workers earn in dollars and euros, boosting Nigeria’s forex reserves and spending power and prove that our youth can compete globally from home</p><p>However, this current wave of remote work is fragmented and informal. A few self-driven individuals succeed on their own, but many more struggle with unreliable power, poor internet, patchy knowledge of opportunities, and payment obstacles. We lack an ecosystem to systematically train, place, and support large numbers of service workers. In short, Nigeria has no structured exported services industry yet. Done right, this could employ hundreds of thousands (eventually millions) of Nigerians and generate billions in exports. It would also boost our global image, and Nigeria would be known as a go-to source of talent and outsourcing. As Africa’s most populous country, “bad black actors” anywhere are too often labelled Nigerian; we can counter that narrative by excelling in global services delivery.</p><p>Let us consider examples of countries that have successfully ridden the services outsourcing wave:</p><ul><li><strong>India</strong>: Through deliberate policy and education focus, India’s IT and business process outsourcing (BPO) sector now employs over 5.4 million people and exports about $194 billion in services each year. Just one Indian tech company, TCS, the world’s third-largest user of U.S. H-1B visas, has around 613,070 employees worldwide with majority of them based in India. This is over 20 times the headcount of Nigeria’s largest employer. India’s outsourcing industry employs around 5.4 million people and contributes around 7–8% of its GDP, an enormous engine created over a few decades. It began with software and call centers and has moved up the value chain to research and development as well as digital innovation, proving a developing country can become a global services hub.</li><li><strong>The Philippines</strong>: With a smaller population (120 million) but smart policies, the Philippines built a world-leading call center and BPO industry. As of 2024 it had 1.82 million outsourcing employees generating $38 billion in export revenue. English-fluent Filipino youth handle customer service, tech support, medical transcription, and more for companies in the US, Europe, and Australia. This industry has become the Philippines’ second-largest source of foreign income (after remittances) and a major employer of its college graduates. By comparison, no single Nigerian company directly employs even 50,000 people.</li><li><strong>Egypt:</strong> Recognizing the opportunity, Egypt recently launched a plan to triple its outsourcing exports and create 215,000 jobs in five years. Already, Egypt’s offshoring sector grew 54% last year, reaching $6.9 billion in service exports in 2024. The government is attracting multinationals to set up support centers in Egypt, leveraging its multilingual workforce to serve Europe and the Middle East. They have signed deals to establish dozens of new outsourcing centers aiming to employ 60,000 more specialists. This shows how quickly a country can ramp up with the right focus.</li><li><strong>South Africa and Others:</strong> South Africa has grown a Global Business Services industry of its own, adding over 150,000 BPO jobs in the past six years by leveraging time-zone alignment with Europe and targeted incentives. Other emerging economies like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Kenya are also training youth in freelancing and IT services, collectively earning hundreds of millions through platforms and contracts abroad. These examples span Asia and Africa, proving that developing countries can successfully export services at scale.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*dbv88dgstBEASAtzW-ZycA.jpeg" /><figcaption>A cross-section of Indian BPO workers at work. Source: IndiaTechDesk</figcaption></figure><p>Crucially, many of these service industries rival or even dwarf Nigeria’s biggest enterprises in employment and output. For instance, Dangote Refinery, Nigeria’s pride, reportedly engaged 30,000 workers at peak construction, but a single Indian outsourcing firm can employ 5 times that number, and the entire Philippine BPO sector employs 50 times more. The message is clear: if Nigeria nurtures an exported services sector, it could quickly become one of our largest employers and revenue earners, perhaps even on par with oil.</p><p>Importantly, developing services talent is cheaper and faster than heavy industrial projects. A young graduate can be trained in coding or digital design in months, at a fraction of the cost of setting up a factory job. To be sure, we should still pursue industrialization and modern farming for long-term diversification, but those require massive capital, stable power, logistics, and time. In the interim, tapping our human capital for exportable services is a low-hanging fruit. It directly tackles unemployment by plugging our youths into the global digital economy. It increases household incomes (foreign clients pay in hard currency) and, by extension, tax receipts from income and consumption. And every Nigerian hired by a US or European firm becomes an informal ambassador, showcasing a different Nigerian narrative of skill and productivity.</p><p><strong>What Next?</strong></p><p>Nigeria is already taking initial steps in this direction. Recent tax reforms have removed major hurdles that previously discouraged foreign companies from hiring Nigerians remotely. Under the new Tax Act, if a non-resident company employs Nigerians resident in Nigeria, to work on overseas services, that foreign employer will not be subject to company taxes in Nigeria, nor be deemed to have a “fixed base” or permanent establishment here. In essence, Nigeria is saying to the world: “Feel free to tap our talent pool; we won’t double-tax you for it.” For pure exports, it’s a smart incentive to attract multinationals to source Nigerian remote workers. The policy aims to make it as easy as hiring in any low-cost location without triggering Nigerian tax residency.</p><blockquote>To be sure, we should still pursue industrialization and modern farming for long-term diversification, but those require massive capital, stable power, logistics, and time. In the interim, tapping our human capital for exportable services is a low-hanging fruit. It directly tackles unemployment by plugging our youths into the global digital economy.</blockquote><p>Other supportive policies are emerging as well. The Nigeria Startup Act 2022 and recent Digital Economy initiatives encourage remote-work and innovation-friendly regulations. A flagship project is ‘Itana’ in Lagos — a private-sector led and government supported charter city and digital free zone spearheaded by entrepreneur Iyinoluwa Aboyeji. Positioned in the Lekki Free Zone, Itana aims to provide world-class infrastructure and business-friendly rules (tax breaks, fast internet, stable power) to host tech companies and remote workers in a campus-like setting. Essentially, Itana is creating an environment “within Nigeria but outside Nigeria” (legally speaking) to rival places like Dubai or Delaware for ease of doing tech business. Such initiatives could help stem the outflow of startups incorporating abroad by offering the same advantages on Nigerian soil. Government should actively support and replicate these models. Imagine multiple tech cities across Nigeria hosting global outsourcing firms and freelancers.</p><p>We see the potential but realizing it will take deliberate action and reforms. Here are concrete steps Nigeria should take to build a thriving exported services industry:</p><p><strong>1. Proclaim Nigeria “Open for Business” and Back It Up with Presence</strong></p><p>Reforms mean little if the world doesn’t know about them. Nigeria must market itself aggressively as the next big talent hub. This requires high-level promotion and diplomatic outreach. It’s puzzling that nearly two years into the current administration, Nigeria has had no appointed ambassadors in key countries. Those positions must be filled with capable representatives whose mandate includes pitching Nigeria’s talent and new business-friendly policies. We should appoint “Tech and Outsourcing Ambassadors” to globe-trot and attend industry events, touting Nigeria’s reforms (like the tax exemption for remote employers) and youthful workforce. If we are cutting red tape and offering incentives, every multinational and outsourcing broker should hear about it. Nigeria needs foreign direct investment in services, not just volatile portfolio flows. We cannot afford diplomatic inertia as outreach is vital. Successful countries treat their image as business destinations seriously; Nigeria should be no different. The bottom line: we must loudly announce that Nigeria is ready to provide the world with skilled services at competitive cost. If we don’t tell our story, no one else will.</p><p><strong>2. Relentlessly Improve the Ease of Doing Business</strong></p><p>Not long ago, Nigeria showed that reforms can yield tangible improvement. Between 2016 and 2019, Nigeria moved up 39 places on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, rising from near the bottom (rank 170 in 2015) to 131 by 2019. This was thanks to the Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC) led by Dr. Jumoke Oduwole, which spearheaded a lot of reforms. Nigeria was even recognized twice as a global top-10 reformer in that period. That momentum must not only continue but accelerate. The new Tax Acts give Nigeria an opportunity to climb further up the rankings. We should target a top-100 spot and beyond. Reforms should focus on simplifying regulations for service-export companies: easy registration for foreign entities hiring remotely, streamlined visa/work permit processes for when training or collaboration needs to happen on-site, strong legal protection for contracts and intellectual property, and elimination of any other outdated laws that hinder remote work. Simply put, make it easy and cheap to do business in Nigeria.</p><p><strong>3. Intentionally Structure and Support Remote Work Initiatives</strong></p><p>Right now, much of Nigeria’s remote work success is spontaneous. To truly scale, we need intentional structures. Government should partner with the private sector to create platforms and hubs that connect Nigerian talent to global demand. This could include setting up a national remote work portal or expanding existing job exchange programs in partnership with global freelancing sites. More concretely, support ventures like Itana City and others aiming to build co-working campuses, training centers, and living facilities optimized for remote workers. The government should facilitate such projects through quick approvals, maybe even seed funding or matching infrastructure (e.g. extending public fiber optic lines to these hubs). Beyond new cities, empower tech parks and innovation hubs in existing urban centers like Lagos, Abuja, Enugu, Kaduna, Port Harcourt. These should provide reliable power/internet (perhaps via solar microgrids and dedicated ISP links) and serve as outsourcing incubators where freelancers and firms can rent space and get support services.</p><p>Even cooperative remote work centers in smaller cities could allow youths to work for foreign clients without moving abroad or to Lagos. The key is scale and coordination: rather than a lone Nigerian on Fiverr here and a small agency there, create clusters of excellence that can take on big contracts. Government can also support aggregators; companies that hire/train hundreds of Nigerians and then secure service contracts from abroad, essentially, local BPO firms.</p><p><strong>4. Tackle the Power Problem, Incrementally and Innovatively</strong></p><p>No discussion of remote work can ignore Nigeria’s chronic power shortages. It’s the bane of every business, and remote work is no exception, you can’t service a client in London or New York if you’re constantly offline due to blackouts. Our power deficit costs Nigeria an estimated $29 billion annually in lost productivity. The truth is we won’t fix power overnight; large-scale generation and transmission projects have long lead times. But we can make incremental progress that specifically helps remote workers. We shouldn’t use the national power crisis as an excuse to do nothing; instead, carve out solutions for this segment. Even modest reliability improvements will yield outsized gains because one hour of uptime could mean a deadline met or a contract delivered. Think of power for remote work as infrastructure for an export industry as it deserves special focus. Every additional kilowatt-hour we deliver to a Nigerian freelancer’s PC is potentially dollars earned for Nigeria.</p><p><strong>5. Massively Invest in Training for All Exportable Skills</strong></p><p>To supply the world with services, Nigeria must upskill its workforce at scale. Honorable Bosun Tijani, the Minister of Communications, Innovation &amp; Digital Economy, has already launched the 3 Million Technical Talent (3MTT) programme, which aims to train 3 million Nigerians in tech skills by 2027. This is billed as the world’s largest tech talent accelerator, and it has shown huge demand — the first phase drew 1.7 million applications for only 30,000 spots. Clearly, our youth are hungry to learn. The 3MTT program focuses on areas like software development, AI, cybersecurity, data analysis, etc., with an eye on making Nigeria a net exporter of tech talent. This is fantastic and must be fully supported to hit its targets. But we should expand training beyond just core tech. The global market needs many other services: customer support (call centers), animation and digital content, financial services outsourcing (accounting, bookkeeping), legal process outsourcing, online tutoring and education services, virtual administration, and more. Nigeria can tap into all of these.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/885/1*1pQdSOPH6IuqRop0cfQcZw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Dr. Olatunbosun Tijani, Nigerian minister of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy. Source: Ministry of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy</figcaption></figure><p>For example, our English accent has been rated among the most attractive in the world by CNN polls. Why shouldn’t people around the globe hear that accent when they call customer service? We should establish training academies for call center professionals, where young Nigerians learn communication skills, customer relations, and gain neutral accents or the ability to switch accents based on client preference. Similar academies can train medical transcriptionists, virtual assistants, data entry clerks, etc., targeting those who may not have a university degree but can perform outsourced tasks with a bit of skill development. These programs should run in parallel with formal higher education</p><p>Additionally, Nigeria can seek partnerships with countries like India, the Philippines, and even the UK/US for training exchange, perhaps a program where Indian IT firms help train a pool of Nigerian apprentices (since ultimately those firms might employ them). It’s worth noting that training for exportable services doesn’t only benefit those who go on to work for foreign firms; even those who remain in domestic jobs will be more productive, which helps our economy internally. It’s a win-win.</p><p><strong>6. Create Incentives and a Supportive Ecosystem for Service Exporters</strong></p><p>Finally, Nigeria should develop a holistic ecosystem to nurture service-exporting businesses. This goes beyond training and infrastructure to include financial and institutional support. For example, set up an Exported Services Development Fund that provides seed grants or soft loans to startups or firms focused on outsourcing. If a company wants to establish a 500-seat call center in, say, Enugu to serve overseas clients, the government could offer a tax holiday or even cover part of their training cost per employee. Our Export Promotion Council (NEPC) could set specific targets and awards for service exporters.</p><p>Legal protection and quality assurance are another aspect: to build a reputation, Nigerian services must be top-notch. Government can help set up professional standards bodies or certifications for outsourcing (for instance, an accreditation for Nigerian call centers that meet certain quality and data security standards). This gives foreign clients confidence that engaging a Nigerian firm or freelancer comes with reliability. The goal is a virtuous cycle: the more services we export, the more FX and jobs we get, which in turn improves our economy and creditworthiness, enabling more investment in people.</p><p>The time to build Nigeria’s exported services industry is now. As Nigeria undertakes bold economic reforms at home, from removing fuel subsidies to overhauling tax laws, we must simultaneously sow the seeds of new industries that can drive growth in the immediate and long term. Oil has been our mainstay for decades, but even optimists know Nigeria won’t miraculously pump 2 million barrels/day again soon; global investment in oil is shifting and any gains will be gradual. Imagine an industry that directly employs our abundant youth and earns foreign exchange without drilling a single well. An industry where output can grow 100% in a year simply by training and connecting more people, no multi-billion-dollar infrastructure required for each incremental gain. That is the promise of an exported services sector.</p><p>Nigeria has the raw ingredients: a large, English-speaking, entrepreneurial youth population, proven diasporic success (which shows our people thrive given the opportunity), and now an administration willing to reform. By improving our business climate, broadcasting our openness, fixing critical bottlenecks like power and internet, investing in human capital, and incentivizing global partnerships, Nigeria can become the next big hub for remote services. We could be known not just for our oil or Nollywood or Afrobeats, but for our armies of skilled developers, customer support reps with melodious accents, engineers and analysts working remotely on projects worldwide, and startups delivering solutions across borders.</p><p>Such a transformation will enrich Nigeria in every sense: higher incomes for families, reduced unemployment and crime, increased government revenue from a broader base, and a positive global reputation as a nation of service and innovation. It will keep more of our talent here (alleviating the brain drain) because they can live in Nigeria and work globally. And it will anchor our economy on a foundation that grows from the sweat equity of Nigerians themselves, a truly sustainable model.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=23133d868501" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nigeria’s Value Added Tax Overhaul: From Sales Tax Roots to a Modern Consumption Tax]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/nigerias-value-added-tax-overhaul-from-sales-tax-roots-to-a-modern-consumption-tax-ede75eae2415?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ede75eae2415</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fiscal-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taxation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria-tax-act]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[value-added-tax]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vat]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Jul 2025 18:31:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-06T18:31:16.453Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>Value Added Tax (VAT) has become one of Nigeria’s most important revenue sources since its introduction in 1993, rising from ₦8 billion ($100m) in 1994 to ₦3.6 trillion ($4.8 billion) in 2023. Yet, the VAT system we know today started as something quite different: a modest state-level sales tax on a narrow set of goods and hotel services. Over three decades, Nigeria’s consumption tax regime has evolved dramatically, from that rudimentary sales tax to a nationwide VAT system, and now to a reformed VAT under newly enacted tax laws in 2025. These changes have not just been about raising rates (though the VAT rate did rise from 5% to 7.5% in 2020); they have fundamentally altered how the tax works, who administers it, what gets taxed or exempted, and how businesses comply.</p><p><strong>From Sales Tax to VAT: The 1993 Transition</strong></p><p>Nigeria’s adoption of VAT on September 1, 1993 marked a turning point in consumption taxation. Before then, states levied a Sales Tax under a 1986 decree, but it had a very limited base. This narrow scope and bias meant the sales tax was neither equitable nor very lucrative. By the early 1990s, the federal government sought a better alternative. A 1991 study group recommended replacing the state sales taxes with a unified VAT system.</p><p>Why VAT? The rationale was clear: VAT has a broader base, covering most goods and services, including high-growth sectors like professional services and banking that the old sales tax missed. Unlike sales tax, which taxed every transaction without relief, VAT uses an input-output mechanism to tax only the value added at each stage. This avoids double taxation and is seen as more efficient; the final consumer bears the tax, but businesses get credits for VAT they pay on inputs. And because VAT taps the general consumption of the population, it promised high revenue yield with minimal resistance.</p><p>Legally, VAT was introduced as a federal decree (№102 of 1993), which explicitly repealed the state sales taxes and centralized the levy. The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) became the collection agency, working with Customs (to collect VAT on imports). VAT officially kicked in at a 5% rate, with businesses starting to charge VAT on invoices from Importantly, although administered centrally, the revenue was shared among the three tiers of government under an agreed formula. This central collection with revenue-sharing was meant to ensure uniformity of tax rates and rules across Nigeria, while still letting states benefit financially.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/636/1*FXGrNGZBMQO5qpnMntf_BA.png" /><figcaption>The erstwhile VAT Form 002</figcaption></figure><p><strong>A Quirky Start: Restrictions on Input VAT Credits</strong></p><p>Nigeria’s VAT was conceived as a modern consumption tax, but in practice the original system (as implemented in the 1990s) had some quirks that made it less than fully ‘modern’. Chief among these was a restriction on input VAT claims. Under the initial VAT Act and its early interpretations, businesses could only recover input VAT on limited categories of purchases, essentially goods purchased for resale or for use as raw materials (stock-in-trade) in producing new taxable goods. Any VAT a company paid on other expenses was simply not creditable against output VAT.</p><p>In plainer terms, if a trading company imported inventory to sell, or a manufacturer bought raw materials, the 5% VAT paid on those could be claimed as a credit on the VAT return. But if the company paid VAT on say, office supplies, or on services like legal fees, or even on equipment and machinery, that input VAT could not be deducted. The law and FIRS practice explicitly denied input VAT credits for “overheads, services and general administration” costs. Businesses had to treat those VAT amounts as part of their normal costs — expensing it in their profit-and-loss if it was an operating cost, or capitalizing it into the asset cost (to be recovered slowly via depreciation) if it was a fixed asset purchase..</p><p>Another odd effect was on non-resident services. Under the VAT Act, foreign companies providing services in Nigeria were supposed to register for VAT and charge it on their invoices to Nigerian customers. In practice, many did not, leaving a question: should the Nigerian client self-assess the VAT? Some early cases brought this to light — notably the Vodacom case. Vodacom Nigeria had purchased satellite bandwidth services from a company outside Nigeria, which did not charge Nigerian VAT. Vodacom initially did not pay VAT on it, arguing the service was rendered offshore and that without a VAT invoice from the foreign provider, there was no legal obligation to remit VAT. The FIRS disagreed, assessing Vodacom for the VAT on the “imported service.” This dispute went up to the Appeal Court. Ultimately, the Courts sided with FIRS, affirming that if the service was consumed in Nigeria (the bandwidth was delivered to ground stations in Nigeria), it was liable to VAT under the ‘destination principle,’ regardless of where the service provider was or whether they issued a VAT invoice. Vodacom was on the hook to pay the VAT to FIRS. The case essentially cemented the idea that Nigerian companies must self-charge VAT on services imported from abroad, even under the old law which did not explicitly state this.</p><p><strong>The Problem of VAT Refunds</strong></p><p>One feature of an ideal VAT system is that if a business’s input VAT in a period exceeds its output VAT, the tax authority should refund the difference. In Nigeria’s original VAT setup, refunds became something of a legend, many talked about them, few ever saw them. FIRS generally required a thorough tax audit or verification before approving any refund. There was no strict time limit for how quickly such audits must be completed, as a result, companies often found their refund claims stuck in limbo for years.</p><p>The government also historically capped the total amount of VAT (and other tax) refunds that could be paid out in a year. For instance, FIRS at one point had a ₦25 billion annual refund budget. Also, unlike some countries where the tax office must pay interest if refunds are delayed, in Nigeria no such customer-friendly rule existed. Many companies simply gave up, treating excess input VAT as a deferred asset to offset future VAT rather than expecting cash back</p><p><strong>Testing the Old System: Legal Challenges and State Resistance</strong></p><p>The limitations of Nigeria’s VAT regime did not go unnoticed. Apart from the Vodacom case on imported services, there were other challenges. Some companies tried to push the envelope on what constituted “stock-in-trade” (and thus eligible for input VAT credit). In one case, the Tax Tribunal agreed that gas, spare parts, and consumables used in a company’s operations could count as “goods used for direct production,” allowing input VAT recovery on those items. That hinted at a more liberal interpretation of the old law, but such wins were few, by and large, FIRS held the line that services and capital items stayed excluded from input claims.</p><p>More dramatically, the very constitutionality of the federal VAT came under question in 2021. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, which came after the VAT law, strangely does not list VAT (or sales tax) explicitly under the federal government’s taxing powers. Citing this omission, some states — most prominently Rivers State, later joined by Lagos — argued that VAT should be considered a residual matter that states can legislate on. In August 2021, Rivers State won a ruling at the Federal High Court declaring that the VAT Act was unconstitutional to the extent it usurped states’ right to impose sales tax. Buoyed by that decision, Rivers promptly enacted its own State VAT Law, and Lagos followed. This sparked a legal and political showdown with businesses caught in limbo. The Court of Appeal stepped in to stay the High Court judgment pending appeal, meaning FIRS continued collecting VAT nationwide. The case was ultimately escalated to the Supreme Court, where it remains pending as of this writing (the final decision has been eagerly awaited, as it will determine whether Nigeria’s VAT remains centralized or balkanized by state).</p><p>Central administration means one set of rules and a unified credit system nationwide. If each state ran its own sales tax or VAT, a company operating across Nigeria could face 36 different tax regimes, a compliance nightmare reminiscent of pre-1993 days. More critically, input tax credit would not smoothly work across state lines. A centrally administered VAT avoids that: if it’s one tax system, the input-output credit flows regardless of which state the transactions occur in. This was a major argument against the states’ move, that fragmenting the system would harm the economy and “reverse the progress” made under the federal VAT.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*rYVS4tQjw6AW51tF2KqjJA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image showing VAT growth courtesy <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/">https://www.icirnigeria.org/</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>2019–2022: Laying the Groundwork for Reform</strong></p><p>Significant changes to VAT began in the Finance Act 2019, which took effect in 2020. This was the same legislation that famously raised the VAT rate from 5% to 7.5%, but it did much more than that. The VAT Act was amended to update definitions and plug gaps in line with global trends and digitalizing economy. Key reforms included:</p><ul><li>VAT Registration Threshold: Businesses with annual turnover below ₦25 million were exempted from registering for VAT or charging it. This was a relief for small enterprises, freeing them from the compliance burden and recognizing that very small transactions need not be taxed.</li><li>Foreign Companies &amp; Digital Services: The law introduced provisions targeting non-resident suppliers. If an international company sells goods or services to Nigeria, they are required to register for VAT and include VAT on their invoices. Practically, this has been focused on digital services (like foreign e-commerce, streaming, software providers, etc.). FIRS even designated some foreign tech giants as VAT collection agents. The law also provided that if the non-resident fails to charge VAT, the Nigerian customer must self-account (withhold and remit) the VAT. This “self-charge” mechanism, essentially a reverse charge, was explicitly baked in after cases like Vodacom highlighted the need. In short, by 2020, Nigeria had a way to capture VAT on imported B2B services: either the foreign supplier charges it, or the local buyer does.</li><li>Clarifying Taxable vs Exempt Items: Finance Act 2019 and subsequent ones also updated schedules of exempt goods and services, and clarified definitions. For instance, basic food items (over 500 staples) were exempt by policy (this existed before, but was expanded). Education materials, medical services, and rent of residential property were confirmed as VAT-exempt. The Finance Act 2020 specifically excluded “land and buildings” and “interest in land” from the definition of goods, cementing that real estate transactions (sales/leases of land) are outside VAT. It also formally exempted residential rental. These clarifications removed ambiguities that had led to disputes.</li></ul><p><strong>2025: A New VAT Era under the Tax Reform Acts</strong></p><p>The incoming administration in 2023 set up the Presidential Fiscal and Tax Reforms Committee, chaired by Taiwo Oyedele, to review and rewrite the tax laws. On June 26, 2025, Nigeria’s President signed four Bills into law, notably the Nigeria Tax Act 2025 (‘NTA’) and the Nigeria Tax Administration Act 2025 (‘NTAA’), which collectively repeal and replace the old VAT Act (among others). These Acts mark the biggest transformation of VAT since 1993. Let us break down the major changes:</p><p><strong>Input VAT Recovery on All Business Purchases</strong></p><p>Perhaps the most significant reform is that Nigeria now adopts a standard input-output VAT model in line with global norms. Businesses can claim input VAT on all goods and services and on fixed assets, so long as those inputs are used to make taxable supplies. If a consulting firm pays VAT on a new office laptop or on a hotel bill for staff training, it can credit that input VAT against its output VAT on consulting fees.</p><p>However, two caveats apply:</p><ol><li>Use for Taxable Supplies: A business can only claim input VAT on purchases that relate to making taxable outputs. If a company produces VAT-exempt goods or services, then the VAT on inputs for those products is still not claimable.</li><li>Proof of VAT Payment: The government still wants to ensure VAT is properly charged. So, the Acts include an interesting compliance twist: any business expense (operational or capital) on which VAT should have been charged, but was not, will not be allowed as a deductible expense or for capital allowance purposes. In other words, if you buy from a supplier who ought to charge VAT but they do not add VAT, you cannot deduct that cost when calculating your profits for corporate tax. This provision essentially means if a business does not pay VAT, they lose a tax deduction of the entire expense (which is a much larger hit). The same goes for import duties. These rules are anti-evasion measures, tying together VAT compliance with income tax consequences.</li></ol><p><strong>Faster &amp; Fairer VAT Refunds</strong></p><p>The NTAA addresses the longstanding issue of VAT refunds, head on. It provides that a VAT refund claim must be made within 12 months of the relevant transaction. Once a claim is made and validated, the FIRS, now Nigeria Revenue Service (‘NRS’) must make a refund within 30 days of receiving the claim. The taxpayer is also entitled to offset that refund against any future tax liability. The law empowers the accountant-general to deduct refund amounts from the VAT pool even before distribution to governments, and put that money in a dedicated refund account.</p><p><strong>Zero-Rating of Essential Goods and Services</strong></p><p>Basic necessities are now zero-rated instead of exempt. Under the previous regime, many essential items like staple foods were VAT-exempt, meaning no VAT was charged to consumers, but businesses selling those items could not claim any input VAT related to them. This often increased the cost of producing these essentials because the suppliers had hidden VAT they could not recover. The 2025 NTA flips several of these from exempt to zero-rated.</p><p>What is the difference? A zero-rated item is still part of the VAT system (at 0% output tax), so the supplier can claim all their input VAT back. It effectively removes VAT from the entire supply chain of that product, not just the final sale. It is a pro-poor and pro-business move rolled into one, aligning with the equity goal of not taxing basic needs while still reimbursing producers for taxes paid.</p><p><strong>Enter the NRS and E-Invoicing: Enforcing Compliance Digitally</strong></p><p>The NRS, under a new Act, is empowered to administer all federal and federation taxes. This centralization goes hand in hand with a push for technology-driven tax administration. For VAT, the buzzword is “fiscalisation” — essentially mandatory electronic invoicing and real-time reporting of sales.</p><p>The new VAT provisions mandate all taxable businesses to use an NRS approved System to record their sales. This could be software or hardware that automatically reports each transaction to the tax servers. Nigeria is one of the early adopters of a nationwide e-invoice clearance platform in Africa. The NRS rolled out the first phase of its Merchant e-Invoicing system, starting with large taxpayers. The plan is to extend this to all VAT-registered businesses over time.</p><p>The benefits are clear from an enforcement perspective: e-invoicing closes loopholes for under-reporting sales, as each invoice is logged. It also will facilitate the new consumption-based revenue sharing (more on that next) by pinpointing where each sale’s customer is located. Additionally, invoice data can feed into automated VAT return preparation, making compliance easier if done right. In countries like Brazil, digital VAT reporting significantly improved compliance. Nigeria hopes for the same.</p><p>One expected side effect: better data = better compliance. If the tax authority sees in real-time the input and output invoices, fraudulent refund claims will be easier to flag, and honest ones faster to verify. The government might collect less net VAT from compliant businesses that previously could not claim full input credit, however, it will also collect more VAT overall by bringing more transactions (those previously hidden or under-reported) into the net. As one observer put it, e-invoicing plus full input credit is like widening the base and lowering the effective burden on compliant players, a trade-off that in theory should encourage businesses to comply since they can recover their VAT and have less incentive to evade.</p><p>There could be an initial dip in VAT revenues from certain sectors that suddenly reclaim a lot of input VAT, however, over time, with economic growth and better compliance, the VAT take should rebound. Additionally, if Nigeria does hike the rate in the future, having the full input credit in place is important to avoid magnifying cascading effects.</p><p><strong>Changing the Sharing Formula: More for States, Emphasis on Consumption</strong></p><p>Earlier we noted the tensions with states over VAT. The 2025 reforms tackled this by revising how VAT revenue is allocated in the Federation Account. Previously, the Federal Government took 15%, States 50%, and Local Governments 35% of collected VAT. Among the states, the sharing was 50% equal share to each state, 30% by population, and 20% by derivation (based on the state where the VAT was collected). Under the new law (Section 81 of NTAA), the Federal Government cedes 5% of its share to the states: now FG gets only 10%, States get 55%, and LGs remain at 35%. More importantly, the basis for sharing among states is adjusted to put greater weight on consumption. The Act specifies that the portion for states and LGs (the 90%) is to be distributed 50% equally, 20% by population, and 30% by “place of consumption”. This essentially increases the derivation principle from the old 20% to 30%.</p><p>This new formula also sends a political signal: it recognizes states’ argument about equity (that those who produce/consume more should benefit more), thus hopefully tempering the desire to exit the federal system. While the Governors’ Forum had debated this, reports in late 2024 indicated governors agreed to a 50–30–20 sharing (which matches what was passed).</p><p>From a business perspective, what does this mean? Potentially, more complexity in VAT compliance because now the tax authority must accurately track the destination of each sale to allocate revenue. Businesses might need to upgrade ERP systems to tag each invoice with the state of the customer. It will be interesting to see how NRS implements this practically. Likely the electronic system will do it in the background using the customer’s tax ID address or so. For now, businesses should be aware that accurate record of destination states for their sales is becoming important.</p><p>The upside of a central system doing it is that businesses still file one VAT return to NRS, not 37 different returns. The NRS then does the slicing behind the scenes. This is far better than the scenario of separate state VATs. So, from the standpoint of efficiency, central VAT with a derivation factor is a compromise that avoids balkanization while addressing some state grievances. There remains the pending Supreme Court case on whether even this arrangement satisfies the constitutional issues, but many think that with the new law and political agreements, the states might stand down on pushing their own VAT laws.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Nigeria’s VAT journey from 1993 to 2025 is a story of continuous adaptation. From a simplistic sales tax to a semi-VAT with unusual limits, and now towards a fully-fledged modern VAT system. The latest reforms aim to ensure VAT is a true consumption tax that it is administered fairly and efficiently (with digital tools and clearer rules), and that the revenues are shared in a way that maintains national cohesion (giving states a reason to stick with the program).</p><p>The policy balance is evident: equity in shielding the poor and small businesses and distributing the tax pie more justly; efficiency in minimizing cascading and compliance burdens; and enforcement via automation and integration. As with any major policy shift, challenges will arise — businesses will need time and support to adjust to the new systems, tax officials will need training and integrity to manage the deluge of data, and consumers will watch to see if these changes translate into any price benefits or improved public services from the increased VAT receipts.</p><p>One thing is clear: Nigeria’s VAT is no longer “broken” or stuck in the 90s. It’s entering a new era, one that mirrors global best practices while tailored to local realities. If implemented well, these reforms could enhance investor confidence (knowing they can get refunds and not be tax-disadvantaged), improve voluntary compliance (through a simpler, more logical tax structure), and boost non-oil revenue in a sustainable way. The journey is not over, effective tax administration is a continuous process, but Nigeria has taken bold steps on the path of reform. As we watch the impact unfold, the hope is that VAT can truly serve its dual role as a reliable revenue workhorse for government and a neutral, fair tax on consumption that underpins, rather than undermines, economic growth.</p><p>In the end, a VAT system should function quietly in the background of the economy, capturing value added at each stage without distorting business decisions or overburdening consumers. Nigeria’s new VAT regime is much closer to that ideal than it was decades ago, striking a nuanced balance between the needs of fiscal authorities and the realities of taxpayers. The coming years will test how well this balance holds, but for now, Nigeria’s VAT evolution stands as a case study in tax modernization driven by the imperatives of equity, efficiency, and effective enforcement.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ede75eae2415" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Free Zones and Fiscal Fairness: Analysing Nigeria’s Proposed Tax Reforms]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/free-zones-and-fiscal-fairness-analysing-nigerias-proposed-tax-reforms-1cf1f19d4da2?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1cf1f19d4da2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fiscal-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[free-trade-zone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taxation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tax-bills]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 May 2025 20:48:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-23T20:52:53.428Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="Aerial drone photo taken on March 1, 2024, shows the entrance to the Lekki Free Trade Zone in Lagos, Nigeria. (Xinhua/Han Xu)" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*DrfSaNHFgIC4wKZtMcqx-A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Aerial drone photo taken on March 1, 2024, shows the entrance to the Lekki Free Trade Zone in Lagos, Nigeria. (Xinhua/Han Xu)</figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria’s experiment with Free Zones dates back to the early 1990s, born from a desire to spur non-oil exports, attract foreign investment, and create jobs amid economic reforms. In 1992, the <strong>Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority (NEPZA) Act</strong> was enacted to establish Export Processing Zones (EPZs) like the Calabar EPZ, later rebranded as the Calabar Free Trade Zone — which became operational in 2001. This was followed by the <strong>Oil and Gas Export Free Zone Authority (OGEFZA) Act</strong> of 1996, creating a specialized free zone at Onne in Rivers State for oil industry services. The rationale was straightforward: designate certain areas as outside Nigeria’s customs territory to incentivize manufacturing for export with relief from burdensome taxes and duties. Over the decades, Nigeria’s Free Zones have grown to 42 zones spread across the country, hosting over 500 licensed enterprises in diverse sectors. These range from multi-product industrial zones to oil &amp; gas hubs, all geared towards boosting industrialization and trade.</p><p><strong>Snapshots: Free Zone Entities in Action</strong></p><p>To appreciate the Free Zone landscape, consider a few prominent examples of Free Zone Enterprises (FZEs) in Nigeria and their activities:</p><ul><li><strong>Dangote Refinery &amp; Petrochemicals (Dangote Industries FZE)</strong> — Though physically located within the Lekki Free Trade Zone, the Dangote Refinery operates under its own dedicated free zone license, granted by NEPZA in 2020, giving it administrative autonomy as a self-contained FZE. This massive complex benefits from duty-free import of equipment and materials and is designed to produce a range of outputs including petrol (PMS), diesel (AGO), jet fuel (ATK), kerosene, LPG, naphtha, fuel oil, bitumen, sulphur, and petrochemicals like polypropylene and polyethylene — making it the largest single-train refinery in the world with a capacity of 650,000 barrels per day.</li><li><strong>Lekki Free Zone Enterprises</strong> — The Chinese-Nigerian JV Lekki zone hosts various companies, from steel mills to consumer goods factories. Firms like <em>Kellogg’s Tolaram</em> (which produces cereals) operate here, leveraging tax-free status for export production. The zone’s development has accelerated industrial output and job creation.</li><li><strong>Calabar Free Trade Zone companies</strong> — As Nigeria’s pioneer zone, Calabar FTZ houses manufacturers like <em>Tinapa Shopping Resort</em> (a retail and leisure FTZ hybrid) and electronics assembly firms. While Calabar FTZ has struggled to reach capacity, it remains a case study in early free zone implementation and its challenges.</li><li><strong>Onne Oil &amp; Gas Free Zone enterprises</strong> — Global oil-service giants (e.g. <em>Halliburton</em>, <em>Schlumberger</em>) and logistics firms operate in the Onne zone, serving Nigeria’s offshore industry. They import equipment and re-export or supply the oil sector tax-free within the zone. Onne’s success is evident in the vibrant oil servicing cluster it created, though it also highlighted the need to align sector-specific incentives with general tax laws.</li></ul><p><strong>Trivia:</strong> Today, Nigeria’s zones are not just about exports; they are evolving into multi-use <em>Special Economic Zones (SEZs)</em> including high-tech parks (e.g. Abuja Technology Village), logistics hubs, and even digital economy zones. Nigeria was recently designated the African Union’s hub for digital free zones, reflecting a push to broaden the Free Zone concept into new domains.</p><p><em>Not all Free Zones in Nigeria have lived up to expectations, however. The Calabar and Kano FTZs struggle with poor infrastructure and underuse. Tinapa, once touted as a luxury retail-industrial hub, failed despite massive investment. Olokola FTZ collapsed after key investors exited due to government delays. Others like Banki Border, Ibom Industrial City, and Oguta Gas Park remain inactive.</em></p><p><strong>Key Tax Policy Milestones for Free Zones (1992–2023)</strong></p><p>Nigeria’s Free Zone tax regime did not remain static; it has been tweaked by various legislative and policy changes over the years:</p><p><strong>1990s — Initial Framework:</strong> Nigeria’s Free Zone tax regime was formally established by the 1992 NEPZA Decree and the 1996 OGEFZA Decree, both of which granted broad fiscal incentives to enterprises operating within designated zones. Under these laws, FZEs were fully exempt from all Federal, State, and Local Government taxes, levies, and duties, so long as their operations remained strictly within the Free Zone. Nigerian courts upheld this expansive tax holiday in decisions like <em>Nigerdock Nigeria Plc FZE v. FIRS</em>, affirming that while activities confined to the zone remain tax-exempt, any business conducted into the Nigerian customs territory would trigger normal tax obligations. This established a foundational principle: FZEs are tax-free enclaves only for export-oriented operations, once they engage with the domestic market, tax liability applies.</p><p>These incentives were further reinforced through amendments to the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA) via decrees in 1996 and 1998, which codified the zero companies income tax (CIT) treatment for companies operating entirely within a Free Zone. While the regime prioritized exports, it also permitted limited domestic sales. The NEPZA Act provides that an FZE may sell up to 25% of its production into the Nigerian customs territory, so long as those sales are covered by a valid permit and attract applicable import duties.</p><p>This 25% threshold, while rooted in the NEPZA Act, was later clarified and operationalized through administrative guidance as the practical limit for domestic market engagement. However, in 2002, then-President Olusegun Obasanjo approved a policy shift via a memo from the Ministry of Finance that allowed FZEs to sell up to 100% of their output into the customs territory, provided applicable duties were paid. This executive directive aimed to align Free Zone policy with Nigeria’s broader industrial strategy by leveraging the country’s large internal market without abandoning the customs safeguards that distinguish zone activity from ordinary trade.</p><p><strong>2000s — Consolidation:</strong> By the 2000s, the NEPZA and OGEFZA Acts were in force, and FZEs enjoyed broad tax holidays, however, there was a lack of uniform guidelines on compliance (as noted, NEPZA vs OGFZA had differing rules on filing returns). The <em>Calabar</em> and <em>Onne</em> zones became operational, and new zones in Lagos, Kano, and other states were announced. The government occasionally issued clarifications, for instance, confirming that value added tax (VAT) does not apply on goods and services moving within or between free zones (since such transactions are outside the customs territory). Local sales from a zone to Nigeria, however, attracted import duties and VAT for the Nigerian buyer at the point of entry.</p><ul><li><strong>2019 — Inadvertent Repeal:</strong> To modernize tax laws, the Finance Act 2019 made sweeping amendments to CITA. Unfortunately, it accidentally deleted the section granting tax exemption to free zone profits. This created uncertainty about whether FZEs still had legal income tax holidays. During 2020, FIRS reassured investors that the incentives remained government policy, but technically the CITA basis was gone.</li><li><strong>Restoring and Reporting:</strong> The Finance Act 2020 stepped in to safeguard FZE tax status while<em> </em>boosting transparency. It explicitly amended NEPZA/OGEFZA laws to require tax filings by FZEs (as discussed). In effect, FZEs must file returns but won’t be taxed if they properly qualify for exemption. Penalties for failure to file (same as any company under CITA) now apply. This marked a turning point; the tax authorities gained oversight over Free Zone companies’ finances, enabling them to detect if an FZE strays into taxable domestic activities.</li><li><strong>2021 — Reaffirming Exemptions:</strong> The Finance Act 2021 addressed the 2019 mishap by reintroducing the income tax exemption for companies in EPZs/FTZs into CITA, retroactively reaffirming the incentive. It clarified that profits of a company operating in a free trade zone are tax-free “provided that requisite conditions are met.” Notably, the 2021 law also harmonized capital allowance rules: companies cannot claim tax depreciation on assets used to generate tax-exempt income (preventing FZEs from double-dipping by using their exempt activities to create future tax shields).</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*jVznKaT-duZ0a_5wIRKyhA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Taiwo Oyedele. Chairman, Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The 2024 Tax Bill: Proposed Taxation Changes for FZEs</strong></p><p>In late 2023, the Nigerian government introduced the <strong>Nigeria Tax Bill 2024 (NTB)</strong> amongst three other landmark fiscal bills. These bills aim to rewrite the country’s tax laws into a unified framework. A significant aspect of this reform is the overhaul of tax rules for FZEs. Below, the author dissects the key changes relevant to FZEs under the 2024 bills:</p><ul><li><strong>Conditional Tax Exemption:</strong> The NTB 2024 proposes that FZEs will no longer enjoy an absolute tax holiday irrespective of their activities. Instead, a conditional regime will apply. In summary:</li><li>If an FZE exports 100% of its goods or services, its profits remain fully exempt from income tax. This preserves the incentive for purely export-oriented businesses.</li><li>If an FZE exports at least 75% of its output (allowing up to 25% sales to Nigeria), it gets partial relief: tax will accrue proportionately on the profits from the goods or services sold into the Nigerian customs territory. In practice, this means if 20% of an FZE’s sales are local, roughly 20% of its profits would be taxed, while the rest remains exempt.</li><li>If in any year more than 25% of the FZE’s sales are to the customs territory, the entire profits of the FZE become taxable in Nigeria, and all free zone tax incentives are dis-applied for that year. This clause means an FZE that crosses the 25% threshold loses its tax holiday altogether for that period, to prevent abuse by firms that primarily serve the Nigerian market under the guise of a free zone.</li></ul><p>This essentially means FZEs must export at least three-quarters of their output to retain full tax-exempt status. It’s a clear message — <strong><em>free zones are for export-led industrialization, not domestic market tax shelters</em> </strong>and align with Nigeria’s new fiscal framework for tax incentives.</p><ul><li><strong>Minimum Tax (Effective Tax Rate) of 15%:</strong> The NTB imposes a 15% minimum effective tax rate on companies above a certain size. This is essentially Nigeria’s version of the global minimum tax. If an FZE (especially a large multinational) manages to reduce its effective tax rate below 15% through exemptions or incentives, it will be required to pay a top-up tax to bring it to 15%. The provision specifically applies to any company that is part of a multinational group or any other company with ₦20 billion+ turnover. <em>This means that even if an FZE qualifies for zero tax under the 75/25 rule, a very large FZE might still have to pay 15% on its profits due to this minimum tax rule</em>. The intent is to prevent highly profitable enterprises from escaping with ultralow tax rates, aligning with OECD’s Pillar Two global tax agreement (though Nigeria is implementing it unilaterally here).</li><li><strong>Full Tax Administration Compliance:</strong> The NTB explicitly subjects FZEs to the provisions of the forthcoming Tax Administration Act (currently a bill). It provides that a licensed FZE must comply with all relevant provisions for registration and filing of tax returns as well as deduction of WHT<strong>.</strong> This essentially carries forward the Finance Act 2020 change but embeds it firmly in the new unified law. Additionally, the administrative bill reinforces that every taxpayer (resident or non-resident) must obtain a Tax ID and file returns; no carve-outs are given to free zones in these obligations. In short, FZEs are unequivocally part of the tax system’s reporting net under the new regime, even if their tax liability is mitigated by exports.</li><li><strong>Anti-Abuse and Transfer Pricing:</strong> The proposed rules include measures to stop creative circumvention of the export requirement:</li><li>If an FZE contracts a related Nigerian company (outside the zone) to do manufacturing or other activities on its behalf, then the income from the eventual sale is <em>reallocated</em> to that Nigerian company for tax purposes (unless the FZE proves the arrangement is arm’s-length). This prevents an FZE from acting as a front to sell products made in Nigeria tax-free.</li><li>If a Nigerian company provides services to a related FZE, transfer pricing rules will ensure the charges are at fair market value. This deters profit shifting between taxed and untaxed affiliates via inflated service fees.</li><li>Services rendered by a person in the customs territory to an FZE, or services consumed by an FZE within Nigeria, will attract the usual transaction taxes (like VAT). This clarifies that FZEs must pay VAT on local services (they cannot claim an exemption for services taken in Nigeria, only for goods or services for export).</li><li><strong>Repeal of Enabling Tax Sections:</strong> The NTB also calls for deleting key sections of the NEPZA and OGEFZA Acts that granted tax exemptions. Specifically, it would repeal Section 8 (which lists applicable incentives) and Section 18(1)(a) of both Acts. This is a consequential move: it dismantles the legal basis of the old incentives in those laws, in favor of the new rules under the Tax Bill. Stakeholders pointed out that these sections were the foundation of FZE incentives since 1992, and their removal represents a sea change. However, the Bill essentially replaces them with the conditional incentives in its Second Schedule, so incentives aren’t gone — they’re just conditional and housed in tax law rather than zone law.</li></ul><p>In essence, the Nigeria Tax Bill 2024 aims to integrate Free Zone taxation into the national tax code, eliminating absolute tax holidays and ensuring FZEs contribute tax when they operate substantially in the local economy. The Tax Administration Bill complements this by making sure FZEs are on the tax authorities’ radar through registration, filing, and withholding compliance (with penalties for default).</p><p><strong>Pushback and Controversies</strong></p><p>These proposed changes have ignited significant debate among stakeholders. On one side, business associations for the free zones warn that the reforms could unravel decades of investment gains; on the other, the government and some industry groups argue the changes are fair and long overdue. Here are the major points of contention and perspectives:</p><ul><li><strong>“Betrayal of Incentives” — Investor Concerns:</strong> Organizations like the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines, and Agriculture (NACCIMA) have vehemently opposed the tax provisions in the 2024 bills. NACCIMA warns that stripping away established tax exemptions is drastic and could scare off investors. They claim Nigeria could lose “over $200 billion in FDI” and see 600,000 jobs jeopardized if the free zones’ allure wanes. The group’s president, Dele Oye, argued the move “contradicts Nigeria’s industrialisation and investment objectives”, noting that the success of zones since 1992 has hinged on their tax-free status. From this view, the reforms are seen as the government reneging on promises made to investors who entered under a no-tax regime. Free zone operators also fear the compliance burden: <em>Will every FZE now face aggressive audits? Will the tax authority understand the unique operating realities of zones?</em></li><li><strong>NEPZA/OGEFZA and Free Zone Administrators:</strong> Officials of the zone authorities, under the umbrella Nigeria Economic Zones Association (NEZA), have expressed cautious concern. In a communiqué after their annual meeting, SEZ stakeholders urged the government to “pass only tax laws that promote sustained inflow of investment into SEZs”, implicitly suggesting the current bills might retard growth. The zone regulators’ stance is nuanced: they understand the need to curb abuses, but they advocate a gradual approach that doesn’t shock existing investors. For example, they might prefer grandfathering existing FZEs or providing a transition period before full implementation of the 25% threshold rule.</li><li><strong>Support from Manufacturers — Leveling the Playing Field:</strong> Notably, the Manufacturers’ Association of Nigeria (MAN) has come out in support of the government’s proposals, calling the FTZ tax changes <em>fair and competitive</em>. MAN’s Director-General Segun Ajayi-Kadir stated that the reforms “align with global best practices” and will ensure fair competition without reversing the core incentives needed for growth. Domestic manufacturers outside the zones have long complained that some free zone firms sell into Nigeria at tax-free advantage, undercutting tax-paying local industries. By taxing FZEs on domestic sales, the reform addresses this distortion. MAN’s support suggests that Nigeria’s broader business community does not see the new conditions as unreasonable, but rather to prevent free zones from becoming enclaves of perpetual tax avoidance.</li><li><strong>Tax Experts and Economists:</strong> Many tax analysts recognize the rationale behind the reforms. There’s acknowledgment that Nigeria’s blanket free zone exemptions were out of step with modern tax principles, and that even China — often cited for its SEZ success — eventually phased out full tax holidays in favor of reduced rates or performance-based incentives. However, experts urge the government to communicate clearly and maybe incentivize compliance. For instance, while FZEs will lose some benefits, the government could ease other pain points (e.g. improved infrastructure and one-stop customs processing, etc.) to keep the zones attractive. Timing is another issue: imposing these changes when Nigeria is desperate for foreign investment (post-COVID and amid oil revenue struggles) could be risky if not managed properly.</li></ul><p>In public discourse, some see this as an exaggerated fuss. The government insists it is not ending the Free Zone scheme, just reforming it for accountability and revenue. The final shape of the law might include compromises, but as it stands, the core principles of the reform seem likely to be enacted.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/925/1*04L1NW1UhRViSrO9XkHeBw.avif" /><figcaption>Panoramic view of Manaus Free Trade Zone | Blu-Castle</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Global Practices: How Other Countries Tax Free Zone Businesses</strong></p><p>To put Nigeria’s move in context, it’s helpful to compare with how other countries handle taxation of enterprises in their free zones or SEZs:</p><ul><li><strong>Ghana:</strong> A peer in West Africa, Ghana’s Free Zones programme offers 100% exemption from import duties and taxes, and a 10-year corporate tax holiday, after which a reduced CIT rate of 15% applies. Crucially, Ghana requires that at least 70% of a Free Zone company’s output be exported; up to 30% can be sold locally but those local sales are subject to full taxes and duties. If a company fails to meet the 70% export requirement, it can lose its free zone status. This model is strikingly similar to Nigeria’s proposed 75% export condition and shows such thresholds are a standard feature. The intent is to ensure the zones focus on export-led growth. Ghana’s regime has attracted manufacturing in textiles, cocoa processing, etc., but Ghana too has been reviewing the efficacy of endless tax holidays. By capping the tax holiday to 10 years and then imposing 15%, Ghana balances attracting investment with eventually collecting some tax, something Nigeria is now emulating.</li><li><strong>Kenya:</strong> Kenya’s Export Processing Zones have long offered a 10-year corporate income tax holiday, followed by a 25% rate (vs. standard 30%) for the next 10 years. Firms in Kenyan EPZs may sell up to 20% of their output into the local market (with approval and payment of duties). Like Nigeria, Kenya found that some companies were abusing EPZ status to enjoy tax breaks while catering to the domestic market, and it has tightened oversight. Recently, Kenya has been considering paring back some EPZ perks under IMF pressure to boost revenue. The lesson: overly generous, open-ended incentives tend to be scaled back eventually, and Nigeria is following that trajectory now.</li><li><strong>South Africa:</strong> South Africa’s approach is to reduce taxes rather than eliminate them. Its SEZs offer qualifying companies a 15% CIT rate (vs. 27% standard), along with accelerated depreciation allowances, but no outright tax exemption. Also, companies must be conducting business <em>within</em> the zone and mainly in certain manufacturing activities to qualify. Notably, there’s no export percentage requirement in SA; zones are intended to boost industrial activity in designated regions (some products even serve the domestic market). However, firms cannot abuse transfer pricing — transactions with related parties outside the zone are limited to 20% of income/expenses to prevent profit shifting. South Africa’s model shows another path: modest tax cuts for SEZ companies rather than blanket exemptions, ensuring they still contribute to the fiscus from day one (albeit at a lower rate). Nigeria’s introduction of the 15% minimum tax echoes this philosophy of at least a baseline contribution.</li><li><strong>Singapore:</strong> Singapore treats its Free Trade Zones (FTZs) primarily as logistics facilitation areas — goods can be stored and transhipped with duties and GST (VAT) suspended, but companies in FTZs do not get automatic income tax holidays. Any company in Singapore pays the 17% corporate tax rate on its profits, FTZ or not, unless it qualifies for specific incentive programs (like pioneer status or development incentives) that are tied to substantive criteria (high-tech investment, etc.) rather than location alone. In essence, Singapore’s FTZs are about customs efficiency and duty exemption on re-exports, not about income tax. This is an important point — Nigeria’s original FTZ concept was more generous than Singapore’s, since Nigeria waived income tax entirely. Under the reforms, Nigeria is moving closer to a middle ground: still offering tax breaks for exporters, but with conditions akin to investment incentive schemes. Singapore’s practice underscores that being competitive doesn’t always mean zero corporate tax; other factors (infrastructure, ease of business, skilled labor) play a huge role in attracting investors.</li><li><strong>Brazil:</strong> Brazil’s famous Manaus Free Trade Zone provides substantial tax incentives, but not a full exemption. Manufacturers in Manaus can get up to 75% reduction in income tax and other federal taxes, meaning an effective CIT rate of around 8% instead of 34% for a period of time. They also enjoy exemptions from import/export duties and some state taxes. These incentives are aimed at developing the remote Amazon region. However, they are periodically reviewed and have expiry dates (currently many are extended to 2032). Manaus companies producing for the domestic Brazilian market still get those tax breaks, which has been controversial with other regions. The Brazilian model shows a scenario where even domestic-focused production can be incentivized with lower taxes to spur regional growth. Nigeria’s reforms are less about regional development and more about export promotion, so Nigeria chose not to subsidize domestic market production in zones with tax breaks (hence the full taxation if &gt;25% sold locally). But the 8% vs 34% example from Brazil highlights that Nigeria’s proposed 15% minimum tax is not outlandish — it ensures FZEs still get a 50% or more tax reduction compared to the standard 30% CIT, which is in line with many global regimes (just less extreme than a 0% rate).</li></ul><p>Other countries include Malaysia, which offers 0% tax for 10 years in certain “Free Zone” manufacturing projects and then 25% thereafter, and United Arab Emirates, long known for 0% tax free zones but now introducing a 9% federal corporate tax with exemptions for zone companies meeting substance tests. China’s SEZs in the 1980s-90s gave 5-year tax holidays then half-rate taxes for subsequent years, but today China mainly uses targeted tax reductions. These examples further underscore that perpetual full exemptions are rare in 2025 — most countries strike a balance.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: A Necessary Reform Aligned with Global Norms</strong></p><p>The proposed changes to FZE taxation under the 2024 reforms reflect a critical, yet balanced recalibration of Nigeria’s tax incentive regime. From the author’s perspective, many FZEs opposing the reforms are being somewhat opportunistic and understandably protective of their tax-free privileges but overlooking the broader context. The essence of a free zone is to catalyze export-led growth, not to serve as a permanent tax haven for domestic business. What the Nigeria Tax Bill 2024 does is to re-anchor the free zones to their original purpose: if you produce and export, you remain tax-exempt; if you leverage the local Nigerian market, you contribute your fair share of taxes. This principle is hard to fault, as it simply enforces the basic tenet that taxation should be based on where economic value is consumed. It also upholds fairness for non-zone companies and aligns with global norms that incentives should be conditional and time-bound, not carte blanche.</p><p>In conclusion, much ado about the free zones might be just that — <em>much ado</em>. The storm of protest will likely settle once stakeholders see that the sky isn’t falling. Nigeria stands to gain by enforcing tax compliance and equity, while still offering substantial incentives (a compliant FZE can still effectively enjoy a 0% tax on 75% of its business and a heavily reduced rate on the rest, or even just 15% minimum if very large — either way, far below the standard 30% corporate tax. Such a regime is hardly punitive; it is, in fact, competitive. The reforms could be a win-win: government broadens its revenue base slightly and curbs abuse, and the Free Zones become more respected and resilient, no longer viewed as avenues for profit shifting but rather as engines of real export production.</p><p>Nigeria’s free zones have come a long way since the 1990s — and they will continue to play a vital role. By recalibrating the incentives now, Nigeria is future proofing the scheme, ensuring that <em>“Free”</em> Zones don’t mean <em>“Free-for-all”</em> zones, but rather zones of freedom to do business <em>the right way</em>. With continued dialogue, a phased implementation, and complementary pro-investment policies, the country can retain its appeal to investors while securing the fiscal sustainability that ultimately underpins all development efforts.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1cf1f19d4da2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[INSIGHT: Tax Revenue Mobilization in Nigeria]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/insight-tax-revenue-mobilization-in-nigeria-29a9b39b4f16?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/29a9b39b4f16</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2025 09:53:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-25T13:30:09.496Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>…Originally published in <strong>Bloomberg Tax</strong> with <strong>Adeniyi Adeyemi</strong> in <strong>July 2020</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DOfNirjSUB_hZT9PwCQSKg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Adeniyi Adeyemi and Adedapo Adeduro of KPMG Nigeria consider the low level of tax compliance in Nigeria and make the case for further collaboration between taxpayers and the Nigerian government, in order to raise tax revenue and support the economy.</strong></p><p>Taxes remain the most sustainable and reliable source of public revenue of any modern state. According to <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/obstacles-to-increasing-tax-revenues-in-low-income-countries/">recent estimates</a> from the International Center for Tax and Development, tax revenues account for more than 80% of total government revenue in about half of the countries in the world and more than 50% in almost every country.</p><p>In Nigeria, the search for a sustainable source of public finance has brought taxation to the forefront of public discourse and attention. This is further reinforced by dwindling oil revenue which has led to increasing reliance on debt as a way of financing the country’s annual budget. In this regard, the International Monetary Fund has maintained that borrowing to shore up revenue is not sustainable. The Minister of Finance has corroborated this with continuous calls to ramp up domestic resource mobilization with a focus on taxation.</p><p>This article examines the tax profile of Nigeria as well as some of the factors limiting tax revenue mobilization. In addition, the authors draw lessons from other countries, and ongoing efforts of the Nigerian government with respect to tax revenue mobilization, to highlight key areas where the government and taxpayers can collaborate to further boost tax revenue for the benefit of the country.</p><h3>Tax Compliance in Nigeria</h3><h3>Current Assessment</h3><p>A review of the country’s tax revenue position and other relevant statistics reveals the low level of tax compliance in Nigeria. According to the Federal Inland Revenue Service, the country’s total tax collection in 2019 was 5.26 trillion naira ($13.5 billion). Assuming this amount relates to income tax from the 3.1 million registered businesses in Nigeria (<a href="https://www.cac.gov.ng/">Corporate Affairs Commission</a> (March 2019), this will bring average tax payments per business to 1,710 naira (less than $5). This is an abysmal figure considering the tax payments by publicly listed companies and the remittances from the oil and gas sector, and for a country where companies pay a minimum tax irrespective of their profitability.</p><p>The statistics on tax payment by economically active persons in Nigeria are equally disturbing. The Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) puts Nigeria’s population of employed persons at 69.5 million people as at September 2018. However, the individual tax-paying population is estimated as 19 million, indicating that about 50.5 million employed Nigerians operate outside the tax net. In 2018, the 36 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) generated a <a href="https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries[search]=IGR">total tax revenue</a> of 669 billion naira, resulting in an average of 35,211 naira per registered taxpayer and a paltry 6,021 naira per economically active person. Evidently, the level of tax compliance is dismal, and this accounts for the low ratio of tax revenue to the country’s gross domestic product. This is even more alarming when Nigeria is benchmarked against South Africa, where tax revenue per employed person is approximated at 570,370 naira and tax-to-GDP ratio is above 25%.</p><h3>Obstacles to Tax Revenue Mobilization</h3><p>Given the above, the tax revenue profile of the country reflects the state of the fiscal contract between its citizens and the government. The tax revenue issue in Nigeria can be traced to a broken social contract which has perpetuated a culture of tax evasion among citizens. In other words, tax morale is low, and this has become a stem bearing fruits of tax evasion, involuntary tax compliance, tax fraud, apathy to tax matters and other issues hampering government efforts to ramp up tax revenue. The result of a <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/dataset/nesg-nigeria-tax-subsidy-perception-dataset/">survey</a> conducted by the Nigeria Economic Summit Group on tax perception reveals that more than a fifth of Nigerians believe it is “not wrong at all” to not pay income taxes, while about 54.3% admit that tax evasion is wrong but that it is justifiable and understandable.</p><p>Several studies have alluded to a combination of factors as obstacles to sustainable tax revenue collection in Nigeria: the perception that taxes do not result in provision of services remains an obstacle to tax revenue mobilization.</p><p>However, the tendency in most conversations about tax revenue performance is to advance one side of the argument either in favor of the government or of taxpayers. Our view is that, to reverse the trend of poor tax compliance, the narrative must move beyond the ‘’blame game’’ to exploring areas of collaboration between government and taxpayers in the short to medium term. This is without losing sight of the need to address the fundamental issues of inclusive economic growth, fiscal discipline and effective resource utilization, among others, in the medium to long term.</p><h3>Stimulate Collaboration Between Government and Taxpayers for Improved Tax Revenue</h3><p>The relationship between the taxpayer and the tax authority is a contract that involves a complex interaction, and which must include the tenets of fairness and reciprocity. Government must prioritize removal of the pain points of existing compliant taxpayers and ensure the economic benefits of paying tax are delivered to taxpayers and citizens at large. A mutually beneficial relationship will lead to an increase in the number of taxpayers and, therefore, tax revenue for government on the one hand, and direct economic benefits and growth for taxpayers, on the other hand.</p><p>While the government has implemented several measures to foster government–taxpayer partnerships, the current tax revenue indices reflect that these measures are yet to materially change the tax revenue position of the country.</p><p>Based on lessons from other countries and global practices in domestic revenue mobilization, we have outlined below some considerations that the government may evaluate to further deepen government–taxpayer collaboration towards boosting tax revenue performance.</p><h3>Strengthen Connection Between Access to Public Services and Tax Compliance</h3><p>A direct link between payment of taxes and usage of government-provided infrastructure and interventions may increase awareness of tax obligations and consequently, the rate of tax compliance. Lagos State has attempted to do this by stamping ‘’pay your tax’’ on most of its infrastructure and documents relating to public services. As a result, residents of Lagos are fairly aware of the link between tax payment and continuous provision of and access to public services. Arguably, this approach is working, as Lagos State alone collected over 30% of the total taxes generated by state governments and the FCT in 2018.</p><p>Beyond public awareness, evidence of tax compliance should be a precondition to access certain benefits. For instance, companies or businesses without evidence of tax registration should not be able to access Central Bank of Nigeria’s intervention facilities. In this regard, the provision of the Finance Act, 2019 which requires mandatory tax registration as a precondition to operate a bank account is highly commendable. Government, at all levels, must ensure full implementation of this initiative and promote more initiatives that restrict access of delinquent taxpayers and tax evaders to certain public benefits.</p><p>On the other hand, government must put provision of services at the center of its tax compliance efforts to motivate willingness. Sweden has one of the highest tax rates in the world, with tax contributing an average of 48.2% of GDP. High income earners in Sweden could pay as much as 49–60% of their income as personal income tax. However, <a href="https://www.thelocal.se/20180111/does-swedens-tax-system-really-screw-the-rich">research</a> has shown that Swedes are happy to pay taxes as tuition is free for their children up to university level, students enjoy free lunch in schools, free health and dental care for under-18s, and child allowance in a sum of $1,500 per child annually.</p><h3>Implement Policies on Tax Transparency</h3><p>The viability of the social contract between taxpayers and government is dependent on the taxpayer’s perception of the government. A positive perception of government’s use of tax receipts will lead to an increased willingness of citizens and businesses to be tax compliant.</p><p>Tax transparency is a concept in the context of tax revenue mobilization which developing countries should adopt and implement. The concept addresses disclosures on how tax revenues are utilized, expenses for tax collection, as well as the percentage of the total tax collection that is attributable to high net worth individuals (HNWIs), multinational corporations and those at the bottom of the economic pyramid, among others. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, tax transparency can put an end to tax evasion.</p><p>Given the above, government should implement policies on mandatory periodic disclosure of relevant information on tax collection and profiling of taxpayers by all states and the federal government. In Finland, as part of the government’s tax transparency drive, the country publishes the taxable income of all its citizens, including the tax data of celebrities, HNWIs and politicians. This action has helped to broaden the country’s tax base as shown by the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/finland-has-just-published-everyone-s-taxes-on-national-jealousy-day/">result of a survey</a> conducted by the country’s tax administrator in 2017. A policy of this nature should be adopted in Nigeria (with slight modifications to cater for individual characteristics in Nigeria) to boost tax morale and broaden the tax base.</p><h3>Foster Partnership with Taxpayers on Direct Utilization of Taxes on Infrastructure</h3><p>In 2019, President Muhammadu Buhari signed the Road Infrastructure Development and Refurbishment Investment Tax Credit Scheme Executive Order 007. The scheme, which provides the opportunity for businesses to utilize their income tax in constructing any approved road infrastructure, launched with six companies granted tax credits to construct 19 federal roads across the country. This scheme is laudable and can be extended and strengthened by streamlining the administrative process for obtaining approvals under the scheme.</p><p>Our view is that schemes of this nature help taxpayers, especially large corporates, to collaborate with government in deciding the most equitable utilization of their taxes. Such schemes should be promoted and more initiatives that grant tax incentives for positive actions from individuals and corporations should be encouraged to motivate voluntary tax compliance.</p><h3>Involve Informal Sector Groups in Tax Compliance Efforts</h3><p>Several trade unions and informal groups have existed in Nigeria for decades. Members of such unions and groups are usually loyal to their leaders, paying their dues as and when due. Government can leverage this trust to collaborate with trade associations and informal groups to expand the tax net. This is particularly useful in places where presumptive taxation is used to assess individuals and trade blocs to tax.</p><p>In this arrangement, trusted members of the respective trade associations are appointed to serve as agents of the tax authorities for collecting and accounting for all funds collected. This can help to build a culture of tax compliance within this group. The government may also link consistency in tax compliance and payment with promise of access to training, workshops, group credit facilities and provision of critical infrastructure to clusters of informal traders and artisans across the country.</p><h3>Expand Whistleblowing Policy to Gather Intelligence for Tax Enforcement</h3><p>In 2016, the federal government, through the federal ministry of finance, launched a whistle-blowing policy in Nigeria. The policy seeks to encourage people to disclose information about fraud, bribery and looted government funds, with the promise of 2.5%–5% of recovered funds as reward. The <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/245933-n30-billion-recovered-tips-whistle-blowers-efcc.html">policy</a> has started bearing fruit, as over 2,150 tips have been received from the public and billions of naira recovered by the federal government .</p><p>This initiative can be extended to the tax system to further demonstrate government’s intolerance for tax evasion and any indiscretion around tax matters. The whistleblowing policy, among other things, would expose corporations who do not pay tax and HNWIs who hide all or part of their income from the tax system. In addition, it would uncover instances of tax waivers and exemption granted in defiance of established procedures or for political expediency. It is, however, important that protection of tax whistleblowers is assured to encourage participation by citizens and successful implementation of the policy.</p><p>In 2018, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service <a href="https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/fy18_wo_annual_report_final.pdf">realized $1.441 billion</a> in taxes, penalties and interest from its whistleblower program, while paying out $312 million in rewards. In 2012 alone, Greece collected 4.5 billion euros ($5 billion) in fines from its whistleblower program under the Financial and Economic Crime Unit.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The need to accelerate tax revenue mobilization in Nigeria cannot be over-emphasized. A collaboration between taxpayers and the government would go a long way to addressing the age-old obstacles to improved tax revenue performance in Nigeria. We hope that government, at all levels, would consider the various areas of collaboration, as examined above, to foster tax compliance and change the narrative around the tax profile of the country.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=29a9b39b4f16" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Nigeria’s Tax Committee supporting Fiscal Reforms?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/is-nigerias-tax-committee-supporting-fiscal-reforms-3e7f748fc9fb?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3e7f748fc9fb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[government-revenue]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taxes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fiscal-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tax-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2025 15:48:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-24T15:48:20.815Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nigeria faces a deep-rooted revenue crisis across all tiers of government, with one of the world’s lowest tax-to-GDP ratios, currently around 10%, far below the African average of 16%. This has led to excessive reliance on borrowing, shrinking fiscal space as debt servicing consumes a significant share of revenue, and perpetuating a cycle of underfunded socio-economic development.</p><p>Despite some progress, past tax reforms have not been transformative enough to change this trajectory. To address this, President Bola Tinubu inaugurated the Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms in August 2023, with a clear mandate to improve Nigeria’s revenue profile while making the business environment more conducive and internationally competitive.</p><p>The Committee, led by Taiwo Oyedele, set an ambitious goal to transform the tax system to support sustainable development, while, at the same time, achieving a minimum of 18% tax-to-GDP ratio within the next three years. One year after inauguration and various stakeholder engagements, four bills, authored by the committee, were submitted by the President to the National Assembly. The Bills include the:</p><p>1. Nigeria Tax Bill 2024</p><p>2. Nigeria Tax Administration Bill 2024</p><p>3. Nigeria Revenue Service Establishment Bill 2024</p><p>4. Joint Revenue Board Establishment Bill 2024</p><p>Here’s how these bills can shape Nigeria’s fiscal direction under the Bola Tinubu administration:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t5egysxFVmafNAB1DU6GqQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Tax Harmonization to Improve Ease of Doing Business</strong></p><p>The Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council, established in 2016, has made significant strides in Nigeria’s ease of doing business ranking, moving from 169th in 2016 to 131st in 2024 per the World Bank. However, Nigeria still lags in tax compliance and remittance efficiency, a key metric in global business competitiveness.</p><p>The Nigeria Tax Bill aims to simplify tax legislation by repealing 14 existing tax acts and amending 11 others, creating a more coherent and business-friendly tax environment. One major improvement is the streamlining of tax refund processes, particularly for excess Value Added Tax (VAT), which must now be refunded within 30 days, a long-overdue reform that addresses a major pain point for taxpayers.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>Exemptions for Small Businesses and Low-Income Earners</strong></p><p>The tax bills take a pro-poor approach, ensuring that low-income earners and small businesses do not bear an unfair tax burden, especially in a high-inflationary environment.</p><p><strong>Key exemptions include:</strong></p><p>· Small businesses (turnover ≤ ₦50 million) will be exempt from VAT registration and remittance.</p><p>· Essential goods and services used by low-income earners will be zero-rated (meaning VAT is recoverable by sellers but should not passed on to buyers).</p><p>· Small businesses will not pay Corporate Income Tax (CIT) or the newly introduced Development Levy.</p><p>· Individuals earning ₦1 million or less annually will be exempt from Personal Income Tax (PIT) while the rates have been amended to make the system more progressive.</p><p>· From January 1 2025, small businesses are not expected to deduct withholding tax (WHT) from their vendors and suppliers provided the transaction sum is below ₦2 million monthly.</p><p>These measures align with global best practices, ensuring that taxation does not stifle economic growth but instead encourages business expansion and employment creation.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>VAT and Excise Duty Adjustments for Revenue Growth</strong></p><p>Since its introduction in 1993, VAT has been a major revenue source for Nigeria due to its ease of collection compared to direct taxes like CIT and PIT. However, at 7.5%, Nigeria’s VAT rate is the lowest in Africa (Statista).</p><p>The new tax bills propose a phased VAT increase:</p><p>· 10% in 2025</p><p>· 12.5% in 2026</p><p>· 15% by 2030 (Africa’s average rate)</p><p>Additionally, excise duties are proposed on telecommunications and foreign currency sales, while winnings from gaming and lottery will now be subject to WHT. These measures aim to boost government revenue without disproportionately affecting low-income earners as stated in (2).</p><p>💡 However, there is resistance: The Nigeria Governors’ Forum strongly opposes VAT and excise duty hikes, citing potential inflationary effects. The House of Representatives has rejected the VAT increase and removed excise duties from the bills, while the Senate is yet to take a final position.</p><p><strong>4.</strong> <strong>Increase in Capital Gains Tax (CGT) exemption threshold on Sale of shares</strong></p><p>In January 2022, Nigeria introduced a 10% Capital Gains Tax (CGT) on share sales above ₦100 million annually to boost non-oil revenue. However, this policy has coincided with historically low foreign percentage participation in the Nigerian Exchange (NGX), a concern for a country striving to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).</p><p>While this is not necessarily cause and effect, the new tax bills partially address this by increasing the CGT exemption threshold to ₦150 million, making it more attractive for investors while preserving Nigeria’s fiscal base.</p><p><strong>5.</strong> <strong>Strengthening Tax Compliance WHT Reforms</strong></p><p>The Deduction of Tax at Source (Withholding) Regulations, 2024, authored by the committee, came into effect in January 2025 and includes stricter compliance measures. Taxpayers without a Tax Identification Number (TaxID) will have WHT deducted at double the standard rate. The tax bills also include provisions that ensures all taxable persons, businesses and MDAs at all tiers of government must obtain a TaxID. The tax laws go as far as empowering tax authorities to assign a TaxID to individuals and entities who fail to register voluntarily. These measures aim to expand Nigeria’s tax net and curb evasion, ensuring that more individuals and businesses contribute fairly to national revenue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FuO0tSL-rVzaoRAeUR8_rg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>6.</strong> <strong>Inter-Agency Collaboration for Tax Administration</strong></p><p>One of Nigeria’s biggest tax challenges has been the lack of inter-agency collaboration. Data is often scattered across multiple government institutions, making enforcement difficult. To address this, the Chairman of the Committee has mentioned that the next phase of reform will focus on improving collaboration between MDAs and enhancing information-sharing mechanisms to plug revenue leakages. In the meantime, the Tax Administration Bill allows tax authorities to delegate tax administration to another agency for efficiency. For example, state tax authorities without an e-filing system can leverage the FIRS TaxProMax platform for a fee. This ensures a more integrated and efficient tax administration system across all levels of government.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: A Bold Step, But Challenges Remain</strong></p><p>The proposed tax reforms represent a significant shift in Nigeria’s fiscal strategy, aiming to increase revenue, ease compliance, and promote economic growth. However, political opposition, inflationary concerns, and enforcement challenges could slow down implementation.</p><p>To achieve the ambitious 18% tax-to-GDP target, the government must win stakeholder buy-in, especially from state governments; ensure tax reforms do not stifle business growth; strengthen enforcement without overburdening compliant taxpayers.</p><p>Will these reforms break Nigeria’s cycle of revenue shortfalls and borrowing? Or will they be watered down before implementation? Only time will tell.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3e7f748fc9fb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On the newly proposed property taxes]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/on-the-newly-proposed-property-taxes-271d949f0616?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/271d949f0616</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taxes]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Sep 2024 18:31:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-10T18:31:56.899Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The recent recommendation by the Presidential Fiscal Policy Committee on property taxes could have a notable impact on the housing market. On one hand, these taxes may prompt more property owners to list their homes for rent/sale, thereby increasing housing supply and potentially reducing rent pressures in the long run. Additionally, the implementation of property taxes could enhance data collection and transparency in the real estate sector, helping to bring greater order and accountability to the market.</p><p>However, this policy could also have unintended consequences. Property owners may pass the additional tax burden onto tenants, potentially leading to higher rents, especially in an already tight rental market. Moreover, for certain groups like money launderers, politicians, or speculative investors (including non-residents), the additional tax may not be a significant deterrent. These actors might be willing to absorb the extra cost, as their primary interest lies in holding the properties for reasons other than immediate returns.</p><p>This raises important questions that deserve a deeper exploration. How will this policy affect ordinary Nigerians versus those using property for financial maneuvering? Are there sufficient safeguards in place to protect tenants which the committee has made clear they want to help. It would be interesting to see experts in the field conduct a thorough analysis of the potential outcomes and trade-offs.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=271d949f0616" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On the new Withholding Tax Regulations in Nigeria]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@adeduroadedapo/on-the-new-withholding-tax-regulations-in-nigeria-98e5d34f130b?source=rss-9f78ae5da514------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/98e5d34f130b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fiscal-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taxes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adedapo Adeduro]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Sep 2024 18:27:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-10T18:27:46.554Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Section 81(8) of the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA) while regulating the administration of withholding tax, states that “the Minister of Finance on the advice of the Service may make regulations for the carrying out of the provisions of this section”. Section 73(6) of the Personal Income Tax Act also states the same, except Service is replaced with Board which refer to the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and the Joint Tax Board (JTB), respectively.</p><p>On July 2 2024, the Ministry of Finance issued a new Deduction of Tax at Source (Withholding Tax) Regulations, 2024 (the Regulation), while the Regulation itself is not dated, it has a commencement date of 1 July, a day before the first copy appeared online. Normally, new tax regulations are published in a gazette to formalize them and serve as official notice to the public; but despite the promise of the Chairman, Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms for the gazette to be released “in few days”, it has been over 2 months and we are still waiting.</p><p>While the Regulation is very welcome and pro-business, it has created potential challenges for the 2024 tax audits. The uncertainty on application and commencement worsens the situation.</p><p>Now comes the argument; on the one hand, the provisions of CITA above, do not explicitly require a gazette for the Regulation to take effect; they only require the Ministry of Finance to issue it, which has already been done. The term “gazette” appears four times in CITA, clearly indicating that when a regulation requires a gazette, it is stated explicitly.</p><p>On the other hand, only the Chairman has released a version of the Regulation. Given the backdrop of recent instances, such as a Presidential spokesman issuing and retracting an official government regulation, can businesses confidently implement this without a gazetted version? Why is there silence from both the FIRS and JTB, and why hasn’t the Regulation been gazetted after two months? In 2020, the FIRS swiftly released a circular clarifying its position on the VAT Modification Order, even publicly disputing certain items with the Ministry of Finance — its supervisor.</p><p>There’s also the timing issue — the Regulation became available after its official commencement date. What happens to a company that incurred and settled significant expenses on July 1? Moreover, the National Tax Policy, ironically published by the same Ministry of Finance, recommends a 90-day window for new laws — how does that factor in here?</p><p>As a tax manager, I initially moved forward with implementing the Regulation after seeing the Minister’s signature. However, I have since reflected on that decision due to the delays in gazetting and the silence from FIRS.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=98e5d34f130b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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