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            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2020 20:16:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-19T19:05:49.450Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Parent-Child Separation in Yarkand County, Kashgar</h3><p><strong>Evidence From Local Government Spreadsheets about the Fate of Thousands of Students With One or Both Parents in Internment Camps</strong></p><p>Dr. Adrian Zenz<br>Senior Fellow in China Studies<br>Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation<br>Twitter: @adrianzenz</p><p><em>Date: October 15, 2020</em></p><p><strong>Overview of Key Findings</strong></p><ul><li>New local government data from Yarkand (Xinjiang) shows over 10,000 mostly Uyghur children in “hardship” due to one or both parents detained.</li><li>About 1,000 of these children have both parents in detention. A number of them have been put into state orphanages, some of which are directly next to schools.</li><li>The number of students in Xinjiang who live in boarding facilities grew by over 380,000 between 2017 and 2019, from about 500,000 to just below 900,000.</li><li>Local government lists of households confirm that there are numerous families with both parents in detention, with children shown to be in orphanages (younger ages) or boarding schools (older ages).</li></ul><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>In July 2019, the author’s detailed report on parent-child separation provided comprehensive evidence from government sources that Beijing’s campaign of mass internment in Xinjiang was separating large numbers of children from their parents. <a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> It showed that the state was engaging in a construction drive to add boarding facilities to educational settings, ranging from preschools to secondary schools.</p><p>Now, for the first time, new evidence from non-public Xinjiang government spreadsheets has come to light that details the fate of over 10,000 children from the Uyghur majority population county of Yarkand (Kashgar Prefecture). All of these children have one or both parents in internment (detention centers, re-education camps or prisons). The documents show how the state is caring for these children.</p><p>About 1,000 of these children have both parents in detention. The spreadsheets indicate that a number of them have been placed into state-run orphanages, while others are kept in full-time boarding school facilities. Other spreadsheets show entire households along with the internment status of their members, corroborating the veracity of these lists of “children in difficult circumstances” and giving us a full picture of their actual family situation.</p><p>By giving unprecedented detail and insight into the fate of these children, the new data represents a highly incriminating set of information that sheds further light on the dramatic social ramifications of Beijing’s actions against these ethnic minorities.</p><h3><strong>1. Context: Boarding Education and Students With Detained Parents in Yarkand and Xinjiang</strong></h3><p><strong>1.1 Xinjiang’s Boarding School Campaign</strong></p><p>China, and specifically Xinjiang, have different categories of needy children. Besides outright orphans (孤儿), there are:</p><ul><li>Left-behind children (留守儿童), typically defined in state documentation as caused by either both parents being away for work reasons, or one parent being away and the other unable to take care of the children.</li><li>Street children (流浪少年儿), who are without proper guardianship.</li><li>Children from “poor families” (贫困家庭), whose situation is impacted by difficult economic circumstances.</li></ul><p>All of the above types of children can be referred to as “children in difficult circumstances” (困境儿童) or “children in especially difficult circumstances” (特殊困境儿童). By the end of 2017, Xinjiang officially had 80,933 orphaned, disabled or other children from such “population groups in difficult circumstances” (困难群体) in centralized state care facilities alone.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> The local government spreadsheets analyzed below indicate that many more children in difficult circumstances are cared for in full-time boarding school facilities.</p><p>In 2018, Xinjiang embarked on a campaign to centralize and expand the boarding capacities of schools across all levels. In March 2018, the regional government issued a call to strengthen the construction of boarding schools throughout the region.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> An government directive from Kashgar Prefecture from August 2018 states that the region is “striving to complete the 2020 goal of completing the construction of dormitory-based schools (寄宿制学校)”.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> For 2020, Kashgar Prefecture planned to expand the comprehensive construction of boarding facilities for countryside schools located in townships.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p>The directive further states that for grades 4 and higher, boarding is mandatory (应寄尽寄), while boarding for younger students is dependent on the wishes and circumstances of parents and guardians. Importantly, boarding facilities are to play a key role in the retention of “students from families with hardships” (家庭困难学生). The text states that for families with hardships and with children grade 3 and below, the state must “implement boarding school education well”. Mandatory boarding schooling for such children above grade 3 is not just limited to Kashgar; related directives can be found for numerous other minority counties in Xinjiang.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>Specifically, Kashgar set aside 60 million RMB for special subsidies for “students from families with hardships”: 2.50 RMB per day for “single-hardship students” (单困生), and 5 RMB per day for “double-hardship students” (双困生). The expressions “single- / double-hardships” indicate whether one or both parents are part of the difficult situation. The evidence presented below indicates that this includes situations where one or both parents are in some form of internment.</p><p>Government statistics show that between 2017 and 2019, the numbers of boarding students in primary and middle schools (grades 1 to 9) increased by 76.9 percent, from 497,800 to 880,500 (Figure 1).<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> This increase of 382,000 boarding school students occurred during the time frame of the internment campaign, and would have predominantly taken place in minority regions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/570/1*Uzvpc5jP8bzi6AslJMmdGQ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Xinjiang boarding school students.</figcaption></figure><p>Previously, a New York Times article on parent-child separation in Xinjiang reported the 497,800 figure by stating that “[n]early a half million children have been separated from their families and placed in boarding schools so far”.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> That wording is potentially misleading, given that this figure simply reports the total number of boarding students (of all ethnic groups) in Xinjiang, without saying anything about separation from parents due to internment or other reasons (at my request, the New York Times kindly agreed to change their subtitle). However, the drastic (76.9 percent) increase of this figure since 2017 is clearly a reflection of both the mandatory boarding policy and of the ongoing detentions.</p><p>Between 2016 and 2019, the number of primary and middle schools in Xinjiang decreased while their total floor space areas grew significantly, reflecting a centralization of educational facilities in larger boarding school complexes. During these years, the average floor space per primary school rose by 44.8 percent, from 3,742sqm to 5,420sqm, and for middle schools by 43.4 percent, from 12,393sqm to 17,766sqm.<a href="#_ftn7">[9]</a></p><p>According to the government, boarding schooling improves the educational situation of students from underdeveloped regions, given that local schools are under-resourced, commutes can be long, and parents may struggle to provide materially for their offspring. Boarding school campaigns have featured in other lesser developed parts of the country, notably in Tibetan regions.</p><p>However, these campaigns have been criticized for promoting environments where minority students face greater pressures to assimilate culturally and linguistically, and where they cannot at all engage in religious practices. Separated from their parents, students are exposed to the full force of the state’s indoctrination apparatus.</p><p>In Xinjiang, these issues are severely compounded against the backdrop of the region’s unprecedented police state and campaign of mass internment, measures that amount to a large-scale cultural and even demographic genocide.</p><p>According to the author’s previous research, Xinjiang’s educational facilities have become highly securitized and intensely political environments, where students live and study under the careful watch of a sophisticated high-tech surveillance apparatus.<a href="#_ftn9">[10]</a> Schools must employ security guards with “firm political views”, feature multi-tiered defensive intrusion prevention systems that rival those installed in internment camps or prisons, install full-coverage video surveillance systems, and some boast electric fences and computerized security patrol management systems equipped with one-button alarms. One Xinjiang middle school published a procurement bid for a 2.1 million RMB campus video surveillance system, which is more than what some re-education camps have spent on such systems.<a href="#_ftn10">[11]</a></p><p>Xinjiang’s weaponized boarding education system represents powerful tool of assimilation. A June 2018 notice issued by the Xinjiang Education Department proclaimed that by the end of that year, the region’s 2.94 million students in mandatory education (grades 1–9) were expected to have a fully Chinese-medium language education.<a href="#_ftn11">[12]</a></p><p>A specific example comes from the Tuokezhake Township Central Primary School (托克扎克镇中心小学), located in Shufu County and therefore in the same prefecture (Kashgar) as Yarkand.<a href="#_ftn12">[13]</a> The school’s document titled “Implementation Plan for a Completely Chinese-Speaking School Environment” (校园内全部讲国语实施方案) stipulates that all classes except for Uyghur language classes must be entirely taught in Chinese, and within the confines of the entire school, Chinese can be the only language for school management and teaching activities. Even teachers who teach the Uyghur language class are “encouraged” to use Chinese for the preparation and teaching of the class, and for any school management related activities. If at any time a teacher or student uses Uyghur, this must immediately be reported and dealt with as if it were a “serious teaching incident” (严重教学事故). Staff members who fail to immediately report such incidents receive the same punishment.</p><p><strong>1.2 Yarkand County: Boarding Schooling and “Students with Hardships”</strong></p><p>In Yarkand, the implementation of the boarding policy is reflected in rising education budgets, especially at the secondary level, where expenditures grew by over 20 percent in 2018.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/612/1*OMkMVN-K9H4aGHIEhoGjqQ.png" /><figcaption>Table 1: Yarkand (Shache) County educational expenditures. Source: Finance department final accounts.</figcaption></figure><p>Between 2018 and 2020, the county’s plans for expanding school boarding facilities specified the addition of 818,426sqm of floor space at a cost of 900.7 million RMB.</p><p>In 2018, the county budgeted 337.4 million RMB to expand or construct boarding and other facilities in 63 schools, and to construct 5 new schools, with a total floor space of 361,650sqm. The same document also outlined the construction of 222 securitized preschools, with surrounding walls and police guards. For 2019, the county budgeted another 165.2 million RMB for this ongoing project, involving now the expansion of 75 existing boarding schools, adding 257,731sqm of new floor space.<a href="#_ftn13">[14]</a> In 2020, the boarding school expansion involved 59 existing primary and middle school, with a floor space expansion of 199,045sqm and a budget of 398.1 million RMB.<a href="#_ftn14">[15]</a> The focus of this latest expansion were village and township schools, which is consistent with Kashgar’s 2020 notice cited above that stipulated the expansion of boarding education into the countryside.</p><p>The most important data point in Yarkand’s 2018 Poverty Alleviation Project Overview is the statement that the expansion of boarding floor space was intended to “solve the livelihood problems of 44,488 hardship students [困难学生].”</p><p>In Xinjiang and elsewhere in China, “children in difficult circumstances” (困境儿童) are typically defined as children where at least one parent is severely disabled or seriously ill, where the children themselves have a serious disability, where at least one parent is dead or serving a long-term prison sentence, or children with a single parent and a low household income where the remaining parent is either unable to financially support the child or unable to fulfill parental guardianship duties.<a href="#_ftn15">[16]</a> All of these children are “included in centralized [state] care” (纳入集中供养). Whether such “inclusion” is a choice or not is not stated in that particular policy document.</p><p>Yarkand’s figure of 44,488 “students in difficult circumstances” only refers to primary and secondary school students (including secondary vocational schools). Given that in 2019, the county had 225,286 primary and secondary school students, 19.7 percent of them were therefore considered to be “in difficult circumstances”.<a href="#_ftn16">[17]</a> However, according to county government data, in 2016 the county only had 8,544 poor households with 31,256 persons in poverty (贫困人口).<a href="#_ftn17">[18]</a> Numerous local government documents testify to the fact that between 2017 and 2019, ethnic minority families fell into poverty as a direct result of the campaign of mass internment.<a href="#_ftn18">[19]</a> Consequently, it seems evident that Yarkand’s numbers of “students in difficult circumstances” were greatly boosted by the internment campaign.</p><p>As a result, Yarkand’s share of such students is dramatically higher than in other Chinese regions. In 2019, neighboring Gansu province, which is also a much lesser developed region than the prosperous east, had a share of “students from families in difficult economic circumstances” (家庭经济困难学生) share of 8.7 percent among all primary and secondary students (including the secondary vocational level).<a href="#_ftn19">[20]</a> While Yarkand has long been a very poor county in China, the evidence presented below clearly indicates that the campaign of mass internment has greatly exacerbated this situation.</p><p><strong>1.3 Internment Camps and Interned Population Statistics for Yarkand County</strong></p><p>Figures of “students in difficult circumstances” need to be examined in the context of the wider internment campaign. Hotan and Kashgar Prefecture, which form a core part of the Uyghur heartland, have been at the center of Chen Quanguo’s re-education and social reengineering drive. Yarkand County has been even more a focus of Beijing’s security crackdown in the region because of the deadly July 28, 2014 incident, where 37 “civilians” (mostly Han Chinese) were killed and 59 assailants (Uyghurs) were shot dead by the police.<a href="#_ftn20">[21]</a></p><p>The China Cables, a set of leaked, classified documents issued by the Xinjiang government, indicate that each county in Xinjiang must establish a “vocational skills education and training leadership small group” (职业技能教育培训领导小组). More specifically, Uyghur majority population counties such as Yarkand appear to have such internment facilities in every township. For example, local government spreadsheets obtained by the author indicate that Alslan Bagh Township (阿尔斯兰巴格乡) shows that this and two other neighboring townships, Hoshrap Township (藿什拉甫乡) and Udalik Township (乌达力克乡), have vocational training internment camps, along with at least two such camps in the Yarkand County seat: the Yarkand Industrial Park Vocational Training Internment Camp (莎车县工业园区教培中心) and the Yarkand County Southern City District Vocational Training Internment Camp (莎车县城南教培中心). Moreover, Alslan Bagh Township has both a vocational training internment camp and a transformation through education camp (教转中心).<a href="#_ftn21">[22]</a></p><p>Local spreadsheets from six villages in three townships located in Yarkand County detail the situation of 1,138 households with 5,407 persons in 2018, all of them ethnic Uyghurs.<a href="#_ftn22">[23]</a> Of the 3,249 adults, 511 or 15.7 percent were classified as either in re-education, detention or prison (三类人员). Within this data set, the spreadsheet from no. 12 village in Azatbag Township (阿扎提巴格乡) showed an overall adult internment share of 28.4 percent, most of them male heads of households.</p><p>A different document shows the internment shares for villages that were implicated in Yarkand’s July 28, 2014 attack. A report about “issues with poverty alleviation” from October 2018 names two locations in that county, Elishku Town (艾力西湖镇诺其巴扎) and Akbash Village (阿克巴什村), both in Kosherik Township (阔什艾日克乡), that are “heavily polluted by extremist ideology” and were involved in that incident. A stunning 59.0 percent (440 of 746) of all households in these two villages are “three types of persons households” (三类人员). In one of the spreadsheets discussed below, which shows the situation of 9,537 students with single- or double-detained parents, 204 of them are from Kosherik Township.</p><p>Previously, the author estimated that up to 15.4 percent of Xinjiang’s Turkic minority adults are or were at one point in some form of extralegal detention. The data from Yarkand presented above feature an average internment adult share of 15.7 percent. The fact that nearly 20 percent of the county’s primary and secondary school students are designated as being in “difficult circumstances” must be viewed against this backdrop.</p><p>Overall, it should not come as a surprise that Yarkand County features an unusually high share of children with one or both parents in some form of internment or imprisonment.</p><p><strong>1.4 Publicly-Available Evidence of Minority Students with “Single-Detained“ or “Double-Detained” Parents</strong></p><p>The evidence contained in the local government spreadsheets on “children in difficult circumstances” with one or both parents in detention can be corroborated through several publicly-available sources, most of them government-issued documents.</p><p>A notice issued by the Kashgar Prefecture government in September 2018 uses f the terms “couples where both partners are detained in re-education” (夫妻双方被收教), and “couples where both partners are in vocational training internment camps” (夫妻双方在教培中心).<a href="#_ftn23">[24]</a> These parents are classified as “especially needy groups” (特殊困难群体), and their children are referred to as “children in difficult circumstances” (困境儿童). The document states that when these children’s parents are both in re-education camps (教培中心) and the family cannot pay their medical insurance bills, the insurance for them and for their children who are at school must be paid for by the local financial authorities.</p><p>Similarly, the Kashgar Prefecture Poverty Alleviation Policy Interpretation document, issued in May 2018, states that for “children from families in difficult circumstances [due to parents in] prison, custody or re-education” (三类人员家庭困境儿童), the prefecture has earmarked annual livelihood subsidies of 60 million RMB.<a href="#_ftn24">[25]</a></p><p>Another reference to the children of parents who are both in detention comes from a website linked to the Kuytun government.<a href="#_ftn25">[26]</a> The document contains detailed entries about persons, their government-issued ID numbers, their livelihood situation, information about their parents and siblings, and so on. One of the entries pertains to a person with a female Uyghur name whose parents are both detained in re-education (父母被收教). Her little brother is in primary school. The household is categorized as low-income and receiving minimum living allowance welfare payments (低保户). Another entry in the same spreadsheet mentions a person with a Kazakh name who is the “child of persons detained for re-education” (收教人员子女). This household is likewise classified as being in “difficult living conditions” and “low income” (生活困难, 低收入).</p><p>Another distinct piece of evidence of the fate of children with parents in detention comes from the report of a young graduate from Zhejiang Province who volunteered to teach Chinese in a rural primary school in Pishan County.<a href="#_ftn26">[27]</a> Dated December 2018, the report details how in the middle of winter, with temperatures as low as -20 degrees Celsius, many children were still wearing thin clothes. These clothes also had not been changed or washed in a long time so that the entire classroom stank. The young teacher learned that the pupils’ parents were away picking cotton or “studying at the VTIC” (在jp中心学习). With both parents away, the “students were in an extremely pitiful state” (学生非常可怜).</p><p>A similar predicament appears to prevail at the Yarkand County №3 Primary School, one of the schools where many children of single- and double-detained parents are listed in the government spreadsheets. A news article from October 2018 (pertaining to the same winter season), shows students lined up with winter clothes donated by the “Love Volunteer Association” (Figure 2).<a href="#_ftn27">[28]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*8KyjRexvX6qpF52WTY6quQ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2</figcaption></figure><p><strong>1.5 Behavioral Correction and Preventative Monitoring: Mitigating the “Security Risks” Posed by Students with Detained Parents</strong></p><p>In November 2016, the XUAR government issued a document outlining the region’s implementation of the central government mandate to organize systematic, centralized care for all rural “left-behind children” (农村留守儿童) by 2020.<a href="#_ftn28">[29]</a> This included the establishment of a computerized left-behind children information system in order to achieve complete reporting. However, as with the preschool construction drive, the state decided to drastically accelerate this policy. In June 2017, shortly after the begin of the internment campaign, the State Council Information Office (SCIO) in Beijing published a notice that required all left-behind children in Xinjiang to be in state care by the end of that year.<a href="#_ftn29">[30]</a> The notice further called for a comprehensive information system and an early intervention mechanism. Children with significant behavioral issues were to be subjected to “behavioral correction”.</p><p>Specifically, a Kashgar City notice from February 2018, which pertained to the expansion of boarding schools, mandates special attention for children whose parents have both either been “sentenced” or are in “vocational training”.<a href="#_ftn30">[31]</a> Here, “school children where one parent has been sentenced” (父母单方被判刑的困境学生) and “school children where [both] parents [are] in vocational skills training” (父母参加职业技能培训的困境学生; refers to vocational internment camps) are both referred to as “students in difficult circumstances” (困境学生).</p><p>The wording of the notice reflects a distinct urgency, indicating that the care of children whose parents are both in re-education had developed into a significant issue. These children are to be monitored and cared for by teachers and student class leaders helping the school leadership, class leaders helping teachers and teachers in charge of dormitory management (宿管老师), as well as student cadres and dormitory heads (宿舍长). All of these groups must “resolutely put an end to negligence in monitoring students in distress.” (坚决杜绝困境学生漏管).</p><p>The notice places similar urgency on “emphasizing and strengthening psychological counseling” (注重加强心理疏导) of all students in difficult circumstances, and to “strengthen students’ thought education” (强化学生思想教育). In particular, all those responsible are to “grasp students’ state of mind in a timely manner, implement one-on-one psychological counseling and psychological correction to the few students in difficult circumstances, … make up for the lack of family ties, and eliminate the negative impact on personality development ” (及时掌握学生思想动态，针对个别困境学生采取“一对一”心理疏导、心理矫正、…弥补亲情缺失，消除人格发展的消极影响). To this end, the affected students are permitted and encouraged to write letters to their detained parents and even to send them short video clips.</p><p>The fact that the state appears to have made detailed provisions for the situation of such schoolchildren provides further evidence of the systemic nature of this issue. Clearly, the boarding school system is used to contain and manage the fallout of the campaign of mass internment, while representing a core mechanism within Xinjiang’s long-term cultural genocide approach.</p><h3><strong>2. Local Government Spreadsheets Show Children with One or Both Parents in Detention</strong></h3><p><strong>2.1 Data Source</strong></p><p>In the summer of 2019, the author obtained a cache of over 25,000 files from different government departments. Government authorities exchange data via local networks, sorted by departments and departmental groups. Higher-level agencies send down policy documents, manuals, software and prepared spreadsheets that are to be filled out in order to meet extensive reporting requirements. The lower levels fill out these sheets, take photos or other evidence of activities, and return them to their superiors. These files are kept in large folders which can be downloaded all at once. The process of obtaining this data set did not involve any form of hacking into computer systems.</p><p>The obtained data pertains mostly to rural minority regions in Hotan, Kashgar and Kizilsu Prefectures, containing information collected or compiled by local government authorities between the years of 2015 and 2019. The key data presented in this paper consist of spreadsheets compiled or completed by local authorities to meet reporting requirements. Some files list all citizens within a local region, at times with their internment status. Other files serve more dedicated purposes, such as showing only the status of certain population groups.</p><p>The spreadsheets analyzed in this section pertain to “students / children in difficult circumstances” (困难学生 / 困境儿童). All of these files list student names, ID numbers, gender, a partial or complete address, their grade, the internment status of their parents, and their care status (cared for at home, at a boarding facility, or at an orphanage). Some files provide additional details such as ethnicity, their school’s name, or the number of their class in their school’s grade level. Some only state whether one or both parents are in some form of internment, while others state the form of internment (prison, detention, re-education).</p><p><strong>2.1 Spreadsheet with 9,357 Students in Difficult Circumstances in Yarkand County (Grades 1 to 6)</strong></p><p>The first file is a “roster of students in difficult circumstances in Yarkand County (grades 1 to 6)” (莎车县家庭困难学生花名册（1–6年级）). It lists 9,537 students with addresses, ID numbers, school names, ethnicity, grade level, and the internment status of their parents. All of these students have one thing in common: at least one of their parents is either a) in prison (监, short for 监狱), b) in detention (押, short for 收押), which would typically be in a detention center (看守所), or in re-education (教, short for 收教). Nearly all are Uyghur, besides 7 Kazakh and 4 Tajiks. Notably, in 2018 Yarkand only had 1,194 Kazaks and 2,918 Tajiks, but 24,958 Han. The list however does not contain a single Han student.</p><p>Of all students, 822 are listed as “double-hardship” (双困), and the remaining 8,715 are shown as “single- hardship” (单困). The column showing the parental internment status directly corresponds to this: “double-hardship” students are shown as having both parents in internment or prison.</p><p>The data indicates that 53.1 percent of all students were kept in boarding facilities: 49.8 percent of the “single-hardship” students, and 88.2 percent of the “double-hardship” students. As previously estimated by the author, the boarding education system plays a major role in caring for students whose parents are in detention. In line with policy requirements, boarding shares are especially high for students in grades 4 and higher (92.2 percent), while only 24.1 percent of grade 1–3 students are in dormitories. However, “double-hardship” students in these lower grades featured a boarding share of 82.1 percent, nearly as high as that of students in the higher grades.</p><p>The document reveals that 10,359 parents were still in internment (note that this figure and related calculations do not account for double-counting due to multiple children per set of parents). Of these, 20.2 percent were in prison, 18.5 percent in “detention”, and 59.4 percent in re-education. When both parents were interned, the most common form was both of them in re-education (298), followed by both of them in detention (136) and one in prison and one in re-education (122).</p><p>Of all students, 287 were shown as attending the Yarkand №3 Primary School (莎车县第三小学, see also section 1.4). This school has both a regular school building with boarding facilities, and an orphanage (福利院). This fact is confirmed by a teacher’s account, which says that: “next to our school is an orphanage, [whose] children also come to our school during the day and go back to the orphanage at night. The principal has to worry about their food and accommodation.”<a href="#_ftn31">[32]</a> Among the 287, 139 were “double-hardship” children, and 99 of them are shown to be located in the school orphanage. The teacher describes the conditions as extremely crowded: her class has 54 children. Since there are no spare rooms, the classroom also functions as the office space for several teachers. Students can stay at the school on the weekends and are then cared for by a “dorm auntie”, who helps them take baths and wash clothes.<a href="#_ftn32">[33]</a> Evidently, a number of students have no functioning family to return to. The teacher’s comment on this is telling: “Therefore, it is not the parents who know the students best, but the teachers and classmates…”.</p><p>The author attempted to identify the likely location of the school and its two distinct buildings on satellite images. According to a public construction bid document, they are located in the Southern City Education District (城南教学园区).<a href="#_ftn33">[34]</a> Their compound does not appear to have any visible security features. They are located directly next to a securitized compound that appears to be a vocational-type internment facility, with building styles and security features (including the internal fencing) being similar to other re-education and vocational training camps previously studied by the author.<a href="#_ftn34">[35]</a> This compound, which is quite likely the Yarkand County Southern City District Vocational Training Internment Camp mentioned above (both itself and the school are said to be located in the “Southern City District”), had its security features were removed in the spring of 2019, which is consistent with many such modifications of camps in the first half of 2019.<a href="#_ftn35">[36]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*XAPDFFnQROhzli3X8KieHA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Yarkand №3 Primary School and orphanage are on the top right, the internment camp is on the left hand side. Location: 38°23&#39;11.07&quot;N 77°13&#39;33.87&quot;E.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/816/1*cAQzYk6Pko_8tyRqxg4e5g.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Close-up of the Yarkand County Southern City District Vocational Training Internment Camp (next to primary school and orphanage), showing security features such as internal fences and surrounding walls.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>2.2 Spreadsheet with 1,619 Children in Difficult Circumstances from Azatbag Township (All Grades)</strong></p><p>Five students from this extensive spreadsheet are also found in a spreadsheet of “children in difficult circumstances” (困境儿童) from Azatbag Township (阿扎提巴格乡). This file contains four different lists and shows the details of 1,619 children, including their care status and the internment situation of their parents.</p><p>The first list shows 85 students under the age of 10 with both parents in internment or prison, with their status being described as “double-parent [in internment]” (双亲). The youngest child on this list was born in March 2017 and is shown on the roster as being one years old. Along with all the other 84 children, this toddler is listed as living in the Yarkand orphanage (福利院).</p><p>The same file contains a separate list of 812 “single-parent” (单亲) children under age 10 where only one parent is detained (in nearly all cases the father). These children are shown to be either “at home” (在家), in a “nursery” (托儿所), or in a “preschool” (幼儿园). None of them is based at an orphanage.</p><p>The file further contains a third list of 715 children who are in grade 4 or higher, featuring the same information. About two-thirds of these children where both parents in detention live in an orphanage, with the others being in school boarding facilities (Table 1). In total, only 5 students live at home. Here, it is notable that 30 of the 31 students in boarding facilities, where both parents are in internment, do not have a specific description of the exact internment status of these parents, and the 31st case has both parents in re-education (“爸爸和妈妈收教”). In contrast, of 16 students where both parents are imprisoned (双亲判刑), all were in the orphanage. Further evidence would be needed to determine whether children are more likely to be sent to orphanages when both parents serve (potentially lengthy) prison terms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WsUUrN178PH9HsGCXjWhkA.png" /><figcaption>Table 2. Care status of students grades 4 and above.</figcaption></figure><p>The fourth list found in this file shows actual “orphans” (孤儿), of which there are only 7 cases. These all live in an orphanage. Here, only two children received this classification due to the imprisonments of their fathers. The main reasons for their status are that parents are missing, dead, divorced, and/or a general lack of parental care. This list provides clear evidence that the “orphan” status requires a very different family situation than the “single/double-hardship” status.</p><p><strong>2.3 Spreadsheet with 5,110 Students in Difficult Circumstances in Yarkand County (Grades 1 to 6)</strong></p><p>The final document (spreadsheet) examined in this paper is dated May 18, 2018. It contains a list of 5,110 primary school students (grades 1 to 6) with one or both parents in some form of internment (473 of them have both parents in detention, re-education or prison). Of these, 4,744 children are also listed in the first document examined in section 2.1, which appears to be a more recent version of this file. Consequently, no detailed analysis will be presented.</p><p>However, this file contains an additional piece of information: reasons why these students (who have at least one parent in internment) are not living in school boarding facilities. Of the 5,110, 3,028 or 59.3 percent do not live in school dorms. Again, dorm shares are much higher for students in grades 4–6, but they only average 69.4 percent, much lower than in the 92.2 percent share from the list discussed in section 2.1. In 90.3 percent of cases where students are not in dorms, the reason is that the school cannot accommodate them due to limited facilities or insufficient funding. Given that the campaign of mass internment was in full swing in 2018, with new internment camps being built and existing ones being expanded, this must have been a high priority for the state. The list from section 2.1 indicates that, in line with the boarding school expansion plans presented in section 1.2, significant progress was made.</p><p><strong>2.4 Individual Case Studies</strong></p><p>The author compared the list of 85 students with both parents interned (section 2.2) with the list of 9,537 students in difficult circumstances (section 2.1), and found five matches (via names and ID numbers), all of them from the Yarkand №3 Primary School, the one with the attached orphanage. These matching cases were then identified in a list of households and their members, also from Azatbagh Township, dated January 26, 2019. This list, which featured in one of the author’s previous publication, shows households as grouped units and identifies the internment status of each member.[37]</p><p>Among the<strong> </strong>85 students under the age of 10 from Azatbag Township, there is a 9-year old boy who is shown to live in a county orphanage. His older siblings (ages 12 and 16) are listed as living in school boarding facilities. The other spreadsheet that shows household members confirms their identities, and shows that their parents are both in detention. In another family, the two young children, a 3-year old boy and a 7-year old girl, are listed as being in the orphanage, while both parents are in “re-education” (教转, short form of 教育转化).</p><p>There are many similar cases.</p><h3><strong>3. Conclusions</strong></h3><p>Increasingly, Beijing’s strategy to subdue its restive minorities in Xinjiang is shifting away from internment and towards mechanisms of long-term social control. At the forefront of this effort is a battle over the hearts and minds of the next generation. By separating children from parents and making itself the primary parent, the state is moving towards the crucial stage of its coercive project of social re-engineering in the region.</p><p>It is not by coincidence that Xinjiang’s expenditures on education have consistently exceeded those on domestic security, even in most recent years.<a href="#_ftn36">[38]</a> Police officers can arrest or intimidate people and surveillance systems can track their movements, keeping a recalcitrant population in oppression. A weaponized education system, however, enables the state to control a group from within their core and their roots rather than merely from the top down.</p><p>The data presented above indicates that in Yarkand, significant shares of children have one or both parents in some form of internment. Some of them end up living alongside actual orphans. Others are put into boarding schools — highly securitized environments where students are monitored around the clock, where all human interaction inside must be conducted in the Chinese language, and where political propaganda and indoctrination are a daily ritual. In at least one instance, the orphanage is right next to the regular school, with “orphans” attending school during the day and returning to the orphanage at night.</p><p>The psychological impact of Xinjiang’s state-sponsored scheme of separating children from parents must be horrific. Children know that their parents’ fate can become their own if they fail to conform to the whims of the state. Securitized orphanage and boarding settings become environments of fear and of potential mental disorders and self-radicalization. Beijing’s battle for the hearts and minds of the next generation constitutes a particularly despicable aspect of its crimes against humanity in the region.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/</a>. See also the related BBC report at <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48825090">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48825090</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://archive.fo/AGSfj">https://archive.fo/AGSfj</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180807011159/http:/www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/03/09/148171.html">https://web.archive.org/web/20180807011159/http:/www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/03/09/148171.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/wip/npzF8">https://archive.is/wip/npzF8</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/wip/HX4PE">https://archive.is/wip/HX4PE</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> See e.g. <a href="https://archive.is/wip/TwARY">https://archive.is/wip/TwARY</a> or <a href="https://archive.is/wip/dUQKL">https://archive.is/wip/dUQKL</a> or <a href="https://archive.is/wip/3RUzC">https://archive.is/wip/3RUzC</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Sources: <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20191216040455/http:/www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/xw_zt/moe_357/jyzt_2016nztzl/ztzl_xyncs/ztzl_xy_dxjy/201801/W020180109353888301306.pdf">http://web.archive.org/web/20191216040455/http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/xw_zt/moe_357/jyzt_2016nztzl/ztzl_xyncs/ztzl_xy_dxjy/201801/W020180109353888301306.pdf</a> (p.232) and <a href="https://archive.is/QZ2eM">https://archive.is/QZ2eM</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftn7">[9]</a> See <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20181018204654/http://www.xjedu.gov.cn/xjjyt/sytj/2018/105865.htm">https://web.archive.org/web/20181018204654/http://www.xjedu.gov.cn/xjjyt/sytj/2018/105865.htm</a> and <a href="https://archive.is/QZ2eM">https://archive.is/QZ2eM</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[10]</a> <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[11]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/5iuGT">https://archive.is/5iuGT</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[12]</a> <a href="http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/s5147/201806/t20180629_341546.html">http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/s5147/201806/t20180629_341546.html</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/lrpZR">http://archive.is/lrpZR</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[13]</a> <a href="https://www.docin.com/p-2145175337.html">https://www.docin.com/p-2145175337.html</a> or <a href="https://max.book118.com/html/2018/0924/7111044151001150.shtm">https://max.book118.com/html/2018/0924/7111044151001150.shtm</a> or <a href="https://archive.is/pS1DT">https://archive.is/pS1DT</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[14]</a> Excel spreadsheet download at <a href="http://shache.xinjiang.gov.cn/gsgg/2018/25123.htm">http://shache.xinjiang.gov.cn/gsgg/2018/25123.htm</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[1</a>5] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20200902004509/http:/webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3AyFFhUAgzVj4J%3Ashache.xinjiang.gov.cn%2FFileDownload.do%3Faffixid%3D18158+&amp;cd=5&amp;hl=en&amp;ct=clnk&amp;gl=us&amp;lr=lang_en%7Clang_de">http://web.archive.org/web/20200902004509/http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3AyFFhUAgzVj4J%3Ashache.xinjiang.gov.cn%2FFileDownload.do%3Faffixid%3D18158+&amp;cd=5&amp;hl=en&amp;ct=clnk&amp;gl=us&amp;lr=lang_en%7Clang_de</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[16]</a> <a href="http://www.xjmca.gov.cn/dfxx/32264.jhtml?path=dfxx">http://www.xjmca.gov.cn/dfxx/32264.jhtml?path=dfxx</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/2850H">http://archive.is/2850H</a>, see also <a href="http://www.urumqi.gov.cn/fjbm/mzj/ggtz/412494.htm">http://www.urumqi.gov.cn/fjbm/mzj/ggtz/412494.htm</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/sUUdG">http://archive.is/sUUdG</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[17]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/b3bZX">https://archive.is/b3bZX</a>. In 2010, the national census puts Yarkand’s population aged 5 to 19 at 185,523. The cited figure was estimated by multiplying this number with 17/19, and then increasing it by the region’s total population increase between 2010 and 2018 (17.0 percent).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[18]</a> <a href="https://bit.ly/332NYfK">https://bit.ly/332NYfK</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[19]</a> <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/</a>, especially section 10.2.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[20]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/wip/OqGzI">https://archive.is/wip/OqGzI</a> and <a href="https://archive.is/wip/30cBi">https://archive.is/wip/30cBi</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[21]</a> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-muslims-20140808-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-muslims-20140808-story.html</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[22]</a> See <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/</a>, section 9.1.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[23]</a> See <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/</a>, section 9.2.2.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[24]</a> <a href="http://www.kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=2976">http://www.kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=2976</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/pXZbj">http://archive.is/pXZbj</a>. In the document, the commonly used shorthand phrase for “re-education center” (教培中心) is replaced with four diamond shaped ASCII characters, presumably to fool search engines or full text searches. However, the context surrounding each occurrence makes the decoding of this replacement quite straightforward. For evidence of the use and meaning of the term 教培中心, see for example <a href="http://www.alt.gov.cn/zwxx/001002/20190321/7f49da54-0cb5-47ad-b486-d07bb4060a8a.html">http://www.alt.gov.cn/zwxx/001002/20190321/7f49da54-0cb5-47ad-b486-d07bb4060a8a.html</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/QPael">http://archive.is/QPael</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[25]</a> <a href="https://archive.fo/9Cpws">https://archive.fo/9Cpws</a>. For a definition of三类人员, see for example <a href="https://archive.fo/9Cpws">http://archive.is/9Cpws</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[26]</a> Raw data: <a href="https://archive.fo/PJ4uo">http://archive.is/PJ4uo</a>. Compare main page at <a href="https://archive.fo/0tpFG">http://archive.is/0tpFG</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[27]</a> <a href="http://www.jxsfgz.com/cyzx/info/1042/1670.htm">http://www.jxsfgz.com/cyzx/info/1042/1670.htm</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/dRBGl">http://archive.is/dRBGl</a>, or <a href="http://www.haorenwang.com.cn/html/news/view52664052428.html">http://www.haorenwang.com.cn/html/news/view52664052428.html</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/F9WMH">http://archive.is/F9WMH</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[28]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/TzFjY">https://archive.is/TzFjY</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[29]</a> <a href="http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2016/12/16/65087.html">http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2016/12/16/65087.html</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/tmPfd">http://archive.is/tmPfd</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[30]</a> <a href="http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/jdbps/Document/1554097/1554097.htm">http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/jdbps/Document/1554097/1554097.htm</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/vTl8A">http://archive.is/vTl8A</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[31]</a> <a href="http://www.xjks.gov.cn/Item/41128.aspx">http://www.xjks.gov.cn/Item/41128.aspx</a> or <a href="https://archive.fo/AMJxJ">http://archive.is/AMJxJ</a> or <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180816113628/http:/www.xjks.gov.cn/Item/41128.aspx">https://web.archive.org/web/20180816113628/http://www.xjks.gov.cn/Item/41128.aspx</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[32]</a> <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20200904150853/https:/www.sohu.com/a/284469647_648658">http://web.archive.org/web/20200904150853/https://www.sohu.com/a/284469647_648658</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[33]</a> Called宿管阿姨 in the account; the formal term is 保育员.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[34]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/wip/WlhL4">https://archive.is/wip/WlhL4</a>, compare also <a href="https://archive.is/wip/mIx7L">https://archive.is/wip/mIx7L</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref34">[35]</a> See <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/</a> and <a href="https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/4j6rq/">https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/4j6rq/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref35">[36]</a> <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/</a>.</p><p>[37] <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/,</a> section 9.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref36">[38]</a> <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/</a>, Figure 9.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=45d07b25bcad" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Response to the Report Compiled by Lin Fangfei, Associate Professor at Xinjiang University]]></title>
            <link>https://adrianzenz.medium.com/a-response-to-the-report-compiled-by-lin-fangfei-associate-professor-at-xinjiang-university-bdad4bbb97f9?source=rss-99a73ce363b3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bdad4bbb97f9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uyghur]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xinjiang]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adrian Zenz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2020 01:39:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-16T19:52:20.858Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>October 6, 2020</em></p><p><strong>Dr. Adrian Zenz<br>Senior Fellow in China Studies<br>Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation<br></strong><em>Twitter: @adrianzenz</em></p><p>On September 14, 2020, Dr. Lin Fangfei, associate professor at Xinjiang University, <a href="https://archive.is/ZaWta">wrote a report</a> which critiques my June 29, 2020, report titled “<a href="https://jamestown.org/product/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birthrates-in-xinjiang/">Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control</a>”, published by the Jamestown Foundation. Lin’s piece was cited by an article in the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3101481/chinese-academic-hits-out-pompeo-backed-xinjiang-sterilisation">South China Morning Post</a>.</p><p>Before engaging with the details of Lin’s report, I would like to point out some general structural observations.</p><p>First, Lin’s report does not start out as an academic exchange. Instead, she opens with the line that my work was endorsed by Mike Pompeo and then refers to me as someone who is part of an “extreme right-wing organization sponsored by the U.S. government.”</p><p>Second, Lin report’s is structured around “six lies” that she charges me to have made. This a very unusual format for what is billed as an independent review by an academic. Notable, state media outlets quickly reproduced this convenient format, as in the <a href="https://archive.is/wip/jvGRs">CGTN report</a> titled “Six lies in Adrian Zenz’s Xinjiang report of ‘genocide’”.</p><p>Third, Lin largely avoids engaging with the actual text of the government policies and reports I cite, instead focusing on critiquing the accuracy and context of the numbers I cite. This is less dangerous for the Chinese state, because numbers are only meaningful in context. One can then discredit the numbers by carefully shifting the context through manipulation, doing so selectively so that incriminating correlations are not shown. That approach allows attacking select aspects of my work without “spilling any beans”, meaning without admitting facts that are problematic for the state. Properly engaging with text, however, is not possible without citing it, which comes at a great risk if said texts are actually quite incriminating.</p><p>Fourth, Lin’s report does not actually link to my Jamestown research paper, but only to the Associated Press report. A likely reason for doing so is that my report contains the actual details of what Lin is seeking to refute. If a reader engaged with those details, they would realize that Lin’s refutations do not constitute any substantive refutation of my actual work. Therefore, it is more strategic for her to link to the AP version and hope that most of her readers will not search for and read my original work. This matches the goals of the Chinese state, which does not want people read and engage with my work. Linking to the AP is therefore the lesser evil (her report had to provide some link).</p><p>Also notable is the fact that Lin is a junior academic, who just published her PhD in 2018. Besides defending her PhD thesis, her publication record does not show a single peer-reviewed academic publication, neither internationally nor domestically.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> Her PhD subject area and stated fields of research are anthropology and gender studies. At Xinjiang University, she lectures in foreign social theory and social work theory. There is no indication that she has accumulated significant academic experience in the areas of demography, family planning or ethnic minority policy. Based on her biography, publications and teaching, she would have gathered expertise in qualitative research, but the extent of her expertise in quantitative data analysis is unclear.</p><p>Below, I will engage in detail with several of her key allegations.</p><h3><strong>Lin disputes that the natural population growth rate in Xinjiang has sharply decreased</strong></h3><p>Lin disputes that Xinjiang’s population growth has “dropped sharply”, arguing that Xinjiang’s 2018 natural population growth rate was higher than the national figure (6.13‰ versus 3.81‰; ‰ stands for per thousand or per mille). Rather than being related to state intervention, she argues that birth rate declines are a “reasonable phenomenon” and caused by a decreasing desire of minority women to have more children, in line with modernization and the lawful implementation of China’s family planning policies.</p><p>In response, I would argue that the decline of Xinjiang’s birth rate from 15.88‰ in <a href="https://archive.is/wip/eit5i">2017</a> to 8.14‰ in 2019 (by 48.7%) and of its natural population growth rate from 11.40‰ in <a href="https://archive.is/wip/eit5i">2017</a> to 3.69‰ in <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20200624214948/http:/www.xinjiang.gov.cn/xinjiang/xjyw/202004/a53b44a4bc84461a8e4c87a3ceaa10b0.shtml">2019</a> (by 67.6%) is sharp and staggering. These are not gradual changes in preference, linked to higher education or livelihood changes, but the result of draconian state interventions detailed in my report: the campaign of mass internment and a systematic state effort to reduce minority births.</p><p>These declines are most staggering in Uyghur regions, which is likely the reason why Chinese state avoids citing their numbers. Lin’s report likewise is very careful to avoid citing past and present population growth figures from Uyghur regions next to each other, so as to not show how dramatic the changes have been.</p><p>Importantly, the sharpest birth and natural population growth rate declines have taken place in rural Uyghur regions and not in urban centers. This fact most clearly contradicts Beijing’s assertions that demographic trends in Xinjiang are explained by the forces of modernization. For example, <a href="http://archive.is/6XNzM">Hotan City’s</a> 2018 natural population growth rate stood at 4.13‰, 40% higher than the 2.96‰ growth seen in the rest of the <a href="http://archive.is/zba9G">predominantly rural prefecture</a>. In Kashgar City, the <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20190911025343/http:/www.xjks.gov.cn/Item/45053.aspx">2018</a> natural population growth rate of 3.96‰ exceeded the 2.38‰ rate of the <a href="http://archive.is/SGRUr">entire prefecture</a> by 66%. This does not reflect a genuine change in people’s choices, but rather mirrors the reality that the government’s actions in rural Uyghur regions have been especially heavy-handed. (Kashgar City has since removed all reports containing annual population growth data from its website except the one from <a href="https://archive.is/wip/iUkZ3">2017</a>.)</p><p>In Hotan Prefecture, natural population growth fell from 15.79‰ in <a href="http://archive.is/73YRE">2016</a> to 2.96‰ in <a href="http://archive.is/zba9G">2018</a>, an 81.3% decline in the space of two years. Note that this sharp drop occurred at the onset of the campaign of mass internment. Importantly, Hotan’s 2019 natural population growth figure has not been published, despite the fact that in previous years, this figure was always published between March and May of the following year. Instead, the region removed all prior local reports from the relevant section of its website after my report was published (compare snapshots from <a href="https://archive.is/lDdEE">May 2020</a> and <a href="https://archive.is/wip/z8Imx">September 2020</a>).</p><p>In Hotan’s Yutian Prefecture, natural population growth fell from 15.46‰ in 2015 to 10.35‰ in 2017, and then sharply turned negative (-0.49‰) in 2018 (sources: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook [below abbreviated as XSY], tables 3–6). My analysis of Xinjiang’s related family planning policy and measures indicates that coercive measures were drastically ramped up during that very year.</p><p>In Kashgar Prefecture, natural population growth fell from 12.54‰ in <a href="http://archive.is/3ZHBy">2016</a> to 2.38‰ in <a href="http://archive.is/SGRUr">2018</a>, an 81.0% decline in the space of two years. Again, this sharp drop occurred at the onset of the campaign of mass internment. Kashgar’s 2019 annual report failed to report birth, death, and natural population growth rates, a noteworthy departure from having done so consistently during the previous 20 years.</p><p>Lin’s report notably fails to discuss the most recent local population statistics from 2019, a fairly glaring omission given than many of them were published in the first half of 2020 and therefore readily available. These figures indicate a further drastic decline in birth and natural population growth rates.</p><p>For example, Qira (Cele) County‘s birth rate declined from an already low 9.36‰ in <a href="https://archive.is/wip/tXlBX">2018</a> to 6.54‰ in <a href="http://archive.is/sM6uO">2019</a>, a decline of 30%. Wushi County’s birth rate nearly halved from 14.58‰ in 2018 to 7.58‰ in <a href="https://archive.is/tAF8e">2019</a>, a 48.0% decline.</p><p>Importantly, Xinjiang’s local governments frequently put a cap on future population growth by mandating very specific growth limits. For example Hotan City’s <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20200514171345/https:/www.hts.gov.cn/file/upload/201904/02/161938677.pdf">family planning documents</a> state that for 2019, the natural population growth rate must not exceed that of 2018, which in this document is given as 3.89‰ (Figure 1; the 4.13‰ figure cited above is from its 2019 SEDR). This growth rate is 76.2% lower than the 16.36‰ rate of 2015 (XSY, table 3–6).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*v2XtYz0nQ-BgUpXLqAFYoA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Hotan City maximum target figures for allowed birth and natural population growth rates for 2019 (2019年人口自然增长率≦2018年同期数3.89‰). Source: <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20200514171345/https:/www.hts.gov.cn/file/upload/201904/02/161938677.pdf">Hotan City</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>These sharp declines are not merely related to the campaign of mass internment, which itself would create a noticeable drop. The fact that they are so dramatic is due to additional, highly coercive birth prevention measures, including the threat of internment for those who violate family planning policies, insertion targets for Intra-Uterine Contraceptive Devices (IUDs) of at least 80% for southern Xinjiang, and specific plans to sterilize a certain percentage of all women of childbearing age in rural minority regions.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> Documents from 2019 reveal plans for a campaign of mass female sterilization in rural Uyghur regions, targeting 14 and 34% of all married women of childbearing age in two Uyghur counties that year.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> This project targeted all of southern Xinjiang and continued in 2020 with increased funding. Lin omitted to mention these documents, which I therefore reproduce below (Figures 2 and 2).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/1*Miw7AnS7UI5TaHh0buAjeQ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Guma (Pishan) County 2019 family planning targets for birth prevention measures among pastoralist and farming populations, which include the “target” figure of sterilization 14,872 persons. Source: see note [3].</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*lnfteAKxvCKciIFkDdNquQ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Guma (Pishan) County 2019 family planning targets for birth prevention measures among pastoralist and farming populations. Source: see note [3].</figcaption></figure><p>Xinjiang’s number of performed sterilization surgeries increased from 3,214 in 2014 to 60,440 in 2018, representing an 18.8-fold increase.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><h3><strong>Lin argues that I misrepresent population growth data by falsely quoting lower natural population growth figures</strong></h3><p>Lin correctly notes a discrepancy between the 2.38% rate for Kashgar used in my report, and the 6.93% contained in the 2019 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook (XSY). This results from a reporting difference that is found for some regions and some years between the XSY and the Xinjiang regional Social and Economic Development Reports (SEDR), which are clearly cited as a second population data source in my report (e.g. under figure 5). Given that Lin is a social scientist at Xinjiang University, one would expect her to be aware of these different data sources.</p><p>I decided to use the SEDR as the source for Kashgar because of extreme discrepancies between both sources for some years. XSY tables cite extremely high birth and natural population growth rates for Kashgar for select recent years. The likely difference between both data sources is in fact discussed in my report. To quote: “Spikes in the reported population during census years (1990, 2000) reflect more rigorous population counts, while increasingly stringent grassroots population control mechanisms are a likely reason behind the 2014 spike in Uyghur population growth.”</p><p>Below is a detailed comparison of these discrepancies:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zCubUNW8iqNGoAyeGD_PEg.png" /><figcaption>Table 1: Comparison of Kasghar natural population growth rates (in per mille) by data source.</figcaption></figure><p>Natural population growth does not typically double, quadruple, or halve, all in the space of 12 months. My tentative analysis of these discrepancies is that the XSYs figures were used by the authorities to include previously undiscovered (“illegal”) births. The discrepancy and related spike was most notable in 2014, the first year of Zhang Chunxian’s campaign to send cadres to villages. Then, in 2017, Kashgar’s natural population growth according to the XSY was nearly twice as high as in 2016, which is explained by Chen Quanguo’s intensified campaign of sending these cadres to Uyghur households in a bid to uncover information that was then used to internment and other draconian measures. Several government documents cited in my Jamestown report speak of a detailed, “dragnet-style” investigation and prosecution of illegal births, especially those since the middle of 2017. This was also combined with the setup of detailed digital Population Information Systems. Overall, the population data contained in the SEDR appear to be much closer to actual reality that the wildly varying XSY figures.</p><p>Interestingly, the drop of natural population growth in Kashgar between <a href="https://archive.is/GovMo">2017</a> and <a href="http://archive.is/SGRUr">2018</a> was in fact “sharp” according to either source: 70.3% (SEDR) and 77.2% (XSY). Lin’s piece, however, avoids making such comparisons.</p><h3><strong>Lin argues that the government documents I cite do not say that those who violate family planning regulations may be subject to internment</strong></h3><p>Rather than actually quoting from these documents, Lin cites from Xinjiang’s White Book to argue that these are just “training centers” that help to reform persons affected by “religious extremism”.</p><p>Notably, Lin does not actually dispute that those who violate the policies are in fact sent to these “centers” as punishment for their behaviors. She simply argues that these facilities are lawful and beneficial.</p><p>Given what we know about the true nature of these so-called “education and training centers” from witness accounts, satellite images, the government’s own documents or documents such as the China Cables, there is nothing further to add here.</p><h3><strong>Lin argues that I miscalculated Xinjiang’s national share of newly-inserted IUDs as 80%, whereas it should be 8.7%</strong></h3><p>Lin arrives at a 8.7% IUD insertion share for Xinjiang (among total national IUD placements) by only taking account of IUD insertions. However, my research report explicitly and clearly states that I estimated newly added IUDs by subtracting IUD removals from insertions (net added IUDs = new insertions — removals).</p><p>This is a very important difference, because on the national level, the figure for IUD removals was very high. Nationally, 3,774,318 IUDs were inserted and 3,474,467 IUDs removed (2018), allowing us to estimate net added IUD placements at 299,851. In contrast, Xinjiang had 328,475 IUD insertions but only 89,018 removals, resulting in 239,457 newly added IUDs, or 80% of the national total.</p><p>Lin possibly took the 8.7% calculation idea from a <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1193454.shtml">Global Times</a> article against my research from early July. Given that Lin is an academic and evidently familiar with the China’s statistical yearbooks, it would have been uncomplicated for her to correctly reproduce my calculations.</p><p>Lin further notes that the number of IUD placements in Xinjiang in 2015 and 2018 was roughly comparable, and therefore does not indicate a marked upwards trend. This is correct, and in fact reproduced by my chart of net added IUDs between 2010 and 2018 (p.14, figure 6).</p><p>Similarly, Chinese state media has sought to attack my work by claiming that I omitted key facts, such as that Han population growth has been lower than that of the ethnic minorities. However, the entire first half of my report is dedicated to a comparison of Han and minority population growth. Rather than being selective, my work contextualizes these facts in light of most recent demographic and policy developments. Here, Lin’s work reproduces a state media propaganda tactic of accusing me of omitting that which I had included. This strategy relies on the fact that most people will not read my full report.</p><h3><strong>Lin critiques my statement that the natural population growth rate of a residential district in Hotan City, where the Han make up the majority, was nearly 8 times higher (in 2018) as that of the surrounding Uyghur majority population regions</strong></h3><p>Lin first states that I did not indicate the data source for natural population growth in Hotan City’s Gulbagh Residential District. That is incorrect. I give the source on p.9, see full quote:</p><p><em>Even more dramatic is the difference between the Uyghur-dominated countryside and Han majority suburbs in Hotan City. Gulbagh Residential District (古勒巴格街道), which is 54.1 percent Han, boosted a natural population growth of 15.17 percent in 2018, a full 7.8 times higher than that of Hotan County (</em><a href="http://archive.is/UUO4F"><em>Hotan City</em></a><em>, November 12, 2019).</em></p><p>[Note: the hyperlink links to the source: <a href="http://archive.is/UUO4F">http://archive.is/UUO4F</a>; <a href="https://archive.is/lEkGa">Hotan County’s figure is here</a>]</p><p>Lin correctly notes that the birth and natural population growth rates of a city district can be affected by various factors in the space of one year, including e.g. population movements. While correct in essence, that assertion is hardly sufficient nor the most logical explanation for a nearly 8-times discrepancy, especially given that rural birth rates consistently exceeded urban ones for decades (if not centuries). Gulbagh Districts’s figure is in fact very similar to those found in southern Xinjiang before the onset of the drastic birth prevention policies.</p><p>The more logical explanation, drawn from the body of evidence presented in my report, is that the Han majority regions benefited from considerable leniency, following the expansion of birth quotas for the Han in mid-2017. In contrast, rural Uyghur majority regions have had their birth rates slashed because these regions constituted the main target of the campaign of mass internment and of the most recent draconian birth prevention measures.</p><p>Lin also states that Hotan’s Prefecture’s Uyghur population increased while its Han population decreased. That is accurate but entirely beside the point. Han population decreases took place in several Uyghur majority regions, and in fact all across Xinjiang. There are most likely the result of the extreme securitization measures and related reasons, such as drastic changes in the socio-economic and business environments in these regions. Natural population growth must be analyzed in distinction from total population count.</p><h3><strong>Lin argues that Kizilsu Prefecture’s 2020 population growth target is not that different from previous years, contrary to my claim that the region lowered its growth targets to an unprecedented low level</strong></h3><p>Lin cites from a government <a href="http://archive.is/4AHOr">family planning document</a> from my report to argue that Kizilsu Prefecture, a region mainly populated by Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, set a natural population growth target for 2020 of 10.5‰ (1.05%), and therefore not that different from that of previous years (of 11.45‰ in 2018). She therefore argues — in contrast to my report — that Kizilsu is not a case of a minority region where the state on purpose planned for a dramatically lower population growth.</p><p>The number cited by Lin refers to a “quality indicator” (质量指标) that outlines a maximum population growth rate (and birth rate) ceiling that must not be exceeded (hence the use of the ≤ symbol). The region does, however, specify a concrete target for 2020, found in the text at the top of that table and stated in my report (Figure 1). This text mandates that for 2020 (compared to the previous year), the birth rate must be reduced by 7.13‰ and the natural population growth rate by 6.14‰.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*4NBFhbaw-Zmrp7URThusOw.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Kizilsu family planning document — project effectiveness indicator table (note highlighted section). Source: <a href="http://archive.is/4AHOr">http://archive.is/4AHOr</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Kizilsu’s <a href="http://archive.is/APGgL">2019 birth rate</a> stood at 8.18‰ and its natural population growth at 3.57‰, meaning that means that the region’s targets for 2020 amounted to a 1.05‰ birth rate and a negative (-2.83‰) population growth rate. This represents a stunning 87.2% decline in Kizilsu’s planned 2020 birth rate compared to the 2019 figure.</p><h3><strong>Lin argues that the quarterly IUD check list from Kumarik District, Payzawat (Ch. Jiashi) County, that is shown in my report (p.13, table 2) does not prove that China has implemented coercive birth control measures even on Uyghur women who have had only one child</strong></h3><p>I will respond to this by quoting the text above and below that table in my report:</p><p><em>By 2019, Xinjiang planned for over 80 percent of women of childbearing age in the rural southern four minority prefectures to be subjected to “birth control measures with long-term effectiveness” (长效避孕率, changxiao biyun lü). [35] This was to be verified through quarterly IUD checks (see Table 2), along with monthly family visits and bi-monthly pregnancy tests. However, “focus persons,” those deemed more problematic by the government, were to receive more frequent checks (e.g. Nilka County, November 20, 2019).</em></p><p><em>At least for ethnic minorities, these measures are not voluntary. For example, Bayingol Prefecture’s related stipulation from May 2018 (Bayingol Prefecture Government, May 10, 2018), stated:</em></p><p><em>After checking… all [women] that meet IUD placement conditions and are without contraindications must have them placed immediately. If there are contraindications, a diagnosis certificate must be issued at a minimum by a level-two health care institution, and follow-up must be strengthened.</em></p><p><em>Birth control statistics between spring 2017 and autumn 2018 for 12 villages and urban districts in Kök Gumbez District, Kuqa County (Aksu Prefecture) show that 73.5 percent of married women of childbearing age (已婚育龄妇女, yihun yuling funu) had IUDs fitted. [36] Clearly, IUDs are not only used for women with three or more children, nor just for those with two children, but also for at least half of those with just one child (</em><strong><em>see Table 3; compare with Table 2</em></strong><em>). </em>[Emphasis added]</p><p>You will note that my report does not primarily cite table 2, but table 3, as evidence of my statement regarding IUD placements and number of children. Table 2 shows a roster for quarterly IUD checks, which includes the names of women together with their number of children. This illustrates the wider point. The main argument of state coercion even over women with one child is however based on table 3, which Lin notably did not want to reproduce or quote from. Consequently, she neither engages with that body of evidence from local data presented in my work nor with the related policy documents.</p><p>Lin goes on to say that my report alleges that the share of women in menopause in Kök Gümbez District, Kuqa County (Aksu Prefecture) doubled because of Depo-Provera injections given during internment (my report, p.20, figure 11). She argues that my assertion that this drug is used in the camps to render women infertile is misleading.</p><p>However, Lin evidently misread my report, or perhaps it was mistranslated, or else misinterpreted on purpose. I simply note that government documents from Kashgar City and Bagrax County state that Depo-Provera is being used for family planning in general. Then my report says: “The drugs administered in internment camps may be more directly targeted at suppressing menstrual cycles.” (p.19) I only state that Depo-Provera can cause a loss of fertility until up to 18 months after injections are stopped, and I only name this drug to show that drugs that induce changes in fertility and menstrual cycles are part of the routine repertoire used for birth prevention in Uyghur regions. However, I suspect that the drugs given to women in internment differ, because their effects seem to be more immediate and more extreme.</p><h3><strong>What did Lin and the governments in Beijing and Xinjiang not comment on?</strong></h3><p>Both Lin and the various Chinese government entities that commented on my report chose not to comment on a number of extremely important claims made in that report. Given their vigorous denouncements of both my person and my research, these omissions are noteworthy. If any of the facts cited in my work were incorrect, Beijing would certainly have seized upon that fact. These omissions are therefore noteworthy.</p><p>First, they did not comment on detailed family planning indicators and related sterilization targets in Pishan County and Hotan City, two regions with Uyghur majority populations, which planned in 2019 to respectively sterilize approximately 14.1% and 34.3% of rural married women of childbearing age. These documents are easily accessible. Their contents directly contradict Lin’s and the Chinese government’s assertions about supposedly “voluntary” fertility choices.</p><p>Second, they did not comment on Xinjiang Health Commission budget documents that show that the region budgeted a combined 1.5 billion RMB in 2019 and 2020 for birth prevention award monies, including rewards for “voluntary” IUD placements and sterilizations, and a combined 260 million (also 2019–20) for “free birth prevention surgeries” in southern Xinjiang, to include health checks, IUD services, abortions, and sterilizations.</p><p>Third, they did not comment on the fact that from 2018, Xinjiang began to commonly use the term “zero birth control violation incidents” (违法生育零发生), a term that has not been routinely used elsewhere in the PRC nor in Xinjiang prior to 2018. “Zero birth control violations” became a standard family planning target in 2018 and 2019. A particularly strict case here is Hotan Prefecture, a region with a population of 2.53 million, which in 2019 planned to have no more than exactly 21 birth control policy violations (sources: my report, p.12).</p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>Unfortunately, I have to conclude that Lin’s report does not aim to constructively and fairly discuss the strengths or weaknesses of my work or analysis, but rather seeks to discredit it outright.</p><p>Her report is a piece of sophisticated propaganda, published under the guise of academia.</p><h3>NOTES</h3><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> See <a href="https://archive.is/sAZOG">https://archive.is/sAZOG</a>. Her publication with the Journal of Peasant Studies is a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2018.1458408">book review</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Download page: <a href="https://archive.fo/hfGL6">http://archive.is/hfGL6</a> (file 2019年自治区卫生健康委员会机关及直属（管）单位绩效目标.xls). Archived download of the spreadsheet: <a href="https://bit.ly/31FcswE">https://bit.ly/31FcswE</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Sources: a) Guma County government website, download page at <a href="http://archive.is/F86ts">http://archive.is/F86ts</a>, file 皮山县计生委.pdf contained in archive at <a href="http://www.ps.gov.cn/Upload/main/InfoPublicity/PublicInformation/File/2019/03/04/201903041238580250.rar">http://www.ps.gov.cn/Upload/main/InfoPublicity/PublicInformation/File/2019/03/04/201903041238580250.rar</a>. Alternative archived download at <a href="https://bit.ly/3fOCTEH">https://bit.ly/3fOCTEH</a>.</p><p>b) Hotan City: <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20200514171345/https:/www.hts.gov.cn/file/upload/201904/02/161938677.pdf">http://web.archive.org/web/20200514171345/https://www.hts.gov.cn/file/upload/201904/02/161938677.pdf</a>.</p><p>For both Guma County and Hotan City, the 600 RMB price tag shown in the respective government planning documents indicates that these are female sterilizations (输卵管结扎), which throughout Xinjiang are budgeted at a standard 600 RMB per procedure, while male sterilizations (输精管结扎) are budgeted at 220 RMB. See e.g. <a href="http://archive.is/wip/m2b9x">http://archive.is/wip/m2b9x</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Source: China Health and Hygiene Statistical Yearbook, table 8–8–2.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Note: the June 29 version of my report incorrectly stated that Kizilsu’s 1.05‰ target for 2020 referred to natural population growth. A July 21 correction, published well before Lin’s report, corrected this to say that this target refers to the birth rate, not the natural population growth rate.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bdad4bbb97f9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Letter to Canterbury University]]></title>
            <link>https://adrianzenz.medium.com/letter-to-canterbury-university-783fbfea13e6?source=rss-99a73ce363b3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/783fbfea13e6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uyghur]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xinjiang]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Adrian Zenz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2020 20:29:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-15T04:36:25.515Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>October 5, 2020</em></p><p>Dr. Adrian Zenz<br>Senior Fellow in China Studies<br>Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation<br>Washington, D.C.<br>USA</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*ntKne68QWLTduXNyfd5hBA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Shihezi University Village Work Team Report (source: <a href="http://archive.is/Vdys4">http://archive.is/Vdys4</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>To :<br>The Vice-Chancellor<br>University of Canterbury<br>Christchurch<br>New Zealand</p><p><strong>To Whom it May Concern:</strong></p><p>I am writing to you in reference to the publication titled “<em>Holding a Pen in One Hand, Gripping a Gun in the Other</em>”, compiled by Professor Anne-Marie Brady.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>Under the subheading “<em>Massey University</em>” (pp.15), Brady’s paper explores Massey’s links with PLA-affiliated entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, Brady notes that Massey has an established partnership with Shihezi University in Xinjiang, which is part of the Xinjiang production and Construction Corps (XPCC).</p><p>It is my understanding that Brady’s publication has sparked criticism, and that her work is under review by her academic institution.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> Massey University has responded to Brady’s allegations by stating that its connection with Shihezi​ University is solely related to work in agriculture, and that “[t]here is no direct relationship between Massey University and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)”.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p>In my capacity as an internationally-known and widely-cited expert on Beijing’s policies and actions in Xinjiang, I have decided to undertake and present a concise and careful evaluation of Brady’s claims.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>There is a comprehensive consensus among scholars of Xinjiang and of China’s ethnic minority policy that the XPCC, a paramilitary entity, has played an integral part in the colonization and “development” of Xinjiang and its ethnic minorities.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> Specifically, the XPCC operates prisons, re-education camps and other internment camps for ethnic minorities, and plays an important role in Xinjiang’s more recent scheme of “poverty alleviation” through various forms of coercive labor.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> The XPCC, also nicknamed the “farming militia”, was founded with the mission to colonize in particular the less habitable parts of Xinjiang through agriculture.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> In November 2019, the Better Cotton Initiative cut ties with the XPCC over severe allegations of forced minority labor.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> In July 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted the XPCC and its current and former party secretaries over human rights abuses related to “surveillance, detention and indoctrination”.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p>The city of Shihezi is the largest XPCC city and served as XPCC headquarter until it was moved to Urumqi.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> Shihezi​ University traces its origins to an institution founded in 1949 by the PLA, the year when Mao’s troops invaded Xinjiang and integrated it into the PRC.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> It currently offers 92 majors, has over 40,000 students, and forms one of only two top-level (“211”) universities in Xinjiang (and the only one associated with the XPCC).<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p>The sources cited by Brady indicate that the collaboration with Massey in the area of sheep farming was formalized in 2006 (other articles note 2005 as the starting point).<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a> Brady states that “[i]n 2015, the pioneering partnership between Massey, Beijing, and Shihezi universities was praised by then-ambassador Wang Lutong as one of the many “firsts” that characterise China’s relationship with New Zealand.” (p.15).</p><p>After conducting further research, I conclude that in respect to Massey’s involvement in Xinjiang, Brady’s paper does not include a number of important additional empirical data points as well as pertinent further contextual material.</p><p>According to relevant Chinese government, state media and other sources (referenced in footnotes throughout), Hugh Blair, Massey University Professor of Animal Science, who was part of the collaboration from its inception, has visited China about 20 times. His Xinjiang visits took place on a regular (annual) basis, meaning that Blair would have been thoroughly familiar with the developing situation in the region.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a> In October 2016, Blair received the China Friendship Award in Beijing through the recommendation of Shihezi University.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> In September 2019, he received Shihezi University’s own Friendship Award.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a> These international collaborations fulfil an important government mandate for such government institutions in the context of the development of the Belt and Road Initiative, and are prominently showcased in related articles and publications.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a></p><p>Given its history, the XPCC and its previous long-standing headquarter city of Shihezi have both long been deeply involved in Xinjiang’s military and security apparatus. XPCC regions are part of the campaign of mass internment in extrajudicial re-education camps that began in early 2017. Shihezi City’s Political and Legal Affairs Committee (政法委), an entity that overseas all domestic security work (including police, law enforcement in general, and administrative detentions), stated in its 2018 final financial accounts that its project-related expenses rose by 74 percent. The main reason for this drastic increase were “re-education center operating expenses” (教育转化中心日常经费).<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a> Further evidence that the city also operates the infamous, so-called “vocational training and education centers” (or what I have referred to as vocational training internment camps), the most common form of extrajudicial internment and forced labor in Xinjiang, comes from the 2018 budget spreadsheets of the justice system (司法局), the government entity that operates the re-education network together with the Public Security Bureaus. These list some of the 2018 operating expenses of these centers (职业技能教育培训中心).<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> According to the China Cables, a leaked set of classified internal government documents from Xinjiang that discuss the prison-style operation of the vocational training internment camps, every administrative region in Xinjiang at county or city level (or above) had to establish a so-called “Education and Training Bureau” (教培局).<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a></p><p>According to the latest report published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on Xinjiang’s re-education and detention facility network, Shihezi City operates both prisons and a detention facility with a large sports ground, several factory buildings and other buildings that are very similar to those found in other extrajudicial re-education or vocational internment facilities (distinct from the building types found in prisons or detention centers).<a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a> In autumn 2017, the facility was expanded with a large new factory building, which further substantiates this assessment. My own research paper from September 2018 identified construction bids for XPCC re-education camps in southern Xinjiang from May 2017.<a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a></p><p>In Xinjiang, larger government entities of any type are invariably implicated in the policing, surveillance and even potentially the internment of ethnic minorities. This takes place through so-called “village-based work teams” (驻村工作队), a highly intrusive social control mechanism pioneered by Xinjiang’s party secretary Chen Quanguo during his tenure in Tibet.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a> The role played by these teams in the internment of minorities, the surveillance and appraisal of the family members of camp detainees, and the close surveillance of persons released from the camps, was laid bare in another leaked internal Xinjiang government document referred to as the Karakax List”.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a></p><p>In April 2018, the AFP reported how a village work team from an XPCC academic entity, the XPCC Broadcast Television University (兵团广播电视大学) based in Urumqi, was responsible for identifying approximately one fifth of the adult population of a minority village for internment.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p>According to government documents, public construction notices and anecdotal evidence, Xinjiang’s internment campaign began in March and April 2017. In my research paper on the Karakax List, I outline how the timing of this campaign was almost certainly determined by the deployment of the village-based work teams, which took place after Chinese New Year, between February 2nd and March 1st, 2017.</p><p>The village work team from Shihezi University was right at the forefront of this effort.</p><p>The university website states that the team was deployed to a township in Shule County, a Uyghur majority region in southern Xinjiang, in February 2017.<a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a> The team was charged with “gathering people’s hearts”, “get familiar with the basic situation of the village”, “integrate with the masses” and “preach the party’s policies”. The work team participated in “grid management” team meetings, a key social control and surveillance mechanism pioneered by Chen Quanguo that enables the micromanaged and close surveillance of community units down to the household level. At these meetings, the Shihezi University work team “promptly reported…problems found in the households visited…and proposed corrective measures.” Other documents indicate that this typically refers to “religious problems”, such as any religious custom, practice or material found in a household. At the grid management meetings, the work team and local officials also discussed the reasons why not all village members attend the mandatory flag raising ceremonies, a key event during which villagers are counted and subjected to intensive propaganda sessions (the Karakax List shows that some persons were interned because they failed to attend flag raising ceremonies, and that others were not being released from the camps because the family members had failed to attend in a “timely manner”). Accompanying images published with the account show Shihezi University team members in military fatigues.</p><p>Without going into further details, the evidence contained in this account makes it abundantly clear that the Shihezi University work team was right at the forefront of the social control drive that formed the core of the state’s effort to identify Uyghurs and other minorities for extrajudicial internment and other forms of punishment.</p><p>Shortly afterwards, on March 13, a Shihezi University village work team was again (or was still) active in Shule County’s Uyghur regions. This time, the team gathered individuals and their family members who had been imprisoned, were in detention, or were in re-education (camps) — all persons who had “poisoned” those around them (with the “poison” of religion).<a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a> This event appears to have been a combination of confessions and of extolling the need to “bravely fight religious extremism”, parading the victims of the internment campaign in front of fellow villagers. The details of and terminology used in the account would in my view be sufficient in an international criminal court of law to charge the Shihezi University village work team with direct involvement in “crimes against humanity”, or whatever legal appraisal the Xinjiang atrocities will end up receiving. As early as 2016, the university itself held meetings that evaluated the past three years worth of re-education work against “evil religious cults”. <a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a> Further teaching sessions on de-extremification and re-education work were held by Shihezi University lecturers in December 2017. All this indicates that the institution did not simply take a passive role in the region’s brutal re-education campaign, but that it closely followed and studied it, and may even have played a role in developing it further.</p><p>The Shihezi University website outlines several other subsequent accounts of university work teams visiting Uyghur villages and implementing government propaganda and social control work. An account from December 2018 shows that a Shihezi University village work team is now directly involved implementing the government next phase in dealing with the minorities: poverty alleviation and labor transfer (i.e. coercive labor).<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a> The work team is described to have assisted the state’s “one household one job” policy, explaining the transfer of rural surplus laborers, and helping 124 villages in Shule County to transform their livelihoods. In this instance, the Shihezi University work team helped organize handicraft trainings and aided in the establishment of a village cooperative, into which individual households subsume (transfer) their labor and means of production. Besides work team members, this effort involved 83 Shihezi University students, who together visited homes in order to propagate “modern thinking”. Between 2017 and 2019, XPCC regions planned to receive 10,500 transferred Uyghur laborers from southern Xinjiang as part of the labor transfer program, which puts minority adults through internment camp-like militarized drill, thought transformation (political re-education) and vocational skills training, after which they are shipped off in large batches to their state-designated work destinations.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a> To further understand the full and complex implications of coercive labor transfer and “poverty alleviation” in the Xinjiang policy context, the reader is advised to consult detailed related research.<a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a></p><p>In October 2016, when Professor Blair received the China Friendship Award in Beijing through the recommendation of Shihezi University, Xinjiang’s new party secretary Chen Quanguo had begun to dramatically ramp up police recruitment and the construction of local neighborhood police stations and checkpoints. My research indicates that these measures were implemented at a drastic speed and scale between September 2016 and the summer of 2017.<a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a> Xinjiang’s surveillance state was established in preparation for the unprecedented campaign of mass internment, which began in early 2017 and accelerated through 2018. In early 2019, the atrocity in Xinjiang was further scrutinized when Xinjiang’s governor Shohrat Zakir claimed that all “students” would be released from the camps, and when the first western media outlets were given a tour of de-securitized “model” camps.<a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a> In July 2019, the BBC published a detailed account of systematic parent-child separation in Xinjiang, caused by the scale and impact of the internment campaign.<a href="#_ftn34">[34]</a> In the summer of 2019, unknown persons in Xinjiang leaked two internal sets of government documents at great risk to their lives to the outside world. They were later passed to myself and others and subsequently published, revealing the prison-like nature of the vocational training camps and the local control mechanisms by which minorities were placed into internment camps. In September 2019, Blair, who is said to have visited Xinjiang annually, received the friendship award from Shihezi University. In June 2020, I published research proving that Xinjiang is committing acts of what might be referred to as “demographic genocide” among the Uyghurs and other ethnic groups.<a href="#_ftn35">[35]</a> Soon after the publication, editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post called for the withdrawal of the 2022 Winter Olympics from Beijing. In July 2020, exile Uyghur groups and a British law team submitted evidence to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, accusing Beijing of crimes against humanity and potential genocide in Xinjiang.<a href="#_ftn36">[36]</a> Meanwhile, the New Zealand government has said that it “would encourage all New Zealand businesses operating in Xinjiang to be conscious of these well documented abuses and how their actions could be interpreted as an endorsement of them.”<a href="#_ftn37">[37]</a></p><p>It should be quite clear that Massey University’s and Professor Blair’s continued and regular involvement with Shihezi University in the context of the evolving large-scale atrocities in Xinjiang is extremely problematic and entirely inappropriate. Even the otherwise quite harmless development of sheep genetics and sheep raising methods is unacceptable when taking into account the context in which this collaboration takes place, and in light of the propaganda material that such a collaboration generates for the XPCC and Xinjiang governments. Foreign collaborations in Xinjiang in the era of these atrocities are routinely utilized to whitewash the atrocity by showcasing “development” and mutually beneficial international exchanges of scientific knowledge. Shihezi University’s related grandiose statements in the context of Blair’s 2019 Friendship Award Ceremony are a case in point.<a href="#_ftn38">[38]</a></p><p>Massey’s and Blair’s entanglement in Xinjiang is in fact unprecedented. I am not aware of any other western university’s involvement in Xinjiang at such a blatant and regular level, even since the onset of the most egregious atrocities in 2017. If Massey decides to continue this collaboration, it will likely find itself being subjected to much scrutiny and mounting criticism.</p><p>This brief research excursion to fact check Professor Brady’s allegations indicates that her findings merely represent the tip of an iceberg that has been allowed to grow for the past decades and years. As the global community carefully and closely observes how Canterbury University is embarking on an investigation of her publication, I urge you to consider the importance on Brady’s work. Many of her peers around the world would not remain silent if her important research efforts were to be unfairly suppressed or silenced.</p><p>Sincerely,</p><p>Dr. Adrian Zenz</p><p>NOTES:</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/2020-07-HoldingAPenInOneHand-Brady.pdf">https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/2020-07-HoldingAPenInOneHand-Brady.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/122405759/canterbury-uni-orders-review-into-publication-by-china-expert-annemarie-brady">https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/122405759/canterbury-uni-orders-review-into-publication-by-china-expert-annemarie-brady</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300101155/massey-defends-links-with-university-connected-to-xinjiang-paramilitary-group">https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300101155/massey-defends-links-with-university-connected-to-xinjiang-paramilitary-group</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> See e.g. <a href="https://victimsofcommunism.org/leader/adrian-zenz-phd/">https://victimsofcommunism.org/leader/adrian-zenz-phd/</a>, <a href="https://jamestown.org/analyst/adrian-zenz/">https://jamestown.org/analyst/adrian-zenz/</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/opinion/china-xinjiang-files.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/opinion/china-xinjiang-files.html</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> See e.g. <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-System-of-Oppression-in-Xinjiang-How-It-Developed-and-How-to-Curb-It.pdf">https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-System-of-Oppression-in-Xinjiang-How-It-Developed-and-How-to-Curb-It.pdf</a> by Dr. James Millward, among many other pertinent examples.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> See <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997?journalCode=ccas20">https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997?journalCode=ccas20</a>, <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-System-of-Oppression-in-Xinjiang-How-It-Developed-and-How-to-Curb-It.pdf">https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-System-of-Oppression-in-Xinjiang-How-It-Developed-and-How-to-Curb-It.pdf</a>, or e.g. <a href="https://archive.is/De1r4">https://archive.is/De1r4</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/08/chinas-vast-strange-and-powerful-farming-militia-turns-60/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/08/chinas-vast-strange-and-powerful-farming-militia-turns-60/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <a href="https://apparelinsider.com/bci-ditches-chinese-partner-with-prison-labour-links/">https://apparelinsider.com/bci-ditches-chinese-partner-with-prison-labour-links/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trump-idUSKCN24W29O">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trump-idUSKCN24W29O</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/wip/hdF96">https://archive.is/wip/hdF96</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/qybaF">https://archive.is/qybaF</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/wip/RfRdi">https://archive.is/wip/RfRdi</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20180923151956/http:/www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-06/15/content_1628385.htm">http://web.archive.org/web/20180923151956/http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-06/15/content_1628385.htm</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> <a href="http://archive.is/yMMFy#selection-637.61-637.80">http://archive.is/yMMFy#selection-637.61-637.80</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> <a href="http://archive.is/yMMFy">http://archive.is/yMMFy</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/DfHEr">https://archive.is/DfHEr</a> and <a href="http://archive.is/zcd4r">http://archive.is/zcd4r</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> See e.g. <a href="http://archive.is/zcd4r">http://archive.is/zcd4r</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Budget spreadsheet titled “政法委2018年部门决算公开信息情况说明”, downloaded from the Shihezi government website (www.shz.gov.cn).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Budget spreadsheet titled “新疆兵团第八师司法局”, downloaded from the Shihezi government website (www.shz.gov.cn).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> ASPI report, Shihezi Facility #1 (facility number 236), satellite coordinates 44.2361, 85.969).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997?journalCode=ccas20">https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997?journalCode=ccas20</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> See e.g. <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> See e.g. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/world/asia/china-reeducation-camps-leaked.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/world/asia/china-reeducation-camps-leaked.html</a> for an overview of the document and the investigation. Detailed research paper: <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> <a href="https://www.afp.com/en/eradicate-tumours-chinese-civilians-drive-xinjiang-crackdown">https://www.afp.com/en/eradicate-tumours-chinese-civilians-drive-xinjiang-crackdown</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> <a href="http://archive.is/Vdys4">http://archive.is/Vdys4</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/wip/1YyMw">https://archive.is/wip/1YyMw</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/NEYGE">https://archive.is/NEYGE</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> <a href="http://archive.is/T0EbE">http://archive.is/T0EbE</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> <a href="https://archive.is/De1r4">https://archive.is/De1r4</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> See e.g. <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang">https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-labor.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-labor.html</a>, <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale">https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/">https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48825090">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48825090</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref34">[34]</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-48873934">https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-48873934</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref35">[35]</a> <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birth-rates-in-xinjiang/">https://jamestown.org/program/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birth-rates-in-xinjiang/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref36">[36]</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/07/exiled-uighurs-call-on-icc-to-investigate-chinese-genocide-in-xinjiang">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/07/exiled-uighurs-call-on-icc-to-investigate-chinese-genocide-in-xinjiang</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref37">[37]</a> <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300101155/massey-defends-links-with-university-connected-to-xinjiang-paramilitary-group">https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300101155/massey-defends-links-with-university-connected-to-xinjiang-paramilitary-group</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref38">[38]</a> <a href="http://archive.is/zcd4r">http://archive.is/zcd4r</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=783fbfea13e6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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