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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Agata C. Hidalgo on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Inside the Apulian Mafia: Fourth Mafia, Sacra Corona Unita, and the Bari Camorra]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/inside-the-apulian-mafia-fourth-mafia-sacra-corona-unita-and-the-bari-camorra-427d589b4ab0?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[sacra-corona-unita]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foggia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[racket]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drug-trafficking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mafia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 23:33:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T22:31:22.810Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8IUqVybG_-QfI_F6o7201Q.avif" /><figcaption>Dario Melillo, owner of the Ultima Spiaggia beach club burnt by the Foggia mafia. Photo by Gianni Cipriano for The Wall Street Journal</figcaption></figure><p><em>“One of the major causes for social alarm on a national level.” This is how Italy’s Supreme Court describes the Foggia mafias. But organized crime in Apulia is not limited to the so-called Fourth Mafia: from the Sacra Corona Unita to the Bari Camorra, the Apulian mafia system is complex, deeply rooted in the region, and constantly evolving.</em></p><p><em>In this article, we trace the origins and history of the Apulian mafias, analyze their current strategies and activities, and — through the stories of entrepreneurs, journalists, and ordinary people — describe the work of those who oppose them.</em></p><blockquote><a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/1bbh3fGjoHPHylqqgHE1oO?si=df5ab14327984e69">Listen to the podcast</a> (in Italian)</blockquote><p><a href="https://vivi.libera.it/it-ricerca_nomi">103 innocent victims</a>;<a href="https://www.wikimafia.it/wiki/Comuni_sciolti_per_mafia"> 26 municipalities dissolved</a>;<a href="https://www.ansa.it/puglia/notizie/2026/09/11/in-7-anni-150-interdittive-antimafia-a-foggia-su-15mila-aziende-analizzate_e54e37d7-337e-4b29-9c4c-6a4bc5bd1fed.html"> 150 companies subject to anti-Mafia interdictive measures</a>. The criminal toll in Apulia certainly cannot be attributed to common street crime. From death <a href="https://lavialibera.it/it-schede-2569-graphic_story_puglia_magistrate_minacciate_mafia_sacra_corona_unita">threats</a> against magistrates, contract killings, armored car robberies, drug trafficking, loan sharking, racketeering, <a href="https://www.rainews.it/tgr/puglia/articoli/2026/10/mafia-beni-per-oltre-500mila-euro-sequestrati-a-un-esponente-della-sacra-corona-cc3333b7-11bb-462c-9eb3-b7b72bfccdd3.html">gambling</a>, <a href="https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/puglia/2179284/anche-gli-insospettabili-pugliesi-alla-banca-della-mafia-perquisiti-imprenditori-tra-brindisi-e-foggia.html">money laundering</a>, and illegal labor recruitment, the Apulian mafias are extending their grip into every sector of the economy — both the official and the underground sectors — even beyond Apulia’s borders. All of this is protected by a wall of silence and social complicity that still shows far too few cracks. That’s what we’re discussing in this article.</p><h3>Apulia’s multipolar criminal landscape</h3><p>How often have you heard about the Apulian mafias? Certainly less often than about the ‘Ndrangheta, the Camorra, and the Cosa Nostra — especially outside the regional press. This gap even led the magazine L’Espresso to run a headline in September 2025 reading<a href="https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2025/9/15/puglia-quarta-mafia-trascurata-infiltrazioni-racket-furti-auto-assalto-portavalori/56795">, “In Apulia, the Neglected Mafia</a>.” A notable exception is a series of reports and articles in Italy, France, and even the United States on the so-called “Fourth Mafia,” which is rampant — sometimes with acts of shocking violence — in the province of Foggia. But it would be wrong to think that there is a single “Fourth Mafia.”</p><p>According to <a href="https://www.procuracassazione.it/resources/cms/documents/PROCURA_GENERALE__GAETA_P.__Relazione_2026.pdf">the</a> latest <a href="https://www.procuracassazione.it/resources/cms/documents/PROCURA_GENERALE__GAETA_P.__Relazione_2026.pdf">report by the Attorney General’s Office of Italy’s Supreme Court</a>, published in January 2026, there are in fact at least three major “mafias” active in Puglia:</p><ul><li>The Foggia mafias (yes, plural) in the northern part , the “Capitanata”— which includes the plane and the Gargano peninsula;</li><li>The Bari Camorra in the center, along with groups active in Barletta, Andria, and Trani;</li><li>And the Sacra Corona Unita in the far south, in Salento.</li></ul><p>Even from their names, one trait is evident: the Apulian mafias are a synthesis of all the worst characteristics of the ‘Ndrangheta, the Camorra, and the Cosa Nostra. While the Sicilians introduced them to the mafia and alliances between mafias, from the Cutolo-era Camorra they learned the use of violence and an entrepreneurial approach. From the ‘Ndrangheta, on the other hand, they have inherited the reliance on blood ties rather than formal affiliation, which makes it more difficult to prove the crime of mafia association and to break through the wall of silence.</p><p>There is, however, also a fundamental difference from the historical mafias: in Puglia, <a href="https://www.raiplay.it/video/2022/01/Spotlight-Sangue-e-affari-Le-mani-della-Quarta-Mafia-sul-foggiano-1c4125e6-61fd-48c4-9233-d65fff1421ae.html">there is no overarching</a> coordinating <a href="https://www.raiplay.it/video/2022/01/Spotlight-Sangue-e-affari-Le-mani-della-Quarta-Mafia-sul-foggiano-1c4125e6-61fd-48c4-9233-d65fff1421ae.html">body</a>. The families act autonomously and forge shifting alliances, which can degenerate into full-blown mafia wars when business disputes arise.</p><p>Each family exercises military control over its own territory — both inside and outside prison — and even on social media, where it normalizes criminal culture, seeking approval and even fascination among young people.</p><p>Control over territory, however, is not synonymous with isolation: the Apulian mafias in fact conduct lucrative business with other Italian mafias and the Albanian mafia, especially in drug trafficking, and now also operate in <a href="https://lavialibera.it/it-schede-2668-da_foggia_la_denuncia_del_procuratore_antimafia_melillo_situazione_grave">Molise, Abruzzo</a>, and even further north, in <a href="https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2025/9/15/puglia-quarta-mafia-trascurata-infiltrazioni-racket-furti-auto-assalto-portavalori/56795">Emilia-Romagna</a>.</p><p>But how did criminal activity spread to such an extent? To understand this, we need to take a few steps back in time.</p><h3>A bit of history</h3><p>According to a 2022 parliamentary <a href="https://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg18/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/023/037_RSt03/INTERO_COM.pdf">report</a>, the process of “mafiosization” in Apulia began as a result of two 1970s government <a href="https://www.museodellecivilta.it/storia-delle-mafie/storia-delle-mafie-mafiepugliesi/">decisions</a>. First, the imposition of forced residence in the region on Corleonesi mafia members and ‘Ndrangheta members; then, the transfer of Cutolian Camorra members to Apulian prisons. While the goal of these decisions was to separate criminals from their social networks, the unintended consequence was the spread of this “disease” throughout the host region.</p><p>It’s a frequent dynamic in the criminal world: similar exemples have been recorded in <a href="https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/from-smugglers-to-narcos-the-leap-of-galician-clans-e3220bfb3b89">Spain</a>, <a href="https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/the-price-of-truth-fernando-villavicencios-against-ecuador-s-corruption-illegal-mines-and-drug-40e92e7ef576">Ecuador</a> and Brazil, where the transfer of criminals to distant prisons allowed them to recruit new allies and extend their control over new territories.</p><p>But let’s return to Apulia. In 1978, Giuseppe d’Onofrio, a drug trafficker from Fasano, in the province of Brindisi, formed ties with the Madonia family of Palermo. The following year, in Lucera, in the province of Foggia, Raffaele Cutolo recruited 40 Apulian criminals into his Nuova Camorra Organizzata (NCO). In 1980, Giuseppe Puca, Cutolo’s right-hand man, repeated the process in Galatina, in the province of Lecce. A year later, the Apulian boss Giuseppe Iannelli created the Nuova Grande Camorra Pugliese, a copycat of the Neapolitan Camorra. However, it was a vassal organization that had to pay <a href="https://www.foggiatoday.it/cronaca/storia-mafia-foggia-anni-settanta-ottanta.html">over 40%</a> of its profits to the NCO in exchange for protection both inside and outside prison.</p><p>When the NCO was dismantled by law enforcement in<a href="https://www.napolitoday.it/cronaca/storia-cutolo-fine-nco-omicidio-casillo.html"> 1983</a>, the Apulians sought a new “big brother” capable of providing them with protection. They found it in the ‘Ndrangheta: Iannelli aligned himself with the Stefano family, while another local boss, Giuseppe Rogoli, was initiated by Umberto Bellocco in the Bari prison. On Christmas Day of that same year (a highly simbolic date), Rogoli founded the Sacra Corona Unita.</p><p>The Sacra Corona Unita was born a new criminal organization, modeled after the ‘Ndrangheta, which divided Puglia into three parts: the north, comprising the provinces of Foggia and Bari, was entrusted to Iannelli and two other local leaders, Giosuè Rizzi and Cosimo Cappellari; the south, comprising the provinces of Lecce and Brindisi, went to Rogoli; while Taranto went to the Modeo brothers. Finally, the Barletta-Andria-Trani area went to Salvatore Annacondia, another figure we’ll return to later.</p><p>The federal model, however, was short-lived. When Rogoli admitted to the judges in Bari that the organization existed, relations with the Foggia faction began to fray. The rivalry between families over control of the drug trade then reached a point of no return. On May 1, 1986, the Rizzi-Moretti clan wiped out, in a shootout, individuals close to the Laviano brothers, emissaries of the Sacra Corona Unita in Foggia. It was the infamous “Bacardi Massacre,” named after the bar in Piazza Mercato where the victims were at the time of the murder. It was this event that marked the definitive emancipation of the Fourth Mafia.</p><h3>From north to south</h3><h4>The Foggia Mafias</h4><p>Referring to a “Fourth Mafia” is actually inaccurate: in the province of Foggia alone, there are in fact three distinct mafia centers:</p><ul><li>The Foggia Society, in the city of Foggia;</li><li>The Cerignola Mafia, in Cerignola, in the southern part of the province;</li><li>And the Gargano Mafia of the mountains of the Gargano peninsula.</li></ul><p>These are not journalistic labels, but organizations recognized by final court rulings: for the Foggia Mafia, this is the 1994 Panunzio ruling, named after the businessman who was shot to death for refusing to pay protection money. For the Cerignola Mafia, it is the 1997 Cartagine ruling, whose key witness, <a href="https://www.foggiatoday.it/cronaca/teresa-potenza-testimone-giustizia-mafia-cerignola.html">Teresa Potenza</a>, recently gave chilling interviews following the release from prison of boss Giuseppe Mastrangelo, who was initially sentenced to life in prison. Finally, for the Gargano Mafia, it is the 2009 Iscaro-Saburo ruling, named after the two investigations into the feud between clans at the time.</p><p>A fourth hub, centered around the city of San Severo, north of Foggia, does not yet have legal recognition but is, according to Italy’ Supreme Court , well on its way to breaking away from the Foggia Society.</p><p>In its January 2026 report, the Supreme Court goes as far as defining Foggia organizations as “the most dangerous and insidious manifestation of the Apulian mafias” and “a cause for social alarm on a national scale.” Why?</p><h4>The Foggia Society</h4><p>Let’s start with the Foggia Society. According to accounts, seven mafia wars ravaged the city between the 1986 Bacardi massacre and 2016. Primarily involved were the “batterie” (as the clans formed by 2–3 allied families are called) of the Moretti-Pellegrino, Sinesi-Francavilla, and Trisciuoglio-Prencipe families. At the heart of the clashes were the struggle for dominance, leadership changes, personal vendettas, and the management of protection money. The toll? 42 people murdered, 2 “lupare bianche” (i.e., murders in which the bodies were never found), 23 failed ambushes, and 30 convictions for murder, including 6 life sentences. The latest high-profile bloodshed — the killing of Boss Moretti’s nephew in January 2026 — has cast the specter of a new war, though it does not yet appear to have broken out. This does not mean that the Society’s activities have diminished in recent years — quite the contrary.</p><p>From the 1980s to the present, the Foggia Society has amassed wealth by<a href="https://lavialibera.it/it-schede-2668-da_foggia_la_denuncia_del_procuratore_antimafia_melillo_situazione_grave"> infiltrating</a> all centers of criminal, political, and economic power in the city. First and foremost, in drug trafficking: Foggia-based gangs resell hashish and cocaine from the Albanian mafia to the Camorra and the ‘Ndrangheta. The goods arrive secretly from Albania on compact, high-speed motorboats, which are unloaded in the nooks and crannies of the rugged Gargano coastline, far from prying eyes. Once in Foggia, the drugs are hidden in places like the public housing projects in the Candelaro neighborhood where the Society maintains military-style control over the entrances and decides who can live there and who cannot.</p><p>In the countryside, the Organization exploits farm laborers (through the infamous “caporalato” system), while in the city it collects protection money. The gangs divide up the neighborhoods according to a shared extortion ledger (the so-called “Foggia System”), a collaboration that allows them to keep the Camorra and the ‘Ndrangheta at bay. It is estimated that 80% of merchants in Foggia pay protection money out of fear of retaliation: even though there have been no murders for a long time, the warning sent by the assassinations of businessmen such as Giovanni Panunzio and Nicola Ciuffreda in the 1990s still holds weight. Not even street vendors and drug dealers are spared: they, too, must pay what magistrate Giuseppe Gatti calls the “sovereignty tax.” As is often the case, this money is used to support prisoners and their families. But of course, mere subsistence is not enough. It is profit that motivates the organization’s members.</p><p>Various investigations have shown that the Foggia Society exploits friendships and family ties with city officials to ensure that anti-Mafia interdictive measures against companies infiltrated by or linked to the clans are ignored, thereby securing contracts for them to manage everything from public parks to cemeteries, including traffic lights, taxes, and public housing.</p><p>And it doesn’t end there: the organization has also attempted to get its hands on the city’s <a href="https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/calcio-foggia/2143136/c-era-la-mafia-dietro-il-ricatto-a-canonico-foggia-calcio-due-pentiti-al-processo-per-le-estorsioni-all-ex-presidente.html?_gl=1*9742ta*_up*MQ..*_ga*MjkxODgyMTExLjE3OTE3MDkyMTE.*_ga_CXTVRMFR11*czE3OTE3MDkyNTEkbzEkZzEkdDE3OTE3MDkyNjMkajQ4JGwwJGgw*_ga_9HD1K76044*czE3OTE3MDkyMTAkbzEkZzAkdDE3OTE3MDkyNjMkajckbDAkaDA">soccer team</a>. Between 2023 and 2024, in fact, a man close to the Sinesi-Francavilla clan carried out a “strategy of intimidation and mafia influence” against executives, players, and even the team’s ultras leader to force President Nicola Canonico to sell Foggia Calcio and thus take control of the club.</p><h4>From the Gargano to Cerignola</h4><p>The situation is no better in the rest of the province. In the Gargano area, what began as a pastoral <a href="https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/puglia/98617/faida-garganica-emesse-10-condanne.html">feud</a> has turned into a full-blown mafia war that has resulted in 35 murders over 30 years. Among those involved are the Li Bergolis clan — still one of the most powerful in the area today — as well as the Alfieri-Primosa and Romito-Lombardi-Ricucci clans. Even after the 2009 ruling, the violence continued and culminated in the 2017 San Marco in Lamis massacre, which claimed the lives of two innocent farmers in addition to the intended victim, the boss Mario Luciano Romito. There is no shortage of reasons for rivalry in the Gargano region: from drug trafficking to protection rackets targeting farms and tourism operators, the clans seek comprehensive control over the territory, sometimes in association with families from Foggia — particularly the Moretti family, as demonstrated by a recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oBEoxqHAwUI">legal proceeding</a>.</p><p>Things are different in Cerignola, in the southern part of the province. Here, the clans have no interest in controlling economic activities in the traditional sense: they simply plunder them. Cerignola-based clans such as the Piarullu and the Saracino-Cartagena have in fact <a href="https://lavialibera.it/it-schede-2563-dietro_gli_assalti_ai_portavalori_c_e_un_controllo_mafioso_sostiene_la_direzione_nazionale_antimafia">specialized</a> in robberies, ATM heists, attacks on armored cars, and break-ins at security firms’ vaults — carried out with military precision even far beyond the borders of Puglia. Milan, Brescia, Chieti, Macerata… between 2015 and 2025, 47 attacks on armored vehicles were recorded in various Italian cities.</p><p>To carry out these heists, several teams operate in a coordinated manner, following well-established methods. Some are responsible for setting stolen cars on fire and scattering nails on the road to block traffic and delay the arrival of law enforcement. Others, on the other hand, brandish Kalashnikovs to coerce drivers into cooperating while they also protect their accomplices. Others still are responsible for breaking into the vehicles to retrieve the stolen goods. The teams disperse after the heist but reunite for other operations. Groups from outside Cerignola are also involved: clans from the Gargano area (such as the Ricucci-Romito-Lombardi clan from the mountains and the Perna-Iannoli clan from Vieste, by the coast), as well as groups from Bari, Sardinian gangs, members of the Brenta Mafia, and even individuals of Sinti origin.</p><p>For the people of Cerignola, the proceeds from the robberies are then used to finance the purchase of drugs to fuel the local drug trade or are <a href="https://www.foggiatoday.it/cronaca/arresto-imprenditore-lavello-riciclaggio-soldi-assalti-portavalori-mafia-cerignola.html">laundered</a> through complicit companies.</p><p>The frequency and violence of these gangs’ activities have placed such a heavy strain on the city and its merchants that, in July 2026, the mayor of Cerignola <a href="https://antimafiaduemila.com/home/rassegna-stampa-sp-2087084558/mafia-eventi-puglia/sindaco-a-cerignola-ce-la-mafia-piu-pericolosa-servono-rinforzi">requested</a> the enforcement of the controversial <a href="https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2023/11/14/23A06292/sg">Caivano Decree</a>.</p><h3>The Bari Camorra</h3><p>Let’s head further south. Remember Salvatore Annacondia, the man appointed by the Sacra Corona Unita to run the Barletta-Andria-Trani area? The undisputed boss of the 1980s, with as many as 72 murders attributed to him, he was arrested and decided to become <a href="https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/171024.pdf">a state witness</a> in 1992. It was a choice made more out of self-interest than repentance, as he was <a href="https://www.ilrestodelcarlino.it/macerata/cronaca/lex-boss-salvatore-annacondia-agli-f8ecffbf">arrested</a> again in the Marche region in 2024 following an attempted extortion of a businessman from Fermo.</p><p>Meanwhile, in what used to be his territory, a series of smaller local clans have emerged, vying for control of the area with offshoots of the Foggia, Cerignola, and Bari mafias. This violent and unstable situation has led the Supreme Court to designate the province as an “emergency zone.”</p><p>In Bari, too, the criminal landscape is fragmented. The so-called “Bari Camorra” consists of rival clans organized by neighborhood, competing with one another both for control of criminal activities (drug dealing, extortion, and the provision of services) and in their operational styles. On one hand, there are clans like the Strisciuglio and Capriati, who flaunt a “gangster” style. In these organizations, leaders earn their place through bloodshed, and young people are recruited by appealing to their desire for a glamorous and violent lifestyle. Other clans, such as the Parisi-Palermiti, on the other hand, prefer to keep a low profile, focusing on major business deals and building solid social support. They are the ones who forge alliances with international drug cartels and provide essential services to the residents of the neighborhoods under their control to ensure their economic dependence. Increasingly, investigators are also noting an expansion of the Bari Camorra beyond the city’s borders into outlying municipalities — a threat of spread that must be taken very seriously.</p><h3>The Sacra Corona Unita</h3><p>And in Salento? Here, the overwhelming power of the Sacra Corona Unita — whose existence was formally recognized in the 1990 Lecce mega-trial — has not yet been broken. After decades of massacres of innocent people and high-profile crimes, however, it is increasingly asserting itself in a “silent” manner. Like the ‘Ndrangheta, from which it derives and from whose alliance it continues to draw credibility, the Sacra Corona Unita has scaled back its acts of visible violence so that it can conduct business undisturbed in both rural areas and cities.</p><p>In addition to illegal activities such as drug trafficking and extortion (here, protection money is called a “pensierino”), what is cause for concern is its infiltration into the legal economy and public administration. The so-called “fringes” of the Sacra Corona Unita are involved in waste processing, the installation and operation of renewable energy systems, and money laundering through agricultural enterprises, agri-food industries, and tourism-related businesses — particularly the restaurant industry. They exploit farm laborers through illegal labor recruitment schemes, commit environmental crimes and engage in unauthorized construction, and are involved in the immigration business. It has also been repeatedly demonstrated that they influence municipal elections and bribe officials — especially in smaller towns — to ensure that contracts are awarded to complicit companies. Not even prison stops the bosses of the Sacra Corona Unita: as in France, affiliates use drones to deliver cell phones to them so they can stay in contact with the outside world.</p><p>For decades, those who opposed the abuses of the Sacra Corona Unita have often paid with their lives. Consider, for example, Renata Fonte, a city councilwoman killed in 1984 for blocking the overdevelopment of a nature reserve; Marcella di Levrano, disfigured and murdered in 1990 for naming the Apulian drug traffickers with whom she had decided to sever ties; or Hyso Telharaj, a young Albanian farm laborer who rebelled against the gangmasters and was killed for it in 1999.</p><p>Today, however, to silence inconvenient voices, the Salento mafia apparatus uses other methods: the courts and social media.</p><p>A prime example is that of journalist Marilù Mastrogiovanni, founder of the publication “Il Tacco d’Italia” and author of numerous investigative reports exposing the collusion between the Sacra Corona Unita and white-collars in southern Salento across a wide range of sectors, from the disposal of toxic waste from northern Italy to dealings with the public administration. At first, Marilù Mastrogiovanni was subjected to all kinds of harassment: threatening phone calls, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08xpYvRZINQ">vandalism and theft at</a> the newspaper’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08xpYvRZINQ">offices</a>, a <a href="https://www.lecceprima.it/attualita/inchieste-scottanti-due-processi-in-un-giorno-giornalista-mastrogiovanni.html">defamatory</a> and dehumanizing campaign on social media, the arson of her home, and the poisoning of her dogs. Then came a barrage of lawsuits, filed by local companies and even by the mayor of Casarano. These lawsuits led to the seizure of Il Tacco d’Italia in 2017. The seizure lasted only 45 days, because the company that had requested it was subsequently hit with an anti-Mafia interdictive order. This situation led the authorities to place her and her family under police protection and to order them to leave the Lecce area. Meanwhile, the legal proceedings surrounding her investigations have continued to this day: in January 2026, the journalist was <a href="https://www.lecceprima.it/cronaca/querele-dopo-inchieste-scottanti-condanna-giornalista-multa-600-euro.html">ordered</a> to pay a fine and compensate the Casarano municipal administrators. But it would be wrong to think that the mafia has won.</p><h3>Resilience</h3><p>Marilù Mastrogiovanni can appeal to defend her right to report the news.</p><p>In a July 2026 ruling, the Province of Lecce was awarded €460,000.00 in <a href="https://www.provincia.le.it/risarcimento-per-la-provincia-nel-maxi-processo-penale-contro-la-sacra-corona-unita-fabio-tarantino-utilizzeremo-somme-per-progetti-su-legalita-nelle-scuole-e-per-cittadinanza-attiva-nelle/">compensation</a> for the reputational damage caused to the region by the Sacra Corona Unita, which the President has promised to invest in promoting the rule of law in schools.</p><p>The executives of Foggia Calcio refused to be intimidated by gunfire, explosions, arson, attempts to bribe players, and defamatory actions at the stadium and on social media. They filed charges, and at the time of this episode’s recording, three of the four perpetrators have been convicted and are serving their sentences in prison, while the team was <a href="https://lavialibera.it/it-schede-2302-foggia_calcio_spari_esplosioni_e_minacce_dell_ultra_legato_ai_clan">placed under anti-mafia supervision</a>.</p><p>In the Candelaro neighborhood, <a href="https://www.foggiatoday.it/cronaca/arresto-droga-rione-candelaro-segnalazioni-cittadini.html">reports</a> from some residents led to the arrest of a repeat drug dealer in 2025.</p><p>Also in Candelaro, on September 14, 2026 the City of Foggia, with the support of the National Magistrates Association and the local Libera chapter, <a href="https://www.foggiatoday.it/cronaca/murale-nicola-ciuffreda-imprenditore-ucciso-mafia.html">unveiled</a> a mural in memory of Nicola Ciuffreda, the first businessman killed for opposing racketeering.</p><p>In various parts of the province of Foggia, other <a href="https://www.wsj.com/story/the-resurgence-of-the-fourth-mafia-f3056e28">business owners</a> are now following in his footsteps, at the cost of great personal and professional sacrifices. Among them are Lazzaro d’Auria, an agricultural entrepreneur; Dario Melillo, owner of a beach resort; and Gianpaolo Romano, manager of a family-run car dealership. All have been targets of threats, sabotage, and repeated arson attacks on their businesses simply for refusing to pay protection money.</p><p>In Vieste, business owners decided to stand united against the mafia: in 2009, with the help of the Italian Anti-Racketeering Federation and the National Anti-Mafia Directorate, 27 of them <a href="https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/foggia/1479237/associazione-antiracket-a-vieste-concreto-supporto-alle-vittime.html">joined forces</a> and filed a joint complaint, providing key testimony in the trial known as “Medioevo.” Today, the Vieste anti-racketeering association has more than 45 members, and this year it was <a href="https://www.foggiatoday.it/cronaca/menzione-speciale-premio-giorgio-ambrosoli-federazione-antiracket-vieste.html">awarded</a> the <a href="https://www.premiogiorgioambrosoli.it/index.html">Giorgio Ambrosoli Prize</a> , an honor given to businesses and institutions that have distinguished themselves for their defense of the rule of law despite external pressure to succumb to illegality.</p><p>For their part, government agencies and law enforcement have increased their presence in the region following the 2017 San Marco in Lamis massacre. Now, the Anti-Mafia Investigative Directorate, the Carabinieri’s special units — in particular the ROS, the helicopter-borne squadron known as the “Cacciatori di Puglia,” and the crime prevention unit — are present not only in Bari and Lecce but also in the Foggia area. In recent years, arrests and trials have increased, thanks to closer collaboration among prosecutors’ offices as well as the growing number of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-6AsCpq6So">turncoats</a> and complaints.</p><p>Institutions cannot combat the mafias alone. What is needed is a collective rejection by civil society. Reporting a crime should not be seen as a heroic act that requires an award, but as a normal act. Those who take this step should not feel — nor be made to feel — isolated, but should remain integrated into a community that shares their principles of legality. This is not yet the case everywhere in Apulia or elsewhere in Italy. But hopefully it will increasingly be.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=427d589b4ab0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From smugglers to narcos: the “leap” of Galician clans]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/from-smugglers-to-narcos-the-leap-of-galician-clans-e3220bfb3b89?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e3220bfb3b89</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cartels]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[galicia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drug-trafficking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[speedboat]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pablo-escobar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 22:36:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-31T22:36:46.582Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AXqL9eXk6VCM1hnRFZFnZQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ultra-fast drug-smuggling boat on the coast between Spain and Portugal. Source: RTVE</figcaption></figure><p>70 km south of Santiago de Compostela, at the northwestern tip of the Iberian Peninsula, lies a port town called Arcade. One evening in the early 1990s, a woman is driving by with her father. But when she tries to brake, the car doesn’t respond. Once, twice, three times. The elderly man realizes something is wrong, but the woman keeps her cool and manages to slow down enough to pull the vehicle over. The next day, her mechanic explains that someone had sabotaged her car by draining the brake fluid.</p><p>Several years and many miles later, another traffic accident involves a woman. We are in Corvillón, one night in 2001. A mother who is going to pick up her daughter at the exit of a nightclub falls asleep at the wheel. The impact against the wall of the National Police’s Anti- Drug Brigade headquarters proves fatal.</p><p>The protagonists of these stories are not just any two women. The first is Carmen Avendaño, spokesperson for Erguete, an association that brings together mothers of young drug addicts in the fight against drug trafficking. The second is Esther Lago, wife of the boss Laureano Oubiña, one of Galicia’s leading tobacco and drug traffickers, and the true mastermind behind his criminal organization.</p><p>Carmen and Esther. Nemeses. Opposing sides of the same story: that of Galicia’s rise as a European logistics hub for drugs coming from South America and North Africa.</p><p>It’s the story we’re dealing with.</p><h3>Galicia, smugglers’ paradise</h3><p>Galicia’s criminal roots run deep into centuries of smuggling. It’s no coincidence: its terrain seems tailor-made for this activity.</p><p>With its 1,498 km of rugged, jagged coastline, Galicia has more coastline than Andalusia and the Balearic Islands combined. A geography that’s perfect for hiding and unloading ships full of illicit goods.</p><p>Nestled above Portugal, Galicia is culturally close to its southern neighbor, with whom it shares a mountainous border, and is peripheral to the capital, Madrid. From the fall of the Roman Empire to the 1864 Border Treaty, Galicia has found itself in an administrative limbo, with borders unclaimed by either side, free of customs duties, and largely self-governing. Even after the treaty, the border between Spain and Portugal remained porous and left to its inhabitants, a situation that persisted until recent times, allowing organized crime to operate with impunity and almost undisturbed for decades.</p><p>Another effect of this partial isolation is that Galicia developed its own language: it is in Galician that the Galician underworld has historically expressed itself, and it is in Galician that the book <em>Fariña </em>by journalist <a href="https://cultura.cervantes.es/sofia/es/Fari%C3%B1a,-de-Nacho-Carretero/128643">Nacho Carretero</a> — on which this article is largely based — is written.</p><p>You’ve likely gathered it by now: Galicia is a region that is perfectly suited for criminal activity. And as they rose to power, the local clans knew how to exploit it to the fullest.</p><h3>Necessity is the mother of invention</h3><p>The first time Galicia had to deal with a “hard” border with Portugal was with the advent of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in 1939. This policy could not have come at a worse time: while Portugal prospered thanks to its colonies, in Galicia — impoverished by the civil war — everything was in short supply, even electricity. Many men then left to work in Castile and Catalonia, while those who remained began an intense smuggling operation of basic necessities: food, soap, medicine, metals, spare parts, and construction materials.</p><p>It is the women who take the cows to pasture who are the first to venture into this activity: moving from one islet to another, the <em>pisqueiras </em>transport not only livestock but also goods, and alert one another to the presence of the Civil Guard by shouting made-up names that could very well be epithets for the animals.</p><p>Even along the railroad, the Galician population organizes itself: some hang white cloths from their windows to signal that the way is clear; drivers slow down, and others take care of looting the train cars. Only the occasional visits by the authorities from Madrid put this practice on hold.</p><p>Smuggling begins to go so well that many men return home and start using boats instead of cows to move goods — a more effective smuggling method. The Civil Guard soon becomes involved in the trafficking, to the point that unless it reaches an agreement with the smugglers, it imposes a fine equal to twice the value of the goods. This drives many to throw their cargo overboard when they are caught.</p><p>Business soon followed necessity: part of the smuggled food was resold to the <em>maquis</em>, anti-Franco guerrillas hiding in the mountains, while the tungsten mined in the hills was sold for a fortune to the Nazi army.</p><p>Things went even better in the 1950s, when economic relations between Galicians and Portuguese began to rebalance. Non-essential goods were sold as well, and trafficking started to take place in both directions. It also began to professionalize: smugglers no longer needed to steer the boats themselves; they could rely on hired pilots. To prevent theft and fraud, upon delivery, the smugglers gave the pilots a minted piece of aluminum that they could then exchange for real money. The system became so normalized that these aluminum pieces were treated as currency in some small villages on both sides of the border. Even overland, young people in need of money and work were hired to wear full-body armor to smuggle metal between Spain and Portugal aboard buses.</p><p>In the 1960s, smuggling reached a new level: as Portugal entered the war against its own colonies, it not only became impoverished but also had to call its citizens to arms. The relationship between the two countries was reversed: now it was Portugal that lacked basic goods, and many wanted to leave the country illegally to avoid conscription. In no time at all, Galician smugglers thus turned into human traffickers.</p><p>Entire Portuguese families were taken to Spain under conditions that were more or less dire: at first, it was enough to get them onto a boat; later, as controls intensified, they had to hide in cisterns, under vans, or in the false bottoms of trunks. Once in Galicia, they were hidden in the homes of accomplices until other traffickers took them to their final destination. In some cases, these were scammers who took the money and abandoned the Portuguese in other regions, especially in Asturias and the Basque Country.</p><p>While smuggling and human trafficking began to bring some relief to certain Galician families, it was still nothing compared to the bonanza that tobacco would bring.</p><h3>The age of tobacco lords</h3><p>During this period, Galician smugglers started to realize that the most profitable commodity — the one worth investing the most effort in — was tobacco. Small and medium-sized smugglers gave way to wholesalers capable of managing warehouses and organizations of hundreds of people, including drivers, transporters, and retailers.</p><p>Between the 1960s and 1980s, three leaders in particular rose to prominence: Celso Lorenzo Villa, Vicente Otero, known as “Terito,” and Manuel Diaz Gonzalez, known as “Ligero.” All three made a point of using their wealth to gain support and expand their influence. In addition to systematically bribing the Civil Guard, they began funding local festivals, soccer teams, and political parties, particularly Alianza Popular. They mingled with the local elite (Lorenzo Villa was even married to the daughter of the Civil Guard chief) and employed thousands of local people, steering the entire economy toward tobacco and leaving little room for tourism, aquaculture, and other activities. Terito, for example, maintained a dense network of companies, particularly in transportation, mostly for money laundering, and hired as boat drivers many of those who would later become the bosses of the second generation of major Galician smugglers. His right-hand man, José Manuel “Nené” Barral, even went so far as to be elected mayor.</p><p>In short, the big names in smuggling presented themselves — and were perceived — as successful businessmen who benefitted the community. Many children of that era wanted to follow in their footsteps, or had a father whose profession was officially listed as “smuggler.” Ligero, who entered politics after his criminal career, even went so far as to say in an interview that there are no people more honorable than smugglers.</p><p>The worst part is that even the law seemed to be on their side. Until 1978, in fact, smuggling was merely an economic offense punishable by fines, which often got lost in the bureaucratic maze of Spain’s young democracy.</p><p>On the rare occasions when raids took place, the bosses either managed to escape or were allowed to get away. The operations were more of a show to demonstrate that the Civil Guard was fighting crime than an effort to actually enforce the law.</p><p>It wasn’t until 1982 that a law criminalizing smuggling was passed — just as the phenomenon was about to reach its peak.</p><h3>The leap: from tobacco to drugs</h3><p>In the early 1980s, the world of smuggling underwent a rapid series of changes that led to what Nacho Carretero calls “the qualitative leap.”</p><p>First, the Galician clans stopped buying tobacco from the Portuguese by land and began sourcing it directly from American manufacturers R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Philip Morris by sea. It was the manufacturers themselves who reached out to them, as well as to Greek gangs and the Neapolitan Camorra, to ensure they could sell surplus or defective tobacco shipments.</p><p>The delivery method was the same one that would later be used for drugs: mother ships anchored in international waters, were approached by smaller motorboats that quickly and stealthily transported the tobacco boxes ashore. Before docking, accomplices on the mainland cut the power three times in the nearest coastal town to signal that there were no guards. Once they reached the most hidden and inaccessible coves, teams of unloaders quickly emptied the boat and loaded the tobacco onto vans headed for safe hideouts: mussel farms, churches, accomplices’ homes, industrial ships, and holes in the ground.</p><p>For these complex logistical operations to succeed, multiple groups often had to collaborate: a lead group and smaller ones for loading and unloading. There was so much work that a second generation of tobacco lords emerged. Among the leading figures were Marcial Dorado Baulde (leader of the Banda de Marcial and famous for his wit despite his lack of education), José Ramón Barreiro Fontán (known as “Sito Carnicero”), and José Ramón Prado Bugallo (known as “Sito Minaco,” Terito’s former top driver and head of ROS SL, the name of his front company), who were often allies.</p><p>Other prominent figures from this period include the brothers Manuel and José Luis Charlín Gama (founders of the Charlín family clan), Laureano Oubina Pinereiro (whose organization was, however, effectively run by his second wife, Esther Lago), Luis Falcon Perez, known as “Falconetti,” and Manuel Carballo.</p><p>These were men of extremely humble origins who, from a very young age, spent more time sailing boats or smuggling than attending school, and who soon found themselves millionaires.</p><p>Even after spending lavishly on villas, cars, women, luxury restaurants, and exclusive nightclubs, they still had too much cash on hand and therefore had to find a way to launder it.</p><p>Thus was born the <em>Peseta Connection</em>: intermediaries drove non-stop from Galicia to Geneva with trunks full of bags of cash, paying bribes to border guards. Once in Switzerland, they parked in front of banks and let the employees swap the bags for sacks of gold bars, which are then sent back to Galicia to be hidden or used to buy jewelry on the black market.</p><p>This was not an exclusive system: the mafia, African clans, and even Basque ETA terrorists used these routes. This exposed Galician leaders to new criminal networks — it is precisely thanks to a Moroccan middleman that old Charlin discovered hashish.</p><p>Although it had been circulating among young Galicians since 1975, Galician smugglers viewed hashish with suspicion. All it took was a couple of test shipments that sold well and with little effort to change their minds: as their Moroccan partners put it, the risk was the same as with tobacco (there were no specific laws for this substance), the effort was less because the packages were smaller, and the profit was greater. Oubiña, too, was seduced by this new product and even established a connection with major producers in Pakistan.</p><p>But hashish wasn’t the only new development linked to money laundering. After Switzerland, in fact, the money flew to Panama, where it was invested through various shell companies. A tax haven favored by Colombian cartels as well.</p><p>With a soft spot for Caribbean women, Sito Miñaco never missed an opportunity to go check on his investments in Panama. It is on one of these trips that he met his future second wife, Odalys Rivera, the niece of the Minister of Justice, who introduced him to cocaine and the Colombian cartels.</p><p>The key contact was a certain Ramon Matta Bellesteros, a trusted associate of none other than Pablo Escobar. The potential for an alliance was immediately apparent to both sides: the Colombians, under pressure from Colombian and U.S. authorities, had an interest in conquering Europe, and Galicia offered a perfect gateway — the same language, de facto impunity, clans with experience in maritime trafficking, and a sophisticated infrastructure already in place. The first trial shipments of cocaine were promptly initiated…and just as quickly put on hold.</p><h3>A failed setback</h3><p>In 1984, Pablo Escobar had the Colombian Minister of Justice killed. The crime was too big to go unpunished: the boss was forced to flee to Nicaragua, while his seconds-in-command, Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez and José Nelson Matta Ballesteros — interested in doing business with the Galicians — chose Spain: the former went to Madrid (where he also underwent a facial plastic surgery), while the latter went to La Coruña, in Galicia. In both places, they quickly set up front businesses and organized cocaine shipments. But the timing was wrong.</p><p>In November of that very year, the judge of Cambados, in Galicia, José Luis Seoane Spiegelberg, with the support of the socialist governor of Pontevedra, Virginio Fuentes, decided to launch the first major operation against tobacco and drug trafficking, dubbed “Macrosumario 11/84.”</p><p>The operation turned out to be a colossal failure with disastrous consequences. Virtually all the Galician bosses were alerted to the operation by their contacts within the police and had time to comfortably relocate to Portugal, just a stone’s throw from the border, from where they continued to run their businesses. Under circumstances that remain unclear, the President of the Xunta de Galicia, Xerardo Fernández Albor of Alianza Popular, visited the location where the bosses were staying and, whether willingly or not (we will never know), spoke with them. This meeting had several consequences: Judge Spielberg and Governor Fuentes were removed from the investigation, the former sent to Cantabria, the latter to Castile. The bosses Marcial and Sito Carnicero, on the other hand, ended up turning themselves in to the Carabanchel prison in Madrid.</p><p>It was probably no coincidence: there was good company there. In addition to Sito Miñaco, Carabanchel held Ochoa and another Colombian. Their time in prison allowed the Colombians and Galicians to get to know each other better. While the Galicians would all be released within a few weeks, the Colombians would remain in prison for two years, but they would manage to persuade — if not bribe — the Spanish government to deny extradition to the United States and instead be repatriated to Colombia, where they were promptly released.</p><p>Of the 93 traffickers tried in Operation Macrosumario, none ever stood trial: the clans paid bail, the trial date was postponed to 1993, and thanks to a 1986 law, the case was dismissed.</p><p>Meanwhile, Escobar’s top man in Galicia, Matta Bellesteros, was on the loose, arranging cocaine shipments and laundering the cartel’s money through numerous local businesses, thereby winning the favor of local authorities. Despite the newspaper El País exposing his scheme and the DEA denouncing him from the United States, the Spanish government took no action. The governor of A Coruña even publicly defends Bellesteros, and the secretary of the Socialist Party downplays the matter, saying it was merely a controversy. The path for drug trafficking was cleared.</p><h3>The golden age (for some)</h3><p>Between the mid-1980s and the 1990s, as the Cali cartel supplanted the Medellín cartel — which was under too much pressure from the DEA — drug trafficking reached its peak in Galicia.</p><p>Four main clans emerged: Marcial’s, Sito Miñaco’s, the Charlins’, and Oubina’s, each of which supported a network of smaller groups with specific roles, such as those led by Falconetti and Carballo. All had highly closed hierarchical organizations, though not necessarily bound by family ties or internal codes. They had no exclusive territory: anyone could unload tobacco and drugs wherever they wanted, and at times they even collaborated.</p><p>It is interesting to note that, in public, both Marcial and Oubina would always deny having ventured into cocaine trafficking, the former claiming to have limited himself to tobacco and the latter to hashish — proof that all these trafficking activities coexisted and were extremely profitable.</p><p>It is established, however, that Sito Miñaco and the Charlins were involved in cocaine trafficking with the Colombians. During these years, their clans acted as subcontractors: they were tasked with sending a ship to retrieve the drugs in Colombia, transporting them to Europe, and unloading them via motorboats in Galicia (the riskiest phase), before delivering the drugs to the Colombians, who, from Spain, resold them to the rest of Europe: the United Kingdom, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland.</p><p>When maritime trafficking routes were too heavily patrolled and therefore dangerous, the clans resorted to other methods: sometimes they recruited poor, illiterate people, lavishly took them to South America and forced up to 30 kg of drugs into their rectums before putting them on a flight back to Europe to “deliver” the goods and receive payment — provided they didn’t complain.</p><p>For every operation, the Galicians had to send a human hostage to Colombia: if the delivery went wrong, the Colombians investigated and, if they deemed it necessary, killed the hostage. This was the case for members of some smaller clans who tried to fool the Colombians.</p><p>The major Galician clans had their own fleets of speedboats, but they also occasionally hired impoverished sailors to meet the mother ship on the high seas. With drugs, the packages were smaller and more manageable than with tobacco, so the work was simpler and faster. To unload the goods quickly, local youths — often drug addicts paid in cocaine — were recruited. The drugs were then loaded onto vans and driven with the lights off to hiding places, such as houses, holes in unused land, or barns. Not all hiding places were safe: for example, there is a reported case of a pig that died of a hashish overdose.</p><p>In some cases, clans like the Charlins use their network of front companies to transport the drugs all the way to Madrid. Once the delivery was made, the Galician clans got paid in cocaine: the split was usually 70% for the Colombians and 30% for the Galicians, but if the operation was very risky, it could go up to 60–40. Often, the Galicians resold the drugs to the Colombians to get cash rather than having to manage the drugs themselves. Even so, a few kilograms remain in Galicia and are sold retail at half the price charged in Madrid.</p><p>Needless to say, the bosses, already millionaires, became even richer. Their ostentation knew no bounds, and investigative journalists probing their affairs were beaten and threatened at home. Like their predecessors, Galician drug lords fund parishes, soccer teams, and political parties of every stripe.</p><p>Ordinary people had a choice: take a humble job with few prospects, or work for the clans and get rich quickly. But these choices had consequences.</p><h3>The resistance</h3><p>The sheer volume of drugs in circulation, their accessibility, and the normalization of their use led to a veritable epidemic of drug addiction and AIDS among Galician teenagers in the 1980s, to the point that they were referred to as the “lost generation.”</p><p>Faced with this social crisis, a group of mothers from the working-class neighborhood of Lavaderos in the city of Vigo, led by Carmen Avendaño, formed an association called “Erguete” (Galician for “rise up”) to raise awareness among families and authorities about the problem of drug addiction and how to address it at both the family and political levels.</p><p>At the association’s inaugural press conference in 1986, instead of issuing a general warning against drug trafficking, the women listed by full name the 38 individuals responsible for drug trafficking in their city.</p><p>Armed with data, the women held conferences throughout the region, met with local and national politicians and magistrates, and organized demonstrations in front of the bosses’ mansions. Not without risk: as we reported earlier, Carmen Avendaño was the victim of an assassination attempt, and the menacing presence of the bosses or their hitmen was never absent during their events. But after years of effort, things began to change.</p><p>In 1988, the governor of Pontevedra also asked the government in Madrid to intervene, and in 1989, an anti-drug investigative unit was established in Galicia.</p><p>These efforts culminated in a second major operation, this time kept secret until the very last moment: Operation Necora (“crab”) in 1990, orchestrated by prosecutor Javier Zaragoza and Judge Baltasar Garzón. In addition to the secret organization to prevent the bosses from being tipped off, this operation again relied on the testimony of two informers, Ricardo Portabales and Manuel Fernández Padín, two low ranking affiliates of the Galician clans.</p><p>The operation, celebrated by the mothers of Erguete and widely covered by the media, led to the arrest of Oubiña, Marcel Dorado, and the sons of the elder Charlin, as well as dozens of members of their clans. Soon, however, the newspapers exposed corruption and favoritism in the prison where the bosses were held; in court, Portabales’s testimony faltered; and the Galician political elite expressesed its dissatisfaction with the entire operation. At the end of the trial, in 1994, despite 33 convictions, none of them involved the leaders.</p><p>Following Operation Necora, drug trafficking continued even more intensely than before. The <em>omertà</em> persisted; the bosses became more discreet and cautious, always speaking in code for fear of being intercepted. In response, Judge José Antonio Vázquez Taín, with the army’s agreement, mobilized customs authorities, the police, and the Civil Guard for maritime operations and managed to carry out a record number of raids. It was not until the beginning of the new century, however, that justice finally prevailed: in 2000, Oubiña was arrested once and for all. In 2001, it was the turn of Charlina, daughter of the elder Charlin and now head of the clan, and in 2003, even Marcel Dorado was caught with cocaine.</p><p>But the fall of the historic drug lords meant anything but the end of drug trafficking, especially since Colombian cartels and militias were enjoying a new phase of impunity thanks to the tolerance of neighboring Venezuela.</p><h3>A new generation</h3><p>With the historic Galician bosses out of the picture, a new phase began: without their trusted contacts, the Colombians tried to rely on African traffickers, but after suffering heavy losses due to theft and corruption, they turned back to the Galicians. Smaller clans, succeeding the historic ones, agreed on drug transport with the Colombians, but subcontracted speedboat transport and unloading to specialized groups. On the Colombian side, too, there are new players: smaller clans that established themselves when the Cali Cartel began to yield to pressure from the DEA.</p><p>The speedboat transport clans, among which the one led by the notorious pilot Manuel Abal Feijóo, alias “Patoco,” stood out, had a fleet of super-powerful motorboats, built specifically to remain at sea for several days and return to shore with a massive cargo. The trafficking thus continued to thrive.</p><p>In response, in 2007 the authorities created the Grupo de Respuesta Especial para el Crimen Organizado (GRECO) within the National Police. Weakened by the authorities’ ever- tightening grip and a war between transport clans, Patoco’s group and those of his competitors were brought down during Operation Tabaiba, carried out in 2009 by Taín and finalized by Judge Irene Roura. This operation also introduced a new approach: the clans were dismantled by applying a scorched-earth strategy around them, arresting mechanics, gas station attendants, drivers, and any other more or less direct accomplices.</p><p>By early 2010, Galician drug trafficking was once again on its knees. Once again, the Colombians (cartels, FARC, paramilitaries) sought logistical alternatives in Africa and Andalusia, but without success. The Galician clans thus had a new opportunity to rise again, and indeed, demand for their logistical services was growing: even the Italian Camorra, the Bulgarian mafia, and Mexican cartels were turning to them. And so new groups can emerge and thrive in Galicia, to the point that in 2018 Spain passed a law to limit the construction and use of high-speed motorboats, notoriously used by drug traffickers. But where do we stand today?</p><h3>What about the present day?</h3><p>Drug trafficking has never left Galicia. Sure, Rotterdam and Antwerp have taken its place as Europe’s main drug hubs, and attention in Spain is now focused on Andalusia, where trafficking and money laundering have gone hand in hand — and in plain sight — for years. But it is precisely the lack of attention — both from the media and the authorities — in Galicia that gives crime room to thrive.</p><p>Two very recent examples. On May 17, 2026, in Portugal — where the construction of high- speed motorboats has moved — a law came into effect to align with Spanish legislation on the matter, leading to the <a href="https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/galicia/2026/05/23/golpe-narcolanchas-portuguesas-tras-nueva-regulacion/0003_202605G23P12996.htm">seizure</a> of 9 vessels and 400 doses of cocaine, 90,000 liters of fuel, and three auxiliary engines, as well as equipment designed to evade police radar.</p><p>Across the border, the Spanish Police Confederation in Galicia recently <a href="https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/vigo/vigo/2026/05/25/trafico-drogas-nunca-vigo-policias-15-anos/0003_202605V25C3992.htm">denounced</a> the alarming resurgence of drug trafficking in the region and the inadequacy of the resources available to law enforcement, both in terms of personnel (“fewer police officers than 15 years ago”) and equipment (“20 years old,” according to their spokesperson) .</p><p>If we can learn anything from Galicia, then, it is that downplaying the issue and indifference are the best allies of organized crime, and that only through structural solutions (legal, social, and economic) and constant awareness-raising can we truly hope to combat a phenomenon of this magnitude.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e3220bfb3b89" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Inside Comando Vermelho, the mafia of Rio de Janeiro]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/inside-comando-vermelho-the-mafia-of-rio-de-janeiro-cf5d20f16622?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cf5d20f16622</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[favela]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mafia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rio-de-janeiro]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Jan 2026 21:49:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-16T21:54:09.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*OaPUjnHr5W-nf2u_6dMmbw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Favelas of Rio de Janeiro after the Oct. 28 clashes. Bruno Itan</figcaption></figure><p>Explosives dropped by drones. Barricades made of cars. Special forces in military gear.</p><p>It’s not the front lines of one of the many wars raging around the world, but the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where on October 28, 2025 a veritable episode of urban warfare took place, claiming more than 120 lives.</p><p>The clash was between the Comando Vermelho (CV), or Red Command, the most powerful criminal organization in the city and the second in the country, and law enforcement sent by Governor Claudio Castro.</p><p>What does this episode tell about organized crime — and the fight against it — in Brazil? That’s what you’ll find out in this article.</p><h3>Operation containement</h3><p>But let’s start with recent events. On October 28, 2025 shortly before 4 a.m. local time, 2,500 police officers and special forces raided the Alemão and Penha favelas, located opposite Rio de Janeiro International Airport.</p><p>The aim of the operation, dubbed ‘containment’, was to arrest the leaders of the Comando Vermelho (CV). But the task was easier said than done. Alemão and Penha are the strongholds of the Comando Vermelho, and the organization knows how to defend them. Barricades of cars, military rifles, explosives dropped by drones: thanks to a paramilitary arsenal, the Comando Vermelho resisted for hours.</p><p>The toll of the blitz, which turned into a siege, is heavy, the heaviest in the history of Rio de Janeiro: over 120 dead, including four police officers, and despite more than 80 arrests, the main target of the mission, the leaders of the organization, remain free and on the run.</p><p>Despite the governor’s triumphant statements, Operation Containment is therefore <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c20edd81e3xo">considered</a> a failure by experts in the fight against organized crime and a clear violation of human rights by the UN, NGOs, and numerous representatives of the local and international community.</p><p>Worse still, the return of crime following operations such as this (a similar one was carried out in 2010) makes it inevitable to ask: does this type of repressive action really work?</p><p>Unlikely, given the sprawling power of the organization. The Comando Vermelho controls — in the military and administrative sense of the term — 52% of the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro and is active in 25 of Brazil’s 26 federal states. How can an organization of this magnitude be dismantled? To answer this question, we must first understand how the Comando Vermelho works and how it came to dominate the criminal landscape of Rio and large areas of Brazil.</p><h3>Inside the Comando Vermelho</h3><p>The use of an associative bond and of intimidation to commit crimes, manage economic activities, or obtain unfair advantages and profits… the Comando Vermelho has all the characteristics that, in the Italian legal system, <a href="https://www.brocardi.it/codice-penale/libro-secondo/titolo-v/art416bis.html">denote</a> a mafia-type association, even a foreign one.</p><p>Comando Vermelho members are bound by a code of conduct and are judged by so-called ‘crime tribunals’ — actual internal tribunals within the organization — if they fail to comply with the group’s rules, incurring penalties that can go as far as the execution.</p><p>In terms of economic activities, Comando Vermelho is far from being a mere drug cartel. After starting out with bank robberies, the organization also launched into theft, particularly of cars, cigarette smuggling (traditional and electronic), fuel and gold sales, protection rackets, illegal mining, logging, and fishing. In recent years, Comando Vermelho has also imposed a “tax” (we could call it protection money) in the favelas under its control on all essential services: internet access, electricity, water, ice, gas, coal, and even car and motorcycle ride-sharing apps.</p><p>These practices are made possible by the CV’s widespread control of the territory, from a military, administrative and economic standpoint. The CV guards favelas with armed men, fortifications, and checkpoints at entrances and around schools; provides provision social and financial services; directly management of drug dealing areas and interferes in commercial activities.</p><p>The profits from this activities are used to buy weapons and drugs, train soldiers, and expand the territory. The rest is laundered, including through cutting-edge financial instruments such as fintech companies that also allow the use of cryptocurrencies, such as <a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/comando-vermelho-o-esquema-bilionario-da-quadrilha-que-mais-cresce-no-pais/">T4bank</a>, a company that was allegedly created by another criminal organization, the PCC of Sao Paulo.</p><p>But what has allowed the Comando Vermelho to proliferate beyond the borders of Rio? The key lies in the structure of the organization, which is similar to a franchise. Below the top leadership, the Comando Vermelho is divided into autonomous cells, each with its own hierarchy. In Rio, each cell is responsible for a morro (hill), which roughly corresponds to a favela. Outside Rio, the cells are made up of local criminal organizations, sometimes autonomous, sometimes directly incorporated. This horizontal and decentralized structure has allowed the CV to expand rapidly and spread like wildfire throughout the country.</p><h3>The sevel levels of the CV</h3><p>The hierarchy in Rio de Janeiro is organized into seven levels (note the reported names are the ones known to authorities in November 2025):</p><p>1) <strong>War chiefs</strong>, responsible for strategy, finance, and territorial expansion. A position held by fugitive Edgar Alves e Andrade, known as Doca or Urso da Penha, from the graffiti depicting a bear on the wall of his house in the Penha favela;</p><p>2) <strong>Area managers </strong>— responsible for drug sales and transferring earnings to the leadership. These include Pedro Paulo Guedes, known as Pedro Bala, responsible for Alemão, and Washington Cesar Braga da Silva, known as Granda or Mayor of Penha, responsible for Penha;</p><p>3) <strong>Security managers </strong>— bodyguards for the leaders and in charge of the arsenal. These include Carlos Costa Neves, known as Gadernal/Gardenal (depending on the location), one of Doca’s most trusted men, responsible for his security, armed groups, and expansion in the western part of Rio; Juan Breno Malta Ramos, known as BMW, head of the “Sombra,” elite assassins; he is also responsible for the western expansion of the CV, as well as security in Penha and money laundering. BMW also trains soldiers and participates in crime tribunals, with the authority to determine the execution of minor rivals.</p><p>4) Soldiers — defend the territory and clash with rival groups</p><p>5) Vaporis— sell drugs directly and transport valuables</p><p>6) Radinhos — responsible for internal communication and monitoring of police actions (often with the help of drones)</p><p>7) Olheiros — control access to the favelas and report suspicious movements</p><p>As this shows, the Comando Vermelho is well known to the Brazilian authorities and media, and it is in fact on these local sources that this article is based. The work of journalists such as Rafael Soares, who has been awarded for his reporting on the Comando Vermelho, writers such as Carlos Amorim, and online media such as Iconografia da Historia, dedicated to explaining public safety issues and the sociology of criminal figures and organizations, is fundamental.</p><p>That said, how did the CV get this far? It’s time to discover its history.</p><h3>The origins of the Comando Vermelho</h3><p>The history of the Comando Vermelho began more than 50 years ago in the Candido Mendes Penitentiary on Ilha Grande (Big Island), about 100 km south of Rio de Janeiro.</p><p>It was the late 1960s and the country was under military dictatorship. Despite its paradisiacal appearance, Ilha Grande — already a lazaretto in the early years of Brazil’s independence — was used as a maximum security prison for some of the country’s most dangerous inmates.</p><p>Among them were members of left-wing groups dedicated to overthrowing the regime by force, such as the Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria and the MR8. To finance their activities and destabilize the regime, these groups — identified as “internal enemies” in Cold War terms — used to engage in bank robberies and kidnappings, even going so far as to take the US ambassador <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/brazil-us-relations/ambassador-charles-burke-elbrick-kidnapping#:~:text=On%20September%204%2C%201969%2C%20three,kidnapped%20in%20Rio%20de%20Janeiro.">hostage</a>.</p><p>In response, in 1967 the regime enacted the Lei de Segurança Nacional, or National Security Law (LSN), which introduced severe penalties for bank robberies. Although the law was designed to combat left-wing revolutionaries, it applied to anyone guilty of this crime. And this had a very important consequence.</p><p>Political prisoners found themselves incarcerated alongside common bank robbers in the Candido Mendes Penitentiary, also known as ‘Caldeira do Diabo’ (Devil’s Cauldron).</p><p>Living conditions in the prison are subhuman. Temperatures used to reach 50 degrees Celsius, and the prison was overcrowded, dilapidated, dirty, and rife with mistreatment and abuse by prison authorities and inmates alike.</p><p>The military’s intention was that throwing political prisoners into this hell would break their will, but it ended up having an unexpected, if not opposite, effect: it equipped common criminals — often illiterate or poorly educated — with intellectual weapons.</p><p>The political prisoners, who came from the middle class, soon began to fight for their rights. They obtained legal assistance and visits, and managed to bring over 100 books into the prison, most of them on left-wing theories. These books circulated among the common prisoners who could read, while the others were introduced to the ideas orally.</p><p>Interactions with political prisoners gave some of the most brilliant common prisoners an idea: to organize themselves into a group governed by rules of conduct, to reduce violence within their sector of the prison and better defend themselves against the abuses of the prison authorities and other inmates.</p><p>Thus was born La Falange Fundão Lei de Segurança Nacional, or Falange LSN, led by William da Silva Lima, known as O Professor, an avid reader of Marx and the mastermind of the organization. The founding members also included José Carlos dos Reis, known as Escadinha, José Jorge Saldanha, known as Zé do Bigode, Jose Carlos Gregorio, known as O Gordo, Rogerio Lamgruber, known as Bagulhão, Paulo Cesar Chavez, known as PC, and Serginho Ratazao.</p><p>The rules were clear: any member who harmed another member would be punished; the enemy was the state. Dozens of prisoners were recruited into the Falange in a short time.</p><h3>Back from the prison to the banks</h3><p>In 1979, two events changed life in the prison forever. On the one hand, political prisoners benefited from an amnesty and were released. On the other, the LSN Falangelaunched an attack on the Jacaré Falange, a rival group residing in another sector of the prison, and won a crushing but bloody victory. The LSN Falange was renamed Falange Vermelha — for the blood shed and its political orientation, summed up in the motto ‘peace, justice and freedom’ — and became the dominant force within the prison, imposing its code of conduct on all inmates.</p><p>At this point, the Falange laid the foundations for its transformation into Comando Vermelho. A common fund was set up to finance the escape of members who, once free, were tasked with resuming bank robberies to feed the group’s finances.</p><p>Ze do Bigode was among the first to escape and establish the CV’s presence on the mainland. He gathered a squad around him and moved into an apartment in a northern Rio neighborhood inhabited by bank employees in order to study their movements. However, the behavior of his men ended up exposing them, and in 1981 their apartment became the target of a massive police operation involving 400 men and a helicopter. Heavily armed, Ze do Bigode resisted to the bitter end even after the death of his men, declaring his affiliation with the Comando Vermelho and his radical opposition to the state, until he was killed. This episode gives the title to the book <em>400 x 1</em>, in which William da Silva Lima recounts the origins of the organization, and to a Brazilian film of the same name.</p><h3>From robberies to drug dealing</h3><p>In the 1980s, Brazil emerged from dictatorship and became a democracy. In 1982, Rio governor Leonel de Moura Brizola regulated police actions in the favelas to avoid indiscriminate bloodshed, and in 1987, prisoners’ rights were formalized.</p><p>But this pacification came too late for the Comando Vermelho, which had by then become a sprawling criminal organization. With the proceeds from robberies, thefts, and protection rackets, in the 1980s the Comando Vermelho entered the drug market, establishing itself as early as 1983–84 on the streets of Rio and as an intermediary for the export of Colombian cocaine to Europe.</p><p>Antônio José Nicolau, known as Toninho Turco, understood that in order to control drug dealing in Rio and supplant small-time traffickers, the Comando Vermelho needed popular support so as to avoid complaints and operate undisturbed.</p><p>During this period, in the favelas where it established itself, the Comando Vermelho replaced the state, providing everything from social and economic assistance to funeral and security services. It paid salaries to the families of incarcerated members and helped complicit citizens in their commercial enterprises. Another member of the organization, Serginho da Ivete, even considered the idea of becoming a political candidate in the poorest favelas. Soon, the members of the Comando Vermelho became role models in the eyes of the young and poor inhabitants of the favelas, who saw in them a chance for social advancement, career, and success.</p><p>During this period, the Comando Vermelho also intensified its imports of weapons and drugs from Paraguay, Peru, and Colombia.</p><h3>The wars for the favelas</h3><p>The late 1980s saw the rise of the second generation of Comando Vermelho leaders. Orlando da Conceição, known as O Jogador, continued the welfare strategy but also decided to conquer the favelas by force. He thus launched a bloody war for drug-dealing territories against rival criminal groups and, in 1987, came to control drug dealing in most of Rio’s hills.</p><p>Bolstered by this success, he attacked the Alemao complex with 30 men and established the first real headquarters of the CV there.</p><p>However, his success was short-lived. In 1994, O Jogador was betrayed and killed by Ernaldo Pinto Medeiros, who was expelled from the organization. The 17-year-old Marcio dos Santos Nepomuceno, known as Marcinho VP, O Jogador’s protégé, swore revenge, while Ernaldo created his own organization, called Amigos do Amigos (ADA), based in the Adeus hill, adjacent to Alemao.</p><p>This move favored another secessionist organization of the CV, the Terceiro Comando, and gave rise to a fratricidal war — fueled by heavy weapons, smuggled or supplied by corrupt police officers — that would continue until Ernaldo’s violent death in 2002.</p><p>It was a disastrous period: in 1994, Rio had 65 murders per 100,000 inhabitants — a huge figure compared to today’s already high rate of 24. The police also armed themselves heavily in response, contributing to the violence. Between 1995 and 2000, many CV leaders were arrested, while the founders were either dead or had lost their power. The third generation of Comando Vermelho leaders took over.</p><p>It was during this period that Luiz Fernando Da Costa, known as Fernandinho Beiramar, emerged. He was originally from the Duque de Caixas favela, north of Penha. He adressed the drug shortage in Rio by sending his men to Paraguay to get Colombian cocaine directly instead of waiting for intermediaries to smuggle it across the border. In Paraguay, at one of his suppliers’ , Beiramar later found refuge after escaping from a prison in Belo Horizonte. From there, Beiramar also coordinated the creation of air bridges from Colombia through the Amazon.</p><p>In 2002, Beiramar was back in prison, this time in Bangu, near Rio. On September 11, presumably on his orders, 50 CV inmates invaded the ADA members’ section, sparking a prison riot that lasted 23 hours. Armed with Austrian pistols, prison police rifles, and homemade bombs, the inmates took eight hostages, killed their rivals, and tied Ernaldo to the mattress in his cell and burned him alive. The events of this violent day are partially depicted in the film <em>Tropa de Elite 2</em>.</p><p>Following this bloody episode, the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) was born from the ashes of the ADA, an organization that still rivals the Comando Vermelho in Rio de Janeiro for power.</p><p>Beiramar, on the other hand, was transferred to a federal prison in Sao Paulo as part of the government’s strategy, introduced in 2006, to ‘eradicate’ the leaders of criminal organizations from their territory in the hope of weakening them. Unfortunately, once again, the effect was the opposite of what was hoped for.</p><h3>The CV and the PCC, a difficult relationship</h3><p>In Sao Paulo, Beiramar came into contact with what is now the main criminal organization in the city and the country, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC). Instead of clashing, the two groups <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BrbUXQTQClc">established</a> a non-aggression pact . This dynamic was further reinforced by the parallel transfer of PCC-affiliated prisoners to federal prisons in Rio, where Marcos Marinho, known as Chapolim, Beiramar’s right-hand man, was located.</p><p>In the early 2000s, Beiramar, with the help of Chapolim and Elias Maluco, successfully forged alliances with various other criminal organizations in the country and expanded the CV’s influence, even negotiating directly with the Colombian revolutionaries of the FARC to gain access to their river ports, laboratories, and logistical infrastructure in the Amazon.</p><p>The CV thus grew to 6,500 members and 300,000 people indirectly linked to the group. At its peak, the CV controlled 70% of drug trafficking in Rio.</p><p>In 2010, in anticipation of the World Cup and the Olympics, the authorities needed to ‘clean up’ the favelas of Rio. Governor Sergio Oliveira Cabral Santos Filho and Security Secretary José Mariano Beninca Beltrame introduced the Pacifying Police Units (UPP) and ordered 2,500 armed men into the Alemao favela to storm the Comando Vermelho headquarters.</p><p>The operation succeeds in liberating the favela, but only temporarily: the CV leaders fled to the surrounding regions and new leaders, including Luiz Claudio Machado, known as Marreta, decided to compensate for the loss of territory by invading that of rival groups, starting with the ADA.</p><p>In 2016, the government realized that the UPP policy was no longer working: criminals had started to return to Alemao undisturbed and the influence of Comando Vermelho outside Rio expanded. 2016 also marked the year of the break between the CV and the PCC, which eliminated Jorge Rafaat Toumani, the drug trafficker who worked with the CV on the border with Paraguay.</p><p>Another border contested between the two groups is the triple border between Brazil, Peru, and Colombia in the heart of the Amazon, a porous border where the state is absent and poverty is extremely high, making it easy to smuggle and commit crimes of all kinds with impunity.</p><p>Illegal mining, gold used to buy coca paste, unauthorized logging, overfishing… these are just some of the activities that enrich the Comando Vermelho and maintain their power over drug trafficking in the Amazon.</p><p>Towards 2018, the CV and the PCC consolidated their territorial division at the triple border: the CV has since controlled the river route on the Solimoes River, while the PCC the land and air routes.</p><p>Over the last five years, Comando Vermelho has been the only criminal organization in Rio de Janeiro to expand its territory, regaining areas lost in 2010 and annexing new ones.</p><p>Today, the CV controls 52% of the metropolitan territory of Rio de Janeiro and is present in 25 of Brazil’s 26 federal states. While the PCC is dominant in Mato Grosso and on the border with Paraguay and Bolivia, the Comando Vermelho now controls large areas of the north and the Amazon, including ports for drug exports to Europe. While blitz and arrests <a href="https://noticias.r7.com/rio-de-janeiro/rj-no-ar/video/policia-afirma-que-complexo-do-chapadao-virou-centro-operacional-do-comando-vermelho-15012026/">continue</a> across the country, institutions are far from defeating the CV.</p><h3>What would it take to eradicate the Comando Vermelho?</h3><p>It is clear that the Comando Vermelho was born in the gaps left — then as now — by the State. Combating the CV requires addressing the critical issues that allow it to thrive: the absence of institutions (in the favelas, on the borders, in prisons), a prison system that trains criminals rather than discouraging them, poverty, inequality, corruption, and the collusion of some parts of the state and ordinary people under CV’s rule.</p><p>This is a titanic undertaking that requires much more than the occasional armed invasion of a favela.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cf5d20f16622" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Avocado: the green gold rush]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/avocado-the-green-gold-rush-c072e8bb6d2c?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c072e8bb6d2c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[consumption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cartels]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[avocado]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mexico]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2025 17:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-09T17:06:00.459Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CmCXbxC-cFSi8qoTyeHQng.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: The Times</figcaption></figure><p>In a poké bowl. On toast. Or simply on its own as a snack. Who hasn’t tasted an avocado? This creamy fruit, native to Central America, has become one of the most fashionable foods in the industrialized world, from the United States to Europe, from the Gulf to China. But behind its <em>memeable</em> and <em>Instagrammable </em>appearance, the avocado hides some uncomfortable truths. From the social and environmental excesses involved in its production to the exploitation of its supply chain by organized crime, the avocado is the cause of unbridled greed — not unlike that which, yesterday as today, fuels the gold rush.</p><h3>The “Green Gold”</h3><p>To explain how organized crime uses avocados, we must first understand what makes this fruit a kind of “gold” in their eyes, starting with what makes it special compared to other foods.</p><p>Consumed for thousands of years in what is now Mexico, the<em> ahuacatl </em>(the Uto-Aztecan name for <em>aguacate</em>, or avocado) is a fruit rich in “good” fat acids, such as those found in olive oil, as well as vitamins and minerals. Numerous scientific studies have identified possible antioxidant, anti-inflammatory, antifungal, and even anticancer properties in its compounds, although none of these <a href="https://ilfattoalimentare.it/avocado-superfood-proprieta.html">have yet found</a> pharmacological application. More prosaically, avocados have a pleasant taste and are <a href="https://www.corriere.it/cook/news/cards/metabolismo-5-alimenti-che-aiutano-ad-alzarlo-bruciano-piu-calorie-la-digestione/avocado.shtml">filling</a>.</p><p>For all these reasons, since leaving Mexico in the 1980s, avocados have gone from being simply a “staple food” to a rare and prized ingredient for Michelin-starred chefs and, more recently, a “<a href="https://www.repubblica.it/green-and-blue/2020/10/17/news/avocado_i_due_volti_dell_oro_verde-270687320/">superfood</a>” for the masses, although it should be remembered that this term belongs more to the <a href="https://www.issalute.it/index.php/la-salute-dalla-a-alla-z-menu/s/superfood">world of advertising</a> than to that of science.</p><p>Superfood or not, the results of this marketing strategy are there for everyone to see: according to the US Department of Agriculture, between the mid-1990s and 2016, per capita consumption of avocados in the United States <a href="https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/charts-of-note/chart-detail?chartId=78928">quadrupled</a>. Growth in Europe was even more exponential, estimated at 179% between 2012 and 2018 (with a peak of 248% in Italy!), according to data from the Dutch state agency <a href="https://www.cbi.eu/">CBI</a>.</p><p>In response to increased demand, avocado production has also grown: a joint study by the OECD and FAO calculates that production of the fruit has increased fivefold between the 1980s and 2023 and estimates that it will continue to grow, making the avocado the world’s best-selling tropical fruit in 2032, <a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2023-2032_08801ab7-en/full-report.html">overtaking</a> pineapple and mango.</p><p>But the popularity of avocados is not the only factor explaining the dramatic growth in their production: it is their profitability. The market value of avocados can in fact be up to 10 times higher than that of other fruits: in 2023, <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/2023/11/03/mangiamo-molto-piu-avocado/">for example</a>, oranges sold for €0.35 per kg in Italy, while avocados sold for €3.50.</p><p>This helps us understand why avocado cultivation has literally spread throughout the world. While Mexico <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/avocado-production-by-country">remains</a> firmly at the top of the list of producing countries , <a href="https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL">followed</a> by Colombia and Peru, other tropical countries — such as Kenya and Indonesia — are becoming increasingly prominent. In addition, avocado plantations are now also found in other latitudes: not only in California, which is the state that consumes the most avocados in the US, but also in Chile, Spain, Morocco, South Africa, and even Italy, at the foot of Mount Etna.</p><p>But like gold fever, avocado fever also brings with it its excesses.</p><h3>The (very relative) environmental and social impact of avocados</h3><p>I don’t know about you, but every time I find myself in the avocado section at the supermarket, I am assailed by doubts: if I buy them, am I contributing to the desertification of an entire region or to the prosperity of small producers? Am I complicit in a system that underpay laborers or one that allows the restoration of soil depleted by overgrazing?</p><p>Avocados are associated with almost as many socio-environmental ills as health benefits. And although these ills are not always linked to crime, it is impossible to talk about avocados without pausing for a moment to consider these phenomena.</p><p>Drought, deforestation, uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions from transport, labor exploitation, including child labor … how much truth is there in these <a href="https://greenly.earth/en-gb/blog/industries/what-is-the-avocados-environmental-impact">statements</a>?</p><p>A <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1746-692X.12289">study</a> published in 2021 in the specialist journal Eurochoices estimates the water footprint of avocados, i.e., the consumption of fresh water for their production. On average, the consumption of ‘green’ (i.e., rainwater) and blue (i.e., surface and groundwater) water for avocados between 1996 and 2005 was 1,086 cubic meters per ton, compared to 899 for the average for all fruits.</p><p>However, this is only an <em>average</em>: consumption varies enormously from one region to another, from values close to zero in the Caribbean to almost 2,300 cubic meters in Chile. How can this gap be explained?</p><p>The answer lies in the climate of the producing regions and the choice of growing seasons. While Mexico, the Caribbean, and Kenya enjoy a tropical climate with long periods of heavy rainfall, this is not the case in the arid areas of Chile, Portugal, Spain, Sicily, or California. But climate alone does not explain all the data. Despite its favorable climate, Mexico has by far the largest water footprint of all producing countries. This is because farmers force avocado production throughout the year, and since this requires a lot of water in the dry season, avocado plantations have ended up draining lakes and depriving local communities of water.</p><p>Avocado CO2 emissions, especially those related to transportation, are also often criticized. However, isn’t this the problem with all tropical products that travel long distances to reach our supermarkets? Here, too, it is necessary to contextualize and relativize the data. How far has the avocado traveled? By what means of transport? And what packaging was used? Depending on where you live, emissions of an avocado packaged in plastic and flown in from the Dominican Republic are not the same as those of an avocado transported in bulk by ship from Sicily.</p><p>It is precisely this kind of information that the World Avocado Organization is leveraging in its fight to restore the reputation of avocado producers. It also highlights success stories of communities in Africa that have developed thanks to avocado cultivation and numerous certifications of ethical and sustainable agriculture.</p><p>So is the avocado’s bad reputation unjustified?</p><p>Not entirely. While the facts show us that we need to put the impact of avocados into perspective, the damage caused by the intensification and spread of their production is undeniable. The drought <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2022/10/08/secheresse-chronique-accaparement-de-l-eau-au-chili-les-avocats-de-la-colere_6144945_4500055.html">linked</a> to the irrigation of plantations in Chile is widely documented, as is the uncontrolled deforestation in Mexico to make way for new crops. Soil erosion and depletion are also recorded, although this is not a problem specific to avocados but to all monocultures. As for wages, while in certain areas avocados have improved the living conditions of farming families and even led to the emergence of a middle class, in others they have <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Romain-Le-Cour-Grandmaison-Paul-Frissard-Martinez-Violent-and-vibrant-Mexicos-avocado-boom-and-organized-crime.-GI-TOC-January-2024.pdf">contributed</a> to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few landowners, without benefiting unskilled laborers.</p><p>In short: the social and environmental problems associated with avocados do exist, and they have been caused by the uncontrolled response to the explosion in demand from industrialized countries. But these problems are neither unique nor inevitable. Growing avocados — and other tropical fruits — in a more sustainable way is possible, thanks to smart irrigation technologies, responsible land use, and fair treatment of farmers, but not everyone does so. And the difference between one region and another, between one country and another, can be substantial.</p><p>This is also true for another phenomenon affecting avocados, one that unfortunately affects them more than other fruits: the involvement of organized crime.</p><h3><strong>The dark side of avocados</strong></h3><p>A profitable fruit such as the avocado is bound to attract the greed of criminals and organized crime. But let’s take things in order of increasing severity and complexity.</p><p>The simplest form of crime linked to avocados is the theft of avocado. It may sound funny, but it is a real problem: for years it has been reported in various parts of the world, from the province of <a href="https://www.lasicilia.it/cronaca/una-volta-nel-mirino-cerano-le-arance-ora-in-sicilia-si-rubano-gli-avocado-4-denunciati-a-fiumefreddo-per-il-furto-di-700-kg-2299230/">Catania</a> in Italy to <a href="https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/maledizione-diamante-verde-lavocado-scatena-guerra-narcos-1728876.html">New Zealand</a>, passing through <a href="https://www.freshplaza.com/africa/article/9704312/avocado-farmers-in-gatundu-north-face-rising-thefts-as-youth-gangs-target-orchards/">Kenya</a> and South Africa. While these crimes are currently treated as simple banditry, there is growing evidence pointing to the existence of organized criminal syndicates. In certain regions, such as <a href="https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2021/03/14/sudafrica-la-guerra-criminale-per-macadamia-e-avocado-furti-da-milioni-di-euro-nei-raid-notturni/6117976/">South Africa</a>, thefts are becoming increasingly systematic and are part of a well-defined supply chain. The thieves, who are sometimes farm employees themselves or gangs of young people, sell the unripe fruit to brokers who then put it back on the market at a higher price.</p><p>This is followed by the theft of water from rivers to irrigate plantations. All that is needed is to dig a well or build a canal to divert the water to the fields. A notorious example is Chile, where water can be privatized without restrictions and where the war for water has led to chronic drought and conflict in the already arid Petorca area.</p><p>Another form of crime linked to natural resources is illegal deforestation: through unauthorized tree felling, <a href="https://www.dutchnews.nl/2024/04/the-avocado-on-your-toast-may-be-the-product-of-a-crime/">arson</a>, and corruption, vast areas of forest, including parts of nature reserves, have been cleared in Mexico to make way for illegal avocado cultivation.</p><p>Also in Mexico, these plantations can serve multiple purposes, such as concealing illegally held weapons and hosting paramilitary training, sometimes even with militiamen from other countries, particularly <a href="https://elpais.com/mexico/2025-07-20/mercenarios-colombianos-para-entrenar-a-narcos-mexicanos-son-sanguinarios-vienen-a-lo-que-vienen.html">Colombia</a>.</p><p>On top of this, landowners in Mexico are often subjected to <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/green-and-blue/2020/10/17/news/avocado_i_due_volti_dell_oro_verde-270687320/">double racket</a>, on the cultivated hectares and on each ripe fruit.</p><p>Organized crime also infiltrates the supply chain, controlling the sharecroppers who harvest the fruit, as well as the pesticide and packaging companies.</p><p>The narcos also exploit containers loaded with avocados destined for overseas markets to hide drugs. This practice has been exposed several times in Colombia (see <a href="https://www.noticiasrcn.com/colombia/extincion-de-dominio-a-bienes-de-narcos-que-usaron-empresas-de-aguacates-928047">here</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6rNtBGTtPIU">here</a>) and also involves other fruits, such as bananas, as I mention in my previous article on drug trafficking in the Netherlands through the port of Rotterdam.</p><p>As if that were not enough, all these criminal activities find their most violent and sophisticated expression in one place in particular: the Mexican state of Michoacan, where political, social, and economic problems have been intertwined with criminal dynamics for over 40 years. A <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Romain-Le-Cour-Grandmaison-Paul-Frissard-Martinez-Violent-and-vibrant-Mexicos-avocado-boom-and-organized-crime.-GI-TOC-January-2024.pdf">report</a> published by Global Initiative in 2023 helps us understand these phenomena.</p><h3><strong>The special case of Michoacan</strong></h3><p>The birthplace of the avocado, the state of Michoacan is located in west-central Mexico. Overlooking the Pacific Ocean, it enjoys a tropical climate and volcanic slopes ideal for growing the ‘green gold’. In 2022, 70% of Michoacan’s territory was devoted to avocado cultivation, and the state accounted for 73% of Mexico’s total production.</p><p>But avocados are not the only crop that grows well in Michoacan: since the 1950s, Michoacan has been an exporter of marijuana and heroin to the United States. For 30 years, criminal groups involved in trafficking these drugs have been collaborating and fighting among themselves and with political authorities and local economic actors, forming unstable alliances.</p><p>The historical weakness of the state — underfunded and corrupt — and its law enforcement agencies has had a significant impact on the way business is conducted in Michoacan: landowners are accustomed to paying out of their own pockets for the security of their fields and interests. This security is provided not only by private organizations, but sometimes also by official law enforcement agencies, naturally in exchange for additional compensation to their salaries, or, depending on the area and the period, by drug cartels. Relying on private security is a practice that, as we will see shortly, still characterizes Michoacan today.</p><p>But let’s get back to our story. In the 1980s, a series of concurrent and complementary phenomena allowed Michoacan drug traffickers to professionalize and diversify, structuring themselves into real cartels.</p><p>Firstly, the arrival of cocaine from South America transformed the Mexican port of Lazaro Cardenas into an important hub on the route to the US. This made Mexican traffickers not only exporters of marijuana and heroin, but also intermediaries in the trafficking of the more lucrative cocaine and, later, the chemicals needed to produce synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines.</p><p>Secondly, the government’s decision to liberalize agriculture disrupted the local economy, creating an excellent opportunity for traffickers to invest and launder cash. The end of subsidies and the opening of the market led to a collapse in prices, which put both the elite and the middle class of landowners in difficulty. Impoverished, they were forced to sell their land. By buying crops, traffickers entered the agricultural sector, particularly the avocado industry, thus diversifying their activities, and doing so in a legal industry.</p><p>The first emblematic example of the rise of these “violent entrepreneurs,” as the Global Initiative report defines them, is the Valencia family, nicknamed “El Cartel de los Aguacates” (the Avocado Cartel) or “Los Reyes del Aguacate” (the Avocado Kings) in the 1980s and 1990s. At the time, brothers Luis Valencia Valencia and Armando Valencia Cornelio directly controlled six avocado farms in the municipalities of Urupan, Tancitaro, and Aguililla and opened several packaging plants to ensure their presence in the supply chain. With hundreds of employees in their companies and parallel control of legal and illegal economic activities, the Valencias consolidated their power in the region.</p><p>The avocado trade — whether managed by legal, illegal, or gray-area actors — underwent further acceleration in the early 2000s, following the signing of free trade agreements first between Mexico and the United States and then between Mexico and the European Union. Drugs and food products traveled along the same routes at an ever-increasing pace.</p><p>This naturally attracted other criminal groups. It was during this period that the Zetas, an organization formed by deserters from the Mexican army and navy special forces, arrived in Michoacan. Not owning any avocado plantations themselves, the Zetas focused on controlling the port and using military techniques to take control of agricultural areas. The Zetas introduced checkpoints and armed patrols to occupy the territory and used violence to extort a heavy racket from key players in the agri-food chain. Their strategy was not without consequences: Michoacan became the center of an armed conflict between the Zetas, private security groups, and existing cartels. The murder rate reached record levels and Michoacan earned a reputation as an ungovernable region.</p><p>A new organization emerges from the war between the Zetas and other criminal groups in the period 2004–2006: the Familia Michoacana. The Familia Michoacana unites various local traffickers and links extortion to the provision of protection services — a bit like the mafia does with the <em>pizzo</em> in Sicily. After gaining control of the Ministry of Agriculture’s official land registry records, in 2009 the Familia Michoacana brought together all landowners with more than five hectares of land for a meeting. The 300 who attend are asked to make a ‘voluntary’ contribution, proportional to their financial means, to finance the protection of their crops from the Zetas. Those who are absent are required by the Familia to pay a tax, effectively protection money, to guarantee the same ‘service’.</p><p>During the same period, the Michoacan avocado producers’ association reported widespread theft and extortion by other actors, including the Federal Police.</p><p>Under the pretext of putting an end to racketeering, a splinter group called the Cabelleros Templares, or Knights Templar, came into conflict with the Familia in 2011. But soon the knights reintroduced a system of extortion that was, if possible, even more suffocating than the previous ones. In addition to setting up checkpoints and armed patrols, the Cabellors extended their protection racket to packaging companies and threaten anyone who dares to disobey with death. They imposed a code of conduct in public spaces and tightened their grip on the local political system, selecting or eliminating officials and politicians according to their needs. A similar system also applied in neighboring regions where lime is grown. With illegal deforestation, the Caballeros also engaged in the sale of timber.</p><p>Such a deeply exploitative system could not last forever. Unable to trust the official law enforcement agencies, landowners institutionalized private security. This led to the emergence of self-defense groups (<em>las autodefensas</em>), which ended up fighting a real war against the Caballeros Templares between 2013 and 2015.</p><p>Financed by avocado, lime, timber, and banana entrepreneurs and managed by local authorities who are accountable to the entrepreneurs, the autodefensas are public-private organizations armed with Kalashnikovs and other war weapons to fight the cartels. For the entrepreneurs interviewed by Global Initiative, the price of the <em>autodefensas</em> is lower than that of racketeering and is simply considered another cost of doing business: as we have seen, paying for protection is normal in Michoacan. Business owners therefore prefer to finance local forces that they can directly control rather than pay the federal police, the army, or the cartels for the same service, especially since the cartels are demanding more and more money and have no qualms about killing those who refuse to pay.</p><p>A prime example of this practice is Tancitaro, one of the main municipalities for avocado production, where in 2013 an independent council made up of avocado producers and exporters, as well as other economic actors, took control of the municipality. This council “convinced” the mayor to coordinate the creation of a self-defense force financed by the council and, the following year, to institutionalize the <em>autodefensa</em> under the name of <em>Tancitaro Public Security Corps</em>, an organization still active today.</p><p>Although formally dismantled in 2015, forms of <em>autodefensas</em> continue to exist in Michoacan, a sign that the situation is far from peaceful. With the exception of Tancintaro, where the Public Security Corps has managed to neutralize organized crime, the rest of the state continues to be home to law enforcement agencies, local police, and public-private security organizations, some of which are enemies and others allies of the cartels.</p><p>In addition to the cartels originating in Michoacan, other powerful criminal organizations — such as the Jalisco Nueva Generacion and their enemies, the Viagras — now have an interest in avocados. The war between these two cartels, as well as with La Familia and Los Caballeros, led to a new record number of deaths in 2019, culminating in the display of 19 dismembered bodies on an overpass. Three years later, the cartels attacked two American phytosanitary inspectors during an inspection, leading the US to temporarily suspend supplies, causing Mexican producers to lose at least US$10 million.</p><p>The Mexican government then intervened immediately to smooth relations with the United States… but not to eradicate crime from Michoacan.</p><h3><strong>Should we boycott avocados?</strong></h3><p>In light of all the crimes that are happening in the avocado industry, an inevitable question arises: should be stop consuming avocados altogether?</p><p>Punishing an entire economic sector without distinguishing between legal and illegal actors is not a viable solution, because it would harm communities that have been able to benefit from avocado exports while respecting the rules and the environment.</p><p>Another way is possible, and there are already those who are <a href="https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2025/07/15/loro-verde-e-sporco-di-sangue-cosi-i-narcos-controllano-la-produzione-di-avocado-gli-usa-reagiscono-lue-no/8061842/">trying</a> to implement it . In Europe, avocados can only be imported if they have UN “GlobalGAP” certification, which attests to the quality of agricultural practices in various areas, such as food safety, respect for the environment, worker health, and supply chain transparency.</p><p>In Mexico, the US ambassador has urged large retail chains to import only avocados that carry the “Pro-Forest avocado” certificate issued by the Michoacan authorities to those who grow on land that has not been illegally deforested or burned, and who contribute to the state reforestation program.</p><p>The World Avocado Organization also advises its members on other certifications: SMETA certification for ethical practices, GAP for hygiene and quality, Rainforest Alliance for environmental protection, BASC to ensure the absence of involvement by traffickers and terrorists, and BRC for food safety.</p><p>My advice, therefore, is: don’t stop eating avocados, but do so responsibly, favoring products whose origin is known, whose supply chain is certified, and whose environmental impact is limited.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c072e8bb6d2c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The DZ Mafia of Marseille: A French Gomorra?]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/the-dz-mafia-of-marseille-a-french-gomorra-5dbbd7bdc34e?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5dbbd7bdc34e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[france]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prison]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[violence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[teenagers]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Apr 2025 08:45:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-27T08:55:28.894Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bDi4H7gRSp3G1LtM8r476w.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/image/JKVREazF3Rf2upIwn-MrQiRD9no/1920x1080/regions/2025/01/08/sjt-coup-de-filet-dz-mafia-00-00-50-10-677e58099962c986354363.jpg">© FTV / Capture X</a></figcaption></figure><p>The body of a young man burned. A woman killed in her apartment by a hail of bullets fired from the street. An execution carried out in broad daylight among public housing blocks.</p><p>No, we are not in Scampia of the early 2000s, the setting of the series <em>Gomorra</em>, but in today’s Marseille.</p><p>Between 2023 and 2024, the Phocaean city was indeed torn apart by a war that saw the DZ Mafia clash with other criminal groups — first the Yoda clan and then the Blacks — for control of the main drug trafficking areas in the city. This war reached unprecedented levels of violence and media coverage, forcing France to confront an existential question: Is the terror gripping its cities a form of mafia?</p><p>In this article you’ll learn about the events that led to this spiral of violence, understand whether the groups involved are of a mafia nature, and assess if France’s response is adequate to the threat they pose.</p><blockquote>Listen to the podcast (in Italian) <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/1rJ8mb2AeUkJs1ndpBroKB?si=4643586a36ec4e73">here</a></blockquote><h4>At the roots of the DZ mafia</h4><p>Criminal group wars are nothing new in Marseille. It was in Marseille that the French “mafia,” known as the milieu, emerged in the early 20th century, and it was also in Marseille that drug trafficking reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s with the French Connection. The struggles between rival clans of the milieu for control of drug trafficking, extortion, gambling, and prostitution continued until 2000. I recounted these events in the Bar Lume podcast “<a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HxoSAFBwPVfnzX4Rq1W4h?si=909e929614d0428d">From the Milieu to Organized Gangs: A Brief History of Organized Crime in France,</a>” which is, in a way, the prequel to this episode.</p><p>After the murder of the last godfather of the Marseille milieu, Francis Vanverberghe, known as “The Belgian,” it was the organized gangs that took over the Marseille criminal scene. These organized gangs, known as bandes organisées, are criminal groups based in the public housing blocks (les cités) of French cities, mostly composed of first or second-generation immigrants, competing mainly for the drug market. Among these groups is the DZ Mafia.</p><p>DZ is an abbreviation of el-Djazaïr or simply Dzayir, the Arabic name for Algeria. The founder of the organization is indeed Algerian: Mehdi Abdelatif Laribi, known as “Rachitique” or simply “Tic.” Tic began his criminal career in the early 2000s with his older brother Lamine, known as Tac. “Tic and Tac,” or “Chip and Dale” in French, were versatile criminals, active in drug trafficking in the Cité la Paternelle but also involved in contract killings. In 2011, they accepted a job from Sami Ati, a drug trafficker and leader of the Cité Micocouliers: to kill three rivals in exchange for 150,000 euros. On Christmas Day that year, the Laribi brothers lured Sonny Albarello, 20, Nouri Oualan, and Mohamed Bouhembel, both 19, to a secluded location outside the city. Lamine, the elder, shot and killed the three, while Mehdi burned the vehicle. This “Marseille barbecue” (as such operations are called) did not go unnoticed: the Laribi brothers were arrested, and in 2015, Tac was sentenced to 25 years in prison, while Tic received 10 years.</p><p>The sentence should have marked the end of Tic’s criminal career, but the COVID-19 pandemic shuffled the deck. Between 2020 and 2021, overcrowded French prisons were forced to release a large number of inmates, who returned home. Among them was Tic, who returned to the Cité la Paternelle and found himself surrounded by criminals ready to resume their activities. This is how the DZ Mafia was born: a criminal alliance that later evolved into a full-fledged franchise, dedicated to wholesale drug sales and the allocation of drug trafficking areas to members and allies operating autonomously. Among these, still in the Cité la Paternelle, was the Yoda clan, named after the Star Wars character graffiti on the wall of their drug trafficking point.</p><p>The model worked: in 2021, there were 160 drug trafficking points in Marseille, capable of generating up to 100,000 euros per day. The Cité Paternelle, ideally located near the highway, became one of the main drug trafficking areas, a modern-day Scampia-Secondigliano. The authorities raised the alarm about the drug crisis, but struggled to contain the phenomenon.</p><p>But La Paternelle was too small to contain two ambitious organizations: the DZ Mafia and the Yoda clan were on a collision course.</p><p>In February 2023, Tic was spending an evening at a nightclub in Phuket, Thailand. Félix Bingui, known as Le Chat (“The Cat”), the leader of the Yoda clan, was also at the same venue. The two began to argue and then came to blows. Le Chat, a Franco-Central African, was more robust than Le Tic and gained the upper hand. This incident became the casus belli: the dispute between the two bosses served as a pretext to unleash a war back home.</p><p>From the safety of their overseas hideouts, Le Tic and Le Chat began recruiting young hitmen, often minors, on social media to eliminate key figures of the rival clan. The effects were devastating: in 2023 alone, Marseille saw 49 deaths. The government quickly realized the gravity of the situation and, in July, presented a bill to combat drug trafficking. But this did not deter the protagonists of the conflict: on September 10, a street shooting killed a woman who was taking refuge in her apartment, shocking public opinion.</p><p>In March 2024, Le Chat was arrested in Morocco, putting the Yoda clan on its knees. But the war was far from over for the DZ Mafia. The Blacks, a clan of Comorians based in the Cité Félix-Pyat (not to be confused with the Blacks of the Cité Lauriers, a long-standing and more structured criminal enterprise), were determined to take over the drug trafficking points of the Yoda clan.</p><p>Following this turn in the conflict, the DZ Mafia underwent a reorganization. Le Tic was ousted from command and “retired” to Algeria. The reins of the organization were taken over by a triumvirate: Amine O., known as “Mamine Escobar” or simply “Jalisco,” Gabriel O., known as “Gaby,” and Madi Z., known as “La Brute,” all of whom had been in detention for some time.</p><p>Mamine Escobar, 31, emerged as the leader. Involved in the murder, dismemberment, and burning of three men in 2020, he has been in prison since 2021. La Brute, a 35-year-old drug trafficker, has also been detained since 2021. Gaby, 30, a former hitman, is responsible for recruiting new young members to carry out contract killings.</p><p>But how do the three manage the organization from prison? Simple: they have cell phones delivered to them at night by drones into the prison, an operation known as “Uber shit.” Only 22 French prison complexes are currently equipped to detect and stop these drones, mainly due to lack of funds.</p><p>Once in control of the organization, the three not only continued the war but also implemented a more violent expansion strategy than their predecessor.</p><p>Under the new leadership, the DZ Mafia formed alliances with the Mocro Mafia in the Netherlands (which I discussed in another episode) and the ‘Ndrangheta in Calabria to secure the best drug shipments arriving in Europe and strengthen its position as a wholesaler. This allowed them to open drug trafficking points even in cities outside Marseille, first in neighboring areas (Avignon, Sète, Valence…) and then in the rest of the country (Lyon, Poitiers, Dijon, even Rennes in Brittany), extending their franchise well beyond the Phocaean city, both in drug trafficking and money laundering.</p><p>To meet the immediate need for cash to finance the war, between spring and summer 2024, the DZ Mafia also entered the world of extortion, targeting shops, nightclubs, and even rappers and influencers. But their demands were so high that the victims refused to pay, leading to tragic consequences: shops were targeted with vandalism and arson, and prominent individuals were subjected to personal attacks. In August, the rapper SCH was the target of a shooting that killed one of his associates.</p><p>But it was the increasingly brutal murders linked to the war against the Blacks that shocked public opinion.</p><p>In early October, a 15-year-old was recruited online by a detainee claiming to be from the DZ Mafia to shoot at the door of a Blacks member and set fire to his home, all while filming himself. The agreed compensation: 2,000 euros. Upon arriving at the Cité Bellevue where he was supposed to commit the crime, the boy was searched. A firearm was found on him, and he was stabbed about fifty times before being burned alive.</p><p>Two days later, the same individual recruited another youth, this time a 14-year-old, to finish the job. The task was simple: go to a hotel room to retrieve a weapon, then kill a member of the Blacks. The compensation this time was 50,000 euros. But this mission also went wrong: the young man booked a ride-share to reach the crime scene, but the driver refused to stop at the indicated location. In response, the boy shot the driver in the back of the head, killing him.</p><p>These two crimes were so heinous that the DZ Mafia decided to issue a statement to distance itself from them. On October 9, about fifteen men dressed entirely in black and hooded published a video online in which they displayed a flag with the inscription “DZ Mafia” and denied involvement in these crimes, blaming the misuse of their brand by other criminal groups.</p><p>But a statement was not enough to clean up the DZ Mafia’s reputation, especially in light of two other high-profile crimes committed shortly afterward.</p><p>In November 2024, in the parking lot of a McDonald’s in Marseille, a car was riddled with Kalashnikov bullets. Inside were five young people, three boys and two girls. The couple sitting in the front was killed. The girl’s only fault: knowing the intended victims. Mamine Escobar was extracted from his cell to be interrogated: investigators believed he was the mastermind behind the execution, carried out by a commando that included a minor.</p><p>The following month, it was Gaby’s turn, another leader of the DZ Mafia, who, determined not to remain idle, put a 120,000 euro bounty on the head of the director of the prison where his deputy was held. A few days later, two armed men from the Île-de-France region, the area around Paris, were stopped near the prison complex. The director and his deputy were placed under protection.</p><p>The authorities then opted for a less sophisticated method: placing Mamine Escobar in solitary confinement. Only then did the number of murders in Marseille dramatically decrease.</p><h4>Where do we stand today?</h4><p>The Yoda clan is defeated. The executions ordered by the DZ Mafia are no longer front-page news in national newspapers. But the situation is far from resolved.</p><p>Criminal groups operating in other French cities are claiming affiliation with the DZ Mafia to carry out activities not necessarily related to drug trafficking. This is the case with a racketeering ring in Nice and a prostitution ring in Toulouse. The DZ Mafia has gone from being a franchise to a full-fledged brand that various groups use to intimidate their victims.</p><p>Meanwhile, in Marseille, the Blacks are still active, along with dozens of other criminal groups. As we saw at the beginning of the episode, the void left by a boss and his organization is immediately filled by competitors, and if the old leaders return to freedom or gain access to means of communication with the outside world, conflict is almost inevitable. Without a real plan for recovery and social integration, the ordeal is far from over for the residents of the Cité Paternelle and other public housing blocks in Marseille.</p><h4>Gang, cartel or mafia?</h4><p>In a November 2024 speech, French Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau spoke of the “Mexicanization” of society.</p><p>A few days later, in a televised debate, French journalist and author Jérôme Pierrat downplayed the issue, saying, “The DZ Mafia is not a real organization” and that “we are far from El Chapo’s cartel.”</p><p>Interviewed on the subject by the French media Brut, Roberto Saviano stated unequivocally: “These organizations can be defined as mafias.”</p><p>While it is very positive that there is a public debate on the nature of the DZ Mafia, the lack of consensus on the issue remains concerning. We might be tempted to dismiss this debate as merely semantic if it were not for the fact that identifying the problem is the first, fundamental step in addressing it.</p><p>Unfortunately, there are good reasons why it is difficult to establish with certainty into which category the DZ Mafia falls. Is it a gang, a drug cartel, or a full-fledged mafia?</p><p>To answer this question, we must start with what we know. The DZ Mafia is certainly an organized criminal group. We know this because French journalists and investigators have been able to reconstruct its hierarchy through the testimonies of arrested members.</p><p>At the top of the DZ Mafia, as we have seen, was initially the founder, Le Tic, who was succeeded by the triumvirate formed by Jalisco, La Brute, and Gaby. Like other competing criminal groups, including the Yoda clan, these leaders are often abroad or in prison. According to Pierrat, this detachment — both hierarchical and geographical — gives the organization a sectarian character. Below the leaders are about thirty lieutenants who, in turn, recruit low-level soldiers, known as “petites mains” (“little hands”).</p><p>These “soldiers” are young people between the ages of 14 and 24, recruited for specific missions on a compensated basis. They are the ones who carry out the dirty work, such as eliminating members of a rival clan. This strategy is successful in many ways: it allows the DZ Mafia not to sacrifice important human resources in dangerous missions, exposes to arrest those who, if minors, face lesser penalties, and, above all, limits the organization’s exposure to investigators. Les petites mains are the lowest rung of the hierarchical ladder and resemble more external collaborators than actual members. Consequently, even if arrested, they can only provide partial information and do not justify the mobilization of resources (such as lawyers) to get them out. From a capitalist perspective, relying on les petites mains is the most cost-effective way to carry out acts of war.</p><p>None of this makes the problem of recruiting petites mains any less serious; in fact, it is on social media that minors are lured, especially on TikTok, where ads for missions ranging from 50 to 150,000 euros are posted. Posting ads on social media allows reaching a maximum number of potential candidates, even from other neighborhoods and cities — just consider the three individuals who came from Paris to Marseille to eliminate the director of the Beaumettes prison and claim the 120,000 euro bounty placed on her head by Gaby.</p><p>Once interest is shown, the conversation moves to Telegram groups and chats, where missions are detailed and assigned. Pierrat explains that sometimes the promise is not just money but also the management of a drug trafficking point, even in locations far from Marseille, where the DZ Mafia has extended its franchise. The promise of easy money is a magnet for the very young, who are willing to risk their freedom and even their lives to obtain it.</p><p>The DZ Mafia can also boast control over a territory: the Cité Paternelle. As happened with the Vele di Scampia, the public housing blocks of the neighborhood become hideouts and drug selling points — unfortunately, this is not an isolated case. Most of Marseille’s cités are in the hands of some criminal group that controls not only illegal activities, particularly drug trafficking but also access to the area. This is evident from the brutal murder of the 15-year-old in October and the historical difficulties of the police in intervening in these zones. Expanding the network of drug trafficking points in the city requires either forming an alliance or engaging in conflict with other groups. This is how the DZ Mafia found itself at war with the Yoda clan and the Blacks, but it is also what drove it to expand into other French cities where the drug trade was less organized.</p><p>Control of the territory is an important aspect to consider in understanding the nature of the DZ Mafia. For Saviano, a gang is motivated solely by profit, while a mafia pursues power, which includes control of a territory. Dismissing the DZ Mafia as a mere gang, therefore, seems reductive.</p><p>Is it a cartel, then? Drug trafficking is undoubtedly the primary activity of the DZ Mafia, and its most bloodthirsty leader, Amine O., nicknames himself Escobar after the infamous Colombian boss, or Jalisco, after the Jalisco Nueva Generación cartel. But unlike cartels, the DZ Mafia does not control the production of drugs (which remains in the hands of Latin American cartels) nor their importation into Europe (handled by the Mocro Mafia and the ‘Ndrangheta). Despite its position as a wholesaler in France, the DZ Mafia is not hegemonic in Marseille: many other groups remain active in drug trafficking independently of it. Additionally, the DZ Mafia has begun to diversify its activities, adding extortion to its portfolio.</p><p>Are we then dealing with a mafia that collects protection money? Not exactly. While the name the organization has given itself is misleading — like the allusions to Mexican cartels, the name DZ Mafia is undoubtedly intended to give importance and intimidating force to the group — unlike Italy, the French penal code does not recognize “mafia-type association,” making it legally impossible to define the DZ Mafia as such.</p><p>We can, however, attempt to interpret the organization and operations of the DZ Mafia based on our definitions. According to Article 416 bis of the Italian Penal Code, a “mafia-type association” is a criminal organization that exploits intimidation, associative bonds, and the resulting subjugation and omertà to control economic activities, concessions, authorizations, contracts, public services, or to achieve unjust profits or advantages, or to hinder or influence the free exercise of voting to its advantage. This definition can apply to both domestic and foreign organizations that share these characteristics.</p><p>In the previously cited interview, Saviano identifies other distinguishing features of mafias: the pursuit of power, hierarchies, their control of territory, vision and long-term strategic planning, investment in the recruitment of new members, and rituals.</p><p>The DZ Mafia meets only some of these criteria. It is certainly a criminal association that exploits intimidation but does not enjoy <em>omertà</em>, either among its members or towards its victims — consider the revelations provided by arrested members, often low-level, but also the public denunciations on social media and TV by shopkeepers and entertainment figures targeted by extortion. Not to mention the organization’s own statements and publications on social media, which it boasts about. It could be said that the DZ Mafia opposes communication to omertà, although the protagonists hide their faces and true identities.</p><p>Furthermore, the way extortion is carried out demonstrates a short-term vision: extortion serves to finance immediate war needs, not to build a secure source of income over the long term. The DZ Mafia demands large sums (several thousand euros) at once, making it impossible for the victim to honor the request. Responding by targeting their business or life destroys any chance of recovering the money. This approach is very different from that of the Sicilian mafia, which, by demanding small sums regularly with less visible threats, ensured a source of income for months if not years.</p><p>Control of the territory is present, albeit on a small scale, and does not extend to control of public works. The aspect of corruption also remains limited: so far, the French judicial police have only registered attempts at corruption in the private sector, such as security, and no direct links with politics.</p><p>Investment in recruits is perhaps the most visible aspect, although, as we have seen, there is a significant distance between les petites mains and the actual members of the association. We are, therefore, dealing with dynamics of quantity rather than quality in recruitment, and very few manage to remain free or alive long enough to hope to fully enter the organization.</p><p>But if the DZ Mafia is a hybrid organization, borrowing traits from many other forms of criminality and adding an unprecedented media component… what can France do to combat it?</p><h4>France’s response</h4><p>Remember the bill presented in 2023 to combat drug trafficking? This Tuesday, it was finally put to a solemn vote in the National Assembly, the “Chamber” of the French Parliament. It is a controversial and widely debated law. The anti-drug trafficking bill introduces important innovations in the fight against organized crime, bringing France closer to the Italian system… without, however, creating a crime of mafia-type association or extending its scope beyond drug trafficking. For the government, and particularly the Interior Minister Retailleau, the scourge to be fought is drug trafficking, not the proliferation of criminal organizations in disadvantaged areas of French cities, for which drug trafficking is merely the most accessible and profitable means of enrichment.</p><p>But let’s look at the innovations of this law.</p><p>First, a new national anti-organized crime investigative pool is created (everything to avoid saying the word “mafia”!). According to Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin, this pool will complement the existing anti-organized crime department within law enforcement.</p><p>A harsh prison regime is then created for the 700–800 most dangerous detainees, a sort of French 41bis, aimed at breaking the detainee’s links with their criminal network. This regime is valid for two renewable years, during which phone use is limited, visits take place exclusively in rooms with a sound diffusion system, and legal proceedings are conducted via video conference. These measures aim to minimize external contacts, both telephonic and physical, and minimize the risk of escape during transfers. In exceptional cases of physical contact with external persons, systematic and thorough searches are provided.</p><p>Another significant advance inspired by the Italian system of confiscating mafia assets is the administrative seizure of the real estate and commercial properties of criminals, thus striking at the heart of their interests: money.</p><p>The status of repentant criminals, already existing, is renewed to increase its use and effectiveness.</p><p>The new law also facilitates the eviction of criminals and stipulates that individuals of foreign nationality sentenced to more than 5 years in prison for drug trafficking will automatically be subject to a ban on re-entering French territory, unless a judge makes a motivated decision otherwise.</p><p>Aggravating circumstances are then introduced for traffickers who exploit minors.</p><p>A major point of contention in the text was the measure that would have allowed authorities to access encrypted messages from all messaging apps. This measure would have impacted cybersecurity and the confidentiality of all communications, not just those of criminals. This measure was rejected by deputies, who instead gave the green light to satellite interceptions and the extension of the experimentation of algorithmic surveillance (with artificial intelligence, therefore) already used during the Olympic Games.</p><h4>What does it take to fight a mafia?</h4><p>The DZ Mafia, with its unprecedented media visibility, has shed light on a phenomenon that has plagued Marseille for over 150 years: not simply drug trafficking, but the mosaic of criminal organizations vying for territory. For these organizations, drug trafficking is merely the most accessible and profitable means of making money, just as prostitution and gambling were a century ago.</p><p>In light of this, France’s response seems insufficient. The recently approved law on combating drug trafficking targets the means (drug trafficking) and not the cause (the organization of parts of the marginalized population into criminal structures). While the tools of repression are stronger, nothing is done for prevention, to prevent young people from finding it more interesting to become hitmen than to go to school, find a job, or play sports. Without a dual approach of repression and prevention, it is difficult to imagine how the authorities’ work will not be limited to cutting off the head of the hydra. In a month, we may no longer be talking about the DZ Mafia, but how many other criminal groups are ready to replace it and conquer its territory?</p><p>Even if France is taking important steps in the fight against organized crime, without a real awareness that the phenomenon goes far beyond drug trafficking, its lasting eradication seems difficult if not impossible. And this awareness must first pass through the terms used in public debate and political and institutional narratives. We are not dealing with simple gangs, nor with organizations dedicated exclusively to drug trafficking. Nor are we dealing with mafias in the traditional sense of the term, but with organizations that nonetheless share a concerning number of their traits.</p><p>And this is what I would like to emphasize to provoke our reflection even beyond French borders. The modus operandi of the DZ Mafia — the recruitment of very young people who act on the orders of bosses who are often in prison or abroad — is not unique in Europe; in fact, we find the same dynamic in Stockholm, Antwerp, Brussels… I refer you to our English podcast episodes “<a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/5XNXcg4KJ0vXagghhgRXPJ?si=5c5f13b83c8648ee">Sweden has a gang problem</a>,” and “<a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/6sUBwcd3XF1B1t8Bviyt8A?si=ae39b36ad0b04b7f">Raising antimafia awareness in Antwerp</a>” to learn more about what is happening in other cities on our continent.</p><p>Faced with this observation, the question arises: Are we witnessing the emergence of a Mafia 2.0? Standardized at the European level, unconcerned with being seen and recognized by the media, organized with a small leadership and a vast army of expendable minor soldiers? And if so, are the tools at our disposal sufficient to combat it?</p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://www.charentelibre.fr/societe/dz-mafia-l-organisation-criminelle-marseillaise-qui-fait-trembler-la-france-21797455.php">DZ Mafia : que sait-on sur cette organisation criminelle marseillaise qui fait trembler la France</a></li><li><a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/justice/20241102.OBS95783/tic-le-minot-devenu-parrain-de-la-dz-mafia.html">Narcotrafic : &quot; Tic &quot;, le minot devenu parrain de la DZ Mafia à Marseille</a></li><li><a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/triple-assassinat-a-marseille-en-2011-perpetuite-requise-10-03-2017-2110890_23.php#11">Triple assassinat à Marseille en 2011: perpétuité requise</a></li><li><a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/provence-alpes-cote-d-azur/bouches-du-rhone/marseille/yoda-dz-mafia-on-vous-explique-cette-guerre-des-clans-du-narcotrafic-a-marseille-apres-l-arrestation-de-felix-bingui-2938050.html">Trafic de drogue : on vous explique la guerre entre Yoda et DZ Mafia à Marseille, après l&#39;arrestation de Félix Bingui</a></li><li><a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/provence-alpes-cote-d-azur/bouches-du-rhone/marseille/narcotrafic-a-marseille-blacks-dz-mafia-yoda-ce-que-l-on-sait-des-gangs-qui-se-font-la-guerre-3042654.html">Narcotrafic à Marseille : Blacks, DZ Mafia, Yoda, ce que l&#39;on sait des gangs qui se font la guerre</a></li><li><a href="https://www.midilibre.fr/2024/10/17/il-seraient-les-vrais-chefs-de-la-dz-mafia-et-sont-tous-en-prison-notamment-a-perpignan-qui-sont-mamine-gaby-et-la-brute-12266681.php">Il seraient les vrais chefs de la DZ Mafia et sont tous en prison, notamment à Perpignan : qui sont &quot;Mamine&quot;, &quot;Gaby&quot; et &quot;la Brute&quot;</a></li><li><a href="https://www.charentelibre.fr/societe/dz-mafia-l-organisation-criminelle-marseillaise-qui-fait-trembler-la-france-21797455.php">DZ Mafia : que sait-on sur cette organisation criminelle marseillaise qui fait trembler la France</a></li><li><a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/provence-alpes-cote-d-azur/bouches-du-rhone/marseille/narcotrafic-ce-que-l-on-sait-de-la-garde-a-vue-d-un-des-chefs-de-la-dz-mafia-pour-meurtre-commandite-en-prison-3067618.html">Narcotrafic : ce que l&#39;on sait de la garde à vue d&#39;un des chefs de la DZ Mafia pour meurtre commandité en prison</a></li><li><a href="https://www.charentelibre.fr/societe/dz-mafia-l-organisation-criminelle-marseillaise-qui-fait-trembler-la-france-21797455.php">DZ Mafia : que sait-on sur cette organisation criminelle marseillaise qui fait trembler la France</a></li><li><a href="https://www.midilibre.fr/2024/10/06/une-sauvagerie-inedite-un-adolescent-de-15-ans-larde-de-50-coups-de-couteau-et-brule-vif-a-marseille-12243347.php">&quot;Une sauvagerie inédite&quot; à Marseille : un adolescent de 15 ans &quot;lardé de 50 coups de couteau&quot; et brûlé vif mercredi, un tueur présumé de 14 ans vendredi</a></li><li><a href="https://www.ladepeche.fr/2024/10/12/trafic-de-drogue-qui-sont-les-blacks-rivaux-de-la-dz-mafia-dans-la-guerre-des-gangs-a-marseille-12254599.php">Trafic de drogue : qui sont les &quot;Blacks&quot;, rivaux de la DZ Mafia dans la guerre des gangs à Marseille ?</a></li><li><a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/provence-alpes-cote-d-azur/bouches-du-rhone/marseille/narcotrafic-ce-que-l-on-sait-de-la-garde-a-vue-d-un-des-chefs-de-la-dz-mafia-pour-meurtre-commandite-en-prison-3067618.html">Narcotrafic : ce que l&#39;on sait de la garde à vue d&#39;un des chefs de la DZ Mafia pour meurtre commandité en prison</a></li></ul><p>Var Matin — Tentative de racket de la DZ mafia marseillese à Nice: seize personnes mises en examen ce vendredi</p><p>Var Matin — Façade mitraillé, incendies criminels…vaste coup de filet dans le sud est, l’ombre de la DZ mafia</p><p>La depeche — plusieurs mamans toulosaines sont menacées par le DZ mafia</p><p><a href="https://documentation.departement06.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_display&amp;id=849144">Ces cadres de la DZ Mafia qui tirent les ficelles depuis la prison- Nicolas Farmine Mathilde Ceilles, Le Figaro</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ladepeche.fr/2024/09/04/uber-shit-par-drone-ils-livraient-des-colis-avec-de-la-drogue-dans-plusieurs-prisons-du-sud-ouest-12174478.php">https://www.ladepeche.fr/2024/09/04/uber-shit-par-drone-ils-livraient-des-colis-avec-de-la-drogue-dans-plusieurs-prisons-du-sud-ouest-12174478.php</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5dbbd7bdc34e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Romantic Scams: Chinese Triads Conquer the World with Pig Butchering Scams]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/romantic-scams-chinese-triads-conquer-the-world-with-pig-butchering-scams-d8a3aaf683cc?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d8a3aaf683cc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cambodia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Apr 2025 08:44:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-27T08:44:59.431Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uqYgT27mQRETqK3vGUFKeQ.png" /><figcaption>Chainanalysis</figcaption></figure><p>Have you ever chatted with a stranger? Maybe on a dating app or your favorite social media platform? It could be someone you matched with, who appeared among your suggested friends, or who contacted you directly on WhatsApp. Someone with whom you created a connection, perhaps even a long-distance friendship, and with whom you might have discussed important and personal topics, including money and investments. Thousands of people worldwide have experienced this and found themselves stripped of their life savings.</p><p>In this article you will learn about one of the most sophisticated scams circulating on the web, the pig butchering scam, which is estimated to have generated over $75 billion for organized crime between 2020 and today. Get yourself a good coffee and get comfortable: this journey will take us from China to the United States, from South East Asia to Africa all the way to Europe, into the depths of a criminal world where often even the executioners are victims.</p><blockquote>Listen to the podcast (in Italian) <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/64QuUQV5GRk9SBFrDG6tTg?si=g0M7wwDRTvuzsJ7PHvjkkw">here</a></blockquote><h4>What is a pig butchering scam?</h4><p><strong>Boston, United States</strong>. In the living room of her home, Cindy Tsai, a middle-aged businesswoman originally from Hong Kong, scrolls through a chat on her smartphone in front of the BBC cameras. It is a long conversation with Jimmy, a young and handsome Chinese man who had just arrived in the United States at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. Alone and isolated in a new country, unable to return home, Jimmy finds in Cindy a kind soul with whom to exchange messages and calls. At the same time, Jimmy is a comfort for Cindy, who, in the midst of a divorce and recently diagnosed with terminal cancer, is going through a particularly difficult time in her life. Within a few days, the two get to know each other, establishing a relationship. Leveraging Cindy’s desire to leave a good inheritance for her son, Jimmy encourages her to invest in a certain cryptocurrency platform that yields stellar returns in a short time. After years of making safe and predictable investments, Cindy is convinced: she starts with an investment of a few thousand dollars, then, reassured by the quick and significant gains that materialize just as Jimmy promised, she decides to transfer increasingly large sums to the platform. Until one day, she suddenly finds herself deprived of what she believed to be a friend and $2.5 million.</p><p>Cindy is probably the most famous victim of a pig butchering scam in the Western world because she is one of the few who had the courage to speak about her experience, doing so openly and using her real name in front of the cameras.</p><p>The pig butchering scam originates from China, where it is known as “shāzhūpán.” It is called this because it involves “fattening up” the victim, just like an animal for slaughter, making them spend all the money they have and can access, until they have not a single penny left. Only then the scammer delivers the final blow and disappears with all the money.</p><h4>How does a pig butchering scam work?</h4><p>The pig butchering scam occurs in three phases. The first is finding the victim. Scammers spend up to 14 hours a day on at least 10 different cell phones, trying to contact potential prey through social media and dating apps. They also use lists of stolen phone numbers to send messages directly on WhatsApp. To avoid alarming potential victims, scammers use carefully studied communication techniques.</p><p>First, they create attractive and reassuring fake profiles, often using photos stolen from influencers, depicting a worldly lifestyle but also showing concern for loved ones, especially family. Scammers then initiate conversations in an apparently legitimate way: on WhatsApp, for example, a classic move is to pretend to have dialed the wrong number, calling the victim by the wrong name, then asking for the correct name and starting a conversation.</p><p>Once the ice is broken, the scammer works on building a relationship with the victim. If necessary, they are ready to spend months gaining their trust. It’s not just about messages: often, the scammer and the victim also have video calls. How do they justify the difference in appearance from the photos posted online? Simple, with an AI application that allows face swapping, i.e., changing the face, thanks to the perfect overlay of an image on the face of the person speaking, an image capable of following their movements.</p><p>When the scammer believes they have gained the victim’s full trust, they finally introduce the topic that has interested them from the beginning: money. The scammer then begins to talk about how they quickly became rich through cryptocurrency investments — something they demonstrate with photos of luxurious trips and hobbies, as well as details about their earnings. The scammer then offers to share the recipe for success with the victim and guide them step by step through their first investment. To further reassure the prey, the scammer invents guarantees, for example, having a relative or friend in finance who can suggest the right investments just before a market movement.</p><p>If the scammer has played their part well, at this point, the victim takes the bait. The steps to start investing are numerous but accessible to anyone, even the least experienced. The scammer asks the victim to download an app — MetaTrader, available on the Apple Store and Play Store and therefore seemingly reliable — and create a virtual wallet. They then instruct the victim to buy cryptocurrencies on a completely legal exchange platform and then transfer the funds to MetaTrader or another front-end platform built on MetaTrader. From there, the victim can start making their first crypto operations. The scammer encourages the victim to invest significant amounts right away, at least a few thousand dollars. The next day, the magic happens: the app shows, as promised by the scammer, stellar gains. And this is where the second phase of the scam begins: the fattening.</p><p>Now that the victim is enthusiastic about their first investment, the scammer must push them to move all their money to the trading app. The amounts become increasingly vertiginous, and the frequency of deposits intensifies. Various victims have reported using up all their savings — including those invested elsewhere, in pension funds or investments — and even going into debt with banks, relatives, and friends to continue feeding their crypto portfolio. The scammer insists until they exhaust the victim: when the victim refuses to invest more, the scammer applies manipulation techniques, such as stopping responding or pretending to have lost interest, to bring the conversation back to the only thing that drives the relationship, namely money. But when the scammer realizes that the victim truly has no more money to spend, they activate the third and final phase of the fraud: the slaughter.</p><p>This is the cruelest phase. The scammer blocks the victim’s access to the crypto wallet. When the victim tries to withdraw their money (and with it the supposed gains), the app gives an error. In most cases, at this point, the scammer stops responding and becomes unreachable. In other cases, they continue the conversation, trying to convince the victim that it is their fault, that they made some mistake, and that they need to start investing again to rebuild their capital. But in the end, the result is the same: the scammer disappears with all the money.</p><h4>Who are the victims?</h4><p><strong>San Francisco, California</strong>. Yuen, an accountant in his 50s originally from Hong Kong, has just buried his father. The eldest of four siblings, Yuen tells ProPublica that he was tasked by his father, who had lung cancer, with deciding whether to suspend life support, as well as handling the funeral and distributing the inheritance. During the long months of vigil at the hospital, Yuen finds comfort in messaging with Jessica, a young and wealthy Chinese woman who works in New York for the investment bank JP Morgan.</p><p>After some time, Jessica confides in Yuen that she has an uncle in finance who provides her with confidential information on gold market movements to make winning investments, a form of illegal insider trading. The shared secret strengthens the bond between the two. Yuen is persuaded by Jessica to convert, unbeknownst to his wife and daughter, all the money he has saved over more than 30 years into cryptocurrencies and transfer the funds to a trading platform called S&amp;J. For weeks, Jessica shares her uncle’s information with Yuen and convinces him to invest more and more money on the platform. If Yuen tries to talk about something else, Jessica seems distracted and indifferent. So, Yuen ends up indulging Jessica. Thanks to her, his gains are quick and substantial, and Yuen gets excited. When his father is admitted to an expensive facility for terminally ill patients, Jessica encourages Yuen to invest even more. The man squanders the family fortune, including the inheritance left by his mother to him and his siblings.</p><p>It is only when his father dies that Yuen takes a break from investing, telling Jessica that other operations will have to wait. For six days, he does not log into the platform. When he returns, he finds a disaster: his account is $480,000 in the red. Jessica convinces Yuen that it is his fault, that he made some wrong move in exiting the app, and that he needs to find other funds to invest to recover the lost capital. Yuen, in a panic, liquidates savings funds worth $500,000 and asks his brother for another $100,000 loan. Jessica urges him to continue investing until the day of the 23rd investment, when disaster strikes again: all of Yuen’s funds disappear. Jessica asks him to start over from scratch, even though he, exasperated, tells her he only has $105 left in his account.</p><p>That same day, Yuen confesses to his family and asks to be taken to a psychiatric hospital, where he is monitored to prevent suicide attempts. A wise choice: another man before him took his own life after discovering he had been “slaughtered” in a similar scam.</p><p>Pig butchering scams target both men and women, mostly between the ages of 30 and 60, from various social backgrounds. In the West, the victims are generally affluent and educated. The primary targets are Chinese people, both residents in China and abroad, but also others scattered across the United States, the United Kingdom, continental Europe, and Africa. Thanks to advances in online translation technology, it is becoming increasingly easy to overcome language barriers. The manipulation techniques applied to Yuen can also be adapted to other sociocultural contexts. The common denominator among all these victims? A moment of vulnerability or weakness.</p><h4>Romantic and group scams: no one is safe</h4><p><strong>Beijing, China</strong>. Joyce, a 35-year-old employee, returns to her small apartment in a public housing complex after a long day at work, accompanied by BBC journalists. After a minimal dinner of vegetables, she prepares her room for a recording: like every evening, she will dance in front of a camera to feed her OnlyFans channel. Since the man she thought was her boyfriend disappeared with all her money, her salary is not enough to repay her debts. Lured by a supposed suitor she met online, the woman was convinced to spend all her savings and go into debt with banks and relatives to make cryptocurrency investments. The money was supposed to be for their wedding and to buy a house together. Now she finds herself alone and penniless, forced to ration food, work on OnlyFans, and ask her parents for help to pay off her debts.</p><p>Most pig butchering scams are romantic in nature, like this one, but there is also a variant: the “group” scam. In this case, the scammer establishes a friendly relationship with the victim and ends up adding them to a chat with other investors to reassure them about the legitimacy of the investments. Too bad that the other people in the chat are also scammers. There are even scammers who encourage, often successfully, the victim to share the investment opportunity with their circle of friends, thus increasing the number of victims.</p><p>But who is behind these scams?</p><h4>Human trafficking and forced labour among the scammers</h4><p><strong>Sihanoukville, Cambodia. </strong>Didi massages his shoulder as he watches the sunset from the roof of the safe house where he has been for a few days. It hurts from when he jumped from the third floor of the complex where he was locked up, but it is a small price to pay for freedom and the prospect of soon returning to his family in China.</p><p>Like about half a million other young men and women between Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, Didi was locked up for months inside a gigantic private compound, fenced and inaccessible, used as a factory for cyber scams. These concrete monsters, built in record time, are scattered throughout the coastal city of Sihanoukville and its surroundings, as well as numerous border areas between Cambodia and Vietnam, between China and Myanmar, and in the infamous Golden Triangle, where the borders of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand converge on the Mekong River. From the outside, many of these buildings look like simple casinos and hotels — and in fact, many operate as such, at least on the ground floor. But as soon as you go up a few floors, you discover hell.</p><p>The rooms are full of human trafficking victims subjected to severe physical and psychological abuse if they refuse to spend their days and nights — depending on the time zone of the designated prey — carrying out pig butchering scams on a large scale. Lured to Cambodia, Laos, or Myanmar with the promise of a well-paid job, young Chinese, Vietnamese, Malaysians, and now even Africans find themselves stripped of their passports and forced by beatings to work for their captors to “buy” their freedom. Like in other human trafficking contexts, the victims are told they have an exorbitant debt to the organization that brought them to the country, a debt impossible to repay with the meager compensation provided and which increases in case of “bad behavior.” Like true slaves, these scammers who are also victims are sometimes “sold” from one compound to another. This operation can further increase their debt.</p><p>The daily life of these people is desolate. Forced to work up to 14 hours a day, they spend all their waking time in front of the small screens of smartphones, first to work, then, before going to sleep, to relax a bit, always under strict surveillance. If the compound is in the city, they can never go out, while if it is more remote, they cannot go beyond the building’s parking lot, and only when the guard or squad leader is lenient. Their life unfolds behind barred windows and walls protected by barbed wire. If they get sick, they receive minimal medical care. If they refuse to work, they are beaten in front of everyone, sometimes suffering injuries that later cause their death. Some are directly killed by gunshots, their lifeless and unidentifiable bodies abandoned in fields or by the roadside. Few manage to escape.</p><p>Within these compounds, there is a para-corporate organization, managed by volunteer or converted scammers who organize real teams of scammers with various levels of experience. If the recruits are tasked with luring victims, the more experienced handle the more delicate phases, such as the first investment or the fattening. Many victims have stated that they felt they were talking to different people.</p><p>Upon arrival at the compound, all scammers undergo training in three phases: technological, to learn how to use the fraudulent trading platforms, which are extremely faithful to real ones; social engineering, to identify and establish a relationship with the victims; and psychological manipulation, to convince them to spend everything they have, leveraging their weaknesses and putting them under pressure. There are actual scam manuals written by the most successful scammers, who can even be promoted to directors of their compound for good performance.</p><p>But how is it possible for such a vast criminal economy to prosper…practically in broad daylight?</p><h4>Fertile ground for Chinese Triads in South East Asia</h4><p><strong>Yangon, Myanmar, 2017</strong>. Chinese businessman She Zhijiang poses with a General of the Burmese border guard, a representative of a large Chinese metallurgical company, and several Chinese officials at the inauguration of a massive urban project in Shwe Kokko, a location on the border between China and Myanmar. In exchange for building roads and buildings, the Burmese authorities cede control of the area around Shwe Kokko to the Chinese magnate, while Chinese institutions celebrate another piece in the new Silk Road wanted by President Xi Jinping to extend Chinese economic influence in the world.</p><p>Three years later, in 2020, the Burmese government begins to reconsider its choice. During an investigation, it is discovered that She Zhijiang has transformed Shwe Kokko into a gambling center, building casinos and structures capable of housing up to 100,000 workers dedicated to maintaining online gambling and betting sites, despite Chinese law prohibiting Chinese companies from investing in casinos and gambling abroad. It also emerges that She has been wanted in China for financial crimes since 2014 but that in 2018 he managed to obtain a Cambodian passport. The investigations reveal that he embezzled over $100 million illegally in Cambodia and that he manages illegal casinos in the Philippines. The Burmese government manages to get China to dissociate itself from the Shwe Kokko development project, but efforts against She suffer a setback with the 2021 coup. It is at this stage that hotels and casinos are converted into operational bases for the criminal organizations that manage pig butchering scams. To avoid problems with the Burmese authorities, the Chinese criminals in charge of Shwe Kokko make large donations to militias and local organizations. It is only when the effects of pig butchering scams on Chinese citizens become too evident that the Chinese government decides to intervene against She, issuing an INTERPOL arrest warrant carried out by Thai law enforcement. Protected from extradition by his Cambodian passport, She continues to manage his affairs from a Thai prison, where he enjoys luxurious treatment and accuses the Chinese Communist Party of vast international conspiracies, including against him.</p><p>A different fate but similar activities for Zhao Wei, a Chinese businessman who has been at the head of casinos between Macao and Myanmar for decades. At the invitation of the Laotian government, Wei took control of the special economic zone of the Golden Triangle in the Bokeo region of Laos. From there, he controls not only navigation on the Mekong River but also the roads connecting China and Laos, as well as the numerous casinos and hotels from which pig butchering scams are coordinated on a global scale. US authorities have officially included Zhao Wei and his business associates on the list of transnational criminal organizations, accusing him of trafficking in drugs, humans, and animals, as well as money laundering and corruption. Thanks to his connections with certain Chinese officials and the major organized crime of Macau, Wei remains at large for now.</p><p>Among his protectors is said to be Wan Kuok-koi, also known as Broken Tooth, the infamous boss of the 14K triad of Macau. The triads are the quintessential form of Chinese organized crime. For more information on their origin and structure, I refer you to the Bar Lume podcast episode “<a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/5J50JvhuekW1lg7uckrYIB?si=529f3ab9cb4a426a">The Ways of the Triad.”</a> For now, you should know that for decades, the triads have carried out all illegal economic activities in China — such as gambling — from other countries, serving the repressed Chinese demand. But let’s get back to Broken Tooth.</p><p>Imprisoned between 1998 and 2012 for illegal gambling, loan sharking, criminal association, and attempted murder of a public official, Broken Tooth resumed his activities starting from Cambodia, where he created a new organization, the World Hongmen Historical and Cultural Association. Taking advantage of the 2017 cryptocurrency boom, he enriched himself by launching a new cryptocurrency, Hong Coin, in Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. After raising $750 million from investors, Broken Tooth made the cryptocurrency and the money disappear, reinvesting it in 2020 in the creation of his big butchering center in Dongmei, on the border between Myanmar and Thailand, with the connivance of the Burmese border militias. Broken Tooth can easily launder the proceeds of the scams thanks to a network of companies he manages between China and Southeast Asia. Despite investigations for organized crime in Malaysia and Thailand, Broken Tooth and his associates have always managed to evade the law and even expand overseas, establishing branches in Uganda, South Africa, and Dubai. Moreover, Broken Tooth has cleaned up his image in his homeland, embracing and defending the policy of the Communist Party on social media, where he has established himself as an influencer, and reinvesting the proceeds of his criminal activities in China, thus feeding the national economy and shielding himself from Chinese investigative action.</p><h4>China’s ambivalent stance</h4><p>The examples of these three men, reported by the US Institute of Peace and various international media, are paradigmatic of the complex network of interests and relationships that link businessmen, organized crime, and the Chinese government in Southeast Asia over the past 40 years.</p><p>Until the 1980s, China had a policy of zero tolerance towards the triads: their capitalist approach and profit orientation made them incompatible with the philosophy of the Communist Party. But since China embraced economic liberalization, things have changed: China has begun to see the triads as allies in its foreign economic influence policy, especially since the launch of President Xi Jinping’s new Silk Road. On the other hand, the Communist Party is well aware that most of the victims of the triads’ activities — from human trafficking to scams — are Chinese citizens and that it is therefore necessary to have, at least on the surface, a policy of repression and contrast. This translates into awareness campaigns about pig butchering in the homeland and some high-profile but mostly isolated raids on the border with neighboring countries, particularly Myanmar. Thus, China can say, both to its citizens and to the international community, that it is addressing the problem without eradicating it entirely. This is also demonstrated by the ambiguous approach towards the bosses: while some are wanted, like She Zhijiang, others are popular idols in China and are treated as simple businessmen by the authorities, like Broken Tooth.</p><p>Even if the Chinese government had a real will to put an end to the triads and other Chinese criminal organizations, it must be recognized that it would not be a walk in the park. These organizations have a very high degree of adaptability, both in their geographical distribution and in their choice of criminal activities.</p><p>Before the COVID-19 pandemic, scams constituted a small part of the triads’ activities in Southeast Asia: gambling was the dominant activity. Since gambling is illegal in China, the triads established themselves in the Philippines, whose governments, hoping to develop the local economy, implemented special economic zones for decades where casinos could operate with minimal rules and taxation. This policy led to the proliferation of online casinos based in the Philippines, especially thanks to President Duterte and his relationship with the Chinese investor Michael Yang. Yang would have facilitated the entry of Chinese criminal organizations into the country to operate pig butchering scams and other illegal activities. Pig butchering scams became particularly prominent in the Philippines’ economy after 2016 when the government had to close several online casinos to appease a dispute with the Chinese government, thus halving gambling profits. The scams continued until 2022 when evidence of human trafficking linked to this activity became impossible to hide, and President Marcos decided to crack down on the phenomenon, drastically reducing casino licenses from 295 in 2019 to 60 in 2024.</p><p>Driven out of the Philippines, the triads sought another country in which to operate. Myanmar, Laos, and northern Thailand, with the Golden Triangle on the Mekong River, offered an ideal opportunity. These countries bordering China are easily accessible for the Chinese clientele and hungry for foreign investment to develop. Thanks to the policy of creating “special economic zones,” Chinese investors have been able to take complete control of entire portions of national territory to build hotels, casinos, and vacation centers in which to carry out illicit activities. If in Laos this process took place with the blessing of local politics, in Myanmar it was facilitated by the 2021 coup, which left the country in the hands of various local military militias with whom corrupt businessmen and the triads can do business directly. For more information on this historical and economic process, I refer you to another episode of the Bar Lume podcast: <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/24rlbHAyODBXHapMQ3X2y3?si=5e6edc0b9ebd43bb">“Southeast Asia: The Golden Triangle of Organized Crime.”</a></p><p>Business in the special economic zones was booming, at least until the peremptory closure of borders decreed by the Chinese government to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. As usual, however, the triads did not give up: it was at this point that pig butchering scams took off. Managed entirely online, they allowed the activity to continue despite travel restrictions. As for the growing need for Chinese-speaking manpower, it was met with human trafficking: an army of young Chinese in search of a good job, armed with a one-way ticket and unable to return home even in case of escape. And so, the hotels once intended for Chinese tourists passionate about gambling were transformed into prisons for these reluctant scammers.</p><p>When the effects of pig butchering — both on the victims of the scams and on human trafficking — became too evident, however, China found itself having to intervene. In Myanmar, the Chinese government financed some militias to destabilize certain special economic zones, especially along the northeastern border, even sending its army and arresting some Burmese military chiefs. This pushed the triads to seek Chinese victims outside of China, in the West, and to move their operations south, even massively relocating to Cambodia.</p><p>Cambodia offered ideal terrain for the triads. Remaining off the radar until then, stable and poor, the country welcomed Chinese investments with open arms. The ruling class, widely corrupt, turns a blind eye to the growing number of investigative journalism and international studies on large-scale detention for trafficking purposes. Law enforcement, even if they wanted to intervene, often have their hands tied, as the hotel-prisons are often located on private properties owned by the ruling class. Victims who manage to escape are not believed and are mistreated as illegal immigrants. Even though the location of the detention compounds and evidence of the abuses that take place there are now public knowledge, there seems to be no will from either the Chinese or Cambodian authorities to combat the phenomenon, except for some rare raid or vague statement to reassure international public opinion, important for a tourist country like Cambodia.</p><h4>Stopping big putchering</h4><p>If pig butchering scams seem like an unstoppable evil, they are not. The first way to combat them is to raise awareness among users. Studies, interviews, and journalistic reports on the phenomenon are increasingly numerous, and the best thing you can do is talk about it with your circle to alert them to this phenomenon and provide them with the tools to identify suspicious behaviors when interacting with someone new online.</p><p>Much must also be done by the authorities, especially in light of the severe psychological and financial damage suffered by the victims and the increasingly widespread export of the pig butchering model. In the United Kingdom, for example, a pig butchering operational center hidden in a hotel on the Isle of Man was recently dismantled, whose orchestrators had even obtained permits to build a gigantic office complex to accommodate personnel dedicated to online gambling and other activities.</p><p>And in Southeast Asia? Cooperation with Chinese and local authorities is not easy, precisely because of the numerous economic and political interests at stake. This is why civil society is the first to intervene. In Singapore, Xellos, the pseudonym of a woman who was a victim of a pig butchering scam, launched the Global Anti Scam Organization. Its mission is to provide a support network for over 80 victims worldwide who have sought help after discovering they have been deceived. For many, processing the loss, both psychological and financial, is difficult because they often kept the relationship with the scammers secret and are ashamed to talk about the harm they suffered. The association also aims to identify the scammers and help those who are victims of trafficking to get out of the system, being careful, however, not to fall into another scam — some pretend to want to escape to ask for money.</p><p>To concretely help the scammers who are victims of trafficking, Xellos collaborates with the managers of safe houses in the countries where they are held, such as Lu Xiangri, who escaped from a pig butchering compound and remained in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, to help others regain their freedom like him.</p><p><strong>Sources</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bW4wYV0V-5s&amp;rco=1">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bW4wYV0V-5s&amp;rco=1</a></p><p><a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/ssg_transnational-crime-southeast-asia.pdf">https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/ssg_transnational-crime-southeast-asia.pdf</a></p><p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz6x1ql1yelo">https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz6x1ql1yelo</a></p><p><a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/662f5d242a3e7860ebcfde4f/66bec89de33fb0311442d888_Asia-CTIP%20Laos%20Dubai%20Investigation.pdf">https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/662f5d242a3e7860ebcfde4f/66bec89de33fb0311442d888_Asia-CTIP%20Laos%20Dubai%20Investigation.pdf</a></p><p><a href="https://www.wired.com/story/pig-butchering-scam-invasion/">https://www.wired.com/story/pig-butchering-scam-invasion/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/ckdgdkrd2n2o">https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/ckdgdkrd2n2o</a></p><p><a href="https://time.com/6836703/pig-butchering-scam-victim-loss-money-study-crypto/">https://time.com/6836703/pig-butchering-scam-victim-loss-money-study-crypto/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/10/28/comment-la-mafia-chinoise-sequestre-des-africains-pour-arnaquer-des-occidentaux_6362394_3212.html">https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/10/28/comment-la-mafia-chinoise-sequestre-des-africains-pour-arnaquer-des-occidentaux_6362394_3212.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/human-traffickers-force-victims-into-cyberscamming">https://www.propublica.org/article/human-traffickers-force-victims-into-cyberscamming</a></p><p><a href="https://www.wired.it/article/cina-pig-butchering-truffa/">https://www.wired.it/article/cina-pig-butchering-truffa/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/101-east/2024/9/26/she-zhijiang-discarded-chinese-spy-or-criminal-mastermind">https://www.aljazeera.com/program/101-east/2024/9/26/she-zhijiang-discarded-chinese-spy-or-criminal-mastermind</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d8a3aaf683cc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Escape of Two Narcos Plunges Ecuador into internal armed conflict]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/the-escape-of-two-narcos-plunges-ecuador-into-internal-armed-conflict-a93e773b1e6c?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a93e773b1e6c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ecuador]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war-on-drugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[state-of-emergency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2025 22:08:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-25T22:11:10.746Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*94iO7VaJm-PrnB2qY1a8eQ.png" /><figcaption>Soldiers on an anti-crime mission in Guayaquil in April 2025. Gerardo Menoscal — AFP</figcaption></figure><p>Ten days ago, on April 14, 2025 Ecuador <a href="https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/latinoamerica/live-news/resultados-elecciones-ecuador-2025-quien-gana-gonzalez-noboa-orix">reelected</a> Daniel Noboa as its president, one day after suspending citizens’ constitutional rights as part of an emergency decree. Since taking office in late 2023, Noboa has enacted a state of emergency no less than 9 times. The official reason: fighting against the narco cartels and armed groups that have plunged the country into chaos, raising mortality and insecurity to record levels. Local organizations and media, however, are expressing increasing <a href="https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20250413-ecuador-noboa-decreta-un-nuevo-estado-de-excepci%C3%B3n-en-la-v%C3%ADspera-de-las-elecciones-presidenciales">concern</a> over abuses of power and public funds in favor of the Naboa administration, which have been accompanied by a rise of disinformation on social media.</p><p>Ecuador is living an extremely delicate time for its democracy while also fighting a war against drug trafficking. But how has this standoff started?</p><p><strong>The great escape</strong></p><blockquote>Listen to the podcast (in Italian) <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/1JDCytQp2anJaR4PLoWgKJ?si=J8mR3YYxQJG-O2hQdvpk-Q">here</a></blockquote><p>January 7, 2024: the freshly elected Naboa administration announces the escape, probably already days old, of Adolfo Macias Villamar, known as Fito, the leader of the powerful Choneros gang. The man reportedly evaded a prison in Guayaquil, the country’s second city and main port, after being warned of his imminent transfer to a maximum-security prison.</p><p>Just hours after the news of his escape, at least 6 prisons rioted, taking guards hostage.</p><p>In response to the escape of one of the country’s top gangsters and the prison riots, known more as gang hideouts than actual penitentiaries, the President decided to declare a state of emergency. In his address to the nation, he stated that the time when narcos and organized crime give orders to the government is over.</p><p>He announced the deployment of the army and law enforcement to counter 22 criminal groups defined as “terrorist” and therefore to be “neutralized.” Military and police were given permission to kill — the Parliament, evacuated for security reasons, started preparing amnesties that could be needed once the crisis is over.</p><p>Meanwhile, civilians had to barricade themselves in their homes and respect a curfew from 11 PM to 5 AM. Healthcare services were reduced to a minimum, schools and shops are closed. The international community also mobilized: China has closed its embassy, the United States has offered military support, while Peru has mobilized its army at the border with Ecuador to prevent the unrest from spreading to its territory</p><p>In response, the gangs issued summary orders on social media to sow terror and show the government who is really in charge. Armed with weapons, dozens and dozens of criminals poured into the cities, especially Guayaquil, engaging in shootouts, looting, and setting cars on fire. They stormed a television studio during a broadcast and held the occupants hostage live on air for several minutes before law enforcement intervened. The official toll is not yet known, but there are already 13 dead and at least 70 injured.</p><p>The chaos also allowed another boss to escape: Fabricio Colon Pico, known as “Capitan” or “Salvaje,” the leader of the rival Los Lobos gang.</p><p><strong>Who are the two most wanted bosses in Ecuador?</strong></p><p>Fito, 44, is the leader of the Choneros gang, already known internationally for threatening to kill journalist and presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, who was murdered on August 9, 2023 after a rally.</p><p>According to estimates, the Choneros, allied with the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel and the Colombian organization Frente Oliver Sinisterra, now have about 8,000 men, many of whom are active inside prisons.</p><p>Imprisoned since 2011, Fito was serving a 34-year sentence for murder, drug trafficking, and organized crime. He escaped for the first time in 2013 but was arrested again a few months later and seemed to have adapted to life behind bars. It is no secret that his stay in the Litoral prison in Guayaquil was more like a residence than imprisonment. Acclaimed as a king both inside and outside the prison, he was perfectly capable of running his business even from prison. He was allowed to organize parties, invite musicians, and even record self-celebratory songs to publish on his YouTube channel. Fito’s rise to the head of the organization occurred inside the prison after the murder of his predecessor in March 2023.</p><p>Fito is the last of the founding members of the Choneros still alive following 3 years of instability marked by power struggles between the Choneros and their splinter gangs. After the murder of the historic boss Jorge Luis Zambrano, known as Rasquiña, in December 2020, his successor, Junior Raldan, failed to impose himself on the various satellite groups of the organization. Thus, less than two months later, in February 2021, the splinter gangs, organized under the name “Nueva Generacion,” launched a coordinated attack in three different prisons, managing to kill and behead 79 Choneros in a single day.</p><p>Among the splinter gangs that participated in the massacre was Los Lobos.</p><p>Los Lobos now have a comparable number of members to the Choneros but are allied with the Mexican Jalisco Nueva Generacion Cartel, a rival of the Sinaloa Cartel. According to Ecuadorian authorities, it is the Mexican cartels that supply the gangs with weapons in prisons and thus facilitate clashes.In March 2023, the Lobos succeeded in their intent: to kill the leader of the Choneros, Junior Raldan. Since then, the leadership of the Choneros has passed to Fito.</p><p>However, the leader of Los Lobos, Capitan Pico, is also on the run. Arrested on January 5, 2024, he managed to escape four days later, along with 31 other inmates, further evidence of the flaws — and corruption — in the Ecuadorian prison system, where it is enough to pay for a better room or even the keys to one’s cell.</p><p><strong>A difficult future</strong></p><p>Since the January 2024 mass evasion, the Ecuadorian government has failed to reign in gang violence. The situation in the country remains critical: with a weak democracy, which is often suspended, widespread insecurity and an unclear path to reestablish the rule of law, Ecuadorians are bracing for another tough period.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a93e773b1e6c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Price of Truth: Fernando Villavicencio against Ecuador’s Corruption, Illegal Mines, and Drug…]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/the-price-of-truth-fernando-villavicencios-against-ecuador-s-corruption-illegal-mines-and-drug-40e92e7ef576?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/40e92e7ef576</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[drugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gold]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ecuador]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2025 19:01:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-25T19:14:32.036Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*Fj2ra9oEPuPYzoRXy1QuUg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The Price of Truth: Fernando Villavicencio against Ecuador’s Corruption, Illegal Mines, and Drug Trafficking</h3><blockquote>“I don’t represent those who remained silent for years while this country was being looted. Where were the candidates? Hiding in fear. I put myself out there. I faced them with courage, not cowardice. With your courage. Because I am not a hero like they say — it’s your boldness that gave me the strength to fight.”</blockquote><p>These were the final statements of Fernando Villavicencio — former investigative journalist, member of parliament, and presidential candidate in Ecuador — before being gunned down on August 9th, 2023, shortly after a campaign rally in the capital, Quito.</p><p>It was the third political assassination in Ecuador that year, but the first to receive the international attention such attacks deserve. Villavicencio’s death exposed not only the fragility of Ecuador’s democracy but also the deep issues of corruption, gangs, and drug trafficking that he had spent his life fighting.</p><p>In this article, you’ll learn about Fernando Villavicencio and the investigations through which he exposed the corrupt schemes and illegal activities that plague Ecuador more than ever.</p><blockquote>Listen to the podcast (in Italian) <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/2mNgn3rlYl0SNgn1bGhAvn?si=e17463cffaab4fc9">here</a>.</blockquote><h4>The man behind the candidate</h4><p>Fernando Villavicencio was born 60 years ago in Sevilla, a small village in Ecuador’s Andean Chimborazo province. At 13, he moved with his family to Quito, and at 17, began working as a broadcaster for a cultural radio station. In 1995, he entered politics through the Pachakutik Movement, an Indigenous party advocating for Ecuador to be recognized as a plurinational state. Over the next three years, he worked for the national oil company, Petroecuador — first as a communications officer, then as a union leader. He later became a journalist for various national outlets and from 2009 to 2014, served as an advisor to congressman Clever Jimenez.</p><p>It was in collaboration with Jimenez that Villavicencio began some of the most significant investigations of his career. They targeted the many shady areas of President Rafael Correa’s administration — from the financing of his electoral campaign to oil sales deals in the Amazon. A turning point came when they accused Correa of crimes against humanity for violently repressing a police revolt on September 30, 2010 — known as 30S.</p><p>Correa’s response was swift. In 2014, he sued Villavicencio, Jimenez, and their assistant Figueroa for defamation, resulting in an 18-month prison sentence. The three evaded capture by fleeing to the U.S., then to Sarayaku, an Indigenous Amazonian village, and finally to Peru.</p><p>With the election of a new president, Lenín Moreno, in 2017, the three returned to Ecuador. But even Moreno wasn’t spared from Villavicencio’s scrutiny: in 2018, along with fellow journalist Christian Zurita, he published the <em>Ina Papers</em>, exposing links between Moreno, the Chinese company Sinohydro, and various offshore entities.</p><p>In 2019, Villavicencio released his most famous investigation, <em>Arroz Verde</em> (Green Rice), uncovering a vast bribery network run by Correa’s administration, which led to one of Ecuador’s biggest trials.</p><p>In 2021, Villavicencio took the fight inside the system. He joined the <em>Honesty Alliance</em> and was elected to parliament, where he published at least 10 corruption reports.</p><p>In 2023, he took the biggest step yet — he ran for president. For Villavicencio, the nation’s core problems were clear: insecurity, unemployment, and lack of healthcare. The common denominator? Weak institutions corrupted by organized crime and clientelism. “This country isn’t poor. The mafias have made it poor,” he told the newspaper <em>La Hora</em>. For him, there were three mafias: corruption, illegal mining, and drug trafficking. Just as he clearly identified the problems, he also offered clear solutions: “remove the rotten apples from the institutions.”</p><p>It was a bold message — one he continued to spread even after two mayors were murdered and he received threats from the <em>Los Choneros</em> gang. His campaign slogan was: “Time for the brave.”</p><p>Shortly after the shooting that killed him, a video was released showing hooded men dressed in black, claiming to be members of the <em>Los Lobos</em> gang and taking responsibility for the murder. But later that same day, another video appeared, this time featuring unmasked men in white clothes, claiming to be the real <em>Los Lobos</em> and denying any involvement. Eventually, authorities arrested six Colombian nationals. It appeared to be a narco-execution — but with so many enemies, the list of possible masterminds was long.</p><p>— -</p><p>Throughout his career, Villavicencio conducted over 260 investigations, uncovering, explaining, and bringing to the attention of both Ecuadorian and American justice systems countless crimes and irregularities.</p><h4>Oil: From Resource to Transnational Fraud</h4><p>Villavicencio’s first major investigation concerns oil corruption and spanned over a decade. To understand this story, a brief digression is necessary.</p><p>Oil was discovered in the Ecuadorian Amazon in 1967. As often happens in Latin America, for decades its exploitation was left almost exclusively in the hands of foreign multinationals, especially American ones, with little regard for the environment, the health of the local population, or the development of the country.</p><p>However, in 2006, something changed: Rafael Correa, then Minister of Economy, who had made a name for himself by revoking the concession of the oil company Oxy, won the elections with a campaign aimed at regaining control of Ecuador’s resources and making another oil company, Chevron, pay for the environmental disasters caused in the country.</p><p>The dream, however, was short-lived: at the end of 2008, Ecuador lost the lawsuits against Oxy and Chevron for breach of contract and was ordered to pay $1 billion in damages. Desperately in need of money and cut off from international markets, Correa turned to the only power he believed could help him in this situation: China.</p><p>In January 2009, the Correa government signed the first of 18 so-called “pre-financing” contracts with Chinese state-owned oil companies (PetroChina, UNIPEC, and Sinochem) and their Thai counterpart, PetroThailand, worth $5.4 billion. In the oil world, this type of contract is quite common: the buyer advances the producer the sum necessary to extract the oil, drawing on its own funds or a bank loan. The producer then repays the debt in barrels of crude oil and interest by a predetermined date. To avoid accusations of selling the country to foreigners, Correa ensured that the agreement was not just a commercial contract but a strategic alliance between friendly nations. However, there was a problem: unlike previous contracts of this type signed by Ecuador, this one did not require the buyer to refine the crude oil in their own country. It was precisely this “free destination” clause for the oil that allowed the birth of a corrupt triangle between Asian companies, private agents, and Petroecuador.</p><p>At the top of this triangle is Gunvor, a multinational group based in Geneva specializing in the buying and selling of natural resources. Through the Canadian agent Raymond Kohut and the subsidiaries he managed in Latin America, Gunvor managed to establish itself as an intermediary in the relationship between Petroecuador, Petrochina, and the other Asian companies, a relationship that, given the strategic agreement binding them, should have been direct and limited to public companies.</p><p>Gunvor not only negotiated the contract between Petroecuador and Petrochina (including the $5.4 billion loan to European banks and the formula for calculating the price of crude oil, which, according to Villavicencio’s investigation, was extremely disadvantageous for Ecuador) but also took care of the transportation and resale of the crude oil on behalf of the Asian companies. In ten years, not a single barrel of crude oil ever reached China. Gunvor and its associates (Castor Petroleum, Core Petroleum, and others, all represented by the same Ecuadorian law firm) took control of the crude oil shipments in Ecuadorian ports and resold them at a price $3 to $7 higher to refineries in the United States, Panama, Peru, and Chile, without ever winning a public tender to represent the Asian companies that formally owned them. Why would Petrochina and the other companies accept such conditions? China obviously denies any involvement, but Villavicencio’s hypothesis was that Petrochina was colluding with Gunvor: it delegated all the work to the intermediary and pocketed its share of the profit (in dollars) without lifting a finger.</p><p>The fraud is of colossal proportions. Between 2009 and 2020, Ecuador signed pre-financing agreements with Asian oil companies totaling $20 billion, repayable with 1.3 billion barrels of crude oil and an interest rate of between 6 and 8% by 2024. These usurious conditions forced Ecuador to spend two-thirds of its national budget in 2020 to repay the debt and to allocate 87% of its production between 2014 and 2020 to Chinese and Thai companies. Moreover, the amount of crude oil promised by Ecuador to repay China was disproportionate to the value of the accounts to be settled. According to Villavicencio’s estimate, with an average price of $60 per barrel, Ecuador could have settled the debt with 350 million barrels, but it committed to selling five times as many.</p><p>How could Ecuador make such evaluation errors, so many times over? The answer is simple: corruption. The Panama Papers revealed that Gunvor’s subsidiaries in Singapore and the Bahamas, on Kohut’s orders, paid commissions of one dollar per barrel to two Ecuadorian “consultants”: Enrique Cadena Marin and Antonio Peré. Their task? To pay bribes to Petroecuador officials to renew the agreements unfavorable to Ecuador with Petrochina and the other Asian companies. Of the $70 million received by Cadenas and Peré during their collaboration with Kohut, $22 million was paid to three people: Nilson Arias Sandoval, known as “El Gordo,” head of international trade at Petroecuador until 2017; his successor, Mauricio Samaniego; and José Agusto Briones, Minister of Energy and Non-Renewable Resources between 2017 and 2020.</p><p>Villavicencio’s investigation and the complaint filed by deputy Jimenez were not in vain: in 2012, the FBI assigned an agent to follow the case, and after 9 years of investigations, in 2021, the New York prosecutor’s office obtained Kohut’s confession. The three Petroecuador officials were arrested: one of them, the former minister, was found dead in his cell a few days later.</p><h4>Bribes: The “Arroz Verde” of President Correa’s Party</h4><p>Villavicencio’s greatest success was with another investigation: “Arroz Verde” (“Green Rice”), later known to the Ecuadorian justice system as the “Caso Sobornos 2012–2016.” Green rice is a typical dish of Ecuadorian popular cuisine and the code name for bribes (in Spanish, “sobornos”).</p><p>The mountain of documents found and analyzed by Villavicencio shows how, between 2012 and 2016, President Rafael Correa’s party, Alianza Pais, received $7.5 million from various multinationals present in the country, such as Odebrecht, Consermín, Skm, Blue, and Sinohydro, in exchange for contracts. The money was used to finance Correa’s 2013 election campaign and was repaid with the awarding of contracts during his two terms in office. All payments were meticulously recorded using code names to hide the identities of politicians, officials, and financiers, but thanks to Villavicencio’s work, the prosecutor’s office was able to identify all 20 people involved.</p><p>Among the most prominent figures are Pamela Martinez, a judge of the Constitutional Court and coordinator of the system, Maria de los Angeles Duarte, then Minister of Transport and Public Works, and President Correa himself, who, to escape an 8-year prison sentence for corruption, took refuge in Belgium, where he still lives today.</p><h4>Fictitious Exports: The Flaw in the SUCRE System</h4><p>Another scoop by Villavicencio was the unmasking of a fictitious export scheme within the international monetary system SUCRE, amounting to $2 billion between 2009 and 2014.</p><p>SUCRE is an acronym for “Sistema Unitario de Compensación Regional” (Unitary System of Regional Compensation). Created in 2009 by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Bolivia, and Ecuador, SUCRE was intended to facilitate payments between countries with different currencies through a common virtual currency, the sucre, usable only by central banks. While the system seems useful on paper, in practice it hides terrible pitfalls: first, the conversion of national currencies into sucre by central banks erases the origin of the money, opening the door to money laundering. Second, Ecuador is the only country in the SUCRE system without its own currency: in 2000, it adopted the US dollar to combat inflation and price volatility. And in Latin America, the dollar is the most sought-after currency of all because it is accepted internationally and not subject to devaluation, thus constituting an excellent reserve of value.</p><p>These conditions immediately appealed to corrupt officials and entrepreneurs, who saw them as an opportunity to launder money and obtain US dollars. How? Through a mechanism of fictitious exports between Ecuador and Venezuela. From Venezuela, companies like the construction firm Fonglocons placed orders with Ecuadorian suppliers. Payment was made in bolivars, the Venezuelan currency, converted into sucre by the central bank for transfer to Ecuador. Once in Ecuador, the sucre was converted a second time, this time into the Ecuadorian currency, the dollar, drawing from the national reserve. However, as soon as they received them, the Ecuadorian companies transferred the dollars to tax havens through offshore companies, without ever exporting anything. It was as if they had stolen directly from the state’s gold reserve.</p><p>Villavicencio’s investigation targeted Andrés Arauz, general director of the Central Bank of Ecuador, and Luis Eduardo Sánchez Yánez, head of the Ecuadorian branch of Fonglocons and brother of a man close to Venezuelan dictator Chavez and Ecuadorian president Correa. The investigation also revealed that Fonglocons was owned by the notorious Venezuelan criminal Alex Saab, currently detained in the United States.</p><h4>The Gold of the Amazon: A Cursed Treasure</h4><p>In addition to what he called the “political mafia,” Villavicencio was also concerned about two other mafias: the gold mafia and the drug mafia.</p><p>Starting in 2017, the blogs Mil Hojas and Periodismo de Investigacion, to which Villavicencio contributed, reported unauthorized activity around the gold deposits in the municipality of Merced de Buenos Aires, in the Amazonian province of Imbabura, on the border with Colombia.</p><p>As we saw in the episode dedicated to Venezuela, where there are illegal mines, other crimes flourish: murders, labor exploitation and sexual exploitation, human trafficking, extortion, money laundering, tax evasion, smuggling… But for Villavicencio, there was something even more disturbing: the infiltration of Chinese organized crime and its probable links with institutions and law enforcement in the region.</p><p>According to his investigations, Chinese organized groups had set up a discreet and effective system of gold appropriation: they extracted the metal from one of the numerous illegal mines, transported it to the capital Quito, where they hid it in regular, front-end stores, and then took it further south, to the province of El Oro, hidden in a shipment of fuel. There it was melted and processed to hide its origin and allow legal export to China.</p><p>What further alarmed Villavicencio was the reluctance of the authorities to investigate: predictable searches, omission of evidence, delay of trials… All signs, according to Villavicencio, of corruption in law enforcement and institutions.</p><h4>Drugs: An Imported War</h4><p>As for drugs, Ecuador is a special case: it is not a producing country, nor does it host local cartels, but the few controls in its ports and the porosity of its borders with countries such as Colombia, Brazil, and Bolivia make it a strategic transit point. Ecuador is also permeable to foreign narcos: historically, Mexican and Colombian cartels have formed alliances with local gangs to facilitate the transit of drugs through the country. Large shipments of drugs destined for the US and UK markets depart from Ecuadorian ports. More recently, the Albanian mafia has also made a strong appearance, vying for territory with Latin American groups.</p><p>Added to the war between foreign narcos is the war between Ecuadorian gangs. An emblematic example is that of the Choneros, the gang that had threatened Villavicencio. Founded in the 1990s in the coastal city of Chone, the Choneros gang was initially dedicated to drug trafficking on the coast, both in managing distribution and providing logistical support to the Sinaloa cartel. After the death of the founder in a war with a rival gang in 2007 and the arrest of his successor in 2011, the Choneros evolved into one of the most feared prison gangs in the country.</p><p>Although they maintain a presence on the streets and an alliance with the Mexican cartel, the Choneros have shifted their energies to activities such as contract killings, smuggling, and extortion, which they can coordinate from behind bars. Obviously, their power did not go unchallenged: a rival gang, the Lagartos, soon challenged them for supremacy, causing widespread bloodshed. To curb the phenomenon, in 2019, President Moreno ordered the dispersal of the leaders of the two rival gangs in prisons throughout the country, but this had the opposite effect: they gave rise to derivative gangs, often used as armed wings of the main gangs to fight on their behalf. This led to a record number of murders in prisons in 2020 and the death of the leader of the Choneros himself.</p><p>The power vacuum encouraged some of the gangs derived from the Choneros — particularly Los Lobos, los Tiguerones, and the Chone Killers — to form a coalition under the name “Nueva Generacion” (in tribute to the Mexican cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación) and rebel against the mother gang, causing 118 deaths in a single day in a prison in Guayaquil in 2021. In parallel, these new gangs continue to clash with gangs derived from the Lagartos, such as the Latin Kings and El Cuartel de las Feas. The war within and between Ecuadorian gangs is therefore far from over.</p><h4>What lies ahead for Ecuador?</h4><p>Villavicencio denounced it, and analysts in the region confirm it: the rise of criminal groups and the explosion of illegal activity in Ecuador have been made possible by the weakness of institutions. The lack of adequate resources, susceptibility to corruption, and absence of a strong political will to address the problems discussed in this article have created the perfect conditions for the proliferation of organized crime.</p><p>Cristian Zurita, co-author of many investigations with Villavicencio, took his place as a presidential candidate, appearing at all press conferences wearing a bulletproof vest. Unfortunately, in the first round of elections, held on August 20, 2023 he came in only third: Luisa Gonzalez, Correa’s heir, and Daniel Noboa, son of the banana magnate, made it to the runoff on October 15. Daniel Noboa was elected president and took office in November 2023. The wind of renewal for which Villavicencio fought will have to wait.</p><h4>Sources</h4><ul><li><a href="https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/politica/fernando-villavicencio-y-sus-260-investigaciones-en-contra-de-rafael-correa-y-otros-gobernantes-nota/">Fernando Villavicencio y sus 260 investigaciones en contra de Rafael Correa y otros gobernantes</a></li><li><a href="https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/politica/fernando-villavicencio-y-sus-260-investigaciones-en-contra-de-rafael-correa-y-otros-gobernantes-nota/">Fernando Villavicencio y sus 260 investigaciones en contra de Rafael Correa y otros gobernantes</a></li></ul><p><a href="https://periodismodeinvestigacion.com/2019/11/27/petrochina-el-mayor-robo-de-la-historia/">https://periodismodeinvestigacion.com/2019/11/27/petrochina-el-mayor-robo-de-la-historia/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-oil-gunvor-idUKL1N2M922J">https://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-oil-gunvor-idUKL1N2M922J</a></p><p><a href="https://periodismodeinvestigacion.com/2021/05/04/la-simulacion-llega-a-su-fin/">https://periodismodeinvestigacion.com/2021/05/04/la-simulacion-llega-a-su-fin/</a> <a href="https://www.ecuadortimes.net/three-petroecuador-officials-involved-in-the-multi-million-dollar-gunvor-related-bribery-scheme-according-to-the-us-fbi-complaint/">https://www.ecuadortimes.net/three-petroecuador-officials-involved-in-the-multi-million-dollar-gunvor-related-bribery-scheme-according-to-the-us-fbi-complaint/</a></p><p><a href="https://periodismodeinvestigacion.com/2022/01/19/ecuador-la-colonia-de-oriente/">https://periodismodeinvestigacion.com/2022/01/19/ecuador-la-colonia-de-oriente/</a> <a href="https://www.publiceye.ch/fr/thematiques/negoce-de-matieres-premieres/en-amazonie-un-predateur-nomme-gunvor">https://www.publiceye.ch/fr/thematiques/negoce-de-matieres-premieres/en-amazonie-un-predateur-nomme-gunvor</a></p><ul><li><a href="https://www.ecuavisa.com/noticias/ecuador/caso-sobornos-fiscalia-pide-mas-mil-millones-dolares-como-MEEC578271">Caso Sobornos: Fiscalía pide más de mil millones de dólares como reparación integral al Estado</a></li><li><a href="https://www.expreso.ec/actualidad/claves-entender-caso-arroz-verde-18279.html">Las claves para entender el caso Arroz Verde</a></li><li><a href="https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/tribunal-declara-culpable-cohecho-rafael-correa/">Rafael Correa sentenciado a ocho años de cárcel por sobornos</a></li><li><a href="https://www.rfi.fr/es/m%C3%A1s-noticias/20220422-expresidente-de-ecuador-rafael-correa-recibi%C3%B3-refugio-en-b%C3%A9lgica">Expresidente de Ecuador Rafael Correa recibió refugio en Bélgica</a></li></ul><p><a href="https://www.planv.com.ec/historias/politica/exportaciones-ficticias-venezuela-alex-saab-correa-y-el-origen-del-mal">https://www.planv.com.ec/historias/politica/exportaciones-ficticias-venezuela-alex-saab-correa-y-el-origen-del-mal</a></p><p><a href="https://periodismodeinvestigacion.com/2019/11/28/la-mafia-china-controla-la-mineria-ilegal-en-imbabura/">https://periodismodeinvestigacion.com/2019/11/28/la-mafia-china-controla-la-mineria-ilegal-en-imbabura/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.milhojas.is/612528-el-oro-volador.html">https://www.milhojas.is/612528-el-oro-volador.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.milhojas.is/612608-el-regreso-a-buenos-aires.html">https://www.milhojas.is/612608-el-regreso-a-buenos-aires.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2021/10/30/exportaciones-ficticias-por-usd-2000-millones-entre-ecuador-y-venezuela-revelarian-los-nexos-entre-alex-saab-y-rafael-correa/">https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2021/10/30/exportaciones-ficticias-por-usd-2000-millones-entre-ecuador-y-venezuela-revelarian-los-nexos-entre-alex-saab-y-rafael-correa/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=40e92e7ef576" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The “parallel society” of Swedish gangs]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/the-parallel-society-of-swedish-gangs-6050e3a6d52a?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6050e3a6d52a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[youth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gangs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[police]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[violence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 21:00:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-02T21:00:40.213Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Sweden ranks 116th of 193 countries in the Global Organised Crime Index. It has a reputation as a safe and developed country, a stable democracy and a champion of gender and social equality. Yet a closer look at life in Sweden’s cities will give you a quite different picture. In this episode you’ll learn about Sweden’s growing gang problem and its links to structural inequality in the country.</em></p><blockquote>Listen to the podcast in English here and in Italian <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/580WVwQerTT0NntnS6Gk4F?si=65314f7da6fc48d2">here</a>.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kUrT1XPLB-I11F9OXdwzGQ.png" /><figcaption>By Elisa Furlan for Bar Lume</figcaption></figure><h4>Street fighting in Sweden</h4><p>Stockholm, Jan. 2, 2023. It is late at night and in the suburb of Grimsta, 15 km northwest of the Swedish capital, all is silent. Residents enjoy the last hours of sleep before the sun rises on the first Monday of the year. No one is out on the cold and frosty streets. Almost no one.</p><p>At 3 a.m., a loud explosion destroys the entrance to a residential building, jolting its residents awake. Shortly afterward, the same scene occurs in Bagarmossen, another suburban town, this time southeast of Stockholm. Fortunately, there are no casualties nor injured people, but the damage to the Grimsta building-and to the peace of mind of its residents-is extensive.</p><p>Contrary to what you may think, such scenes are anything but rare in Sweden. Since 2018, the National Police have recorded 523 explosions, nearly 30 percent of which in Stockholm alone. If we look at shootings, the figures are even more alarming: 1840 have occurred in the same period, more than a third in the capital.</p><p>Behind these attacks are the young, often very young members of the many gangs that rule the streets of Swedish cities, both of large urban centres such as Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo, as well as of provincial towns such as Gävle, Helsinborg, Jönköping, Linköping, Sundsvall, and Västerås.</p><p>Swedish gangs are, so to speak, “amorphous” organisations: they have little hierarchy, lack specialization, have a fast and flexible recruitment process and lack any particular membership criteria, thus enabling a frequent turnover. According to a 2017 study, 76 percent of gang members are first- or second-generation immigrants, mainly from the Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kurdistan) or the Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia). In the same gang, several of these ethnicities can coexist: the uniting factors for these young men are their neighborhood and their similar socio-economic status. Indeed, most gang members come from disadvantaged urban areas that are physically and culturally isolated from the rest of the city, have a predominantly foreign population and provide few opportunities for personal and professional development. Strongly tied to their territory, gangs rarely venture farther than the center of their own city.</p><p>The average age within these gangs is 20–24, well below the 30–34 in the rest of Europe. Minors are particularly numerous: according to Stockholm police, half of recently arrested individuals are under 18. A striking example is the 15-year-old arrested on Jan. 28 for the murder of a boy of his same age, perpetuated at dinnertime in front of a restaurant in downtown Skogås, south of Stockholm.</p><p>Finding weapons to commit these crimes is not a problem for teenagers in Sweden. Indeed, the Serbian and Syrian mafias import large quantities of guns in the country from former war territories in the Balkans and the Middle East and put them on the market at low prices. According to an investigation by the New York Times, in Sweden you can buy a grenade for less than 12.50 USD. And when it is not possible to buy them, it is enough for gangs to steal demolition explosives from a construction site or bribe someone to do it for them. As for firearms, handguns but also military rifles such as Kalashnikovs and Uzis are widespread.To hide the tracks of weapons used to commit crimes, gangs pass them from town to town. The result is that virtually all gang members circulate armed without much risk of being identified.</p><p>Emboldened by the possession of weapons, young gang members engage in various illegal activities, notably drug dealing, robberies and burglaries, but increasingly also contract killings, especially of rival gang members or their loved ones. It seems that the recent wave of violence in Stockholm is due to a war for the control of the drug market in Sundsvall, a port city in the centre of the country. Prosecutors believe factions involved are led by two leaders who pull the strings of the conflict from abroad, providing their affiliates with lists of people to kill at home. One of these leaders is reportedly safe in Turkey, from which extradition is not possible due to tensions between the Turkish and Swedish governments.</p><p>Getting minors to do the dirty work is an increasingly popular technique among Swedish gangs. Indeed, the sentences imposed on juveniles are lighter than on adults, which allows gangs to put their men back on the street more quickly. This strategy increasingly puts judges and public opinion in a tight position, especially in the face of serious crimes. It was the case, for instance, of the 17-year-old who killed a policeman in Biskopsgården, one of Gothenburg’s most marginalised neighbourhoods, in 2021. Even considering the aggravating factors, the court ended up sentencing the boy to “only” 8 years in prison instead of giving him the life sentence he would have received had he been only a few months older.</p><p>The risk of going to prison, or, worse, dying in a fight with other criminal groups, does not seem to discourage teenagers from getting involved in gangs — on the contrary, young people practically line up to get a gang assignment, which could even be a murder, in exchange for compensation. Celebrated in rap music, the violent world of gangs, made of shootings, fast cars and easy money, fascinates rather than alienates the youth of Sweden’s suburbs. Indeed, many boys see gangs as an avenue for personal fulfilment and improvement of their socioeconomic status.</p><p>The deep divide between life in gang-dominated neighbourhoods and life in the rest of Sweden — prosperous champion of social democracy and textbook example of welfare state — has led many to speak of “parallel societies.” To understand the origins of this divide, we need to go back a few years.</p><h4>The origins of Sweden’s “parallel societies”</h4><p>The idea of “parallel societies” is not new in Sweden.</p><p>The first mention of “street gangs” dates back to 1941, when the National Social Work Association published a report estimating the existence of 322 gangs between Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo. In the 1950s and 1960s, Sweden enacted policies to attract foreign workers, which led to a large influx of Finns, Italians, Greeks, and Yugoslavs in the country.</p><p>Within the Yugoslavian community developed an organisation that would dominate the Swedish criminal landscape for two decades between the 1970s and 1980s. This organization was initially led by Željko Ražnatović, also known as Arkan, a Serbian gangster, spy, and later war criminal, and it was primarily devoted to high-profile robberies. Following a series of internal feuds that led to the deaths of several leaders, the organization lost its primacy. The Serbian Mafia continues to exist in Sweden, but it is involved in other businesses, particularly drug, arms, and human trafficking.</p><p>The vacuum left in the late 1980s was soon filled by biker gangs, a type of organization imported from the United States via Denmark. Biker gangs are clubs of Harley Davidson aficionados, who mainly gather to celebrate their shared passion for motorcycles but who do not disdain illegal activities such as robberies and dealings with other organised crime groups. The first two such gangs in Sweden were the Bandidos MC and the Hells Angels, who established a system of local “sections” later copied by other competing groups.</p><p>Biker gangs provide a prime example of a parallel Swedish society: their members take pride in living outside of the mass society and often wear a star with the “1%” symbol to emphasise their identification as a minority. These gangs ended up fighting each other during the Great Nordic Biker Wars between 1994 and 1997, as a result of which the biker movement lost its hegemony, giving way to street gangs. Biker gangs continue to exist to date, but the threat they pose is marginal compared to street gangs.</p><p>Indeed, since the early 2000s Sweden has experienced a troubling growth in criminal activity by gangs with varying degrees of organisation based in predominantly migrant neighborhoods. At first glance, these dormitory blocks are decent and well-kept. Looking closely, however, you realize these areas lack supermarkets, cafes and leisure facilities and suffer from poor transport connections to the rest of the city, which effectively turns them into ghettos. The suburb of Rinkeby, near Stockholm, is a case in point. Separated from the more prosperous municipality of Sundyberg by a highway that forces a long detour to get to the other side, Rynkeby is like a gray island in a shimmering white sea. Another example of a multiethnic, marginal neighborhood is Rosengård, just outside of Malmo, famous for being the hometown of soccer star Zlatan Ibrahimovic.</p><p>Starting in 2015, the street gang phenomenon accelerated partly due to the massive intake of asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan, many of whom were unaccompanied minors. Left to their own devices, these children are particularly at risk of entering the destructive spiral of gangs, as they find in gangs an alternative to the family they no longer have.</p><p>The failure (or rather, absence) of an integration policy, however, is only one of the reasons why the street gang problem is so acute in Sweden today. Another is the dramatic increase in inequality in Swedish society over the past 30 years.</p><p>In his book “<em>Greedy Sweden: How the People’s Homeland Became a Haven for the Super-rich</em>,” journalist Andreas Cervenka explains the origins of this phenomenon. Beginning in the 1990s, Swedish governments abolished important redistributive taxes, such as wealth taxes, real estate taxes, and inheritance taxes. This decreased the tax burden for the better-off, allowing them to become even richer. As a result, the gap between the elite and the rest of the population took a steep increase. Today, Sweden is one of the countries with the highest number of billionaires per capita in the world, while nearly 15% of its population is economically fragile. Financial insecurity is increasingly visible not only among first- and second-generation immigrants, but also among Swedes. This is particularly evident in the City Missions that help the poor in urban areas. Indeed, in a recent interview with Euronews, Jonas Wihlstrand, secretary general of the association, stated that membership in social supermarkets has doubled compared to last year.</p><p>Another factor contributing to the increase in inequality is the privatization of public services such as education and health care, which has — ironically — taken place under social democratic governments. According to a school dean also interviewed by Euronews, the result of these reforms has been catastrophic for schools, especially in suburbs. Many children in deprived neighbourhoods do not go to kindergarten and therefore do not have the necessary foundations to enter first grade. The dropout rate in the senior year is very high because children find the final exam too difficult. For the dean, part of the problem is that in private schools only 30 to 40% of teachers have a bachelor’s degree, and that many of them inflate grades to prevent pupils from failing years, eventually causing them to arrive unprepared for senior year.</p><p>This means in turn that most gang members are poorly educated and have difficulty finding jobs outside the criminal world. Add to this prejudice against the residents of neighbourhoods with a criminal reputation, and it is easy to see why, growing up, many gang members see no alternative for their future. One young man interviewed on condition of anonymity by the Franco-German channel ARTE, for example, admitted having joined a gang when he was 15. At 29, he states that he is tired of gang life but has no idea how to get out of it.</p><h4>Alternatives</h4><p>Ways out do exist: in the city of Helsingborg, north of Malmo, several citizens have taken action to create them.</p><p>Nour Habib is a 30-year-old who grew up in Dahlem, one of the city’s most segregated neighbourhoods. Born in Iraq, he migrated to Sweden when he was 4 years old. As a teenager he chose the wrong company-in a criminal escalation, he turned first to vandalism, then to theft, robbery, and eventually to drug dealing. Drug dealing made him feel grown up and allowed him to hang out with older boys. Arrested during an armed robbery, however, Nour had to serve two and a half years in prison. His family disowned him, scarring him deeply. Upon his release in 2018, Nour decided to turn his life around. He launched an association called Trygg Rätt whose mission is to bring young people between the ages of 17 and 23 out of criminal circles. It does so through training and awareness-raising activities at the local level but also, and more importantly, by creating professional opportunities via a network of partner companies in the area. In the 2018–2022 period, Trygg Ratt managed to pull 63 of the 78 young men participating in its program out of crime and to find them regular employment. The organisation is active throughout Sweden, and young people can contact it directly through a form on its website-although Nour admits that most requests for help come via Instagram.</p><p>Instagram is a powerful channel to communicate with young people in Sweden. The policewoman Mona Ammar Persson knows it well. Of Lebanese descent but raised in the Soder area, Mona knows everyone in Helsingborg. When she joined the police a few years ago, she opened an instagram account to encourage other women to follow in her footsteps. Her approach: talking about her everyday work in an informal and accessible way and inviting followers to ask her questions. Today she has 27k followers and is a social media star for the kids in her neighbourhood.</p><p>Two of Mona’s childhood friends, brothers Omar and Hassan El Malli, are also striving to change things for the better. Omar studied sociology and criminology and now orients young people who are finishing school about their future. Many of those who do not join gangs want to become social workers or policemen. Hassan, on the other hand, works on the cultural aspect of the phenomenon: in his rap songs, he criticises rather than celebrates the gang lifestyle, especially highlighting the often understated phenomenon of violence against women in criminal environments.</p><h4>The way forward</h4><p>Laudable as they are, however, these efforts remain marginal without an adequate institutional response. Until a decade ago, Swedish authorities had difficulty even admitting the extent of the gang phenomenon. Now that serious accidents such as the murder of a policeman, the rise in explosions and the increased frequency of shootings in city centres have made the problem impossible to ignore, the state’s response remains inadequate. The ruling government, led by a moderate premier with the support of the far-right Sweden Democrats party, has put all its efforts into repression: a crackdown on migration policy, more severe punishment for young criminals, and a massive deployment of law enforcement. For policewoman Clarissa Seidou, who works in Rinkeby, focusing efforts on deportations of foreigners makes no sense: most of the suspects in her area were born in Sweden. Moreover, repression has little effect on gang boys — violence is normalized, neither death nor prison scares them. According to Clarissa, only collaboration between schools, police and social workers can pacify the neighborhood and bring young men back on track.</p><p>In conclusion, if Sweden wants to defeat gangs, it should stop tackling the symptoms and address the root causes of the problem: the growing social and economic marginalisation of an increasingly large part of the Swedish population.</p><h4>Sources</h4><p><a href="https://sociologiskforskning.se/sf/article/view/18237">https://sociologiskforskning.se/sf/article/view/18237</a></p><p><a href="https://www.arte.tv/it/videos/100300-010-A/re-sguardi-sulla-societa/">https://www.arte.tv/it/videos/100300-010-A/re-sguardi-sulla-societa/</a></p><p><a href="https://polisen.se/om-polisen/polisens-arbete/sprangningar-och-skjutningar/">https://polisen.se/om-polisen/polisens-arbete/sprangningar-och-skjutningar/</a></p><p><a href="https://ocindex.net/country/sweden">https://ocindex.net/country/sweden</a></p><p><a href="https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/gang-leaders-behind-stockholms-crime-wave-believed-to-be-overseas">https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/gang-leaders-behind-stockholms-crime-wave-believed-to-be-overseas</a></p><p><a href="https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/explosives-from-building-sites-used-in-bombings">https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/explosives-from-building-sites-used-in-bombings</a></p><p><a href="https://www.expressen.se/gt/krim/17-aring-misstanks-ha-skjutit-ihjal-polis--i-dag-faller-domen/">https://www.expressen.se/gt/krim/17-aring-misstanks-ha-skjutit-ihjal-polis--i-dag-faller-domen</a></p><p><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/country-governance/governance/sweden_en">https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/country-governance/governance/sweden_en</a> <a href="https://www.expressen.se/gt/krim/17-aring-misstanks-ha-skjutit-ihjal-polis--i-dag-faller-domen/">/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/hassan-21-rappar-om-mans-vald-mot-kvinnor-maste-ta-ansvar/">https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/hassan-21-rappar-om-mans-vald-mot-kvinnor-maste-ta-ansvar/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.tryggratt.se/">https://www.tryggratt.se/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.instagram.com/mona.a.persson/?hl=en">https://www.instagram.com/mona.a.persson/?hl=en</a></p><p><a href="https://m.facebook.com/lpohelsingborg/photos/a.1029642343719027/5327526200597265/">https://m.facebook.com/lpohelsingborg/photos/a.1029642343719027/5327526200597265/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/01/26/stockholm-bridge-row-exposes-the-bitter-divisions-fracturing-swedish-society">https://www.euronews.com/2023/01/26/stockholm-bridge-row-exposes-the-bitter-divisions-fracturing-swedish-society</a></p><p><a href="https://www.anews.com.tr/world/2023/01/27/swedish-police-make-arrests-in-crackdown-on-violent-gangs">https://www.anews.com.tr/world/2023/01/27/swedish-police-make-arrests-in-crackdown-on-violent-gangs</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/world/europe/sweden-crime-immigration-hand-grenades.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/world/europe/sweden-crime-immigration-hand-grenades.html</a></p><p><a href="https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/two-explosions-in-stockholm-five-suspects-in-custody">https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/two-explosions-in-stockholm-five-suspects-in-custody</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6050e3a6d52a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Pandora Papers explained]]></title>
            <link>https://agata-hidalgo.medium.com/pandora-papers-explained-6e1e5e01d82c?source=rss-25dcf6f0c20b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6e1e5e01d82c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[offshore-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pandora-papers]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Agata C. Hidalgo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 May 2023 14:11:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-02T20:45:17.014Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Global financial wealth stored in so-called “offshore” accounts corresponds to some 10% of the world’s GDP. While not illegal per se, offshore accounts are often used to hide proceeds from corruption, tax evasion and criminal activities. In this episode you’ll learn about the making, revelations and outcomes of the largest-ever journalistic investigation into offshore finance: the Pandora Papers.</em></p><blockquote>Listen to the podcast in English here and in Italian <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/2lzpcL3PVAhBSOIP9DyHs1?si=2f4e82a9e4de4edc">here</a>.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sbT8C7ou7FZ97HJQnO5xVA.png" /><figcaption>By Elisa Furlan for Bar Lume</figcaption></figure><h4>The investigation</h4><p>11.9 million documents. 600 journalists. 117 countries. The Pandora Papers are the largest collaborative investigation in the history of journalism. Released in October 2021, the Pandora Papers are a collection of documents revealing the wealth hidden by the earth’s powerful through a complex system of shell companies and offshore accounts managed via trusts in so-called “tax havens.”</p><p>Tax havens are jurisdictions where the tax rate is very low and the legal regime for financial activities very loose. Famous tax havens include Monaco, the Cayman Islands, and Fiji. In these countries, creating legal entities such as corporations and foundations is easy, and the checks that financial service providers have to make on the identity, activities, and origins of their clients’ assets are minimal. In addition, these countries do not participate in tax information exchange agreements with authorities in other jurisdictions and refuse international administrative cooperation. This makes tax havens perfect places for offshore finance, that is, the provision of financial services to people residing in other countries, especially those seeking secrecy for their transactions. Among offshore financial services, the creation of foundations and shell companies is particularly prominent.</p><p>Shell companies are empty legal entities, firms that produce nothing and only exist on paper to justify the transfer of funds from one account to another. This, in turn, helps hide the owners of the accounts and the origins of their capital in a completely legal manner. The ideal structure to establish and manage these shell companies are trusts. The Pandora Papers are the result of a massive leak of documents from 14 trusts scattered around several tax havens: Belize, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Dubai, the British Virgin Islands, Panama, the Seychelles and Switzerland. 7 more trusts were added to the Pandora Papers list in 2022.</p><p>The trust that suffered the largest leak (3.4 million documents) was the Trident Trust, a company founded in the British Virgin Islands in 1970. Like the other trusts involved in the investigation, its mission was managing the wealth of high-profile individuals from around the world. Such high profile individuals included politicians, public officials, businessmen, celebrities, but also criminals and terrorists.</p><p>Some of the names that have caused uproar are Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Jordan’s King Abdallah II, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Chinese entrepreneur Jack Ma, supermodel Claudia Schiffer, singer Shakira, and soccer coaches Ancelotti and Mancini. When we look at geographies, Russia, Brazil, the United Kingdom and Israel are the countries with the most millionaires involved, while Ukraine, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Honduras, Colombia and Nigeria dominate the politicians rankings.</p><p>It took 151 newspapers and 2 years of work to publish the Pandora Papers. Some of the most prominent media involved include The Washington Post, Le Monde and El Pais. The International Consortium for Investigative Journalism (ICIJ) ensured their coordination and is in charge of the maintenance of the database of the investigation, which is entirely public and free to access. The ICIJ was established in 1997 as a project of the Center for Public Integrity and became an independent nonprofit organization with headquarters in Washington DC in 2017. The ICIJ rose to international prominence in 2015 with the publication of the first-ever investigation into offshore finance, the Panama Papers. Two years later, the ICIJ made headlines again with another investigation, the Paradise Papers. What is so special about the Pandora Papers then?</p><h4>The revelations</h4><p>In Greek mythology, Pandora, whose name means “all gifts,” was the first mortal woman and one of Zeus’ weapons against the titans. After ordering Hephaestus to mould her, Zeus required all the other gods to give Pandora a gift. Zeus’ gift was a vase that he advised Pandora not to open. He then sent Pandora to earth to marry the titan Epimetheus, who did so despite his brother Prometheus’ warnings not to accept any gifts from Zeus. Shortly after the wedding, Pandora succumbed to curiosity: she opened the vase gifted to her by Zeus, releasing all the evils of the world on earth. Only hope, stuck in the hasty closing of the vase, could not get out.</p><p>The reason why the Pandora Papers caused such a stir is because they revealed three great “evils”.</p><p><strong>The first revelation of the Pandora Papers is that offshore finance, while formally legal, remains the go-to wealth management solution for criminals</strong>. Indeed, the loose regulations in tax havens have emboldened trust companies to accept convicted criminals, fugitives, wanted persons, people under investigation and sanctioned individuals among their clients. Italy provides two prime examples in this regard.</p><p>One is Camorra boss Raffaele Amato, aka “Lello Amato” or “a’ vecchiarella”, who has grown famous for inspiring the character of Salvatore Conte in the TV series “Gomorra.” A key player in the Secondigliano drug war of the early 2000s, Amato exploited offshore finance to launder drug proceeds through real estate investments in Spain, where he spent much of his criminal career. Here’s how.</p><p>Amato first deposited some 3 million euros from drug trafficking into the Banque Monegasque de Gestion in Monte Carlo using the name of his wife Elmelinda Pagano. He then entrusted the money to a management company also based in Monaco, Moores Rawland International. Amato’s alleged partners then gave a subsidiary of Moores Rawland, Radnor Investments SA of Panama, a mandate to subscribe 10,000 shares valued $1 USD each of another company, the Palm Tree Service Ltd, based in the British Virgin Islands. Palm Tree Service Ltd in turn entered into a trust agreement with the British company Starfield Investment Limited, which then acquired a Barcelona-based firm called Mer Vacanze Immobiliare. It was the latter that purchased, on Amato’s behalf, some plots of land in Andalusia. If you got lost in all the steps the money went through don’t worry: this is exactly what money laundering is about.</p><p>Another criminal case is that of the neo-fascist terrorist Delfo Zorzi. His story-and the fortune he made from offshore finance- could be the plot of a movie. Convicted in 1968 for possession of weapons and explosives, Zorzi ended up in the suspects list for the Piazza Fontana massacre that took place in Milan in 1969. To escape capture, Zorzi fled to Japan, where he married a wealthy heiress, obtained Japanese citizenship and changed his name into Hagen Roi. The new identity enabled him to avoid an international arrest warrant issued in 1997 and to create a business empire completely undisturbed. Indeed, the Pandora Papers, and in particular documents from Alcogal, a trust firm from Panama, identified him as the owner of the Thor Trust, a shell company run by another trust, the Swiss firm Fidinam. To further add secrecy, the trust was formally run by a “protector” that is, a representative who allowed Zorzi to remain anonymous. Such a protector was a lawyer called Giorgio Spiess, famous in Italy for defending the leader of the P2 Masonic lodge. Starting 2009, Zorzi’s Thor Trust has acted as treasury for six other offshore companies, all of which can be traced back to Hagen Roi, Zorzi’s Japanese identity. These six companies are scattered among the Isle of Man, Madeira, Cyprus, Panama and Luxembourg and control, sometimes through representatives, clothing brands in Italy, Sweden and other European countries.</p><p>In 2004 a Supreme Court ruling acquitted Zorzi for the Piazza Fontana massacre, but confirmed his responsibility for two other bombings, fortunately without casualties, carried out against the Slovenian minority in Italy in the 1960s. This, however, has had no impact on his life or wealth.</p><p><strong>The second revelation of the Pandora Papers is that offshore actors have become increasingly good at walking the fine line between legality and illegality.</strong> If the revelations of the Panama Papers brought down entire governments (that of Iceland for instance), the Pandora Papers have proven insufficient to bring about convictions or at least push powerful men to resign.</p><p>A prime example is Ecuador’s President Guillermo Lasso, who was linked by the Pandora Papers to 10 trust companies between Panama and the United States. Holding offshore companies is illegal for candidates and public officials under Ecuadorian law. However, Lasso declared he was no owner, shareholder or beneficiary of any of the companies involved in the Pandora Papers investigation and that any use he made of international entities before becoming president was legitimate. Today, most of the companies linked to him have been dissolved and Lasso remains in power.</p><p>Another example is that of Abdul Daim bin Daim Zainuddin, a wealthy Malaysian businessman who also served as Minister of Finance. The Pandora Papers revealed his and his family members’ involvement in as many as 12 trusts. His sons, for example, control two shell companies that own properties worth several million in London. Daim Zainuddin denies any wrongdoing by claiming he has always correctly declared his offshore companies and paid the due taxes. To date, no formal charges have been brought against him.</p><p><strong>The third and most surprising revelation of the Pandora Papers is that the engine of the global financial system, the United States, is also a tax haven</strong>. Indeed, the Pandora Papers have uncovered the existence of 206 trust companies scattered among South Dakota, Florida, Delaware, Texas, Nevada and Alaska. Many of these entities have sprung out of a massive wave of financial liberalization driven by local lawmakers persuaded that a loose regulatory framework would attract foreign investment and create jobs in otherwise marginal states like South Dakota and Alaska. While foreign capital has arrived, it has not produced the desired effects on growth and employment. Worse still, these reforms have left the United States in an awkward position vis-à-vis their international partners: while the United States requires other jurisdictions to share information about U.S. citizens holding accounts abroad, they refuses to do the same with foreigners who control offshore accounts on their soil.</p><h4>The challenges ahead</h4><p>Contrary to what these stories seem to suggest, holding offshore accounts, companies or foundations is not a crime, not even if they are in a tax haven. However, it is undeniable that the secrecy and lack of oversight of the offshore financial system facilitate tax evasion, money laundering, corruption, and allow criminals and wanted persons to move capital undisturbed.</p><p>Without the involvement of the United States, who play an outsized role in global finance, putting an end to this system seems impossible. In 2014, the United States refused to join an international agreement supported by more than 100 jurisdictions, including other tax havens such as the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg, on the sharing of information about offshore account holders in their territory. There seems to be no willingness to address the issue domestically either. Foreigners who own shell companies in the United States are in fact exempt from a recent transparency law that requires trusts to declare the identity of their clients. On top of that, trust managers in the United States have no obligation to verify the origins of their clients’ funds, making them a perfect destination for money laundering. Lastly, the Enablers Act, a law proposed in reaction to the Pandora Papers to force trusts, lawyers and art dealers to verify the profile of clients who intend to bring capital into the United States, was blocked by the Senate in December 2022.</p><p>Should we simply surrender to the existence of a parallel and opaque financial system? No. Some of the investigations initiated thanks to the Pandora Papers are still ongoing. It’s the case, for example, of the probe into the purchase of a villa on the French Riviera by the former Czech prime minister Andrej Babiš through a series of shell companies based in Monaco and the United States. This kind of investigation has the potential to demonstrate that offshore finance is being systematically used to commit financial crimes and thus increase political pressure to drastically overhaul the system. Perhaps we should reopen Pandora’s box- this time to unleash the hope that remained trapped inside.</p><h4><strong>Sources</strong></h4><p><a href="https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/AJZ2018.pdf">https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/AJZ2018.pdf</a></p><p><a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/">https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/secrecy-brokers/">https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/secrecy-brokers/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/global-investigation-tax-havens-offshore/">https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/global-investigation-tax-havens-offshore/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2022/08/12/pandora-papers-france-opens-investigation-into-former-czech-pm-andrej-babis_5993339_8.html">https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2022/08/12/pandora-papers-france-opens-investigation-into-former-czech-pm-andrej-babis_5993339_8.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.euractiv.fr/section/justice-affaires-interieures/news/france-continues-to-investigate-babis/">https://www.euractiv.fr/section/justice-affaires-interieures/news/france-continues-to-investigate-babis/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6e1e5e01d82c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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