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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Andrew Small on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Bombard the Headquarters” — China and the Liberal Order]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/out-of-order/bombard-the-headquarters-china-and-the-liberal-order-9bd501293f0b?source=rss-269b9aa2ff06------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Small]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Apr 2017 19:49:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-04T19:50:27.389Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>“Bombard the Headquarters” — China and the Liberal Order</h3><h4>What to read ahead of the Xi-Trump summit</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/973/1*IdHYQ-cgi3I3baDxqkYsYw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Typically, the visit of a Chinese leader to the United States provides the stage for analysts to reflect on the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to defend the liberal international order against China’s challenge.</p><p>Not this time.</p><p>With the Trump administration weakening its commitments to crucial pillars of the liberal order, and in some areas even threatening to overturn them, the lead-up to Xi Jinping’s Florida trip has elicited commentary of a different flavor. As François Godement notes in a <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/expanded_ambitions_shrinking_achievements_how_china_sees_the_global_order">recent report</a> for ECFR:</p><blockquote>The election of Trump and the rise of populist and anti-globalization forces in the West might signal a paradigm shift on the issue of China and the global order. Just two or three years ago, questions about the future of the global order centered on China’s potential contributions or challenges to it. Today, the world finds itself asking whether China could step in to lead, and what that would mean.</blockquote><p>Most of the analysis by leading China hands around Xi Jinping’s Swiss outing in January, when his Davos and Geneva speeches placed the question of China’s leadership role firmly on the table, was scathing. One elegantly excoriating <a href="http://https/www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-01-22/beijing-no-champion-globalization">take</a> by Liz Economy on China’s credentials as a “champion of globalization” concludes with the warning that:</p><blockquote>Global leadership has to be earned on merit, not simply granted in desperation and hope. The world must recognize that globalization with Chinese characteristics is not globalization at all.</blockquote><p>Yet Xi’s achievement — and Trump’s failure — has been in the reframing of the debate.</p><p>Last year there was an emerging consensus among Western policymakers not only that Chinese behavior in an assortment of trade and economic fields was undermining confidence in the global economic system, but that an exceptional response was required. Economists and businesspeople who once physically recoiled every time they heard the word “reciprocity ” were reluctantly becoming its advocates when it came to dealing with China.</p><blockquote>The Trump administration has achieved the implausible feat of making the United States appear the greater potential threat to the open global trade order than China — at least temporarily.</blockquote><p>Some analysts even pinned the big illiberal upsets of 2016 on Chinese trade practices. A series of <a href="http://www.ddorn.net/papers/Autor-Dorn-Hanson-ChinaShock.pdf">papers</a> by Autor, Dorn and Hanson looked at the impact of the “China shock” on the U.S. presidential election and the ideological composition of the House of Representatives, methodology that was replicated by <a href="http://https/www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/07/the-real-reason-the-u-k-voted-for-brexit-economics-not-identity/?utm_term=.97ccdbdd07f4">Colantone and Stanig</a> in their analysis of its role in the Brexit vote. The conclusion in each case: the Chinese import surge had a crucial part to play in tipping the balance of public opinion. But with all of the Trump administration’s talk of “economic nationalism”, outright protectionism, withdrawal from TPP, and threats to the WTO, it has achieved the implausible feat of making the United States appear the greater potential threat to the open global trade order than China — at least temporarily.</p><p>Clearly no-one is being fooled into thinking that China has transmogrified into a paragon of anti-protectionist virtue. An <a href="http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2080484/china-must-defend-globalisation-deeds-and-not-just-words%20">op-ed </a>by the German ambassador to Beijing captures the current tone — taking advantage of Xi’s “pro-globalization” language to push China on its commitments, while continuing to note the many aspects of Chinese behavior that are wildly inconsistent with this stance. But it gloomily notes that while “the future of US policy is unclear…it would be a huge surprise to see it morph into a champion of multilateralism” and as a result, “Germany, as well as the EU, is ready to intensify cooperation with China in order to keep globalization going”.</p><p><em>The Economist’s</em> visit <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/china/21719828-xi-jinping-talks-china-solution-without-specifying-what-means-china-challenging?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/tortoisevhareischinachallengingtheunitedstatesforgloballeadership">preview</a>, in unpacking the new terms of art that followed Xi’s speeches — the “two guides” and the “China solution” — explains why China suddenly looks so appealing, despite the obvious caveats:</p><blockquote>China is a revisionist power, wanting to expand influence within the system. It is neither a revolutionary power bent on overthrowing things, nor a usurper, intent on grabbing global control.</blockquote><p>In normal conditions, elements of that revisionism are a profound concern. During a period of populist insurgencies and deep uncertainty about the direction of US foreign policy, it is the fact that China is not a “revolutionary power” that becomes more salient. This is an argument I explore in more detail in previous piece for <em>Out of Order, </em>the “<a href="https://medium.com/out-of-order/the-counter-enlightenment-and-the-great-powers-5a472dcd2f13">Great Powers and the Counter-Enlightenment</a>”.</p><blockquote>Beijing has an opening to consolidate a strengthened position for itself in the global order.</blockquote><p>If the Trump administration’s foreign and economic policy takes on a more predictable and traditional quality, that would almost certainly shift, but with nervous U.S. friends and allies discreetly hedging their bets, it is clear that Beijing has an opening to consolidate a strengthened position for itself in the global order. In the past, China has not always been very adept at taking advantage of these opportunities. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, for instance, instead of consolidating a reputation as a new pillar of the global system, Beijing’s <a href="http://https/www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/4.13.11Small.pdf">hubristic and assertive</a> behavior magnified the sense among many actors that it was a growing threat. This time, in fields ranging from <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/14/china-south-korea-join-tpp-members-in-trade-talks.html">trade</a> to <a href="http://https/www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/asia/trump-climate-change-paris-china.html">climate</a> to <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/29/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/trumps-policies-trade-climate-u-n-push-china-toward-eu/">the UN</a>, China is playing its hand more effectively.</p><p>One area in which China would still expect to find itself on the wrong side of a dividing line from the United States and its like-minded allies is democracy and human rights. Ahead of the Xi visit, however, the Trump administration has abdicated the traditional U.S. position on these issues too. Its <a href="http://https/www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/22/eleven-countries-signed-a-letter-slamming-china-for-torturing-lawyers-the-u-s-did-not/?utm_term=.62f51834ad82">unwillingness</a> to sign on to a recent letter from embassies in Beijing, over claims that lawyers and human rights activists were tortured in detention, was another striking illustration.</p><p>A couple of visit previews contend that this decoupling of liberalism from U.S. China policy may have benign consequences. Orville Schell argues, in his <a href="http://https/www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-once-and-future-democracy-1490977327?utm_source=The+Sinocism+China+Newsletter&amp;utm_campaign=1da16d4bdb-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_01&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_171f237867-1da16d4bdb-25977941&amp;mc_cid=1da16d4bdb&amp;mc_eid=79b7b7e372">article</a> on China’s democratic legacy, that:</p><blockquote>Paradoxically, with the new U.S. president seemingly disinclined to exert public pressure on Beijing about democracy and the rule of law, the Chinese themselves may be better able to find their own voice on these issues.</blockquote><p>This is explored further in a <a href="http://https/www.lawfareblog.com/what-trump-presidency-means-china">piece</a> by Taisu Zhang, which contends that “if a Trump presidency takes ‘liberalism’ out of the perceived ‘West,’ then it is not inconceivable that there can be some room for intellectual reconciliation between Chinese nationalism and liberalism.”</p><p>That seems overly optimistic given the Communist Party-sized obstacle to a rebirth of Chinese liberalism. But it is illustrative of an unusual degree of flux in the ideological terrain that is leaving many people uncertain whose side they are on. A particularly vivid exploration of these issues comes in Chris Buckley’s <a href="http://https/www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/world/asia/maoists-for-trump-in-china-fans-admire-his-nationalist-views.html?_r=0">look</a> at how the neo-Maoists in China are navigating the new world of Trump, populism, and a Chinese leader seeking to grab the pro-globalization mantle:</p><blockquote>Some Maoists say Mr. Trump also offers a model. They think he led a populist revolt that humbled a corrupt political establishment not unlike what they see in China. They cheer his incendiary tactics, sometimes likening them to Mao’s methods. And they hear in his remarks an echo of their own disgust with Western democracy, American interventionism and liberal political values…</blockquote><blockquote>…Many Maoists see Mr. Xi as a fellow traveler who is taking China in the right direction by restoring respect for Mao and Marx. But others say privately that even Mr. Xi may not be a dependable ally. They point out that he has promoted himself abroad as a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/business/dealbook/world-economic-forum-davos-china-xi-globalization.html">proponent of expanding global trade</a> and a friend of multinational corporations, drawing an implicit contrast with Mr. Trump.</blockquote><p>CNN takes the Mao comparison further, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/03/asia/china-us-trump-xi-mao-analysis/">interviewing</a> analysts who see a “silver lining in Trump’s ‘Maoist’ mentality”:</p><blockquote>For too long, they argue, the Communist leadership in Beijing has been taking advantage of successive administrations in Washington — benefiting from an open global trade system advocated by the U.S., and then using its rising economic might to reinforce an authoritarian political system at home and fund its strategic expansion abroad… “Trump may be …illogical or clueless about politics, but he knows that things have to change — and the only way to do so is through unconventional means. As he turns the world upside down, China must feel nervous.”</blockquote><p>But U.S. friends and allies feel nervous too. And if the strange role reversal between the United States and China on their commitment to the maintenance of critical pillars of a stable global order persists, Beijing may face a new set of burdens but it is also poised to reap many of the political rewards.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9bd501293f0b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/out-of-order/bombard-the-headquarters-china-and-the-liberal-order-9bd501293f0b">“Bombard the Headquarters” — China and the Liberal Order</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/out-of-order">Out of Order</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Counter-Enlightenment and the Great Powers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/out-of-order/the-counter-enlightenment-and-the-great-powers-5a472dcd2f13?source=rss-269b9aa2ff06------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[enlightenment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Small]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Mar 2017 14:19:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-14T22:22:45.085Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>China, Europe, Russia and the new geopolitical dividing line</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*5g88AxBxR54wcACtc_8bHw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Whatever the differences between European and U.S. policymakers in recent decades, there was little doubt that the two sides were operating on the basis of shared Enlightenment values, however loosely defined.</p><p>Even at the peak of the rifts over the Iraq war, the very vehemence of the fights gave them the quality of a vicious family feud. Institutionalists, liberal interventionists, neo-conservatives, and other competing keepers of the universalist flame largely argued over how, rather than whether, liberal democratic principles should be defended and advanced, even if they were not always willing to credit the motives of their opponents at the time.</p><p>Since the election of Donald Trump, transatlantic differences have had very little intra-familial feel. Confusion and deep unease, rather than anger, has been the prevailing response in Europe. While much of this is focused on Trump himself, European policymakers have also sought to discern the intentions of those in the new administration who are capable of pursuing a coherent agenda amid the chaos. This has not proved a reassuring exercise. While evidently there are cabinet secretaries and senior officials who represent the mainstream U.S. foreign policy tradition, the political DNA for the figures who have most effectively channeled the president’s instincts is not just illiberal but explicitly counter-Enlightenment in nature: nativist, ethno-nationalist, anti-rationalist, and avowedly hostile to international institutions, the intelligentsia, and a list of enemies that has been a trope of reactionary political movements since the early nineteenth century.</p><p>Unlike the conservative political tradition that it disdains for being too accommodating, this form of politics is professedly revolutionary. In common with their counterparts in Russia and on the European far-right, its advocates want to roll back progressive social change, overthrow “globalist” institutions, and brandish “the will of people” against the legal and political obstacles to populist illiberalism. They also maintain a darkly symbiotic relationship with another group of revolutionary believers in an imagined, utopian past: Islamist extremists, who function as the legitimizing excuse for much of their behavior, and whose message of civilizational conflict they mirror and magnify.</p><blockquote>For those who see the EU as the Enlightenment institution <em>par excellence…</em> the prospect of the United States colluding with the forces that want to destroy it is not treated lightly.</blockquote><p>For European policymakers, this constellation of counter-Enlightenment forces represents a threat. While debates about NATO, U.S. alliance commitments, and European defense spending have naturally proliferated in recent months, it is the U.S. approach to the European Union that serves as the litmus test of whether Europe now faces a hostile ideological agenda. For those who see the EU as the Enlightenment institution <em>par excellence</em>, a peace project that has kept the continent from being dragged down by the ghosts of its past, the prospect of the United States colluding with the forces that want to destroy it is not treated lightly. This was recently dramatized by Wolfgang Ischinger, the sober-minded former German ambassador to the United States, who stated that if Washington were to drop its traditional posture of backing European integration to press for other countries to follow the UK’s example, it “would amount to a kind of non-military declaration of war. It would mean conflict between Europe and the United States”.</p><p>The hope is evidently that, beyond occasional dinners with Nigel Farage and cheerleading from a few figures in the White House, no such effort will be seriously pursued. There are still grounds for thinking that it will prove possible for Europeans to work with more mainstream elements in the administration and Congress to curtail President Trump’s wilder policy excesses, and continue cooperation on many shared areas of interest. In any case, there is every prospect that any “anti-EU” agenda would be ineptly pursued, whether because it is predicated on a fantasy of Europe as a terrorism-wracked continent plagued with “no-go zones” or simply because it is informed by a very limited understanding of how European politics and the EU itself actually work. European policymakers were unclear, for instance, whether early efforts by the administration to undercut EU authority over trade policy by proposing bilateral deals with member states were a product of ignorance or of incompetent attempts at trouble-making. Less amateur efforts could prove counter-productive anyway, doing more to catalyze resistance and taint by association than to provide ballast to the populist cause. Brexit and Trump have already proved a boon in opinion polls for many moderate, pro-European forces who are aghast at what they see in the old heartlands of liberalism and Enlightenment values.</p><p>But clearly none of this can be taken for granted, and the anxiety for Europe lies precisely in the fact that the raw material is there for a bleaker set of outcomes. In Brexit, Europeans have already watched a xenophobic, slyly misleading political campaign, based on hostility to elites and foreigners, emerge from the right-wing fringes to catalyze the withdrawal of a major EU member state. “Illiberal democracies” in Central Europe have established themselves within the EU’s borders with no effective sanction. There are significant elections to ride out this year and, despite Germany’s impressively resilient political center and promising dynamics in France, even victories will result in more of a sense of buying time than of having found long-term solutions to the social and political challenges that are roiling western democracies and the EU itself. Clearly the most important dynamics are internal: the rise of populist and far-right parties reflects trends that long predate Trump, Brexit, or “neo-reactionary thought”, and will persist regardless of them. But external, state-backed forces can play an important role at the margins, as Russian involvement in the U.S. elections has already demonstrated. And at worst, right-wing populist movements could gain a considerable boost from a combination of direct practical support and a set of U.S. policies specifically conceived to mesh with their agenda.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/1*Ayafu2J6IU8uSfa6PzSGPg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Moreover, the risks to Europe of a counter-Enlightenment agenda being run out of the White House are not limited to its EU-specific elements. There have been significant concerns about the dangers that U.S. policies may pose to a global trade order that was consciously forged with the lessons of the 1930s in mind. Whatever trade strategy the United States decides to adopt towards Europe itself, if the self-described “economic nationalists” win out, the administration’s broader approach to trade deficits, supply-chains, and the WTO could pose a serious threat to the economic system on which European prosperity is based. Add to this the prospect of United States unraveling the Paris climate deal (<em>de facto</em> if not formally), rolling back the regulations that had been designed to prevent another financial crisis, and a host of still-undetermined risks stemming from the proclivities of various figures in the administration for confrontation with the Islamic world, and the list of potential challenges is daunting.</p><p>Europe’s strategic choices look different as a result. The question most often posed since November is that of how Europeans can maintain the liberal international order in the absence of a committed U.S. partner. The answers given are some variant of working quietly with other like-minded democracies and sympathetic parts of the U.S. administration to hold things together for four years until a more normal U.S. presidency can pick things up again. It is not an answer that is ever given with total conviction though. In theory, the resources of the leading democracies — militarily and financially — add up to some impressive totals if collectively marshaled. But aside from the clear difficulties in doing so, in present circumstances most of those countries have less ambitious goals than the maintenance of a liberal order at the global level. For many Europeans, sustaining liberal democracy at home, staving off direct security threats, holding the EU together, and ensuring that the broader global economic and security order doesn’t deteriorate too markedly would be accomplishment enough in the next four years. And inevitably, a major part of the debate in Europe about how to support this more limited agenda has been about China.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/825/1*ESVwxzPp2hIQi8CmiBE5YQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>It is easy to be dismissive of Beijing’s efforts to position itself as the savior of globalization and the international order in the aftermath of the U.S. presidential election. From Lima to Davos to Munich, Chinese trade negotiators, foreign policy officials, and Xi Jinping himself have been showing up with the same underlying message: at a time of radical uncertainty, China is going to be one of the few grown-ups left in the room. For China hands from across the political spectrum, the whole effort appears ludicrous. They point to the rich varieties of Chinese protectionism as among the root causes of the backlash against globalization, to Xi Jinping’s political repression and burgeoning personality cult, to China’s military expansionism in the South China Sea, to the stoking of nationalism, to censorship, surveillance, and a litany of other credibility-shredding issues. Indeed, for certain commentators who subscribe to the “Enlightenment versus counter-Enlightenment” mode of analysis, China is self-evidently on the wrong side:</p><blockquote>“Nietzschean thinking is back in the form of Vladimir Putin. Marxian thinking is back in the form of an aggressive China. Both Russia and China are trying to harvest the benefits of the Enlightenment order, but they also want to break the rules when they feel like it. They incorporate deep strains of anti-Enlightenment thinking and undermine the post-Enlightenment world order.” — <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/opinion/the-enlightenment-project.html">David Brooks, New York Times</a></blockquote><p>There are certainly frameworks within which this conflation of Russia and China makes sense. Both powers have been challenging elements of the “rules-based” international order, whether blatantly in Crimea or more incrementally in the South China Sea. Both have authoritarian governments that see liberal forces as an acute danger to them and act in concert to push back against international efforts to promote human rights and democracy. There is no credible account in which China is the defender of a “liberal” international order, nor does it purport to be. But in the current geopolitical context — and particularly when seen from Europe — the Enlightenment framework tends to illuminate the differences rather than the similarities between the two powers. Simply, Russia acts as a proselytizing counter-Enlightenment power, where China does not.</p><blockquote>Even as China advances its own version of national exceptionalism, it wants a global system that works, and the institutions that underpin it to hold together.</blockquote><p>To take only a few of the most obvious examples: Chinese cyber-capabilities are not deployed to subvert western elections and undermine confidence in democratic political systems. China does not finance, host, support or direct its propaganda outlets to back extremist parties. Beijing sees the rise of populist forces as more of a threat than an opportunity, given their propensity for upending the global economic order on which its rise depends. It is not part of a common “traditionalist” agenda to roll back LGBTQ or women’s rights. It engages in no anti-semitic dabblings. It has no interest in “civilizational conflict”. It doesn’t flirt with climate change denial. Even as China advances its own version of national exceptionalism, it wants a global system that works, and the institutions that underpin it to hold together. At the peak of the financial crisis, when Russia was urging China to dump its holdings in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to put further stress on Washington, Beijing wanted nothing to do with it. China undoubtedly takes advantage of divisions between EU member states to advance its own interests, but it has been supportive of European integration, and takes the EU and its institutional architecture seriously. China has played a constructive role at moments of real fragility for the European project, whether through its public stance against Brexit or its behavior in the bond markets during the eurozone crisis.</p><p>For the sake of not overloading this blog with debates about the May Fourth Movement, Marxism, Leibniz, Voltaire, enlightened despotism, and the current state of the Chinese Communist Party, I will not delve into the far more complex question of whether it makes sense to think of China as an Enlightenment power. Even today, there are credulity-stretching efforts to hold China up as a latter-day Confucian meritocracy of the sort that fired the imaginations of early European Enlightenment thinkers, which it evidently isn’t. The argument is more modest: during a period of reactionary, insurgent threats, China is not a power that sees the Enlightenment project as its enemy and the political challenges facing the west as an opportune moment to overturn the system.</p><p>As a result, in Europe there is now a quiet debate underway about what the relationship with Beijing should look like in this new era. This debate is, for the moment, still secondary to a broader set of questions about how Europe should navigate a world in which the Anglo-American spine of the liberal order has buckled. There is almost certainly not going to be a repeat of the sort of episode we saw back in 2004, when the EU contemplated lifting the arms embargo it had imposed after Tiananmen. Even if there was no intention on the part of European leaders at the time actually to sell weapons to Beijing, the whole process was infused with a degree of naivety about what sort of power China was becoming and Europe’s capacity to influence its trajectory. That naivety is absent in Europe today. Even as the EU’s trade commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, makes statements about “fighting protectionism together” with China, there are simultaneous efforts to press ahead with Europe-wide CFIUS mechanisms to address the risks of Chinese investments in strategic sectors. The EU has been beefing up its trade defense instruments to deal with Chinese industrial overcapacity. Just as in the United States, there has been much talk of “reciprocity” as a guiding principle.</p><blockquote>The abiding hope [is that] in four years, the Europeans will have their closest partner back.</blockquote><p>In the security sphere, the failure to secure unanimous consent for a convincing EU statement after last year’s arbitral tribunal ruling on the South China Sea was disappointing, but stemmed largely from the behavior of governments on the margins of EU politics; the mainstream European consensus on the issue was clear. There are no illusions about what is going on in Xi’s China either, whether for Chinese citizens, European companies, or extra-territorially abducted Europeans. In normal circumstances, this would a period in which U.S.-European cooperation in navigating many of these issues was moving ahead. And aside from the underlying principles at stake, no-one in Europe is going to make any precipitous moves with China while the credibility of American security guarantees, and the Atlantic alliance itself, seems to hang in the balance. Any harm inflicted on it will not come from pre-emptive moves in Berlin or Brussels but from actions taken in Washington. The abiding hope remains that these will not be as damaging as advertised, and that in four years, the Europeans will have their closest partner back.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*IFKJnv7vU016_kNr-zJ6Iw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Yet, with all these caveats noted, there is no doubt that on a series of existential issues for Europe, ranging from the global trade order to climate change, from the future of the EU to the future of liberal democracy in Europe, there is a real need for partners who can be counted on to follow basically rational principles and not actively seek to subvert the existing system. This is a low bar, but it is not obvious that the United States under a Trump presidency clears it. And as a result, there is now the prospect that Europeans will discreetly shift emphasis in the next few years from working with the United States to sustain a liberal international order — as they would wish — to working with whichever powers can help stave off the counter-Enlightenment forces that currently look like the most potent threat to Europe’s future. At present, they see Russia acting as an unambiguously counter-Enlightenment power; the United States engaged in an internal struggle over whether counter-Enlightenment elements will get to pursue their agenda in government; and China — an illiberal power, yes, an authoritarian power, yes, but not a counter-Enlightenment one. And if the wrong side wins the policy battles in Washington, the division over Enlightenment principles could prove to be the geopolitical fault-line that matters.</p><p><em>This is the first installment in a new Medium publication called Out of Order. Follow us for more analysis on the liberal international order and the forces challenging it.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5a472dcd2f13" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/out-of-order/the-counter-enlightenment-and-the-great-powers-5a472dcd2f13">The Counter-Enlightenment and the Great Powers</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/out-of-order">Out of Order</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor — the Unanswered Questions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ajwsmall/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-the-unanswered-questions-b9633a7115c2?source=rss-269b9aa2ff06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b9633a7115c2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[one-belt-one-road]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Small]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Oct 2016 18:40:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-18T18:40:07.218Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was interviewed on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by Zofeen Ebrahim, for The Third Pole, which you can read <a href="https://www.thethirdpole.net/2016/10/13/cpec-and-major-unanswered-questions/">here</a>. That interview was well edited, and also features interesting answers to the questions from Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center. In case of interest, though, below is the lengthier version of the answers I gave.</p><p><strong>1. Despite a national level consensus over CPEC, why does distrust (mistrust) persist among political parties, provinces, the media and even the people?</strong></p><p>CPEC is an initiative with substantial political, economic and strategic implications for Pakistan, yet there have been many unknown elements to it, whether it comes to the financing, the sequencing, the beneficiaries and even basic questions about which projects are really moving forward. In that sense, some level of mistrust is inevitable. While it isn’t possible to be completely transparent about every single detail of every deal, both the Pakistani government and the Chinese government could have done more to address the opacity around the scheme. There is politics in play too though: some provinces want a bigger share of the pie, some people want angles to attack the government, some want more of a say over how CPEC proceeds, and so on. The situation has improved since the start of 2016, both in terms of the information being released and the reduced intensity of the political infighting, but the stakes around it around high and I suspect that battles over the spoils, the credit, and the blame are never going to stop entirely.</p><p><strong>2. Is this bickering coming in the way of the smooth execution of the various projects under CPEC? What should be done to gain a genuine support from all?</strong></p><p>The bickering has not been helpful — it has been a major source of concern for the Chinese, who don’t want to be embroiled in political controversy and who have encouraged the government to do more to bring the provinces along. It initially made it harder to push plans forward in places such as K-P, and at points it has even resulted in a problematic level of uncertainty around the entire initiative. But the implementation challenges are now more about bureaucratic capacity and effective coordination than the political fights that clouded the first year. This is a mammoth undertaking and neither the Chinese side nor the Pakistani side have attempted anything quite like it.</p><p>In Pakistan, although the Planning Commission has a central role, much of the process is split between different ministries and decision-makers, with a number of ensuing turf battles, and despite the establishment of a CPEC committee, there’s still a sense that the whole thing is essentially a government initiative rather than one where national consensus is the paramount consideration. While there is much that is the prerogative of the elected government of the day, given the very long-term nature of the CPEC plans, there’s more of an onus than usual to build and maintain broad-based consent for the details of the scheme rather than just its general thrust. Implementation isn’t just a national-level issue though — privately, the Chinese side are critical of the fact that certain provinces that have made a lot of noise about the lack of investments coming their way have lagged behind others when it comes to doing their homework on their projects, for instance on land acquisition.</p><p><strong>3. What can China do to crease out these differences?</strong></p><p>The Chinese side could certainly help on the transparency issue, which would make a significant difference to perceptions. The Pakistani government often gets blamed for the secrecy around some of the projects but Pakistani officials are actually often quite eager to showcase some of them — the caution in a number of these cases comes from the Chinese government and Chinese companies. In general, Beijing would like to see a smoother implementation process, and an entity that resembles a “one-stop shop” for CPEC rather than the more diffuse arrangements that are currently in place — but it’s ultimately it’s a Pakistani decision how to manage a complex national project like this. Chinese officials have nudged the government to put new mechanisms in place but they need to tread a little carefully to ensure that it’s not just a way to circumvent the normal political process around an initiative like this. And a venture like CPEC is new for them too — the Chinese bureaucracy has faced its own challenges, from the approvals process to the flood of private firms that arrived to bid for projects in Pakistan. They’ve put vast, comprehensive investment packages of this sort in place at home but never abroad, on this scale and speed — they’re learning.</p><p><strong>4. Should there be an independent and autonomous CPEC authority?</strong></p><p>Many of the decisions around CPEC are inherently political in nature and so the elected civilian government should naturally have a leading role — it can’t just be hived off to a fully independent and autonomous body to make the critical calls. But a body that that can drive a more effective and inclusive implementation process, incorporating a role for the military and a role for the provinces, would have advantages for all sides, and could be maintained on a long-term basis. There is some concern that an “independent authority” is just code for taking the control away from the civilian government entirely — it would depend how it was constituted, who chaired and ran it and so on, but that needn’t and shouldn’t be the case.</p><p><strong>5. Should CPEC’s security be handled by the army? There are rumours if the PM does not relent, it could lead to him having to step down. Pls comment.</strong></p><p>CPEC consists of a wide array of projects, and the security measures required will vary considerably — some of them necessitate direct army protection, others may benefit from the army’s involvement in security planning. It appears that the Chinese are keen to have the army hard-wired into virtually all of the projects, given how central their security concerns are and the level of trust that they have for the army as an institution. Over the long-term though, it’s clearly not desirable for anyone if every road, power plant, and industrial park requires military protection. There are already plans for a second Special Security Division for CPEC protection, which adds up to a remarkably large number of personnel all in — around 30,000. There may be need for “iron-clad” security in the short-to-medium term but ultimately the CPEC projects will have to be more normalized if the Chinese and other investors are going to feel entirely comfortable. I doubt the rumours, but I would note — purely hypothetically — that, were anything like that to happen, it would be reputationally disastrous for China. If the flagship project of Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” initiative was directly tied to a weakening of civilian rule in Pakistan, there would be serious questions for many other governments around the world about their own involvement, and all the more so if China was seen to have provided even tacit encouragement.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b9633a7115c2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China is not “the winner of Brexit”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ajwsmall/china-is-not-the-winner-of-brexit-3bba736cf474?source=rss-269b9aa2ff06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3bba736cf474</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Small]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jul 2016 02:40:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-07T17:58:35.143Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>And the rash of articles suggesting that it is are misguided.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_JMxQ9At-2n4_MXn5OIeEw.jpeg" /></figure><p>I hadn’t intended to write on this topic: the situation in London is still in considerable flux, making long-term prognostications about China, Europe and the UK at best difficult. But there have been a spate of “the winner of Brexit is China!” articles since the vote (see e.g. <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-24/china-could-be-the-biggest-winner-from-brexit">here</a>, <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/06/27-brexit-aftermath-chinas-rise-dollar">here</a>, <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-china-is-a-potential-brexit-winner/">here</a>, and <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/how-china-can-benefit-from-brexit/">here</a>) that are misplaced. Other pieces that more accurately characterize China’s reaction have been published too (see e.g. <a href="https://strifeblog.org/2016/06/25/what-brexit-means-for-uk-china-ties/">here</a>, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/30/china-britain-and-brexit-vote-to-leave-eu-robs-golden-relationship-of-its-lustre">here</a>, and <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-27/xi-s-cameron-bromance-all-for-nothing-after-brexit-vote">here</a>) but, given its prevalence, the “China as winner” argument needs to be taken on.</p><h4><strong>1) Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials </strong><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df78cae4-797e-11e5-933d-efcdc3c11c89.html"><strong>specifically said</strong></a><strong> they did not want to see a Brexit.</strong></h4><p>It would have been easy for them to make non-committal statements about non-interference in other countries’ political affairs and move on. Instead, the Chinese leadership ensured that the “Remain” campaign was able to make the case, accurately, that <a href="http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/06/21/asian-leaders-agree-about-little-except-they-want-britain-remain">none</a> of the major Asian economies want to see the UK leave the EU. While this had little public traction, it helped to demolish a crucial Brexiteer argument that a world beyond Europe was salivating at the prospect of free trade deals with the Brits.</p><p>According to the “China Wins Brexit” camp, this public positioning was either a ruse or an act of politeness. Privately, the Chinese government was supposedly rooting for Brexit because it would make the EU less influential, weaken the West, leave China’s assertiveness in Asia unchecked, and increase the opportunity to “divide and conquer” Europe. This argument fundamentally misunderstands the entire orientation of Chinese strategy towards the EU, and the UK’s very particular role in it.</p><h4><strong>2) China, along with Japan and India, sees the UK as the best gateway into the EU single market for its growing investments.</strong></h4><p>While other EU member states were ready to block Chinese investments in various sectors on national security grounds, the UK has remained a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/16/nuclear-deals-with-china-could-endanger-uk-national-security-says-labour">remarkably unrestricted</a> environment. Although often linked to David Cameron and George Osborne’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/oct/18/britian-has-made-visionary-choice-to-become-chinas-best-friend-says-xi">“golden era”</a> push in UK-China relations, the British disposition to investment openness long predated them. The UK is now the <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5136953a-1b3d-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.html">largest European recipient</a> of Chinese FDI and there was every indication that bigger Chinese commitments were on their way. Unless a deal is secured that maintains the UK’s access to the single market, however, those bets are off and Chinese investment plans will be rendered far more complicated. The economic uncertainty ensuing from Brexit is unlikely to be beneficial either, at a time when the fragile Chinese economy could very much do without additional complications</p><h4><strong>3) The UK has been China’s chief ally in its increasingly fraught relationship with the EU on trade.</strong></h4><p>In a context where Chinese industrial overcapacity is a matter of <a href="https://euobserver.com/news/133426">acute tension</a> for European industry, the UK is one of the <a href="https://euobserver.com/eu-china/131801">chief advocates</a> for China to be granted market-economy status. London has been a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/12/sajid-javid-uk-blocked-higher-eu-steel-tariffs-fearing-shoe-price-rises">major roadblock</a> to EU rule-changes that would have permitted higher tariffs on Chinese steel. The UK was one of the only states <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/cameron-irritates-brussels-by-pushing-eu-china-trade-deal/">to push seriously</a> for FTA negotiations with Beijing. The departure of the UK will not make it easier for China to pursue “divide and rule” tactics on trade policy — it will remove China’s single biggest ally and tilt the balance of intra-EU politics on in favor of those advocating a tougher stance. The greater ease of concluding a bilateral FTA with the UK further down the line does not even begin to compensate for the long-term impact on the pattern of economic relations with what is, until Britain leaves, the world’s largest market and — though some appear to be <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/how-china-can-benefit-from-brexit/">confused</a> about this fact — negotiating bloc.</p><h4><strong>4) China has been a consistent supporter of the European project.</strong></h4><p>There is little doubt that China maneuvers to play states and <a href="http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/divide-conquer-aim-east-china-has-a-sharp-new-european-trade-strategy/eastern-europe-beijing-foreign-commerce/c1s10100/#.Uqx7B_TuJhw">groupings</a> off against each other within the EU to influence policy outcomes in its favor and to strike advantageous bilateral commercial deals. It does not follow from this that China would be pleased to see a fundamental division of the EU itself, let alone its complete unraveling. Beijing has long wanted to see the EU function as one of the poles in a multipolar world. It does not view a strong EU solely within the framework of a “strong West” but as a balancing and moderating influence on U.S. power. European attitudes to China are believed to be more cooperatively disposed than U.S. attitudes, with the <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/31c4880a-c8d2-11e4-bc64-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3UCDXZI5H">AIIB imbroglio</a> only the most striking recent example.</p><p>A well-functioning EU is also seen as a source of stability and order, and a critical partner to China for managing a complex array of global challenges that go well beyond hard security (without excluding that either), whether in the realm of finance, regulation, infrastructure, climate, the environment, development or a litany of other areas. China has never been one of those powers that lazily caricature the EU as either ineffectual or overweening. Beijing is one of the most sophisticated external actors in working out precisely how the EU matters to its objectives, where competences lie, and how power works between member states and the EU institutions. China was disappointed when the push for an EU constitution failed. It has provided important symbolic backing to the euro, notably during the Eurozone crisis, a period when Beijing had ample opportunity to undermine the EU discreetly if that was its real objective. China is evidently not a <em>communautaire</em> saint and it is always ready to rebalance its political tactics as circumstances require. There have been ebbs and flows in how much Beijing seeks to transact through Brussels and how much through member states. But China has demonstrably identified its interest with the EU’s continued success — and not as a provisional, quickly adjusted policy, but a clear, well-embedded, long-term orientation.</p><p>Recent developments in the EU’s policies in Asia are a relatively small part of this big picture. Beijing was certainly not happy to see, for instance, the <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/11-hr-declaration-on-bealf-of-eu-recent-developments-south-china-sea/">tougher EU statement</a> on the South China Sea. But while Beijing certainly cares about the EU’s stance — for reasons of legitimacy if not enforcement capacity — the idea that this issue now trumps all other considerations grossly overestimates the salience of the issue in the broader context of Chinese strategy towards the European Union.</p><h4><strong>Other issues tilt both ways:</strong></h4><ul><li>China doesn’t like “splittist” referendums succeeding. On the other hand, the demonstrably damaging impact of the referendum on the UK’s interests and the chaotic political aftermath has provided <a href="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/06/minitrue-dont-hype-speculate-comment-brexit/">ample material</a> for those arguing that democracy is a dangerous thing.</li><li>In theory, there are political opportunities presented by the fact that the UK may be pushed to develop closer ties with states outside the EU to shore up its economic and strategic position. But there is a country that looms larger than China in this respect: the UK may need to work even harder to demonstrate its transatlantic <em>bona fides</em> during a wobbly phase with Washington, where there are now serious questions about the UK’s waning value as a partner.</li></ul><p>These issues will take clearer shape in the months to come. But the broader forces at play in the referendum are unequivocally bad from a Chinese perspective. If there is a revolt against globalization, China is its embodiment. A western world that is roiled by populism, hostility to trade and antipathy towards elite-led efforts to manage global order cooperatively is not a congenial place for Chinese interests. Part of the fear of the Brexit vote is that it is just the start.</p><p>All sorts of geopolitical developments distract and weaken the West, reducing its collective ability to stand up to Chinese assertiveness. Each and every time, there are “China is the winner!” articles published in the aftermath as if Beijing’s predominant impulse is anarchic pleasure at others’ incapacity, regardless of what the other costs might be. Most of the time, the answer is a far more complex mix of trade-offs. In this case, however, it is not even that ambiguous. China didn’t support Brexit before the vote and it doesn’t now. There will doubtless be a couple op-eds in Global Times and reactive quotes from Chinese “strategists” that make hubristic countervailing arguments. But if there’s one thing the Brexit vote surely taught us, it’s to beware <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/25/boris-johnson-michael-gove-eu-liars?CMP=share_btn_tw">glibly persuasive</a> newspaper columnists whose interests are more bound up in political positioning than in truthfully identifying their country’s genuine long-term interests.</p><p><em>Cross-posted on </em><a href="http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/07/01/china-not-%E2%80%9C-winner-brexit%E2%80%9D"><em>the GMFUS blog</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3bba736cf474" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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