<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Akhilesh Godi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Akhilesh Godi on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@akhileshgodi?source=rss-4af0ae8c2d67------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:29:13 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@akhileshgodi/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A curious case of missing files, and ‘sudden’ elimination of stigma vis-a-vis LGBT+ persons]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@akhileshgodi/a-curious-case-of-missing-files-and-sudden-elimination-of-stigma-vis-a-vis-lgbt-persons-d8fec45000ed?source=rss-4af0ae8c2d67------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d8fec45000ed</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lgbtq]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[constitution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akhilesh Godi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Apr 2023 23:58:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-18T03:37:26.940Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Note: Any information presented on this post may be used freely by any publication as long as the author is duly credited. All original documents can be made available by making a request to the author.<br>If you’re short on time a </em><a href="#20fb"><em>TL;DR</em></a><em> version is available at the end.</em></p><p>The Supreme Court of India is all set to hear arguments in <em>Supriyo v. Union of India </em>and connected matters, in relation to marriage equality for LGBT+ persons. On 13.03.2023, the CJI’s bench had placed this matter before a 5-judge Constitution Bench. The learned Solicitor General of India, Mr. Tushar Mehta made perplexing oral submissions before the court on the date of last hearing.</p><h3>Live Law on Twitter: &quot;SG Mehta: This continuous arguments on stigma...after Navtej Johar judgment there is no stigma.#SupremeCourtOfIndia #LGBTQIA / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>SG Mehta: This continuous arguments on stigma...after Navtej Johar judgment there is no stigma.#SupremeCourtOfIndia #LGBTQIA</p><p>With all due respect, this submission by the Ld. Solicitor reeks of intellectual dishonesty, apparent lack of empathy and inability to engage with a community that has been struggling and pushed to the margins. Other than the fact that the lived experience of individuals is contrary to the submission made, I shall attempt to enlighten, how much the Govt. of India has done to eliminate said stigma.</p><p>About 5 years ago, on 06.09.2018, the Supreme Court of India through its landmark judgement in <em>Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India</em>, read down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, and recognised that LGBT+ persons are entitled to the full range of civil liberties as envisaged by the Constitution of India, and recognised their rights under Article 14, 15, 19, 21 of Part III (Fundamental Rights) of the Constitution. Various judges gave separate but concurring opinions. In his concurring opinion, Justice R.F. Nariman while recognising the plight of, and discrimination meted out against LGBT+ persons, directed Union of India as under:</p><blockquote><a href="https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2016/14961/14961_2016_Judgement_06-Sep-2018.pdf">98. We are also of the view that the Union of India shall take all measures to ensure that this judgment is given wide publicity through the public media, which includes television, radio, print and online media at regular intervals, and initiate programs to reduce and finally eliminate the stigma associated with such persons. Above all, all government officials, including and in particular police officials, and other officers of the Union of India and the States, be given periodic sensitization and awareness training of the plight of such persons in the light of the observations contained in this judgment.</a></blockquote><p>One would now assume that since the Ld. Solicitor General has made bold submissions saying that there is no stigma after Navtej Singh Johar, his submission would be backed by facts and that the Govt. has actually done a lot of work to help eliminate stigma. Through the rest of the article, we shall see this ‘<em>data</em>’.</p><p>Since there was no visible sensitisation and training of the officers of Union of India (which includes perhaps, even the office of the SG?), or visible publicity done by the Union of India, the author had filed RTI Applications in 2021 to understand the status of compliance of the said directions.</p><p>Firstly, in early 2021, information was requested from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to provide details of all the efforts made by the Ministry to comply with the directions. This application was then transferred to several departments within the Ministry of I&amp;B such as Prasar Bharati, Doordarshan, Press Council of India, Central Bureau of Communication, etc. As we would have it the information available to them was ‘NIL’. However, Prasar Bharati made a further submission in their RTI response:</p><blockquote>The Prasar Bharati has not apparently received any instructions from the Department of Legal Affairs. Moreover, the direction is to the Union of India in the Ministry of Law and Justice. It is for that Ministry to give effect to the directions of the Court, including publicity through the public media, including television radio, print and online media. Hence, no information is available in Prasar Bharati.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Hbq-TNsyzvgpapbLfNx6Fg.png" /><figcaption>RTI Response by Prasar Bharati</figcaption></figure><p>Secondly, given it was responded that it was for the Department of Legal Affairs to “give effect” to the directions/orders, an RTI Application was filed on 01.06.2021 with the Department of Legal Affairs. The Law Ministry did not respond to the RTI Application.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Xbglgl-QwirqCZ4gVyeRzw.png" /><figcaption>RTI Application before the Law Ministry</figcaption></figure><p>An appeal was filed with the First Appellate Authority alleging a lack of response within the stipulated time period would be in violation of the provisions under the RTI Act; that the Public Information Officer, was to respond within 30 days. The appeal which was filed on 06.09.2021 was disposed of on 23.09.2021 asking the PIO to respond within 10 days. However the quest for the response continues until 2023.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5c2rq0fiDY5QxItmZ_TjPw.png" /><figcaption>First Appeal in RTI Application</figcaption></figure><p>Since there was no response for months on, a Second Appeal was filed before the Chief Information Commission (CIC) on 25.03.2022 which would later be heard on 15.03.2023.</p><p>The Law Ministry finally responds to the RTI Application on 02.09.2022 with false, misleading information that the response was provided physically, when as a matter of fact it was not.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fm_bNagUAGpqsBMPviHznw.png" /><figcaption>RTI Application Response — False, Misleading information</figcaption></figure><p>On 15.03.2023, this matter came up for hearing before the Hon. Information Commissioner Saroj Punhani. The Law Ministry first submits that the files pertaining to the RTI Application were missing. It is bewildering to say the least as to how files in the Union of India went ‘<em>untraceable</em>’.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WRyJH7QaL-pbiLTp8vxt8w.png" /><figcaption>Untraceable files in the Law Ministry — Submission of CPIO</figcaption></figure><p>The CPIO further submitted albeit erroneously that there was a response filed in another RTI matter which has sought the ‘same’ information and was disposed of stating that there is no information available. Further, it was submitted that it was not the subject matter of the Department of Legal Affairs despite them being the main respondent in the case.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mkmSgzMhmqLfa49cwOuj_A.png" /><figcaption>Further submissions by CPIO, Department of Legal Affairs</figcaption></figure><p>Let’s now take a detour on what exactly the CPIO was referring to on an RTI Application containing ‘same queries’. This was patently false, erroneous and misleading and was contested. The RTI Application being referred by the CPIO, was distinct and different in terms of the queries sought. The queries that were being referred to so far in this article, were on ‘<em>giving effect to the directions</em>’ as submitted by Prasar Bharati; whereas the queries referred by the CPIO were those which had sought information on what publicity was done - this RTI Application was in fact not filed with the Law Ministry directly but went through a whirlwind tour of various Ministries.</p><p>The Ministry of Social Justice &amp; Empowerment was where aforesaid RTI Application referred to was first filed — was transferred to the Law Ministry, which was then transferred by them to the Home Ministry. And the Home Ministry then transferred the application back to the Law Ministry. So in a circus of events, the ‘other’ RTI Application came back full circle. The reasoning given by the Home Ministry on <em>that </em>RTI Application was that, it was for the Ministry of Law &amp; Justice to respond since they were the respondents in the 377 case. It is pertinent however to note that the Under-Secretary in the Home Ministry was the one to file an <a href="https://www.scobserver.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Centre-affidavit-Section-377__Word_.pdf">affidavit</a> in the court in the 377 case.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Pym5abUOciZp71YHcLkk5w.png" /><figcaption>Appeal and Information sought - Home Ministry response in RTI Application’s Appeal</figcaption></figure><p>Getting back to the RTI Application we were discussing on this article from the beginning, and reading through the responses so far, it is clear that not only false and misleading information was provided in the application responses, but also that the CPIO in Department of Legal Affairs didn’t even bother to forward the RTI Application to the right ministry if he so believed that it was the subject matter of some other Ministry. In either case, the Home Ministry had raised their hands up in another RTI Application dealing with a similar subject (but different queries) and said it is not for them to do anything in regards to the compliance of the said directions.</p><p>While the written orders from the CIC in the Second Appeal are awaited in the case as of 14.04.2023; what may be understood so far is that, apparently the directions that were made in <em>Navtej Singh Johar</em> to the <em>Union of India </em>seem to have been made in vacuum, because clearly no Ministry thinks it is for them to implement the directions.</p><p>Given the state of affairs — missing files, providing information ‘physically’ and hoping no one would ask how they were provided physically, and circus of transfers between the various ministries, not knowing who really is responsible for implementing said orders — it is not clear if this is wilful ignorance, a case of not reading the judgement at all in the first place or just a matter of incompetence.</p><p>Through all of the painstaking exercise of tracking who responded and who transferred RTI Applications to whom, we are now at over 4.5 years since the judgement was rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and if you are smart enough to read between the lines — the answer would be straight forward. Apparently, <strong>nothing</strong> has been done to give effect to the orders till today. And if I may, <em>Union of India</em> is also probably in contempt of court.</p><p>We must also wonder if the Ld. Solicitor General had privately implemented these orders and eliminated all the stigma after the judgement. But again, who will question him? And even if one does, would he be open to explaining and providing us with the information backing his bold submissions? I’ll leave that for you to wonder. (<em>Hint: Read the affidavits filed by the Union of India in the marriage equality petitions</em>)</p><h3>TL;DR:</h3><ul><li>Ministry of Information and Broadcasting has no information on implementing the directions of the Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar.</li><li>Prasar Bharati further submitted that it is for the Ministry of Law &amp; Justice to give effect to the orders, which has not apparently been done.</li><li>The Law Ministry who was the respondent in the case, first did not respond for 1.5 years; submitted falsely that the information was provided physically; then that the files related to RTI Application were missing and later claimed that the directions to implement the orders were not made to them in the judgement.</li><li>They submitted now that the Home Ministry should be implementing the directions. However in <em>another</em> RTI Application with similar subject matter, the Home Ministry had sent the application back to the Law Ministry saying since Law Ministry was the respondent and it is for them to respond.</li><li>All in all, it seems apparent that nobody has implemented the directions in the judgement to either sensitise and train officials of UoI or give publicity to the judgement through various means.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d8fec45000ed" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Of equality, unequal laws and claims to equal citizenship]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@akhileshgodi/of-equality-unequal-laws-and-claims-to-equal-citizenship-573d86d350d5?source=rss-4af0ae8c2d67------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/573d86d350d5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[constitution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[equality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[same-sex-marriage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akhilesh Godi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2020 19:22:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-08T16:00:03.894Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At the backdrop of this conversation are challenges placed in front of the courts in India to legalise same-sex marriage. For the uninitiated, there are four petitions filed in the country’s high courts — the first in the Kerala HC by a gay couple asking for their marriage to be registered under the ‘Special Marriage Act’ whose purpose was to cover interfaith marriages which were not covered under religious <a href="https://www.constitutionofindia.net/blogs/constitution_in_the_classroom__3_1__worksheets_on_religion_and_personal_laws#:~:text=Constitution%20of%20India&amp;text=Personal%20laws%20regulate%20marriage%2C%20divorce,gender%20inequality%20and%20discriminatory%20attitudes.">personal law</a>, the second by four Hindus — a PIL before the Delhi HC for same-sex marriages between any two Hindus to be recognised under the ‘Hindu Marriage Act’, the third and fourth before the Delhi HC by a lesbian and gay couple for their marriages to be registered under ‘Special Marriage Act’ and ‘Foreign Marriage Act’ respectively. (Edit on 25th February 2021: Four queer persons — Udit Sood &amp; ors. filed another petition in the Delhi HC asking for the ‘Special Marriage Act’ to be read in a gender neutral manner to encompass marriages regardless of gender.)<br>Note: Summaries are provided <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Ndx6y65hnp0aLbAz2PYBNPHJyhDtWyLgJ0C-BFQ6GAQ/edit?usp=sharing"><strong>here</strong></a> with links to affidavits, petitions.</p><p>While a lot of people are gung-ho about these developments, many even from the queer communities have very little understanding about how the courts in India operate or adjudicate on such cases which come before them. This is my humble attempt as a non-lawyer to do two things — firstly, to help appreciate the pillars that form the basis for decisions swinging one way or another in the courts — precedence, philosophy, logic, and rationalisation; secondly and more importantly to give a bird’s eye view of how cases that come before the court should not be looked at in silos — that it is the <em>reasonings </em>provided in the judgments of <em>seemingly</em> unrelated case which help decide future cases. Why should you be interested in this at all, you may ask? The answer is simple — be an informed citizen who knows <em>something</em> about the Constitution of the country you live in; but hey, would you not be interested in the process which is used to deny or affirm your rights and mine?</p><p>How am I trying to go about this? I will try and explain in as less jargon as possible (forgive me if I don’t manage this :P). So, if you were a judge, how would you possibly decide on equality based claims for same-sex marriage? Well, duh — heterosexuals have a right to marry, homosexuals don’t — this is straightforward inequality! Right? Wrong. Wrong about the ‘straight-forward’ part at least.</p><p>Let’s first understand what these people who want same-sex marriage to be allowed are asking from the court. We’ll limit this post to the Special Marriage Act (SMA) petitions (so as to not complicate things). The SMA petitioners tell the court that the gay and lesbian couples in two different cases tried to get their marriage registered but they were denied by the marriage officer. They ask for the court to direct the marriage officer to register their marriage. But before that they need to convince the court that their marriage should indeed be legal(ised). How do they do that? They say that, the heterosexual undertones used in the language of the Special Marriage Act is wrong and this amounts to violation of their rights so they should be read-down (the least chaotic option: to change the way the Act is interpreted— because if it were to be struck down completely then inter-faith marriages would not have a legal standing) or the parts that violate their rights be struck down to the extent that their marriage is allowed to be registered legally. They argue that the Indian Constitution allows them to make such claims and that these are grounded in the ‘Fundamental Rights’ chapter in that document — more specifically in Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21.</p><p>What are these articles really? Are the petitioners right in making these claims? Let’s analyse (but in the interest of space and to limit the scope) — we will deal with their claims made under Articles 14, 15 which deal with ‘equality’. To first get things out of our way, can the court even look at these claims? The answer to that is an emphatic yes. What gives courts such powers? The answer — as you might have guessed is in the Constitution itself — Article 13 and Article 226 (Article 32 for SC) give the High Courts this power.</p><p>Great, so we have established that you as a judge can indeed adjudicate on the case before you. How do we proceed from here? Let’s take a look at what Article 14 is and then we’ll go on to 15.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Article 14</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>The State shall not deny to any person </em><strong><em>equality before the law</em></strong><em> or the </em><strong><em>equal protection of the laws</em></strong><em> within the territory of India</em></blockquote><p>A cursory reading of this article seems to suggest that the people who wrote this text thought that the State should be treating all people equally and that everyone has equal protection of the laws. That’s true — partially. The words <em>equality before the law </em>have across the world come to mean that no matter your stature — the law will treat you equally. However, for the words ‘<em>equal protection of the laws’, </em>the derived understanding of this is that equals should be treated equally but unequals needn’t necessarily be treated equally.</p><p>Now what? This seems vague. How do you decide who are equals and who are unequals? In particular are homosexual and heterosexual persons equals or unequals? While it might be obvious who decides on these interpretations — the constitutional courts tasked with interpreting the constitution (duh!), what might not be apparent is “how?”. The courts over time, as cases come before them, try to develop ‘frameworks’ or ‘tests’ through which they hope that ambiguity is reduced. The effect of this they hope will be that there is lesser randomness in interpretations, by not delegating the outcomes of cases to individual judges’ morality. So, for Article 14, the courts have historically developed a two pronged ‘reasonable classification’ test. The test says:</p><ol><li>There should be some ‘<em>intelligible differentia</em>’ between the two classes or groups being subjected to different treatment</li><li>There should be a ‘<em>rational nexus</em>’ between the classification done and the goal that the State attempts to achieve.</li></ol><p>Let’s see how this could go — the State could (for the sake of argument) say — “Most heterosexuals can procreate if they wish to, however homosexuals cannot. Therefore they constitute two classes (<em>intelligible differentia</em>). Society and religion has traditionally looked at marriage as a union between a man and a woman. The laws made are a codification of societal morality. Therefore there is a rationalisation or reasoning behind subjecting them to different treatment (<em>rational nexus</em>). That’s not it, the Court should not be in the business of making laws and that it should be left to the Parliament to make laws”</p><p>Pardon me for the bad argument on behalf of the State, however what must be paid attention to in light of this is that as long as the State could come up with some rationalisation, it could use the tests to its advantage and very well deny equal treatment. Having said that, the arguments of the State in the case before us can be countered by saying that marriage is not for procreation alone and is a union of two souls. There is no intelligible differentia in the first place and the classification itself is irrational. Besides there is no rational justification to not providing same sex couples access to marriage as an institution which along with it brings in multiple other benefits as pointed out by the petitioners such as nomination in insurance, ease in matters of finance and inheritance, etc. It has been made abundantly clear that ‘<em>constitutional morality</em>’ must prevail over public morality as in cases of conflict the latter cannot be a justification to deprive people their rights.</p><p>However, there could certainly be some other argument by the State (if not in this case, in another) where a seemingly unequal law could be rationalised away. The shortcomings of these tests were noted by judges. In the 1970s the court decided to introduce a new test of ‘reasonableness’ that tried to suggest that the objective sought to be achieved shouldn’t be ‘arbitrary’ as well. This gained prominence recently since the Triple Talaq case and most recently the Section 377 case where this doctrine of ‘manifest arbitrariness’ was attempted to be developed further. The arbitrariness tests says that if a law is “<em>disproportionate, excessive… or otherwise manifestly unreasonable”</em>, then it would be struck down under Article 14. However, the arbitrariness test itself has come under critique, for its, well — ‘arbitrariness’. The words <em>disproportionate</em>, <em>excessive</em> or <em>unreasonable</em> all seem to be very open-ended and are at the risk of leaving it to each judge’s morality. The crux of the problem though is that the tests developed so far haven’t adequately understood equality in the true sense and reduced it to a mere formula — how this doctrine pans out in the future is for all of us to see because it affects the understanding of equality and therefore all claims to ‘equal rights’. And maybe if you are a judge — how would you evolve the existing tests or perhaps what new test would you propose?</p><p>What have you decided on Article 14? Do the petitioners’ claims stand the scrutiny of the tests developed? Not too sure? Well, that’s when the courts go on to cite earlier cases, sometimes even cases from courts outside the country to further strengthen their understanding or buttress their line of reasoning. You could do the same too.</p><p>E.g. A judge in the S.377 case opined thus:</p><blockquote><em>“Where a legislation discriminates on the basis of an intrinsic and core trait of an individual, it cannot form a reasonable classification based on an intelligible differentia</em>”</blockquote><p>You could be the textualist judge who would be true to the text literally (defer to the State, rely on separation of powers argument, under-inclusiveness cannot be grounds to strike down law, say these words take precisely the meaning that was known at the time of writing the Constitution), or be the judge who expansively reads things to mean a lot more than what things were meant to be (the dangers of which too again are plenty), or be the judge who relies on transformative constitutionalism — the idea that believes in staying true to the structure, history, text while acknowledging the overarching commitment of the writers of the constitution to political and social transformation. How do you find out what the writers of the Constitution might have meant? The Constituent Assembly Debates are well documented which serve the purpose.</p><p>Without further delay, let us for the sake of argument assume that the rationalisation provided by the State was <em>prima facie</em> accepted by the judge (you). How would you analyse the claims under Article 15?</p><blockquote><strong><em>Article 15</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth<br>(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on </em><strong><em>grounds</em></strong><em> </em><strong><em>only</em></strong><em> of religion, race, caste, </em><strong><em>sex</em></strong><em>, place of birth </em><strong><em>or any of them</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, </em><strong><em>sex</em></strong><em>, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to<br> (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and palaces of public entertainment;</em></blockquote><p>If you put on a hat of a textualist, you might say the claims of the petitioners are bold but nonsensical. There is no ‘sexual orientation’ in Article 15, so the question of its application does not arise.</p><p>However, parking that aside for a bit, we will attempt to see what possible questions we might have while reading the said Article.</p><ol><li>One way to read the Article is — religion, race, caste, <strong>sex</strong>, place of birth cannot be the <strong>motivation</strong> for (i.e. explicit intention of) the State to discriminate against any citizen.</li><li>Another way to read it is — it is not important what the motivation for your classification was, what is important is whether the act <strong>in its effect</strong> discriminates, and its effect is discrimination on one of the protected grounds.</li><li>Does ‘<strong>only</strong>’ mean a closed set of grounds which are named in clause (1) of Article 15?</li><li>What happens when one discriminates on let’s say ‘sex’ and another ground not listed in Article 15: eg: sex+age (let’s call it <em>sex plus</em>) — does that amount to discrimination?</li></ol><p>The answers to these are not obvious. On 1 vs 2: the courts for a good part of its history had used interpretation as in 1. Therefore if it wasn’t the intent of the State to discriminate against you — too bad, Article 15 test has failed. It is only in recent times that the court has, after a lot of flip-flops come to understand, acknowledge and use the <strong>effects-based test</strong>. Doing so, it also attempted to evolve an understanding of indirect discrimination alongside direct discrimination where laws maybe facially neutral but (might) have a ‘disparate impact’ on one of the protected class. If you are wondering how this argument could look like in the marriage equality case — the State’s argument could be the intention of the marriage laws which were drafted was not to discriminate against the same-sex couple petitioners, therefore no case of discrimination arises. That is, there is no ‘direct’ discrimination (#1). However employing the effects based test (#2) would look like, it is not important whether or not the State’s intention was to discriminate against the same-sex couple petitioners, but in-effect the law ‘indirectly’ and in its ‘effect’ discriminates against them.</p><p>The answer to 3 is a grey area, and to answer it in a yes or no — tilts <em>mostly</em> to: yes, it is a closed list of grounds. Why I say <em>mostly</em> is answered in a while below.</p><p>The answer to 4 <em>so far</em> (barring exceptions) is: unfortunately no. Application of reasoning 2 over 1 has enabled the possibility of it being yes.</p><p>So, it looks like A.15 is a stronger article than A.14 for various reasons and primarily because the State would be put through a much higher level of scrutiny (just rationalisation does not cut it anymore) provided the class is a protected class mentioned in A.15.</p><p>But, on what basis do the petitioners even think their claims are tenable? The answer to that lies in the Supreme Court judgments (case law) of recent times which have been consistent in applying the anti-stereotyping principle lately. To put it simply, if any law discriminates on the basis of a stereotypical understanding of the ‘sex’ that law would be violative of Article 15. This line of argument has been recently used in cases pertaining to the permanent commission of women to the Army and Navy which earlier disallowed women. However, the interesting application of this principle was in S.377 case by one of the judges — that discrimination based on sexual orientation relies on stereotypical understanding of ‘sex’ — “this is what a man is” and “this is what a man is not” this translates to sex-based stereotypes such as “<em>sex with women is appropriate for members of one sex, but not for members of the other sex”</em></p><p>The reading of grounds analogous to sex into Article 15 was first seen in 2009 Delhi HC <a href="http://164.100.69.66/jupload/dhc/APS/judgement/02-07-2009/APS02072009CW74552001.pdf">judgment</a> of S.377. The judgment was overturned in a badly written SC <a href="https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/41070.pdf">judgment</a> in 2013. Following similar lines as in the 2009 Delhi HC <a href="https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/41411.pdf">judgment</a>, in 2014 there was an affirmation of transgender rights — gender identity being a facet of sex, thus being part of Article 15 was made clear.</p><p>Well, that’s not all, two other judges of SC in the 2018 S.377 <a href="https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2016/14961/14961_2016_Judgement_06-Sep-2018.pdf">judgment</a> independently, albeit with different lines of reasonings (and I’d implore you to attempt to read through the reasonings yourself) held that sexual orientation based discrimination was covered under Article 15. Thus, in my opinion it is not the reading down of 377 but the reasonings obtained in the S.377 judgments, particularly the A.15 line of reasoning which was the biggest win for the petitioners, opening up the gateway to civil rights. [Why’s that? Article 15(2) takes it a step ahead covering not just discrimination by the State but by private entities (to an extent) too. In the absence of a clear anti-discrimination law in the private realm in the country, the importance of recognition under A.15 is under-stated.] This since it has the approval of the majority (3 out of 5 judges) would be binding on you (our judge) or on the benches that decide on the Special Marriage Act petitions. Since marriage between same sex couples is denied based on sex based stereotypes, it would be violating Article 15. Or not? You decide. Similarly what do you think about petitioners’ claims under Article 19 &amp; 21?</p><p>The Constitution of this country was in no way meant to be merely a text that is limited to the courts, the lawyers or the political class but to be lived by its people — and here’s hoping it would nudge you in that direction.</p><p>This article was inspired from my understanding after reading the book ‘<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/43913429-the-transformative-constitution"><strong>The Transformative Constitution</strong></a>’ by Gautam Bhatia, <a href="https://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Through%20the%20Looking%20Glass%20of%20Intersectionality%20Making%20Sense%20of%20Indian%20Discrimination%20Jurisprudence%20under%20Article%2015.pdf">Shreya Atrey</a>, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1246892">Tarunabh Khaitan</a>’s work, the judgments of the cases mentioned and the petitions filed in the same-sex marriage petitions on file with me (also detailed <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Ndx6y65hnp0aLbAz2PYBNPHJyhDtWyLgJ0C-BFQ6GAQ/edit?usp=sharing"><strong>here</strong></a>).</p><p><em>Side note: I was very surprised to see that the A.15 rights claim was not made by Abhijit Iyer &amp; ors in their petition challenging The Hindu Marriage Act.</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: I have not studied law formally; I neither am nor claim to be a legal expert — in case you find any incorrectness in my post, please feel free to point it out and I shall correct it.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=573d86d350d5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>