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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Aleksejs Kuprins on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Brief Glory of Cabassous/FluBot — a private Android banking botnet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/csis-techblog/the-brief-glory-of-cabassous-flubot-a-private-android-banking-botnet-bc2ed7917027?source=rss-ce8ecbabdcd1------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aleksejs Kuprins]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2021 12:54:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-16T12:54:13.944Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Brief Glory of Cabassous/FluBot — a private Android banking botnet</h3><h3>Introduction</h3><p>A novel piece of banking malware for Android OS has surfaced around December 2020, attacking users in Spain. In this article, we will discuss the timeline of its existence, the targeted apps, the current size and the spread of the botnet as well as the techniques and capabilities, which the authors have employed, and speculate about how effective they are.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/347/1*z6d2A54qPRwX7MjwzGf8uA.png" /></figure><p>We have found neither indications of its name/alias, nor any sales threads within the underground forums. The latter fact suggests that the malware is likely a private bot, which means that it will have a small client base in the future and no advertisement campaigns.</p><h4>Timeline of Events</h4><p>We have discovered the first in-the-wild samples during late December 2020. Since then, the ‘version’ field in the malware’s configuration file was being incremented rather frequently with new features and fixes added every week. The first piece of analysis about Cabassous that we can find came on January 06 from ThreatFabric.</p><h3>JavaScript is not available.</h3><p>New Android banking Trojan &quot;Cabassous&quot; doesn&#39;t yet provide more than classic overlay and SMS stealing features but is the only known active banker using DGA.It uses an RSA based DH scheme to protect the communications with the C2 and obtains relevant C2 addresses using a DGA. pic.twitter.com/NDrBCoiyWn</p><p>Moving onward, several researchers have been publicly documenting the malware’s spreading campaign on Twitter. Our sinkhole statistics were showing that Cabassous was growing very fast, until it reached around 60,000 infections. By that moment, it suffered a major blow from the Spanish law enforcement authorities on the day of publication of analysis by <a href="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prodaft/malware-ioc/master/FluBot/FluBot.pdf">PRODAFT</a>.</p><p>The Spanish authorities coordinated with PRODAFT and arrested 4 suspected members of the criminal group on March 05.</p><h3>JavaScript is not available.</h3><p>Catalan police arrested four suspects last week on suspicion of managing FluBot, an Android malware strain that infected at least 60,000 devices https://t.co/lpAngHleyC</p><p>Unfortunately, the arrest did not bring the operation to a complete halt. The C&amp;C server was offline during March 05, however, the campaign was restored a couple of days later. On the day of writing, Cabassous is alive and well, spreading the malware, defrauding its victims and even continuing the development of the bot, although the rate of new infections has slowed down.</p><h3>JavaScript is not available.</h3><p>This is a new version (3.4), which includes some changes on domains check for the DGA. Now it generetes 5000 domains per month, and it saves on shared preferences the last good domain, which is checked every 20 domains..</p><p>The same week, the malware has started to spread in Poland with the similar phishing theme. The list of targeted apps did not change yet, the latest known version at the moment of writing is 3.6.</p><h3>JavaScript is not available.</h3><p>@niebezpiecznik od rana dostałem 5 smsow z różnych numerów o przesyłce z @FedEx w środku info z prośbą o instalacje nowej apki do sledzenia🙃 może ostrzeżcie innych mniej ogarniętych bo chyba jakaś zorganizowana akcja... pic.twitter.com/GNfyJSxhhG</p><p>Our sinkhole stats indicate that there has indeed been a fall in the spreading of Cabassous after 5th of March, when the number of infections dropped from ~40k unique connections per day down to ~15k in two days. The statistics continue to fall after that for a different reason — the authors have updated the domain generation algorithm in the newly distributed samples.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/606/1*PW5Zev129M2WJbn0P62puQ.png" /><figcaption>Stats from the sinkholed domain nfiuerwtftasnuk[.]com</figcaption></figure><h4>Attention: This is a sinkhole</h4><p>Speaking of sinkholes, the C&amp;C server’s proxy used to display a curious message back in January, which was intended to either deter researchers from looking at the server or just an attempt at humor. Likely the latter. It is quite simple — the server’s HTTP response to the root “/” URI was the following text: “Attention: this is a sinkhole”. Sinkhole is a term used by security researchers and describes a web server, which was set up to have malicious domains pointing at it. This is done in order to monitor or hijack a botnet, as the malware would connect to it, believing that it is the legitimate C&amp;C server. However in this case, it is just a fake message that means nothing and it is in fact the real C&amp;C server’s proxy into its backend.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/304/1*IdhtC4PxBE-5DVAI-UVuMA.png" /><figcaption>Index page of the C&amp;C server</figcaption></figure><p>Around the end of February 2021, the above message was changed to a strongly worded greeting phrase for researchers in Russian. Also a quote by Dmitriy Medvedev and a video montage of him dancing to an old Russian pop song about “American boy” and “Balalaika” from the 90s. Obviously, this page is reserved for the “public relations” and the original message about the sinkhole is more of a joke rather than a legitimate attempt to conceal the server’s location.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9qnXriAJm9cyy4aQTKYq5A.png" /><figcaption>“Greetings, researcher-****s. We wish you well, good mood and health!”</figcaption></figure><h3>Spreading</h3><p>The main target and most of the current bot pool is the mobile banking and cryptocurrency users from Spain. The spreading campaign is the widely-tested scheme of impersonation of postal and delivery services. A given victim first receives an SMS message about a package delivery with a link to the fake page of the postal service. Upon visiting, the victim is prompted to download the package tracking app, which in fact is the malware. The majority of infections likely come from the bot’s SMS spam: upon infection, the bot sends the local contact list over to the C&amp;C server, then requests the spam message and receives it with the number to be sent to.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/574/1*93sILorFRMLNVl26CF2wvw.png" /><figcaption>Samples of the SMS spam</figcaption></figure><p>The less frequently seen versions of the malware lure impersonate the DHL and FedEx delivery services:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JRU4HgXercCY9EMMoL6kcg.png" /><figcaption>Delivery services themed lures</figcaption></figure><p>We have estimated the botnet to currently be of the size of around 60k unique infections in total.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/910/1*9RFTaLYwdRYU3RSRnbsa3g.png" /><figcaption>Current spread of Cabassous around Europe</figcaption></figure><p>About half of the infected devices are running Android 10. Supporting the latest versions of Android OS seems to be working out very well for Cabassous:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/615/1*nsqw8ZQYeUEheOTQ5gBMaw.png" /><figcaption>Distribution of infected operating systems</figcaption></figure><p>The following applications are targeted by overlay attacks (aka injects). Spanish banking apps:</p><pre>“Bankinter Móvil” — com.bankinter.launcher<br>“BBVA Spain | Online banking” — com.bbva.bbvacontigo<br>“Cajasur” — com.cajasur.android<br>“Grupo Cajamar” — com.grupocajamar.wefferent<br>“Imagin. Much more than an app to manage your money” — com.imaginbank.app<br>“Kutxabank” — com.kutxabank.android<br>“ruralvía” — com.rsi<br>“Banca Móvil Laboral Kutxa” — com.tecnocom.cajalaboral<br>“Santander” — es.bancosantander.apps<br>“Bankia” — es.cm.android<br>“EVO Banco móvil” — es.evobanco.bancamovil<br>“Ibercaja” — es.ibercaja.ibercajaapp<br>“CaixaBankNow” — es.lacaixa.mobile.android.newwapicon<br>“Banca Digital Liberbank” — es.liberbank.cajasturapp<br>“Openbank — banca móvil” — es.openbank.mobile<br>“Pibank” — es.pibank.customers<br>“UnicajaMovil” — es.univia.unicajamovil<br>“Banco Sabadell App. Your mobile bank” — net.inverline.bancosabadell.officelocator.android<br>“ING España. Banca Móvil” — www.ingdirect.nativeframe</pre><p>Cryptocurrency apps:</p><pre>“Binance: Bitcoin Marketplace &amp; Crypto Wallet” — com.binance.dev<br>“Coinbase — Buy &amp; Sell Bitcoin. Crypto Wallet” — com.coinbase.android<br>“Blockchain.com Wallet — Buy Bitcoin, ETH, &amp; Crypto” — piuk.blockchain.android</pre><p>Here are a few examples of the inject screens:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l1LJ91yVme76SL5fvUKD0g.png" /><figcaption>Webinjects targeting Spanish speaking users</figcaption></figure><h3>Capabilities</h3><p>As mentioned above, the Cabassous’s main business is banking fraud. It provides the following functionality:</p><ul><li>Intercept SMS messages</li><li>Send SMS messages and automated contact list spam</li><li>Display overlays/injects for banking and cryptocurrency apps, as well as a generic credit card phishing screen</li><li>Steal contacts</li><li>Open URLs</li><li>Disable PlayProtect</li><li>Run USSD commands</li><li>Uninstall App</li><li>SOCKS proxy</li></ul><p>The overlays are displayed using the standard WebView.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/514/1*4mugHuoWilCCc4wTPzyRMQ.png" /><figcaption>Cabassous loading an overlay</figcaption></figure><h3>Techniques</h3><p>There are two techniques that are worthy of noting in this case. The obfuscation and the C&amp;C communication.</p><p>Most of the samples are packed with Tencent’s Legu Packer application. This solution encrypts the APK file and hides its content from the simple sandbox services. However, it is also trivial to unpack using either software like Frida, Xposed Framework, or the apklab.io service.</p><p>The second layer of obfuscation is the string encryption. The software package for that was taken from a <a href="https://github.com/MichaelRocks/paranoid">public github repository</a>. This means that after the first layer (Tencent Legu) is unpacked — you are still looking at the malware code with all of its strings packed into a single class in an encrypted state, while any uses of the strings are replaced with calls to the obfuscator’s de-obfuscation routine, which only allows the strings to be decrypted during runtime. This obfuscation is also trivial to bypass using any runtime hooking method, such as Frida or Xposed Framework.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/858/1*N6UslpFW6_HhM_Fhk2dJXQ.png" /><figcaption>Public Github repository of the string obfuscation module</figcaption></figure><h4>Communication</h4><p>The specialty about the C&amp;C communication of this malware is the rare use of a DGA module (Domain Generation Algorithm). Normally a piece of any malware comes with a domain name or an IP address of the C&amp;C server embedded into it. The use of DGA is a different approach — instead of connecting to a predefined address, the malware carries a block of code, which would manipulate text and/or digits in a specific way. The output of this operation is a list of possible domain addresses, typically a lot of them — 2000 (5000 as of version 3.6) in case of Cabassous.</p><p>Every time the malware starts up, it generates a set of possible domain names of the C&amp;C server, tries to resolve them and then connects to the first one that resolves to an IP address and is not offline. The strength of this technique is the resilience against the domain takedowns. In the event of the current C&amp;C server domain getting seized and taken down by either the law enforcement or the domain registry service, the malware still has a lots of other domains to use. The threat actors can then simply register a new domain from the list and all of the infected devices will automatically connect to it, thus being completely unaffected by the takedown.</p><p>Usually a malware with a DGA module will begin its domain generation from a given seed value, like a short string. This value can be frequently updated by the criminals in order to prevent the investigators from being able to predict their future domains and blocking them all before they are even used. However, the authors of Cabassous took a different approach: the seed of their algorithm is the combined string of the digits of the current year and month. They have also not added any mechanism to update the seed, or the malware itself. Basically this means that anyone can run their malware on an analysis device with a system date set to the next month and predict all of the future generated domains. The can then block all of these domains on the DNS level within their organization.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/455/1*0rYlLawf82ZI8DFF2TriPg.png" /><figcaption>The DGA seed is based on the current year and month</figcaption></figure><p>The order of the generated domains in this case is also intentionally randomized, but not to a great extent. It appears that the generated lists of domains are very similar with just a few differences. In our tests we observed a certain degree of predictability. To measure it, we ran the malware on a device with the date set to the first day of the next month, then we wrote down the first 10 out of 2000 generated domains. Then we ran the test 10 more times. Around 5 domains from the first run’s first 10 domains would appear within the first 10 domains in the following 10 tests, usually on almost identical position in the order of generation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/792/1*Ra4iwN1JJISEAtaTfY5MpQ.png" /><figcaption>DGA order randomization feature</figcaption></figure><p>The version 3.6 of Cabassous has introduced an actual full randomization of the domain order, using the standard Java library — Collections.shuffle().</p><p>The DGA module also protects the botnet from hijacking. Since the domains can be predicted and anyone can register the future domains of the malware, in theory one should be able to steal all of the bots from the criminals. However, Cabassous has implemented a server verification mechanism. The bot’s outgoing messages to the C&amp;C are encrypted with the server’s public key. This means that no one will be able to decrypt the hijacked traffic until they obtain the private key from the C&amp;C server. The incoming traffic is encrypted with the simple XOR, which does not matter much.</p><p>Whenever the bot first connects to a server, it sends it a PKI encrypted bot ID string. It then expects the server to be able to decrypt it and send it back. The DGA module will move on to the next domain if the server does not respond with the same bot ID.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/803/1*KwmRM540_IIKN2Wa-bxcUQ.png" /><figcaption>Outgoing traffic encryption with an embedded public key</figcaption></figure><p>The listing of the set of commands, which the server can exchange with the bot are included in the IOC section of this article.</p><p>The DGA domains point to a server running an instance of PRIVOXY, which is a software that redirects the requests to the real server, as another measure of takedown resilience. Early on in the campaign we have observed the server to leak the real backend address via the PRIVOXY info page: hkwl6qgewwvj2q7rtfxehu3jq3cypvr435u4vby3dwo4lwuxi47i5bqd[.]onion. Very soon the misconfiguration was fixed and the onion address was changed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8wn7T-zAzZ0zxkp2iQuOzg.png" /><figcaption>Misconfigured PRIVOXY info page</figcaption></figure><h3>Summary</h3><p>The threat actors in this case are definitely somewhat savvy and hardly beginners in the business. The authors have started out with targeting just one country, knowing fully well that defrauding even one country takes a lot of effort. There is no need to make too much noise in the other countries, when you know up front that you will not have enough time to fraud their victims. While taking those careful steps, they probably felt that their private malware could become unique, so they stuffed it with a DGA algorithm. Domain generation is very rarely used in Android malware.</p><p>The authors release updates to the malware code every few days, which is quite frequent. Despite the many successes, the arrests have still taken place and we may see more of them.</p><p>The implementation of the DGA is unique and secure. Throwing PKI cryptography on the bot’s outgoing messages and only simple XOR on the incoming messages shows that the criminals know about the hijacking risks and how to address the issue. We speculate that the criminals might rent the botnet out for use by other carders, at which point we will start seeing other countries to be targeted by it.</p><p>For now, we recommend being very careful about dealing with your package tracking since this infection vector has proven itself incredibly viable and effective. Whenever you expect a package, we recommend that you copy the tracking number from your email and then navigate to the website of the delivery service manually. This way, you avoid clicking the links, which you receive over SMS or email. Also, your delivery service would always have their real tracking app published on the official application stores — that is Apple AppStore for iOS devices and GooglePlay for Android devices. Getting the app only from the official store makes it far less likely that you will download a fake malicious version instead.</p><h3>References</h3><ul><li><a href="https://twitter.com/ThreatFabric/status/1346807891152560131">https://twitter.com/ThreatFabric/status/1346807891152560131</a> — ThreatFabric’s initial report on Cabassous</li><li><a href="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prodaft/malware-ioc/master/FluBot/FluBot.pdf">https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prodaft/malware-ioc/master/FluBot/FluBot.pdf</a> — PRODAFT’s analysis paper</li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/alberto__segura/status/1368833293051977735">https://twitter.com/alberto__segura/status/1368833293051977735</a> — Alberto Segura’s report on the version 3.4 after the arrests in Spain</li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/danlopgom/status/1359966295307993091">https://twitter.com/danlopgom/status/1359966295307993091</a> — Daniel López’s collection of spam domains</li><li><a href="https://github.com/MichaelRocks/paranoid/">https://github.com/MichaelRocks/paranoid/</a> — OpenSource string obfuscator “paranoid”</li><li><a href="https://frida.re/">https://frida.re/</a> — powerful runtime debugging framework for Android and other platforms</li><li><a href="https://www.xda-developers.com/xposed-framework-hub/">https://www.xda-developers.com/xposed-framework-hub/</a> — Runtime hooking framework Xposed</li><li><a href="https://www.privoxy.org/">https://www.privoxy.org/</a> — the free web proxying software which the Cabassous criminals have used to hide their real malware backend</li><li><a href="https://blog.quarkslab.com/a-glimpse-into-tencents-legu-packer.html">https://blog.quarkslab.com/a-glimpse-into-tencents-legu-packer.html</a> — Analysis of the Tencent’s Legu packer</li></ul><h3>IOC</h3><ul><li>Bot Commands</li></ul><pre>PREPING<br>PING<br>LOG<br>SMS_RATE<br>GET_SMS<br>GET_INJECT<br>GET_INJECTS_LIST<br>CONTACTS<br>SMS<br>INTERCEPTING<br>INTERCEPTING_ERR_NOT_DEF<br>AMI_DEF_SMS_APP<br>INJECT<br>BAL_GRABBER<br>EXCEPTION<br>GET_CONTACTS<br>SMS_INT_TOGGLE<br>OPEN_URL<br>DISABLE_PLAY_PROTECT<br>CARD_BLOCK<br>SEND_SMS<br>RELOAD_INJECTS<br>RETRY_INJECT<br>RUN_USSD<br>UNINSTALL_APP<br>BLOCK<br>SOCKS<br>NONE</pre><ul><li>C2 proxy IPs</li></ul><pre>8.209.76.91<br>8.209.80.73<br>8.208.101.253</pre><ul><li>old C2 backend onion address</li></ul><pre>hkwl6qgewwvj2q7rtfxehu3jq3cypvr435u4vby3dwo4lwuxi47i5bqd[.]onion</pre><ul><li>Spam/APK delivery URLs (cheers to @danlopgom on his <a href="https://twitter.com/danlopgom/">twitter</a>)</li></ul><pre>7277320[.]ru/app/<br>acoi[.]my/fedex/<br>ailnoir[.]com/app/<br>aminatech[.]net/fedex/<br>amzstudy[.]com/pack/<br>app[.]crconsultoriacontable[.]com/info/<br>avacoper[.]com/fedex/<br>blog[.]sidmach[.]com/app/<br>boattrip[.]amsterdam/info/<br>buguilou[.]com/p/<br>bxc[.]net[.]au/fedex/<br>canopusbd[.]com/fedex/<br>cashboxcafe[.]ru/web/<br>chevychasefarmersmarket[.]org/info/<br>clone[.]app[.]home-cost[.]com/app/<br>colegioaugustoribeiro[.]com[.]br/fedex/<br>contornosdesign[.]pt/pkg/<br>cwfplaceoptin[.]com/info/<br>dclifechanging[.]com/fedex/<br>delhi[.]tie[.]org/p/<br>dgeneration[.]in/pack/<br>diamondcup[.]gr/fedex/<br>dibae[.]blog/fedex/<br>dilalla[.]com[.]ar/web/<br>ekremakin[.]org/pack/<br>elonatheexplorer[.]com/fedex/<br>erbiltursu[.]com/app/<br>ericom[.]ltd/fedex/<br>fallenjewellery[.]com/fedex/<br>fbtataw[.]w99[.]hk-network[.]com/web/<br>ganesha[.]com[.]py/web/<br>geeklevi[.]com/fedex/<br>illuminate[.]org/info/<br>investisho[.]com/fedex/<br>kakagems[.]com/fedex/<br>keyofislam[.]com/dhl/<br>kidimy[.]org/pkg/<br>lacasa-dh[.]nl/pack/<br>lavozislamica[.]com/www/<br>lgklgklgk[.]com/fedex/<br>magicboximportados[.]com[.]br/web/<br>martinsinnovativeproductsoptin[.]com/app/<br>maskarena[.]co[.]il/fedex/<br>microdreamit[.]net/info/<br>mir2018[.]mrororr[.]ru/fedex/<br>mmcamping[.]com/app/<br>nbkangxi[.]com/pack/<br>nbkfinance[.]ru/fedex/<br>njzmfcls[.]com/fedex/<br>nuevocalor[.]com/fedex/<br>offx[.]link/info/<br>ordermy[.]vn/web/<br>ouyangpengcheng[.]xyz/p/<br>paradjsproductores[.]club/fedex/<br>pochitto-daikou[.]com/info/<br>prtysh[.]in/app/<br>raeloficial[.]com/pkg/<br>raisegroup[.]it/fedex/<br>rasf[.]sa/fedex/<br>rees[.]games/app/<br>rishipes[.]co[.]nz/pack/<br>ryansa[.]com/pkg/<br>safemarkglobal[.]com/fedex/<br>simplestepsllc[.]com/info/<br>smcsme[.]com/fedex/<br>spave[.]com[.]pk/p/<br>standwithsabeena[.]com/info/<br>tacloban[.]gov[.]ph/info/<br>test[.]runningandliving[.]com/info/<br>testtaglabel[.]com/web/<br>thetopinterioraccentsoptin[.]com/web/<br>topblackfridaydealz[.]com/web/<br>tourvoltaire[.]fr/app/<br>trophygamer[.]de/app/<br>valleclean[.]com/fedex/<br>verdun[.]com[.]br/app/<br>viralfeeds[.]net/fedex/<br>visotka[.]in/pack/<br>walton[.]circusvn[.]com/dhl/<br>webelevates[.]com/app/<br>weboyal[.]com/p/<br>wittyx[.]com/fedex/<br>wowfollowers[.]com/fedex/<br>xn--thvitstore-c7a[.]com/pack/<br>yangbin[.]100cuo[.]com/pack/<br>ylem222[.]com/p/<br>yourelectricians[.]co[.]uk/app/<br>zyzlk[.]com/pack/</pre><ul><li>SHA256</li></ul><pre>d22c5db75f6260823e83057721a2d3e90a9821bdbc81ec52683e8cce49d9a49d<br>80260cc2e49e1014d64f871f5cc89754ecd0124337e3ce0a2ec9c2ec7f65c726<br>86e40d6ceb89373b121e9ce0c6af8777d976ceb7931edfe42eeba2646bc2f778<br>68d377abecc0b4505cc05552f602abed314ad75fea766086376cadd7ea5a09b0<br>78397b3bc5bb086787474d81a3cea6a6c58f89931c7bb19eb52b1795b2695cdc<br>804e48d95ee79a82d05e8616155e6ef9bf17277d01ab2ef900f67292ce1b8d56<br>2ac92933595be179484d18b672645d763a8177db4bc48826c4a688726f291084<br>31140a45bbd38bd69df903efe9d9fee1c08e620a3de102a3533bbbe583b3060e<br>13cf22d878e208ea3d290532612e0f2fd805732c2e4c93f5b263bebc21eca801<br>cf7ab4597dd8530b36bdebdb5b94ea89e49450ace25acdcdfaaa603f22e21842<br>b8e728113d204794f5b566d14a4f8b1e9aaf1042aec336104ea08ba57f9bd594<br>a2f1e1fa5c54caf389db3d987689e658944c63f784191b812fa2632fc088deca<br>60fee547a07856bb7fd5dfa8434d02403a8204b6b405f3398f8f1547b4bc57ac<br>19e6e34762a605989fa2b1bedfd1e7333e77c6c8528622813db5f69affd0bd6e<br>5bb121bf54f3317dfe65e6382040d4366244bab84e40a5f6dae966be0f4933f6<br>6de8e6aeda050c499a2908be94209153f2f86b46e71cb33524e445a8c8b058a7<br>d0d5065262bc77c1cecd94c44a4c754e64657110d3de8904e8ad5e55e4a271e8<br>b66cf091750015413f63d048de8eb05b41d3e0d7e6ee33b86ae852f5bca40a66<br>67cd309e42e9b3cabbea8c4ecb4d37235fa209b52356cfc23b505e81cb9e491b<br>cb1b15162f8a776a2942379f34459d784162ac7ccc4c312458d8ee1fd3712b41</pre><ul><li>C2 proxy DGA domains (a short batch of them for the sake of example)</li></ul><pre>afhckrfcucjbpln.com<br>aoeaqxivuikhhdp.cn<br>arymabkciiyygmh.com<br>bdoefrixkguoivh.ru<br>bfsggebsrhigyxh.com<br>blaganfaqbsmgwc.ru<br>corxcbfbpjcunia.ru<br>dckhborssheephs.com<br>dsjllaauvfxtxuu.cn<br>eboyewtljkwywbr.ru<br>ehjhihxkxtgbayy.cn<br>eiobblimcjpilij.com<br>ffqjqgorpsotrsj.ru<br>gfnkhxbixjshqdx.com<br>gykgaiboudkqllm.com<br>hxntfaqyapsiqap.cn<br>ilynavfqveqtaeg.cn<br>ipiravjcwmjpjxa.cn<br>ivsidewdwmtqhib.com<br>ixexifcomsummmw.ru<br>ixshbrjebrwhnwp.cn<br>jagwvpmhykktllh.cn<br>jiuyniwbhmnrubd.ru<br>joslxklqphibnhn.cn<br>joxcxsbjibkwoqe.cn<br>joysqegeomjdipq.com<br>jpbqlxiallxpxnf.ru<br>jrjarkacjxptwaa.ru<br>kuoycxqewotcwnr.cn<br>larrowlygahvjrf.cn<br>laxixnnswnfcoat.com<br>lbdvdftoknnjgnt.cn<br>lboyoqtrjngmxot.cn<br>lcbqyugshoarnup.ru<br>lqibdkotaucksjv.com<br>ltyijgdjdiwatrd.cn<br>luwardwlejahsbl.cn<br>mcwaoarumdwfuoi.ru<br>mkomjxfqmkpdsnp.com</pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc2ed7917027" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/csis-techblog/the-brief-glory-of-cabassous-flubot-a-private-android-banking-botnet-bc2ed7917027">The Brief Glory of Cabassous/FluBot — a private Android banking botnet</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/csis-techblog">CSIS TechBlog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The RoamingMantis Group’s Expansion to European Apple Accounts and Android Devices]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/csis-techblog/the-roamingmantis-groups-expansion-to-european-apple-accounts-and-android-devices-e6381723c681?source=rss-ce8ecbabdcd1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e6381723c681</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[android]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ios]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aleksejs Kuprins]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2020 09:39:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-25T09:39:23.750Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Background</h3><p>The RoamingMantis cybercrime group has been extensively blogged about, analyzed and discussed on different information security conferences and blogs since 2017. It is known to infect victims with the following range of malware families for the Android OS: FakeCop, FakeSpy, MoqHao and FunkyBot. The malware is meant to provide the criminals with access to the victims’ Android OS devices for further monetary fraud. Until now, the group has been known to focus mostly on Asian countries. It was attacking Europe back in 2018 as well, however we have found those campaigns to be not as organized as these new ones.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J2MkvNLMAZ4a-0eYmx9U5g.jpeg" /><figcaption>The image above is present on every FakeCop malware’s control panel</figcaption></figure><p>This trojan is usually delivered via SMS spam, containing links to a variety of different fake websites, which entice the victims to download and install a malicious component — in this case <strong>FakeCop</strong>.</p><p>Cases of infections via the official GooglePlay store have been identified in the past as well. Please see the references section to find the articles featuring technical analysis of each of the malware families used by this group, as well as a summary of the group’s operations and timelines.</p><p>The recent events have exposed the novel ambitions of this group, particularly in their desire to extend their fraud to European countries. Specifically, we have observed such campaigns in: Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland. Besides these EU countries, we have also seen this attack against the mobile users in United Kingdom, Switzerland, Brazil and Japan. With this campaign, RoamingMantis is not only attacking Android OS with malware, but also employs phishing against Apple ID accounts. Please note, that unlike the Android OS component, the iOS part of the fraud is unrelated to any malicious apps.</p><h3>The Move on Europe</h3><p>Besides the previously used SMS spam, the chosen strategy for attacking mobile device users in these newly-added regions is the use of phishing website lures. All of these websites impersonate a locally-used postal/delivery service.</p><p>For example, the campaign in Denmark involves a website, which looks almost identical to PostNord — a postal/delivery service widely used in this country. The rest of the campaigns for the aforementioned new target countries each feature that country’s own locally-popular postal/delivery service.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qeSU6byDaxGwSsx613cwXw.png" /><figcaption>Examples of the European adaptations of the FakeCop’s spreading websites</figcaption></figure><p>On such fake websites, the victim is usually being asked to enter their phone number. Upon entry, the website offers to download and install an APK file (APK is the file extension of app packages for the Android OS). This technique has been successfully utilized by the group in other regions in the past.</p><h3>Apple ID Phishing</h3><p>Along with extension to the new regions and the phishing page strategy, the RoamingMantis group has also decided to incorporate a phishing attack on the victims’ Apple ID accounts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dESxSrc6xLjtPiVnvxsHzQ.png" /><figcaption>Examples of AppleID phishing pages — these are displayed to the users who run iOS</figcaption></figure><p>Unfortunately, the phishing pages impersonate the original websites accurately enough. For that reason, we have found these phishing pages to yield Apple ID account names and passwords to the criminals at an alarming rate. At one point we have observed the traffic of between <strong>10 to 15 </strong>credentials <strong>per hour, in Denmark alone</strong>. However, this rate has slowed down greatly on the second day of our observations.</p><h3>Data Collection</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Zjudvlt1bphFUwPh9TE4rQ.png" /></figure><p>The backend of RoamingMantis’ FakeCop malware and its European phishing campaign is split between different hosts, each responsible for providing the criminals with a web user interface for management of the stolen data, as well as the database behind it. Each of the phishing websites runs its own panel, which stores the data acquired from the phishing.</p><p>In case anyone reading out there has looked at the screenshot above and instantly remembered an article <a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/05/trumps-dumps-making-dumps-great-again/">on Krebsonsecurity about Trump’s Dumps</a> — sorry, we are not aware of any connection of RoamingMantis to it beyond the use of this design.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7sY6R8_FubLo9FeNUTD1vA.png" /></figure><p>Notably, all of the control panels that we have observed provide the user interface in Chinese language. It is <strong>highly uncommon</strong> for Chinese-speaking carders to attack European financial organizations.</p><p>RoamingMantis has a wide variety of monetization schemes, which ranges from bitcoin mining and money laundering to banking fraud. You can expect a group as large as this one to use every opportunity at their disposal to generate revenue.</p><p>Using these control panels, the criminals can change different settings to fine-tune the phishing activity. We have used GoogleTranslate on some of the screenshots for the ease of reading.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/939/1*p6vJsb0YLbXGUPlrKl37rg.png" /><figcaption>The Settings of the phishing website designed to attack Denmark</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2-IRGc19l3GXZc3pk-gtDw.png" /><figcaption>This user interface provides the criminals with access to the stolen data from the campaign in Denmark</figcaption></figure><p>Meanwhile, the IDs of the stolen data records on the main panel are much larger, indicating its magnitude (nearly 7,000 records). This panel includes data from various campaigns:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CjclC8ubrK-Dz9Iu8_XjCQ.png" /></figure><p>Finally, the user interface for monitoring of specifically the FakeCop’s malware data in EU has a different design, but also shows the amount of devices affected in EU (nearly 300).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KHCwjPvfOSXpDXsmMDzVZQ.png" /></figure><h3>Summary</h3><p>Roaming Mantis campaigns usually come in huge volumes of spam, but now also have a wide regional coverage. The analysis above covers only a minor part of such campaigns during just two days of observation.</p><p>The technique of impersonation of postal/delivery services is nothing new and has been used rather successfully around the world by cybercriminals for years. Nearly everyone expects a package delivery from time to time and often would be impatient to receive it. The criminals will always exploit such impatience, because the phishing page can seem more credible when the victim is actually expecting a delivery.</p><p>Please remember to always verify the source of notifications for your mail or other delivery. Is it the same incoming phone number in that SMS notification as it was previously, when you have received a different delivery? Did you receive an email notification at the same time as well? Can you remember or check the official website name of your postal/delivery service? If so, maybe you could navigate to that page manually instead of clicking the provided link in the notification.</p><p>Exercise caution and avoid installing any unknown apps or entering your AppleID credentials when the context should not call for that. Your real postal/delivery service is most likely to provide their official app only through the official app store, which is relevant for your device: Apples AppStore in case of iOS devices and Googles GooglePlay, if your device runs Android OS.</p><h3>References and Further Reading</h3><ol><li><a href="https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/B2019-Ishimaru-Niseki-Ogawa-Mantis.pdf">https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/B2019-Ishimaru-Niseki-Ogawa-Mantis.pdf</a></li><li><a href="https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/moqhao-related-android-spyware-targeting-japan-and-korea-found-on-google-play/">https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/moqhao-related-android-spyware-targeting-japan-and-korea-found-on-google-play/</a></li><li><a href="https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-uses-dns-hijacking-to-infect-android-smartphones/85178/">https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-uses-dns-hijacking-to-infect-android-smartphones/85178/</a></li><li><a href="https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-dabbles-in-mining-and-phishing-multilingually/85607/">https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-dabbles-in-mining-and-phishing-multilingually/85607/</a></li><li><a href="https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-part-3/88071/">https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-part-3/88071/</a></li><li><a href="https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-part-iv/90332/">https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-part-iv/90332/</a></li><li><a href="https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-part-v/96250/">https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-part-v/96250/</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/fakespy-android-information-stealing-malware-targets-japanese-and-korean-speaking-users/">https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/fakespy-android-information-stealing-malware-targets-japanese-and-korean-speaking-users/</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/a-look-into-the-connection-between-xloader-and-fakespy-and-their-possible-ties-with-the-yanbian-gang/">https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/a-look-into-the-connection-between-xloader-and-fakespy-and-their-possible-ties-with-the-yanbian-gang/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/funkybot-malware-targets-japan">https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/funkybot-malware-targets-japan</a></li><li><a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/05/trumps-dumps-making-dumps-great-again/">https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/05/trumps-dumps-making-dumps-great-again/</a></li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/ninoseki/status/1273057220586950656">https://twitter.com/ninoseki/status/1273057220586950656</a></li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/ninoseki/status/1249623587574517761">https://twitter.com/ninoseki/status/1249623587574517761</a></li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/papa_anniekey/status/1275759555830407168">https://twitter.com/papa_anniekey/status/1275759555830407168</a></li></ol><h4>IOCs</h4><pre>FakeCop APK SHA256<br>19e4f566c9193ab381828b390be24b63fc7c5ba32a4799bee2dc2890204f5833<br>1915ea279e8e5f518e766c9e3363d651891cc4e63951c1dbca0d6e600673d972<br>351e1cd5a9f1e39964d6ecddb81623f97ec137192cec3d314c273d31fcb4a106<br>359e1c533e8008969031255977493f6d07026879b7a39f3cfd4e8a3615db529f<br>4d008b863447590fe42cabdcf1ab5d2d9575db503a4d4566a2b298e684817fb5</pre><pre>Phishing domains:<br>deutschepost .top<br>die-1 .top<br>die-5 .top<br>die-t .top<br>die-u .top<br>die-w .top<br>die-x .top<br>die-y .top<br>kuroneko-b .top<br>kuroneko-c .top<br>kuroneko-d .top<br>kuroneko-e .top<br>kuroneko-f .top<br>kuroneko-h .top<br>kuroneko-i .top<br>kuroneko-k .top<br>kuroneko-m .top<br>kuroneko-n .top<br>kuroneko-o .top<br>kuroneko-r .top<br>kuroneko-u .top<br>kuroneko-x .top<br>laposet .top<br>poste-m .com<br>postnl .top<br>royal-mail .top<br>www.postnl .top<br>post-y .top<br>fr-a .top<br>post-ap .top<br>jppost-tu .top<br>jppost-ha .top<br>jppost-hi .top<br>jppost-ru .top<br>jppost-yu .top<br>jppost-ka .co<br>jppost-ama .com<br>jppost-so .co<br>jppost-ke .co<br>jppost-si .co<br>jppost-ki .co<br>jppost-ko .co<br>jppost-so .top<br>jppost-sso .top</pre><pre>Host/C2 IPs:<br>103.126.100 .18<br>103.145.106 .131<br>45.137.183 .33</pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e6381723c681" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/csis-techblog/the-roamingmantis-groups-expansion-to-european-apple-accounts-and-android-devices-e6381723c681">The RoamingMantis Group’s Expansion to European Apple Accounts and Android Devices</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/csis-techblog">CSIS TechBlog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Analysis of Joker — A Spy & Premium Subscription Bot on GooglePlay]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/csis-techblog/analysis-of-joker-a-spy-premium-subscription-bot-on-googleplay-9ad24f044451?source=rss-ce8ecbabdcd1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9ad24f044451</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[spyware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[android]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[google-play]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aleksejs Kuprins]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Sep 2019 14:21:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-09T12:14:37.050Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Analysis of Joker — A Spy &amp; Premium Subscription Bot on GooglePlay</h3><p>Over the past couple of weeks, we have been observing a new Trojan on GooglePlay. So far, we have detected it in 24 apps with over 472,000+ installs in total. The malware — going by the name “the Joker” (which was borrowed from one of the C&amp;C domain names) — delivers a second stage component, which silently simulates the interaction with advertisement websites, steals the victim’s SMS messages, the contact list and device info.</p><p>The automated interaction with the advertisement websites includes simulation of clicks and entering of the authorization codes for premium service subscriptions. For example, in Denmark, Joker can silently sign the victim up for a 50 DKK/week service (roughly ~6,71 EUR). This strategy works by automating the necessary interaction with the premium offer’s webpage, entering the operator’s offer code, then waiting for a SMS message with a confirmation code and extracting it using regular expressions. Finally, the Joker submits the extracted code to the offer’s webpage, in order to authorize the premium subscription.</p><p>The Joker malware only attacks targeted countries. Most of the infected apps contain a list of Mobile Country Codes (MCC) and the victim has to be using a SIM card from one of these countries in order to receive the second stage payload. The majority of the discovered apps target the EU and Asian countries, however, some apps allow for any country to join. Furthermore, most of the discovered apps have an additional check, which will make sure that the payload won’t execute when running within the US or Canada. The UI of C&amp;C panel and some of the bot’s code comments are written in Chinese, which could be a hint in terms of geographical attribution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/714/1*hJAgjsgv9TO4dD7tpfQ0ng.png" /></figure><p>The full list of 37 targeted countries includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Argentina, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.</p><p>Besides loading the second stage DEX file, the malware also receives dynamic code and commands over HTTP and runs that code via JavaScript-to-Java callbacks. Such an approach provides an extra layer of protection against static analysis, since a lot of instructions in this case are not hard-coded into the malicious app on GooglePlay.</p><h3>Loader</h3><p>In most of the apps the developers have inserted the Joker initialization component into one or another advertisement framework. The little package of malicious code typically consists of: <br>• Target country checking via MCC<br>• Minimum C&amp;C communication — just enough to report the infection and receive the encrypted configuration<br>• DEX decryption &amp; loading<br>• A notification listener — when a new SMS message arrives, this listener captures it and sends out a broadcast for the Core (second stage) component to pick up.</p><p>Often, an app would contain a so-called “Splash” screen — an activity, which displays the app’s logo, while performing various initialization processes in the background. Some of the Joker apps use such activity for initialization as well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/694/1*Wq3NboGO-TvA7FdTUGlaPQ.png" /><figcaption><em>310 and 302 are the MCC codes for USA and Canada</em></figcaption></figure><p>The Joker employs custom string obfuscation schemes for all of the configuration/payload/communication parsing procedures. The code listing below displays an example of an obfuscated MCC code list, <em>(DEFAULT_COUNTRY_ISO)</em> separated by the underscore symbol.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*FhjKcYwlNN3sB1iwqiXdPg.png" /><figcaption><em>In this case, a method for de-obfuscation dynamically builds a string “28 Ux0-” and removes it from these strings</em></figcaption></figure><p>After the initialization is done, the malware will download an obfuscated and AES-encrypted configuration from the payload distribution C&amp;C server. Joker composes the AES key for the configuration string decryption using yet another string scheme, which would concatenate the app’s package name with MCC code string and shuffle the symbols around in a specific way. Eventually, the settings for the second stage retrieval decrypt to a message of the following format:</p><pre>#x#<strong>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs.com/s8-all</strong>#x#<strong>18</strong>#x#<strong>32</strong>#x#<strong>com.plane.internal.Entrance</strong>#x#<strong>initialize</strong>#x#<strong>http://joker2.dolphinsclean.com/</strong>#x#<strong>swfyXB</strong></pre><p>The configuration string above contains the necessary information about the second stage code — the core component of the Joker. Being split by a 3-symbol delimiter, the configuration string above contains (ordered): <br>1. The URL for the Joker Core DEX file — this file is obfuscated<br>2. The de-obfuscation “keys” — indexes of the obfuscated read buffer<br>3. The initialization class name — the class, which implements the initialization method<br>4. The initialization method name — which method to call upon loading<br>5. The C&amp;C URL<br>6. The campaign tag</p><p>The Loader downloads the DEX and starts the de-obfuscation routine. The said routine reads the DEX file in a buffer 128 bytes at a time. The de-obfuscation “keys” are the positional indexes for this buffer. For each iteration, the routine reads the bytes of the obfuscated buffer only between these positions and writes them into a file, producing a valid DEX file in the end.</p><h3>Core</h3><p>This malware kit stands out as a small and a silent one. It is using as little Java code as possible and thus generates as little footprint as possible. After all of the Loader’s MCC checks and payload loading — the Core component begins its work. It is designed in a job-scheduler fashion, meaning that it periodically requests new commands from the C&amp;C server. When found, it executes them in strict order and then reports the results, depending on the type of the given task. The below figure is an example of a command (truncated).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/792/1*0J54P_-n4mk5Qe_3kfsiNw.png" /><figcaption>A job message from Joker’s C&amp;C</figcaption></figure><p>When Joker receives such message, it proceeds to open the offer URL, injects the JavaScript commands one by one and waits for an authorization SMS (if any). When the SMS message arrives, the malware extracts the necessary authorization code using case-specific regular expressions. At other times, it simply sends a SMS message to a premium number, with a specific code from the offer page.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/829/1*vILiWZ9m3yu4-8nIQvZGIg.png" /><figcaption>Snippet of JavaScript from a premium offer page</figcaption></figure><p>The Joker knows when to send a premium SMS message when it opens a premium offer page and finds an attribute with value starting with “<em>sms:</em>”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/733/1*osw5PET4X8UMN2WoeDQHsg.png" /><figcaption>Joker builds a SMS to be sent to a premium number, using data from the premium offer webpage</figcaption></figure><p>Whenever the malware extracts a code from a SMS message — it also reports it to the C&amp;C after the job is complete. Hypothetically, the botnet operator can craft a job, which would result in all incoming SMS messages being stolen.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/629/1*IL-gFalC6XtvF0uKnrl0sQ.png" /><figcaption>Joker’s SMS data exfiltration, encrypted with AES</figcaption></figure><p>The figure above is a sample of the second stage communication with the C&amp;C and it contains the full text of a stolen test SMS message. It can be decrypted into a JSON object. The clear-text communication can also be observed using a debugger.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/509/1*Es6GnVinalyxQvYdTciHtg.png" /><figcaption>A portion of decrypted report, containing the stolen SMS message</figcaption></figure><p>The final important thing worth mentioning about the Joker is the phone book contact list theft. The core component collects all numbers in the contact list and sends them over to the C&amp;C in an encrypted form:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/603/1*bhH_Y-mbFmStNVJVFlEHkg.png" /><figcaption>Contact list harvesting</figcaption></figure><p>A total of 12 unique builds of the second stage payload were observed among the 24 infected apps. The version names come from the payload URLs and data inside the sample’s configuration class:</p><pre>-s8-release<br>-s8–5-release<br>-s8–5-dsp-release<br>-s8-all<br>-s9–6-release<br>-s9–6–3<br>-s9–3-sendsms<br>-s9–6–2-release<br>-Y12-all-no-log<br>-Y12-no-log<br>-Y13-all<br>-Y13-all-v2-no-log</pre><h3>Summary</h3><p>The described trojan employs notably stealthy tactics to perform quite malicious activities on GooglePlay, while hiding within the advertisement frameworks and not exposing too much of its malicious code out in the open. The earliest occurrence of the Joker in the wild that we can pinpoint comes from DNS metadata, which suggests that the Joker malware family has begun its recent campaigns in early June 2019. However, the major version digits in the build names give an impression of a slightly longer life cycle, potentially with more campaigns in the past.</p><p>Despite the volume (24 apps) Google seems to be on top of this threat as much as it is possible. Some of the apps do rack up 100,000+ installs before they get removed, however, the install number can always be artificial to some degree due to the common astroturfing practices. Throughout this investigation, Google has been removing all of these apps without any note from us.</p><p>We recommend paying close attention to the permission list in the apps that you install on your Android device. Obviously, there usually isn’t a clear description of why a certain app needs a particular permission, which means that whenever you are downloading any app — you are still relying on your gut feeling to some extent.</p><h3>IOC</h3><pre>The first stage (payload distribution) C&amp;C: <a href="http://3.122.143[.]26/">http://3.122.143[.]26/</a><br>Main C&amp;Cs:<br>http://joker2.dolphinsclean[.]com/<br>http://beatleslover[.]com/<br>http://47.254.144[.]154/</pre><pre>Second stage binaries (Core):<br>https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.site-group-df[.]com/s8-release<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/s8–5-release<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/s8-5-dsp-release<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/s8-all<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/s9-3-sendsms<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/s9–6-release<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/s9–6–2-release<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/s9-6-3<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/Y12-all-no-log<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/Y12-no-log<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/Y13-all<br>https://tb-eu-jet.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs[.]com/Y13-all-v2-no-log</pre><pre>Unpacked second stage of the build &quot;Y13-all-v2-no-log&quot; SHA256: a7dc4238682147012751bb853001b053527ca8031a624bbd5db1a77a3e563ead</pre><pre>Loader YARA rule:<br>rule android_joker {     <br>    strings:<br>        $c = { 52656D6F746520436C6F616B } // Remote Cloak<br>        $cerr = { 6E6574776F726B2069737375653A20747279206C61746572 } // network issue: try later<br>        $net = { 2F6170692F636B776B736C3F6963633D } // /api/ckwksl?icc=<br>        $ip = { 332E3132322E3134332E3236 } // 3.122.143.26     <br>    condition:<br>        ($c and $cerr) or $net or $ip <br>}</pre><pre>Infected Apps on GooglePlay:</pre><pre>SHA256: b36fbe6b75f00ae835156185ca5d6955cdfbe410d73c3e5653dabbaff260f166<br>Package Name: com.with.nofear.myheart<br>Installs: 100,000+<br>Loader Path: com.startapp.android.publish<br>MCC Config: 262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_272_427_228_214</pre><pre>SHA256: 718210a0c41160240843711d79f2757548e72934e996b0e16a2b2277369d366b<br>Package Name: com.certain.icdesktop.wallpaper<br>Installs: 100,000+<br>Loader Path: com.tohsoft.wallpaper.ui.details.basics<br>MCC Config: unknown_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_272_427_228_214</pre><pre>SHA256: 81d784ee65a8dc113683cd7cc271a36da275a500621cefa187095951af3a5114<br>Package Name: com.building.castle.bster<br>Installs: 50,000+<br>Loader Path: com.startapp.android.publish<br>MCC Config: 620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286</pre><pre>SHA256: 2d9a7d75227c3332591e1af5a2f2223eec3328c75c95dea9a33ea269200faf38<br>Package Name: com.futureage.facelook<br>Installs: 50,000+<br>Loader Path: com.startapp.android.publish<br>MCC Config: 262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_272_427_228_214</pre><pre>SHA256: 1e724a5af76927106ee92421412af62698707d1d44a9891f91b3c6902f1780cd<br>Package Name: com.comeback.myside.sms<br>Installs: 50,000+<br>Loader Path: com.blur.blurphoto.view<br>MCC Config: 242_620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286</pre><pre>SHA256: 69d94f94233a2e42d49eeafaea7bf2aad86671cdaf3be45b00ff3de624d7e883<br>Package Name: com.sybo.ggp.cam<br>Installs: 10,000+<br>Loader Path: com.startapp.android.publish<br>MCC Config: 262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_272_427_228_214</pre><pre>SHA256: e44f514c7729a6c39700db6ac51c817c77741e19178f8942c2d26f6b62ef9df5<br>Package Name: com.declare.smsarr.message<br>Installs: 10,000+<br>Loader Path: com.messages.messenger.chat.list</pre><pre>SHA256: 226e9c5ca45facb9b9a36529e09958546c4b351f4b7ae02101f8e3c1d6e3de7b<br>Package Name: com.change.nicephoto<br>Installs: 10,000+<br>Loader Path: com.blur.blurphoto.view.<br>MCC Config: 242_620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286</pre><pre>SHA256: 6261be516a54d8566348b8305e96f34bdbf4f11620350c5f36f4bc3cb67fc181<br>Package Name: com.rapidface.smart.scanner<br>Installs: 10,000+ <br>Loader Path: com.fungo.constellation.common.ball<br>MCC Config: unknown_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_272_427_228_214</pre><pre>SHA256: 43b36c438a3531e42623fbd00f5b57066a4db8048ce8e0ab0b5ecf9eac67aabf<br>Package Name: com.burning.rockn.scan<br>Installs: 10,000+<br>Loader Path: com.startapp.android.publish<br>MCC Config: 620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286</pre><pre>SHA256: da2171a32f3b95620c35a48a34fb7293a321ab41266d3461f808b2f07694e5a7<br>Package Name: com.board.picture.editing<br>Installs: 10,000+<br>Loader Path: com.color.black.filter<br>MCC Config: unknown_460_262_520_202_222_427_232</pre><pre>SHA256: 494c8c6155a08ae95a2f1962636911310c98d36f065e81eddf4ffcb172913495<br>Package Name: com.cute.hd4kcam.camera<br>Installs: 10,000+<br>Loader Path: com.facebook.appevents.camera.pics<br>MCC Config: unknown_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_272_427_228_214</pre><pre>SHA256: a8bf4055a4988ee181be9915c93c6278503be562475a558aef3c6dba54e06b13<br>Package Name: com.wallpapers.dazzle.gp<br>Installs: 10,000+<br>Loader Path: com.startapp.android.publish<br>MCC Config: 262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_272_427_228_214</pre><pre>SHA256: befde4166a9cdf2ff7c8f81fb5dec6a6760d20e0debbc667a8274899a248ef31<br>Package Name: com.cantwait.ezlife.wallpaper<br>Installs: 10,000+<br>Loader Path: com.startapp.android.publish<br>MCC Config: 620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286</pre><pre>SHA256: b631b2254850e62804fc66895850dcbf007d670aa843af8d2e525c85947da2d4<br>Package Name: com.Climate.sms<br>Installs: 10,000+<br>Loader Path: com.color.black.filter<br>MCC Config: unknown_620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286</pre><pre>SHA256: 2e3bff9dda4c568a5e12c2f468227ec8dc5baf9913fe573f02ef2d5432b37bc0<br>Package Name: com.xw.supervpnfree<br>Installs: 5,000+<br>Loader Path: org.greenrobot.eventbus.util<br>MCC Config: 242_620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286</pre><pre>SHA256: 9b4a1b7c638be029f0ffcb92dcfac74052f41fc36d43a45f6aa80d20d1285646<br>Package Name: com.vegtable.blif.camera<br>Installs: 5,000+<br>Loader Path: com.startapp.android.publish</pre><pre>SHA256: 5405e39dbde78e3b561a6e54f208ce557f04bdbdc363ea6442892d26ba91811e<br>Package Name: com.print.plant.scan<br>Installs: 5,000+<br>Loader Path: com.plantfinder.identification.ui.inner<br>MCC Config: unknown_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_272_427_228_214</pre><pre>SHA256: 65135899349daca2646ca36c5a442382bc988f5b3749a2bd5322170d777af77a<br>Package Name com.saying.wallpaper.bb<br>Installs: 5,000+<br>Loader Path: com.startapp.android.publish<br>MCC Config: 262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_272_427_228_214</pre><pre>SHA256: 54aba1530d829c71b2410c06628de034e38bc52be3002f82cc771c219d91958d<br>Package Name: com.hampi.sender<br>Installs: 1,000+<br>Loader Path: com.color.black.filter<br>MCC Config: unknown_620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286</pre><pre>SHA256: 27450c3c735dc3dcba9254a3b08ed22bbcde8631343cb70107d4e41e17fbb548<br>Package Name: com.Ignite.amino.clean (still up!)<br>Installs: 1,000+<br>Loader Path: com.alc.coolermaster.activity.create<br>MCC Config: 242_620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286_602_255</pre><pre>SHA256: 162ee177dea9b94366063de63dffd97f92f7a50e0e429d54fea73dc3a52f1b3a<br>Package Name: com.anti.mysecurity<br>Loader Path: org.greenrobot.eventbus.util<br>MCC Config: 242_620_708_208_427_310_262_202_460_268_520_502_424_510_414_232_204_222_228_272_240_724_404_722_505_206_280_214_208_234_419_260_220_525_293_286</pre><pre>SHA256: f165e04ee6ec84a2e57108c0f7e157a5dc1158fb38a161e5cfcde89476838c09<br>Package Name: com.hello.sweetangle.horoscope<br>Loader Path: com.mopub.common.boost</pre><pre>SHA256: 0eba66cda54c732645ca69949882097c2f2e69dff917e8834b6636ef00848772<br>Package Name: com.tr.rushphoto<br>Loader Path: com.mopub.common.boost</pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9ad24f044451" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/csis-techblog/analysis-of-joker-a-spy-premium-subscription-bot-on-googleplay-9ad24f044451">Analysis of Joker — A Spy &amp; Premium Subscription Bot on GooglePlay</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/csis-techblog">CSIS TechBlog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Updates for Samsung” — from a blog to an Android advertisement revenue goldmine of 10,000,000+…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/csis-techblog/updates-for-samsung-from-a-blog-to-an-android-advertisement-revenue-goldmine-of-10-000-000-166585e34ad0?source=rss-ce8ecbabdcd1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/166585e34ad0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[android]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[google-play]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[samsung]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aleksejs Kuprins]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jul 2019 08:50:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-04T08:50:14.320Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>“Updates for Samsung” — from a blog to an Android advertisement revenue goldmine of 10,000,000+ users</h3><p>The latest Android OS comes in countless varieties of vendor builds and versions. Are you aware of what else is countless about Android OS? It is the amount of complex and often privacy-invasive advertisement frameworks available. In addition, it seems that the aforementioned facts are being exploited for easy income.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/741/1*RMNiuyiiFClcXY4XlKWq8g.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=samsungupdate.com">https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=samsungupdate.com</a></figcaption></figure><p>The above eye-catching app exists on the official Android OS application store. How did the developer trick 10,000,000+ users into installing it? I am going to put my money on the fact that he or she named the app “Updates for Samsung”. It would be wrong to judge people for mistakenly going to the official application store for the firmware updates after buying a new Android device. Vendors frequently bundle their Android OS builds with an intimidating number of software and it can easily get confusing.</p><p>The main “chunk” of the content for this app comes from it rendering a blog website updato[.]com on the main screen of the app. It features some news and android-related tutorials.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IBEO0oMwAXsO0e7fQ7Fijg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1_za8-2HhQTSUrwUaEzD_g.png" /><figcaption>The app displays a blog website in a WebView and offers to remove all ads for a ~$12 payment</figcaption></figure><p>A user can search for their specific firmware in the “Download Firmware” section of the app. Besides being stuffed with advertisement frameworks and not being affiliated with Samsung (yet distributing their firmware), the app offers paid subscriptions for the downloads of the said firmware. A user can get an annual subscription for Samsung firmware update downloads for a small fee of $34.99. Interestingly, that doesn’t happen through the official GooglePlay subscriptions. The app simply asks for your credit card info and sends it to an API endpoint under updato[.]com over HTTPS.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YxeXPzqsq8yxg5QEe3eKtw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oESZK5Bx0Yzz_P2hwojS3Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XyOQvKpOJgsfLEAOOKX6tA.png" /></figure><p>There is a shady peculiarity about these firmware downloads. You may have noted from the screenshot above that the app offers both free and paid options for its downloads. And it does indeed allow the registered users to download the firmware for free. However, the download rate is limited to 56 KBps. Which means that a download of a typical firmware ROM of ~700 MB would take at least an infuriating wait of 4 hours. Furthermore, as a number of app reviewers have indicated, — the download is also almost doomed to timeout and fail, hence “motivating” the user to pay for “Fast downloads through paid premium packages”. During our tests, we too have observed that the downloads don’t finish, even when using a reliable network.</p><p>Last but not least, the app claims to offer SIM card unlocking for any network operator, starting at $19.99. Also not via GooglePlay subscription.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dxy5DAknIIQsts-yk69Gqg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iDvLV-dXktHibbjHq8XWtA.png" /></figure><p>Although not malicious in the traditional meaning of that term “Updates for Samsung” does not seem to offer users much of value besides a lighter wallet and as such highlights the risks of ignoring the fine print. We recommend users to follow Samsung’s designed procedure for downloading firmware updates. That is, by opening the “Settings” application on your Android device and navigating to the “About phone” -&gt; “Software Update” menu. These updates are guaranteed to come directly from the vendor and are free of charge.</p><h3>IOC</h3><p>Package name: samsungupdate.com</p><p>GooglePlay app URL: <a href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=samsungupdate.com">https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=samsungupdate.com</a></p><p>SHA256:9c2b78a3c88ac698b6ad86c2535d1816b68c42f0eb3e6f3f70eb8c7b1c7ab2ac</p><p>The blog: updato[.]com</p><p>App permissions:</p><pre>android.permission.INTERNET<br>android.permission.CAMERA<br>android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE<br>android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE<br>android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE<br>android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION<br>com.android.vending.BILLING<br>android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED<br>android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE<br>android.permission.BLUETOOTH<br>android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN<br>android.permission.WAKE_LOCK<br>com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE<br>com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE<br>samsungupdate.com.permission.C2D_MESSAGE<br>android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION<br>com.google.android.gms.permission.ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION</pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=166585e34ad0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/csis-techblog/updates-for-samsung-from-a-blog-to-an-android-advertisement-revenue-goldmine-of-10-000-000-166585e34ad0">“Updates for Samsung” — from a blog to an Android advertisement revenue goldmine of 10,000,000+…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/csis-techblog">CSIS TechBlog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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