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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ala eddine Khemissi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ala eddine Khemissi on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Ala eddine Khemissi on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alaeddine.khmissi?source=rss-61d2976d1476------2</link>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[LetsDefend — SOC138: Detected Suspicious Xls File]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alaeddine.khmissi/letsdefend-soc138-detected-suspicious-xls-file-85b0737b564c?source=rss-61d2976d1476------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/85b0737b564c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lets-defend]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vba-macros]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[log-analysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ala eddine Khemissi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 11:14:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-06T11:14:53.685Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this investigation, I analyzed alert <strong>SOC138 (Event ID 77)</strong> triggered on the LetsDefend platform. The alert flagged a suspicious Excel macro-enabled workbook “ORDER SHEET &amp; SPEC.xlsm” delivered to host <strong>Sofia</strong> with ip address 172.16.17.56.</p><h3><strong>Alert Overview</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*2kUSwGbtyTHlnBok_1-pjQ.png" /><figcaption>Alert Overview</figcaption></figure><p>After gathering the artifacts from the generated alert, our analysis will focus on the following details:</p><ul><li><strong>File Extension:</strong> .xlsm</li><li><strong>File Hash: </strong>7ccf88c0bbe3b29bf19d877c4596a8d4</li><li><strong>Device Action: </strong>Allowed</li></ul><h3><strong>Understanding </strong><strong>.xlsm Execution Risks</strong></h3><p>An <strong>.xlsm</strong> file is a Microsoft Excel Macro-Enabled Workbook capable of executing embedded <strong>VBA (Visual Basic for Applications)</strong> code. While legitimate users leverage macros to automate repetitive tasks, attackers frequently abuse them to deliver malicious payloads, perform WMI calls, or download secondary malware onto the endpoint.</p><h3><strong>Investigation and Analysis</strong></h3><p>Step 1: Playbook initiation and threat verification</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*M1R5QJukmpXz2sgoZciQ1w.png" /></figure><p>Upon inspecting the alert artifacts, the device action was marked as Allowed, indicating that the malicious .xlsm file was neither quarantined nor cleaned.</p><p>Step 2: Malware analysis (third-party intelligence)</p><p>To assess the risk posed by the file, I checked the file hash on <strong>VirusTotal :</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*kC0issElu5q8MT8lNAOlYw.png" /></figure><p>To evaluate the threat level of ORDER SHEET &amp; SPEC.xlsm, I queried its file hash on VirusTotal. The file was flagged as malicious by 45 out of 64 security vendors. Behavioral telemetry confirmed embedded malicious macro activity, including calls to WMI, dropped file execution, and auto-open routines associated with CVE-2017–11882.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*I0cWIzv-5PNbD1on9e1JEg.png" /></figure><p>Step 3: Network and C2 traffic inspection</p><p>To verify whether the malicious payload initiated outbound network connections upon execution on the host 172.16.17.56 we inspected the network logs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*P6x8rJa5k10S9jyDlgtIKA.png" /></figure><pre>Timestamp: Mar 13, 2021, 08:20 PM   <br>Source IP: 172.16.17.56 / Port 52155)   <br>Destination IP (C2): 177.53.143.89 / Port 443  <br>Action: Connections recorded via Firewall logs. </pre><p>Log analysis revealed active outbound communication established with C2 infrastructure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*gUvHv1wk8Aix5EaozgqjRw.png" /></figure><p>Step 4: Endpoint isolation and containment</p><p>Because the host successfully communicated with C2 infrastructure, network containment was required immediately.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*oDOSosM45JucqnbSOPj-8A.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Artifacts and Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)</strong></h3><p>The following IoCs were recorded during the investigation:</p><ul><li>MD5 Hash: 7ccf88c0bbe3b29bf19d877c4596a8d4</li><li>C2 IP Address: 177.53.143.89</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*mG9pTaAM7OV6IDi_7M4qqg.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Analyst notes</strong></h3><p>On March 13, 2021, at 20:20, the endpoint 172[.]16[.]17[.]56 executed a suspicious XLS file (name: ORDER SHEET &amp; SPEC.xlsm, MD5 : 7ccf88c0bbe3b29bf19d877c4596a8d4). Shortly after execution, the host initiated an outbound connection to 177[.]53[.]143[.]89 on port 443. The endpoint was contained to prevent further compromise, and the alert was escalated to Tier 2 for deeper analysis.</p><p>I hope you found this walkthrough helpful and enjoyed following the analysis process.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=85b0737b564c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SOC137 — Malicious File/Script Download Attempt]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alaeddine.khmissi/soc137-malicious-file-script-download-attempt-fc6bf8733649?source=rss-61d2976d1476------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fc6bf8733649</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[virustotal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lets-defend]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-operation-center]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ala eddine Khemissi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 10:11:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-17T15:46:48.625Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>LetsDefend Alert</strong></p><p>This write-up provides a step-by-step guide for investigating a SOC alert titled “<strong>Malicious File/Script Download Attempt</strong>”.</p><p><strong>Step 1: Alert Triage and Artifact Gathering</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*KS8GtdtXDRCZTpVIE2o_Aw.png" /></figure><p>In this phase, we extract key Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and context directly from the SIEM or EDR alert:</p><pre>EventID : 76<br>Event Time : Mar, 14, 2021, 07:15 PM<br>Rule : SOC137 - Malicious File/Script Download Attempt<br>Source Address : 172.16.17.37<br>Source Hostname : NicolasPRD<br>File Name : INVOICE PACKAGE LINK TO DOWNLOAD.docm<br>File Hash : f2d0c66b801244c059f636d08a474079<br>File Size : 16.66 Kb<br>Device Action : Blocked</pre><p><strong>Step 2 : IoC Analysis and Reputation Check</strong></p><p>In this phase, we analyze the IoCs extracted during the previous step, file hash, using external threat intelligence tools like <strong>VirusTotal</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AVxbje2xJQ6OvMoUQqv8_g.png" /><figcaption>VirusTotal analysis</figcaption></figure><p>Threat intelligence results indicated high confidence of malicious intent, with 40/65 detection engines labeling the file payload as a Trojan.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8LdEoJ25k0tk6f9SLjN6vA.png" /></figure><p>The analyzed file was confirmed to be <strong>malicious</strong>.</p><p><strong>Step 3 : Activity Analysis</strong></p><p>During this step, we analyze endpoint and network telemetry such as EDR, firewall, and web proxy logs to determine if the payload was successfully downloaded or executed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*mH-S92IWRSDcTo1vESwUJQ.png" /><figcaption>Network Logs</figcaption></figure><p>The logs above revealed that the internal host reached only two ip addresses on march 07 before the generation of the alert on march 14.</p><p>The analysis of both visited domains <strong>hxxp[://]ueba6ka[.]club/favicon[.]ico</strong> and <strong>iluuryeqa[.]info </strong>confirmed that both domains were malicious.</p><p><strong>hxxp[://]ueba6ka[.]club/favicon[.]ico</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*fJr4iln0qoO5POx2f9rDGw.png" /></figure><p>The processes svchost.exe and iexplore.exe are often associated with process injection or automated task execution.</p><p>The URL randomly generated alphanumeric pattern, strongly suggesting C2 infrastructure or a malicious host; beside the use of http protocol.</p><p><strong>iluuryeqa[.]info</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*tqzPuhNaXBxQiJ4fnWNIxw.png" /></figure><p>The processes wmiprvse.exe and powershell.exe indicates remote execution via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This is a classic lateral movement or persistence technique (T1047 / T1059.001).</p><p>The next step in this phase was to analyze the endpoint logs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*cRMpBo61iwTVbr5PCOGBWQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*jXoRXvHwvWQWcCByuFHRkg.png" /></figure><p>After 4 days of the alert generation, the endpoint logs confirmed post-exploitation discovery activity on the host.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/957/1*WClWB7GvES8MsdHE7r9RKg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VxHADbkkq6Ge-UBysiyf3w.png" /></figure><p>No Command and Control (C2) communication was observed after the alert was generated.</p><p><strong>Step 4 : Containment and Remediation</strong></p><p>In this phase if the alert is confirmed as a <strong>True Positive (TP); </strong>response actions are required such as:</p><ul><li><strong>Isolate Host:</strong> Network isolation of the impacted endpoint via EDR.</li><li><strong>Block IoCs:</strong> Add the malicious IP/URL to the firewall/proxy blocklist and hash to EDR blacklist.</li><li><strong>Purge Artifacts:</strong> Terminate running processes and delete dropped payloads from the filesystem.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*RI1rGN-7gf8uFqimJhAP4A.png" /></figure><p>The malware is <strong>Quarantained</strong>. <strong>Device Action : Blocked</strong></p><p>Although perimeter controls flagged and blocked the initial <strong>.docm</strong> payload on March 14, log analysis showed discovery activity occurring on March 18–19. This confirms that the host was uncontained and an active threat actor had established persistence.</p><p><strong>Step 5 : Documentation</strong></p><p>In this final phase, an incident investigation walkthrough document is generated to classify the alert as either a <strong>True Positive (TP)</strong> or <strong>False Positive (FP)</strong>, outline the root cause, and summarize all actions taken.</p><p><strong>Analyst Notes</strong></p><p>On Mar 14, 2021, at 19:15, the endpoint 172[.]16[.]17[.]37 generated an alert for a malicious document (name : INVOICE PACKAGE LINK TO DOWNLOAD.docm ; md5 : f2d0c66b801244c059f636d08a474079).</p><p>VirusTotal analysis confirmed the file’s malicious nature.</p><p>Log analysis did not reveal any outbound communication with known malicious infrastructure at or after Mar 14 2021 ; But on Mar 7 the endpoint had contacted malicious domains iluuryeqa[.]info and hxxp[://]ueba6ka[.]club/favicon[.]ico.</p><p>Endpoint telemetry indicated the execution of system discovery commands (net user, whoami, tasklist …) between March 18–19, 2021, suggesting potential attacker reconnaissance activity following initial compromise. The alert was escalated to Tier 2 for deeper investigation.</p><p><strong>Artifacts</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l6QqILaJ75dNX5OHh08uhw.png" /></figure><p>I hope you found this walkthrough helpful and enjoyed following the analysis process.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fc6bf8733649" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Port Scan Activity — LetsDefend]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alaeddine.khmissi/port-scan-activity-letsdefend-c006fac54529?source=rss-61d2976d1476------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c006fac54529</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lets-defend]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[port-scanning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wireshark]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ala eddine Khemissi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2026 13:21:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-04T13:21:41.283Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Can you determine evidences of port scan activity?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ABzVogQH5-u1008FCLh8kw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>Port scanning is a fundamental reconnaissance method used by attackers to discover which services are listening on a network. By probing various ports, a threat actor can map out the target’s attack surface and identify potential vulnerabilities.</p><p>In the context of the <strong>Cyber Kill Chain</strong>, port scanning is a critical component of the <strong>Reconnaissance</strong> phase. Furthermore, it is officially classified under the <strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK</strong> framework as <strong>Technique T1046 (Network Service Discovery)</strong> within the <strong>Discovery</strong> tactic.</p><p><strong>Question 1 :</strong> What is the IP address scanning the environment?</p><p>To identify the source of the scanning activity, we first enumerated all endpoints present in the PCAP file using the <strong>Statistics → Endpoints</strong> menu in Wireshark. The results showed that the IP address 10.42.42.253 generated the highest volume of traffic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*xr7xj7ESy9K5nFPHTckStA.png" /><figcaption>Endpoints</figcaption></figure><p>Next, by examining the <strong>Statistics → Conversations</strong> menu, we observed that 10.42.42.253 initiated communication attempts with multiple hosts across the network.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*An5PBHDIhhLGDob7rpStJg.png" /><figcaption>Conversations</figcaption></figure><p>To further investigate, we applied the filter <strong>ip.src == 10.42.42.253</strong>. The filtered results revealed clear indicators of port scanning activity:</p><ul><li>Short time intervals between consecutive requests.</li><li>Connection attempts targeting multiple ports across different hosts, including: o Port 80 (HTTP), Port 389 (LDAP), Port 23 (Telnet), Port 22 (SSH).</li><li>All observed packets contained the [SYN] flag, without completing the TCP handshake. This is indicative of a <strong>TCP SYN scan</strong>.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*qKQ9KLng63-68JSTp9X_8Q.png" /><figcaption>Port Scanning Activity</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : 10.42.42.253</strong></p><p><strong>Question 2 :</strong> What is the IP address found as a result of the scan?</p><p>By applying the filter <strong>ip.dst == 10.42.42.253</strong>, we identified the endpoints that responded to the scanner’s requests. The analysis showed that the host 10.42.42.50 completed the full TCP three-way handshake, with packets observed containing the [SYN, ACK], [ACK], and [FIN, ACK] flags.</p><p>This behavior confirms that a successful connection was established on ports <strong>135</strong> and <strong>139</strong>, indicating that these ports are open and accessible on the target system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*pLdQTxUy78-SMnDa9zk_wg.png" /><figcaption>Established connection</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : 10.42.42.50</strong></p><p><strong>Question 3 :</strong> What is the MAC address of the Apple system it finds?</p><p>First, enable the name resolution option by going to <strong>Edit → Preferences → Name Resolution</strong>.<br> Then navigate to <strong>Statistics → Endpoints → Ethernet</strong>.<br> Finally, you can enable or disable <strong>Name Resolution</strong> using the checkbox at the bottom of the window.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*wClCsjeQaPfH7LNL40kH5w.png" /><figcaption>Name resolution</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*1oYwilnQHbuKhZE16GN5pQ.png" /><figcaption>Name resolution</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : 00:16:cb:92:6e:dc</strong></p><p><strong>Question 4 :</strong> What is the IP address of the detected Windows system?</p><p>Referring back to the second question, we observed that 10.42.42.50 was the only host to successfully complete a TCP connection with the scanner.</p><p><strong>Answer : 10.42.42.50</strong></p><p>I hope you found this walkthrough helpful and enjoyed following the analysis process.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c006fac54529" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Http Basic Auth. — LetsDefend]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alaeddine.khmissi/http-basic-auth-letsdefend-72782a6ce7b7?source=rss-61d2976d1476------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/72782a6ce7b7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lets-defend]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[packet-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wireshark]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-operation-center]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ala eddine Khemissi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 02 May 2026 11:10:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-02T11:10:09.661Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We receive a log indicating a possible attack, can you gather information from the .pcap file?</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>HTTP traffic analysis is an essential skill for cybersecurity professionals, network administrators, and incident responders. Since many applications and web services communicate over the HTTP protocol, analyzing this traffic can provide valuable insights into user activity, network behavior, and potential security threats.</p><p>In this walkthrough, we will perform a deep-dive analysis of a <strong>.pcap</strong> file using <strong>Wireshark</strong>. Our goal is to investigate suspicious traffic patterns and uncover the indicators of compromise (IOCs) required to solve the <strong>HTTP Basic Auth</strong> challenge from <strong>LetsDefend</strong>.</p><p><strong>Question 1 :</strong> How many HTTP GET requests are in pcap?</p><p>To effectively investigate the capture, I utilized two distinct methods.</p><p>The first focused on leveraging Wireshark’s <strong>Statistics</strong> menu, which provides multiple statistics options ready to investigate to help users see the big picture in terms of the scope of the traffic, available protocols, endpoints and conversations, and some protocol-specific details like DHCP, DNS and HTTP.</p><p>Navigate to <strong>statistics &gt; http &gt; Packet Counter</strong> to view statistics about total http packets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*3go4PM9vMfxqAjugrpXTyQ.png" /><figcaption>HTTP GET requests</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : 5</strong></p><p>The second method involved a deep dive into the traffic using Wireshark’s powerful display filters. I used the <strong>http.request.method == “GET”</strong> filter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*Oj949LLd9QNXtU7s_xyFJQ.png" /><figcaption>HTTP GET requests</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Note:</strong> Wireshark provides a large number of filters, which can be challenging to memorize. Therefore, a practical tip for identifying the appropriate filter for each protocol will be provided at the end of this article.</p><p><strong>Question 2 : </strong>What is the server operating system?</p><p>The analysis showed that all requests were directed to a single destination, suggesting that the server’s IP address is 1[.]1[.]1[.]5. Further investigation was performed by applying the <strong>ip.addr == 1.1.1.5</strong> filter to inspect the related traffic in more detail.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*a-oK4RdT1XL6LPh6jWdH3g.png" /><figcaption>Server Operating System</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : FreeBSD</strong></p><p><strong>Question 3 :</strong> What is the name and version of the web server software?</p><p><strong>Answer : Apache/2.2.15</strong></p><p><strong>Question 4 :</strong> What is the version of OpenSSL running on the server?</p><p><strong>Answer : OpenSSL/0.9.8n</strong></p><p><strong>Question 5 :</strong> What is the client’s user-agent information?</p><p>By selecting one of the requests sent from the client to the web server, we can inspect the User-Agent field.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/987/1*G6CYsDERZrzNRWHabbU1-Q.png" /><figcaption>User-Agent</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : Lynx/2.8.7rel.1 libwww-FM/2.14 SSL-MM/1.4.1 OpenSSL/0.9.8n</strong></p><p><strong>Question 6 : </strong>What is the username used for Basic Authentication?</p><p>By applying the <strong>ip.addr == 1.1.1.5 &amp;&amp; http</strong> filter, we were able to isolate the HTTP communications exchanged between the client and the web server. The captured traffic shows multiple HTTP requests and server responses, including several <strong>401 Authorization Required </strong>responses followed by successful <strong>200 OK</strong> responses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*VFv3RacPa8yC4o4XCweUyQ.png" /></figure><p>To identify the credentials provided by the client, we inspected the packet located between the <strong>401 Authorization Required</strong> response and the <strong>200 OK</strong> response.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*q654vmDY80uer3xoA2MyXQ.png" /><figcaption>Credentials</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : webadmin</strong></p><p><strong>Question 7 :</strong> What is the user password used for Basic Authentication?</p><p><strong>Answer : W3b4Dm1n</strong></p><p><strong>Hint</strong></p><p>Wireshark has a built-in dictionary. Navigate to <strong>Analyze &gt; Display Filter Expressions </strong>to open a searchable menu of every available protocol and field.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/503/1*tmlHnBv6fxKzSnIiIPn2Nw.png" /></figure><p>The <strong>“Display Filter Expressions”</strong> menu shows all protocol fields, accepted value types (integer or string) and predefined values (if any).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*vrBDuzo2Yq_Pc-1RibrBWA.png" /></figure><p>Wireshark will automatically build the perfect syntax for you at the bottom.</p><p>I hope you found this walkthrough helpful and enjoyed following the analysis process.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=72782a6ce7b7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Investigate Web Attack — LetsDefend]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alaeddine.khmissi/investigate-web-attack-letsdefend-d499fb2a66dc?source=rss-61d2976d1476------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d499fb2a66dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web-attack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[log-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lets-defend]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ala eddine Khemissi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 13:41:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-21T13:41:39.541Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We detected some web attacks and need to do deep investigation.</p><p>Web applications constitute the most significant external attack surface, providing a direct gateway for threat actors to exploit organizational networks.</p><p>Logging web traffic is a critical component of incident investigation. Among the various logs generated, the <strong>access.log</strong> file is perhaps the most vital; it provides a chronological record of every request made to the server. By analyzing this file, investigators can determine the <strong>source</strong> (IP address), <strong>timing</strong> (timestamp), <strong>target</strong> (URL/endpoint), and <strong>intent</strong> (HTTP methods like GET or POST) of a potential attacker.</p><p>Now that we understand the importance of logs, let’s begin our investigation by diving into a real-world scenario.</p><p><strong>Question 1 : </strong>Which automated scan tool did attacker use for web reconnaissance?</p><p>The first step of the Cyber Kill Chain is <strong>Reconnaissance</strong>. In this critical phase, adversaries gather intelligence about the target to identify potential vulnerabilities and map out the attack surface before ever launching a payload.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*nb3TXzhQNx36uvYUjZHDEQ.png" /><figcaption>Reconnaissance with Nikto</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : Nikto</strong></p><p>In this phase, attackers often rely on automated tools to accelerate the discovery process. In our scenario, the adversary utilized <strong>Nikto</strong>, an open-source web server scanner.</p><p><strong>Question 2 :</strong> After web reconnaissance activity, which technique did attacker use for directory listing discovery?</p><p>Following the reconnaissance phase, the attacker often initiates a <strong>Directory Brute Force</strong> attack to uncover hidden paths or sensitive files on the web server. This activity is easily identifiable as an automated attack due to the hundreds or even thousands of requests sent within a very short timeframe. The attacker systematically tests combinations of characters or uses a wordlist to find valid directories. In the logs, a <strong>404 </strong>status code indicates a failed attempt, while a <strong>200 </strong>response signals that the directory exists, providing the attacker with a potential entry point.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*5gNkGmQXaMg3SA100xm9Ow.png" /><figcaption>Directory Brute Force</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : Directory Brute Force</strong></p><p><strong>Question 3 :</strong> What is the third attack type after directory listing discovery?</p><p>Once an entry point is identified — in this case, the <strong>login.php</strong> interface, the attacker shifts their focus to compromising the authentication mechanism. By performing a <strong>Credential Brute Force</strong> attack, the attacker attempts to gain unauthorized access to a valid account.</p><p>At this stage, the attacker has moved from Discovery to Exploitation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*T3K09gmw9ZY0OcFEnoUBEg.png" /><figcaption>Brute Force Attack</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : Brute Force</strong></p><p><strong>Question 4 : </strong>Is the third attack successful?</p><p>A deeper analysis of the log files reveals that after a series of failed attempts, the status code for the <strong>login.php</strong> interface shifts from <strong>200 </strong>to <strong>302</strong>. This redirection confirms that the attacker successfully bypassed the authentication mechanism. Following this breach, the logs show the attacker navigating to sensitive internal interfaces, specifically <strong>portal.php</strong> and <strong>phpi.php</strong>, signaling the start of the post-exploitation phase.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*j8odl44c2_CmRN3ywNLWyQ.png" /><figcaption>Authentication mechanism bypassed</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : yes</strong></p><p><strong>Question 5 : </strong>What is the name of fourth attack?</p><p>The adversary attempted to inject malicious code to enumerate the systems and to ensure persistence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*q5iMihxCI19A6232ue7e4Q.png" /><figcaption>Code Injection</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Answer : Code Injection</strong></p><p><strong>Question 6 :</strong> What is the first payload for 4th attack?</p><p><strong>Answer : whoami</strong></p><p><strong>Question 7:</strong> Is there any persistency clue for the victim machine in the log file ? If yes, what is the related payload?</p><p><strong>Answer : %27net%20user%20hacker%20asd123!!%20/add%27</strong></p><p><strong>Final takeaway :</strong> Understanding these common attack patterns within the access logs is the first and most critical step in moving from a state of compromise to a state of resilience.</p><p>Thank you for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d499fb2a66dc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SOC141 — Phishing URL Detected]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alaeddine.khmissi/soc141-phishing-url-detected-d6d019b70cc5?source=rss-61d2976d1476------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6d019b70cc5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lets-defend]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ala eddine Khemissi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 13:17:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-16T13:17:40.448Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>LetsDefend Alert</strong></p><p>This write-up provides a step-by-step guide to investigating a SOC alert titled <strong>“Phishing URL Detected”</strong> from LetsDefend.</p><p>The investigation begins by reviewing the alert overview and extracting the key fields for further analysis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*S9GVoCf3Jdid_ofG2oVHNw.png" /></figure><p>The key fields that need to be reviewed are:</p><p><strong>Note:</strong> Always use the <strong>Defang UR</strong>L and <strong>Defang IP Address</strong> operations in <strong>CyberChef</strong> when handling URLs and IP addresses, in order to prevent accidental access to potentially malicious content.</p><p><strong>LINK</strong>: <a href="https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/">https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/</a></p><pre>Source Address : 172[.]16[.]17[.]49<br>Source Hostname : EmilyComp<br>Destination Address : 91[.]189[.]114[.]8<br>Destination Hostname : mogagrocol.ru<br>Request URL : hxxp[://]mogagrocol[.]ru/wp-content/plugins/akismet/fv/index[.]php?email=ellie@letsdefend[.]io<br>User Agent : Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.88 Safari/537.36<br>Device Action : Allowed</pre><p>The investigation began with an analysis of the attached URL using VirusTotal and the HybridAnalysis sandbox to assess its potential malicious nature.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*nT8qstijWK0SaDOWV5UZzw.png" /><figcaption>VirusTotal</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*P5OZe3_C_EvKRZAKr85bNQ.png" /><figcaption>HybridAnalysis</figcaption></figure><p>The results indicate that the attached URL is malicious.</p><p><strong>Note</strong>: A sandbox is a secure and isolated virtual environment designed to execute and analyze suspicious files or URLs without exposing the host system to potential infection.</p><p>The next step in our investigation is to examine the logs for any connections from local devices to the suspicious IP address 91[.]189[.]114[.]8.</p><p>The log analysis revealed two events in which the source IP address 172[.]16[.]17[.]49 belonging to ellie made two connection attempts to the suspicious URL. One attempt was allowed by the firewall, while the second was blocked.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*drTptkFEMSCg8J4kj87Ijg.png" /><figcaption>Allowed connection</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*wdXEN-fuX-_fO4I9Sh-c9Q.png" /><figcaption>Blocked connection</figcaption></figure><p>After confirming that a connection was established between a local device and a suspicious URL, the endpoint was successfully contained by the EDR solution to prevent any further potential compromise.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*oUVd5zypL8I45Yo_4Q1gvw.png" /><figcaption>Endpoint containment</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>The investigation concluded that the alert was a true positive.</strong></h3><h3>IoCs:</h3><ul><li><strong>URL</strong>: hxxp[://]mogagrocol[.]ru/wp-content/plugins/akismet/fv/index[.]php?email=ellie@letsdefend[.]io</li><li><strong>IP address</strong>: 91[.]189[.]114[.]8</li></ul><h3><strong>Analyst Note:</strong></h3><p>At Mar, 22, 2021, 09:23 PM, an internal endpoint with IP address 172[.]16[.]17[.]49, belonging to EmilyComp, attempted to access a malicious hxxp[://]mogagrocol[.]ru/wp-content/plugins/akismet/fv/index[.]php.</p><p>Log analysis indicates that two access attempts were made: the first attempt was allowed, the second attempt was blocked by the firewall</p><p>Following these events, the endpoint was successfully contained by the EDR solution to prevent any potential further compromise.</p><p>At this stage, there is no confirmed evidence of successful exploitation, but further investigation is recommended to assess any potential impact from the initial allowed connection.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*HFglTpxDV8WbemQ-wrMOpA.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6d019b70cc5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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