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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Dymphna&#39;s Archive on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Dymphna&amp;#39;s Archive on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Berkeley Dissolves]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/berkeley-dissolves-67e553f9d55c?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 11:31:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-16T11:31:02.390Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/663/1*md9CKQ0r9AtJCjuANrnIKA.jpeg" /><figcaption>James Boswell and Samuel Johnson</figcaption></figure><h3>Harwich, 1763</h3><p>One Sunday in the summer of 1763, James Boswell and Samuel Johnson came out of church in Harwich and stood talking about Bishop Berkeley, who had been dead for ten years. Boswell’s account has them on Berkeley’s clever argument that matter does not exist and that everything in the universe is only ideas. Boswell observed that, though they were satisfied the doctrine was not true, it was impossible to refute. Johnson struck his foot against a large stone with such force that he rebounded from it, and said, “I refute it thus.”</p><p>The gesture has been quoted against Berkeley ever since, and it sits oddly with what he argued. Berkeley never denied that the stone was there, or that it was hard. His claim was that hardness, weight, colour and cold are sensations, and that a stone is what we call a steady bundle of them. A foot meeting a rock is a sensation too. In the first of his <em>Three Dialogues</em> he argues that intense heat cannot be told apart from pain, and that pain cannot exist outside a mind. On his account, Johnson’s rebound was a very vivid idea.</p><h3>From Locke’s Shell</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/203/1*i4W-DBTLs3XwR18srS3ixQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>John Locke</figcaption></figure><p>Berkeley begins where Locke left off. Locke had divided the qualities of bodies into primary ones, such as shape, size, motion and solidity, which are in bodies as they appear, and secondary ones, such as colour, heat and taste, which are produced in us. Beneath both he had left an unknowable something. Berkeley takes the division apart in three steps.</p><p>The first is that primary qualities cannot be separated from secondary ones. Try to picture a shape that has no colour and no feel, and nothing is left to picture. The second is relativity. Locke himself had noticed that one hand hot and the other cold, put into the same bowl of water, will find it cold and warm at once, and had used the example to show that heat is in the perceiver. Berkeley points out that the same holds for size and motion, which also change with the observer’s position. The third is that an idea can resemble nothing but another idea, so our ideas of shape cannot copy a shape that exists apart from any mind.</p><p>The case reduces to three sentences. We perceive ordinary objects. What we perceive are only ideas. Ordinary objects are therefore ideas. The obvious reply is that we perceive objects indirectly, by way of ideas that represent them, but this leaves matter as something that is never perceived, and Berkeley presses the materialist to say what it is. Part of his attack on matter is the argument that its defenders cannot characterise it. Alongside this he attacks Locke’s view that words stand for abstract general ideas. We cannot, he says, form an idea of colour in general, or of man in general, without any particular properties.</p><h3>What Remains</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/384/1*FEImYMZkQNTQNYfAA__iBQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Bishop George Berkeley</figcaption></figure><p>Matter <em>dissolves</em>. Berkeley holds that no material things exist at all, and what is left is minds and their ideas. Spirits are active and ideas are passive. His slogan is <em>esse est percipi (aut percipere)</em>: to be is to be perceived, or to perceive.</p><p>The picture is the reverse of Hobbes’s. Hobbes kept bodies and made the mind a motion in them. Berkeley keeps minds and makes bodies a pattern in them. His target, as he saw it, was both Hobbes’s view that only material things exist and the Cartesian and Lockean view that matter and mind are two kinds of thing.</p><p>What of a stone that no human is looking at? It exists, because God perceives it, and the order of nature is willed by God for the good of created spirits. Berkeley came to treat what we see as a kind of language in which God addresses us, and his defence of his work on vision carries a title that says so. The title page of the Dialogues says what the book is for: in opposition to sceptics and atheists. Berkeley thought materialism promotes both, scepticism because it leaves the senses misrepresenting a world we can never reach, and atheism because matter alone can do without a creator. In the first dialogue Philonous, his spokesman, turns the accusation round. The materialist, he suggests, is the greater sceptic, since he holds paradoxes more contrary to common sense than the man who denies matter.</p><h3>A Young Man in a Hurry</h3><p>George Berkeley was born on 12 March 1685 at Dysart Castle, near Thomastown in County Kilkenny. He entered Trinity College, Dublin, in March 1700, took his BA in 1704, and became a fellow in 1707, the year he began the notebooks in which the argument first appears. An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision came out in 1709, an influential contribution to the psychology of vision, though it says nothing of the immaterialism he already held. In 1710, at twenty-five, he published the <em>Principles</em>, and in 1713 he went to London to see the Dialogues into print. There he met Addison, Swift, Pope and Steele and wrote for Steele’s <em>Guardian</em> against the freethinkers.</p><p>The writers did not take the doctrine seriously. Many of his first readers greeted it with incomprehension. It was much read afterwards and little followed, though it influenced both Hume and Kant.</p><h3>Bermuda and the Ghosts</h3><p>In 1724 Berkeley became Dean of Derry and began preparing a scheme for a college in Bermuda to educate the sons of colonists and of Native Americans. Parliament passed a bill promising money, and in 1728 he sailed for Rhode Island with his new bride, Anne Forster. They spent three years at Newport waiting for a grant that never came. The prime minister, Robert Walpole, finally quashed the project, and Berkeley returned to Britain in 1731. He left his farm to Yale and sent his library after it. At Newport he wrote <em>Alciphron</em>, a series of dialogues against freethinkers. His quarrel with Newton had begun earlier. In 1720, touring the Continent as a tutor, he had written <em>De Motu</em>, a short tract on the foundations of mechanics which treats physical forces as aids to calculation and not as causes.</p><p>Back in London he turned on the mathematicians. The <em>Analyst</em> of 1734 is addressed to an infidel mathematician, thought to be Edmond Halley, and it asks whether the foundations of the calculus, Newton’s and by implication Leibniz’s, are any more clearly conceived than the mysteries of religion. He did not dispute that the results were true. He asked what fluxions are, and answered that they are neither finite quantities nor infinitely small ones, nor yet nothing: “ghosts of departed quantities”. It was left to later mathematicians to put the calculus on firmer ground.</p><p>He became Bishop of Cloyne in 1734. His bestseller in his lifetime was not a work of metaphysics. It was <em>Siris</em> (1744), a book about the medicinal virtues of tar-water, which wanders from the remedy to the causes of physical things and the divine activity behind them.</p><h3>Oxford, 1753</h3><p>In 1752 Berkeley left Cloyne for Oxford, where his son George was studying at Christ Church. He died there on Sunday evening, 14 January 1753. One account has him on a couch while his wife read to him. His daughter brought him tea and found him apparently asleep. He was already dead. His will, made the previous July, had directed that his body be kept five days above ground “even till it grow offensive by the cadaverous smell”, a provision said to have been meant to prevent premature burial. He was buried in Christ Church on 20 January, and his wife later put up a marble monument to him there.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=67e553f9d55c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Leibniz Multiplies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/leibniz-multiplies-402919ba6329?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[spinoza]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monads]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isaac-newton]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leibniz]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-13T11:31:01.715Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Vienna, 1714</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/202/1*1xohQP0fzhu_lkvpWGj6Mg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Gottfried Leibniz</figcaption></figure><p>Suppose a machine had been built so that it thought, felt and perceived. Suppose it were enlarged, with every proportion kept, until a person could walk into it as into a mill. Looking round the inside, Gottfried Leibniz argued, a visitor would find only parts that push on one another and nothing that could explain a perception. Whatever perceives cannot be a machine, and cannot be anything built out of parts.</p><p>He set the thought experiment down in the summer of 1714, in Vienna, where he had been living for most of two years. He was sixty-eight. A French correspondent, Nicolas Remond, had pressed him for a fuller account of the philosophy behind his <em>Theodicy</em>, and Leibniz wrote a short text for him in numbered paragraphs. It seems never to have been sent, and it remained largely unknown when he died. A German translation appeared in 1720, whose translator gave it the title <em>Monadology</em>, a word Leibniz never used for it. The French text was not printed until 1840.</p><p>The mill is aimed at any mechanical account of the mind, the kind Hobbes had offered, in which thought is motion in the body. If perception cannot belong to a machine, he reasoned, it must belong to something that has no parts at all.</p><h3>One Into Many</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/414/1*I_flSmbgQGKbAnYnmBbxkA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Spinoza</figcaption></figure><p>Leibniz had met the man who drew the opposite conclusion. Between 18 and 21 November 1676, on his journey from Paris and London to a court post in Hanover, he talked with Spinoza, who had three months left to live. A friend, Tschirnhaus, had told him a good deal of what the unpublished <em>Ethics</em> contained. Leibniz respected Spinoza’s intellect and thought many of his proofs unsound. His notebooks from this period contain some of his earliest replies to Spinoza’s monism.</p><p>His own answer begins from the same demand for unity. A composite, he says, is only a collection of simples, so there must be simple substances. Where there are no parts there is neither extension nor shape nor any possible division. He calls these monads, the true atoms of nature. Spinoza had concluded that there is one substance. Leibniz concludes that there are infinitely many.</p><p>The monads are not tiny bits of matter. Each is a centre of perception and appetite, a mind-like unit with no location in space, and each differs from every other, since two beings perfectly alike would be indistinguishable. Most perceive dimly. Leibniz ranks them: bare monads, in a stupor like dreamless sleep; souls, with sensation and memory; and minds, which reason. God alone is the original unity from which the rest are produced.</p><p>On the usual reading, matter is what these perceiving units look like from outside, and Leibniz’s picture of it is correspondingly crowded. Each portion of matter, he writes, can be conceived as a garden full of plants and a pond full of fishes, and every branch of the plant and every drop of the animal’s humours is another garden and pond, without end. Interpreters still argue about how far he held this view throughout his life, and whether it makes him an idealist.</p><h3>Two Clocks</h3><p>Elisabeth’s question to Descartes, how an immaterial thing moves a body, has by now collected several answers. Descartes proposed a gland. Hobbes kept only the body. Spinoza made mind and body two aspects of one thing. Leibniz keeps the two and takes away the traffic between them. Monads, he says, have “no windows” through which anything could enter or leave. Nothing in one can be altered by another. Each unfolds its own states out of its own nature.</p><p>What he offers in place of interaction is harmony. Soul and body follow their own laws, each as though the other were absent, and they agree because God arranged them from the beginning to agree. His image was of two clocks that keep perfect time together. The agreement could come from one clock influencing the other, from a clockmaker constantly adjusting both, or from each having been built so well that it needs no adjusting. Leibniz chose the third. He thought Descartes would have arrived at the same place if he had known that nature conserves the total direction of motion in matter, which would have made it impossible for a soul to change the direction of a body.</p><p>The price is that no monad ever acts on another. What looks like interaction is a correspondence between independent mirrors. Each simple substance mirrors the whole universe from its own position, as a single town looks different from every street that leads into it: one town, seen from endlessly many viewpoints.</p><h3>Absolute Space</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/407/1*BtCjMyOo3B0Xf12Ac2ir2Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Isaac Newton</figcaption></figure><p>Newton’s <em>Principia</em> appeared in 1687 and gave physics its stage: an absolute space and time in which bodies move. Leibniz, whose own work on force was developed in answer to the Principia, thought the stage a fiction.</p><p>The dispute broke into the open in 1715, when Leibniz wrote to Caroline, Princess of Wales, that natural religion seemed to be declining in England and that Newton’s physics was partly to blame. Caroline had been his pupil in Germany. She showed the letter to Samuel Clarke, a clergyman and Newton’s spokesman, and Clarke answered. The papers passed through her hands for eleven months, five from each man, the last of Clarke’s dated 29 October 1716.</p><p>Leibniz’s opening shot used the same machine as his harmony. On the Newtonian account, he wrote, God must wind up his watch from time to time or it would stop, and mend it as a clockmaker mends his work. He had lacked the foresight to give it perpetual motion, and the oftener a clockmaker has to adjust his machine, the clumsier he must be. Clarke answered that a world running without God’s attention, as a clock runs without a clockmaker, is the doctrine of materialism and fate.</p><p>Leibniz’s weapon was the principle that nothing happens without a sufficient reason. Applied to the universe as a whole, it asks why this world exists rather than any of the infinitely many that were possible. The only sufficient reason, he says, is that this one contains the most perfection, so that God chose the best. Applied to space, it gives a second result. If space were an absolute container, God could have had no reason to set the universe down in one place rather than another, or to give it this velocity rather than another. Two universes identical in every respect except their position would be one and the same, since there are never two beings that are perfectly alike. Space, for Leibniz, is only the relations among bodies. Clarke replied that this made God a necessary agent.</p><p>A quarrel of another kind ran alongside. Leibniz published his calculus in 1684. Newton had devised his own method earlier but published later. When the Royal Society examined the question in 1712, its report found for Newton. Newton, the Society’s president, had written it himself. Leibniz protested only in private letters.</p><h3>Veins in the Marble</h3><p>Leibniz had already answered Locke. His <em>New Essays</em>, written in 1703 and 1704 as a chapter-by-chapter reply to Locke’s <em>Essay</em>, reject the picture of the mind as a blank tablet. A block of marble with veins that follow the outline of Hercules, he says, is more determined to that shape than a uniform block would be, though the sculptor must still work to bring it out. Ideas and truths are innate in the same way, as “inclinations, dispositions, tendencies, or natural potentialities” and not as finished actualities, and experience occasions them without creating them. He keeps what is right in Locke’s claim that nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses, and adds an exception: the intellect itself.</p><p>Locke’s emptied mind got some furniture back. Of the Cartesians, in the Monadology, he made a different complaint: that they counted only the perceptions we are aware of.</p><h3>Hanover, 1716</h3><p>In his last years Leibniz suffered increasingly from gout and kidney colic. He died late on the evening of 14 November 1716, and the papers with Clarke, whose fifth reply was dated 29 October, ended only with his death. The grave had to be dug and walled in the floor of the Neustädter church, so the burial took place a month to the day later, on 14 December. His secretary Eckhart is said to have been the only mourner. The grave carried no name for decades.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=402919ba6329" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Locke Hollows]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/locke-hollows-734b17b38bda?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[john-locke]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 11:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-09T11:31:01.456Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/203/1*i4W-DBTLs3XwR18srS3ixQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>John Locke</figcaption></figure><h3>Oxford, 1683</h3><p>On 21 July 1683 the University of Oxford met in Convocation, condemned a list of seditious doctrines with Hobbes’s among them, and sent his books to the fire. A man at Christ Church was already being watched. John Locke was fifty. He had held a studentship there since 1652, had taught Greek, rhetoric and moral philosophy, and had studied medicine without taking the degree. For fifteen years he had been confidential secretary to Lord Ashley, who became the Earl of Shaftesbury, and Shaftesbury had fled to Holland the previous year and died in Amsterdam that January. One report from Oxford in 1682 had it that Locke lived “a very cunning unintelligible life here”.</p><p>In the autumn of 1683 he followed his patron into exile. In November 1684 the king ordered him deprived of his studentship, through the Dean of Christ Church, John Fell. He lived mainly in Utrecht, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and in Amsterdam he fell in with Philip van Limborch, a Remonstrant professor of theology, and the young scholar Jean Le Clerc. The three met in a weekly society. Limborch is one of the names on the list of those who wrote against Spinoza.</p><p>In Holland Locke worked at the book he had been writing off and on since 1671, <em>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</em>. An abstract appeared in a Dutch journal in 1688. The book itself came out the year after, in England, with 1690 on its title page.</p><h3>A Blank Page</h3><p>By his own account the book began with an evening’s talk among five or six friends about the limits of human understanding. It ran to four books, and the first is an attack on a Cartesian idea. Descartes had held that some ideas, God among them, are in the mind before any experience. Locke chose the favourite candidates for innate principles, that whatever is, is, and that the same thing cannot both be and not be, and observed that large numbers of people have never heard of either.</p><p>Book Two supplies the alternative. Suppose the mind to be “white paper”, he writes, with nothing written on it. How does it come to be furnished? The answer is experience, by two routes: sensation, through the senses, and reflection, the mind’s notice of its own operations. Gassendi had helped to convince him that knowledge begins in sensation. Everything else, however elaborate, is built by the mind out of these simple materials, and an interruption in the supply leaves a gap. A man who had seen nothing but black and white, Locke writes, would no more have an idea of scarlet than someone who has never tasted a pineapple has of its flavour. Descartes’s mind arrives stocked. Locke’s arrives empty.</p><h3>Under the Qualities</h3><p>The second emptying is harder to see. Locke followed Boyle and Galileo in dividing the qualities of bodies. Solidity, extension, shape and motion belong to a body however finely it is divided, and our ideas of them resemble what is there. Colour, smell and taste are different: they are effects, in the observer, of the primary qualities of particles too small to see. On the corpuscular hypothesis, which Locke favoured while treating it with some scepticism, the world is a swarm of tiny bodies, and the sensory richness of the rose is produced in us.</p><p>What holds the qualities together? We notice that certain ones constantly go together, and we suppose something beneath them that supports them. We call it substance. Locke says our idea of it is obscure and relative, an idea of a support whose own nature we do not grasp. To make the point he tells of an Indian philosopher who thought that the earth must rest on something, and so supplied an elephant, and a tortoise for the elephant, and, when asked what held up the tortoise, had nothing to name. The word substance, Locke suggests, does no better than the tortoise.</p><p>Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, wrote that Locke had “almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world”. Locke replied that if the charge meant he denied or doubted that substances exist, he did not understand it. His claim was narrower: that we have no clear idea of what they are in themselves. He added a symmetry. Of spirit, the supposed support of the mind’s operations, we are as ignorant as we are of body. Scholars still disagree about what exactly this substratum is, whether a bare bearer of properties or something nearer to a thing’s real essence.</p><p>A reader might hear in this an echo of <em>The Cloud of Unknowing</em>, the anonymous Middle English treatise written in the latter half of the fourteenth century, probably by a Carthusian, which draws on the negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius. The two do not meet. The author of the Cloud means the unknowing of God, approached in love through a cloud of forgetting. Locke means the unknowing of whatever sits beneath the colour and weight of an ordinary thing, and nothing in his argument invites love.</p><h3>Thinking Matter</h3><p>Descartes had said that mind must be immaterial. Hobbes had said that there are only bodies. Locke declined to say either. In the fourth book he allows that God, if He chose, could add thought to some systems of matter fitly disposed, and that we may be unable to rule this out.</p><p>Stillingfleet saw the danger, and pressed it. If matter can think, why cannot animals form abstract ideas as well? And what becomes of the soul’s immortality? Locke’s answer, on one modern reading of the correspondence, was that immortality does not depend on immateriality. This refused both the dualist’s certainty and the materialist’s. Hobbes’s conclusion remained possible. It was not demonstrated.</p><h3>Consent</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*2ukpAQxMlZTdFZNGAhd6Og.jpeg" /><figcaption>Robert Filmer</figcaption></figure><p>Locke’s politics came out in the same months. <em>Two Treatises of Government</em> was published anonymously in December 1689, with 1690 on the title page. Peter Laslett argued that most of it was written in 1679 and 1680, during the Exclusion Crisis, and Locke never acknowledged his authorship in his lifetime. The first treatise takes apart Sir Robert Filmer’s case for divine right. The second sets out the alternative, in which people enter civil society to protect their natural rights under a common authority, and a government that rules without the consent of the people can be overthrown. Hobbes’s covenant gave the sovereign a monopoly on force. Locke made the ruler answerable to those who had consented.</p><p>He had returned to England in February 1689, in the fleet that carried the future Queen Mary. The same man had bought stock in the Royal African Company in 1672. In 1669, as secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, he had a hand in the Fundamental Constitutions of that colony, which gave masters absolute power over their slaves. Scholars dispute how far the Constitutions express his own views, since he wrote them for the eight proprietors, much as a lawyer writes a will for a client. Historians have not settled the question.</p><h3>Oates, 1704</h3><p>Locke spent his last years at Oates, in Essex, in the household of Sir Francis Masham. Lady Masham corresponded with Gottfried Leibniz from late 1703 until 1705. Leibniz had read the Essay, and in 1704 he finished a chapter-by-chapter rebuttal of it, the <em>New Essays</em>. He wrote to Lady Masham in the middle of September and again on 7 October, before she had time to reply.</p><p>Locke never read the rebuttal. Leibniz kept the manuscript back, remarking that he disliked refuting dead authors, and it stayed unpublished until 1765, sixty years later. Locke had died at Oates on 28 October 1704, with Lady Masham beside him, reading the Psalms.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=734b17b38bda" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Spinoza Unifies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/spinoza-unifies-f9feb1bb5d71?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baruch-spinoza]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[spinoza]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 11:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-08T11:31:01.450Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/830/1*SWuOfyVPP2U4GxZrj_igug.jpeg" /><figcaption>Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig</figcaption></figure><h3>Heidelberg, 1673</h3><p>In February 1673 a letter reached The Hague from Johann Ludwig Fabritius, a professor at the University of Heidelberg, offering a chair in philosophy. It came in the name of the Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig, and its terms were generous: full liberty to teach, provided the teaching did not disturb the established religion. Karl Ludwig was the brother of Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, who thirty years earlier had asked Descartes how an immaterial soul could move a body. The Elector’s adviser Urbain Chevreau later claimed that his master owned the one book Spinoza had put his name to, an exposition of Descartes’s <em>Principles of Philosophy</em>, and had decided to approach him after reading some of its chapters.</p><p>The man receiving the offer was forty. He earned his living grinding lenses, some of them for Christiaan Huygens. His reply thanked the Elector and then set out his difficulties. He had never wished to teach in public. Lecturing to young students would take the time his research needed. He could not tell where the freedom he was being offered would end, if he was to avoid anything that looked like disturbing the established religion. He asked for time to think, and then declined.</p><h3>Amsterdam, 1656</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/414/1*I_flSmbgQGKbAnYnmBbxkA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Baruch de Espinoza</figcaption></figure><p>He had been expelled from one community already. On 27 July 1656 the leaders of the Portuguese-Jewish congregation of Talmud Torah proclaimed a herem against Baruch de Espinoza from in front of the ark in their synagogue. In Jonathan Israel’s account the ban was declaimed by candlelight, to the sound of a shofar. Its text declared him “cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night”. It named his evil opinions and monstrous deeds without saying what they were. He was twenty-three.</p><p>He had been born in Amsterdam to a family of Portuguese origin. His father was a merchant, and Spinoza helped in the import business until his father’s death. He learned Latin from Franciscus van den Enden, a teacher whose ideas had a reputation for being subversive. What followed the ban was a life among friends who shared his reading, many of them drawn to Descartes and to a religion with very little theology in it. Jan Rieuwertsz, the bookseller who published Dutch translations of Descartes and would later publish Spinoza, belonged to the circle, as did the translator Jan Glazemaker, the physician Lodewijk Meyer and the brothers Koerbagh, one of whom died in prison for holding views like his. Spinoza’s first book, in 1663, was a geometric exposition of the first two parts of Descartes’s Principles, set out in the manner of Euclid. He wrote it as a Cartesian.</p><h3>The Definition</h3><p>Descartes had defined substance in the Principles as a thing which so exists that it “stands in need of no other thing for existing”. Then he hedged. Strictly, he conceded, only God meets that standard. Created things need only God’s concurrence, and mind and matter qualified as substances in that weaker sense. The hedge is what allowed two substances to stand side by side.</p><p>Spinoza took the hedge away. The standard view of his day held that no substance can depend on anything else for its existence, and Spinoza held to it without exception. If substance means what depends on nothing else, nothing created can be one, and the only substance is God. Everything else exists in God, as a mode of one of God’s attributes. Minds and bodies are modes. The argument has been picked at ever since, and commentators disagree about how tightly it follows from its premises, but its starting point is Descartes’s own definition.</p><p>Attributes are what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence. Spinoza agrees with Descartes that thought and extension are really distinct, in the sense that each can be conceived without the other. He denies that this makes them two substances. They are two attributes of one, and God has infinitely many, of which we know these two. His own formula for the whole is <em>Deus sive Natura</em>, God or Nature. God, on this view, is Nature operating by its own necessary laws.</p><h3>One Thing, Two Descriptions</h3><p>Elisabeth’s problem existed because Descartes had made two substances and then needed them to meet. Spinoza removes the meeting. A mind and its body are one mode of the one substance, grasped through two attributes, and the order of ideas and the order of bodies line up because they are a single order described twice. No immaterial thing needs to push a material one. No pineal gland is required.</p><p>Hobbes had kept the body and dropped the second substance. Spinoza keeps both descriptions and drops the second substance. He retains Descartes’s mechanical physics for bodies and gives thought equal standing. Neither attribute is derived from the other.</p><p>The continuity with Hobbes runs further. Hobbes’s endeavour, the small beginning of motion inside a body, is <em>conatus</em> in Latin. In Spinoza it becomes the essence of every finite thing. Each strives to “persevere in its being”, and the human mind is no exception. Desire is that striving, accompanied by awareness of it. Human beings are not outside nature, and what they do follows from the same laws as everything else. There is no faculty of will standing outside the chain of causes. Freedom, for Spinoza, is acting from one’s own nature, and a person is unfree to the extent that other things determine what he does.</p><h3>Hobbes and the State</h3><p>Spinoza studied Hobbes. He mentions him in a note to the <em>Theological-Political Treatise</em> and in a letter of 1674. The two were causal determinists who admired geometry, and both had people transfer their natural right, Hobbes to a sovereign and Spinoza to the social order. The letter to his friend Jarig Jelles says where they part. Spinoza always keeps natural right intact, and allows the magistrate only as much right over his subjects as exceeds their power over themselves. The same letter adds that calling God one is strictly improper, since a thing is called one only in respect of its existence and not of its essence.</p><p>The treatise appeared anonymously in 1670. It was prohibited in 1674, after the scandal it caused, and Spinoza did not even attempt to publish the <em>Ethics</em> in his lifetime.</p><h3>The Long Ban</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/202/1*1xohQP0fzhu_lkvpWGj6Mg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz</figcaption></figure><p>Leibniz visited him in 1676, three months before his death, and held several long conversations with him. In later years he played down the encounter. Spinoza, for his part, had been wary of entrusting his manuscripts to Leibniz. Leibniz, Bayle and many others attacked the Ethics once it appeared, though it also made a considerable impression on English and French deists, and in 1705 John Toland coined the word pantheism to describe the doctrine, sympathetically.</p><p>Spinoza died in The Hague on 21 February 1677, of consumption that his lens grinding had probably made worse. His landlady was at church. His friend and physician Meyer was with him. Meyer and the others edited his papers for the <em>Opera Posthuma</em>, which Rieuwertsz published the same year, and the volume was frequently banned and almost suppressed before it appeared.</p><p>Respectable opinion went on treating him as a satanic atheist. The turn came in Germany. In 1785, four years after Gotthold Lessing’s death, Friedrich Jacobi published his correspondence with Moses Mendelssohn, which recounted a conversation Jacobi had held with Lessing in 1780. Lessing, Jacobi reported, had said that he knew no philosophy except Spinozism, and had lamented that the philosopher was still treated like a dead dog. Within a few years Spinoza’s standing had reversed.</p><p>During that conversation, at Wolfenbüttel on 7 July 1780, Jacobi showed Lessing a fragment of Goethe’s unpublished poem <em>Prometheus</em>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f9feb1bb5d71" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hobbes Reduces]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/hobbes-reduces-286b628b1842?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/286b628b1842</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[thomas-hobbes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[de-cive]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leviathan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 11:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-07T11:31:01.642Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/554/1*Hv2IDE92e8kBJfp9eA1iyQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Thomas Hobbes</figcaption></figure><h3>Paris, December 1640</h3><p>Late in 1640 a Latin manuscript reached an Englishman in Paris. Thomas Hobbes was fifty-two. He had left England that year in anticipation of the Civil War and had fallen in with the circle around Marin Mersenne, the friar who acted as a clearing-house for European natural philosophy. Mersenne passed him Descartes’s <em>Meditations</em> and asked what he made of it. Hobbes probably had it that December, and his written objections went to Mersenne in January.</p><p>He was not an obvious reader for it. In the 1620s, by John Aubrey’s account, he had walked the grounds at Gorhambury with Francis Bacon, taking dictation and helping to turn some of Bacon’s essays into Latin. The association left less trace than the legend suggests. Hobbes hardly mentions Bacon in his philosophy and had little patience for experiment, and he came to philosophy late, after 1629. Aubrey’s story is that he opened a copy of Euclid at a proposition that struck him as impossible, followed its proof back through the earlier ones to the axioms, and was convinced. Euclid became the model for his thinking: definitions first, then consequences, with nothing smuggled in.</p><h3>The Jumper</h3><p>Hobbes accepted the <em>cogito</em>. What he rejected was the corollary that the self which thinks is a thinking thing of a special kind. We cannot conceive, he argued, of “jumping without a jumper”, or of knowing without a knower or thinking without a thinker. Every act needs a subject, and the subjects of acts, so far as we ever meet them, are bodies. It seemed to follow that the thing that thinks might be corporeal. He added a second complaint: Descartes talked about an intellect or a reason as though it were a thing, when acts of understanding belong to subjects and are not substances of their own.</p><p>Scholars describe Descartes’s replies as largely exasperated. He granted that there is no thought without something that thinks, since what thinks is not nothing, and then called the step to a corporeal thinker baseless and contrary to all logic and usage.</p><p>How far Hobbes had already committed himself is disputed. One scholar argues that in the early 1640s he did not yet assert that bodies are the only substances. Another reads a lost letter of November 1640 as a challenge to Descartes to accept a corporeal God. A third argues that answering Hobbes forced Descartes himself to reshape his doctrine of substance. All three can be right. The objections are a first move. Descartes dismissed it, and the next fourteen years hardened it.</p><p>Two years later Elisabeth of Bohemia would put the same difficulty as a question: how does an immaterial soul move a body? Hobbes’s objections had already suggested a way round it, which was to let the thing that thinks be a body.</p><h3>Motion</h3><p>Late in 1640 a Latin manuscript reached an Englishman in Paris. Thomas Hobbes was fifty-two. He had left England that year in anticipation of the Civil War and had fallen in with the circle around Marin Mersenne, the friar who acted as a clearing-house for European natural philosophy. Mersenne passed him Descartes’s <em>Meditations</em> and asked what he made of it. Hobbes probably had it that December, and his written objections went to Mersenne in January.</p><p>He was not an obvious reader for it. In the 1620s, by John Aubrey’s account, he had walked the grounds at Gorhambury with Francis Bacon, taking dictation and helping to turn some of Bacon’s essays into Latin. The association left less trace than the legend suggests. Hobbes hardly mentions Bacon in his philosophy and had little patience for experiment, and he came to philosophy late, after 1629. Aubrey’s story is that he opened a copy of Euclid at a proposition that struck him as impossible, followed its proof back through the earlier ones to the axioms, and was convinced. Euclid became the model for his thinking: definitions first, then consequences, with nothing smuggled in.</p><h3>The Jumper</h3><p>Hobbes accepted the <em>cogito</em>. What he rejected was the corollary that the self which thinks is a thinking thing of a special kind. We cannot conceive, he argued, of “jumping without a jumper”, or of knowing without a knower or thinking without a thinker. Every act needs a subject, and the subjects of acts, so far as we ever meet them, are bodies. It seemed to follow that the thing that thinks might be corporeal. He added a second complaint: Descartes talked about an intellect or a reason as though it were a thing, when acts of understanding belong to subjects and are not substances of their own.</p><p>Scholars describe Descartes’s replies as largely exasperated. He granted that there is no thought without something that thinks, since what thinks is not nothing, and then called the step to a corporeal thinker baseless and contrary to all logic and usage.</p><p>How far Hobbes had already committed himself is disputed. One scholar argues that in the early 1640s he did not yet assert that bodies are the only substances. Another reads a lost letter of November 1640 as a challenge to Descartes to accept a corporeal God. A third argues that answering Hobbes forced Descartes himself to reshape his doctrine of substance. All three can be right. The objections are a first move. Descartes dismissed it, and the next fourteen years hardened it.</p><p>Two years later Elisabeth of Bohemia would put the same difficulty as a question: how does an immaterial soul move a body? Hobbes’s objections had already suggested a way round it, which was to let the thing that thinks be a body.</p><h3>Motion</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/361/1*5M-IoF6K3RxYOcCGFpaP8A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes</figcaption></figure><p><em>Leviathan</em> appeared in May 1651, written during Hobbes’s exile in France. By then the hint had become a system. External bodies press on the organs of sense and set up motion inside the body. Imagination is what is left of that motion as it fades. Thought, desire and will are the same stuff, motions in the parts of an organic body. Hobbes’s physics owed much to Galileo, for whom bodies keep moving unless something stops them, and his psychology followed: a person is a body moved by sensations, appetites and aversions.</p><p>Hobbes <em>reduces</em> what Descartes had divided. Descartes had stripped matter of purpose and inner life and set mind aside as a second substance to hold what was left. Hobbes drops the second substance. What Descartes had called mind is a way matter behaves in one kind of organ.</p><p>The same move attacks Aristotle. Hobbes argued explicitly against the Aristotelian belief in incorporeal substances. For him the phrase was a contradiction in terms, a word joined to its own negation. That is <em>ousia</em>, the bearer that persists beneath changing qualities, with the immaterial half removed: a substance is a body, and a body is something that takes up room and can be moved.</p><p>Even desire has a physical account. What he calls endeavour is the smallest beginning of motion inside the body, before it shows in walking or speaking. Desire is endeavour toward an object, and aversion is endeavour away from it. The vocabulary of the will becomes the vocabulary of mechanics.</p><p>His method set him apart as well. Hobbes wanted philosophy to proceed like geometry, by deduction from first principles, and had little use for experiment. That set him against Robert Boyle, whose experimental science he saw as a stand-in for Cartesian dualism. The man who had once taken Bacon’s dictation never took up Bacon’s method.</p><p><em>De Corpore</em> (1655) gave the philosophy its fullest and driest statement: matter and motion at the foundation, with the theory of man and the state built on top.</p><h3>The Body of God</h3><p>A philosophy with no room for incorporeal substance has a problem with God, who is traditionally the incorporeal substance. Hobbes’s answer changed over the years, and the plainest version came in his quarrel with Bishop Bramhall. God, he said there, is a spirit, but a corporeal one, meaning only that God has magnitude.</p><p>His enemies heard atheism. After Leviathan, opponents charged him with it and banned his books. Scholars still argue whether his corporeal God was piety, or cover, or a provocation. The sharpest alarm came in 1666, when the House of Commons prepared a bill against atheism and profaneness and its committee was instructed to look into Leviathan. Hobbes, nearly eighty, burned papers he thought might damage him. Charles II, who liked his wit and paid him a pension, protected him, and the bill failed. Hobbes’s history of the Civil War, <em>Behemoth</em>, written around 1668, appeared only in 1681, after his death.</p><h3>The Artificial Man</h3><p>The same bodies, set loose in politics, collide. Hobbes asked what human life would be like before any government, with everyone moved by appetite and aversion and no power above them. His answer is the best-known line he wrote: life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. The cure is a covenant by which people hand their power to a sovereign who holds a monopoly on force, and in return keeps the peace.</p><p>He had his own account of where the fear came from. Born prematurely in the spring of 1588, he liked to say in his verse autobiography that his mother, frightened by rumours of a Spanish fleet at sea, had borne twins, himself and fear.</p><p>The state, in his picture, is itself a body: an artificial man, made by people and kept alive by their consent. The frontispiece to Leviathan, engraved by Abraham Bosse after discussion with Hobbes, shows the sovereign as a giant above the landscape, his torso and arms made up of hundreds of tiny people.</p><p>On the Continent, readers who met Hobbes through <em>De Cive</em> (1642) treated his political philosophy as separable from his materialism, while in Britain Leviathan kept the two together. That left the contract free to travel without the metaphysics, and Locke would later keep it and turn it against absolutism.</p><h3>Oxford</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/687/1*cklEwVIoxB9NNJJh3OwbNA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hardwick Old Hall</figcaption></figure><p>Hobbes died at Hardwick Hall in Derbyshire on 4 December 1679, aged ninety-one, after a stroke, and was buried in the churchyard at Ault Hucknall. On 21 July 1683, three and a half years after his burial and weeks after the discovery of the Rye House Plot against Charles II and his brother, the University of Oxford met in Convocation and condemned twenty-seven propositions drawn from several authors, Hobbes among them. One of the condemned sentences held that self-preservation is the fundamental law of nature and overrides every other obligation. The decree ordered De Cive and Leviathan burned in public.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=286b628b1842" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Descartes Divides]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/descartes-divides-f8763548beab?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f8763548beab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[francis-bacon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rené-descartes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elisabeth-of-bohemia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[princess-palatine]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 11:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T11:31:01.497Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A new 10-part philosophy primer series from Descartes through to Immanuel Kant</em></p><h3>A Simulation Four Centuries Old</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*W7FFakQnkfOcrNSMXcOJzw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Neo asleep at his computer, a scene from the first The Matrix film</figcaption></figure><p>In <em>The Matrix</em>, a programmer sits up late at his computer and begins to suspect that the world around him is a construction. The film confirms it. Human bodies lie in pods, farmed by machines for their energy, while their minds are fed a seamless city that does not exist. The offer made to him is a choice between staying inside the pleasant fiction and waking into a wrecked, true world.</p><p>The film opened in 1999. The same premise had been put with equal force in 1641, by a Frenchman who invented an enemy to put it for him: a demon of the greatest power and cunning, whose whole effort goes into deceiving him about everything he perceives. The man who conjured that demon did not begin as a recluse. He began as a soldier.</p><h3>Neuburg, 1619</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/403/1*WoWBVlBs_9cFNfCgiBa77A.jpeg" /><figcaption>René Descartes</figcaption></figure><p>René Descartes was twenty-three in November 1619. He had published nothing and would publish nothing for eighteen years. He had been educated by the Jesuits at La Flèche, which he entered in 1606 or 1607, and he carried out of it the Aristotelian vocabulary that governed European learning. A thing, in that vocabulary, was a substance: Aristotle’s <em>ousia</em>, the bearer that stays the same underneath its changing qualities. A tree is green in summer and bare in winter, and the tree persists.</p><p>He had enlisted in 1618 under Maurice of Nassau at Breda, partly to study military engineering. There he fell into conversation with Isaac Beeckman, a Dordrecht schoolmaster, and the two came to share a conviction that mathematics and physics had to be joined by a single method. The following year Descartes moved into the service of the Catholic Maximilian of Bavaria, and the army wintered at Neuburg an der Donau.</p><p>His first biographer, Adrien Baillet, reports that on the night of 10–11 November he shut himself in a stove-heated room and had three dreams. In the first he walked a road among phantoms. In the second a thunderclap rang out and sparks filled the room. In the third, a dictionary and a book of poems lay on a table. He took the sequence as a summons to unify the sciences, and in the <em>Discourse on the Method</em> (1637) he traces the beginning of his new thinking to that winter in Germany, with no company and nothing to distract him.</p><h3>The Cut</h3><p>The method was doubt, applied without mercy. The senses sometimes deceive, so they cannot be trusted entirely. Dreams are indistinguishable from waking while they last. And then, in the <em>Meditations on First Philosophy</em> (1641), the demon: if such a being were arranging every appearance, even arithmetic might be a trick played on him.</p><p>One thing survives. A deceived mind must still exist to be deceived. “I think, therefore I am” is the sentence in which the Discourse states it, and the <em>cogito</em> became the fixed point from which everything else was rebuilt.</p><p>What the rebuilding produced was a division. Descartes asked what he was and answered: a thing that thinks. He asked what a body was and answered: whatever has extension, with length, breadth and depth, shape and motion. The two descriptions share nothing. Mind has no size and no location. Matter has no thought. Descartes <em>divides</em> substance into two, and the cut runs through the middle of every human being. In the film the cut is literal: the body lies in a pod in one place while the mind lives somewhere else.</p><p>The consequences ran in two directions at once. Matter, stripped of purpose and inner life, became something geometry and mechanics could describe, and nature could be treated as a machine. Mind withdrew into a private interior that no one else could inspect. The arrangement also served the aim stated in the full Latin title of the Meditations, which promises demonstrations of God’s existence and of the soul’s distinction from the body. A soul that is a different kind of thing from the body need not perish with it.</p><p>What the arrangement left unexplained was how a thinking thing and an extended thing could be one person. A man decides to raise his arm and the arm rises. A man treads on a nail and feels pain. Both events cross the line Descartes had drawn, in opposite directions, and he had drawn the line so that nothing could cross it.</p><h3>Bacon’s Ship</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/201/1*jiACrQIGdItAaHEBOaDjMQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Francis Bacon</figcaption></figure><p>A year after the stove, in 1620, Francis Bacon published the <em>Novum Organum</em>. Its title page shows a galleon passing between the Pillars of Hercules, out of the charted waters of the Mediterranean and into the open Atlantic.</p><p>Bacon’s target was the same one Descartes had in view. Scholastic logic, built on the syllogism, compels assent but discovers nothing new. His remedy ran in the opposite direction. Where Descartes begins with doubt and digs down to a single certainty, Bacon begins with an inventory of what distorts the human mind, which he calls idols. There are four: the idols of the tribe, flaws built into human nature; of the cave, the bias of the individual; of the marketplace, the errors language breeds; and of the theatre, the inherited systems of philosophy, staged like plays. Only after clearing them does he proceed by induction, gathering particular observations and climbing with care toward general principles.</p><p>One man builds down, the other builds up. Later commentators would sort them into rival camps. In 1620 they were two men clearing the same ground from opposite sides, a soldier on the Continent and the Lord Chancellor of England, with a sea between them and no shared programme.</p><h3>The Princess’s Question</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/402/1*Xtzby8pa-8j0UF_Gg-9Ddw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Elisabeth, Princess Palatine of Bohemia</figcaption></figure><p>In May 1643, two years after the Meditations appeared, Elisabeth, Princess Palatine of Bohemia, began writing to Descartes. She put to him the question his system had left open. If the soul is only a thinking substance, how can it set the body’s spirits moving to produce a voluntary action?</p><p>She framed it in his own physics. Anything that moves, she observed, is moved by how much it is pushed, by the manner of the push, or by the surface texture and shape of whatever pushes it. The first two seem to require contact, and an immaterial thing, she wrote, cannot possibly touch anything. The third requires extension, which Descartes had denied to the soul. She was holding his philosophy to its own rules.</p><p>Descartes’s reply named three primitive notions: soul, body, and their union, each grasped in its own way, with the union known best by ordinary life and not by study. For the moving force he reached for weight. We do not imagine heaviness pushing a stone down like a hand, he pointed out, and yet we have no difficulty conceiving how it moves the stone; the soul might move the body in the same manner.</p><p>She was unmoved. Descartes did not himself hold weight to be a separate quality acting on the stone, so the example, she objected, explained nothing. She wrote that she found it easier to “concede matter and extension to the soul” than to grant an immaterial being the power to move a body. A further letter conceded that the senses show the soul moving the body, and added that they do not show how.</p><p>Descartes’s later attempt came in <em>The Passions of the Soul</em>, which went to press in 1649 and had been written originally for Elisabeth. It located the soul’s contact with the body in the pineal gland. The gland has not survived as an answer. The cut was made, the stitch was attempted, and the stitch did not hold.</p><p>Her concession pointed in a direction already in print. Thomas Hobbes had submitted objections to the Meditations, and Descartes’s replies to them were printed with the work. Hobbes’s solution to the problem of the two substances was to keep only one.</p><h3>Stockholm</h3><p>When Queen Christina of Sweden asked for his views on the sovereign good, Descartes sent her part of his correspondence with Elisabeth. In the autumn of 1649 he travelled to Stockholm at her invitation. By tradition she preferred to study at dawn, and the lessons began at five in the morning. He died there in February 1650. The man who had once shut himself in a stove-heated room to think was crossing a Swedish city in the dark to teach a queen.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f8763548beab" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Habit of Leaving]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/the-habit-of-leaving-2ce893287773?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2ce893287773</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[secessionism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[secession-building]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gustav-klimt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 09:46:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-05T09:46:54.029Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XJMmBFOn98grCmWv_SHS7Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Josef Maria Olbrich, Secession Building, Vienna 1897–98</figcaption></figure><p><em>From Munich to Vienna to Berlin, the Secessions kept breaking apart, and the founders were never exempt.</em></p><p>Beside the entrance of Joseph Maria Olbrich’s white exhibition hall in Vienna, the title of the group’s magazine is set into the façade: <em>Ver Sacrum</em>, Sacred Spring. The phrase comes from an old Roman rite. A community in crisis would vow the young born in a single spring to the gods, and when those children grew up they were sent away to found a settlement of their own. The Vienna Secession put that name on its new building in 1898. Seven years later its best-known members walked out of the association, and the building stayed with the people who remained.</p><h3>Ninety-Six Members Walk Out</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/541/1*b3fGqgA34Qa9dNjvMs9Tdg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Munich Secession</figcaption></figure><p>Art in the 1890s ran on juries. Annual exhibitions organised by academies and artists’ guilds decided which canvases the public saw. On 4 April 1892, ninety-six members left the Munich Artists’ Cooperative and founded a rival body, the <em>Verein bildender Künstler Münchens</em>, soon known as the Secession. Its complaint was practical: a conservative exhibition policy and the tutelage of an official art establishment. Bruno Piglhein was elected its first president.</p><p>Franz von Stuck, a painter of mythological and Symbolist subjects, became its most recognisable name and designed posters for its exhibitions, which were international from the first. Fritz von Uhde, Lovis Corinth, Hugo von Habermann and the Berlin painter Max Liebermann were among the founders. The Munich group was the first in Germany to secede from the exhibitions of more traditionally minded organisations, and its method was easy to copy: a grievance over hanging space, a mass resignation, a rival show. By 1896 Gustav Klimt, Josef Engelhart and Carl Moll were discussing an independent association for Vienna with Munich as their model.</p><h3>The Building Came First</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4JJB2b70SWZ5yIEKcJ81bA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Vienna Secession</figcaption></figure><p>The Vienna Secession was founded in the spring of 1897 by artists who resigned from the Künstlerhaus association. Klimt became its first president, with the designer Koloman Moser, the architects Josef Hoffmann and Olbrich, and Moll among the founders. Otto Wagner joined soon afterwards. Olbrich began planning an exhibition building before the association formally existed, and it opened in 1898. The magazine ran for six volumes between 1898 and 1903 and carried the group’s graphic work, and Olbrich helped design it as well as the building.</p><p>The Secessionists treated an exhibition as a designed environment, with Hoffmann and Moser handling the presentation of the shows. Foreign artists including Max Klinger, Eugène Grasset and Charles Rennie Mackintosh were invited into Olbrich’s rooms, and the aim was a single scheme in which painting, sculpture and architecture worked together.</p><p>The peak came in the spring of 1902, when the fourteenth exhibition, a homage to Beethoven, ran from 15 April to 27 June. Alfred Roller conceived the overall production and Hoffmann designed the interiors. At its centre sat Klinger’s polychrome sculpture of the composer on a throne. Klimt painted a frieze of more than thirty metres across three walls of a side hall, directly onto the wall in light materials: a procession of longing, hostile forces and a final embrace. On the eve of the private view, Gustav Mahler stationed six trombonists on the staircase to play his arrangement of a passage from the finale of Beethoven’s Ninth. It probably ran no longer than five minutes, and some of Vienna’s press and public treated it as a desecration. The golden knight in Klimt’s frieze resembles Mahler.</p><p>The frieze was meant to be destroyed when the show closed, as the other artists’ murals were. It survived because Klimt’s patron, the industrialist Carl Reininghaus, bought it.</p><h3>Lost by a Single Vote</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/401/1*jWNEgXlboxg7YwXevjB--w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Galerie Miethke</figcaption></figure><p>By 1905 the association had become two camps. Klimt’s “stylists” were open to the applied arts, to the Wiener Werkstätte, to working with dealers. The “realists” around Josef Engelhart regarded those entanglements as a conflict of interest. The Leopold Museum locates the cause in that opening towards workshops and dealers, and gives questions of style a smaller part.</p><p>The flashpoint was the The Vienna Secession. Moll, a Secession co-founder, took over its artistic direction in the spring of 1905, and a proposal followed that the Secession buy the gallery or use it as an outlet for its members’ work. On 14 June 1905 the membership voted, and Klimt’s side lost by a single vote.</p><p>Klimt and seventeen others, among them Hoffmann, Wagner, Moll and Alfred Roller, resigned. They left behind the building that had been designed for their work. Galerie Miethke became the sole outlet for Klimt’s work, and under Moll it brought international art to Vienna, chiefly the French Impressionists. Moll’s time there was short: in 1912 Klimt wrote to Emilie Flöge that he had been fired.</p><p>That year Klimt also withdrew from the commission for the Faculty Paintings at the University of Vienna and repaid his fee to the ministry. His one significant institutional tie after the split was the Wiener Werkstätte, a company making high-quality handmade goods, on whose supervisory board he sat.</p><p>The leavers built again, this time in wood. For the 1908 <em>Kunstschau</em>, Hoffmann designed a temporary complex of fifty-four rooms with terraced gardens, a café and a garden theatre, and Moser designed a room for sixteen of Klimt’s works. Klimt gave the opening speech and showed <em>The Kiss</em>, still unfinished, which the Austrian state gallery bought. A second Kunstschau followed in 1909.</p><h3>The Jury Changes Hands</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/538/1*ZAOzZteYDVN08r00cvqhGg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Group of Eleven</figcaption></figure><p>Berlin followed the same script with an extra turn. In 1892 Liebermann and Walter Leistikow formed a Group of Eleven, and that November the Association of Berlin Artists closed an Edvard Munch exhibition after a scandal, its members calling the paintings “repugnant, ugly and mean”. Liebermann had already watched the throne intervene: in 1896, sitting on the jury of the Great Berlin Art Exhibition, he recommended works by Käthe Kollwitz and Leistikow for a prize, and Wilhelm II and other jurors turned them down.</p><p>The modernists’ demand was modest: a room of their own and a jury of their own within that exhibition. The Academy and the artists’ association refused. In 1898 the jury rejected a landscape by Leistikow, and in May of that year he, Liebermann and Franz Skarbina led a mass departure. Most counts put the number at sixty-five. Liebermann, who had been on Munich’s founding list six years earlier, became president. Corinth, Max Slevogt and Kollwitz were founding members, and the new Secession put on two exhibitions a year.</p><p>Twelve years on, the Berlin jury under Liebermann turned away twenty-seven artists, with eighty-nine works between them, most of them expressionists. Heckel, Kirchner, Pechstein and Schmidt-Rottluff were among those named. In May 1910 the rejected held an exhibition of their own, billed as the work of those refused by the Berlin Secession. The group that grew out of it, the <em>Neue Secession</em>, elected Max Pechstein president, with Georg Tappert as chairman, and the Brücke painters joined. It mounted seven exhibitions in Berlin between 1910 and 1914. Nolde, who had joined the old Secession in 1908, fell out with Liebermann, wrote him an open letter and was expelled. Liebermann resigned the presidency in 1911.</p><p>The pattern ran on inside the breakaway. When Pechstein was not re-elected president, he left with the Brücke painters, and the Neue Secession came apart in late 1911. In 1914 more than forty members quit the Berlin Secession, including Liebermann and Slevogt, and formed the <em>Freie Secession</em>, which lasted until 1924. Liebermann had helped found the Munich Secession, presided over the Berlin one, and in 1914 walked out of it.</p><p>In Vienna, the ground on Lothringerstrasse where Hoffmann’s wooden pavilions stood now holds a concert hall and a skating club. Olbrich’s white building on the Getreidemarkt, the one the leavers left behind, still holds exhibitions, and Klimt’s frieze, painted for a single show, is still inside.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2ce893287773" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Room Keeps Emptying]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/the-room-keeps-emptying-dd6535f79908?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dd6535f79908</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 10:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-16T10:31:01.469Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/668/1*Ifq4N1Rm2Ja8A6KiqHZ7Ng.jpeg" /><figcaption>Gil J Wolman, Mohamed Dahou, Guy Debord, Ivan Chtcheglov</figcaption></figure><p>It happens four times across this account, always with the same shape. A younger man walks into a room where an older generation is performing, and tells them it’s over. Tzara outgrows Ball’s refusal to turn Dada into a doctrine and keeps going without him, opening a gallery under the same name while Ball retreats into theology. Breton puts Tzara on trial for refusing to let Dada’s negation serve any purpose at all, then — once he’s won that argument and built an entire apparatus of offices and journals around his own answer — expels his own closest collaborators in turn, Desnos among them, for not keeping pace with where he’d decided the movement should go next. Isou, a refugee not yet a year off the boat, walks into a Tzara premiere in January 1946 and announces that Dada is dead. Six years later, Debord and Wolman decide Isou’s own revolution hasn’t gone far enough and walk out to start one of their own. Four generations, thirty-six years, the same gesture repeated with the names changed each time. It’s worth asking, now that the whole arc is visible, what these men actually thought they were fighting over — because it was never simply impatience with the old guard. It was a disagreement about where, exactly, the problem was located.</p><h3>The target keeps shrinking because the last one wasn’t trusted</h3><p>Here is the argument this account has been making in pieces: each movement didn’t just reject its predecessor’s answer, it relocated the entire question to a smaller, less accessible site. Dada’s founders decided the problem was institutional — the museum, the gallery, the coherent saleable artwork — because they still trusted that an artist’s conscious will, aimed correctly, could dismantle it. Breton’s circle decided that trust was naive. If reasoned argument and well-composed paintings could coexist with the Somme, the fault wasn’t in the institutions housing art; it was in the conscious, reasoning mind producing it, the same mind that had spent 1914 to 1918 finding eloquent justifications for industrial slaughter. So the target moved inward, from the gallery to the unconscious, and the method became automatism: get the hand moving faster than the part of the brain that edits. Isou’s generation, arriving after a second war in which official language itself had been the instrument — propaganda, euphemism, the bureaucratic vocabulary of deportation — concluded that even the unconscious wasn’t safe ground, because the images it produced still travelled in words, and words carried the century’s exhausted meanings with them no matter how freely they were rearranged. So the target shrank again, from the mind to the letter, and Lettrism tried to build poetry back up from sound alone, before sense had a chance to attach itself. Each generation didn’t think its predecessor had aimed too low. It thought the predecessor hadn’t located where the rot actually started.</p><h3>What the two wars left behind</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/738/1*Buo7_siVNTBcnEtstCoLzw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Robert Desnos</figcaption></figure><p>Run the same argument through the actual experience of the wars and it holds up. Zurich’s Dadaists built their nonsense in a country that had lost nothing and risked nothing, which is exactly why their refusal stayed abstract — a protest against reason itself, performed in cardboard and invented syllables, aimed at no one in particular. Berlin’s Dadaists, working in a defeated country with named enemies and real courtrooms waiting for them, couldn’t afford that abstraction; their photomontage went straight for the Reichswehr and the profiteers, and some of them paid fines for it. Surrealism grew up in the uneasy, unstable peace between the wars, still hopeful enough to believe the unconscious might hold something worth recovering — an optimism Dada’s survivors, scarred by an actual defeated war, had mostly run out of by 1920. That hope didn’t fully collapse until a second war scattered the movement’s founders across two continents and left one of its own, Robert Desnos, dead of typhus in a camp weeks after its liberation, identified in his final days not by the movement that had expelled him but by a stranger who happened to have read his poetry. Lettrism inherited a continent that had just watched its own governments lie fluently and efficiently for six years, dressing deportation orders in bureaucratic euphemism and calling propaganda news, and built a literary movement on the premise that language itself, not merely the institutions or the minds that used it, could no longer be trusted at face value.</p><h3>Who actually built this</h3><p>France hosted more of this history than it authored alone. The movement’s founding room was a bar in neutral Switzerland, filled by a German poet, two Romanians, an Alsatian sculptor, and whichever stray refugees the war had displaced that month, with a future Bolshevik leader living a few doors up the same street. Its most politically dangerous photomontage came out of Berlin, aimed at an army that had the power to put its makers in a courtroom. Its single most durable popular image — the razor through the eye — was shot by two Spaniards working from their own dreams, in a film finished in a matter of weeks. Its Belgian wing, organised by a Brussels poet who spent his days working as a biochemist and never let the two halves of his life touch, kept its distance from Paris and its orthodoxies almost on principle. And the movement that finally reduced all of it to a single letter arrived in Paris at twenty years old, a Romanian Jewish refugee who had survived a pogrom and a continent at war to get there, carrying a suitcase of manuscripts and a stranger’s letter of introduction. Paris was where these people happened to end up, and where the arguments got loud enough to leave a paper trail. It was rarely where the arguments started.</p><h3>Where this account stops</h3><p>By the early 1950s, Isou found himself occupying the exact position Tzara and Breton had each occupied before him: the founder, ageing into orthodoxy, furious at the protégés who’d decided his revolution hadn’t gone far enough. Debord and Wolman’s Lettrist International spent its first years still arguing, at least nominally, about poetry, before its attention drifted toward something that had considerably less interest in words at all, isolated letters or otherwise. Where that drift led — the Situationist International, founded in a small Italian town in the summer of 1957 — is a different argument than the one this account set out to trace, and a better one told on its own terms.</p><p>Hugo Ball never got to see any of this. He died of stomach cancer in September 1927 in a small village in the Swiss canton of Ticino, eighteen years before Isou’s suitcase of manuscripts even reached Paris, having spent his last years writing theology and apparently trying to forget the noise he’d helped let loose in a rented room on the Spiegelgasse. He missed the Second Manifesto, the razor through the calf’s eye, the scandal at Cannes — all of it. The argument he started in a cardboard bishop’s costume outlived him by three decades and travelled considerably further than Zurich, but by the time it reached its final, smallest unit — a single spoken letter, stripped of everything it used to mean — the man who’d first tried speaking in something other than sense was two decades in the ground, and nobody left in the room had been there to hear how it began.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dd6535f79908" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Chocolate Industries and the City It Didn’t Choose]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/chocolate-industries-and-the-city-it-didnt-choose-56acc645b0a7?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/56acc645b0a7</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 12:16:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-15T12:16:31.072Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/554/1*VF2sLCKyJVcsQNuXYpUJuw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Funkstörung’s <em>Post.Art</em> EP</figcaption></figure><p>The first record on Chocolate Industries came with two speeds. Funkstörung’s <em>Post.Art</em> EP, released in 1998, was cut to play at either 33 or 45 rpm, and the switch changed the room: at one speed, head-nodding hip-hop grooves; at the other, kinetic jungle stutters. Marvin “Seven” Bedard, who ran the label alone, had never liked sorting music into sides. As a young man he refused to make mixtapes for friends with electronic tracks on one half and hip-hop on the other, and the label grew out of that refusal.</p><h3>Records That Change Speed</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/238/1*3MvUu85mF74SPxqZWoG00A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Marvin “Seven” Bedard</figcaption></figure><p>Seven was born in the Bronx to Haitian parents, spent a few turbulent post-Duvalier years in Haiti, and settled in West Kendall, Florida, shuttling back to New York through high school. His five sisters controlled the stereo: ska shows, Bad Brains, Gorilla Biscuits, the Go-Go’s, Michael Jackson, Kraftwerk, Herbie Hancock, with Haitian music and gospel from his parents underneath. His own route into electronic music ran through the experimental composers Iannis Xenakis and John Cage, and through the Detroit techno that carried a hint of struggle.</p><p>In Miami he worked on local imprints, Schematic among them, and co-founded Isophlux with Shad T., part of a pair of pioneering North American IDM labels that formed in the early to mid-nineties. He left because the labels wanted music pinned to a specific style within a genre, and he wanted to release whatever he was feeling. Chocolate Industries gave him an identity of his own. The first releases were a run of four-song EPs, vocal-less and fringy, in a post-hip-hop vein, and the label’s early output was shaped less by any sound than by what the <em>Miami New Times</em> later described as a commitment to innovation over genre rules.</p><p>His closest collaborator was Edgar Farinas, the Miami producer who records as Push Button Objects and is credited alongside Seven as a founder. Seven remembered digging through the enormous record collection Farinas had inherited from an uncle, and remembered Farinas mixing his influences with hip-hop. Farinas’s 1999 record <em>Unauthorized</em> settled on no single style. Industrial, goth, house, electro, hip-hop and the abstract soundscapes of Autechre all fed into a stark, repetitious study of the breakbeat.</p><p>The breakthrough came from a rap record. Seven re-released “Tried by 12,” an obscure single by East Flatbush Project that underground hip-hop radio DJs cherished and fans of cutting-edge electronic producers had never heard. He then asked those producers for remixes: Autechre, Funkstörung, Squarepusher, the Miami act Phoenecia, and Ko-Wreck Technique, a collaboration between Farinas and DJ Craze. Many of them altered the vocals, a long-standing taboo in hip-hop. The album-length collection sold very well for a one-man independent and put the label on the map. Seven later admitted that, knowing the business side as he now did, he would have handled the release differently, though he judged the acclaim worth it. The Miami New Times named Chocolate Industries the city’s best electronica label in 1999.</p><h3>A Temporary Move</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/738/1*6DjBq05TTgbfq7ap6Cydqw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Art Institute of Chicago</figcaption></figure><p>Around 2000, Seven left for Chicago. The move was meant to be temporary: his girlfriend had been accepted to the Art Institute. He stayed because the city suited a label head without a car. “There’s a really good transit system here,” he told the New Times. Miami, by his account, isolated anyone short of money, which he was, and scattered his attention with friends and good weather. Chicago was about work.</p><p>The paper that had crowned the label in 1999 marked its departure with a second honour: best record label to leave town. It added that Seven had kept the output coming, from South Florida and abroad. He already had a run of records by While, an artist from Washington, D.C., behind him, and in 2000 the label issued <em>Rapid Transit</em>, a retrospective of its first years. The new address was a mailing address on North Milwaukee Avenue, and the music still came from other places.</p><h3>Chicago Voices</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/447/1*hlgavsFFLKLrVH1LyBDRGQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Diverse “One A.M”</figcaption></figure><p>The first Chicago signings were local: the MC Diverse, the producer and vocalist Via Tania, and the freeform sampler Caural. Diverse, born Kenny Jenkins in Englewood and raised in several parts of the city, settled in Rogers Park, where he worked as a mail carrier and spent years sharpening his rapping. By 2001 he was being hailed at home as the city’s most talented MC since Common. He met Seven, and Seven signed him.</p><p>Mos Def joined him on “Wylin Out,” a track for the 2002 compilation <em>Urban Renewal Program</em>, which introduced Diverse to New York’s underground and built a buzz around his debut album. <em>One A.M.</em> arrived in 2003 with production from RJD2, Madlib and Prefuse 73, and guests including Lyrics Born, Jean Grae and Vast Aire of Cannibal Ox.</p><p>Prefuse 73 was Scott Herren, an Atlanta beatsmith whom the label had debuted and whose first Warp album had drawn rave reviews. Before his second Warp album he cut a one-off single for Chocolate Industries with Mos Def and Diverse, and he then turned up as a producer on Diverse’s debut. Vast Aire went on to make his own album for the label.</p><p>Seven’s ambitions in those years ran ahead of the label’s output. While the compilation was still in preparation he told the New Times that he planned six LPs in a single year, though Chocolate Industries had never issued a proper full-length. Push Button Objects, Diverse, Via Tania and Caural were all due albums, and he hinted at artists so high-profile that he could not yet name them. He also worried that other labels had started to sound like his own, which was reason enough to move on.</p><h3>A Switchboard on Milwaukee Avenue</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/383/1*Aft2thCj8s2p1QL0B1zX-g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Prefuse 73</figcaption></figure><p>Funkstörung came from Germany, Prefuse 73 from Atlanta, While from Washington, and Lady Sovereign from Wembley, in north-west London. In November 2005 Chocolate Industries released her <em>Vertically Challenged</em> EP, which gathered most of her singles to date. That same year Jay-Z signed her to Def Jam. The label’s announcements for what came next still introduced it as the home of Lady Sovereign.</p><p>Billboard judged the label in 2004 to be among the most artful, high-profile independents in Chicago, a standing built largely on records from elsewhere. NPR’s history of Chicago hip-hop describes a city defined from the start by outsiders, treated as flyover country one day and a magnet for scrutiny the next. Seven was an outsider in another sense. He arrived by accident, built the roster from other places, and then signed the city’s own.</p><h3>The Cool Kids</h3><p>In October 2007 the label signed The Cool Kids, a Chicago duo made up of Chuck Inglish, then 23, and Mikey Rocks, then 19. They had met in 2005 when Rocks found a beat Inglish had put online, and their early material had gone out almost entirely through MySpace, apart from a single for the DJ A-Trak’s Fool’s Gold label. Seven said that meeting them felt like fresh air, and the duo said they chose Chocolate Industries because it gave them room to evolve. They toured with M.I.A. that November, and their EP <em>The Bake Sale</em> followed on 20 May 2008, through XL Recordings, Chocolate Industries and their own C.A.K.E. imprint.</p><h3>Bedroom Recordings</h3><p>By 2012 the <em>Chicago Reader</em> counted almost eighty releases in the catalogue and credited the move to the Midwest for the label’s most popular work. Bedard, then 34, told the paper that things got hairy when he went full-time after being fired from his day job, but the body of work was deep enough to keep the label afloat. That same year the label issued <em>Personal Space: Electronic Soul 1974–1984</em>, a compilation of home-recorded electronic soul from the seventies and eighties, a long way from the Miami record collection an uncle had left to a nephew.</p><p>He had come for a girlfriend’s place at an art school, without a car, and the trains ran well enough that he stayed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=56acc645b0a7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What the Pictures Remembered]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alastair.kemp/what-the-pictures-remembered-834457c9b928?source=rss-6fb27a105075------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/834457c9b928</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dymphna's Archive]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 10:33:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-12T10:33:59.159Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/548/1*hndg7XCYB_qz4Qbd7h8EWA.jpeg" /><figcaption>André Masson</figcaption></figure><p>By the mid-1920s, the face of Surrealism had started to change. The Bureau’s archive of dreams and the journal’s dense columns of text were still running, but the group now included André Masson, whose automatic drawings let the same unplanned, uncensored method that had produced Les Champs magnétiques move onto canvas, and Joan Miró, whose biomorphic shapes turned automatism into a visual vocabulary of its own. The movement that had spent its first years as an office full of paperwork was about to acquire a set of images the public would actually remember.</p><h3>The eye and the razor</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/738/1*5TX1r2b1u8m5vK4UWM6X4Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Un Chien Andalou</figcaption></figure><p>No image did more of that work than the opening seconds of a sixteen-minute film two Spaniards made together in a matter of weeks. Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí wrote Un Chien Andalou at Dalí’s family home in Figueres, drawing on two dreams — Buñuel’s, of a cloud slicing the moon like a blade through an eye, and Dalí’s, of a hand crawling with ants — and shot it in Paris that spring. The film opens with a man sharpening a razor, a cloud crossing the moon, and a straight razor drawn across a woman’s open eye; the eye, in fact, belonged to a calf, but the shock the sequence produced required no such distinction. It premiered on 6 June 1929 at the Studio des Ursulines and ran for eight months. By the end of that year Breton had written the preface to Dalí’s first Paris exhibition, and both men were inside the Surrealist circle they would spend the next several years alternately enriching and infuriating.</p><p>Dalí’s arrival came tangled up with someone else’s departure. That same summer, Paul Éluard brought his wife Gala to Cadaqués to cheer up the young painter, who had been giving himself fits of hysterical laughter and wasn’t sending finished work to his dealers. Gala — who, a few years earlier, had spent time in Max Ernst’s household during his own first months in France — fell for Dalí almost on sight; Éluard went home from that holiday alone, and he and Gala divorced before the year was out. It was, by now, a familiar enough pattern inside this circle that nobody seems to have found it especially remarkable: the same small group of people kept forming and reforming its households along exactly the lines its paintings and poems were exploring.</p><h3>A movement next door</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/302/1*6DGwrxh8Ge0xoAr7U_HsyQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Paul Nougé</figcaption></figure><p>Not every outpost of Surrealism answered to Paris. In Brussels, the poet Paul Nougé had been assembling his own circle since 1924, and by the autumn of 1926 it had a name and a rough shape: Nougé himself, the painter René Magritte, the writer Camille Goemans, the composer and dealer E.L.T. Mesens. Breton and Éluard travelled up to approve their pamphlet journal, Correspondance, as authentically Surrealist, but the Belgians never behaved like a satellite office. Nougé worked by day as a biochemist in a Brussels laboratory; the group kept its art and its private lives carefully separate, in a way the Paris circle, forever dissolving its marriages into its manifestos, conspicuously did not. Magritte moved to Paris in 1927, stayed three years, fell out with Breton over matters the two men never fully reconciled, and went home to Brussels in 1930 to keep painting on his own terms, at a careful distance from the man French Surrealism still called its leader.</p><h3>The movement turns on itself</h3><p>That distance started to look wise. Breton had spent the mid-1920s drawing the Surrealists toward Communism, and in 1927 he, Aragon, Éluard, Péret, and Pierre Unik all joined the French Communist Party together. It didn’t hold the group steady; if anything, it gave Breton a new standard by which to judge who still belonged. In December 1929 he published his Second Manifesto of Surrealism, a document that functioned less as a statement of principle than as a list of names read out of the movement — among them Robert Desnos, the poet whose trance performances had done more than almost anyone’s to prove automatism could be more than a literary exercise five years earlier. The expelled wrote back the following January with a pamphlet of their own, mocking Breton under the title Un Cadavre — the same title, pointedly, Breton’s circle had once used to mock a dead novelist they despised. The movement that had spent its first years defining itself against Dada’s wreckage and, before that, against the war that made Dada necessary, had found a new target close enough to touch: itself.</p><p>Politics widened the split rather than healing it. By 1932, Aragon had committed fully to the Communist Party line and broken with Breton’s circle for good; Breton, expelled from the Party himself the following year for refusing to subordinate Surrealism to its cultural directives, went looking for a different kind of revolutionary company. He found it in April 1938 in Coyoacán, Mexico, in the exiled Leon Trotsky, hunted by Stalin’s agents and living under armed guard at Diego Rivera’s house. Breton, Trotsky, and Rivera spent weeks in conversation and produced a joint manifesto that July, denouncing fascism and Stalinism in the same breath and calling for an international federation of genuinely independent revolutionary artists. Trotsky himself couldn’t risk a public signature; the document went out under Breton’s and Rivera’s names alone. Two years later Trotsky was dead, an ice axe through his skull, and the federation he’d helped design barely outlived him.</p><h3>The scatter</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/328/1*zhYfD8yALffQAiO0kUfYPw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Varian Fry</figcaption></figure><p>By then there was a larger war to survive. When German forces entered Paris in June 1940, Breton and much of what remained of his circle fled south to Marseille, where an American named Varian Fry had arrived with three thousand dollars taped to his leg and a list of roughly two hundred people the Gestapo and the Vichy police wanted found. Fry’s committee rented a crumbling villa on the city’s outskirts, Air-Bel, and for a few months in the autumn and winter of 1940 it filled with refugees waiting on exit visas: Breton and his family, Max Ernst, André Masson, Victor Brauner, Benjamin Péret, the Cuban painter Wifredo Lam. To keep the waiting bearable they invented games, among them a new version of the tarot deck, its traditional suits replaced with ones more suited to their own obsessions — love, dream, revolution, knowledge — played out around a dinner table in a house that could be raided at any moment, and was, that December, while Marshal Pétain visited the city a few miles away. Ernst eventually sailed for New York by way of Portugal. Breton and Lam left Marseille on a converted freighter bound first for Martinique, then onward to New York, where exiled Surrealism would spend the rest of the war as a transplanted colony, its office and its archive left behind in an occupied country.</p><p>Robert Desnos did not go. Expelled from the movement eleven years earlier, he had stayed in Paris through the occupation, joined a Resistance intelligence network, forged papers for people in hiding, and kept publishing poetry under cover of a pseudonym respectable enough to pass the censors. The Gestapo arrested him in February 1944. He survived Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and a slave-labour camp in Saxony before being marched, in the war’s final weeks, toward Theresienstadt. He was dying of typhus there when two young Czech medical volunteers found him among the new arrivals; one of them, it turned out, had read Desnos’s poetry in translation and recognised the name. He died on 8 June 1945, a month after the camp’s liberation, having been identified, in his last days, not by the movement that had thrown him out but by a stranger who happened to have read what he once wrote in a trance, half a world and half a lifetime away from the room where he’d first spoken it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=834457c9b928" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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