<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alcis on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alcis on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@alcis?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 00:04:08 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@alcis/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[One Battle After Another]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alcis-stories/one-battle-after-another-a1af5ffadb82?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a1af5ffadb82</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[flooding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pollution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alcis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2019 15:09:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-18T08:03:24.938Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Conflict, Flooding and Toxic Waste in Northern Syria</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hNHbivFCYSDslBzdM-0C-w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 1 — Future site for Al Arisha IDP Camp</figcaption></figure><p>Since the conflict in Syria began, tree felling has become a necessity in order to provide firewood for homes. The illegal production of charcoal has also led to mass deforestation across the north of the country. Following heavy rainfall and a harsh winter, much of Northern Syria has experienced severe flooding in recent months.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CWucYDigmvLmMGQeqLxjRQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 2 — Camp shown situated between oil refineries</figcaption></figure><p>As a consequence of the conflict, over 10,000 displaced Syrians found themselves living in the Arisha IDP camp, located between three makeshift oil refineries. The combination of bad weather and poor siting has forced the residents of Arisha to move again as rising flood waters wash away parts of the camp.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7QbMBq3SHcwQ5elv8AG3Dw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 3 — New camp location and flooding extent</figcaption></figure><p>Adding to the risk are the toxic waste products from the oil refineries, now contaminating the flood water and compounding the hazard. Yet another danger to the many already experienced by the people of Arisha.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sj6BOqMb2sFp6UHjtf6RTQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 4 — Flood comparison</figcaption></figure><p>Alcis will continue to monitor change over time at locations of interest through the use of high resolution satellite imagery, ground data collection and other geospatial data.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a1af5ffadb82" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories/one-battle-after-another-a1af5ffadb82">One Battle After Another</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories">Alcis Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[When salt and water mix]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alcis-stories/when-salt-and-water-mix-2bad69e3c01d?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2bad69e3c01d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mining]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[satellite-technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alcis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2019 09:18:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-10T10:29:36.630Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uGCrwHV0CUH-V5QVHDa1JQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Illegal mining in Afghanistan prevented not by law enforcement but by flooding</strong></p><p><strong>Author:</strong> Richard Brittan, Alcis</p><p>Alcis continues to monitor mining activities across Afghanistan, the vast majority of which are illegal. Our recently released <a href="https://stories.alcis.org/in-plain-sight-ed9ce986773f">preliminary study into the use of satellite imagery to analyse and monitor extractive activities in Afghanistan</a> covers some of this activity. What has recently transpired at one of the mine locations covered in the preliminary study is fascinating.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UGZtxyAB_dMvOSie8L1vQQ.png" /></figure><p>In early January 2018, <a href="https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/ghoryan-salt-mine-contract-signed">the Afghan Government signed a five year contract</a> with a mining company to permit the extraction of 125,000 tons of salt per year at a mine in Ghoryan district, Herat province, in western Afghanistan. The mining concession area is the red polygon shown on the above satellite image, 18 kilometres from the Iranian border. The green polygon shows the area of recent mining activity. Surprisingly, this contract was abruptly cancelled in mid April 2018, less than three months later, <a href="https://www.tolonews.com/business/salt-mine-contract-cancelled-after-lithium-uranium-discovered">on the grounds that lithium and possibly uranium had subsequently been discovered in the area</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XYGRyvZZidFxx6_sEa38tA.png" /></figure><p>Despite the mining contract being cancelled six months previously, analysis from satellite imagery, collected between August and September 2018, shows ongoing mining activity at this mine site. This now illegal mining activity has continued to be extensive, illustrated through the presence of machinery, trucks and the expansion of mining activity over time. That is until recently.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TJFGdg4Wp6hye-hL_RE1Zw.png" /></figure><p>In the absence of any obvious efforts by the Afghan government to prevent this continuing mining activity either at the mine site or along routes used to transport the extracted mineral(s), mining has now stopped at this location. The image above, captured three weeks ago, shows that the mine area is now under water. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-flash-floods-update-no-8-2-april-2019">According to UN OCHA</a>, since the beginning of 2019, more than 163,000 people have now been affected by floods across Afghanistan, with more than 42,000 people displaced. This mine site and the wider environment as well has not been spared by this year’s flooding.</p><p>Alcis will continue to monitor this and other mining locations across Afghanistan.</p><p>For over 15 years, Alcis has been supporting and collaborating with donors, policy makers, programme implementers and academics to better understand and operate within fragile and complex environments. As technology has evolved over this time, Alcis has continued to innovate a number of technology dependent, collaborative methodologies that have been highly effective at providing robust, data driven, evidence bases for decision making in these environments.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2bad69e3c01d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories/when-salt-and-water-mix-2bad69e3c01d">When salt and water mix</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories">Alcis Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Greening the Deserts]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alcis-stories/greening-the-deserts-ca269298f929?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ca269298f929</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[desert]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[agriculture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alcis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 May 2018 10:38:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-23T10:38:05.356Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fzKT-uDgTYIrSPue1c_yJA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Agricultural Expansion in South West Afghanistan</strong></p><p>Desert areas of southwestern Afghanistan are undergoing dramatic change. Over the past couple of decades, these areas have been transformed by households that have moved into these desert areas either by capturing or purchasing what was once and to many still remains ‘Government land’.</p><p>Between 2003 and 2016 agriculture in the desert areas increased by more than 300,000 hectares, an area approximately four times the size of New York city. This area supports up to 2.2 million people, the majority of whom have settled there over the last ten years. Analysis of satellite imagery from early 2018 shows that this dramatic pattern of human settlement and expansion of agriculture in these desert areas continues to the present day.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4MvOsiRVYfzXxeXggEEdhg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Map showing the history of agricultural expansion. Light green areas existed prior to 2003, the darker green areas are the more recent additions</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/959/1*pMjKYNNpmgHUEyJC06ufag.png" /><figcaption>Extent of agriculture in 2002, constrained by access to formal irrigation systems fed by the Helmand river</figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the agricultural productivity of southwest Afghanistan has been limited to the irrigated lands fed by the river systems in the region, most notably the Argandab and Helmand rivers. The Karez systems of subterranean water supply and rain fed agriculture made up the mix of alternative water delivery systems in the area.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RUWkVJawyjjeX0oXyCF8Yg.png" /><figcaption>Drawing underground water for irrigation using a diesel powered pump</figcaption></figure><p>Between 2006 and 2014 increasing numbers of households came to these former desert areas driven by population pressure, the ensuing fighting between ISAF and the Taliban, as well as by coercive efforts to ban opium poppy by the government of Afghanistan and its foreign backers. Agricultural practice in these desert areas was then principally enabled by drawing water through deep tube wells to irrigate established fields. The pumps that drew this water were fueled by diesel, an expense that significantly limited the amount of water households would draw, impacting the extent and nature of the crops that were subsequently cultivated.</p><p>Since 2014, the vast majority of these households have adopted solar technology to significantly reduce diesel input costs. As a consequence, agricultural production in this area is both expanding and diversifying, driving increases in the areas of opium poppy cultivation, along with other crops.</p><p>In just three years between 2013 and 2016, the area of agriculture in southwest Afghanistan increased by a further 150,000 hectares, an area approximately two times the size of New York city.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ho8OFr9gyWQvzJepAvrsnA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Map showing the annual levels of cultivated areas, where dark green shows long standing agriculture and light green shows newly cultivated land</figcaption></figure><p>At the time of writing, Alcis has not completed the satellite imagery analysis for the measurement of the area of agriculture in 2017 and 2018, but it is clear from imagery collected over the last 2 years that this expansion of agriculture in these desert areas has continued at significant pace.</p><p>A good proxy indicator for this continued expansion is the increase in the number of household water reservoirs. Alcis’ recent <a href="https://stories.alcis.org/reaching-saturation-73d97a38d891">short report</a> showed that between 2013 and 2016 the number of these reservoirs increased from negligible levels to over 14,000 reservoirs. However between 2016 and 2018, the number has increased by a further 36,000 to over 50,000 reservoirs, pointing to this further considerable expansion and diversification of agriculture in these areas.</p><p>For more information on this current dynamic, please see a <a href="https://areu.org.af/archives/publication/1808">report</a> entitled Still Water Runs Deep: Illicit Poppy and the Transformation of the Deserts of Southwest Afghanistan, recently released by The <a href="https://areu.org.af/">Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)</a>, written by <a href="http://www.davidmansfield.org/home/index.html">David Mansfield</a> with support from <a href="http://osdr.org.af/">OSDR</a> and <a href="https://www.alcis.org/">Alcis</a>.</p><p>More information can as well be found in this <a href="https://stories.alcis.org/draining-the-deserts-of-afghanistan-32d3e06541db">report</a> entitled Draining the Deserts of Afghanistan by Alcis, David Mansfield and OSDR.</p><p><em>If you liked this article please 👏 and follow us. If you want to be kept in the loop with future publications subscribe to our newsletter </em><a href="http://subscribe.alcis.org/"><em>here</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ca269298f929" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories/greening-the-deserts-ca269298f929">Greening the Deserts</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories">Alcis Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Reaching saturation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alcis-stories/reaching-saturation-73d97a38d891?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/73d97a38d891</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[water]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[heroin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[solar-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drugs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alcis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 May 2018 09:07:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-18T09:09:59.200Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fTojwfFdmmPhCYqx5gCMhQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>Solar technology adoption in South West Afghanistan</strong></h4><p>For many years farmers in the deserts of South West Afghanistan have irrigated their land using water pumps fueled by diesel. But recently they have embraced solar on a massive scale.</p><p>Over the last four years the vast majority of these households have adopted solar technology and the creation of household water reservoirs to significantly reduce diesel input costs. From less than 200 in 2014 to over 50,000 reservoirs in 2018, it is this phenomenon that has supported the recent rise in illicit opium cultivation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RApGKqiqDSDW0Fdcvd9DjA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Reservoirs in South West Afghanistan 2016–2018</figcaption></figure><p>As a result, agricultural production in this area is both expanding and diversifying, driving increases in the areas of opium poppy cultivation, along with other crops, in these previously unproductive areas.</p><p>The image below shows varying numbers of solar panels and associated sizes of reservoirs, where the vast majority of the crop being cultivated is opium poppy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UvL9_nSAiwNVIOrqjfrk_w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Reservoirs and Solar Panels in Northern Helmand 2018</figcaption></figure><p>The adoption rate of this technology is now on average over 80% for the households in these areas.</p><p>The map below shows a research area that Alcis has been monitoring for over ten years. The vast majority of households have now adopted this technology and constructed water reservoirs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GUSgsNzklLtNtJloTuuBLQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Reservoirs in Shna Jama, Helmand 2018</figcaption></figure><p>What is less clear are the associated consequences of the adoption of this green technology. In many cases this adoption is consolidating the presence of households on land that is viewed by many as still owned by the Government.</p><p>The greatest unknown impact however is on the subterranean aquifer upon which these communities depend and for how long it can sustain this level of extraction.</p><p>The <a href="https://areu.org.af/">Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)</a> have recently released a <a href="https://areu.org.af/archives/publication/1808">report</a>, written by <a href="http://www.davidmansfield.org/home/index.html">David Mansfield</a> with support from <a href="http://osdr.org.af/">OSDR</a> and <a href="https://www.alcis.org/">Alcis</a>, which deepens the understanding of this phenomenon.<br>More information can as well be found in this <a href="https://stories.alcis.org/draining-the-deserts-of-afghanistan-32d3e06541db">report</a> by Alcis, David Mansfield and OSDR.</p><p>If you liked this article 👏 away and follow us. If you want to keep in the loop subscribe to our mailing list <a href="http://subscribe.alcis.org/">here</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=73d97a38d891" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories/reaching-saturation-73d97a38d891">Reaching saturation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories">Alcis Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[After the Dust Settles — Making Sense of the Non-sense]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alcis-stories/after-the-dust-settles-making-sense-of-the-non-sense-c97da619a20f?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c97da619a20f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[moab]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alcis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 May 2017 10:39:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-03T10:39:41.132Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*DN-A3in92OBvKGlbng5Iuw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>After the Dust Settles — Making Sense of the Non-sense</h3><h4>A deeper analysis of the MOAB strike in Afghanistan</h4><h3>Summary</h3><p>Drawing on very high resolution satellite imagery, along with recent ground photography and reporting, <strong>it is now clear that the recent MOAB strike in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan created far less damage and destruction than was initially widely reported. </strong>This MOAB strike destroyed a total of 38 buildings and 69 trees within an area extending 150 metres from the centre of the strike location, debunking media reports of the MOAB strike destroying buildings over three kilometres away. David Mansfield and Alcis have been studying this remote, troubled valley in Eastern Afghanistan since 2005. This report follows on from our <a href="https://stories.alcis.org/after-the-dust-settles-d167fa0e7599">initial report</a> put out in the immediate aftermath of the strike.</p><p><a href="https://stories.alcis.org/after-the-dust-settles-d167fa0e7599">After the dust settles</a></p><p>Given the importance of the Mahmand valley in national politics and its location deep within one of the fracture lines in the Afghan state, there is a need to assess the wider social, economic and political ramifications of the MOAB strike and the campaign against the militants in the upper reaches of Achin district. These aspects will be covered in the third report to follow in this series.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>On 13 April 2017, the US military released a GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) on a small settlement and reported tunnel network, at the entrance to the Mahmand Valley, within Achin District, Nangarhar Province, in Eastern Afghanistan, as shown in Figure 1 below. <strong>This settlement, despite its size, is not a recognised settlement, and has no official name </strong>in either the Afghan National or International settlement databases. <strong>The settlement does however feature as an unnamed settlement in </strong><a href="https://www.alcis.org/settlements.aspx"><strong>Alcis’ settlement database for Afghanistan</strong></a><strong>. </strong>The settlement sits 650 metres to the southwest of the centre of the village of Asadkhel, close to the villages of Lansai Ahmad and Tangai and three kilometres from Shadal Bazaar, as shown in Figure 2 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IcJL2lSBVAnMFVUJMPzU9A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 1. Location of the Mahmand Valley. Imagery copyright ESRI</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FJaZFbywhuaIqQ6kqKou6g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 2. The area around the MOAB strike location, in 3D. Imagery copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><h3>Alcis analysis — site damage</h3><p>Drawing on satellite imagery, recently collected ground photography and video from the strike location as well as geospatial and 3D visualisation tools, subsequent analysis can now provide a deeper understanding of this unique event.</p><p>Analysis of the damage to buildings within and beyond the strike location from high resolution pre- and post-strike satellite imagery, shows that <strong>the extent of the blast shock wave extended at least as far as 135 metres but less than 450 metres from the centre of the MOAB strike. The accompanying fire ball extended less far, out to 140 metres from the strike location</strong>, based on the analysis of <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Video/videoid/519242/">cockpit footage</a> of the strike, satellite imagery and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/news/picture/where-the-mother-of-all-bombs-dropped?articleId=USRTS13O56">ground photography</a>. These distances are considerably less than <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4409964/All-need-know-Mother-Bombs.html#ixzz4fuwJirJ9">other reporting</a>, which stated that the MOAB has a blast radius of one mile. <strong>The destroyed area amounts to four hectares, approximately the size of seven football fields.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ednzU6oxG0Et0I-sj-1Vfg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 3. Annotated pre and post strike satellite images with a count of the destroyed buildings and trees. Imagery copyright Digital Globe.</figcaption></figure><p>Although it is not possible from high resolution satellite imagery and ground photography to determine an identifiable crater on the ground from the MOAB strike, this imagery shows that <strong>the destruction of the 38 buildings and 69 trees that make up this settlement was absolute,</strong> as shown in Figure 3 above and Figure 4 below. A 3D representation of the destroyed settlement, along with animated video around the settlement is at Figure 5 below. Damage to caves and tunnels within the strike location has not yet been assessed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K7KRyxuqH2GbFnVqdldTRg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 4. Media photography taken in the days following the strike, positioned on a detailed 3D model of the area. The red lines show the field of view from the bottom right inset photograph within Figure 5. Imagery copyright Digital Globe and Parwiz/Reuters</figcaption></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fr-t6NitXgfs%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dr-t6NitXgfs&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fr-t6NitXgfs%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9e57a1512ee69d2621ba1427fe334129/href">https://medium.com/media/9e57a1512ee69d2621ba1427fe334129/href</a></iframe><h3>Alcis analysis — wider damage</h3><p>It was initially unclear how far damage from the MOAB blast extended from the area of impact. Damage to buildings and compounds could be seen in satellite imagery in the nearby villages of Lansai Ahmad, Tangai and Tangah, as well as Shadal Bazaar, three kilometres away. Analysis of multi-dated satellite imagery indicates that the damage within the white circles in Figure 6 below has occurred within the last seven months. However, given the very contained and targeted nature of the destruction visible at these locations, where individual compounds have been destroyed, it is likely that these are not due to the MOAB blast but are a consequence of the ongoing conflict in the area, most likely airstrikes carried out by the US Military.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QCfhxc62S0Oc3-86Q4j3EQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 6. Overview of the area showing the locations and damage to buildings in close proximity to the MOAB strike. Three Inset images from this overview are included below. Imagery copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0kCdgTzLnlajmFqn0IOt2g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 6, Inset 1 — Imagery copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b_vQDONy-Ns0bGOGg3vA9A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 6, Inset 4 — Imagery copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*x7Rz0YaYcZ2JswDXbeFz1g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 6, Inset 5 — Imagery copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><h3>Media Reporting</h3><p>In the immediate aftermath of the MOAB strike, media reporting was extensive. <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4409964/All-need-know-Mother-Bombs.html#ixzz4fuwJirJ9">Media interest</a> focused on the fact that this was the largest non-nuclear bomb ever used in combat. <strong>The expectation was of massive damage to the area of the strike and up to a mile from the strike location, including a 300 metre crater at point of impact. </strong>Now that journalists have been allowed close to the site of the MOAB strike, ground photography and film footage of the strike location has started to emerge. As well, recent <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/video/521296/site-gbu-43-b-nangarhar-afghanistan">video</a> taken by the Afghan Local Police taken from the actual strike location has emerged, via the US Military. This reporting has proved helpful in <strong>confirming the absence of a 300 metre crater at the strike location.</strong></p><p>Some media as well <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4413864/Afghan-death-toll-mother-bombs-rises-94.html">reported</a> that buildings in Shadal Bazaar, over three kilometres away, had been destroyed by the blast, where reporting included ground photographs to support these claims. Based on the analysis of the actual extent of the MOAB blast, as set out above, it is most likely that the reported damage at Shadal Bazaar, as represented in Figure 7 below, <strong>is due to the ongoing conflict in the area and not due to the MOAB strike</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d2UyxEMuu5B6vC-mTB1TEQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 7. View from Shadal Bazaar to the MOAB strike point, with media photography purportedly showing MOAB destruction accurately located — Imagery copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><h3>Military Reporting</h3><p>Whilst media interest in the story of the MOAB strike was significant, military commentary on the other hand was and still remains muted, save for a few limited press statements and briefings. <strong>The US Military are yet to release a full damage assessment of the MOAB strike.</strong></p><h3>Casualties</h3><p>On 15 April, Afghanistan’s defence ministry <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4413864/Afghan-death-toll-mother-bombs-rises-94.html">reported</a> that <strong>94 militants including four major commanders had been killed in the strike, along with zero civilian casualties. </strong>Whilst it is understood the assessment of dead militants might be based on detailed military intelligence reporting, the precision around the number of exactly 94 militant deaths seems overly precise, especially given the nature of the ongoing conflict in the area and the relatively confined area of the MOAB blast.</p><p>Likewise, the claim of zero civilian casualties seems anomalous. Conflict has been ongoing in this area between Daesh, the Taliban and subsequently the Afghan government security forces dating back to mid-2015. Over this time, local residents in the area of the MOAB strike have been driven from their homes by Daesh. <a href="https://areu.org.af/archives/publication/1602">In many cases, Pakistani Orakzai families moved into these vacated settlements</a>. Post-strike satellite imagery and ground photography shows active crops in the fields belonging to the settlement at the centre of the strike. With up to a month until harvest time, it is unlikely these crops would have been left unattended. Indeed, it is likely that some of the farmers tending these fields would have been residing within the buildings of the settlement obliterated by the MOAB strike. It is therefore entirely possible that the count of casualties has included working-age male farmers rather than solely militants, as the Afghan defence ministry has indicated.</p><p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39705128">BBC reported</a> that it is hard to know how many were killed by the MOAB strike. Ultimately, the real number of militants and civilians killed is likely to remain unknown.</p><p>If you liked this story send us some ❤ and share with others.</p><h3>References</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.alcis.org/settlements.aspx">Settlement Data</a></li><li><a href="https://www.defense.gov/Video/videoid/519242/">Aerial Footage of MOAB Bomb Striking Cave, Tunnel System</a></li><li><a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4409964/All-need-know-Mother-Bombs.html#ixzz4fuwJirJ9">Here&#39;s all you need to know about the &#39;Mother of all Bombs&#39;</a></li><li><a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/video/521296/site-gbu-43-b-nangarhar-afghanistan">Site of GBU-43/B, Nangarhar, Afghanistan</a></li><li><a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4413864/Afghan-death-toll-mother-bombs-rises-94.html">Death toll from MOAB attack on IS in Afghanistan rises to 94</a></li><li><a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-official-death-toll-from-massive-us-bomb-rises-to-94-including-4-isis-commanders-1.463677#.WPeLivnyvX4">Afghan official: Death toll from massive US bomb rises to 94, including 4 ISIS commanders</a></li><li><a href="https://areu.org.af/archives/publication/1602">The Devil is in the Details: Nangarhar&#39;s continued decline into insurgency, violence and widespread drug production</a></li><li><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39705128">The Mother of All Bombs: How badly did it hurt IS in Afghanistan? - BBC News</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c97da619a20f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories/after-the-dust-settles-making-sense-of-the-non-sense-c97da619a20f">After the Dust Settles — Making Sense of the Non-sense</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories">Alcis Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[After the dust settles]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alcis-stories/after-the-dust-settles-d167fa0e7599?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d167fa0e7599</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mother-of-all-bombs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[moab]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alcis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Apr 2017 14:40:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-20T16:22:16.815Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ql_x5KKOlx6wQbcEICulTg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>After the dust settles — I<strong>magery analysis of the Afghan MOAB strike location</strong></h3><p>There has been intense media coverage of the US Military’s Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) strike last week in Nangarhar, Afghanistan. Despite estimates of Daesh fatalities, the wider effect of the strike has not yet been reported as access on the ground to the actual strike location has been restricted by the US Military. Now, using high resolution satellite imagery <strong>captured 15 hours after the strike</strong>, we can begin making assessments of the strike’s impact.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D9bvEZsjLkPeXP6SloEGlg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Post-strike image of the MOAB impact area. Image copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><p>David Mansfield and Alcis have been studying this remote, troubled valley in Eastern Afghanistan since 2005. Over the coming weeks, we will release a series of reports covering this MOAB strike and the wider context within which this strike has taken place.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dpy0IqMFLJvb8cRl8nd2NA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Map showing location of Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan</figcaption></figure><p>Just after 7.30pm local time, on the 13th April 2017, the United States Military dropped the largest non-nuclear bomb ever used in combat, known as the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB). Post-strike high resolution satellite imagery shows that <strong>although the blast did not create a significant crater on the ground, the destruction was absolute of approximately 20 compounds and trees</strong>, 650 metres to the southwest of the centre of the village of Asadkhel and close to the villages of Tangai and Lansai Ahmad and 3 kms from Shadal Bazaar. These villages sit at the entrance to the Mahmand Valley, in Achin District in Nangarhar, Afghanistan. There are signs of destruction to agriculture and trees in the immediate vicinity of the blast. Damage to compounds and buildings can be observed further from the blast site but it is not clear whether this damage was caused by this particular attack. <strong>Damage to buildings and infrastructure within Shadal Bazaar, as reported by the media, is unlikely to have been caused by this blast.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FOZz8MaXo4lash8gAD8vSw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Map showing location of MOAB strike within Achin district, Nangarhar province.</figcaption></figure><p>It is understood that the MOAB weapon explodes approximately six feet above the ground and propels its flame and shock waves horizontally, rather than vertically. The effect is to knock over trees, buildings and other infrastructure, collapse cave entrances and underground facilities and kill, maim or demoralise enemy combatants. Reports indicate that the blast has an effective range of approximately 1 km.<strong> The aim of last week’s strike was to destroy tunnels and caves currently being used by Daesh militants operating in the area.</strong> On the 15th April, Afghanistan’s defence ministry reported the death of 94 militants including 4 major commanders and that no civilians had been killed in the strike <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4409964/All-need-know-Mother-Bombs.html">[i]</a>.</p><p>This strike has received significant media attention. However with no access to the site other than US Military <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4413864/Afghan-death-toll-mother-bombs-rises-94.html">[ii]</a>, there is currently very little understanding of the actual impact of the strike. High resolution satellite imagery collected before and after the strike provides immediate insight. Pre-strike imagery is dated 3rd September 2016, just over 7 months before the strike. Post-strike imagery, as shown below, is dated 14th April 2017, the day after the strike. The red box in the image below is 1.5 x 1.5 kms and the white cross within Area 1 represents the estimated impact point, based on the aerial footage of the strike <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-official-death-toll-from-massive-us-bomb-rises-to-94-including-4-isis-commanders-1.463677#.WPeLivnyvX4">[iii]</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z1zXgszlR4df3oTkwf7QtA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Overview of the strike area, where the image is post-strike, dated 14th April 2017. Image copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The overall picture of destruction is varied.</strong> In the immediate area around the impact point, Area 1, no buildings or structures remain standing and many of the trees and vegetation are destroyed. Analysis of the point of impact can determine little in the way of a crater, despite some media reports suggesting that the crater left by the blast would be more than 300 meters wide <a href="http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/blast-site-%E2%80%98-limits%E2%80%99-everyone-except-us-forces">[iv]</a>. Areas 2, 3 and 4 in the image above exhibit signs of destruction to buildings, with some roofs destroyed, but large numbers of buildings remain apparently undamaged. <strong>Whilst the damage to compounds in area 1 can be ascribed to the MOAB strike, it is less clear whether the damage to buildings in Areas 2, 3 and 4 were caused by the MOAB strike</strong>. Damage in these areas may well have been caused by other aspects of the conflict that has been ongoing in this area between Daesh, the Taliban and subsequently the Afghan government security forces dating back to mid-2015.</p><p>Further afield and 3 km from the point of impact, sits Shadal Bazaar. Given that little damage can be observed in the imagery of buildings within Asadkhel, the village that lies between the point of impact and Shadal Bazaar, <strong>it is likely that media reporting of significant damage to Shadal bazar as a consequence of the MAOB strike, are significantly over stated</strong> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Video/videoid/519242/">[v]</a>. It is likely the damage at Shadal Bazaar seen in the ground photographs from media reporting pre-date this strike and are a consequence of the conflict that has been ongoing in the area for some time.</p><h4><strong>Area 1.</strong></h4><p>Most man-made structures observed in the pre-strike image are seen to be destroyed in the post strike image. Trees and scrub appear to be burnt or destroyed in the post the strike image. The distance across each of these images is approximately 375 meters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2OtQglJL0mPrSaKeIx2cnw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Area 1. Pre and post-strike imagery showing extensive destruction of buildings and trees. Images copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Area 2.</strong></h4><p>The approximate distance from the MOAB point of impact to the centre of Area 2 is 500 meters. Some buildings within compounds appear to be destroyed, whilst walls and other structures remain standing. There appears less impact on vegetation compared to Area 1. <strong>Note</strong>: Given the nature of the remaining buildings, the destruction of the buildings in this area may not necessarily be due to the MOAB strike.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ovOswCZl1ksVvBdoLTO7Iw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Area 2. Pre and post strike imagery showing destruction of some buildings and trees. Images copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Area 3.</strong></h4><p>The approximate distance from the MOAB point of impact to the centre of Area 3 is 450 meters. Some limited destruction of buildings is visible, less so than Area 2 above and some vegetation shows signs of damage. <strong>Note</strong>: Given the nature of the remaining buildings, the destruction of the buildings in this area may not necessarily be due to the MOAB strike.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AzdjDbC_5dbc9mpEwC3B2A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Area 3. Pre and post strike imagery showing some destruction of buildings and trees. Images copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Area 4.</strong></h4><p>The approximate distance from the MOAB point of impact to the centre of Area 4 is 570 meters. Patchy destruction of buildings can be observed, with several showing the loss of roofs. Some damage to trees is evident.<strong> Note</strong>: Given the nature of the remaining buildings, the destruction of the buildings in this area may not necessarily be due to the MOAB strike.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DeCRUyiUY61P-yEkdhfGRg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Area 4. Pre and post strike imagery showing destruction of some buildings and trees. Images copyright Digital Globe</figcaption></figure><p>Further reports on this area are coming. If you liked this story press the ❤ and share with others.</p><h4>References</h4><p><a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4409964/All-need-know-Mother-Bombs.html">[i] </a><a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-official-death-toll-from-massive-us-bomb-rises-to-94-including-4-isis-commanders-1.463677#.WPeLivnyvX4">https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-official-death-toll-from-massive-us-bomb-rises-to-94-including-4-isis-commanders-1.463677#.WPeLivnyvX4</a></p><p><a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4413864/Afghan-death-toll-mother-bombs-rises-94.html">[ii] </a><a href="http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/blast-site-%E2%80%98-limits%E2%80%99-everyone-except-us-forces">http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/blast-site-%E2%80%98-limits%E2%80%99-everyone-except-us-forces</a></p><p><a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-official-death-toll-from-massive-us-bomb-rises-to-94-including-4-isis-commanders-1.463677#.WPeLivnyvX4">[iii] </a><a href="https://www.defense.gov/Video/videoid/519242/">https://www.defense.gov/Video/videoid/519242/</a></p><p><a href="http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/blast-site-%E2%80%98-limits%E2%80%99-everyone-except-us-forces">[iv] </a><a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4409964/All-need-know-Mother-Bombs.html">http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4409964/All-need-know-Mother-Bombs.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.defense.gov/Video/videoid/519242/">[v] </a><a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4413864/Afghan-death-toll-mother-bombs-rises-94.html">http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4413864/Afghan-death-toll-mother-bombs-rises-94.html</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d167fa0e7599" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories/after-the-dust-settles-d167fa0e7599">After the dust settles</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories">Alcis Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[DRAINING THE DESERTS OF AFGHANISTAN]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alcis-stories/draining-the-deserts-of-afghanistan-32d3e06541db?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/32d3e06541db</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[agriculture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[water]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alcis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Jul 2016 16:27:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-02T14:26:10.130Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xWHzER5FLcHZ9oZPq-SrrA.jpeg" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F173599228&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F173599228&amp;image=http%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F580006112_1280.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/036ca420d10ad8713c29fe3410eaf6d9/href">https://medium.com/media/036ca420d10ad8713c29fe3410eaf6d9/href</a></iframe><p>15 years ago this corner of South West Afghanistan was nothing but sand. Following the fall of the Taliban regime a growing number of people began to come to this and other desert areas of south and south west Afghanistan.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eCQ3hOA0T7yOtWOYX9PROw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Shna Jama research site 2007</figcaption></figure><p>Using percussion drills, farmers sank wells into the ground up to 100 metres deep. Then, with affordable diesel generators and pumps imported from Pakistan and China these farmers transformed what was once rocky desert soil into productive agricultural land.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gbmrOYEVKMNFG1b2-8o18A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Percussion drilling rigs</figcaption></figure><p>Over time, increasing numbers of households came to these former desert areas driven by population pressure, the ensuing fighting between ISAF and the Taliban, as well as by efforts to ban poppy by the government of Afghanistan and its foreign backers. In fact it was illegal poppy that provided the means by which to settle these former desert areas. Were it not for the price premium associated with its illegal status this area would have remained as it was — free of both people and agriculture. Instead, illegal opium provided farmers with the capital required to establish their deep wells, to cultivate new lands, to build a home and to feed both their families and their livestock.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zZgiXYZf0rpewPp7AhWBAg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Shna Jama research site 2008</figcaption></figure><p>By 2013, there was an extra 300,000 hectares of agricultural land in the south west of Afghanistan alone, compared to 2003. This land provided both homes and livelihoods for as many as 1.2 million people.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BEmuz8rCdb4h-BMv69ZywA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Shna Jama research site 2013</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I6_wEyl0zUfdd_TLkZCCdg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Evidence of widespread salination</figcaption></figure><p>However, by 2013 there were also signs of growing environmental stresses in these former desert areas. Increased salination, the mono cropping of poppy and poor plant husbandry resulted in consecutive years of low opium yields. Some farmers — particularly the land poor- were left unable to meet their production costs and feed their families. Some left the desert and went looking for new land elsewhere. Many persevered in the desert, conscious of the shortage of land in the well irrigated areas of south west Afghanistan, hoping their crop would eventually recover.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mKRT4ZxPXBDCJMl6BIQ5GA.jpeg" /><figcaption>New solar panels and reservoir appearing in 2015</figcaption></figure><p>Those with few alternatives looked to find a solution to the failure of their opium crop. Some farmers sourced opium seeds from other areas where they believed it was not diseased. Those with capital installed solar panels to provide power for their tubewells, thereby eliminating the 450 litres of diesel needed for pumps to irrigate each acre of land, reducing their input costs. Each solar powered tubewell was accompanied by a reservoir 1–2 metres deep and up to 1,000 square metres in size. Although significant amounts of water is lost in evaporation, these reservoirs are topped up constantly by tubewells that farmers’ now consider free to run.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*juyaaU-aJio_JjzU88iR2Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Expansion of solar powered reservoirs from 2013 to 2016 in Shna Jama research site</figcaption></figure><p>What started as a few isolated cases in 2014 became commonplace and by 2016 over 13,000 solar powered tubewells could be seen across this 300 km by 300 km patch of south west Afghanistan — the vast majority of which were established since the autumn of 2015 and funded by a doubling of opium prices over a twelve month period.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mg77QOlLgbWa7onZXzrx8w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Blue dots each representing a single solar powered reservoir, in this scene there are over 13,000</figcaption></figure><p>In 2016 the shift to solar powered technology in the deserts of Afghanistan supported crop diversification and a shift to wheat. With the recovery of opium yields and the high price of opium poppy it is possible that we will see even greater amounts of opium poppy in 2017.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UmADlBA3dYLk7NgFhSwaDg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Farmer inspecting his 2nd (Summer) poppy crop in Helmand 2016</figcaption></figure><p>Moreover, freed from the need to buy diesel to power their tubewells, it is even possible that farmers will turn to opium poppy in the summer despite the low yields. We may even see more households moving into the desert — and reversing the out-migration that were seen from these areas in 2014 and 2015.</p><p>However, the environmental implications of the dramatic uptake in solar powered technology are harder to predict. In the past farmers estimated the ground water had dropped up to a metre each year since moving into the desert. Now that the area is awash with solar powered technology and water is considered ‘free’ there is little incentive to manage it efficiently. The implications of draining this ground water will undoubtedly be felt further afield.</p><p>Surely it is only a question of time before this area once again returns to desert? But what are the implications of the loss of livelihood for the 1.2 million people who currently live in these former desert areas and where are they to go when the water eventually runs out?</p><p>References:</p><p><a href="http://www.alcis.org/">Alcis</a></p><p><a href="http://davidmansfield.org/index.php">David Mansfield</a></p><p><a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1611E%20Moving%20With%20the%20Times.pdf">Afghanistan Research &amp; Evaluation Unit</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=32d3e06541db" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories/draining-the-deserts-of-afghanistan-32d3e06541db">DRAINING THE DESERTS OF AFGHANISTAN</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories">Alcis Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[DRINKING THE POISONED WATER]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alcis-stories/drinking-the-poisoned-water-3a302baca99a?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3a302baca99a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monitoring]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alcis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Nov 2015 13:55:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-03T12:25:12.810Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i09l3QSAHt4QvXsqP46fQg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>DRINKING THE POISONED WATER: Monitoring and Evaluation in today’s Afghanistan</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/360/1*2QTsi9b5F9_LFqNeVHFIuw.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/11/12/effective-monitoring-and-evaluation-in-conflict-affected-environments">USIP report on effective M&amp;E in conflicted-affected environments, November 2015</a></figcaption></figure><p>Over the last few years conducting Monitoring and Evaluation (M&amp;E) in Afghanistan has come to feel like drinking from a poisoned chalice. This was not always the case. Now, taking on an M&amp;E assignment requires considering whether the donor truly wants to know the impact their program is having on the population. For the evaluator it is essential to clarify beforehand whether the donor will support a <a href="http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/11/12/effective-monitoring-and-evaluation-in-conflict-affected-environments"><strong><em>methodological approach</em></strong></a> which acknowledges that ‘lessons learned’ come as much from understanding what did not work as what did; and whether they recognise, with the advent of new technology, that there are better ways to ascertain the impact of development efforts. Critically, donors must come to accept that the ubiquitous polling that has, thus far, helped (mis)shape the state building project in conflict affected countries like Afghanistan, has left donors blind to the unfolding crisis in the very areas that they looked to have greatest impact.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*2HRmLbkxWGSiIgvembKt6g.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Collective Madness</h3><p>Afghans with the unenviable task of collecting data in rural areas have long suspected that donors have a strong preference for positive accounts of the impact of their programs. Project implementers and M&amp;E specialists express significant challenges with ‘speaking truth to power’ and informing donors about the downsides of their programs, especially those considered ‘flagships’.</p><p>Armed with a proverb for any situation, Afghan colleagues recount the fictional former King and his administration’s response to learning that the water supply in the country was poisoned, turning the population ‘mad’ when they drank it. Realising that the population was crazed, the King approached his closest confidantes for advice. Eager to preserve the royal court, the advisers suggested building a reservoir containing clean water for the exclusive use of the royal quarters. The King followed the advice, believing that everyone’s best interest lay in his administration being spared the madness that had swept over his people.</p><p>However, the next time the ‘sane’ King addressed his subjects they no longer understood him. He believed them to be mad but they saw the King in exactly the same way. To the population the King made no sense whatsoever. They called for his removal and for a replacement to be found; a King that was intelligible and could truly represent their interests. Under threat, the King returned to his advisers: ‘The people are mad, they say they do not understand me, they are calling for me to be killed, and for a new King to be appointed! What should I do?’ His advisers pondered for a while, or so the story goes, before deciding that their best course of action was to join the fray: ‘we too should drink the poisoned water’.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vkx6L7T8S8WkikbpuYAigQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Just give us the good news!</h3><p>This tale reflects the madness that many in the field succumb to because of the bias for ‘good news stories’ by donors and the institutions responsible for the delivery of aid. Pressured by a relentless media in search of bad news and evidence of waste — the ‘gotcha moments’ — it sometimes seems as if the donor community has retreated behind the intellectual equivalent of the blast walls that surround them in Kabul, as they actively avoid collecting data on what is really happening on the ground in rural Afghanistan for fear of being publicly lambasted and losing their funding.</p><p>Indeed, there have been a number of occasions where donors have openly talked of the need to contain the bad news that they believe might be uncovered by an evaluation. One such occasion involved the review of an agricultural input distribution program. On learning that this program was to be evaluated — a program that was known to have a number of significant problems — an official with the principal donor expressed exasperation at why such a review was commissioned at all: ‘What were they thinking of back at headquarters?!’ Realising that the evaluation was in progress and could not be stopped, this official expressed the hope that those commissioning the review had the foresight to draw up such tight Terms of Reference that none of the problems would be exposed. He exclaimed: ‘After all, if you don’t want to know what underwear your mother wears don’t look in her chest of drawers!’</p><p>Most recently, the independent review component of a major development program was terminated early because the impact assessment data generated at the inception phase challenged the veracity of the information produced by those responsible for project implementation, including the recipient government’s own M&amp;E unit. Faced with confronting the aid recipient’s management unit about their inflated accounts of program outputs and impact, the donor simply chose to shut down the independent M&amp;E component and commissioned an alternative review. The subsequent review employed surveyors conducting fieldwork alongside government staff and the NGO responsible for implementing the project to collect attitudinal data on what farmers thought of the program. It argued for the expansion of the program, in stark contrast to the previous review that used multi-dated, high resolution satellite imagery, GPS photography and detailed research, to reveal that many of the original development investments had deteriorated significantly, some had been abandoned altogether and the impact on the wider economy was negligible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vtmOdxWxceYx0hrE-DovlA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>A methodology that pleases</h3><p>Methodology is a large part of the problem. Attitudinal surveys that dominate performance measurement and M&amp;E in Afghanistan at the program and strategic levels have become ubiquitous measures of ‘progress’ for the international state building project.</p><p>These surveys are typically subject to <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/12/03/in-afghanistan-it-s-not-all-in-numbers/epjw"><strong><em>significant bias</em></strong></a>. The results are skewed by <a href="https://www.alcis.org/settlement.aspx"><strong><em>large gaps in the population data </em></strong></a>and insecurity, which results in the interviewing of communities that are more likely to be pro-government and pro-assistance. The methodological approach also relies on enumerators collecting data on what Afghans ‘think’ of the assistance rather than identifying what they do with it, or measuring how it subsequently changes their lives, for better or for worse.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TkZZpgToI5VEVDYw_i7Yvg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Central Helmand; red dots showing locations from the settlement data set most widely used for surveys and polling and black polygons showing the locations of Alcis settlements (10 or more compounds in close proximity). Yellow dashed areas show greatest mismatch.</figcaption></figure><p>Furthermore, these kind of large scale surveys present respondents with closed questions so as to make the tabulation of data easier, and pursue lines of inquiry that are derived by what donors want to know, not necessarily the experiences and challenges that Afghan communities wish to talk about, the substance of which makes for more <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/428382/Beneficiary-Feedback-Feb15a.pdf"><strong><em>effective evaluation processes</em></strong><em>.</em></a> The subjectivity bias that the current M&amp;E approach entails means we are at best measuring the perceptions of aid recipients in secure areas. But more often than not we are simply collating what Afghans in areas with strong linkages to the state, and who have been the primary recipients of development assistance, think we want to hear.</p><p>And now that development assistance is big business, there are numerous commercial companies well aware of the donors’ need for ‘good news stories’ and are willing to provide the data to support such favourable claims, which in turn keeps the money flowing. Some of these businesses are also implementing development programs themselves and therefore subject to their own vested interests. Armed with rafts of data from these attitudinal surveys and backed by claims of ‘representative samples’ of program ‘beneficiaries’, these companies provide messages that are the development equivalent of cat food adverts that assert ‘8 out of 10 cats prefer it’.</p><p>Unfortunately the combination of this desire for ‘good news’ and commercial entities that are keen on peddling the party line results in our being partially sighted when it comes to the impact development programs are having on the populations of countries like Afghanistan; and more importantly we are blind when it comes to knowing how to improve programs in Afghanistan, and other conflict affected states, in the future.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XpeVdnFM5uVN0tJaHCQ1Nw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Improving accountability as well as knowledge</h3><p>Yet, in this era of new technology with affordable high resolution imagery there are ways to find out what has become of the development assistance provided and whether it has contributed to improving lives and livelihoods in both secure and insecure space. As a <a href="http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/11/12/effective-monitoring-and-evaluation-in-conflict-affected-environments"><strong><em>recent report published by USIP shows</em></strong></a>, it is now possible to determine for example whether the saplings that have been distributed are bearing fruit or have been cut down; the irrigation works paid for have facilitated the cultivation of a wide range of horticultural crop, or are surrounded by opium poppy; and identify whether the greenhouses established are being used as intended or have been abandoned altogether. Combined with well-focused fieldwork, this approach can tell us not only what happened to development monies, but why there <a href="http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00kcpt.pdf"><strong><em>were successful outcomes in some areas while failures in another</em></strong></a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*wuDeaulLHKOdOJ3tzZHMBQ.gif" /><figcaption>Example of imagery analysis showing changes in land allocated to orchards in Nangarhar, 2007 through 2010 to 2014</figcaption></figure><p>Imagery analysis is clearly not a universal panacea. The use of high resolution imagery cannot be used for measuring all development outcomes — there are complex social outcomes such as shifts in <a href="https://developmentseed.org/blog/2014/07/07/afghanistan-runoff-from-space/"><strong><em>political participation, attitudes to the state and conflict resolution</em></strong></a> that do not produce direct physical outcomes. However, the integration of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) offers a valuable contribution to the portfolio of M&amp;E strategies for conflict affected states. When combined with field research, it certainly offers something more than polling and the kind of generic data — the image of an ‘average’ Afghan, Kandahari, Nangarhari, or Wardaki — that has so beleaguered our understanding of the complex and dynamic political topography that is so common in countries like Afghanistan.</p><p>In particular, locating data within the particular geographical space where it is collected generates a deeper knowledge of the areas where donors are funding programs, gives greater insights into the different population groups that reside there, and compels donors to challenge the assumptions that underlie their investments, especially when supported by imagery that shows how their monies are being used and what effect they had on the ground.</p><p>It is certainly clear that we have to move beyond current methods of M&amp;E that look to exclude anything that does not have a positive spin. We also need those conducting M&amp;E — many of whom proclaim independence — to have the courage to both collect and convey data that their clients may not always wish to hear. To continue to acquiesce and drink the poisoned water remains a sure route to madness as well as a waste of scarce development funds — both are outcomes that we all should wish to avoid.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*sJ3oke0SGYGXQAiWSmaqdg.gif" /><figcaption>Expansion of agriculture North of the Bogra canal, Helmand, 2002 to 2012</figcaption></figure><p><strong>David Mansfield</strong></p><p>Visiting Scholar, Columbia University and author: ‘<a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/a-state-built-on-sand/">A State of Built on Sand: How Opium Undermined Afghanistan’</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a302baca99a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories/drinking-the-poisoned-water-3a302baca99a">DRINKING THE POISONED WATER</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories">Alcis Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Where have all the flowers gone?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alcis-stories/where-have-all-the-flowers-gone-7de7b34e8478?source=rss-9bef3edd55c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7de7b34e8478</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[agriculture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[poppy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[opium]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alcis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2015 16:31:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-03T12:27:57.494Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ipN1oBfl6bndbpK81_mtWw.png" /></figure><h3>WHERE HAVE ALL THE FLOWERS GONE? The real reasons for the drop in the poppy crop in Afghanistan in 2015</h3><p>Levels of poppy cultivation have fallen by almost a fifth this year, dropping from an estimated 224,000 hectares (ha) in 2014 to <a href="http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afg_Executive_summary_2015_final.pdf">183,000 ha in 2015</a>. According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) statistics this is the first time in six years that there has been a reduction in overall cultivation in the country. The Executive Director of the UNODC - <a href="http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2015/October/after-six-years-on-the-rise--afghan-opium-crop-cultivation-declines_-new-unodc-survey.html?ref=fs1">Yuri Fedotov</a> talks of the need for the Afghan government and the international community to build upon these “hard won achievements”, implying that it is drug control interventions that have delivered this turn around. The <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/un-afghan-opium-production-down/3005243.html">UNODC Regional Representative for Afghanistan and Central Asia</a>, is also cited as accrediting the reduction to “better cooperation between law enforcement agencies and Afghan policy makers”. Even the <a href="http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2015/10/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-mahmoud-saikal-designated-permanent-representative-of-the-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-to-the-united-nations-at-the-unodc-launch-of-the-afghanistan-opium-survey-2015/">National Unity Government of Afghanistan</a>, has claimed that the reductions in cultivation can be attributed to its first year in office.</p><p>Detailed <a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1521E%20Helmand%20on%20the%20Move-%20Migration%20as%20a%20Response%20to%20Crop%20Failure.pdf">field research and geospatial analysis</a>, however, reveals that the reasons for the dramatic reduction in cultivation does not lie with the actions of the Afghan government, or other external agencies, but with the repeated crop failure that has plagued the former desert areas of southern and south-western Afghanistan. These are areas where opium production concentrated over the last five years and which will become economically unviable if the crop continues <a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1521E%20Helmand%20on%20the%20Move-%20Migration%20as%20a%20Response%20to%20Crop%20Failure.pdf">to fail</a>. Having relocated to the desert due to a lack of land, economic opportunities, and to flee the violence, unrest and corruption they associate with the Afghan government, elements of this desert population are once again on the move. The question is where will they go, and given their vehement dislike of the Afghan state and its foreign supporters, what impact will they have on the areas where they settle?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sxxMrN6eytJonURBGgUDHg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Children harvesting a failed opium crop</figcaption></figure><h3>Turning Deserts into Flowers</h3><p>Between 2003 and 2013 the amount of land under agriculture in the south and south western regions of Afghanistan increased from 150,000 ha to 414,000 ha. This rapid expansion was not a function of the efforts of western donors and the Afghan government but of a process of encroachment and settlement of former desert areas formally recognised as “government land”. Initially captured by local power brokers the land was distributed through patronage networks and then sold as a going concern. In the area <a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1128E-Between%20a%20Rock%20and%20a%20Hard%20Place-CS-2011.pdf">north of the Boghra canal</a> in Helmand many of these men were linked with the former governor Sher Mohammed Akundzada and the Karzai government. In the deserts of Bakwa in Farha province, desert land was distributed amongst the dominant Noorzai tribe.</p><p>As time passed and the rural population realised that the government was not going to do anything to prevent the encroachment of this desert land, the initial settlers were joined by even more farmers. This latter group were not just part of a burgeoning rural population unable to find land in the main irrigated valleys, but were those also fleeing violence and conflict, as well as the government’s efforts to ban opium production in central Helmand, and in other areas where the Afghan state and its foreign backers had gained a foothold. Many of them were the land-poor share croppers and tenant farmers who found themselves <a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/NRM%20CS6%20ver%202%20%282%29.pdf">evicted</a> from the main irrigated valleys once opium poppy was banned by initiatives such as the <a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1122E%20Managing%20Concurrent%20and%20Repeated%20Risks%202011.pdf">“Helmand Food Zone”</a>.</p><p>It was these farmers with their knowledge of the opium crop and their need for land and shelter that provided the momentum for the surge in poppy production in these former desert areas after 2008. Land owners in the desert were presented with a bountiful labour force, skilled in the husbandry of opium poppy. Desperate for land and shelter these share croppers were willing to work for a smaller share of the final crop than in the main river valleys where poppy cultivation was becoming more challenging due to the growing presence of Afghan and international military forces.</p><p>But this was high cost agricultural production. The desert land needed to be cleared, levelled and fertilised. Machinery had to be hired and wells drilled into the underground water supply in order to irrigate the land. In the early days of settlement the wells were shallow, known locally as ‘bawre” but as more people came to farm in these former desert areas, the water table dropped and deeper wells — “barma” — had to be drilled. Generators, pumps and piping were also needed to draw the water. These were all extra costs that were not associated with farming in the main river valleys. And then of course there was the diesel required to run the pumps and generators. Purchased from local traders in 200 to 220 litre barrels each hectare of opium poppy required the best part of two barrels per season. Without the premium associated with illicit opium production this land would not have been economically viable and the land would not have been settled.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E781FdMxRGt279_wkWcBOg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Drilling for water: The first requirement of any new settler in the desert is to hire a rig and tap into the aquifer — not even family members will allow a new farmer to borrow such an expensive commodity for more than a single season</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GxaCJ137AndGyaAmq4Y5gw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Setting up camp in the deserts of Bakwa: In 2013 new settlers could be seen living in tents as they worked to bring land under agriculture to the north of what was already settled desert land</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VtjtolQsMt7b9e5-WJJ5pw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Its getting crowded round here: As time past and more farmers settle larger tracts of desert land were cultivated with opium poppy and wheat; it is rare that any other crops are grown</figcaption></figure><p>Ultimately opium production in these former desert areas was buoyed by cheap and skilled labour driven out of the main river valleys, more affordable technology from Pakistan, Iran, and China, and the growing availability of herbicides that eased the burden of the spring weeding — previously a tiring chore for the whole household. Further spurred on by a spike in opium prices that accompanied failure of the opium crop in Helmand in 2010 and concerns that the increased presence of military forces would deter production in the major opium growing districts of central Helmand — these former desert areas of southern and south-western Afghanistan became awash with opium poppy.</p><p>So much so that by 2013 the population of these former desert areas in the southern and south-western region had swelled to anything from 660,000 to 1.2 million people. In the area just north of the Boghra canal and south of Highway 1 there were 26,032 household compounds in 2013 where ten years earlier there had been all but a handful. The same patterns of expansion could be seen in the former desert areas of Zahre in Kandahar in the areas north of Highway 1 where tracts of desert land had also been captured and settled. In Nowzad in upper Helmand, Bakwa and Gulistan in Farah and in Maiwand in Kandahar it was the desert land surrounding the original Karez irrigated villages that was absorbed by the original residents and turned into cultivable land — the vast majority of which was dedicated to poppy. There were now fewer and fewer isolated farms surrounded by barren land as there was during the initial stages of settlement. Instead it was almost contiguous farmland, which in the case of the former desert areas north of the Boghra, stretched almost as far as Camp Bastion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U-UFPEFf8EcrB4jLpbB7rQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The loss of desert land: Analysis showing the dramatic loss in the quality of vegetation across the former desert lands of southern and southwestern Afghanistan. 2013–2015</figcaption></figure><h3>And back to sand again</h3><p>However, it looks like the good times are over. In their heyday these former desert areas were a potential route out of poverty for some, and a source of asset accumulation for others. The desert offered affordable land to those that had none before and were never going to be able to afford land in the canal irrigated areas where costs were 20 times higher.</p><p>With a reasonable yield even a share cropper could afford to eat meat and fruit three times a week, purchase medicine for family members who were sick, and in a very good year his share of the opium crop might pay for a motorbike to travel to the nearest bazaar or buy a solar panel to light the house at night. Those with larger landholdings fared much better and could accrue motor vehicles, multiple solar panels with which to run a tubewell; thereby bypassing the need for diesel or invest in some of their fallow land which could in turn be parcelled off to be worked by new share croppers and tenant farmers allowing even more money to be earned.</p><p>With the growing population and increased disposable income came more trading opportunities. The bazaars that straddled the Boghra canal in Helmand grew; they expanded the range of goods they sold and the number of market days held. Informal markets “the picnics” also began to appear much further into the desert space.</p><p>But this process of expansion into the desert areas reached its peak in 2013. Although there was continued new settlement in these former desert areas until as late as 2014 there were widespread reports of falling yields as 2012 but at that stage it didn’t stop people coming and trying to settle.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S5DxL4jPs5m0xUWe1MSi7A.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Good old’ Days: When the opium economy was at its peak the markets straddling the Boghra canal grew. Like the one above in Nawabad Shawal, Nad e Ali, Helmand.</figcaption></figure><p>It has all changed now and repeated crop failure is compelling many to leave. The “disease” that started in the poppy plants in the area north of the Boghra canal in <a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1302%20Opium%2023%20Jan-Final.pdf">2012</a> has not only hit the same land north of the Boghra canal again and again but it has now spread. The story is the same no matter where you go in the desert. Farmers report that the leaves of their poppy wither during the capsule formation stage. By the time capsules are formed they are smaller than usual and yield much less fresh opium than the 60 kg per hectare farmers were accustomed to.</p><p>During the initial years of the disease, farmers north of the Boghra canal would often lance their crop early before the disease took full effect but it did little to compensate for the falling yields. By late 2013 farmers in Bakwa in Farah were complaining of the same problems, although were not feeling it quite as acutely as those just to the north of the Boghra canal. Some share croppers even relocated from the desert areas of Helmand to Bakwa to mitigate the risk of crop failure. However, by the summer of 2015 the opium crop failed yet again. This time yields were at an all time low at just over 5 kg per hectare.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8S-WIW0yCA-4YZI7Lc9nVw.jpeg" /><figcaption>A picture of the salination that beleaguers the land in the former desert areas north of the Boghra canal</figcaption></figure><p>Of course farmers themselves blame it on the Americans. They report the noise of air planes at night and argue that their crops were sprayed. The poor desert soils, the high levels of salination that is evident across the area, as well as the poor cropping practices such as mono-cropping, the re-use of diseased seed and the absence of nutrient rich legumes- is dismissed as neither here nor there. It is the foreigners and the corrupt Afghan government that is to blame.</p><p>Ultimately these former desert areas are economically unviable without opium poppy. Farmers just cannot afford the high production costs, the diesel, the maintenance, and the labour without a decent yield from their opium crop. As the recent <a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1521E%20Helmand%20on%20the%20Move-%20Migration%20as%20a%20Response%20to%20Crop%20Failure.pdf">AREU report</a> shows losses are currently U$ 1,500 per ha but can be even higher. The landless are the first to leave, searching out new areas to cultivate opium poppy as they did in the fall of 2013 when they left the desert areas north of the Boghra canal in Helmand for Bakwa on the Nimroz/Farah border.</p><p>Some have already moved back into the main canal irrigated areas of Helmand trying their hand at opium but even here the crop has failed. Others began the search for land in the summer months hoping that they might find somewhere that they could stay on during the coming winter.<br>Most recognise there is much less land available for share croppers in the main canal command area. Now that poppy has gone there just isn’t the same demand for labour. Not with the legal crops that have replaced opium such as wheat, cotton, mung bean and maize — they just don’t require as much labour. But what are they to do? It is not just the land that they need to grow both opium and wheat on, they also need the house that comes with the land, the irrigation that waters their crops, their family and their livestock.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/1*FrihSq-WJ4Bh8rmBF7470A.gif" /><figcaption>From Bad to Worse: Analysis of the loss of vegetative index in the areas north of the Boghra canal, 2013–2015</figcaption></figure><p>In the last two years 11,000 ha of agricultural land has been lost in the former desert areas just north of the Boghra canal. If we look beyond this area into the former desert areas of Bakwa, Maiwand and Nowzad we see the same loss in agricultural land and drop in vegetative index. The 11,000 ha north of the Boghra canal that was agricultural land in 2013 but lies idle in 2015 would have sustained 50,000 people. Where are these people to go?</p><p>And what of the others experiencing the same crop failure in the other former desert areas of southern and south-western Afghanistan? A conservative estimate would indicate a further 15,000 hectares of land was lost in the former desert areas of Nowzad, Maiwand and Bakwa over the same period of time. This could be anything from 65,000 to 120,000 people on the move. Without land and jobs — and <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/why-afghanistans-private-sector-is-struggling/a-18779159">lets face it most people agree these are in short supply</a> — what are these people to do, to make ends meet? And what is to happen if this pattern of crop failure were to continue and larger tracts of these former desert areas returns to sand? It would not just be the tenant farmers and share croppers looking for new places to live and new farmland, but those that have settled more permanently in these areas, building houses, communities and a place they have come to call home.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uP411nWJglg6V_YRrmpoZg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Where Have all the flowers gone?: The image on the left shows Camp Bastion in 2014 with agricultural land — much of it poppy — alongside its perimeter wall. Some farmers were helped by the waste water that seeped from the Base, storing it in small reservoirs and using it to irrigate their poppy and wheat. The image on the right shows the same scene in 2015 with much less land under agriculture and the loss of much of the crop that had been directly watered by Bastion the previous year.</figcaption></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>It is not unusual for the drug control community to attribute reductions in cultivation to its own actions even where there is <a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/722E-Evidence%20from%20the%20Field%20BP.pdf">insufficient evidence</a> to support such a claim. Many amongst this group will no doubt celebrate the reduction in this year’s cultivation and see it as “a job well done”. Although field research and high resolution imagery indicates that the 19% reduction in opium poppy cultivation that has occurred this year is not a function of the kind of efforts that UNODC describes but of repeated crop failure, the much more important issue is whether these crop losses in the former desert areas will continue.</p><p>Like it or not these former desert areas have been an important safety valve in the wake of growing population pressure and a finite amount of agricultural land in rural Afghanistan. The premium associated with producing an illegal commodity like opium, combined with improved access to affordable and improved technologies, has provided a burgeoning rural population with productive land in what was once barren earth. Without opium production this population will have nothing to sustain itself or the communities they have established. They are already on the move and many more are likely to follow.</p><p>At a time when the world is increasingly concerned about the flow of migrants into western Europe — of which estimates suggest as many <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11890892/Mapped-How-the-way-migrants-come-to-Europe-has-changed-in-the-10-years.html">one quarter</a> may be from Afghanistan there are concerns as to where those from these desert areas will end up. This is not to say that farmers from these remote desert areas are likely to find themselves at the gates of Europe; they are most likely to be displaced within Afghanistan — at least to start with. But numbering anything from 660,000 to as many as 1.2 million people — which according to the <a href="http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/Helmand%281%29.pdf">official statistics</a> is equivalent in size to that of the population of Helmand province — this is a sizeable population that will only add to the number of people looking for what are increasingly fewer jobs, services and resources, thereby further increasing the pressure on Afghans to migrate to neighboring countries and beyond.</p><p>What is more, given the particular history of those migrating into the desert — that of fleeing the corruption, unrest and actions of the Afghan authorities — and their vehement opposition to the Afghan state and its foreign backers, this is a population that may not make the best of neighbours wherever they find a new place to settle.</p><p>So while the United Nations commends the “<a href="http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2015/October/after-six-years-on-the-rise--afghan-opium-crop-cultivation-declines_-new-unodc-survey.html?ref=fs1">hard won achievements</a>” that they say led to this year’s reductions in cultivation, those who are interested in looking beyond simple drug control statistics might want to examine the real reasons why the poppy crop fell, explore whether this pattern of failing crops in the former desert areas will continue, and consider what impact it will have on the stability of Afghanistan, the region and the current outflow of people from the country that so many in Europe are concerned about.</p><p>Furthermore, informed analysts and commentators may also want to ask why it is that the United Nations and others are so unsighted on both why cultivation has fallen and what is happening in these former deserts spaces. As, despite the rapid growth in both agricultural land and population in these desert areas you still hear little about them; they are at best but a reference in the margins of official documents. The Central Statistics Office does not acknowledge just how populated these areas have become and therefore the surveys, polls and other data collection tools used in Afghanistan are unrepresentative of the population that live there, and thereby the country as a whole. Surely, it is rather hard for surveys to inform policies, as Yuri Fedotov has suggested this year’s UNODC survey could do, when we are not only blind to dramatic changes in population in the countries that are the major sources of migrants and refugees, but also on what is causing them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AE34Hoy0I8lm0RoJ5MDNfw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Alcis analysis has captured every household compound in Afghanistan. This particular image contrasts these households compounds in central Helmand and Kandahar with the far more limited mapping of villages by the Central Statistics Office of Afghanistan.</figcaption></figure><h4>David Mansfield</h4><p>Author <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/1849045682">‘A State Built on Sand’: How Opium undermined Afghanistan</a></p><p>Mapping and analysis Copyright © Alcis</p><p>Satellite imagery Copyright © Digital Globe</p><h4>References</h4><p><a href="http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afg_Executive_summary_2015_final.pdf"><em>http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afg_Executive_summary_2015_final.pdf</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2015/October/after-six-years-on-the-rise--afghan-opium-crop-cultivation-declines_-new-unodc-survey.html?ref=fs1"><em>http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2015/October/after-six-years-on-the-rise--afghan-opium-crop-cultivation-declines_-new-unodc-survey.html?ref=fs1</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/un-afghan-opium-production-down/3005243.html"><em>http://www.voanews.com/content/un-afghan-opium-production-down/3005243.html</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2015/10/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-mahmoud-saikal-designated-permanent-representative-of-the-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-to-the-united-nations-at-the-unodc-launch-of-the-afghanistan-opium-survey-2015/"><em>http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2015/10/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-mahmoud-saikal-designated-permanent-representative-of-the-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-to-the-united-nations-at-the-unodc-launch-of-the-afghanistan-opium-survey-2015/</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1521E%20Helmand%20on%20the%20Move-%20Migration%20as%20a%20Response%20to%20Crop%20Failure.pdf"><em>http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1521E%20Helmand%20on%20the%20Move-%20Migration%20as%20a%20Response%20to%20Crop%20Failure.pdf</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1128E-Between%20a%20Rock%20and%20a%20Hard%20Place-CS-2011.pdf"><em>http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1128E-Between%20a%20Rock%20and%20a%20Hard%20Place-CS-2011.pdf</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/NRM%20CS6%20ver%202%20%282%29.pdf"><em>http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/NRM%20CS6%20ver%202%20(2).pdf</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1122E%20Managing%20Concurrent%20and%20Repeated%20Risks%202011.pdf"><em>http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1122E%20Managing%20Concurrent%20and%20Repeated%20Risks%202011.pdf</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1302%20Opium%2023%20Jan-Final.pdf"><em>http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1302%20Opium%2023%20Jan-Final.pdf</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1521E%20Helmand%20on%20the%20Move-%20Migration%20as%20a%20Response%20to%20Crop%20Failure.pdf"><em>http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1521E%20Helmand%20on%20the%20Move-%20Migration%20as%20a%20Response%20to%20Crop%20Failure.pdf</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.dw.com/en/why-afghanistans-private-sector-is-struggling/a-18779159"><em>http://www.dw.com/en/why-afghanistans-private-sector-is-struggling/a-18779159</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/722E-Evidence%20from%20the%20Field%20BP.pdf"><em>http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/722E-Evidence%20from%20the%20Field%20BP.pdf</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11890892/Mapped-How-the-way-migrants-come-to-Europe-has-changed-in-the-10-years.html"><em>http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11890892/Mapped-How-the-way-migrants-come-to-Europe-has-changed-in-the-10-years.html</em></a></p><p><a href="http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/Helmand%281%29.pdf"><em>http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/Helmand(1).pdf</em></a></p><p><a href="http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2015/October/after-six-years-on-the-rise--afghan-opium-crop-cultivation-declines_-new-unodc-survey.html?ref=fs1"><em>http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2015/October/after-six-years-on-the-rise--afghan-opium-crop-cultivation-declines_-new-unodc-survey.html?ref=fs1</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7de7b34e8478" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories/where-have-all-the-flowers-gone-7de7b34e8478">Where have all the flowers gone?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alcis-stories">Alcis Stories</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>