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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alex Domash on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alex Domash on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Beveridge curve still indicates low probability for a soft landing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alex.domash/despite-recent-fall-in-job-vacancies-the-beveridge-curve-still-indicates-low-probability-of-a-soft-886795220427?source=rss-837242d30df9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Domash]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Aug 2022 14:47:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-31T14:52:34.022Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By: <a href="https://medium.com/u/837242d30df9">Alex Domash</a>¹ and <a href="https://medium.com/u/d0db4de69533">Lawrence H. Summers</a>²</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HnNS8hlNNgnhww2qNc-m9A.jpeg" /></figure><p>In a <a href="https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/bad-news-fed-beveridge-space">recent paper</a> published with Olivier Blanchard in July 2022, we argued that the Fed’s hope to cool the labor market through a decrease in job vacancies alone — without an increase in unemployment — was highly implausible. The empirical evidence shows that there has never been a historical example where job vacancies came down in a substantial way without a significant increase in unemployment.</p><p>Over the last few months, however, some <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/what-does-the-beveridge-curve-tell-us-about-the-likelihood-of-a-soft-landing-20220729.html">have questioned</a> our conclusions on the basis that job vacancies have started to fall from their March 2022 peak, with little movement in the unemployment rate. Between March 2022 and July 2022, the total number of job openings declined from 11.8 million to 11.2 million. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate has fallen from 3.6 percent to 3.5 percent.</p><p><strong>Rather than contradicting our conclusions, the recent movement in job vacancies continues to show very little evidence for a soft landing for two reasons:</strong></p><ol><li><strong>Job openings in July 2022 remain near record highs and show little sign of cooling</strong>. While data from last month’s Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) showed a large drop in job vacancies for June, recently released data included a large upward revision for June job openings, and an <em>increase</em> in job openings in July to 11.2 million. As such, the labor market still has a long way to go before wage pressures begin to ease.</li><li><strong>Even if job vacancies had declined, vacancies always decline significantly months before the unemployment rate begins to increase. </strong>On average, when job vacancies decline by 10 percent from their peak, the unemployment rate contemporaneously increases by only 0.2 percentage points. However, in the 12 months after vacancies fall 10 percent from their peak, the unemployment rate increases, on average, by 2.5 percentage points. This suggests that an initial fall in the job vacancy rate, with no contemporaneous movement in the unemployment rate, is to be expected based on the historical experience.</li></ol><p>Given these two observations, we continue to believe that fighting inflation will require a reduction in job vacancies and also an increase in unemployment.</p><p>Figure 1 shows the Beveridge curve (the relationship between job openings and unemployment) with the recently released JOLTS data, which includes job vacancy data through July. The outward shift in the Beveridge curve continues to be pronounced, with very low unemployment and very high job vacancies. In July, the job vacancy rate was 6.9% (up from 6.8% in June), while the vacancy to unemployment ratio was at a record high at 2.0 (up from 1.9 in June).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/784/1*GfNyykQjaRWLK_6UlNU8Eg.png" /></figure><p>In our <a href="https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/pb22-7.pdf">July 2022 paper</a>, we looked at the historical relation between job vacancies and unemployment going back to the 1950s and showed that there has never been a historical example where the job vacancy rate came down in a substantial way without a significant increase in unemployment. We also discussed the existence of “Beveridge loops” — counterclockwise movements in the vacancy/unemployment space, which arise since firms can adjust vacancies instantaneously, while unemployment adjusts only as layoffs and hires take place. This implies that vacancies usually decrease after a peak before the unemployment rate starts to increase.</p><p>Figure 2 uses historical data to demonstrate the existence of Beveridge loops. The figure plots separately each previous vacancy rate peak (red), along with i) the movement in unemployment when vacancies fall 10 percent from a peak (green), and ii) the increase in unemployment within the subsequent 12 months after vacancies decline (blue). The figure shows that a 10 percent decline in the vacancy rate from a peak usually occurs with very little change in the unemployment rate (movement from the red to green dots). However, in the 12 months after the vacancy rate declines by 10 percent, the unemployment rate always increases substantially (movement from the green to blue dots).</p><p><strong>To the extent that job vacancies have declined in recent months, this evidence suggests that a decline in job openings — with no contemporaneous increase in the unemployment rate — is fairly typical, and offers little reason for optimism about the chances of a soft landing.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/814/1*OerucRgrG0as1PhDdTFQ-Q.png" /></figure><p>Table 1 presents the same evidence in quantitative terms. For each episode, it computes the change in the unemployment rate from the month of the peak vacancy rate to i) the month when vacancies fall 10 percent from a peak, and ii) the month when unemployment reaches a maximum over the subsequent 12 months.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*DaAQSX_C8UnCcoIN8WwbNg.png" /></figure><p>The evidence suggests that the vacancy rate almost always falls substantially before the unemployment rate increases: historically, a 10 percent decline in the vacancy rate is associated with an average contemporaneous increase in the unemployment rate of only 0.2 percentage points. But the data also shows that the unemployment rate always increases substantially in the 12 months following a steep decline in vacancies: on average, a 10 percent fall in vacancies is associated with a 2.5 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate over the subsequent year.</p><p>Some have critiqued the use of job openings data for evaluating labor market tightness, arguing that data on openings may be overstated since firms may not imminently intend to fill all job listings. But the nature of a JOLTS vacancy has not changed over the last two years, and requires that “there is active recruiting for workers from outside the establishment location” and that “the job could start within 30 days.” We have also previously <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w29739">shown</a> that job vacancies are comparable to unemployment in predicting wage inflation, and that there has not been much of a trend in peak vacancies going back to the 1950s. Finally, the job quits rate tends to covary with job vacancies, and quits have exhibited a very similar pattern to job vacancies in recent months (total quits have decreased by 6% since March, compared to a 5% decline for vacancies). For these reasons, we believe the vacancy data is a credible signal of labor market tightness.</p><p>Overall, the data suggests that job vacancies still have a long way to go before they are at a level compatible with the Fed’s inflation target. And while the unemployment rate has remained at historic lows, we show that the empirical evidence implies that job vacancies almost always fall significantly before unemployment starts to increase. The information from the labor market indicates that it is far too soon for a victory lap regarding the prospects of a soft landing for the US economy.</p><p>[1] Alex Domash is a Research Fellow in the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business &amp; Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is recent graduate of the Masters in Public Administration in International Development (MPA/ID) program at the Harvard Kennedy School. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/asdomash">@asdomash</a></p><p>[2] Lawrence Summers is the Charles W. Eliot University Professor and President Emeritus at Harvard University. He served as the 71st Secretary of the Treasury for President Clinton and the Director of the National Economic Council for President Obama. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/LHSummers">@LHSummers</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=886795220427" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Strong US labor market suggests economy not in recession, but does not invalidate recession…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alex.domash/strong-us-labor-market-suggests-economy-not-in-recession-but-does-not-invalidate-recession-71ade20e726e?source=rss-837242d30df9------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Domash]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Aug 2022 05:07:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-20T14:06:41.646Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Strong US labor market suggests economy not in recession, but does not invalidate recession forecasts over the medium term</strong></h3><h4>By <a href="https://medium.com/u/837242d30df9">Alex Domash</a>¹ and <a href="https://medium.com/u/d0db4de69533">Lawrence H. Summers</a>²</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*w_v__qMnuq8y_HixJjUvQA.jpeg" /></figure><p>In March 2022, <a href="https://medium.com/@alex.domash/history-suggests-a-high-chance-of-recession-over-the-next-24-months-78e38d468e05">we predicted</a> a high probability of recession over the next 12 to 24 months given the high level of inflation and low level of unemployment in the economy. High inflation and low unemployment are both strong predictors of future recessions: since the 1950s, every time inflation has exceeded 4 percent and unemployment has been below 5 percent, the U.S. economy has gone into a recession within two years. Given this empirical evidence, we argued that the probability of a US soft landing for the economy was very low.</p><p>Recently, there has been much debate about the likelihood of recession in the US in the near term. While some have argued that the US economy is already in a recession, others have suggested that a very robust labor market refutes recession forecasts: the July jobs report showed that the pace of employment growth remained strong, with the US economy adding 528,000 jobs, and that the unemployment rate fell to 3.5 percent.</p><p>To examine the plausibility of both arguments, we look at the historical trajectory of labor market indicators, as well as production and income measures, in the quarters immediately before and after a recession starts. Our analysis of the historical evidence suggests two conclusions:</p><p><strong>First, our analysis indicates a low probability that the US was in a recession in the first half of 2022, despite the two quarters of negative GDP growth. </strong>During every recession in the last 70 years, payroll employment decreased significantly in the first six months of a recession (with the exception of 1973). In contrast, employment grew by 1.8 percent over the first six months of 2022. Similarly, the unemployment rate increased by an average of 1.2 percentage points over the first six months of recession — compared to a decrease of 0.3 percentage points in the first six months of 2022.</p><p><strong>Second, we find that labor market indicators do not historically signal a slowdown in the economy until after a recession starts, suggesting a recession is still very plausible over the next 12 to 18 months. </strong>In the six months preceding every recession in the last 70 years, jobs growth has always been positive, and the unemployment rate, on average, has remained flat. More than six months before a recession starts, jobs growth and the change in the unemployment rate are indistinguishable from any other point during an economic expansion.</p><p><strong>Overall, these findings suggest that the strong labor market likely refutes claims that the economy was in recession in the first half of the year, but provides little reason for optimism that the economy can avoid a recession over the next 12 to 18 months.</strong></p><p><strong><em>Labor Market Measures</em></strong></p><p>We begin by examining whether the strong current labor market invalidates recession forecasts. We look at the six-month changes in employment and unemployment in the two years before a recession and compare these changes to i) the first six months of a recession, and ii) the average six-month changes during all other points of an economic expansion.</p><p>Figure 1 shows the results for total nonfarm payroll employment. Jobs growth, on average, remains strong and positive in the months before a recession, and then becomes strongly negative in the six months after a recession starts. The average six-month growth in payroll employment for all periods during an economic expansion is 1.3 percent (annualized), which is comparable to the average six-month growth in employment up until six months before a recession, when there is a slight slowdown. In the first six months of 2022, jobs grew by a 1.8 percent annualized rate, which is in line with the historical experience 6 to 12 months before a recession.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/920/1*2VuO-P_FhdbRM6hqxp59Gw.png" /></figure><p>Figure 2 shows the same calculations for the unemployment rate. In the six months before a recession, the unemployment rate remains flat, on average, compared to an average increase of 1.2 percentage points in the first six months after a recession starts. The average six-month change in unemployment during all expansionary months is -0.3 percentage points, which is comparable to the average six-month change in the 24 months leading up to recessions. During the first 6 months of 2022, the unemployment rate fell by 0.3 percentage points — which suggests the economy was not in recession, but provides little reason for optimism against a recession in the medium term.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H2Ebhy6OZEiTLFDzI9Hw4g.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>GDP Measures</em></strong></p><p>Other measures beyond labor market indicators are also important for assessing the health of the US economy. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) tracks several other indicators to identify the start of recessions, including real personal incomes less transfers and real personal consumption expenditures. Some have pointed to strong consumer spending as evidence against an imminent recession.</p><p>Table 1 shows the average growth in real output, real consumption, real final sales to private domestic purchasers, real income excluding government transfers, and real private fixed investment in the quarters around a recession. The results suggest that most recession indicators exhibit a similar pattern to the labor market indicators: more than two quarters before a recession, none of these measures provide any signal of an imminent economic slowdown. The average 2-quarter percent change for each indicator three to four quarters before a recession is comparable to the average 2-quarter percent change at all other points of an economic expansion. In the two quarters before a recession, all our indicators do experience a steep slowdown.</p><p>None of these findings contradict a high probability of recession over the next 12 to 18 months. On the contrary, the one-quarter growth numbers in Q2 2022 suggest a substantial slowing down of the economy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4pfKpShK5Qw18snR8aCnhg.png" /></figure><p>Overall, a holistic look at the historical data provides strong evidence that the US was not in a recession in the first half of 2022; but it provides no great basis for optimism that the economy can avoid a recession over the next 12 to 18 months. Both labor market and other indicators can change quickly, and usually don’t signal economic slowdowns until right before a recession starts. Moreover, there are some indications that the labor market may start to cool in the coming months. Total job openings have declined from their March high of 11.8 million to 10.6 million in in June. The 4-week moving average of initial insurance claims has also ticked up to its highest level of 2022.</p><p>The high probability of a recession in the medium term, combined with core inflation measures and wage inflation well above 5 percent, suggests that stagflation risks should be taken seriously.</p><p>[1] Alex Domash is a Research Fellow in the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business &amp; Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, and a Fellow at the Center for Global Development. He is recent graduate of the Masters in Public Administration in International Development (MPA/ID) program at the Harvard Kennedy School. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/asdomash">@asdomash</a></p><p>[2] Lawrence Summers is the Charles W. Eliot University Professor and President Emeritus at Harvard University. He served as the 71st Secretary of the Treasury for President Clinton and the Director of the National Economic Council for President Obama. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/LHSummers">@LHSummers</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=71ade20e726e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Can job vacancies fall without an increase in unemployment?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alex.domash/can-job-vacancies-fall-without-an-increase-in-unemployment-1031fe19c635?source=rss-837242d30df9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1031fe19c635</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Domash]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jun 2022 13:37:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-06T14:09:38.136Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By: <a href="https://medium.com/u/837242d30df9">Alex Domash</a>¹ and <a href="https://medium.com/u/d0db4de69533">Lawrence H. Summers</a>²</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HnNS8hlNNgnhww2qNc-m9A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Despite recent hikes in the fed funds rate, the U.S. labor market continues to be extraordinarily tight. In April, the job openings rate remained elevated at 7.0 percent, workers continued to quit at a historic rate of 2.9 percent, and wage growth sustained its rapid pace well above 6 percent (according to the Atlanta Wage Tracker). The consensus view among the Fed and other economists is that the labor market is unsustainably hot.</p><p>In recent remarks, the Fed has pushed a new theory on how to cool the labor market and slow down wages while still achieving a soft landing of the economy. Essentially, the Fed leadership believes it can curb demand in such a way that job openings fall considerably, without a corresponding increase in unemployment. Consider the following statements:</p><blockquote>“There’s a path by which we would be able to have demand moderate in the labor market and therefore have vacancies come down without unemployment going up.” <em>Fed Chair Jerome Powell, FOMC Press Conference, 4 May 2022</em></blockquote><blockquote>“The vacancy rate can be reduced substantially, from the current level to the January 2019 level, while still leaving the level of vacancies consistent with a strong labor market and with a low level of unemployment, such as we had in 2019.” <em>Fed Governor Christopher Waller, Speech at the IMFS, 30 May 2022</em></blockquote><blockquote>“We’ve got twice as many job openings as unemployed. In those circumstances historically, businesses have brought down hiring and reduced openings rather than necessarily laid off workers,” <em>Fed Vice-Chair Lael Brainard, CNBC Interview, 2 June 2022</em></blockquote><p>To examine the plausibility of the Fed’s claims, we look at the historical relationship between job vacancies and unemployment going back to the 1950s, and analyze the trajectory of unemployment after vacancies come down from a peak. <strong>We find that there has never been a historical example where the job vacancy rate came down in a substantial way without a significant increase in unemployment.</strong> <strong>On the contrary, we show that reducing vacancies by 20 percent requires, on average, a 3-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.</strong></p><p>Historically, the job vacancy rate and the unemployment rate are strongly negatively correlated: an increase in vacancies corresponds to a decrease in unemployment, and a decrease in vacancies corresponds to an increase in unemployment. This relationship, known as the Beveridge curve, is plotted in Figure 1 using data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) going back to 2001. Notably, since the outset of the pandemic, job vacancies have surged to a record high and deviated significantly from their historical relationship with the unemployment rate — leading to the outward shift in the Beveridge curve shown in orange.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*JnyFTj82GbcxYgzEeFPRpA.png" /></figure><p>Last week, Fed Governor Waller argued that the most plausible path forward was a movement in vacancies and unemployment from current levels to January 2019 levels (when vacancies were last at a peak). We depict this path with the red arrow in Figure 1. This near vertical drop would require the vacancy rate to fall from 7.2 percent to 4.6 percent — a 35 percent decrease — with very little movement in the unemployment rate.</p><p>To assess whether it’s credible that vacancies can fall so significantly without a subsequent increase in unemployment, we extend the JOLTS vacancy series back to the 1950s using data constructed by Barnichon (2010), who makes use of the Help-Wanted Index published by the Conference Board to create a vacancy rate series from 1951 to 2000. Using this historical vacancy series, combined with the JOLTS vacancy data from 2001 to present, we are able to analyze movements in the Beveridge curve for the U.S. economy from 1951 to present.</p><p>Figure 2 plots separately each vacancy rate peak plus and minus eight quarters to visualize the movement in the unemployment rate after each previous peak in vacancies in the postwar period. The eight quarters before a peak are shown in blue and the eight quarters after a peak are shown in orange. Contrary to the Fed’s claim that vacancies can come down without unemployment going up, the figure shows that in every historical example, the unemployment rate has risen substantially in the eight quarters after the vacancy rate reaches its maximum.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/882/1*14NaRG1nt_uKxzq7UzFM9w.png" /></figure><p>Table 1 presents further evidence showing that the vacancy rate has never come down in a significant way without large increases in unemployment. For each of the previous nine vacancy rate peaks, we calculate the increase in unemployment that follows from a substantial fall in the vacancy rate. To be conservative in our estimate, we look at a 20 percent decline in vacancies, which would bring the vacancy rate down from its March 2022 peak of 7.2 percent to a still extremely elevated level of 5.8 percent.</p><p><strong>Our results show that every time after the vacancy rate falls by 20 percent from its peak, the unemployment rate increases substantially.</strong> On average, a 20 percent decline in vacancies requires a 3-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. The smallest increase in unemployment associated with a 20 percent drop in vacancies in the postwar period was 1.5 percentage points. The largest increase occurred in the mid 1970s, when unemployment rose by more than 5 percentage points.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f3x3uqCUAGN98_6xb4OLTg.png" /></figure><p>It’s important to note that a 20 percent decline in the vacancy rate from its March 2022 high of 7.2 percent would still only bring vacancies down to 5.8 percent. For perspective, the highest pre-pandemic vacancy rate was 5.2 percent (which occurred in 1979 and would require a 28 percent drop in vacancies), and the 50-year historical average pre-pandemic was 3.4 percent (which would require a more than 50 percent drop in vacancies). The Fed has recently suggested that the January 2019 vacancy rate of 4.6 percent is a plausible target — which would require a 35 percent drop in the vacancy rate.</p><p>The historical evidence thus suggests that a significant drop in the vacancy rate back to historically reasonable levels is unlikely without an increase in unemployment. Even if the Fed can reduce vacancies somewhat without a rise in unemployment, it’s highly plausible that we would continue to see inflationary pressure from the labor market. In a recent paper, we have argued that the job vacancy rate and the quits rate are both highly significant for wage inflation (Domash and Summers 2022), and both remain extraordinarily elevated compared to their historical averages. There is little reason to believe that a marginal drop in vacancies will be sufficient to cool the labor market.</p><p>Our findings indicate that bringing down job openings without increases in unemployment is at odds with both economic theory and the empirical evidence. Based on historical experience, the Fed’s new labor market hope for a soft landing seems to be a very difficult outcome to achieve.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Barnichon, R. (2010). Building a composite help-wanted index. Economics Letters, 109(3), 175-178.</p><p>Brainard, Lael (2022). Transcript of Vice Chair Lael Brainard Interview on CNBC, 2 June.</p><p>Diamond, P. A., &amp; Şahin, A. (2015). Shifts in the Beveridge curve. Research in Economics, 69(1), 18–25.</p><p>Domash, Alex &amp; Summers, L. H. (2022). A labor market view on the risks of a U.S. hard landing (No. w29910). National Bureau of Economic Research.</p><p>Domash, Alex &amp; Summers, L. H. (2022). The relation between nominal and real wage growth. Medium Blog Post. 11 April. <a href="https://medium.com/@alex.domash/the-relation-between-nominal-and-real-wage-growth-2bfd2e1b27b8">https://medium.com/@alex.domash/the-relation-between-nominal-and-real-wage-growth-2bfd2e1b27b8</a></p><p>Powell, J H (2022). Transcript of Chair Powell’s Press Conference, 4 May. <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20220504.pdf">https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20220504.pdf</a></p><p>Waller, Christopher J. (2022). Responding to High Inflation, with Some Thoughts on a Soft Landing. Speech at the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) Distinguished Lecture, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany. 30 May. <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20220530a.htm">https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20220530a.htm</a></p><p>[1] Alex Domash is a Research Fellow in the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business &amp; Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is recent graduate of the Masters in Public Administration in International Development (MPA/ID) program at the Harvard Kennedy School. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/asdomash">@asdomash</a></p><p>[2] Lawrence Summers is the Charles W. Eliot University Professor and President Emeritus at Harvard University. He served as the 71st Secretary of the Treasury for President Clinton and the Director of the National Economic Council for President Obama. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/LHSummers">@LHSummers</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1031fe19c635" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The relation between nominal and real wage growth]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alex.domash/the-relation-between-nominal-and-real-wage-growth-2bfd2e1b27b8?source=rss-837242d30df9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wages]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Domash]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Apr 2022 06:50:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-12T17:25:14.994Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By: <a href="https://medium.com/u/837242d30df9">Alex Domash</a>¹ and <a href="https://medium.com/u/d0db4de69533">Lawrence H. Summers</a>²</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/766/1*R6ZBiWEZdjwQrj4_frGxxQ.png" /></figure><p>Over the past year, as employers faced a severe labor shortage and struggled to fill record levels of job openings, workers in the US gained significant leverage and won historically unprecedented pay raises. According to the best available wage data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, median year-over-year wage growth in the US reached a series high of 6.5 percent in February 2022.</p><p>While it is tempting to think that higher average wages categorically make workers’ richer, we believe there is reason for uncertainty. It is useful to consider the following football analogy made by Arthur Okun to differentiate between individual and aggregate outcomes: When an individual football fan stands up in the crowd, he can see the football game better. But if everyone in the crowd stands up, then nobody sees any better, and everyone is made less comfortable and worse off. Similar to this logic, we believe there is reason to question whether aggregate wage increases are always better for workers.</p><p>We first highlight that in general, the correlation between economy-wide wage increases and worker purchasing power is close to zero or negative. Table 1 shows the historical relationship between nominal wage growth and real wage growth going back to 1965. We show the correlation coefficient using alternating wage measures and inflation measures, and include both the contemporaneous correlation and the correlation between lagged nominal wages and real wages. Across all our series, the correlation between nominal wage growth and real wage growth is very low, and usually becomes negative with a lag.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*sDSLkOOFE4q8c2eF0_pTvQ.png" /></figure><p>Looking more carefully at the data, one can see that up until a certain threshold, there is a positive association between nominal wage growth and real wage growth, but beyond this point, the relationship turns negative. Figures 1 and 2 show scatterplots of real wage growth vs nominal wage growth, using two different wage measures. Both figures show a clear parabolic relationship between nominal wage growth and real wage growth: as wages rise, workers’ purchasing power increases up until wage growth reaches about 5 percent, and falls thereafter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/752/1*A5Pmp3KeH_0bpNxWnFoKDQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/846/1*7_sN-htqRl6uLW0oE28oBg.png" /></figure><p>While this correlation appears robust across different specifications, we do not believe it is appropriate to interpret it in a causal way. Both nominal wage growth and real wage growth reflect a variety of economic forces. Our suspicion about the best way to understand the documented relationship is that in environments of stable inflation, increases in wages are primarily driven by increases in productivity growth, which justify higher real wages. But past a certain point, it is likely that most increases in wages are driven either by adverse supply shocks or by increases in nominal aggregate demand, both of which are naturally associated with decreases in real wages.</p><p>It’s useful to look at nominal wages over the last 25 years to understand the challenge of taming accelerating wage growth. Since the late 1990s, nominal wage growth has reduced rapidly on two occasions — from 2001 to 2002 and 2008 to 2009 — and both times coincided with significant recessions and increases in unemployment (see Figure 3). Between 2001 and 2002, wage growth reduced by 2.4 percentage points, which required unemployment to remain above 5 percent for 4 years and 4 months. Between 2008 and 2009, wage growth reduced by 2.8 percentage points, which required unemployment to remain above 5 percent for 7 years and 10 months.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/708/1*Vs-4Zzyoj4OxGTuP8UPs6A.png" /></figure><p>Historically, wage growth and price inflation have tracked each other very closely, implying that bringing down price inflation will likely require sharp reductions in wage growth, and large increases in economic slack. Table 2 below shows the relation between nominal wage growth (measured using the Employment Cost Index) and price inflation over the last two decades, using both the PCE and CPI. Since 2001, annual nominal wage growth has been 0.7 percentage points higher, on average, then annual price inflation (using the PCE), with a standard deviation of 0.9. Wage growth has never been more than 2.5 percentage points higher than price inflation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*0AfIQiBcaOh2I7fNF0kZlg.png" /></figure><p>These results imply that it is highly improbable that average price inflation will fall below 3 percent by 2023 — as predicted by the Federal Reserve — without a significant drop in wage growth from its current level of 6.5 percent. We have shown that such declines in wage growth have historically been associated with recessions and large increases in unemployment. Overall, the historical evidence presented in this note thus suggests that we have reason to be wary that higher nominal wages are always good for workers: on an economy wide basis, wage growth that runs too far ahead of productivity can contribute to underlying inflation and reverse the very gains in worker purchasing power that we are trying to achieve.</p><ol><li><a href="https://medium.com/u/837242d30df9">Alex Domash</a> is a Research Fellow in the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business &amp; Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is a recent graduate of the Masters in Public Administration in International Development (MPA/ID) program at the Harvard Kennedy School. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/asdomash">@asdomash</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/u/d0db4de69533">Lawrence H. Summers</a> is the Charles W. Eliot University Professor and President Emeritus at Harvard University. He served as the 71st Secretary of the Treasury for President Clinton and the Director of the National Economic Council for President Obama. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/LHSummers">@LHSummers</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2bfd2e1b27b8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[History Suggests a High Chance of Recession over the Next 24 Months]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alex.domash/history-suggests-a-high-chance-of-recession-over-the-next-24-months-78e38d468e05?source=rss-837242d30df9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/78e38d468e05</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Domash]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Mar 2022 21:22:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-28T15:44:37.314Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By: <a href="https://medium.com/u/837242d30df9">Alex Domash</a>¹ and <a href="https://medium.com/u/d0db4de69533">Lawrence H. Summers</a>²</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1023/1*SJlsPka9AoVFur6lXG07iQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>As the Federal Reserve moves this week to raise interest rates by a quarter of a percentage point, there is much discussion over the likelihood that the central bank can achieve a soft landing in the economy. While engineering a soft landing is historically very rare, Fed Chair Jerome Powell told lawmakers in early March that he believes achieving a soft landing is “more likely than not.” The Fed’s latest forecast, as well as the consensus forecast from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), supports this claim: in both forecasts, inflation recedes to below 3 percent and unemployment remains below 4 percent over the next year.</p><p>To examine the plausibility of these forecasts, we look at quarterly data going back to the 1950s and calculate the probability that the economy goes into a recession within the next 12 and 24 months, conditioning on alternative measures of inflation and unemployment. <strong>We find that, given the current inflation level of nearly 8 percent and unemployment below 4 percent, historical evidence suggests a very substantial likelihood of recession over the next year or two.</strong></p><p>Table 1 shows the historical probability of a recession occurring within the next 12 and 24 months, conditional on contemporaneous measures of CPI inflation and the unemployment rate. The results indicate that lower unemployment and higher inflation significantly increase the probability of a recession over the next 12 and 24 months. Historically, when average quarterly inflation rises above 5 percent, the probability of a recession over the next two years is above 60 percent, and when the unemployment rate drops below 4 percent, the probability of a recession over the next two years approaches 70 percent.</p><p>Since 1955, there has never been a quarter with average inflation above 4 percent and unemployment below 5 percent that was not followed by a recession within the next two years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QcS3r7sUOfp91TeYBrmXCw.png" /></figure><p>The above results do not reflect our use of the CPI rather than alternative inflation measures, or the use of the unemployment rate rather than alternative labor market tightness measures. Measuring labor market tightness with the job vacancy rate, which we have advocated for in our prior work (Domash and Summers 2022), suggests an even higher probability of recession over the next 12 and 24 months. Similarly, using Core PCE inflation or wage inflation rather than the CPI also yields the same conclusions. These results are included in tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix.</p><p>Some may argue that the historical data presented in these tables overstate the probability of recession, since there has been a trend towards greater business cycle stability in recent decades. Motivated by this concern, and to make maximum use of available information, we use a probit model to predict the probability of a future recession based on current economic conditions and controlling for a time trend.</p><p>Table 2 presents the results from our probit models. The predicted probability of a recession over the next 12 months in Q1 2022 is highlighted in blue, and is very high across all our model specifications. In our baseline model, we use a four-quarter trailing average of inflation and a one-quarter lag of unemployment as our main explanatory variables. To allow for the possibility that recession probabilities have declined over time, we also have specifications that include a time trend (column 2) and a dummy for years after 1982 (column 3). We find that a trend towards greater business cycle stability does not appear in any significant way once one controls for economic conditions. Finally, we include a specification with a dummy for whether the economy is more than 6 quarters into an economic expansion (column 4), and with the time trend and expansion dummy (column 5).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LWXBSvTjZiD57ShOHEQCVg.png" /></figure><p>Table 3 presents the same models, using instead the predicted probability of a recession over the next 8 quarters as the dependent variable. The results suggest a strikingly high probability of recession over the next two years, given current levels of inflation and unemployment. We also repeat the above analysis using a quadratic model, and find similar predicted probabilities of a recession over the next 4 and 8 quarters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GPr0CswqeEJ6OobEt3kpUw.png" /></figure><p>Table 4 below summarizes the predicted probabilities of a recession occurring over the next 12 and 24 months for each of the 5 model specifications. The results suggest a very high likelihood of recession in the coming years, and are robust across all our specifications. Moreover, the findings do not reflect our choice to use the CPI as the inflation measure or the unemployment rate as the slack measure. Using wage inflation, rather than the CPI, results in higher predictions of the probability of recession, and using Core PCE inflation results in similar predictions. Replacing the unemployment rate with the vacancy rate (which we believe to be a better slack indicator) also yields higher predicted probabilities of a recession over the next years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8otzynRG4TFD6OTMCVj2QA.png" /></figure><p>Overall, the evidence we present in this note suggests that engineering a soft landing is a very difficult thing to do in a rapidly growing, inflation economy. Arguably the only time the Fed has been successful in achieving a soft landing occurred in 1994–1995 when the Fed doubled interest rates to 6 percent and was able to slow economic growth without triggering a recession.</p><p>But with inflation nearing 8 percent and unemployment below 4 percent, the Fed today is way behind the curve, and now has to play catch-up to try to tame price increases. The historical evidence indicates that when inflation is as high as it is today, and the unemployment rate is as low as it is today, the probability of a recession over the next one and two years is extraordinarily high. Moreover, none of these calculations account for the recent supply shocks associated with the war in Ukraine, which will only increase the probability of recession even further. We therefore believe that the likelihood that the Fed achieves a soft landing in the economy is low.</p><p><strong>REFERENCES</strong></p><p>C-SPAN (2022). House Hearing on Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy. National Cable Satellite Corporation. March 2, 2022.</p><p>Domash, A., &amp; Summers, L. H. (2022). How Tight are US Labor Markets? (No. w29739). National Bureau of Economic Research.</p><p>Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2022). First Quarter 2022 Survey of Professional Forecasters. Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. February 11, 2022.</p><p>U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (2021). FOMC Summary of Economic Projections. December 15, 2021.</p><p><strong>APPENDIX</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p6V0A_6gy3FzyqOfiSku6g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q-HOpo1Io77kxbi702hiJg.png" /></figure><ol><li>Alex Domash is a Research Fellow in the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business &amp; Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is a recent graduate of the Masters in Public Administration in International Development (MPA/ID) program at the Harvard Kennedy School. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/asdomash">@asdomash</a></li><li>Lawrence Summers is the Charles W. Eliot University Professor and President Emeritus at Harvard University. He served as the 71st Secretary of the Treasury for President Clinton and the Director of the National Economic Council for President Obama. Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/LHSummers">@LHSummers</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=78e38d468e05" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[US gasoline prices are relatively moderate compared to historical levels]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alex.domash/us-gasoline-prices-are-relatively-moderate-824a189a33fa?source=rss-837242d30df9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/824a189a33fa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Domash]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Mar 2022 16:56:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-12T17:14:11.724Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By: <a href="https://medium.com/u/837242d30df9">Alex Domash</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/u/d0db4de69533">Lawrence H. Summers</a></h4><p>Over the last week, there has been heightened concern in the US over the rising price of gasoline associated with Russia’s war in Ukraine. On Tuesday, March 8, after President Biden announced a ban on Russian energy imports, the average cost of a gallon of regular across the country surged to $4.25, according to AAA. A barrel of US crude oil was temporarily trading at $130 per barrel.</p><p>But relative to historical levels, the average cost of a gallon of gasoline remains somewhat moderate. To put the price into perspective, we present in this note 1) the inflation-adjusted real cost of a gallon of gasoline and 2) the real cost of driving a mile, to recognize improvements in fuel economy (the average mpg for all 2021 car models was 31.3 compared to an average of 13.5 mpg for 1970 car models and 23.3 mpg for 1990 models).</p><p>Figure 1 shows the inflation-adjusted real cost of a gallon of gasoline from January 1976 to March 2022, using data on the average monthly price of regular gasoline available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (for March 2022, we use weekly data available from the Energy Information Administration for the week of March 7). The nominal average price of gasoline is deflated using February 2022 CPI data. We also show estimates for the price of gasoline associated with future increases in the price per barrel of US crude oil.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WbjITb_CfpKBbg5G2_281g.png" /></figure><p>Adjusting the price of gasoline for inflation reveals that the real cost of a gallon remains lower than it was 10 years ago, and relatively unexceptional compared to historical levels. Moreover, the quick rate of increase over the past weeks is also not historically unprecedented, and is comparable to changes in the average price of gasoline experienced during the mid 2000s.</p><p>To predict the price of gasoline that would correspond to further increases in the price of a barrel of US crude oil, we follow Hamilton (2009) who estimates that the relationship between crude oil prices and US gasoline prices follows a linear relationship with an intercept of 0.84 and a coefficient of 0.025 (approximately a $1 increase in gas prices for a $42 increase in price of a barrel). Given this relationship, we estimate that the price per barrel of crude oil that corresponds to the average U.S. gas price from Monday, March 7 ($4.10) is $130 per barrel. If the price per barrel increases to $150, we estimate the price of gasoline will increase to $4.59, and if the price per barrel increases to $200, we estimate the price of gasoline will increase to roughly $5.84.</p><p>Figure 2 below shows the inflation-adjusted average gas price per mile, factoring in improvements in fuel economy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Bo-_tWTBHPEW6enRCi1u1Q.png" /></figure><p>When accounting for improvements in fuel efficiency since the 1970s, the inflation-adjusted price of gasoline per mile in March 2022 looks relatively modest. Even if the price of crude oil per barrel increases to $150 or $200, the average cost of gasoline per mile would still be below previous record levels. The rate of the price increase is also not unprecedented: from 2003 to 2007, the real cost of gasoline per mile increased by over 15 cents per mile.</p><p>Overall, these figures suggest that the implications of the rising price of gasoline are unlikely to be extremely consequential, and that a lot of the panic over current gasoline prices are exaggerated when put in historical perspective. Furthermore, when accounting for the fact that family incomes have risen over the past decades, the current gasoline price becomes even less exceptional. Justin Wolfers <a href="https://twitter.com/JustinWolfers/status/1501258248090968069/photo/1">shows</a> that a gallon of gas costs an average of 9.3 minutes of labor today, compared to 13.5 minutes in 2008.</p><p>So, counter to what some have been suggesting: no, real US gasoline prices are not close to an all-time high today.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Hamilton, James D. “Understanding crude oil prices.” <em>The energy journal</em> 30.2 (2009).</p><p>IHS Markit Co., <em>Average Age of Light Cars and Trucks in U.S</em>, (Annual release), available at <a href="https://news.ihsmarkit.com/news-releases">https://news.ihsmarkit.com/news-releases</a>.</p><p>Michael T. Owyang and E Katarina Vermann, <em>Rockets and Feathers: Why Don’t Gasoline Prices Always Move in Sync with Oil Prices?</em>, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. October 01, 2014.</p><p>US Energy Information Administration. <em>Oil and petroleum products explained</em>. July 26, 2021, available at <a href="https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/">https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/</a></p><p>US Environmental Protection Agency. <em>2021 EPA Automotive Trends Report</em>. Data available at <a href="http://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/explore-automotive-trends-data.">www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/explore-automotive-trends-data.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=824a189a33fa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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